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THE

WORKS

OF

JAMES HARRIS, ESQ.

WITH AN ACCOUNT OF

HIS LIFE AND CHARACTER

BY HIS SON

THE EARL OF MALMESBURY.

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MEMOIRS

OF THE

LIFE AND CHARACTER OF THE AUTHOR.

A NEW edition of my father's Works having been for some time expected by the public, I have been induced to prefix to it the following short memoirs of his life and character.

There are few readers, I believe, who do not desire to know something more of an author than is commonly to be learned merely from his own writings. What he has been in private life, and in his domestic retirement; what appear to have been his habits of study, and of relaxation; how he has conducted himself as a member of society, so as to have deserved praise or blame: all these are natural topics of inquiry concerning every writer who has attained considerable literary eminence. To gratify a curiosity so reasonable, is one motive which has engaged me in the present undertaking; but, I will confess, it is not the only one.

The pride which I feel in being the son of such a father, and the gratitude and affection with which I must ever recollect him, have also powerfully induced me to pay this public tribute of respect to his memory. To his early care of my education, to his judicious introduction of me to respectable friends and patrons, to his constant good advice and excellent example, I am fond of attributing whatever credit I may have acquired in the various active employments that have fallen to my share.

I reflect with the highest pleasure on his having seen me, during many years, engaged in the service of my country; and I can with truth say, that such advantages of rank or distinction as I have been fortunate enough to acquire, which he did not live to witness, have, from that very circumstance, lost much of their value in my estimation.

James Harris, esq., the writer of these volumes, was the eldest son of James Harris, esq., of the Close of Salisbury, by his

second wife, the lady Elizabeth Ashley, who was third daughter of Anthony earl of Shaftesbury, and sister to the celebrated author of the Characteristics, as well as to the Hon. Maurice Ashley Cooper, the elegant translator of Xenophon's Cyropædia. He was born upon the 20th of July, 1709. The early part of his education was received at Salisbury, under the Rev. Mr. Hele, master of the grammar school in the Close, who was long known and respected in the west of England as an instructor of youth.

From Mr. Hele's school, at the age of sixteen, he was removed to Oxford, where he passed the usual number of years as a gentleman-commoner of Wadham college. His father, as soon as he had finished his academical studies, entered him at Lincoln's Inn, not intending him for the bar, but, as was then a common practice, meaning to make the study of the law a part of his education.

When he had attained his twenty-fourth year, his father died. This event, by rendering him independent in fortune, and freeing him from all control, enabled him to exchange the study of the law for other pursuits that accorded better with his inclination.

The strong and decided bent of his mind had always been towards the Greek and Latin classics. These he preferred to every other sort of reading; and to his favourite authors he now applied himself with avidity, retiring from London to the house in which his family had very long resided in the Close of Salisbury, for the sake of enjoying, without interruption, his own mode of living.

His application during fourteen or fifteen years to the best writers of antiquity, continued to be almost unremitting, and his industry was such as is not often exceeded. He rose always very early, frequently at four or five o'clock in the morning, especially during the winter, because he could then most effectually insure a command of time to himself. By these means he was enabled to mix occasionally in the society of Salisbury and its neighbourhood, without too great a sacrifice of his main object, the acquisition of ancient literature.

I have heard my father say, that it was not until many years after his retirement from London that he began to read Aristotle and his commentators, or to inquire, so deeply as he afterwards did, into the Greek philosophy. He had imbibed a

prejudice, very common at that time even among scholars, that Aristotle was an obscure and unprofitable author, whose philosophy had been deservedly superseded by that of Mr. Locke; a notion which my father's own writings have since contributed to correct, with no small evidence and authority.

In the midst, however, of his literary labours he was not inattentive to the public good, but acted regularly and assiduously as a magistrate for the county of Wilts; giving, in that capacity, occasional proofs of a manly spirit and firmness, without which the mere formal discharge of magisterial duty is often useless and inefficient.

The first fruit which appeared to the world of so many years spent in the pursuit of knowledge, and in habits of deep speculation, was a volume published in 1744, containing three treatises: the first concerning Art; the second concerning Music, Painting, and Poetry; the third concerning Happiness. These treatises, in addition to their merit as original compositions, are illustrated by a variety of learned notes and observations, elucidating many difficult passages of ancient writers, the study and examination of whom it was my father's earnest wish to promote and to facilitate. Lord Monboddo, speaking of the Dialogue upon Art, praises it, as containing "the best specimen of the dividing, or diæretic manner, as the ancients called it, that is to be found in any modern book with which he is acquainted."

In the month of July 1745, my father was married to miss Elizabeth Clarke, daughter and eventually heiress of John Clarke, esq., of Sandford, near Bridgewater, in the county of Somerset. Five children were the issue of this marriage; two of whom died young; myself and two daughters only have survived my father.

This change in his state of life by no means withdrew his attention from those studies in which he had been used to take so great delight, and which he had cultivated with such advantage and reputation; for in 1751 he published another work, called "Hermes, or a philosophical inquiry concerning universal grammar." An eulogium so honourable to this publication has been made on it by the learned Dr. Lowth, late bishop of London, that I cannot deny myself the pleasure of here inserting it, as of indisputable weight and authority. "Those,"

says the bishop, in the preface to his English Grammar, "who would enter deeply into the subject (of universal grammar), will find it fully and accurately handled, with the greatest acuteness of investigation, perspicuity of explication, and elegance of method, in a treatise entitled Hermes, by James Harris, esq.; the most beautiful example of analysis that has been exhibited since the days of Aristotle."

What first led my father to a deep and accurate consideration of the principles of universal grammar, was a book which he held in high estimation, and has frequently quoted in his Hermes, the Minerva of Sanctius. To that writer he confessed himself indebted for abundance of valuable information, of which it appears that he knew well how to profit, and to push his researches on the subject of grammar to a much greater length, by the help of his various and extensive erudition.

From the period of his marriage until the year 1761, my father continued to live entirely at Salisbury, except in the summer, when he sometimes retired to his house at Durnford, near that city. It was there that he found himself most free from the interruption of business and of company, and at leisure to compose the chief part of those works which were the result of his study at other seasons. His time was divided between the care of his family, in which he placed his chief happiness, his literary pursuits, and the society of his friends and neighbours, with whom he kept up a constant and cheerful intercourse. The superior taste and skill which he possessed in music, and his extreme fondness for hearing it, led him to attend to its cultivation in his native place with uncommon pains and success; insomuch that, under his auspices, not only the annual musical festival in Salisbury flourished beyond most institutions of the kind, but even the ordinary subscription-concerts were carried on by his assistance and direction, with a spirit and effect seldom equalled out of the metropolis. Many of the beautiful selections made from the best Italian and German composers for these festivals and concerts, and adapted by my father, sometimes to words selected from Scripture or from Milton's Paradise Lost, sometimes to compositions of his own, have survived the occasions on which they were first produced, and are still in great estimation. Two volumes of these selections have been lately published by Mr. Corfe, organist of Salisbury cathedral;

the rest remain in manuscript, in possession of my family. His own house, in the mean time, was the frequent scene of social and musical meetings: and I think I do not hazard too much in saying, that he contributed, both by his own conversation and by the company which he often assembled at his house from various parts, to refine and improve the taste and manners of the place in which he resided.

In 1761, by the interest of his near relation and very respectable friend, the late Edward Hooper, esq., of Hurn Court in Hampshire, my father was chosen one of the representatives in parliament for the borough of Christ Church; which seat he retained to the day of his death. The year following, he accepted the office of one of the lords of the admiralty; from thence he was promoted, in 1763, to be a lord of the treasury. He remained in that situation until the ministry with which he was connected went out of office in 1765; and after that time he did not hold any employment until 1774, when he became secretary and comptroller to the queen. This appointment was always valued by him exceedingly: not only by reason of the handsome and flattering manner in which it was conferred upon him by her majesty, but also on account of the frequent occasions it afforded him of experiencing her majesty's gracious kindness and condescension, of which he had a very high sense, and which were continued to him without interruption to the end of his life; for in her service he died.

Although assiduous in the discharge of his parliamentary duty, and occasionally taking a share in debates, my father never contracted any violent spirit of party. He abhorred faction of every kind; nor did he ever relinquish, for public business, those still more interesting pursuits which had been the delight and occupation of his earliest years. If they were somewhat intermitted during the sitting of parliament, he renewed them with increased relish and satisfaction on his return into the country. Those who saw him in London, partaking with cheerfulness and enjoyment of a varied and extensive society, and frequenting dramatic and musical entertainments, while, during his stay in Salisbury, he always exercised a respectable, but well-regulated hospitality, were surprised that he could have found time to compose and publish, in 1775, another learned work. It contains, under the title of Philosophical Arrangements, a part only of a larger work that he had me-

ditated, but did not finish, upon the Peripatetic logic. So far as relates to the arrangement of ideas, it is complete; but it has other objects also in view. It combats, with great force and ability, the atheistical doctrines of chance and materialism: doctrines which have been lately revived in France, under the specious garb of modern philosophy, and, issuing from thence, have overspread a great part of Europe; destroying the happiness of mankind, by subverting, in every part of their progress, the foundations of morality and religion.

The last of my father's literary productions was printed in 1780, by the name of Philological Inquiries, but not published sooner than 1781. It is a more popular work than any of his former ones; and contains rather a summary of the conclusions to which the philosophy of the ancients had conducted them in their critical inquiries, than a regular and perfect system. The principles on which those conclusions depend are therefore omitted, as being of a more abstruse nature than was agreeable to his design, which was to teach by illustration and example, not by strict demonstration. Indeed, this publication appears to have been meant, not only as a retrospective view of those studies which exercised his mind in the full vigour of his life, but likewise as a monument of his affection towards many of his intimate friends. I cannot therefore but consider it as a pleasing proof of a mind retaining, at an advanced age, a considerable degree of its former energy and activity, together with what is still more rarely to be found, an undiminished portion of its candour and benevolence.

Before this last volume was entirely concluded, my father's health had evidently begun to be very much impaired. He never enjoyed a robust constitution; but for some time, towards the end of his life, the infirmities under which he laboured had gradually increased. His family at length became apprehensive of a decline, symptoms of which were very apparent, and by none more clearly perceived than by himself. This was evident from a variety of little circumstances, but by no means from any impatience or fretfulness, nor yet from any dejection of spirits, such as are frequently incident to extreme weakness of body, especially when it proves to be the forerunner of approaching dissolution. On the contrary, the same equable and placid temper which had distinguished him throughout his whole life, the same tender and affectionate attention to his sur-

rounding family, which he had unceasingly manifested while in health, continued, without the smallest change or abatement, to the very last; displaying a mind thoroughly at peace with itself, and able without disturbance or dismay to contemplate the awful prospect of futurity.

After his strength had been quite exhausted by illness, he expired calmly on the 22nd of December 1780, in the seventy-second year of his age.

His remains were deposited in the north aisle of the cathedral church of Salisbury, near those of his ancestors; and I cannot forbear to record tokens of unsolicited respect, honourable to my father's memory, and soothing to the recollection of his family, which were shewn from various quarters upon that melancholy occasion. Six gentlemen, his friends and neighbours, supported the pall. At the western door of the cathedral, the corpse was met by the whole choir, and a funeral anthem was performed while the procession moved towards the grave. On the ensuing Sunday, the Rev. Mr. Chaffy, who preached at the cathedral, adverted in his sermon to the recent event of my father's death with such apposite and judicious commendation, as at once to mark his own sincere respect for a deceased neighbour, and strongly to excite the sympathy of his audience by the truths delivered concerning him.

A monument was soon after erected to the memory of my father, near the spot where he was interred, on which is the following inscription:

M. S.
Jacobi Harris Sarisburiensis
Viri boni, et docti,
Græcarum Literarum præcipue periti,
Cujus opera accuratissima
De artibus elegantioribus
De Grammatica, de Logica, de Ethice,
Stylo brevi, limato, simplici,
Sui more Aristotelis
Conscripta,
Posteri laudabunt ultimi.
Studiis severioribus addictus,
Communia tamen vitæ officia,
Et omnia Patris, Mariti,
Civis, Senatoris munia,
Et implevit et ornavit.
Obiit XXII. Die Decembris, M.DCC.LXXX.
Anno Ætatis LXXII.

Above this inscription, a female figure of Philosophy is represented, holding over a medallion of my father, a scroll, with the following inscription.

Το Φρονειν
Μονον αγαθον
Το δ' αφρονειν
Κακον.

It remains for me to add some further particulars concerning my father, which, I think, are requisite to make his character completely understood.

The distinction by which he was most generally known, while living, and by which he is likely to survive to posterity, is that of a man of learning. His profound knowledge of Greek, which he applied more successfully, perhaps, than any modern writer has done, to the study and explanation of ancient philosophy, arose from an early and intimate acquaintance with the excellent poets and historians in that language. They, and the best writers of the Augustan age, were his constant and never-failing recreation. By his familiarity with them, he was enabled to enliven and illustrate his deeper and more abstruse speculations, as every page almost of these volumes will abundantly testify. But his attainments were not confined to ancient philosophy and classical learning. He possessed likewise a general knowledge of modern history, with a very distinguishing taste in the fine arts, in one of which, as before observed, he was an eminent proficient. His singular industry empowered him to make these various acquisitions, without neglecting any of the duties which he owed to his family, his friends, or his country. I am in possession of such proofs, besides those already given to the public, of my father's laborious study and reflection, as I apprehend are very rarely to be met with. Not only was he accustomed, through a long series of years, to make copious extracts from the different books which he read, and to write critical remarks and conjectures on many of the passages extracted, but he was also in the habit of regularly committing to writing such reflections as arose out of his study, which evince a mind carefully disciplined, and anxiously bent on the attainment of self-knowledge and self-government. And yet, though habituated to deep thinking and laborious reading, he was generally cheerful, even to playfulness. There was no pedantry in his manners or conversation; nor was he ever seen either to

display his learning with ostentation, or to treat with slight or superciliousness those less informed than himself. He rather sought to make them appear partakers of what he knew, than to mortify them by a parade of his own superiority. Nor had he any of that miserable fastidiousness about him which too often disgraces men of learning, and prevents their being amused or interested, at least their choosing to appear so, by common performances and common events.

It was with him a maxim, that the most difficult and infinitely the preferable sort of criticism, both in literature and in the arts, was that which consists in finding out beauties, rather than defects; and although he certainly wanted not judgment to distinguish and to prefer superior excellence of any kind, he was too reasonable to expect it should very often occur, and too wise to allow himself to be disgusted at common weakness or imperfection. He thought, indeed, that the very attempt to please, however it might fall short of its aim, deserved some return of thanks, some degree of approbation; and that to endeavour at being pleased by such efforts, was due to justice, to good nature, and to good sense.

Far, at the same time, from that presumptuous conceit which is solicitous about mending others, and that moroseness which feeds its own pride by dealing in general censure, he cultivated to the utmost that great moral wisdom by which we are made humane, gentle, and forgiving; thankful for the blessings of life, acquiescent in the afflictions we endure, and submissive to all the dispensations of Providence. He detested the gloom of superstition, and the persecuting spirit by which it is so often accompanied; but he abhorred still more the baneful and destructive system of modern philosophy; and from his early solicitude to inspire me with a hatred of it, it would almost seem that he foresaw its alarming approach and fatal progress. There is no obligation which I acknowledge with more thankfulness; none that I shall more anxiously endeavour to confer upon my own children, from a thorough conviction of its value and importance.

My father's affection to every part of his family was exemplary and uniform. As a husband, a parent, a master, he was ever kind and indulgent; and it deserves to be mentioned to his honour, that he thought it no interruption of his graver

occupations, himself to instruct his daughters, by exercising them daily both in reading and composition, and writing essays for their improvement, during many of their younger years. No man was a better judge of what belonged to female education, and the elegant accomplishments of the sex, or more disposed to set a high value upon them. But he had infinitely more at heart, that his children should be early habituated to the practice of religion and morality, and deeply impressed with their true principles. To promote this desirable end, he was assiduous both by instruction and example; being himself a constant attendant upon public worship, and enforcing that great duty upon every part of his family. The deep sense of moral and religious obligation which was habitual to him, and those benevolent feelings which were so great a happiness to his family and friends, had the same powerful influence over his public as his private life. He had an ardent zeal for the prosperity of his country, whose real interests he well understood; and in his parliamentary conduct he proved himself a warm friend to the genuine principles of religious and civil liberty, as well as a firm supporter of every branch of our admirable constitution.

MALMESBURY.

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THREE TREATISES:

I. CONCERNING ART.

II. CONCERNING MUSIC, PAINTING, AND POETRY.

III. CONCERNING HAPPINESS.

CONCERNING ART:

A DIALOGUE.

TO THE RIGHT HONOURABLE THE EARL OF SHAFTESBURY.

My Lord,

The following is a conversation in its kind somewhat uncommon, and for this reason I have remembered it more minutely than I could imagine. Should the same peculiarity prove a reason to amuse your lordship, I shall think myself well rewarded in the labour of reciting. If not, you are candid enough to accept of the intention, and to think there is some merit even in the sincerity of my endeavours. To make no longer preface, the fact was as follows.

A friend, from a distant country, having by chance made me a visit, we were tempted, by the serenity of a cheerful morning in the spring, to walk from Salisbury to see lord Pembroke's at Wilton. The beauties of gardening, architecture, painting, and sculpture belonging to that seat, were the subject of great entertainment to my friend: nor was I, for my own part, less delighted than he was, to find that our walk had so well answered his expectations. We had given a large scope to our curiosity, when we left the seat, and leisurely began our return towards home.

And here, my lord, in passing over a few pleasant fields, commenced the conversation which I am to tell you, and which fell at first, as was natural, on the many curious works, which had afforded us both so elegant an amusement. This led us insensibly to discoursing upon art, for we both agreed, that whatever we had been admiring of fair and beautiful, could all be referred to no other cause. And here, I well remember, I called upon my friend to give me his opinion upon the meaning of the word "art:" a word it was (I told him) in the mouth of every one; but that nevertheless, as to its precise and definite idea, this might still be a secret; that so it was, in fact, with a thousand words beside, all no less common, and equally familiar; and yet all of them equally vague and undetermined.—To this he answered, that as to the precise and definite idea of art, it was a question of some difficulty, and not so soon to be

resolved; that, however, he could not conceive a more likely method of coming to know it, than by considering those several particulars, to each of which we gave the name. It is hardly probable, said he, that music, painting, medicine, poetry, agriculture, and so many more, should be all called by one common name, if there was not something in each which was common to all.—It should seem so, replied I.—What, then, said he, shall we pronounce this to be?—At this, I remember, I was under some sort of hesitation.—Have courage, cried my friend, perhaps the case is not so desperate. Let me ask you, Is medicine the cause of any thing?—Yes, surely, said I, of health.—And agriculture, of what?—Of the plentiful growth of grain.—And poetry, of what?—Of plays, and satires, and odes, and the like.—And is not the same true, said he, of music, of statuary, of architecture, and, in short, of every art whatever?—I confess, said I, it seems so.—Suppose, then, said he, we should say, it was common to every art to be a cause: Should we err?—I replied, I thought not.—Let this then, said he, be remembered, that all art is cause.[a]—I promised him it should.

But how, then, continued he, if all art be cause, is it also true, that all cause is art?—At this again I could not help hesitating. —You have heard, said he, without doubt, of that painter famed in story,[b] who being to paint the foam of a horse, and not succeeding to his mind, threw at the picture in resentment a sponge bedaubed with colours, and produced a foam the most natural imaginable. Now, what say you to this fact? Shall we pronounce art to have been the cause?—By no means, said I.—What, said he, if instead of chance, his hand had been guided by mere compulsion, himself dissenting and averse to the violence?—Even here, replied I, nothing could have been referred to his art.—But what, continued he, if instead of a casual throw, or involuntary compulsion, he had willingly and designedly directed his pencil, and so produced that foam, which story says he failed in? Would not art here have been the cause?—I replied, in this case, I thought it would.—It should seem, then,

[a] Artis maxime proprium, creare et gignere. Cic. de Nat. Deor. l. ii. c. 22. Ἔστι δὲ τέχνη πᾶσα περὶ γένεσιν. "All art is employed in production; that is, in making something to be." Arist. Ethic. l. vi. c. 4.

The active efficient causes have been ranged and enumerated after different manners. In the same Ethics they are enumerated thus: αἴτια γὰρ δοκοῦσιν εἶναι φύσις, καὶ ἀνάγκη, καὶ τύχη· ἔτι δὲ νοῦς, καὶ πᾶν τὸ δι' ἀνθρώπου. "The several causes appear to be nature, necessity, and chance; and besides these, mind, or intellect, and whatever operates by or through man." lib. iii. c. 3. The paraphrast Andronicus, in explaining this last passage, Πᾶν τὸ δι' ἀνθρώπου, adds οἷον τέχνη, ἢ ἄλλη τις πρᾶξις, "as, for instance, art, or any other human action."

Alexander Aphrodisiensis speaks of efficient causes, as follows: Ἀλλὰ μὴν τὰ κυρίως αἴτια ποιητικὰ, φύσις τε, καὶ τέχνη, καὶ προαίρεσις. "The causes, which are strictly and properly efficient, are nature, art, and each man's particular choice of action." Περὶ Ψύχης, p. 160. B. ed. Ald.

In what manner art is distinguished from the rest of these efficient causes, the subsequent notes will attempt to explain.

[b] See Valer. Max. l. viii. c. 11. See also Dion. Chrysost. Orat. lxiii. p. 590.

said he, that art implies not only cause, but the additional requisite of intention, reason, volition, and consciousness; so that not every cause is art, but only voluntary or intentional cause.—So, said I, it appears.

And shall we, then, added he, pronounce every intentional cause to be art?—I see no reason, said I, why not.—Consider, said he; hunger this morning prompted you to eat. You were then the cause, and that too the intentional cause, of consuming certain food: and yet will you refer this consumption to art? Did you chew by art? Did you swallow by art?—No, certainly, said I.—So by opening your eyes, said he, you are the intentional cause of seeing, and by stretching your hand, the intentional cause of feeling; and yet will you affirm, that these things proceed from art?—I should be wrong, said I, if I did: for what art can there be in doing what every one is able to do by mere will, and a sort of uninstructed instinct?—You say right, replied he, and the reason is manifest: were it otherwise, we should make all mankind universal artists in every single action of their lives. And what can be a greater absurdity than this?—I confessed that the absurdity appeared to be evident.—But if nothing, then, continued he, which we do by compulsion, or without intending it, be art; and not even what we do intentionally, if it proceed from mere will and uninstructed instinct; what is it we have left remaining, where art may be found conversant? Or can it, indeed, possibly be in any thing else, than in that which we do by use, practice, experience, and the like, all which are born with no one, but are all acquired afterward by advances unperceived.—I can think, said I, of nothing else.—Let therefore the words habit and habitual, said he, represent this requisite, and let us say, that art is not only a cause, but an intentional cause; and not only an intentional cause, but an intentional cause founded in habit, or, in other words, an habitual cause.—You appear, said I, to argue rightly.

But if art, said he, be what we have now asserted, something learnt and acquired; if it be also a thing intentional or voluntary, and not governed either by chance or blind necessity; if this, I say, be the case, then mark the consequences.—And what, said I, are they?—The first, said he, is, that no events, in what we call the natural world, must be referred to art; such as tides, winds, vegetation, gravitation, attraction, and the like. For these all happen by stated laws; by a curious necessity which is not to be withstood, and where the nearer and immediate causes appear to be wholly unconscious.—I confess, said I, it seems so.—In the next place, continued he, we must exclude all those admired works of the animal world, which, for their beauty and order, we metaphorically call artificial. The spider's web, the bee's comb, the beaver's house, and the swallow's nest, must all be referred to another source. For who can say, these ever

learnt to be thus ingenious? or, that they were ignorant by nature, and knowing only by education?—None, surely, replied I. —But we have still, said he, a higher consideration.—And what, said I, is that?—It is, answered he, this: not even that Divine Power which gave form to all things, then acted by art, when it gave that form. For how, continued he, can that intelligence, which has all perfection ever in energy, be supposed to have any power, not original to its nature? How can it ever have any thing to learn, when it knows all from the beginning; or, being perfect and complete, admit of what is additional and secondary? —I should think, said I, it were impossible.—If so, said he, then art can never be numbered among its attributes: for all art is something learnt, something secondary and acquired, and never original to any being which possesses it.—So the fact, said I, has been established.

If this, therefore, continued he, be true; if art belong not either to the divine nature, the brute nature, or the inanimate nature; to what nature shall we say it does belong?—I know not, said I, unless it be to the human.—You are right, said he; for every nature else, you perceive, is either too excellent to want it, or too base to be capable of it. Beside, except the human, what other nature is there left? Or where else can we find any of the arts already instanced, or, indeed, whatever others we may now fancy to enumerate? Who are statuaries, but men? Who pilots, who musicians?—This seems, replied I, to be the fact.

Let us then, continued he, say, not only that art is a cause, but that it is man becoming a cause; and not only man, but man intending to do what is going to be done, and doing it also by habit; so that its whole idea, as far as we have hitherto conceived it, is, man becoming a cause, intentional and habitual.[c] —I confess, said I, it has appeared so.

[c] Aristotle, in his Rhetoric, thus accurately enumerates all the possible manners, either direct or indirect, in which mankind may be said to act, or do any thing. *Πάντες δὴ πράττουσι πάντα, τὰ μὲν, οὐ δι' αὐτούς· τὰ δὲ, δι' αὐτούς· τῶν μὲν οὖν μὴ δι' αὐτοὺς, τὰ μὲν διὰ τύχην πράττουσι, τὰ δὲ ἐξ ἀνάγκης· τῶν δ' ἐξ ἀνάγκης, τὰ μὲν βίᾳ, τὰ δὲ φύσει· ὥστε πάντα, ὅσα μὴ δι' αὐτοῦς πράττουσι, τὰ μὲν ἀπὸ τύχης· τὰ δὲ φύσει· τὰ δὲ βίᾳ. Ὅσα δὲ δι' αὐτοὺς, καὶ ὧν αὐτοὶ αἴτιοι, τὰ μὲν δι' ἔθος, τὰ δὲ δι' ὄρεξιν· καὶ τὰ μὲν διὰ λογιστικὴν ὄρεξιν, τὰ δὲ δι' ἀλόγιστον. Ἔστι δὲ ἡ μὲν βούλησις, μετὰ λόγου ὄρεξις ἀγαθοῦ—ἄλογοι δ' ὀρέξεις, ὀργὴ καὶ ἐπιθυμία. Ὥστε πάντα ὅσα πράττουσιν, ἀνάγκη πράττειν δι' αἰτίας ἕπτα· διὰ τύχην, διὰ βίαν, διὰ φύσιν, δι' ἔθος, διὰ λογισμὸν, διὰ θυμὸν, δι' ἐπιθυμίαν.* "All men do all things, either of themselves, or not of themselves. The things which they do not of themselves, they do either by chance, or from necessity; and the things done from necessity, they do either by compulsion, which is external necessity, or by nature, which is internal. So that all things whatsoever, which men do not of themselves, they do either by chance, or from compulsion, or by nature. Again, the things which they do of themselves, and of which they are themselves properly the causes, some they do through custom and acquired habit, others through original and natural desire. Further, the things done through natural desire they do, either through such desire assisted by reason, or through such desire devoid of reason. If it be assisted by reason, then it assumes the denomination of will; on the contrary, the irrational desires are anger and appe-

And thus, said he, have you had exhibited to you a sketch of art. You must remember, however, it is but a sketch: there is

tite. Hence it appears, that all things whatever which men do, they necessarily do through one of these seven causes; either through chance, compulsion, nature, custom, will, anger, appetite." Arist. Rhet. l. i. c. 10.

It remains, agreeably to this enumeration, to consider with which of these causes we ought to arrange art.

As to chance, it may be observed, in general, of all casual events, that they always exclude intention or design: but intention and design are from art inseparable. Thus is the difference between art and chance manifest.

As to external compulsion, we have it thus described: Βίαιον δὲ οὗ ἡ ἀρχὴ ἔξωθεν: that is, "an act of compulsion, the efficient principle of which is from without, independent of the doer." Arist. Ethic. l. iii. c. 1. Again, in the same treatise, l. vi. c. 4. we are told of the works of art, that they are such, ὧν ἡ ἀρχὴ ἐν τῷ ποιοῦντι, "the efficient principle of which is in the doer, or agent." Thus, therefore, is art distinguished from compulsion.

These two causes, chance and compulsion, are mentioned and considered in the Dialogue, page 2.

Nature, or rather natural necessity, is that cause through which we breathe, perspire, digest, circulate our blood, &c. Will, anger, and appetite, are (as already observed) but so many species of natural desire, considered either as assisted by reason, or else as devoid of it. Now though natural desire and natural necessity differ, because in the one we act spontaneously, in the other not spontaneously, yet both of them meet in the common genus of natural power. Moreover this is true of all natural power, that the power itself is prior to any energies or acts of that power. Οὐ γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ πολλάκις ἰδεῖν ἢ πολλάκις ἀκοῦσαι τὰς αἰσθήσεις ἐλάβομεν, ἀλλ' ἀνάπαλιν, ἔχοντες ἐχρησάμεθα, οὐ χρησάμενοι ἔχομεν. "For [to instance in the natural powers of sensation] it was not from often seeing, and often hearing, that we acquired those senses; but, on the contrary, being first possessed of them, we then used them, not through any use or exercise did we come to possess them." Arist. Ethic. l. ii. c. 1.

Now the contrary to this is true in the case of any powers or faculties not natural, but acquired by custom and usage. For here there are many energies and acts, which must necessarily precede the existence of such power or habit, it being evident (as is said in the same chapter) that ἐκ τῶν ὁμοίων ἐνεργειῶν αἱ ἕξεις γίγνονται, "from similiar and homogeneous energies it is that habits are obtained." So again, in the same place: Ἃ γὰρ δεῖ μαθόντας ποιεῖν, ταῦτα ποιοῦντες μανθάνομεν οἷον οἰκοδομοῦντες οἰκόδομοι γίνονται, καὶ κιθαρίζοντες κιθαρισταί. "The things which we are to do, by having learnt, we learn by doing. Thus, by building, men become builders; and by practising music, they become musicians."

Thus, therefore, is art distinguished from all natural power of man, whether natural necessity, will, anger, or appetite. But art has been already distinguished from chance and compulsion. So that being clearly not the same with six of those seven causes, by which all men do all things, it must needs be referred to the seventh; that is, to custom or habit.

It must be observed, the natural causes or powers in man, considered as distinct from art, are treated in the Dialogue, page 3.

And now, as we have shewn art to be a certain cause working in man, it remains to shew how it is distinguished from those other causes beside man, which we suppose to operate in the universe. These are either such causes as are below him, like the vegetative power, which operates in vegetables, the sensitive in animals; or else such causes as are above him, like God, and whatever is else of intelligence more than human.

The causes below us may be all included in the common genus of nature; and of nature we may say universally, as well of nature without us as within us, that its several operations, contrary to those of art, are not in the least degree derived from custom or usage. Thus the author above cited: Οὐδὲν γὰρ τῶν φύσει ὄντων ἄλλως ἐθίζεται· οἷον ὁ λίθος φύσει κάτω φερόμενος, οὐκ ἂν ἐθισθείη ἄνω φέρεσθαι, οὐδ' ἂν μυρίακις αὐτὸν ἐθίζῃ τις ἄνω ῥίπτων, οὐδὲ τὸ πῦρ κάτω. "None of those things, which are what they are by nature, can be altered by being accustomed. Thus a stone, which by nature is carried downward, can never be accustomed to mount upward, no, not though any one should ten thousand times attempt it, by throwing the stone upward. The same may be said of accustoming fire to move downward." Ethic. l. ii. c. 1. Again, in the works of nature, such as trees, animals, and the like, the efficient principle is vitally united to the subjects wherein it operates: ἐν αὐτοῖς ἔχουσι ταύτα τὴν ἀρχήν. Ethic. l. vi. c. 4. But in the works of art, such as statues or houses,

still something wanting to make it a finished piece.—I begged to know what this was.—In order to that, replied he, I cannot do better, than remind you of a passage in your admired Horace.

the efficient principle is disunited from the subjects, and exists not in the things done or made, but in the doer or artist, ὃν ἡ ἀρχὴ ἐν τῷ ποιοῦντι ἀλλὰ μὴ ἐν τῷ ποιουμένῳ. Ethic. l. vi. c. 4. It is, indeed, possible, that, even in works of art, the subject and efficient cause may be united, as in the case of a physician becoming his own patient, and curing himself. But then it must be remembered, that this union is κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς, merely accidental, and no way essential to the constituting of art, considered as art. By this, therefore, is art clearly distinguished from nature, whose definition informs us that it is ἀρχὴ τὶς καὶ αἰτία τοῦ κινεῖσθαι καὶ ἠρεμεῖν ἐν ᾧ ὑπάρχει πρώτως, καθ' αὑτὸ καὶ μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκός: "a certain principle or cause of moving and ceasing to move, in some subject wherein such principle exists immediately, essentially, and not by way of accident." Arist. Natur. Ausc. l. ii. c. 1.

The causes which are of rank superior to man, such as the Deity, can have nothing to do with art, because being (as is said in the Dialogue, p. 4,) "perfect and complete, and knowing all from the beginning, they can never admit of what is additional and secondary." Art, therefore, can only belong to beings like men; who, being imperfect, know their wants, and endeavour to remove them by helps secondary and subsequent. It was from a like consideration that Pythagoras called himself a philosopher; that is to say, (according to his own explication of the name,) "a lover and seeker of what was wise and good," but not a possessor, which he deemed a character above him. Consonant to this we read in Plato's Banquet, θεῶν οὐδεὶς φιλοσοφεῖ, οὐδ' ἐπιθυμεῖ σοφὸς γενέσθαι· ἔστι γὰρ, etc.: "no god philosophizes, or desires to become wise, for he is so already. Nor, if there be any other being wise, doth he philosophize, for the same reason. On the other hand, neither do the indocile philosophize; for this is the misfortune of indocility, without being virtuous, good, or prudent, to appear to oneself sufficient in all these respects. In general, therefore, he who thinketh himself in no want, desireth not that which he thinks himself not to need. 'Who, then,' said Socrates to Diotima, (the speaker of this narration,) 'who are those who philosophize, if they are neither the wise nor the indocile?' 'That (replied she) may be now conspicuous even to a child. They are those of middle rank, between these extremes.'" Plat. vol. iii. p. 203. edit. Serrani.

Here we see (agreeably to what is said in the Dialogue, page 4,) that as to acquired, or secondary habits, some beings are too excellent for them, and others too base; and that the Deity, above all, is in the number of those transcendent, and is thus, as a cause, distinguished from art. Vid. Amm. περὶ Ἑρμεν. p. 26. b. et omnino εἰς κατηγ. p. 127, 128.

There are, besides the Deity and nature now spoken of, certain other external causes, which are mentioned in the first note as distinct from art; namely, chance and necessity. But of these hereafter, when we consider the subject of art.

The Peripatetic definition of nature, given above, though in some degree illustrated page 11, (note *g*,) yet being still, from its brevity, perhaps, obscure, the following explication of it is subjoined.

In the first place, by "nature," the Peripatetics meant that vital principle in plants, brutes, and men, by which they are said to live, and to be distinguished from things inanimate. Nature, therefore, being another name for "life," or a vital principle, throughout all subjects, is universally found to be of the following kind; namely, to advance the subject, which it enlivens, from a seed or embryo, to something better and more perfect. This progression, as well in plants as in animals, is called "growth." And thus is it that nature is a principle of motion.—But then this progression, or growth, is not infinite. When the subject is mature, that is, hath obtained its completion and perfect form, then the progression ceases. Here, therefore, the business of the vital principle becomes different. It is from henceforward no longer employed to acquire a form, but to preserve to its subject a form already acquired. And thus is it that nature is a principle of rest, stability, or ceasing to move. And such indeed she continues to be, maintaining, as long as possible, the form committed to her care, till time and external causes in the first place impair it, and induce at length its dissolution, which is death.

And thus it has been shewn how nature may be called a principle both of motion and ceasing to move.

As to the rest of the definition, namely, that nature is a principle, which inheres in its subject immediately, essentially, and not by way of accident; no more is meant by this, than that the nature or life in every being, which hath such principle, is really and truly a part of that being, and not detached and separate from it, like the pilot

It is concerning Alfenus; who, (if you remember,) he tells us, though his tools were laid aside, and his shop shut up, was still an artist as much as ever:

> Alfenus vafer omni
> Abjecto instrumento artis clausaque taberna,
> Sutor erat.

I remember, said I, the passage; but to what purpose is it quoted?—Only, replied he, to shew you, that I should not be without precedent, were I to affirm it not absolutely necessary to the being of art, that it should be man actually becoming a cause; but that it was enough, if he had the power or capacity of so becoming.—Why then, said I, did you not settle it so at first?—Because, replied he, faculties, powers, capacities, (call them as you will,) are in themselves, abstract from action, but obscure and hidden things. On the contrary, energies and operations lie open to the senses,[d] and cannot but be observed, even whether we will or no. And hence, therefore, when first we treated of art, we chose to treat of it as of a thing only in energy. Now we better comprehend it, we have ventured somewhat further.—Repeat, then, said I, if you please, the alteration which you have made.—At first, answered he, we reasoned upon art, as if it was only man actually becoming a cause intentional and habitual. Now we say it is a power in man of becoming such cause; and that, though he be not actually in the exercise of such a power.—I told him, his amendment appeared to be just.

There is, too, another alteration, added he, which, for the sake of accuracy, is equally wanting; and that is with respect to the epithet, "intentional or voluntary."—And what, said I, is that?—We have agreed it, replied he, to be necessary, that all art should be under the guidance of intention or volition, so that no man acting by compulsion, or by chance, should be called an artist.—We have.—Now though this, said he, be true, yet it is not sufficient. We must limit this intention or volition to a peculiar kind. For were every little fancy, which we may work up into habit, a sufficient foundation to constitute an art, we should make art one of the lowest and most despicable of things. The meanest trick of a common juggler might, in such case, entitle

from the ship, the musician from the instrument. For to these subjects though those artists are principles of motion and rest, yet do they in no sense participate with them in vital sympathy and union.

[d] Εἰ δὲ χρὴ λέγειν τὶ ἕκαστον τούτων, οἷον τὶ τὸ νοητικὸν, ἢ τὶ τὸ αἰσθητικὸν, πρότερον ἐπισκεπτέον, τὶ τὸ νοεῖν, καὶ τὶ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι· πρότεραι γὰρ καὶ σαφέστεραι πρὸς ἡμᾶς τῶν δυνάμεών εἰσι αἱ ἐνέργειαι. προεντυγχάνομεν γὰρ αὐταῖς, καὶ τὰς δυνάμεις ἀπὸ τούτων ἐπινοοῦμεν. "If we are to explain what each of these things are, as for instance, what the intelligent principle, what the sensitive, we must first inquire what it is to think, what to see, hear, and use the senses. For with respect to us men, the energies are prior and more evident than the powers, because it is in the energies we are first conversant, and comprehend the powers from them." Themist. in lib. ii. de Anima, p. 76. ed. Ald. Fol. Aristot. de An. ii. 4.

a man to the character of an artist.—I confessed, that without some limitation, this might be the consequence. But how limit intentions to a kind or species?—What think you, replied he, if we were to do it, by the number and dignity of the precepts, which go to the directing of our intentions?—You must explain, said I; for your meaning is obscure.—Are there not precepts,[e] replied he, in agriculture, about ploughing and sowing? Are there not precepts in architecture, about orders and proportions? Are there not the same in medicine, in navigation, and the rest? —There are.—And what is your opinion of these several precepts? Are they arbitrary and capricious, or rational and steady? Are they the inventions of a day, or well-approved by long experience?—I told him, I should consider them for the most part as rational, steady, and well-approved by long experience. —And what, continued he, shall we say to their number? Are they few? Or are they not rather so numerous, that in every particular art, scarce any comprehend them all, but the several artists themselves; and they only by length of time, with due attendance and application?—I replied, it seemed so.—Suppose then we were to pronounce, that to every art there was a system of such various and well-approved precepts: should we err?—No, certainly.—And suppose we should say, that the intention of every artist, in his several art, was directed by such a system: would you allow this?—Surely.—And will not this limiting of intentions to such only, as are so directed, sufficiently distinguish art from any thing else which may resemble it? in other words, is it likely, under this distinction, to be confounded with other habits of a trifling, capricious, and inferior kind?—I replied, I thought not.

Let us then see, said he, and collect all that we have said together. We have already agreed, that the power of acting after a certain manner is sufficient to constitute art, without the actually operating agreeably to that power. And we have now further held the intentions of every artist to be directed by a system of various and well-approved precepts. Besides all this, we settled it before, that all art was founded in habit; and was peculiar to man; and was seen by becoming the cause of some effect. It should seem, then, that the whole idea of art was this, "an habitual power in man of becoming the cause of some

[e] Vid. Plat. in Min. vol. ii. p. 316, 17. edit. Serran. et in Gorgia, vol. i. p. 465. A. ἐγὼ δὲ τέχνην οὐ καλῶ, ὃ ἂν ᾖ ἄλογον πράγμα.

As to those low habits here mentioned, from which we distinguish art by the number and dignity of its precepts, they fall, in general, under the denomination of ματαιοτεχνία, of which Quintilian gives the following account. Ματαιοτεχνία quoque est quædam, id est, supervacua artis imitatio, quæ nihil sane nec boni nec mali habeat, sed vanum laborem: qualis illius fuit, qui grana ciceris, ex spatio distante missa, in acum continuo et sine frustratione inserebat: quem, cum spectasset Alexander, donasse dicitur ejusdem leguminis modio. Quod quidem præmium fuit illo opere dignissimum. Inst. Orat. l. ii. c. 20.

effect, according to a system of various and well-approved precepts."[f]—I replied, that his account appeared to be probable and just.

II. And now, then, continued he, as we have gone thus far, and have settled between us what we believe art to be; shall we go a little further, or is your patience at an end?—Oh! no, replied I, not if any thing be left. We have walked so leisurely, that much remains of our way; and I can think of no method how we may better amuse ourselves.

[f] The Peripatetic definition of art is ἕξις μετὰ λόγου ἀληθοῦς ποιητική: "an efficient habit, joined with sound and true reason." Arist. Ethic. l. vi. c. 4.

The Stoic definition, as we find it in Sext. Empir. adversus Logicos, p. 392, is, Σύστημα ἐκ καταλήψεων ἐγγεγυμνασμένων πρὸς τὶ τέλος εὔχρηστον τῶν ἐν τῷ βίῳ. Thus translated by Cicero in Diodemes de Grammat. l. ii. Ars est perceptionum exercitatarum collectio, ad unum exitum vitæ utilem pertinentium. And again by Quintilian, Inst. Orat. l. ii. c. 18. Artem constare ex perceptionibus consentientibus et coexercitatis ad finem utilem vitæ. The same definition is also alluded to in the Academics of Cicero, l. ii. c. 7, where it is said, Ars vero quæ potest esse, nisi quæ non ex una, aut duabus, sed ex multis animi perceptionibus constat?

There is a third definition of art cited by Quintilian in the same place, and ascribed by him to Cleanthes: Ars est potestas via (id est, ordine) efficiens. The Greek, from which this Latin definition is taken, is fuller and more philosophical: the words are, Ἕξις ὁδῷ βαδίζουσα μετὰ φαντασίας: which may be rendered, "an habit, which proceeds in a road or method, having a sense, withal, of what it is about." The last character distinguishes art from the natural energies of all things insensitive, which, though they proceed methodically, yet want a sense of what they are doing. Vid. Niceph. Blemmid. Epit. Logic. p. 20.

Now if we compare these definitions with that in the Dialogue, we shall find them all to correspond. "The habitual power in man of becoming the cause of some effect," is the same as Ἕξις ποιητική in the Peripatetic definition. "According to a system of various and well-approved precepts," is the same as μετὰ λόγου ἀληθοῦς. For sound and true reason must needs be the basis of all such precepts.

Again, as to the second definition; the words Σύστημα καταλήψεων [a system of comprehensions, or of certain and evident truths] correspond to the latter part of the definition in the Dialogue, "according to a system of various and well-approved precepts." The word ἐγγεγυμνασμένων [that is to say, worked in by habit and exercise] corresponds to the first part, that "art is a cause founded in habit." And the rest [πρὸς τὶ τέλος, &c. that is to say, "a system which has respect to some useful and serviceable end or purpose in human life,"] shews the system here mentioned to regard practice and action, not theory and speculation. And thus does it correspond with the definition of the Dialogue, where it is said that art is an habitual power, not of merely contemplating and knowing, but of becoming the cause of some effect. It is not, indeed, expressed in the Dialogue, that this effect has respect to the utility of human life, because this latter circumstance is reserved to the definition of the final cause of art, given page 16.

As to the third definition of art, *potestas via efficiens*, "a power operating methodically," it may be observed, that by being called an operating power, it is distinguished from powers purely speculative; and as it is said to operate methodically, or in a road and regular process, it is distinguished from chance as well as blind necessity. And thus far it corresponds with what is offered in the Dialogue. But it does not appear from this definition, whether the power therein mentioned be original and natural, or secondary and habitual, because powers of either sort may operate methodically. And perhaps Cleanthes intended not to distinguish so far, but took art in that larger and more general sense, adopted sometimes by the Stoics; as when they describe Nature herself to be a πῦρ τεχνικὸν ὁδῷ βαδίζον πρὸς γένεσιν, "an artificial fire, proceeding methodically to production or creation." For it is not to be imagined, they intended by this to insinuate that nature was a fire, which had learnt by habit so to operate. On the contrary, by "artificial," it is probable they intended no more than some active efficient principle, working with reason, order, and method; of which principle they considered fire to be the properest vehicle, as being of all bodies the most subtle, and that into which the rest are all ultimately resolvable. Vide Diog. Laert. l. vii. s. 156. Cic. de Nat. Deor. l. ii. c. 22.

My friend, upon this, proceeded with saying, that if art were a cause, (as we had agreed it was,) it must be the cause of something.—Allow it, said I.—And if it be the cause of something, it must have a subject to operate on. For every agent has need of some patient: the smith of his iron, the carpenter of his wood, the statuary of his marble, and the pilot of his ship. —I answered, it was true.—If, then, said he, the subjects of particular arts be thus evident, what idea shall we form of that universal subject which is common to all art?—At this question, it must be confessed, I was a little embarrassed.

This induced him to ask me, how many sorts of subjects I allowed of?—Here I could not help hesitating again.—There is nothing, continued he, so difficult in the question. You must needs perceive, that all natures whatever can be but either contingent or necessary.—This may be, replied I; but even yet I do not comprehend you.—Not comprehend me! said he; then answer me a question: can you conceive any medium between motion and no-motion, between change and no-change?—I replied, I could not.—If not, can you conceive any thing in the whole order of being, which must not be either liable to these, or not liable?—Nothing.—Call those things, therefore, said he, which are liable to change and motion, contingent natures; and those which are not liable, necessary natures: and thus you have a division, in which all things are included.—We have so, said I.

In which, therefore, said he, of these natures shall we seek for this common subject of art?—To this, I told him, I was unable to answer.—Reflect, said he, a little. We have found art to be a cause.—We have.—And is it not essential to every cause to operate? or can it be a cause, and be the cause of nothing?—Impossible.—Wherever, therefore, there is cause, there is necessarily implied some operation.—There is.—And can there possibly be operation, without motion and change?—There cannot.—But change and motion must needs be incompatible with what is necessary and immutable.—They must.—So, therefore, is cause.—It must.—And so, therefore, art.—It must.—Truth, therefore, said he, and knowledge; principles and demonstrations; the general and intellectual essences of things; in short, the whole immutable and necessary nature is no part of it reducible to a subject of art.—It seems so, said I.

If, therefore, art, said he, have nothing to do with the steady, abstract, and necessary nature, it can have only to do with the transient, the particular, and contingent one.—It is true, said I; for there is no other left.—And shall we then say, replied he, it has to do with all contingent natures existing in the universe? —For aught, replied I, which to me appears contrary.—What think you, said he, of those contingents of higher order? such as the grand planetary system; the succession of the seasons; the regular and uniform course of all superior natures in the

universe? Has art any ability to intermeddle here?—No, certainly, said I.—These superior contingents, then, which move without interruption, are, it seems, above it.—They are.—And shall we say the same of those of lower sort; those, whose course we see often interrupted; those, which the strength and cunning of man are able to influence and control?—Give instances, said I, of what you mean.—I mean, said he, earth, water, air, fire, stones, trees, animals, men themselves. Are these contingents within the reach of art, or has art here no influence?—I should think, said I, a very great one.

If this, continued he, be true, it should seem that the common or universal subject of art was, all those contingent natures which lie within the reach of the human powers to influence.[g]—I acknowledge, said I, it appears so.

[g] The cause here treated is the material, the Ὕλη, or Ὑποκείμενον, or τὸ ἐξ οὗ γενεταί τι ἐνυπάρχοντος.

Of a contingent we have the following definition: Λέγω δ' ἐνδέχεσθαι, καὶ τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον, οὗ μὴ ὄντος ἀναγκαίου, τεθέντος δ' ὑπάρχειν, οὐδὲν ἔσται διὰ τοῦτ' ἀδύνατον. "I call that a contingent, which not being necessary, but being supposed to be, there will follow nothing impossible from such supposition." Arist. Anal. prior. l. i. c. 13. Diog. Laert. l. iii. s. 10.

That this is true in works of art, is evident. It is not necessary, that a given fragment of such a rock should assume the figure of Hercules: but there follows nothing impossible, if we suppose it so figured. It is for this reason that the subject of art is in the Dialogue called "a contingent."

But, however, to explain the whole of what is said in this place, it is necessary to go backward, and deduce what we would say from some remoter considerations.

The Peripatetics held the end or aim of their philosophy to be the discovering and knowing the ἀρχή, the "primary and creative principle of all things." They pursued this inquiry, when they reasoned analytically, that is to say, upwards, by beginning their contemplation from those things which are to us first in the order of our comprehension, and so ascending gradually to that which is truly first in the real order of beings. Ammon. εἰς E. φων. p. 36.

The first and original objects of our comprehension are those nearer and more immediate, viz. the objects of sense, with which we are surrounded on every side. These objects we perceive to be all in motion; and the motions are multiform, various, and often opposite to each other. The consequences of this we perpetually behold. By such motions we see, that not only the mere local site of these beings is changed, but their very bulk, and figure, and qualities; nay, more than this, even the beings themselves are made to separate and perish, while new beings arise from the re-assemblage of the scattered parts, which parts different motions can as well bring together, as disunite. The beings or objects of the character here described, the Peripatetics denoted under the common appellation of the τὰ κινούμενα καὶ φθαρτὰ, "the beings moving and corruptible."

From these moving and perishable objects they passed to those sublimer and more transcendent objects of sense, which they saw adorn the heavens. Here, likewise, they discovered motion; but then this motion was uniform and constant; affecting not the beings moved, save in the relation of local site. As, therefore, they beheld no change in the form and essence of these beings, they deemed them (upon their hypothesis) incorruptible, and out of them established another class of beings, that is to say, the τὰ κινούμενα καὶ ἄφθαρτα, "the beings moving and incorruptible."

From these sublimer objects of sense they passed to objects of pure intellect; to bodies devoid of all motion, and of all quality, save that inseparable one of figure; such bodies, for instance, as the cube, the sphere, and the rest of bodies mathematical. From mathematical bodies, and the truths resulting from them, they passed to the contemplation of truth in general; to the soul, and its powers both of intuition and syllogization; to *being* universal, and above both time and place; and thus, at last, to that supreme cause, the great principle of the whole, which is ever the same, immutable and eternal. The several objects of this intellectual comprehension they styled, not merely ἄφθαρτα, but ἄφθαρτα καὶ ἀκίνητα, "beings incorruptible and immoveable." Vid. inf. note *r*.

Thus far, then, said he, we have advanced with tolerable success. We have gained some idea of art, and some idea of its

In this manner did the Peripatetics speculate. And hence was it they established to themselves three species of philosophical employment—one about beings motionless and eternal; another, about beings moveable and eternal; and a third, about beings moveable and perishable. The first they held the proper employment of the metaphysician; the two last of the astronomer and the naturalist.

Διὸ τρεῖς αἱ πραγματεῖαι· ἡ μὲν περὶ ἀκίνητον· ἡ δὲ, περὶ κινούμενον μὲν, ἄφθαρτον δέ· ἡ δὲ, περὶ τὰ φθαρτά. Idcirco tres sunt tractationes; una, de immobili; altera de eo, quod movetur quidem, sed est interitus expers; tertia de rebus, interitui obnoxiis. Arist. Natural. Ausc. l. ii. c. 7. *Διὸ καὶ τρεῖς αἱ πραγματεῖαι· ἡ μὲν, περὶ κινούμενα καὶ φθαρτά· ἡ δὲ περὶ κινούμενα, ἄφθαρτα δέ· ἡ δὲ, περὶ ἀκίνητα καὶ ἄφθαρτα.* Themistii Paraphrasis in loc.

This threefold subject of philosophic inquiry is elegantly explained in the following passage: *Τὶ δὲ τὸ τέλος ἐστὶ τῆς Ἀριστοτελικῆς φιλοσοφίας; φαμὲν ὅτι γνῶναι τὴν πάντων ἀρχὴν, τὴν τῶν πάντων δημιουργὸν αἰτίαν, τὴν ἀεὶ καὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχουσαν· ἀποδείκνυσι γὰρ πάντων ἀρχὴν, καὶ ἀσώματον· ἐξ ἐκείνης δὲ τὰ πάντα παράγεσθαι. Τίνα δὲ τὰ ἄγοντα ἡμᾶς εἰς τοῦτο τὸ τέλος; φαμὲν ὅτι ἡ διδασκαλία τῶν ἐν χρόνῳ καὶ μεταβολῇ ὑπαρχόντων· τοιαῦτα δέ ἐστι τὰ ἐν γενέσει καὶ φθορᾷ· ἀπὸ γὰρ τούτων, διὰ μεσῶν μαθηματικῶν, ἀνάγομεν ἑαυτοῦς ἐπὶ τὰ ἀεὶ καὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχοντα· τοιαῦτα δὲ ἔστι τὰ οὐράνια· καὶ οὕτω, μετὰ τὰς ἀσωμάτους οὐσίας, ἐπὶ τὴν πρώτην πάντων ἀρχήν. Πάσης γὰρ κινήσεως ἢ κατ' οὐσίαν οὔσης, ἢ κατὰ ποιὸν, ἢ κατὰ τόπον, τὰ μὲν ἐν γενέσει καὶ φθορᾷ κατὰ πάσαν κίνησιν κινοῦνται· τὰ δὲ οὐράνια κατὰ μόνην τὴν κατὰ τόπον. Διὸ χρὴ εὐτάκτως ὁδεύειν ἀπὸ τῶν πολυτρόπως κινουμένων ἐπὶ τὰ κατὰ μίαν, καὶ μόνην κίνησιν κινούμενα, καὶ οὕτως ἐπὶ τὴν ἀκίνητον καὶ ἀεὶ ὡσαυτῶς ἔχουσαν ἀρχήν. Ἀμμωνίου εἰς τὰς κατηγορίας*, p. 12. edit. Venet. 8vo. 1545.

The author of the Dialogue has had reference to this threefold division of subjects, as may be seen in that part of his Dialogue which gives occasion to the present comment. He has chosen, however, to style the *τὰ οὐράνια*, or "heavenly bodies," rather contingents of higher order, than beings necessary, as imagining the former to be their truer character.

It may be here added, that the Peripatetics confined *Φύσις*, or "Nature," for the most part, to this earth of ours, where they considered her as the active principle of life in plants and animals. Hence, therefore, they distinguished not her effects from those of art, by their necessity, (for the effects of both they treated as contingent,) but from the cause in natural subjects operating within, artificial without, as has been already observed, note *c*. See Diog. Laert. p. 459.

It may be further added, that they placed these effects of art and nature, and, indeed, all other contingents whatever, in a middle rank between things necessary and things impossible. The reason was evident. Things necessary could not but be; things impossible could not be; but contingents were *τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα καὶ εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι*, that is, "were equally susceptible both of being and non-being."

But still, though all contingents admitted, on their hypothesis, both of being and non-being, yet they supposed some to have a greater tendency to existence, and others to have a less. The first species of these they styled *τὰ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ*, "the things which happen for the most part;" the last, *τὰ ἐπ' ἔλαττον*, "the things which happen less frequently."

Now as it is evident that both nature and art oftener obtain their end, than miss it, (for complete animals are more frequently born than monsters; and the musician, if an artist, strikes oftener the right string than the wrong,) hence it was, that they ranged the effects of nature and art among those contingents which were *τὰ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ*, "contingents of greater frequency." But yet, as these effects were not from the hypothesis necessary, and contrary to these upon occasion happened, hence it was, that whenever either nature or art became causes of the *τὰ ἐπ' ἔλαττον*, "those rarer events," in such case they (nature and art) were considered by these philosophers as *αἰτίαι κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς*, "causes by way of accident," and not according to their own essence and distinguishing character. In such instances it was, that they assumed the names of *Τύχη* and *Αὐτόματον*, Fortune and Chance; *Τύχη* having mostly reference to works of men, *Αὐτόματον* to works of nature. The instances given by Themistius, in cases of chance and fortune, are as follow. A tile falls from a house. The end of its falling is to arrive at that lower place, whither nature would carry it by the common law of gravity. In falling, it strikes and wounds a passenger. This last event is from chance. Again, a man digs in his garden, to plant. In digging, he

subject. Our inquiry, on the whole, has informed us, that art is "an habitual power in man of becoming a certain cause;" and that its subject is, "every such contingent nature, which lies within the reach of the human powers to influence."

III. It is true, said I, this appears to have been the result of our inquiry, and a full and ample one it seems to have been.—A long one, replied he, if you please, but not a full and ample one.—Can any thing, said I, be wanting, after what you have said already?—Certainly, replied he, a great deal. We have talked much, indeed, of art, considered as a cause; and much of the subject on which it operates; but what moves these operations to commence, and where it is they end, these are topics

discovers a hidden treasure. This last event is from fortune. And thus, adds Themistius, ἡ αὐτὴ πρᾶξις καὶ μία, ἄλλου μὲν καθ' αὐτὴν αἰτία, ἄλλου δὲ κατὰ συμβεβηκός: "the same individual action is the cause of one thing from its own peculiar character, and of another thing, by way of accident." And again, ἔστι μὲν οὖν καὶ τῶν οὕτως συμβαινόντων ἡ τὴν φύσιν ἡ τὴν προαίρεσιν αἰτίων πῶς εἰκεῖν, ἀλλ' οὐ καθ' αὑτήν. οὐ γὰρ τούτων χάριν οὔτε προήλθεν ὁ ἄνθρωπος, οὔτε ἡ κέραμις κατηνέχθη, ἀλλ' εἰ ἄρα, κατὰ συμβεβηκός: "of these events we may call nature, or human will, in a manner the cause, but yet not so from themselves, and according to their own peculiar essence; for it was not for the sake of what happened, that either the passenger went forth, or the tile fell downward, but, if any thing, it was by accident." Themist. in lib. ii. Natur. Auscult. p. 26. edit. Ald. See also Arist. Natur. Auscult. l. ii. c. 4, 5, 6. Ammon. in Prædicam. p. 113. b. This doctrine came originally from Plato, whose definition of fortune was σύμπτωμα φύσεως ἢ προαιρέσεως, "a symptom, or thing co-incident either with nature or human will." Vid. Suidam in voc. Εἱμαρμένη.

It must be here observed, that κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς, "by accident," means, in no part of these quotations, accidental, as standing for casual; for this would be mere tautology, as to what is here said concerning chance. It means, rather, something by way of appendage; something adventitious; in other words, it means accident, as adhering to substance, without which it can have no being, though suppose it absent or taken away, the nature of substance is no way affected. It was in this sense the Peripatetics supposed chance and fortune to be accidents or appendages to nature and mind. According, therefore, to them, the supposition of chance and fortune was so far from excluding nature and mind from the universe, that they demonstrably proved their existence in it. For admitting their account of chance and fortune to be just; if we grant the accidents to exist, much more must we grant the subjects, and this, too, with that superior dignity and priority of existence, which is evidently due to all subjects above their accidents. Well, therefore, did the philosopher conclude, ὕστερον ἄρα τὸ Αὐτόματον, καὶ ἡ Τύχη τοῦ Νοῦ, καὶ τῆς Φύσεως. "Subsequent in existence, are chance and fortune to mind and nature." Arist. Natur. Ausc. l. ii. c. 6.

From what has been said, we see the reason of that enumeration of causes mentioned in the beginning of the first note, where they are described to be necessity, nature, man, and fortune.

To necessity they referred all those things and events, which they supposed of necessary existence; such as the universe, the heavenly bodies, together with their uniformly regular motions.

To nature, man, and chance, they referred all contingents; to nature and man, obtaining their end, all contingents of greater frequency; to the same causes, either falling short of their end, or going beyond it, and thus becoming chance or fortune, those opposite contingents of existence less usual.

And hence, as art and fortune were both conversant about the same subjects, (viz. such contingents as respected human life,) we find the meaning of that verse of Agatho's, cited by Aristotle, in his Ethics, l. vi. c. 5.

Τέχνη τύχην ἔστερξε, καὶ τύχη τέχνην.

"Art loveth fortune; fortune loveth art."

The whole chapter, indeed, is well worth perusal. But we shall not venture to lengthen this note, which may be probably deemed too long already, and which can be only excused, as giving some sample of a philosophy, which, from its rarity, perhaps, may possibly furnish some amusement.

which we have, as yet, little thought of.—I begged him, then, that we might now consider them.

He was willing, he said, for his part, and immediately went on, by asking, what I thought was the beginning of art?—I mean, said he, by beginning, that cause for the sake of which it operates, and which being supposed away, men would be never moved to follow it.[h]—To this, I told him, I was unable to answer.—You will not think it, said he, so difficult, when you have a little more considered. Reflect with yourself: was it not the absence of health which excited men to cultivate the art of medicine?[i]—I replied, it was.—What, then, said he, if the human body had been so far perfect and self-sufficient, as never to have felt the vicissitudes of well and ill; would not, then, this art have been wholly unknown?—I replied, I thought it would.—And what, said he, if we extend this perfection a degree further, and suppose the body not only thus healthful, but withal so robust, as to have felt no uneasiness from all inclemencies of weather: would not, then, the arts of building also, and clothing, have been as useless as that of medicine?—I replied, it seemed they would.—But what, said he, if we bound not this perfection of ours even here?—What if we

[h] As the cause here spoken of, is that cause usually called final, it may be asked, how it comes in this place to be considered as a beginning. The answer is, that what comes last in practice, stands in theory first; or, in other words, the order of ideas in the intellect of the artist is exactly inverted, with respect to the order of his energies.

Thus Ammonius: *Καθόλου γὰρ τῆς μὲν θεωρίας τὸ τέλος γίγνεται ἀρχὴ τῆς πράξεως· ἔμπαλιν δὲ τῆς πράξεως τὸ τέλος, ἀρχὴ τῆς θεωρίας. οἷον ὁ Οἰκοδόμος, ἐπιταγεὶς οἶκον, λέγει καθ' ἑαυτὸν, ἐπετάγην οἶκον ποιῆσαι· ὅπερ ἐστὶ σκέπασμα, κωλυτικὸν ὄμβρων καὶ καυμάτων· τοῦτο δὲ οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο, μὴ γινομένης δροφῆς. Ἐντεῦθεν οὖν ἄρχεται τῆς θεωρίας. προβαίνων δὲ φησίν· Ἄλλα τοῦτο οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο, μὴ γινομένων τοίχων· οὗτοι δὲ οὐκ ἂν γένοιντο, μὴ ὑποβληθέντων θεμελίων· οἱ δὲ θεμελίοι οὐκ ἂν βληθεῖεν, μὴ ὀρυχθείσης τῆς γῆς. ἐνταῦθα κατέληξεν ἡ θεωρία. Ἐντεῦθεν οὖν ἄρχεται ἡ πρᾶξις. πρότερον γὰρ ὀρύττει τὴν γῆν· εἶθ' οὕτω βάλλει τὸν θεμέλιον· εἶτα ἐγείρει τοίχους· καὶ ὕστερον ἐπιτίθησι τὴν δροφὴν, ἥτίς ἐστι τέλος τῆς πράξεως. ἡ δ' ἀρχὴ τῆς πράξεως, τέλος τῆς θεωρίας. Ἀμμ. εἰς κατηγ.* p. 15. edit. Ven. 8vo. "For in general the end of theory is the beginning of practice; and so reciprocally, the end of practice, the beginning of theory. Thus, for instance: an architect, being ordered to build a house, says to himself, I am ordered to build a house; that is to say, a certain defence, to protect against the rains and the heats. But this cannot be, without a roof or covering. From this point, therefore, he begins his theory. He proceeds and says—but there can be no roof, if there be no walls; and there can be no walls, without some foundations; nor can there be laid foundations, without opening the earth. At this point, the theory is at an end. Hence, therefore, commences the practice, or action. For, first, he opens the earth; then lays the foundation; then raises the walls; and, lastly, puts on the roof, which is the end of the action or practice, [but beginning of the theory,] as the beginning of the practice was the end of the theory." See also Arist. Ethic. l. iii. c. 3. et de Anima, l. iii. c. 3.

[i] Vide Platon. de Rep. l. i. vol. ii. p. 341. edit. Serrani. *Ὥσπερ (ἔφην ἐγὼ) εἴ με ἔροιο εἰ ἐξαρκεῖ σώματι, εἶναι σώματι, ἢ προσδεῖται τίνος· εἴποιμ' ἄν, ὅτι παντάπασι μὲν οὖν προσδεῖται. διὰ ταῦτα καὶ ἡ τέχνη ἐστὶν ἰατρικὴ νῦν εὑρεμένη, ὅτι σῶμα ἐστι πονηρὸν, καὶ οὐκ ἐξαρκεῖ αὐτῷ τοιούτῳ εἶναι.* "Quemadmodum, inquam, si a me quæreres, an satis sit corpori, ut sit corpus, an alia quapiam re indigeat: responderem, omnino indigere. Atque hac quidem de causa medicinæ ars nunc est inventa, quoniam corpus per se profligatum est, neque ipsi satis est, ut sit hujusmodi." So, likewise, the acute Scaliger: "Motionis enim appetentia causa est; appetentiæ, privatio." De Caus. L. Lat. l. xv. c. 114.

suppose, that not only things merely necessary, but that those also conducive to elegance and enjoyment, were, of course, all implied in the constitution of human nature; that they were all steady, constant, and independent from without, and as inseparable from our being, as perspiring, or circulation: in such case, would not the arts of music, painting, and poetry, with every other art passing under the denomination of elegant, have been as useless as we have held those others of medicine, clothing, and architecture?—I replied, it seemed they would.—It was, then, the absence of joys, elegancies, and amusements from our constitution, as left by nature, which induced us to seek them in these arts of elegance and entertainment.—It was.—And what, said he, are joys, elegancies, amusements, health, robustness, with those several other objects of desire, whose absence leads to art, but so many different names of that complex being called "Good," under its various, and multiform, and popular appearances?—I replied, it seemed so.

If this, then, said he, be granted, it should seem that the beginning, or principle of art, was the absence of something thought good; because it has appeared that it is for the sake of some such absent good that every art operates; and because, if we suppose no such absence to have been, we should never have known any art.—I confess, said I, it seems so.

But how, then, continued he, if it be true that all art implies such principle, is it reciprocally true that every such principle should imply art?—I see no reason, said I, why not.—Consider, said he. It might be thought a good by some, perhaps, to be as strong as those horses which are ploughing yonder field; to be as tall as those elms, and of a nature as durable: yet would the absence of goods, like these, lead to art? Or is it not absurd to suppose there should be an art of impossibilities?[k]—Absurd, said I, certainly.—If so, said he, when we define the beginning or principle of art, it is not enough to call it the absence of something thought good, unless we add, that the good be a good possible; "a thing attainable by man; a thing relative to human life, and consistent with human nature:" or does not this, also, appear a requisite?—I replied, I thought it did.

But still, continued he, is it a sufficient motive to art, that the good desired should be attainable? In other words, does every absence of good attainable lead to art? or is our account

[k] What is here said concerning the difference between those things for which we may possibly wish, and those which we actually pursue, is expressed in the Ethics of Aristotle, l. iii. c. 2. *Προαίρεσις μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἔστι τῶν ἀδυνάτων, καὶ εἴ τις φαίη προαιρεῖσθαι, δοκοίη ἂν ἠλίθιος εἶναι. Βούλησις δ' ἐστὶ τῶν ἀδυνάτων, οἷον ἀθανασίας.* "There is, indeed, no determined choice of action with respect to things impossible; and if any one should say he had so determined, he would appear to be a fool. But there may be a willing, or longing after things impossible; as, for instance, never to die."

still too loose, and in need of stricter determination?—Of none, said I, which appears to me.—Reflect, said he; there are some of the possible goods so obvious and easy, that every man, in an ordinary state of common natural perfection, is able to acquire them, without labour or application. You will hardly deny, but that a fair apple, tempting to eat, may be gathered; or a clear spring, tempting to drink, may be drank at, by the mere suggestions of will and uninstructed instinct.[l]—I granted, they might.—It would be therefore impertinent, said he, to suppose that goods, like these, should lead to art, because art would be superfluous, and in no respect necessary.—Indeed, said I, it seems so.

If, therefore, said he, neither impossibles lead to art, because of such there can be no art; nor things easily possible, because in such nature can do without art: what is it we have left, to which we may refer it? Or can it indeed be to any other than to that middle class of things, which, however possible, are still not so easy, but to be beyond the powers of will, and instinct uninstructed?—I replied, it seemed so.—That there are many such things, said he, is evident, past doubt. For what man would pay artists so largely for their arts, were he enabled by nature to obtain whatever he desired? Or who would study to be skilled in arts, were nature's original powers to be of themselves alone sufficient?—I told him, it was not likely.

It should seem, then, said he, according to this reasoning, that the beginning, motive, or principle of art; that cause, which first moves it to action, and for the sake of which its several operations are exerted, is "the want or absence of something appearing good; relative to human life, and attainable by man, but superior to his natural and uninstructed faculties."[m]—I

[l] "Will," *βούλησις*, or *ὄρεξις λογιστική*: "uninstructed instinct," *ὄρεξις ἀλόγιστος*. See before, note *c*.

[m] The cause here described is the *τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα*, or "final."—Aristotle, in his Physics, l. ii. c. 3. in enumerating the various sorts of causes, reckons amongst the rest, *τὸ δ' ὡς τὸ τέλος, καὶ τ' ἀγαθὸν τῶν ἄλλων. τὸ γὰρ οὗ ἕνεκα βέλτιστον, καὶ τέλος τῶν ἄλλων ἐθέλει εἶναι*: "to these may be added that cause, which is considered as the end and good of all the rest. For that, for whose sake all the others are deemed necessary, has just pretensions to be best, and to be the end of them all." To this he subjoins, consonant to what is said in the Dialogue, *διαφερέτω δὲ μηδὲν αὐτὸ εἰπεῖν ἀγαθὸν ἢ φαινόμενον ἀγαθόν*: "let it make no difference whether we call this end, real good, or only apparent good." So in the beginning of his Ethics: *Πᾶσα τέχνη, καὶ πᾶσα μέθοδος, ὁμοίως δὲ πρᾶξίς τε καὶ προαίρεσις ἀγαθοῦ τινος ἐφίεσθαι δοκεῖ. Διὸ καλῶς ἀπεφήναντο τ' ἀγαθὸν, οὗ πάντα ἐφίεται*: "every art, and every orderly speculation, so likewise every action, and determined choice of pursuit, appear all of them to tend toward some good. Well therefore have they pronounced 'good' to be that toward which all things tend." See also Plat. in Gorg. vol. i. p. 499. E. edit. Serrani.

In the definition here treated, the words "relative to human life" express that part of the Stoic definition of art [*πρὸς τὶ τέλος εὔχρηστον τῶν ἐν τῷ βίῳ.*] They were omitted in the definition, pages 8, 9, as more properly belonging to the present definition, which respects art in its final cause. See note *f*.

That what is perfect and self-sufficient is above the secondary helps of art; that our own weakness and insufficiency, and the prospect of procuring that absent good, by which we all hope to supply ourselves, where deficient; that this is the source not

replied, I could not deny, but that the account appeared probable.

IV. Let this, then, said he, suffice, as to the beginning of art. But how shall we describe its end? What is it we shall pronounce this?—My answer, I replied, must be the same as often already; which was, indeed, that I could not resolve the question.—It should seem, said he, not so difficult, now we have discovered what beginning is. For if beginning and end are contraries and opposed, it is but to invert, as it were, the notion of beginning, and we gain of course the notion of end.—I asked him, in what manner?—Thus, said he, the beginning of art has been held to be something, which, if supposed away, men would be never moved to apply to art. By inversion, therefore, the end of art must be something, which, while supposed away, men will never cease applying to art; because, were they to cease, while the end was wanting, they would cease with imperfection, and their performance would be incomplete.—To this I answered, That the account, however true, was by far too general, to give me much intelligence.

He replied, If it was, he would endeavour to be more particular. And what, continued he, should we say, that every art, according to its genius, will of course be accomplished either in some energy, or in some work; that, besides these two, it can be accomplished in nothing else; and consequently that one of these must of necessity be its end?—I could not here but answer him, with a smile, that the matter was now much obscurer than ever.—I find, then, said he, it is proper we should be more explicit in our inquiries, and deduce our reasonings from some clearer point of view.—I told him, it was quite necessary, if he intended to be intelligible.

Thus, then, said he, You will grant, that every art, being a cause, must be productive of some effect: for instance, music, of a tune; dancing, of a dance; architecture, of a palace; and sculpture, of a statue.—It is allowed, said I.—You will grant also, said he, that in these productions they are all accomplished

only of all arts, but (joined to social affection) is the origin and cement of human society; see (besides the place here treated) page 4; and of the third treatise, s. 12.

Thus the poet in Stobæus, p. 515.

Χρειὼ τάντ' ἐδίδαξε· τί δ' οὐ χρειώ κεν ἀνεύροι;

Need all things taught: what cannot need invent?

Agreeably also to this, Virgil, in his first Georgic, having told us of the various changes to the worse which happened in the natural world immediately subsequent to the golden age, goes on to enumerate the several inventions of men, which were the natural result of this their newly indigent state. He at last sums up the whole by saying,

Tum varia venere artes: labor omnia vicit
Improbus, et duris urgens in rebus egestas.

Where (according to the doctrine in the Dialogue) want is made the beginning or origin of arts. The poet even refers this dispensation, this introduction of indigence, care, and solicitude, to the immediate will of Providence, acting for the good of mankind; lest plenty should lull them into slothful lethargy, so as to forget their noblest and most active faculties.

Pater ipse colendi
Haud facilem esse viam voluit, primusque per artem
Movit agros, curis acuens mortalia corda,
Nec torpere gravi passus sua regna veterno.

and ended; or, in other words, that as music produces a tune, so it is ended and accomplished in a tune; and as sculpture produces a statue, so is it ended and accomplished in a statue.—It is admitted, said I.—Now these productions, continued he, if you will examine, are not like units or mathematical points; but, on the contrary, all consist of a certain number of parts, from whose accurate order is derived their beauty and perfection. For example: notes, ranged after such a manner, make a tune in music; and limbs, ranged after such a manner, make a statue or a picture.—I replied, they did.—If then the productions, continued he, of every art thus consist of certain parts, it will follow, that these parts will be either co-existent, or not; and if not co-existent, then of course successive.—Assist me, said I, by another instance, for you are growing again obscure.—Co-existent, replied he, as in a statue, where arms, legs, body, and head all subsist together at one individual instant: successive, as in a tune or dance, where there is no such co-existence, but where some parts are ever passing away, and others are ever succeeding them.[n]

Can any thing be said to exist, said I, whose parts are ever passing away?—Surely, replied he; or how else exist years and seasons, months and days, with their common parent, time itself? Or, indeed, what is human life, but a compound of parts thus fleeting; a compound of various and multiform actions, which succeed each other in a certain order?[o]—The fact, said I, appears so.

This then, continued he, being the case, and there being this difference in productions, call every production, the parts of which exist successively, and whose nature hath its being or essence in a transition, call it, what it really is, a motion or an energy: thus a tune and a dance are energies; thus riding and

[n] This division of beings or productions we find mentioned by Aristotle in his Physics, (l. iii. c. 8.) where, explaining his doctrine concerning *infinite*, he says, Ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ πολλάκις τὸ εἶναι, ὥσπερ ἡ ἡμέρα ἐστὶ, καὶ ὁ ἀγὼν, τῷ ἀεὶ ἄλλο καὶ ἄλλο γίνεσθαι, οὕτω καὶ τὸ ἄπειρον. "Inasmuch as *being* is manifold, such as is the being of a day, or public festival, (which exist by continually becoming something further,) such also is the being and nature of infinite." The same sentiment soon after is more fully explained and opened: Ὥστε τὸ ἄπειρον οὐ δεῖ λαμβάνειν, ὡς τόδε τι, οἷον ἄνθρωπον, ἢ οἰκίαν· ἀλλ' ὡς ἡμέρα λέγεται, καὶ ὁ ἀγὼν οἷς τὸ εἶναι, οὐκ ὡς οὐσία τὶς γέγονεν, ἀλλ' ἀεὶ ἐν γενέσει καὶ φθορᾷ. "We are not to conceive of infinite, as of a positive particular substance, like a man or a house; but rather as we pronounce existence of a day, or public festival, which have their essence, not as sensible, individual substances, but by a continued procedure of being and ceasing to be." Vid. Scalig. de Caus. Ling. Lat. l. iii. c. 72. p. 124. Aristot. Categ. c. 6. Ammon. Com. *eis* Κατ. p. 82. b. Scal. Poetic. l. iii. c. 1. p. 82.

[o] It is not inelegantly said in the Ethics, so often referred to, Ἡ δὲ ζωὴ ἐνέργειά τίς ἐστι, καὶ ἕκαστος περὶ ταῦτα καὶ τούτοις ἐνεργεῖ ἃ καὶ μάλιστα ἀγαπᾷ· οἷον ὁ μὲν μουσικὸς, τῇ ἀκοῇ περὶ τὰ μέλη, ὁ δὲ φιλομαθὴς, τῇ διανοίᾳ περὶ τὰ θεωρήματα· οὕτω δὲ καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν ἕκαστος. "Life is a certain energy, and each man energizes about those subjects, and with those faculties, for which he hath the greatest affection: the musician, with his hearing, about sounds harmonious; the studious, with his intellect, about matters of speculation: and, in like manner, each man else of the various sorts beside." Ethic. l. x. c. 4.

sailing are energies; and so is elocution, and so is life itself. On the contrary, call every production, whose parts exist all at once, and whose nature depends not on a transition for its essence, call it a work, or thing done, not an energy or operation. Thus a house is a work, a statue is a work, and so is a ship, and so a picture.—I seem, said I, to comprehend you.

If, then, there be no productions, said he, but must be of parts, either co-existent or successive; and the one of these be, as you perceive, a work, and the other be an energy; it will follow, there will be no production, but will be either a work or an energy.—There will not, said I.—But every art, said he, you have granted, is accomplished and ended in what it produces?—I replied, I had.—And there are no productions, but works or energies?—None.

It will follow, then, said he, that every art will be accomplished and ended in a work or energy.[p]

To this I answered, that his reasoning I could not impeach;

[p] The cause here treated is the formal, called by various names; the *εἶδος*, the *λόγος*, the *τί ἐστι*, the *τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι*. Vid. Scal. de Caus. Ling. Lat. l. v. c. 113. p. 232. Imperfectum autem Græci, etc.

In the beginning of the above-cited Ethics, after the author has told us that every art, and human action, tend to some good, or end; he adds, *Διαφορὰ δέ τις φαίνεται τῶν τέλων· τὰ μὲν γὰρ εἰσιν ἐνεργείαι· τὰ δὲ παρ' αὐτὰς, ἔργα τινά:* "but there appears a difference in ends: for some are energies; some, over and above these energies, are certain works." In Quintilian's Institutes, the same distinction, with respect to the end of arts, is mentioned, l. ii. c. 18. Vid. Plat. in Dio. Laert. l. iii. c. 84. p. 216. c. 100. p. 225.

But here perhaps it may be asked, if all arts are ended and accomplished in some energy or work, and this energy or work be almost universally that absent good, toward which they all tend, and for the sake of which they are all exerted; (for a dance, which is an energy, and a house, which is a work, are certain absent goods or pleasures, for the sake of which certain arts operate;) if this be allowed, it may be asked, whence then the difference between the formal cause and the final; the final, as in note [m] it has been already treated?

The answer to this is, that they concur and are the same. *Τὸ μὲν γὰρ τί ἐστι, καὶ τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα, ἓν ἔστι.* "The formal cause and the final are one." Arist. Nat. Ausc. l. ii. c. 7. If they differ, it is (as Jeannes Grammaticus observes in commenting on this place) a difference rather in the time and manner of our viewing them, than in their own essence and nature. It may not perhaps be improper to transcribe his own words: *Ταυτὸν τῷ ἀριθμῷ τὸ τέλος καὶ τὸ εἶδος, τῇ σχέσει μόνῃ διαφέρον, ὡς εἴρηται, καὶ τῷ χρόνῳ. ὅταν μὲν γὰρ ὡς γινόμενον, καὶ μήπω ὂν θεωρῆται, τέλος ἐστὶν· ὅταν δὲ ὡς ἤδη γενόμενον, εἶδος.* "The end and the form are numerically the same, differing (as has been said) in relation only, and time. For thus the same thing, while considered as in its progress to completion, but as not yet complete, is so long an end; when considered as actually complete, is no longer an end, but a form." And thus is this question one way answered, by acknowledging that these two causes coincide, and differ not in their essence or real character; but rather in the time and manner of our contemplating them.

But there is another answer, and that is derived from the twofold nature of final causes. According to this doctrine, arts have not only a nearer and more immediate end, (as a ship is the end of ship-building, or navigating the end of pilotry,) but they have a still remoter and higher end, a *τέλος τελικώτατον*, that is to say, man, human-kind, or (in other words) the utility or elegance of human life. Thus the Stagirite: *Ἐσμὲν γὰρ πῶς καὶ ἡμεῖς τέλος· διχῶς γὰρ τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα.* "For we ourselves also are in some sort an end: for the final cause is twofold." Natur. Auscult. l. ii. c. 2. If, therefore, we have respect to this ultimate end, these two causes will be found to differ, and be really distinct from each other.

And thus it is that in some respects they agree, and in others they differ, according to the above distinctions established by this philosophy.

but that still the distinction of work and energy was what I did not well comprehend.—There are several circumstances, said he, which will serve sufficiently to make it clear.—I begged he would mention some.

Thus, then, said he, when the production of any art is an energy, then the perfection of the art can be only perceived during that energy. For instance, the perfection of a musician is only known while he continues playing. But when the production of any art is a work, then is not the perfection visible during the energy, but only after it. Thus the perfection of the statuary is not seen during his energies as a statuary, but when his energies are over; when no stroke of the chisel is wanting, but the statue is left as the result of all.—It is true, said I.

Again, continued he, in consequence of this, where the production is an energy, there the production is of necessity coeval with the artist. For how should the energy survive the man; the playing remain when the musician is dead? But where the production is a work, then is there no such necessity. The work may well remain, when the artist is forgotten; there being no more reason, that the statue and the artist should be coeval, than the man and the rude marble, before it received a regular figure.—You seem now, said I, to have explained yourself.

If, then, said he, work and energy be made intelligible terms, you cannot but perceive the truth of what we before asserted, that every art, according to its genius, must needs be accomplished in one of these; that, except in these two, it can be accomplished in nothing else; and, consequently, that one of these must of necessity be its end.—I answered, that the reasoning appeared justly deduced.—So much, then, replied he, for the ending or accomplishment of art; and so much also for a long, and, I fear, an intricate disquisition.

V. He had no sooner said this, than I was beginning to applaud him; especially on his having treated a subject so copiously, started, as it were, by chance, and without any apparent preparation. But I had not gone far, before he interrupted me, by saying, that as to my praises they were more than he deserved; that he could pretend to no great merit for having been, as I called it, so copious, when he had so often before thought on what at present we had been talking.—In short, says he, to tell you a secret, I have been a long time amusing myself in forming an essay upon this subject.—I could not here forbear reproaching him, for having hitherto concealed his intentions. My reproaches produced a sort of amicable controversy, which at length ended in his offering, that, to make me some amends, he would now recite me (if I pleased) a small fragment of the piece; a fragment which he had happened accidentally to have about him. The proposal, on my part, was willingly accepted, and without further delay the papers were produced.

As to the performance itself, it must be confessed, in point of style, it was somewhat high and florid, perhaps even bordering upon an excess. At the time however of recital, this gave me less offence, because it seemed, as it were, to palliate the dryness of what had passed before, and in some sort to supply the place of an epilogue to our conference. Not however to anticipate, he began reading as follows:

"O Art! thou distinguishing attribute and honour of human kind! who art not only able to imitate Nature in her graces, but (what is more) even to adorn her with graces of thy own.[q] Possessed of thee, the meanest genius grows deserving, and has a just demand for a portion of our esteem. Devoid of thee, the brightest of our kind lie lost and useless, and are but poorly distinguished from the most despicable and base. When we inhabited forests in common with brutes, nor otherwise known from them than by the figure of our species, thou taughtest us to assert the sovereignty of our nature, and to assume that empire for which Providence intended us. Thousands of utilities owe their birth to thee; thousands of elegancies, pleasures, and joys, without which life itself would be but an insipid possession.

"Wide and extensive is the reach of thy dominion. No element is there either so violent or so subtle, so yielding or so sluggish, as by the powers of its nature to be superior to thy direction. Thou dreadest not the fierce impetuosity of fire, but compellest its violence to be both obedient and useful. By it thou softenest the stubborn tribe of minerals, so as to be formed and moulded into shapes innumerable. Hence weapons, armour, coin; and previous to these, and other thy works and energies, hence all those various tools and instruments which empower thee to proceed to further ends more excellent. Nor is the subtle air less obedient to thy power, whether thou willest it to be a minister to our pleasure, or utility. At thy command it giveth birth to sounds, which charm the soul with all the powers of harmony. Under thy instruction it moves the ship over seas, while that yielding element, where otherwise we sink, even water itself is by thee taught to bear us; the vast ocean to promote that intercourse of nations, which ignorance would imagine it was destined to intercept. To say how thy influence is seen on earth, would be to teach the meanest what he knows already. Suffice it but to mention fields of arable and pasture; lawns

[q] This alludes to a capital distinction of art, taken from a view of her different ends. Art may in some respects be said to finish nature; in others, to imitate her. She finishes her, where nature, having given the powers, is of herself unable to give them perfection. It is thus the gymnastic arts, dancing, riding &c., finish the corporeal powers; while the sublimer arts, logic, rhetoric, moral virtue, &c., finish the mental. Where she does not finish nature, she imitates her, as in sculpture, painting, dramatic poetry, &c.

Aristotle expresses the above sentiment as follows: Ὅλως τε ἡ τέχνη τὰ μὲν ἐπιτελεῖ, ἂν ἡ φύσις ἀδυνατεῖ ἀπεργάζεσθαι, τὰ δὲ μιμεῖται. Physic. l. ii. c. 8.

and groves, and gardens, and plantations; cottages, villages, castles, towns; palaces, temples, and spacious cities.

"Nor does thy empire end in subjects thus inanimate. Its power also extends through the various race of animals, who either patiently submit to become thy slaves, or are sure to find thee an irresistible foe. The faithful dog, the patient ox, the generous horse, and the mighty elephant, are content all to receive their instructions from thee, and readily to lend their natural instincts or strength, to perform those offices which thy occasions call for. If there be found any species which are serviceable when dead, thou suggestest the means to investigate and take them. If any be so savage as to refuse being tamed, or of natures fierce enough to venture an attack, thou teachest us to scorn their brutal rage; to meet, repel, pursue, and conquer.

"And such, O Art! is thy amazing influence, when thou art employed only on these inferior subjects; on natures inanimate, or, at best, irrational. But whenever thou choosest a subject more noble, and settest to the cultivating of Mind itself, then it is thou becomest truly amiable and divine; the ever-flowing source of those sublimer beauties of which no subject but Mind alone is capable. Then it is thou art enabled to exhibit to mankind the admired tribe of poets and of orators; the sacred train of patriots and of heroes; the godlike list of philosophers and legislators; the forms of virtuous and equal polities, where private welfare is made the same with public; where crowds themselves prove disinterested and brave, and virtue is made a national and popular characteristic.

"Hail! sacred source of all these wonders! Thyself instruct me to praise thee worthily, through whom, whatever we do is done with elegance and beauty; without whom, what we do is ever graceless and deformed. Venerable power! By what name shall I address thee? Shall I call thee Ornament of Mind; or art thou more truly Mind itself? It is Mind thou art, most perfect Mind; not rude, untaught, but fair and polished: in such thou dwellest, of such thou art the form; nor is it a thing more possible to separate thee from such, than it would be to separate thee from thy own existence."

My good friend was now arrived to a very exalted pitch, and was pursuing his panegyric with great warmth and fluency, when we entered the suburbs, our walk being near finished. The people, as we went along, began to look at us with surprise; which I, who was less engaged, having leisure to observe, thought it was proper to admonish my friend, that he should give over. He immediately ceased reading; put his papers up; and thanked me for stopping him at so seasonable a time.

VI. What remained of our discourse passed off with less

rapture, and was, indeed, no more than a kind of short recapitulation.

He observed to me, that our inquiries had furnished out an answer to four different questions. For thus, said he, if it be asked us, What Art is? We have to answer, "It is an habitual power in man of becoming the cause of some effect, according to a system of various and well-approved precepts." If it be asked us, On what subject art operates? We can answer, "On a contingent which is within the reach of the human powers to influence." If it be asked us, For what reason, for the sake of what, art operates? We may reply, "For the sake of some absent good, relative to human life, and attainable by man, but superior to his natural and uninstructed faculties." Lastly, if it be asked, Where it is the operations of art end? We may say, "Either in some energy, or in some work."

He added, that if he were not afraid of the imputation of pedantry, he could be almost tempted to say, that we had been considering art, with respect to those four causes, so celebrated once among professors in the schools. By these, upon inquiry, I found that he meant certain causes, called the efficient,[r] the material,[s] the final,[t] and the formal.[u]

[r] Page 8.
[s] Page 11.
[t] Page 16.
[u] That is to say, *τὸ κινήσαν, ἡ Ὕλη, τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα, τὸ Εἶδος.*

Thus Seneca, in his 65th epistle: Causam Aristoteles putat tribus modis dici. Prima, inquit, causa est ipsa materia, sine qua nihil potest effici. Secunda, opifex. Tertia, forma quæ unicuique operi imponitur, tanquam statuæ; nam hanc Aristoteles idos (*εἶδος*) vocat. Quarta quoque, inquit, his accedit, propositum totius operis.

Quid sit hoc, aperiam. Æs prima statuæ causa est: nunquam enim facta esset, nisi fuisset id, ex quo ea funderetur, ducereturve. Secunda causa, artifex est: non potuisset enim æs illud in habitum statuæ figurari, nisi accessissent peritæ manus. Tertia causa est forma: neque enim statua ista Doryphoros aut Diadumenos vocaretur, nisi hæc illi esset impressa facies. Quarta causa est, faciendi propositum: nam nisi hoc fuisset, facta non esset. Quid est propositum? Quod invitavit artificem, quod ille secutus fecit. Vel pecunia est hoc, si venditurus fabricavit; vel gloria, si laboravit in nomen; vel religio, si donum templo paravit. Ergo et hæc causa est, propter quam fit. An non putas inter causas facti operis numerandum, quo remoto factum non esset.

Aristotle's own words are as follow: *Ἕνα μὲν οὖν τρόπον αἴτιον λέγεται τὸ ἐξ οὗ γίνεταί τι ἐνυπάρχοντος· οἷον, ὁ χαλκὸς τοῦ ἀνδριάντος, καὶ ὁ ἄργυρος τῆς φιάλης, καὶ τὰ τούτων γένη. Ἄλλον δὲ, τὸ εἶδος, καὶ τὸ παράδειγμα· τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ὁ λόγος ὁ τοῦ τί ἦν εἶναι, καὶ τὰ τούτου γένη· οἷον τοῦ διὰ πασῶν τὰ δύο πρὸς ἕν, καὶ ὅλως ὁ ἀριθμὸς, καὶ τὰ μέρη τὰ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ. Ἔτι, ὅθεν ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς μεταβολῆς ἡ πρώτη, ἢ ἡ τῆς ἠρεμήσεως· οἷον ὁ βουλεύσας, αἴτιον· καὶ ὁ πατὴρ, τοῦ τέκνου· καὶ ὅλως τὸ ποιοῦν τοῦ ποιουμένου, καὶ τὸ μεταβάλλον τοῦ μεταβαλλομένου. Ἔτι, ὡς τὸ τέλος· τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα· οἷον τοῦ περιπατεῖν ἡ ὑγίεια· διὰ τί γὰρ περιπατεῖ; φαμὲν ἵνα ὑγιαίνῃ, καὶ εἰπόντες οὕτως, οἰόμεθα ἀποδεδωκέναι τὸ αἴτιον.* "In one manner that may be called a cause, out of which, existing as a part of it, any thing is made or compounded. Thus is brass the cause of a statue, silver of a cup, and so also the higher genera, in which these are included, [as metal, the genus including brass and silver; body, the genus including metal, &c. &c.] In another way, the form and exemplar of any thing is its cause; that is to say, in other words, the definition, the detail or narrative of its essence, [that which, characterising it to be such a particular thing, distinguishes it from all things else,] and of this definition the several higher genera. Thus the cause of the diapason, or octave, is the proportion of two to one; and more generally than that, is number; and is moreover the several parts, out of which this definition is formed. Add to this cause, that other, from whence

But here, without further explaining, he begged for the present that we might conclude, being sufficiently, as he said, fatigued with the length of what had passed already. The request was reasonable, I could not but own; and thus ended our conversation, and soon after it our walk.

the original principle of change, or of ceasing to change; as, for instance, the person who deliberates, is the cause of that which results from such deliberation; the father is the cause of the son; and, in general, the efficient, of the thing effected; the power changing, of the thing changed. Besides these causes, there is that also which is considered as the end; that is to say, the cause, for the sake of which the thing is done. Thus the cause of exercising is health. For if it be asked, Why does he use exercise? We say, To preserve his health: and having said thus much, we think we have given the proper cause." Arist. Natur. Auscult. l. ii. c. 3.

See also p. 20.

A DISCOURSE

ON

MUSIC, PAINTING, AND POETRY.

CHAPTER I.

INTRODUCTION. DESIGN AND DISTRIBUTION OF THE WHOLE. PREPARATION FOR THE FOLLOWING CHAPTERS.

All arts have this in common, that they respect human life. Some contribute to its necessities, as medicine and agriculture; others to its elegance, as music, painting, and poetry.

Now, with respect to these two different species, the necessary arts seem to have been prior in time;[a] if it be probable, that

[a] The following extract from a manuscript of Philoponus may help to shew the comparative priority of arts and sciences, by shewing (according to this author) the order of their revival in a new-formed society. Such society he supposes to have arisen from scattered individuals again assembling themselves, after former societies had, by various incidents of war, famine, inundation, and the like, been dissipated and destroyed.

Having spoken of the effects of Deucalion's flood, he proceeds as follows: Οὗτοι οὖν οἱ περιλειφθέντες, μὴ ἔχοντες ὅθεν ἂν τραφεῖεν, ἐπενόουν ὑπ' ἀνάγκης τὰ πρὸς χρείαν, οἷον τὸ ἀλήθειν μύλαις σῖτον, ἢ τὸ σπείρειν, ἤ τι τοιοῦτον ἄλλο· καὶ ἐκάλεσαν τὴν τοιαύτην ἐπίνοιαν σοφίαν, τὴν εἰς τὰ ἀναγκαῖα τοῦ βίου τὸ λυσιτελὲς ἐξευρίσκουσαν, καὶ σοφὸν τὸν ἐπινενοηκότα.

Πάλιν ἐπενόησαν τέχνας, ὡς φησὶν ὁ ποιητής,

. . . . ὑποθημοσύνησιν Ἀθήνης,

οὐ μόνον τὰς μέχρι τῆς εἰς τὸν βίον ἀνάγκης ἱσταμένας, ἀλλὰ καὶ μέχρι τοῦ καλοῦ καὶ ἀστείου προϊούσας· καὶ τοῦτο πάλιν σοφίαν κεκλήκασιν, καὶ τὸν εὑρόντα σοφόν· ὡς τὸ,

. . . . . σοφὸς ἤραρε τέκτων,

Εὖ εἰδὼς σοφίης . . . .

ὑποθημοσύνησι δ' Ἀθήνης εἶπεν, ἐπεὶ διὰ τὴν ὑπερβολὴν τῶν εὑρημάτων εἰς θεὸν τὴν τούτων ἐπίνοιαν ἀνέφερον.

Πάλιν, ἀπέβλεψαν πρὸς τὰ πολιτικὰ πράγματα, καὶ ἐξεύρον νόμους, καὶ πάντα τὰ συνιστῶντα τὰς πόλεις· καὶ ταύτην πάλιν τὴν ἐπίνοιαν σοφίαν ἐκάλεσαν· τοιοῦτοι γὰρ ἦσαν οἱ ἑπτὰ σοφοὶ, πολιτικὰς τινὰς ἀρετὰς εὑρόντες.

Εἶτα λοιπὸν, ὁδῷ προϊόντες, καὶ ἐπ' αὐτὰ τὰ σώματα, καὶ τὴν δημιουργὸν αὐτῶν προῆλθον φύσιν, καὶ ταύτην εἰδικώτερον φυσικὴν ἐκάλεσαν θεωρίαν, καὶ σοφοὺς τοὺς τὴν τοιαύτην μετιόντας σκέψιν.

Τελευταῖον δ' ἐπ' αὐτὰ λοιπὸν ἔφθασαν τὰ θεῖα, καὶ ὑπερκόσμια, καὶ ἀμετάβλητα παντελῶς, καὶ τὴν τούτων Γνῶσιν κυριωτάτην σοφίαν ὠνόμασαν.

"These, therefore, that were thus left, not having whence they could support themselves, began through necessity to contrive things relative to immediate want, such as the grinding of corn by mills, or the sowing it, or something else of like kind; and such contrivance, discovering what was conducive to the necessaries of life, they called wisdom; and him a wise man, who had been the contriver.

"Again, they contrived arts (as Homer says),

By precepts of Minerva;

that is, not only those arts that stop at the

men consulted how to live and to support themselves, before they began to deliberate how to render life agreeable. Nor is

necessity of life, but those also that advance as far as the fair and elegant: and this, too, they called wisdom; and the inventor, a wise man. Thus the poet:

The work
'Twas a wise artist fram'd, his wisdom taught
By precepts of Minerva.

The last words are added, because, from the transcendence of the inventions, they referred their contrivance to a divinity.

"Again, they turned their eyes to matters political, and found out laws, and the several things that constitute cities, or civil communities: and this contrivance in its turn they called wisdom, and of this sort were those celebrated seven wise men, the inventors of certain virtues political.

"After this, still advancing in a road, they proceeded to corporeal substances, and to nature, their efficient cause; and this speculation, by a more specific name, they called natural speculation, and those persons wise, who pursued such inquiries.

"Last of all, they attained even to beings divine, supramundane, and wholly unchangeable; and the knowledge of these they named the most excellent wisdom."

A few observations on this important passage may not perhaps be improper.

Our first observation is, that though we give it from Philoponus, yet is it by him (as he informs us) taken from a work of Aristocles, an ancient Peripatetic, entitled, Περὶ Φιλοσοφίας, "Concerning Philosophy." Some, indeed, have conjectured, that for Aristocles, we ought to read Aristoteles, because the last published a work under this title, which he quotes himself in his treatise *De Anima*. Be this as it may, the extract itself is valuable, not only for its matter, but for being the fragment of a treatise now no longer extant.

Our next observation is, that by "matters political," in the third paragraph, the author means, not the first associations of mankind, for these were prior to almost every thing else, and were not referable to art, but to the innate impulse of the social principle: he means, on the contrary, those more exquisite and artificial forms, given to societies already established, in order to render them happy, and rescue and preserve them from tyrannic power. Such was the polity given by Lycurgus to the Lacedæmonians, by Solon to the Athenians, by Numa to the Romans, &c. Those great and good men, in meditating their institutions, had the same sentiment with Alcidamas, according to that noble fragment of his, preserved in the scholiast upon Aristotle's Rhetoric, Ἐλευθέρους ἀφῆκε πάντας θεός· οὐδένα δοῦλον ἡ φύσις πεποίηκεν, "God hath sent forth all men free; nature hath made no man a slave."

Our third observation is, that by "the most excellent science," in the last paragraph, is meant the science of causes, and, above all others, of causes efficient and final, as these necessarily imply pervading reason, and superintending wisdom. This science, as men were naturally led to it from the contemplation of effects, which effects were the tribe of beings natural or physical, was, from being thus subsequent to these physical inquiries, called metaphysical; but with a view to itself, and the transcendent eminence of its object, was more properly called ἡ πρώτη φιλοσοφία, "the first philosophy."

Our fourth observation is on the order of these inventions; namely, arts necessary, arts elegant, arts political, science physical, science metaphysical; in all, five habits, or modes of wisdom. The necessary arts it is evident must on all accounts have come first. When these were once established, the transition to the elegant was easy and obvious. Inventions of necessity, by the superadditions of despatch, facility, and the like, soon ripened into inventions of convenience; and again these, having in their very nature a certain beauty and grace, easily suggested inventions of pure and simple elegance.

That the legislators, though in rank and genius far superior to all natural philosophers, should come before them in point of time, is owing to the nature of their subject, which had a more immediate connection with man, and human happiness. It was not, indeed, till societies were thoroughly established, and peace had been well secured both internally and externally, that men had leisure, or even inclination, to reflect on the objects round them, or to recognise that vast mansion in which they found themselves existing.

Lastly, as the tremendous part of physical events led weak minds, who could not resolve them, into the abyss of dark and dreary superstition; so those of the same kind, which had beauty and order, being in their turn equally striking, and equally objects of admiration, led strong and generous minds into principles the very reverse. They conceived it probable, as their own views were limited, that, even where beauty and order were not to them apparent, they might still in others' views have a most real existence. Further, as these observers could

this, indeed, unconfirmed by fact, there being no nation known so barbarous and ignorant, as where the rudiments of these necessary arts are not in some degree cultivated. And hence possibly they may appear to be the more excellent and worthy, as having claim to a preference, derived from their seniority.

The arts, however, of elegance cannot be said to want pretensions, if it be true, that nature framed us for something more than mere existence. Nay, further,[b] if well-being be clearly preferable to mere-being, and this without it be but a thing contemptible, they may have reason perhaps to aspire even to a superiority. But enough of this; to come to our purpose.

II. The design of this discourse is to treat of music, painting, and poetry; to consider in what they agree, and in what they differ; and which, upon the whole, is more excellent than the other two.

In entering upon this inquiry, it is first to be observed, that the mind is made conscious of the natural world and its affections, and of other minds and their affections, by the several organs of the senses.[c] By the same organs, these arts exhibit to the mind imitations, and imitate either parts or affections of this natural world, or else the passions, energies, and other affections of minds. There is this difference, however, between these arts and nature; that nature passes to the percipient through all the

perceive nothing done either by themselves, or those of their own species, which, if it in the least aspired to utility, or beauty, was not necessarily the effect of a conscious and intelligent cause, they were, from the superior utility and beauty of physical effects, induced to infer a conscious and intelligent cause of these, far superior to themselves; a cause, which from the universality of these events, as well as from their union and sympathy, was not, as are the sons of men, a multitude of limited causes, but a simple cause, universal and one; a cause, too, which, from the never-ceasing of its events, was not, like the same human beings, an intermittent cause, but a cause, ever operating, ever in energy.

We see, therefore, the reason why this first philosophy was subsequent in point of time to physical speculation, and why of course to the other habits or modes of wisdom here enumerated, though in its own dignity and importance far superior to them all.

Our fifth observation is, that as a nation may be said to be in a state of perfection, which is in the full possession of all these habits, or modes of wisdom; so those nations are nearest to perfection, that possess them in the greatest number, or in a state of the greatest maturity.

A man of ingenuity might find rational amusement from this speculation, by comparing the same nation, as to these matters, either with itself in different periods, or with its neighbours in the same periods, either past or present. He might, for example, compare ancient Britain with ancient Greece; present Britain with present Greece; Britain in the age of crusades, with Britain in the age of Elizabeth; present Britain with her colonies, with Italy, France, Holland, and the enlightened countries; with Spain, Portugal, Barbary, &c. But this we leave, as foreign to our work, and drawing us into a theory, which merits a better place than an occasional note.

[b] Οὐ τὸ ζῆν περὶ πλείστου ποιητέον,
Ἀλλὰ τὸ εὖ ζῆν.
Plat. in Critone.

[c] To explain some future observations, it will be proper here to remark, that the mind from these materials thus brought together, and from its own operations on them, and in consequence of them, becomes fraught with ideas; and that many minds so fraught, by a sort of compact assigning to each idea some sound to be its mark or symbol, were the first inventors and founders of language. See Hermes, lib. iii. cap. 3, 4.

senses; whereas these arts use only two of them, that of seeing and that of hearing. And hence it is, that the sensible objects, or media, through which they imitate,[d] can be such only as these two senses are framed capable of perceiving; and these media are motion, sound, colour, and figure.

Painting, having the eye for its organ, cannot be conceived to imitate, but through the media of visible objects. And further, its mode of imitating being always motionless, there must be subtracted from these the medium of motion. It remains, then, that colour and figure are the only media through which painting imitates.

Music, passing to the mind through the organ of the ear, can imitate only by sounds and motions.

Poetry, having the ear also for its organ, as far as words are considered to be no more than mere sounds, can go no further in imitating, than may be performed by sound and motion. But then, as these its sounds stand by compact for the various ideas,[e] with which the mind is fraught, it is enabled by this means to imitate, as far as language can express; and that it is evident will, in a manner, include all things.

Now from hence may be seen, how these arts agree, and how they differ.

They agree, by being all mimetic or imitative.

They differ, as they imitate by different media: painting, by figure and colour; music, by sound and motion; painting and music, by media which are natural; poetry, for the greatest part, by a medium which is artificial.[f]

III. As to that art, which, upon the whole, is most excellent of the three, it must be observed, that among these various media of imitating, some will naturally be more accurate, some less; some will best imitate one subject, some another. Again, among the number of subjects there will be naturally also a difference as to merit and demerit. There will be some sublime,

[d] To prevent confusion, it must be observed, that in all these arts there is a difference between the sensible media, through which they imitate, and the subjects imitated. The sensible media, through which they imitate, must be always relative to that sense, by which the particular art applies to the mind; but the subject imitated may be foreign to that sense, and beyond the power of its perception. Painting, for instance, (as is shewn in this chapter,) has no sensible media, through which it operates, except colour and figure: but as to subjects, it may have motions, sounds, moral affections, and actions; none of which are either colours or figures, but which, however, are all capable of being imitated through them. See chap. ii. notes *i*, *j*, *k*.

[e] See note *c*, page 27.

[f] A figure painted, or a composition of musical sounds, have always a natural relation to that of which they are intended to be the resemblance. But a description in words has rarely any such natural relation to the several ideas, of which those words are the symbols. None, therefore, understand the description, but those who speak the language. On the contrary, musical and picture-imitations are intelligible to all men.

Why it is said, that poetry is not universally, but only for the greater part artificial, see below, chap. iii., where what natural force it has, is examined and estimated.

and some low; some copious, and some short; some pathetic, and others void of passion; some formed to instruct, and others not capable of it.

Now from these two circumstances, that is to say, from the accuracy of the imitation, and the merit of the subject imitated, the question, concerning which art is most excellent, must be tried and determined.

This, however, cannot be done, without a detail of particulars, that so there may be formed, on every part, just and accurate comparisons.

To begin, therefore, with painting.

CHAPTER II.

ON THE SUBJECTS WHICH PAINTING IMITATES. ON THE SUBJECTS WHICH MUSIC IMITATES. COMPARISON OF MUSIC WITH PAINTING.

THE fittest subjects for painting, are all such things and incidents as are peculiarly characterized by figure and colour.[g]

Of this kind are the whole mass of things inanimate and vegetable;[h] such as flowers, fruits, buildings, landscapes: the various tribes of animal figures; such as birds, beasts, herds, flocks: the motions and sounds peculiar to each animal species, when accompanied with configurations, which are obvious and remarkable:[i] the human body in all its appearances, (as male, female; young, old; handsome, ugly,) and in all its attitudes, (as lying, sitting, standing, &c.:) the natural sounds peculiar to the human species, (such as crying, laughing, hallooing, &c.:[j])

[g] Page 28.

[h] The reason is, that these things are almost wholly known to us by their colour and figure: besides, they are as motionless, for the most part, in nature, as in the imitation.

[i] Instances of this kind are the flying of birds, the galloping of horses, the roaring of lions, the crowing of cocks: and the reason is, that though to paint motion or sound be impossible, yet the motions and sounds here mentioned having an immediate and natural connection with a certain visible configuration of the parts, the mind, from a prospect of this configuration, conceives insensibly that which is concomitant; and hence it is, that, by a sort of fallacy, the sounds and motions appear to be painted also. On the contrary, not so in such motions as the swimming of many kinds of fish, or in such sounds as the purring of a cat, because here is no such special configuration to be perceived. Homer, in his shield, describing the picture of a bull seized by two lions, says of the bull, ὁ δὲ μακρὰ μεμυκὼς Ἕλκετο, "he, bellowing loudly, was dragged along." Where Eustathius, in commenting on this bellowing, says, ὡς ἐδήλου τῷ χήματι, "as he (the bull) made manifest (in the picture) by his figure or attitude." Eust. in J. Σ. p. 1224.

[j] The reason is of the same kind as that given in the note immediately preceding: and by the same rule, the observation must be confined to natural sounds only. In language, few of the speakers know the configurations which attend it.

all energies, passions, and affections of the soul, being in any degree more intense or violent than ordinary:[k] all actions and events, whose integrity or wholeness depends upon a short and self-evident succession of incidents;[l] or if the succession be extended, then such actions, at least, whose incidents are all along, during that succession, similar:[m] all actions which, being qualified as above, open themselves into a large variety of circumstances, concurring all in the same point of time:[n] all actions which are known, and known universally, rather than actions newly invented, or known but to few.[o]

And thus much as to the subjects of painting.

II. In music, the fittest subjects of imitation are all such things and incidents as are most eminently characterized by motion and sound.[p]

Motion may be either slow or swift, even or uneven, broken

[k] The reason is still of the same kind, viz. from their visible effects on the body: they naturally produce either to the countenance a particular redness or paleness, or a particular modification of its muscles, or else to the limbs a particular attitude. Now all these effects are solely referable to colour and figure, the two grand sensible media peculiar to painting. See Raphael's cartoons of St. Paul at Athens, and of his striking the sorcerer Elymas blind; see also the crucifixion of Polycrates, and the sufferings of the consul Regulus, both by Salvator Rosa.

[l] For, of necessity, every picture is a *punctum temporis*, or "instant."

[m] Such, for instance, as the storm at sea; whose incidents of vision may be nearly all included in foaming waves, a dark sky, ships out of their erect posture, and men hanging upon the ropes: or as a battle; which, from beginning to end, presents nothing else than blood, fire, smoke, and disorder. Now such events may be well imitated all at once; for how long soever they last, they are but repetitions of the same. Nicias, the painter, recommended much the same subjects, viz. a sea-fight, or a land-battle of cavalry; his reasons too are much the same with those mentioned in the following note. He concludes with a maxim, (little regarded by his successors, however important,) that the subject itself is as much a part of the painter's art, as the poet's fable is a part of poetry. See Demetrius Phal. p. 58. edit. Oxon.

[n] For painting is not bounded in extension, as it is in duration. Besides, it seems true in every species of composition, that, as far as perplexity and confusion may be avoided, and the wholeness of the piece may be preserved clear and intelligible, the more ample the magnitude, and the greater the variety; the greater also, in proportion, the beauty and perfection. Noble instances of this are the pictures above mentioned in note *k*. See Aristot. Poet. c. 7. Ὁ δὲ καθ' αὑτὴν φύσιν τοῦ πράγματος ὅρος, ἀεὶ μὲν, etc. See also Characteristics, vol. i. p. 143. and Bossu, book i. c. 16. L'Achille d'Homere est si grand, &c.

[o] The reason is, that a picture being (as has been said) but a point or instant in a story well known, the spectator's memory will supply the previous and the subsequent: but this cannot be done where such knowledge is wanting. And therefore it may be justly questioned, whether the most celebrated subjects, borrowed by painting from history, would have been any of them intelligible through the medium of painting only, supposing history to have been silent, and to have given no additional information.

It may be here added, that Horace, conformably to this reasoning, recommends, even to poetic imitation, a known story before an unknown:

Tuque
Rectius Iliacum carmen deducis in actus,
Quam si proferres ignota, indictaque primus.
Art. Poet. v. 128.

And, indeed, as the being understood to others, either hearers or spectators, seems to be a common requisite to all mimetic arts whatever, (for to those who understand them not, they are in fact no mimetic arts,) it follows, that perspicuity must be essential to them all; and that no prudent artist would neglect, if it were possible, any just advantage to obtain this end. Now there can be no advantage greater than the notoriety of the subject imitated.

[p] Page 28.

or continuous; sound may be either soft or loud, high or low. Wherever, therefore, any of these species of motion or sound may be found in an eminent (not a moderate or mean) degree, there will be room for musical imitation.

Thus, in the natural or inanimate world, music may imitate the glidings, murmurings, tossings, roarings, and other accidents of water, as perceived in fountains, cataracts, rivers, seas, &c.; the same of thunder; the same of winds, as well the stormy as the gentle. In the animal world, it may imitate the voice of some animals, but chiefly that of singing birds; it may also faintly copy some of their motions. In the human kind, it can also imitate some motions[q] and sounds;[r] and of sounds, those most perfectly, which are expressive of grief and anguish.[s]

And thus much as to the subjects which music imitates.

III. It remains, then, that we compare these two arts together. And here, indeed, as to musical imitation in general, it must be confessed, that, as it can, from its genius, imitate only sounds and motions; as there are not many motions, either in the animal or in the inanimate world, which are exclusively peculiar, even to any species, and scarcely any to an individual; as there are no natural sounds, which characterize, at least, lower than a species, (for the natural sounds of individuals are in every species the same:) further, as music does but imperfectly imitate even these sounds and motions;[t] on the contrary, as figures, postures of figures, and colours characterize, not only every sensible species, but even every individual, and, for the most part, also the various energies and passions of every individual:[u] and further, as painting is able, with the highest accuracy and exactness, to imitate all these colours and figures, and while musical imitation pretends, at most, to no more than the raising of ideas similar, itself aspires to raise ideas the very same: in a word, as painting, in respect of its subjects, is equal to the noblest part of imitation, the imitating regular actions consisting of a whole and parts; and of such imitation, music is utterly incapable: from all this it must be confessed, that musical imitation is greatly below that of painting, and that at best it is but an imperfect thing.

As to the efficacy, therefore, of music, it must be derived from

[q] As the walk of the giant Polypheme, in the pastoral of Acis and Galatea:

See what ample strides he takes, &c.

[r] As the shouts of a multitude, in the coronation anthem of God save the king, &c.

[s] The reason is, that this species of musical imitation most nearly approaches nature: for grief, in most animals, declares itself by sounds, which are not unlike to long notes in the chromatic system. Of this kind is the chorus of Baal's priests in the oratorio of Deborah:

Doleful tidings, how ye wound, &c.

[t] The reason is, from the dissimilitude between the sounds and motions of nature, and those of music. Musical sounds are all produced from even vibration, most natural from uneven; musical motions are chiefly definite in their measure, most natural are indefinite.

[u] See note *k* of this chapter.

another source, which must be left for the present, to be considered of hereafter.[x]

There remains to be mentioned, imitation by poetry.

CHAPTER III.

ON THE SUBJECTS WHICH POETRY IMITATES, BUT IMITATES ONLY THROUGH NATURAL MEDIA, OR MERE SOUNDS. COMPARISON OF POETRY IN THIS CAPACITY; FIRST WITH PAINTING, THEN WITH MUSIC.

Poetic imitation includes every thing in it which is performed either by picture-imitation or musical; for its materials are words, and words are symbols by compact of all ideas.[y]

Further, as words, beside their being symbols by compact, are also sounds variously distinguished by their aptness to be rapidly or slowly pronounced, and by the respective prevalence of mutes, liquids, or vowels, in their composition; it will follow, that, beside their compact-relation, they will have likewise a natural relation to all such things, between which and themselves there is any natural resemblance: thus, for instance, there is natural resemblance between all sorts of harsh and grating sounds. There is, therefore, (exclusive of its signification,) a natural relation between the sound of a vile hautboy, and of that verse in Virgil,[z]

Stridenti miserum stipula disperdere carmen;

or of that other in Milton,[a]

Grate on their scrannel pipes of wretched straw.

So also between the smooth swift gliding of a river, and of that verse in Horace,[b]

at ille
Labitur, et labetur in omne volubilis ævum.

And thus, in part, even poetic imitation has its foundation in nature: but then this imitation goes not far; and taken without the meaning derived to the sounds from compact, is but little intelligible, however perfect and elaborate.

II. If, therefore, poetry be compared with painting, in respect of this its merely natural and inartificial resemblance, it may be justly said, that inasmuch as of this sort of resemblance, poetry (like music) has no other sources, than those two of sound and motion; inasmuch as it often wants these sources themselves, (for

[x] Chapter vi.
[y] See note *c*, chap. i.
[z] Ecl. iii. ver. 27.
[a] In his Lycidas.
[b] Epist. ii. l. 1. ver. 42, 43.

numbers of words neither have, nor can have, any resemblance to those ideas of which they are the symbols;) inasmuch as natural sounds and motions, which poetry thus imitates, are themselves but loose and indefinite accidents of those subjects to which they belong,[c] and consequently do but loosely and indefinitely characterize them; lastly, inasmuch as poetic sounds and motions do but faintly resemble those of nature, which are themselves confessed to be so imperfect and vague. From all this it will follow, (as it has already followed of music,) that poetic imitation founded in mere natural resemblance is much inferior to that of painting, and at best but very imperfect.

III. As to the preference which such poetic imitation may claim before musical, or musical imitation before that, the merits on each side may appear perhaps equal. They both fetch their imitations from sound and motion.[d] Now music seems to imitate nature better as to motion, and poetry as to sound. The reason is, that in motions, music has a greater variety;[e] and in sounds, those of poetry approach nearer to nature.[f]

If, therefore, in sound the one have the preference, in motion the other, and the merit of sound and motion be supposed nearly equal, it will follow, that the merit of the two imitations will be nearly equal also.

CHAPTER IV.

ON THE SUBJECTS WHICH POETRY IMITATES, NOT BY MERE SOUNDS OR NATURAL MEDIA, BUT BY WORDS SIGNIFICANT; THE SUBJECTS AT THE SAME TIME BEING SUCH, TO WHICH THE GENIUS OF EACH OF THE OTHER TWO ARTS IS MOST PERFECTLY ADAPTED. ITS COMPARISON IN THESE SUBJECTS, FIRST WITH PAINTING, THEN WITH MUSIC.

The mimetic art of poetry has been hitherto considered, as fetching its imitation from mere natural resemblance. In this it has been shewn much inferior to painting, and nearly equal to music.

[c] Page 31.

[d] Page 28.

[e] Music has no less than five different lengths of notes in ordinary use, reckoning from the semibreve to the semiquaver; all which may be infinitely compounded, even in any one time, or measure. Poetry, on the other hand, has but two lengths, or quantities, a long syllable and a short, (which is its half;) and all the variety of verse arises from such feet and metres, as these two species of syllables, by being compounded, can be made produce.

[f] Musical sounds are produced by even vibrations, which scarcely any natural sounds are: on the contrary, words are the product of uneven vibration, and so are most natural sounds; add to this, that words are far more numerous than musical sounds. So that poetry, as to imitation by sound, seems to exceed music, not only in nearness of resemblance, but even in variety also.

It remains to be considered, what its merits are, when it imitates not by mere natural sound, but by sound significant; by words, the compact symbols of all kinds of ideas. From hence depends its genuine force. And here, as it is able to find sounds expressive of every idea, so is there no subject either of picture-imitation, or musical, to which it does not aspire; all things and incidents whatever being, in a manner, to be described by words.

Whether, therefore, poetry, in this its proper sphere, be equal to the imitation of the other two arts, is the question at present which comes in order to be discussed.

Now as subjects are infinite, and the other two arts are not equally adapted to imitate all, it is proposed, first, to compare poetry with them in such subjects to which they are most perfectly adapted.

II. To begin, therefore, with painting. A subject in which the power of this art may be most fully exerted, (whether it be taken from the inanimate, or the animal, or the moral world,) must be a subject which is principally and eminently characterized by certain colours, figures, and postures of figures—whose comprehension depends not on a succession of events; or at least, if on a succession, on a short and self-evident one—which admits a large variety of such circumstances, as all concur in the same individual point of time, and relate all to one principal action.

As to such a subject, therefore, inasmuch as poetry is forced to pass through the medium of compact, while painting applies immediately through the medium of nature; the one being understood to all, the other to the speakers of a certain language only:[g] inasmuch as natural operations must needs be more affecting than artificial: inasmuch as painting helps our own rude ideas by its own, which are consummate and wrought up to the perfection of art; while poetry can raise no other, than what every mind is furnished with before:[h] inasmuch as painting shews all the minute and various concurrent circumstances of the event in the same individual point of time, as they appear in nature; while poetry is forced to want this circumstance of intelligibility, by being ever obliged to enter into some degree of detail: inasmuch as this detail creates often the dilemma of either becoming

[g] Note *f*, p. 28.

[h] When we read in Milton of Eve, that

Grace was in all her steps, heav'n in her eye,
In ev'ry gesture dignity and love;

we have an image, not of that Eve which Milton conceived, but of such an Eve only as every one, by his own proper genius, is able to represent, from reflecting on those ideas which he has annexed to these several sounds. The greater part, in the mean time, have never perhaps bestowed one accurate thought upon what grace, heaven, love, and dignity mean; or ever enriched the mind with ideas of beauty, or asked whence they are to be acquired, and by what proportions they are constituted. On the contrary, when we view Eve as painted by an able painter, we labour under no such difficulty; because we have exhibited before us the better conceptions of an artist, the genuine ideas of perhaps a Titian or a Raphael.

tedious, to be clear; or if not tedious, then obscure: lastly, inasmuch as all imitations more similar, more immediate, and more intelligible, are preferable to those which are less so; and for the reasons above, the imitations of poetry are less similar, less immediate, and less intelligible than those of painting. From all this it will follow, that in all subjects, where painting can fully exert itself, the imitations of painting are superior to those of poetry; and consequently, in all such subjects, that painting has the preference.

III. And now to compare poetry with music, allowing to music the same advantage of a well-adapted subject, which has already been allowed to painting in the comparison just preceding.

What such a subject is, has already been described.[i] And as to preference, it must be confessed, that, inasmuch as musical imitations, though natural, aspire not to raise the same ideas, but only ideas similar and analogous;[k] while poetic imitation, though artificial, raises ideas the very same, inasmuch as the definite and certain is ever preferable to the indefinite and uncertain, and that more especially in imitations where the principal delight[l] is in recognising the thing imitated; it will follow from hence, that even in subjects the best adapted to musical imitation, the imitation of poetry will be still more excellent.

[i] See chap. ii. sect. 2.

[k] Page 31.

[l] That there is an eminent delight in this very recognition itself, abstract from any thing pleasing in the subject recognised, is evident from hence, that, in all the mimetic arts, we can be highly charmed with imitations, at whose originals in nature we are shocked and terrified. Such, for instance, as dead bodies, wild beasts, and the like.

The cause, assigned for this, seems to be of the following kind. We have a joy, not only in the sanity and perfection, but also in the just and natural energies of our several limbs and faculties. And hence, among others, the joy in reasoning; as being the energy of that principal faculty, our intellect or understanding. This joy extends, not only to the wise, but to the multitude. For all men have an aversion to ignorance and error; and in some degree, however moderate, are glad to learn and to inform themselves.

Hence, therefore, the delight arising from these imitations; as we are enabled, in each of them, to exercise the reasoning faculty; and, by comparing the copy with the archetype in our minds, to infer that this is such a thing, and that another: a fact remarkable among children, even in their first and earliest days.

Τό τε γὰρ μιμεῖσθαι, σύμφυτον τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐκ παίδων ἐστὶ, καὶ τούτῳ διαφέρουσι τῶν ἄλλων ζώων, ὅτι μιμητικώτατόν ἐστι, καὶ τὰς μαθήσεις ποιεῖται διὰ μιμήσεως τὰς πρώτας· καὶ τὸ χαίρειν τοῖς μιμήμασι πάντας. Σημεῖον δὲ τούτου τὸ συμβαῖνον ἐπὶ τῶν ἔργων. Ἃ γὰρ αὐτὰ λυπηρῶς ὁρῶμεν, τούτων τὰς εἰκόνας τὰς μάλιστα ἠκριβωμένας, χαίρομεν θεωροῦντες· οἷον θηρίων τε μορφὰς τῶν ἀγριωτάτων, καὶ νεκρῶν. Αἴτιον δὲ καὶ τούτου, ὅτι μανθάνειν οὐ μόνον τοῖς φιλοσόφοις ἥδιστον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὁμοίως· ἀλλ' ἐπὶ βραχὺ κοινωνοῦσιν αὐτοῦ. Διὰ γὰρ τοῦτο χαίρουσι τὰς εἰκόνας ὁρῶντες, ὅτι συμβαίνει θεωροῦντας μανθάνειν καὶ συλλογίζεσθαι, τί ἕκαστον· οἷον, ὅτι οὗτος ἐκεῖνος. Arist. Poet. c. 4.

CHAPTER V.

ON THE SUBJECTS WHICH POETRY IMITATES BY WORDS SIGNIFICANT, BEING AT THE SAME TIME SUBJECTS NOT ADAPTED TO THE GENIUS OF EITHER OF THE OTHER ARTS. THE NATURE OF THOSE SUBJECTS. THE ABILITIES OF POETRY TO IMITATE THEM. COMPARISON OF POETRY IN THESE SUBJECTS, FIRST WITH PAINTING, THEN WITH MUSIC.

THE mimetic art of poetry has now been considered in two views: first, as imitating by mere natural media; and in this it has been placed on a level with music, but much inferior to painting. It has been since considered as imitating through sounds significant by compact, and that in such subjects respectively, where painting and music have the fullest power to exert themselves. Here to painting it has been held inferior, but to music it has been preferred.

It remains to be considered, what other subjects poetry has left, to which the genius of the other two arts is not so perfectly adapted; how far poetry is able to imitate them; and whether, from the perfection of its imitation, and the nature of the subjects themselves, it ought to be called no more than equal to its sister arts; or whether, on the whole, it should not rather be called superior.

II. To begin, in the first place, by comparing it with painting.

The subjects of poetry, to which the genius of painting is not adapted, are, all actions, whose whole is of so lengthened a duration,[m] that no point of time, in any part of that whole, can be given fit for painting; neither in its beginning, which will teach what is subsequent; nor in its end, which will teach what is previous; nor in its middle, which will declare both the previous and the subsequent. Also all subjects so framed, as to lay open the internal constitution of man, and give us an insight into characters,[n] manners, passions, and sentiments.

The merit of these subjects is obvious. They must necessarily

[m] For a just and accurate description of wholeness and unity, see Arist. Poet. chap. 7 and 8; and Bossu, his best interpreter, in his treatise on the Epic Poem, book ii. chap. 9—11.

[n] For a description of character, see below, note *o*, of this chapter.

As for manners, it may be said in general, that a certain system of them makes a character; and that as these systems, by being differently compounded, make each a different character, so is it that one man truly differs from another.

Passions are obvious; pity, fear, anger, &c.

Sentiments are discoverable in all those things, which are the proper business and end of speech or discourse. The chief branches of this end are to assert and prove; to solve and refute; to express or excite passions; to amplify incidents, and to diminish them. It is in these things, therefore, that we must look for sentiment. See Arist. Poet. c. 19: Ἔστι δὲ κατὰ τὴν Διάνοιαν ταῦτα, ὅσα ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου δεῖ παρασκευασθῆναι. Μέρη δὲ τούτων, τό τε ἀποδεικνῦναι, καὶ τὸ λύειν, καὶ τὸ πάθη παρασκευάζειν,—καὶ ἔτι μέγεθος, καὶ σμικρότητα.

of all be the most affecting, the most improving, and such of which the mind has the strongest comprehension.

For as to the affecting part, if it be true, that all events more or less affect us, as the subjects which they respect are more or less nearly related to us, then surely those events must needs be most affecting, to whose subjects we are of all the most intimately related. Now such is the relation which we bear to mankind; and men and human actions are the subjects here proposed for imitation.

As to improvement, there can be none surely (to man at least) so great, as that which is derived from a just and decent representation of human manners and sentiments. For what can more contribute to give us that master-knowledge,° without which all other knowledge will prove of little or no utility?

As to our comprehension, there is nothing certainly of which we have so strong ideas, as of that which happens in the moral or human world. For as to the internal part, or active principle of the vegetable, we know it but obscurely; because there we can discover neither passion, nor sensation. In the animal world, indeed, this principle is more seen, and that from the passions and sensations which there declare themselves. Yet all still rests upon the mere evidence of sense; upon the force only of external and unassisted experience. But in the moral or human world, as we have a medium of knowledge far more accurate than this, so from hence it is that we can comprehend accordingly.

With regard, therefore, to the various events which happen

° ΓΝΩΘΙ ΣΑΥΤΟΝ. But further, besides obtaining this moral science from the contemplation of human life, an end common both to epic, tragic, and comic poetry, there is a peculiar end to tragedy, that of eradicating the passions of pity and fear. *Ἔστιν οὖν τραγῳδία μίμησις πράξεως σπουδαίας καὶ τελείας—δι' ἐλέου καὶ φόβου περαίνουσα τὴν τῶν τοιούτων παθημάτων κάθαρσιν.* Arist. Poet. c. 6. "Tragedy is the imitation of an action important and perfect, through pity and fear working the purgation of such-like passions."

There are none, it is evident, so devoid of these two passions, as those perpetually conversant, where the occasions of them are most frequent; such, for instance, as the military men, the professors of medicine, chirurgery, and the like. Their minds, by this intercourse, become, as it were, callous; gaining an apathy by experience, which no theory can ever teach them.

Now, that which is wrought in these men by the real disasters of life, may be supposed wrought in others by the fictions of tragedy; yet with this happy circumstance in favour of tragedy, that, without the disasters being real, it can obtain the same end.

It must, however, for all this, be confessed, that an effect of this kind cannot reasonably be expected, except among nations, like the Athenians of old, who lived in a perpetual attendance upon these theatrical representations. For it is not a single or occasional application to these passions, but a constant and uninterrupted, by which alone they may be lessened or removed.

It would be improper to conclude this note, without observing, that the philosopher in this place by pity means not philanthropy, natural affection, a readiness to relieve others in their calamities and distress; but, by pity, he means that senseless effeminate consternation, which seizes weak minds, on the sudden prospect of any thing disastrous; which, in its more violent effects, is seen in shriekings, swoonings, &c. a passion, so far from laudable, or from operating to the good of others, that it is certain to deprive the party, who labours under its influence, of all capacity to do the least good office.

here, and the various causes by which they are produced; in other words, of all characters, manners, human passions, and sentiments; besides the evidence of sense, we have the highest evidence additional, in having an express consciousness of something similar within; of something homogeneous in the recesses of our own minds; in that which constitutes to each of us his true and real self.

These, therefore, being the subjects, not adapted to the genius of painting, it comes next to be considered, how far poetry can imitate them.

And, here, that it has abilities clearly equal, cannot be doubted; as it has that for the medium of its imitation, through which nature declares herself in the same subjects. For the sentiments in real life are only known by men's discourse.[p] And the characters, manners, and passions of men, being the prompters to what they say, it must needs follow, that their discourse will be a constant specimen of those characters, manners, and passions.

> Format enim natura prius nos intus ad omnem
> Fortunarum habitum; juvat, aut impellit ad iram:
> Post effert animi motus, interprete lingua.[q]

Not only, therefore, language is an adequate medium of imitation, but in sentiment it is the only medium; and in manners and passions there is no other which can exhibit them to us after that clear, precise, and definite way, as they in nature stand allotted to the various sorts of men, and are found to constitute the several characters of each.[r]

III. To compare, therefore, poetry, in these subjects, with painting: inasmuch as no subjects of painting are wholly superior to poetry;[s] while the subjects, here described, far exceed the power of painting: inasmuch as they are, of all subjects, the most affecting and improving,[t] and such of which we have the

[p] Page 36, note *n*.

[q] Hor. de Art. Poet. 108.

[r] It is true, indeed, that (besides what is done by poetry) there is some idea of character, which even painting can communicate. Thus there is no doubt, but that such a countenance may be found by painters for Æneas, as would convey, upon view, a mild, humane, and yet a brave disposition. But then this idea would be vague and general. It would be concluded, only in the gross, that the hero was good. As to that system of qualities peculiar to Æneas only, and which alone properly constitutes his true and real character, this would still remain a secret, and be no way discoverable. For how deduce it from the mere lineaments of a countenance? Or, if it were deducible, how few spectators would there be found so sagacious? It is here, therefore, that recourse must be had, not to painting, but to poetry. So accurate a conception of character can be gathered only from a succession of various and yet consistent actions; a succession, enabling us to conjecture, what the person of the drama will do in the future, from what already he has done in the past. Now, to such an imitation, poetry only is equal; because it is not bounded, like painting, to short, and, as it were, instant events, but may imitate subjects of any duration whatever. See Arist. Poet. c. 6. Ἔστι δὲ ἦθος μὲν τὸ τοιοῦτον, ὃ δηλοῖ τὴν προαίρεσιν ὁποία τις ἐστίν, ἐν οἷς οὐκ ἔστι δῆλον, εἰ προαιρεῖται ἢ φεύγει ὁ λέγων. See also the ingenious and learned Bossu, book iv. c. 4.

[s] Pages 28 and 34.

[t] Page 37.

strongest comprehension: further, inasmuch as poetry can most accurately imitate them:[u] inasmuch as, besides all imitation, there is a charm in poetry arising from its very numbers;[x] whereas painting has pretence to no charm, except that of imitation only: lastly, (which will soon be shewn,[y]) inasmuch as poetry is able to associate music as a most powerful ally, of which assistance painting is utterly incapable: from all this it may be fairly concluded, that poetry is not only equal, but that it is, in fact, far superior to its sister art of painting.

IV. But if it exceed painting, in subjects to which painting is not adapted, no doubt will it exceed music, in subjects to music not adapted. For here it has been preferred,[z] even in those subjects which have been held adapted the best of all.

V. Poetry is, therefore, on the whole, much superior to either of the other mimetic arts; it having been shewn to be equally excellent in the accuracy of its imitation;[a] and to imitate subjects which far surpass, as well in utility,[b] as in dignity.[c]

CHAPTER VI.

ON MUSIC, CONSIDERED NOT AS AN IMITATION, BUT AS DERIVING ITS EFFICACY FROM ANOTHER SOURCE. ON ITS JOINT OPERATION BY THIS MEANS WITH POETRY. AN OBJECTION TO MUSIC SOLVED. THE ADVANTAGE ARISING TO IT, AS WELL AS TO POETRY, FROM THEIR BEING UNITED. CONCLUSION.

In the above discourse, music has been mentioned as an ally to poetry.[d] It has also been said to derive its efficacy from another source than imitation.[e] It remains, therefore, that these things be explained.

Now, in order to this, it is first to be observed, that there are

[u] Page 38.

[x] That there is a charm in poetry, arising from its numbers only, may be made evident from the five or six first lines of the Paradise Lost; where, without any pomp of phrase, sublimity of sentiment, or the least degree of imitation, every reader must find himself to be sensibly delighted; and that, only from the graceful and simple cadence of the numbers, and that artful variation of the *cæsura*, or pause, so essential to the harmony of every good poem.

An English heroic verse consists of ten semipeds, or half-feet. Now, in the lines above mentioned, the pauses are varied upon different semipeds in the order which follows; as may be seen by any, who will be at the pains to examine Paradise Lost, book i.

Verse 1	has its pause fall upon	Semiped 7
—— 2		—— 6
—— 3		—— 6
—— 4		—— 5
—— 5		—— 3
—— 6		—— 4

[y] Chap. vi.

[z] Chap. iv. sect. 3.

[a] Page 38.

[b] Page 37.

[c] See p. 36. and p. 30, note *n*. See also p. 28, 29.

[d] Chap. v. sect. 3.

[e] Page 31.

various affections which may be raised by the power of music. There are sounds to make us cheerful, or sad; martial, or tender; and so of almost every other affection which we feel.

It is also further observable, that there is a reciprocal operation between our affections and our ideas; so that, by a sort of natural sympathy, certain ideas necessarily tend to raise in us certain affections; and those affections, by a sort of counter-operation, to raise the same ideas. Thus, ideas derived from funerals, tortures, murders, and the like, naturally generate the affection of melancholy. And when, by any physical causes, that affection happens to prevail, it as naturally generates the same doleful ideas.

And hence it is, that ideas derived from external causes, have at different times, upon the same person, so different an effect. If they happen to suit the affections which prevail within, then is their impression most sensible, and their effect most lasting. If the contrary be true, then is the effect contrary. Thus, for instance, a funeral will much more affect the same man if he see it when melancholy, than if he see it when cheerful.

Now this being premised, it will follow, that whatever happens to be the affection or disposition of mind, which ought naturally to result from the genius of any poem, the same, probably, it will be in the power of some species of music to excite. But whenever the proper affection prevails, it has been allowed that then all kindred ideas, derived from external causes, make the most sensible impression. The ideas, therefore, of poetry, must needs make the most sensible impression, when the affections,[f] peculiar to them, are already excited by the music. For here a double force is made to cooperate to one end. A poet, thus assisted, finds not an audience in a temper averse to the genius of his poem, or, perhaps at best, under a cool indifference; but by the preludes, the symphonies, and concurrent operation of the music in all its parts, roused into those very affections which he would most desire.

An audience so disposed, not only embrace with pleasure the ideas of the poet when exhibited, but, in a manner, even anticipate them in their several imaginations. The superstitious have not a more previous tendency to be frightened at the sight of spectres, or a lover to fall into raptures at the sight of his mistress, than a mind, thus tempered by the power of music, to enjoy all ideas which are suitable to that temper.

And hence the genuine charm of music, and the wonders which it works through its great professors.[g] A power which

[f] Quintilian elegantly, and exactly apposite to this reasoning, says of music, Namque et voce et modulatione grandia elate, jucunda dulciter, moderata leniter canit, totaque arte consentit cum eorum, quæ dicuntur, affectibus. Inst. Orator. l. i. c. 10.

[g] Such, above all, is George Frederic

consists not in imitations, and the raising ideas, but in the raising affections to which ideas may correspond. There are few to be found so insensible, I may even say so inhuman, as when good poetry is justly set to music, not in some degree to feel the force of so amiable an union; but to the Muses' friends it is a force irresistible, and penetrates into the deepest recesses of the soul.

Pectus inaniter angit,
Irritat, mulcet, falsis terroribus implet.[h]

II. Now this is that source from whence music was said formerly to derive its greatest efficacy;[i] and here, indeed, not in imitation,[k] ought it to be chiefly cultivated. On this account also it has been called a powerful ally to poetry.[l] And, further, it is by the help of this reasoning that the objection is solved, which is raised against the singing of poetry, (as in operas, oratorios, &c.) from the want of probability and resemblance to nature. To one, indeed, who has no musical ear, this objection may have weight; it may even perplex a lover of music, if it happen to surprise him in his hours of indifference. But when he is feeling the charm of poetry so accompanied, let him be angry (if he can) with that which serves only to interest him more feelingly in the subject, and support him in a stronger and more earnest attention; which enforces, by its aid, the several ideas of the poem, and gives them to his imagination with unusual strength and grandeur. He cannot surely but confess, that he is a gainer in the exchange, when he barters the want of a single probability, that of pronunciation, (a thing merely arbitrary, and everywhere different,) for a noble heightening of affections which are suitable to the occasion, and enable him to enter into the subject with double energy and enjoyment.

III. From what has been said, it is evident, that these two arts can never be so powerful singly, as when they are properly united: for poetry, when alone, must be necessarily forced to waste many of its richest ideas, in the mere raising of affections, when, to have been properly relished, it should have found those affections in their highest energy; and music, when alone, can only raise affections which soon languish and decay, if not maintained and fed by the nutritive images of poetry. Yet must it be remembered, in this union, that poetry ever have the pre-

Handel; whose genius having been cultivated by continued exercise, and being itself far the sublimest and most universal now known, has justly placed him without an equal, or a second. This transient testimony could not be denied so excellent an artist, from whom this treatise has borrowed such eminent examples, to justify its assertions in what it has offered concerning music.

[h] Horat. Epist. l. l. ii. 211.

[i] Page 31.

[k] For the narrow extent, and little efficacy of music, considered as a mimetic or imitative art, see chap. ii. sect. 3.

[l] Page 39.

cedence; its utility,[m] as well as dignity, being by far the more considerable.

IV. And thus much, for the present, as to music,[n] painting, and poetry; the circumstances in which they agree, and in which they differ; and the preference due to one of them above the other two.

[m] Chapter v. sect. 2.

[n] Page 27.

CONCERNING HAPPINESS:

A DIALOGUE.

PART I.

J. H. *to* F. S.

NATURE seems to treat man as a painter would his disciple, to whom he commits the outlines of a figure lightly sketched, which the scholar for himself is to colour and complete:[a] thus from nature we derive senses, and passions, and an intellect, which each of us for himself has to model into a character. And hence (the reverse of every species beside) human characters alone are infinitely various; as various, indeed, as there are individuals to form them: hence, too, the great diversity of systems, and of doctrines, respecting the laws, and rules, and conduct of human life.

It is in the history of these, my friend, you have so successfully employed yourself: you have been studious to know, not so much what Greeks, Romans, or Barbarians have done, as what they have reasoned, and what they have taught. Not an epicure has more joy in the memory of a delicious banquet, than I feel in recollecting what we have discoursed on these subjects.

And here you cannot forget (for we were both unanimous) the contempt in which we held those superficial censurers, who profess to refute, what they want even capacities to comprehend. Upon the faith of their own boasting, (could that be credited,) sentiments are exposed, opinions demolished, and the whole wisdom of antiquity lies vanquished at their feet. Like Opera heroes, upon their own stage, they can with ease despatch a lion, or discomfit a whole legion. But, alas! were they to encounter, not the shadow, but the substance, what, think you, would be the event then? Little better, I fear, than was the fortune of poor Priam, when the feeble old man durst attack the youthful Pyrrhus:

[a] Ut Phidias potest a primo instituere signum, idque perficere; potest ab alio inchoatum accipere et absolvere: huic est sapientia similis. Non enim ipsa genuit hominem, sed accepit a natura incheatum: hanc ergo intuens, debet institutum illud, quasi signum absolvere. Cic. de Fin. iv. 13. p. 334. edit. Davis.

Telum imbelle sine ictu
Conjecit: rauco quod protenus ære repulsum,
Et summo Clypei nequicquam umbone pependit.[b]

Among the many long-exploded and obsolete systems, there was one, you may remember, for which I professed a great esteem. Not in the least degree convinced by all I had heard against it, I durst venture to affirm, that no system was more plausible; that grant but its principles, and the rest followed of course; that none approached nearer to the perfection of our own religion, as I could prove, were there occasion, by authority not to be controverted. As you, I knew, were the favourer of an hypothesis somewhat different,[c] so I attempted to support my own, by reciting you a certain dialogue: not succeeding, however, so happily in the recollection, as I could wish, I have since endeavoured to transcribe, what at that time I would have rehearsed. The result of my labour is the following narrative, which I commit with confidence to your friendship and candour.

II. It was at a time when a certain friend, whom I highly value, was my guest. We had been sitting together, entertaining ourselves with Shakespear: among many of his characters, we had looked into that of Wolsey.—How soon, says my friend, does the cardinal in disgrace abjure that happiness which he was lately so fond of? Scarcely out of office, but he begins to exclaim,

Vain pomp and glory of the world! I hate ye.[d]

So true is it, that our sentiments ever vary with the season; and that in adversity we are of one mind, in prosperity of another.—As for his mean opinion, said I, of human happiness, it is a truth, which small reflection might have taught him long before: there seems little need of distress to inform us of this. I rather commend the seeming wisdom of that eastern monarch,[e] who, in the affluence of prosperity, when he was proving every pleasure, was yet so sensible of their emptiness, their insufficiency to make him happy, that he proclaimed a reward to the man who should invent a new delight: the reward indeed was proclaimed, but the delight was not to be found.—If by delight, says he, you mean some good, something conducive to real happiness, it might have been found, perhaps, and yet not hit the monarch's fancy.—Is that, said I, possible?—It is possible, replied he, though it had been the sovereign good itself: and, indeed, what wonder? Is it probable that such a mortal as an eastern monarch, such a pampered, flattered, idle mortal, should have attention or capacity to a subject so delicate? A subject, enough to exercise the subtlest and most acute?

What then is it you esteem, said I, the sovereign good to be? It should seem, by your representation, to be something very

[b] Æneid. l. ii. 544.
[c] Viz. the Platonic.
[d] Shakespear's Henry the Eighth.
[e] Tusc. Disp. v. 7.

uncommon.—Ask me not the question, said he, you know not where it will carry us. Its general idea, indeed, is easy and plain, but the detail of particulars is perplexed and long; passions and opinions for ever thwart us; a paradox appears in almost every advance. Besides, did our inquiries succeed ever so happily, the very subject itself is always enough to give me pain.—That, replied I, seems a paradox indeed.—It is not, said he, from any prejudice which I have conceived against it; for to man I esteem it the noblest in the world: nor is it for being a subject to which my genius does not lead me; for no subject at all times has more employed my attention: but the truth is, I can scarce ever think on it, but an unlucky story still occurs to my mind. "A certain star-gazer, with his telescope was once viewing the moon, and describing her seas, her mountains, and her territories. Says a clown to his companion, 'Let him spy what he pleases, we are as near to the moon as he and all his brethren.'" So fares it, alas! with these, our moral speculations. Practice too often creeps, where theory can soar:[f] the philosopher proves as weak as those whom he most contemns: a mortifying thought to such as well attend it.—Too mortifying, replied I, to be long dwelt on. Give us rather your general idea of the sovereign good: this is easy, from your own account, however intricate the detail.

Thus then, said he, since you are so urgent, it is thus that I conceive it. The sovereign good is that, the possession of which renders us happy.[g]—And how, said I, do we possess it? Is it sensual, or intellectual?—There you are entering, said he, upon the detail; this is beyond your question.—Not a small advance, said I, to indulge poor curiosity? Will you raise me a thirst, and be so cruel not to allay it?—It is not, replied he, of my raising, but your own. Besides, I am not certain, should I attempt to proceed, whether you will admit such authorities as it is possible I may vouch.—That, said I, must be determined by their weight and character.—Suppose, said he, it should be mankind, the whole human race; would you not think it something strange, to seek of those concerning good, who pursue it a thousand ways, and many of them contradictory?—I confess, said I, it seems so.—And yet, continued he, were there a point in which such dissentients ever agreed, this agreement would be no mean argument in favour of its truth and justness.—But where, replied I, is this agreement to be found?

He answered me by asking, What, if it should appear that there were certain original characteristics and preconceptions of

[f] See sect. 7. and note *o*.

[g] Κτήσει γὰρ ἀγαθῶν, οἱ εὐδαίμονες, εὐδαίμονες: "By the possession of things good are the happy made happy." Platon. Conviv. vol. ii. p. 204. edit. Serrani. Phileb. Plat. p. 60. B. See Arrian Epict. l. iii. c. 22.

The reader will be pleased to observe, that in all quotations from the Dissertations of Epictetus, collected by Arrian, the author refers to the late edition in two volumes quarto, published by his learned and ingenious friend, Mr. Upton.

good,[h] which were natural, uniform, and common to all men; which all recognised in their various pursuits; and that the difference lay only in the applying them to particulars?[i]—This

[h] The preconceptions here spoken of are called by the Latins *præmotiones*, or *anticipationes;* by the Greeks *προλήψεις*, or *ἔννοιαι*, with the occasional epithets of *κοιναὶ*, *ἔμφυτοι*, or *φυσικαί*.

It is evident, that all men, without the least help of art, exert a kind of natural logic; can in some degree refute, and prove, and render a reason.

Now this cannot be (as the meanest proficient in logic well knows) without general ideas, and general propositions, because a syllogism of particulars is an impossibility; there must be therefore some natural faculty to provide us these generals: this faculty cannot be any of the senses, for they all respect particulars only; nor can it be the reasoning or syllogizing faculty, for this does not form such generals, but use them when formed. There only, therefore, remains the faculty called *νοῦς*, that is to say, the inductive faculty; the faculty, which, by induction of similar individuals, forms out of the particular and the many, what is general and one. This species of apprehension is evidently our first and earliest knowledge; because all knowledge by reasoning dates its origin from it; and because, except these two, no other knowledge is possible.

As, therefore, every ear, not absolutely depraved, is able to make some general distinctions of sound; and, in like manner, every eye, with respect to objects of vision; and as this general use of these faculties, by being diffused through all individuals, may be called common hearing, and common vision, as opposed to those more accurate energies, peculiar only to artists; so fares it with respect to the intellect. There are truths, or universals, of so obvious a kind, that every mind, or intellect, not absolutely depraved, without the least help of art, can hardly fail to recognise them. The recognition of these, or at least the ability to recognise them, is called *κοινὸς νοῦς*, "common sense," as being a sense common to all, except lunatics and ideots.

Further: as this power is called *κοινὸς νοῦς*, so the several propositions, which are its proper objects, are called *προλήψεις*, or preconceptions, as being previous to all other conceptions. It is easy to gather from what has been said, that these *προλήψεις* must be general, as being formed by induction; as also natural, by being common to all men, and previous to all instruction. Hence, therefore, their definition: *Ἔστι δ' ἡ πρόληψις, ἔννοια φυσικὴ τῶν καθόλου:* "a preconception is the natural apprehension of what is general, or universal." Diog. Laert. l. vii. s. 54. See also Arrian. Epict. l. i. c. 22. l. iii. c. 6. Cic. de Natura Deor. l. i. c. 16, 17. Plut. de Placit. Philosoph. 910. C. Aristot. de Anim. iii. 11.

[i] This was called *ἐφαρμογὴ τῶν προλήψεων ταῖς ἐπὶ μέρους οὐσίαις—τὰς φυσικὰς προλήψεις ἐφαρμόζειν ταῖς ἐπὶ μέρους οὐσίαις.* Arr. Epict. l. i. c. 22. ed. Upt. See an eminent instance, illustrating the truth of this reasoning, in the same author, l. iv. c. 1. p. 545. *Ἐννοοῦμεν γὰρ, ὅτι,* &c. Boet. de Cons. l. iii. Prosa. ii. p. 106.

So Proclus, in his manuscript comment on the first Alcibiades of Plato, p. 139. *Ἡ κοινὴ καὶ ἀδιάστροφος ἔννοια τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν τῇ αὐταρκείᾳ χαρακτηρίζει· παρ' ὧν γὰρ τὸ εὖ, παρὰ τούτων καὶ τὸ αὐτάρκες. καὶ ὁρᾶς δὴ πάλιν ὅπως ἐνταῦθα καὶ ὁ Ἀλκιβιάδης κατορθοῖ μὲν κατὰ τὴν μείζονα, σφάλλεται δὲ κατὰ τὴν ἐλάττονα πρότασιν. Συλλογίζεται γὰρ οὕτως· ἐγὼ διὰ σῶμα, καὶ γένος, καὶ φίλους, καὶ πλοῦτον εὐδαίμων· ὁ εὐδαίμων ἀνενδεής· ἐγὼ (φησὶν) ἀνενδεής, οὐκοῦν ὅτι μὲν ὁ εὐδαίμων ἀνενδεής, ἀληθές· ὅτι δὲ αὐτὸς εὐδαίμων, ψευδές· τὸ γοῦν συμπέρασμα ψευδὲς διὰ τὴν ἐλάττονα. καὶ οὕτως εὑρήσεις καὶ τὸν φιλήδονον, καὶ τὸν φιλοχρήματον, διὰ ταύτην ψευδομένους. ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἡδονὴν, ὁ δὲ χρήματα τίθεται τὸ ἀγαθόν. ὅτι δὲ πᾶν τὸ ἐφετὸν ἀγαθὸν, κοινόν ἐστιν αὐτοῖς. καὶ συνελόντι φᾶναι, τὰς μὲν μείζους τῶν προτάσεων ἕκαστοι τιθέασιν, ἀπὸ τῶν κοινῶν ἐννοιῶν καὶ τοῦ λόγου ταύτας προβάλλοντες, τὰς δὲ ἐλάττους ἀπὸ φαντασίας, ἀπὸ αἰσθήσεως, ἀπὸ τῶν ἀλόγων προφέρονται παθῶν· διὸ καὶ ταύταις μὲν διαφέρονται πρὸς ἀλλήλους, ἐκείναις δὲ ὁμοφρονοῦσι. τὰ μὲν γὰρ πάθη μερισμοῦ καὶ διαστάσεώς ἐστιν αἴτια ταῖς ψυχαῖς· τιτανικὰ γάρ ἐστι, καὶ διασπᾷ, καὶ σπαράττει τὸν ἐν ἡμῖν νοῦν· ὁ δὲ λόγος κοινός ἐστι πᾶσι, καὶ ἡ τοῦ λόγου προβολή· καὶ διὰ τοῦτο* ΚΟΙΝΟΣ Ο ΕΡΜΗΣ *ἵνα δὴ καὶ ἠθικῶς αὐτοῦ ποιησόμεθα τὴν ἐξήγησιν.*

"The universal and unperverted idea of man characterizes happiness by self-sufficiency: for with whomever well-being exists, with them the self-sufficient exists also. You see, therefore, how here again Alcibiades is right as to his major proposition, but mistaken as to the minor. For thus it is he syllogizes: 'I, on account of my person, and family, and friends, and wealth, am happy. The person happy is superior to want; therefore am I superior to want.' Now that the person happy is superior to

requires, said I, to be illustrated.—As if, continued he, a company of travellers, in some wide forest, were all intending for one city, but each by a rout peculiar to himself: the roads, indeed, would be various, and many, perhaps, false; but all who travelled would have one end in view.—It is evident, said I, they would.—So fares it, then, added he, with mankind in pursuit of good: the ways, indeed, are many, but what they seek is one.

For instance: did you ever hear of any one, who, in pursuit of their good, were for living the life of a bird, an insect, or a fish?—None.—And why not?—It would be inconsistent, answered I, with their nature.—You see, then, said he, they all agree in this, that what they pursue, ought to be consistent, and agreeable to their proper nature.—So ought it, said I, undoubtedly.—If so, continued he, one preconception is discovered, which is common to good in general; it is, that "all good is supposed something agreeable to nature."—This, indeed, replied I, seems to be agreed on all hands.

But again, said he, is there a man scarcely to be found of a temper so truly mortified, as to acquiesce in the lowest, and shortest necessaries of life? who aims not, if he be able, at something further, something better?—I replied, scarcely one.—Do not multitudes pursue, said he, infinite objects of desire, acknowledged every one of them to be in no respect necessaries? exquisite viands, delicious wines, splendid apparel, curious gardens; magnificent apartments adorned with pictures and sculpture; music and poetry, and the whole tribe of elegant arts?—It is evident, said I.—If it be, continued he, it should seem that they all considered the chief or sovereign good, not to be that which conduces to bare existence, or mere being; for to this the necessaries alone are adequate.—I replied, they were.—But if not this, it must be somewhat conducive to that which is superior to mere being.—It must.—And what, continued he, can this be, but well-being? well-being, under the various shapes in which differing opinions paint it? Or can you suggest any thing else?—

want, is true; but that he was happy, was false. The conclusion, therefore, is false through the minor proposition.

"It is thus also you will find the lover of pleasure, and the lover of money, erring in their reasonings through the same proposition. For one of them lays down the good of man to be pleasure, the other to be riches; but that every thing desirable is good, this they possess in common, and assent to on both sides.

"It may be said, indeed, universally, that all individuals produce the general propositions, which they lay down, from their common or universal ideas, and from the faculty of reason: but that their minor propositions are produced from imagination, from sense, and from irrational passions. And hence it is, that about these last they differ one with another, while in the former they all agree. The passions, indeed, may be considered within the souls of men as the causes of division and distance; for they are Titanic, and distract and tear our intellect to pieces. But reason is the same and common to all, as is also the faculty of speech, the medium of its promulgation. And hence it is that Hermes (the type of rational discourse) is called 'common' and 'universal,' if we may be allowed to give of him an ethical explanation."

I replied, I could not.—Mark here, then, continued he, another preconception, in which they all agree: the sovereign good is somewhat conducive, not to mere being, but to well-being.—I replied, it had so appeared.

Again, continued he, what labour, what expense, to procure those rarities which our own poor country is unable to afford us? How is the world ransacked to its utmost verges, and luxury and arts imported from every quarter? Nay, more, how do we baffle nature herself; invert her order; seek the vegetables of spring in the rigours of winter, and winter's ice during the heats of summer?—I replied, we did.—And what disappointment, what remorse, when endeavours fail?—It is true.—If this, then, be evident, said he, it should seem, that whatever we desire as our chief and sovereign good, is "something which, as far as possible, we would accommodate to all places and times."—I answered, so it appeared.—See, then, said he, another of its characteristics, another preconception.

But further still; what contests for wealth? what scrambling for property? what perils in the pursuit, what solicitude in the maintenance? And why all this? To what purpose, what end? Or is not the reason plain? Is it not, that wealth may continually procure us whatever we fancy good; and make that perpetual, which would otherwise be transient?—I replied, it seemed so.—Is it not further desired, as supplying us from ourselves, when, without it, we must be beholden to the benevolence of others, and depend on their caprice for all that we enjoy?—It is true, said I, this seems a reason.

Again; Is not power of every degree as much contested for as wealth? Are not magistracies, honours, principalities, and empire, the subjects of strife, and everlasting contention?—I replied, they were.—And why, said he, this? To obtain what end? Is it not to help us, like wealth, to the possession of what we desire? Is it not further to ascertain, to secure our enjoyments; that when others would deprive us, we may be strong enough to resist them?—I replied, it was.

Or to invert the whole, Why are there who seek recesses the most distant and retired?[k] fly courts and power, and submit to parsimony and obscurity? Why all this, but from the same intention? From an opinion that small possessions, used moderately, are permanent; that larger possessions raise envy, and are more frequently invaded; that the safety of power and dignity is more precarious than that of retreat; and that there-

[k] Multi autem et sunt, et fuerunt, qui eam, quam dico, tranquillitatem expetentes, a negotiis publicis se removerint, ad otiumque perfugerint. His idem propositum fuit, quod regibus; ut ne qua re egerent, ne cui parerent, libertate uterentur: cujus proprium est sic vivere, ut velis. Quare cum hoc commune fit potentiæ cupidorum cum iis, quos dixi, otiosis: alteri se adipisci id posse arbitrantur, si opes magnas habeant; alteri si contenti sint et suo, et parvo. Cic. de Offic. l. i. c. 20, 21.

fore they have chosen what is most eligible upon the whole?—It is not, said I, improbable, that they act by some such motive.

Do you not see, then, continued he, two or three more preconceptions of the sovereign good, which are sought for by all, as essential to constitute it?—And what, said I, are these?—That it should not be transient, nor derived from the will of others, nor in their power to take away; but be durable, self-derived, and (and if I may use the expression) indeprivable.—I confess, said I, it appears so.—But we have already found it to be considered as something agreeable to our nature; conducive, not to mere being, but to well-being; and what we aim to have accommodate to all places and times.—We have.

There may be other characteristics, said he, but these I think sufficient. See then its idea; behold it, as collected from the original, natural, and universal preconceptions of all mankind. The sovereign good,[1] they have taught us, ought to be something, "agreeable to our nature; conducive to well-being; accommodate to all places and times; durable, self-derived, and indeprivable."—Your account, said I, appears just.

[1] The original preconceptions of the sovereign good here recited, may be justified by the following authorities, from among many which are omitted.

Agreeable to nature.—Neque ulla alia in re, nisi in natura, quærendum esse illud summum bonum, quo omnia referrentur. Cic. Acad. l. i. c. 5. p. 27. edit. Davis.

Conducive to well-being.—Epictetus calls that "truth or knowledge, which respects our real happiness," (*τὴν ἀλήθειαν τὴν περὶ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας*); the "truth or knowledge which regards not mere living, but which conduces to living well," (*οὐ τὴν περὶ τοῦ ζῆν, ἀλλὰ τὴν πρὸς τὸ εὖ ζῆν.*) Arrian. Epict. l. i. c. 4. p. 28. edit. Upt. *Αἱ κοιναὶ περὶ εὐδαιμονίας ἔννοιαι, τὸ ζῆν κατὰ φύσιν, καὶ τὸν κατὰ φύσιν βίον, εὐδαιμονίαν λέγουσι· πρὸς δὲ τούτοις, τὸ εὖ ζῆν, καὶ τὸ εὖ βιοῦν, καὶ τὴν εὐζωΐαν, εὐδαιμονίαν φασὶν εἶναι:* "Our common preconceptions concerning happiness call it, the living according to nature; further than this, they say it is living or existing well, the life of well-being. Alex. Aphrod. περὶ ψυχ. p. 157. edit. Ald.

Accommodate to all places and times.—Antoninus, speaking of that happiness which he deemed our sovereign good, calls it something which was in our power, *πανταχοῦ καὶ διηνεκῶς*, "everywhere and perpetually," l. vii. s. 54.

Durable, and indeprivable.—Nisi stabili et fixo et permanente bono, beatus esse nemo potest. Tusc. Disp. l. v. c. 14. p. 372. edit. Davis. So, immediately after, in the same page: An dubium est, quin nihil sit habendum in eo genere, quo vita beata completur, si id possit amitti? Nihil enim interarescere, nihil exstingui, &c. *Καὶ τίς αὕτη ἡ εὔροια, ἣν ὁ τυχὼν ἐμποδίσαι δύναται, οὐ λέγω Καίσαρ ἢ Καίσαρος φίλος, ἀλλὰ κόραξ, αὐλητὴς, πυρετὸς, ἄλλα τρισμύρια; ἡ δ' εὔροια οὐδὲν οὕτως ἔχει ὡς τὸ διηνεκὲς καὶ ἀνεμπόδιστον:* "And what sort of happiness is this, which any thing intervening may embarrass; I say not Cæsar, or Cæsar's friend, but a crow, a piper, a fever, a thousand things beside? Happiness, surely, implies nothing so much as perpetuity, and being superior to hindernnce or impediment." Arrian. Epict. l. iv. c. 4. p. 585. edit. Upt. See also l. ii. c. 11. p. 227.

Self-derived.—Atque hoc dabitis, ut opinor, si modo sit aliquid esse beatum, id oportere totum poni in potestate sapientis: nam, si amitti vita beata potest, beata esse non potest. Cic. de Fin. l. ii. c. 27. p. 163. *Καὶ τοῖς μὲν κατ' ἀλήθειαν κακοῖς ἵνα μὴ περιπίπτῃ ὁ ἄνθρωπος, ἐπ' αὐτῷ [οἱ θεοὶ] τὸ πᾶν ἔθεντο:* "That man might not fall into real evils, the gods have put the whole in his own power." M. Ant. l. ii. s. 11. *Τί γάρ ἐστιν, ὃ ζητεῖ πᾶς ἄνθρωπος; εὐσταθῆναι, εὐδαιμονῆσαι, πάντα ὡς θέλει ποιεῖν, μὴ κωλύεσθαι, μηδ' ἀναγκάζεσθαι:* "For what is it that every man seeks? To be securely fixed, to be happy, to do all things according to his own will, not to be hindered, not to be compelled." Arrian. Epict. l. iv. c. 1. p. 539, 540. Aristotle joins self-derived and indeprivable in his idea of good: *Τἀγαθὸν δὲ οἰκεῖον τι καὶ δυσαφαίρετον εἶναι μαντευόμεθα.* Eth. Nic. l. i. c. 5.

It matters, continued he, little, how they err in the application; if they covet that as agreeable to nature, which is in itself most contrary; if they would have that as durable, which is in itself most transient; that as independent, and their own, which is most precarious and servile. It is enough for us, if we know their aim; enough, if we can discover, what it is they propose; the means and method may be absurd, as it happens.—I answered, their aim was sufficient to prove what he had asserted.

It is true, replied he, it is abundantly sufficient. And yet, perhaps, even though this were ever so certain, it would not be altogether foreign, were we to examine, how they act; how they succeed in applying these universals to particular subjects. Should they be found just in the application, we need look no further: the true sovereign good would of course be plain and obvious; and we should have no more to do, than to follow the beaten road.—It is granted, replied I: but what if they err?—Time enough for that, said he, when we are satisfied that they do. We ought first to inform ourselves, whether they may not possibly be in the right.—I submitted, and begged him to proceed his own way.

III. Will you, then, said he, in this disquisition into human conduct, allow me this: That such, as is the species of life, which every one chooses; such is his idea of happiness, such his conception of the sovereign good?—I seem, said I, to comprehend you, but should be glad you would illustrate.—His meaning, he answered, was no more than this: if a man prefer a life of industry, it is because he has an idea of happiness in wealth; if he prefers a life of gaiety, it is from a like idea concerning pleasure. And the same, we say, holds true in every other instance.—I told him, it must, certainly.

And can you recollect, said he, any life, but what is a life of business, or of leisure?—I answered, none.—And is not the great end of business either power or wealth?—It is.—Must not every life therefore of business be either political or lucrative?—It must.—Again, are not intellect and sense the soul's leading powers?—They are.—And in leisure, are we not ever seeking to gratify one or the other?—We are. Must not every life therefore of leisure be either pleasurable or contemplative?—If you confine pleasure, said I, to sense, I think it necessarily must.—If it be not so confined, said he, we confound all inquiry.—Allow it.

Mark, then, said he, the two grand *genera*, the lives of business and of leisure: mark also the subordinate species; the political and lucrative, the contemplative and pleasurable.[m] Can you think of any other, which these will not include?—I replied, I knew of none.—It is possible, indeed, said he, that there may be other lives framed, by the blending of these, two or more

[m] This fourfold distinction of lives is mentioned in Aristotle's Ethics, l. i. c. 5.

of them together. But if we separate with accuracy, we shall find that here they all terminate.—I replied, so it seemed probable.

If, then, continued he, we would be exact in our inquiry, we must examine these four lives, and mark their consequences. It is thus only we shall learn, how far those, who embrace them, find that good and happiness, which we know they all pursue.—I made answer, It seemed necessary, and I should willingly attend him.

IV. To begin then, said he, with the political life. Let us see the good, usually sought after here. To a private man, it is the favour of some prince, or commonwealth; the honours and emoluments derived from this favour; the court and homage of mankind; the power of commanding others. To a prince, it is the same thing nearly, only greater in degree; a larger command; a stricter and more servile homage; glory, conquest, and extended empire. Am I right in my description?—I replied, I thought he was.—Whether, then, said he, all this deserves the name of good or not, I do not controvert. Be it one or the other, it affects not our inquiry. All that I would ask concerning it is this, do you not think it a good (if it really be one) derived from foreign and external causes?—Undoubtedly, replied I.—It cannot come then from ourselves, or be self-derived?—It cannot.—And what shall we say as to its duration and stability? Is it so firm and lasting, that we cannot be deprived of it?—I should imagine, said I, quite otherwise.—You insist not, then, said he, on my appealing to history? You acknowledge the fate of favourites, of empires, and their owners?—I replied, I did.

If so, said he, it should seem that this political good, which they seek, corresponds not to the preconceptions of being durable and indeprivable.—Far from it.—But it appeared, just before, not to be self-derived.—It did.—You see, then, said he, that in three of our preconceptions it entirely fails.—So, indeed, said I, it appears.

But, further, said he, we are told of this good, that in the possession it is attended with anxiety; and that when lost, it is usually lost with ignominy and disgrace; nay, often with prosecutions and the bitterest resentments; with mulcts, with exile, and death itself.—It is frequently, said I, the case.—How, then, said he, can it answer that other preconception, of contributing to our well-being? Can that contribute to well-being whose consequences lead to calamity, and whose presence implies anxiety?—This, it must be confessed, said I, appears not probable.

But, once more, said he, there are certain habits, or dispositions of mind, called sincerity, generosity, candour, plain-dealing, justice, honour, honesty, and the like.—There are: and it has been generally believed, that these are agreeable to nature.—Assuredly.—But it has been as generally believed, that the political good we speak of, is often not to be acquired but by habits contrary to these; and which, if these are natural, must

of necessity be unnatural.—What habits, said I, do you mean? —Flattery, answered he, dissimulation, intrigue: upon occasion, perhaps iniquity, falsehood, and fraud.—It is possible, indeed, said I, that these may sometimes be thought necessary. —How, then, said he, can that good be agreeable to nature, which cannot be acquired, but by habits contrary to nature?—Your argument, said I, seems just.

If, then, said he, we have reasoned rightly, and our conclusions may be depended on, it should seem that the supposed good, which the political life pursues, corresponds not, in any instance, to our preconceptions of the sovereign good.—I answered, so it appeared.

V. Let us quit, then, said he, the political life, and pass to the lucrative. The object of this is wealth.—Admit it.—And is it not too often, said he, the case, that, to acquire this, we are tempted to employ some of those habits which we have just condemned as unnatural? Such, I mean, as fraud, falsehood, injustice, and the like?—It must be owned, said I, too often.

Besides, continued he, what shall we say to the esteem, the friendship, and love of mankind? Are they worth having? Is it agreeable, think you, to nature, to endeavour to deserve them? —Agreeable, said I, to nature, beyond dispute.—If so, then to merit hatred and contempt, said he, must needs be contrary to nature.—Undoubtedly.—And is there any thing which so certainly merits hatred and contempt, as a mere lucrative life, spent in the uniform pursuit of wealth?—I replied, I believed there was nothing.—If so, said he, then, as to corresponding with our preconceptions, the lucrative good, in this respect, fares no better than the political.—It appears not.

And what shall we say as to anxiety? Is not both the possession and pursuit of wealth, to those who really love it, ever anxious?—It seems so.—And why anxious, but from a certainty of its instability; from an experience, how obnoxious it is to every cross event; how easy to be lost and transferred to others, by the same fraud and rapine which acquired it to ourselves? This is, indeed, the tritest of all topics. The poets and orators have long ago exhausted it.—It is true, said I, they have.—May we not venture, then, said he, upon the whole, to pass the same sentence on the lucrative life, as we have already on the political, that it proposes not a good, correspondent to those preconceptions, by which we would all be governed in the good, which we are all seeking?—I answered, we might justly.

VI. If, then, neither the lucrative life, nor the political, said he, procure that good which we desire, shall we seek it from the pleasurable? Shall we make pleasure our goddess?

Pleasure,
Whom love attends, and soft desire, and words
Alluring, apt the steadiest heart to bend.[n]

[n] Alluding to Homer, Iliad. Ζ. 214.

So says the poet, and plausible his doctrine.—Plausible, said I, indeed.

Let it, then, continued he, be a pleasurable world; a race of harmless, loving animals; an Elysian temperature of sunshine and shade. Let the earth, in every quarter, resemble our own dear country; where never was a frost, never a fog, never a day but was delicious and serene.—I was a little embarrassed at this unexpected flight, until recollecting myself, I told him, (but still with some surprise,) that, in no degree to disparage either my country or my countrymen, I had never found either so exquisite as he now supposed them.—There are, then, it seems, said he, in the natural world, and even in our own beloved country, such things as storms and tempests, as pinching colds and scorching heats.—I replied, there were.—And consequent to these, disease, and famine, and infinite calamities.—There are.—And in the civil or human world, we have discord and contention; or, (as the poet better describes it,[o])

> Cruel revenge, and rancorous despite,
> Disloyal treason, and heart-burning hate.

—We have.—Alas! then, poor pleasure! where is that good, accommodate to every time; suited to every place; self-derived, not dependent on foreign external causes? Can it be pleasure, on such a changeable, such a turbulent spot as this?—I replied, I thought not.

And what, indeed, were the world, said he, modelled to a temperature the most exact? Were the rigours of the seasons never more to be known; nor wars, devastations, famines, or diseases? Admitting all this, (which we know to be impossible,) can we find still in pleasure that lengthened duration, which we consider as an essential, to constitute the sovereign good? Ask the glutton, the drinker, the man of gaiety and intrigue, whether they know any enjoyment not to be cancelled by satiety? which does not hastily pass away into the tedious intervals of indifference? Or yielding all this, too, (which we know cannot be yielded,) where are we to find our good, how possess it in age? in that eve of life, declining age, when the power of sense, on which all depends, like the setting sun, is gradually forsaking us?

I should imagine, said I, that pleasure was no mean adversary, since you employ, in attacking her, so much of your rhetoric. —Without heeding what I said, he pursued his subject.—Beside, if this be our good, our happiness, and our end, to what purpose powers, which bear no relation to it? Why memory? why reason? Mere sensation might have been as exquisite, had we been flies or earthworms. Or can it be proved otherwise?—I replied, I could not say.—No animal, continued he, possesses its faculties in vain. And shall man derive no good from his best,

[o] Spencer's Fairy Queen, book ii. cant. 7. stanz. 22.

his most eminent? from that, which, of all, is peculiar to himself? For as to growth and nutrition, they are not wanting to the meanest vegetable; and for senses, there are animals which, perhaps, exceed us in them all.

VII. This seems, said I, no mean argument in favour of contemplation. The contemplative life gives reason all the scope which it can desire.—And of all lives, answered he, would it surely be the best, did we dwell, like Milton's Uriel, in the sun's bright circle. Then might we plan, indeed, the most romantic kind of happiness. Stretched at ease, without trouble or molestation, we might pass our days contemplating the universe, tracing its beauty; lost in wonder, ravished with ecstacy, and I know not what: but here, alas! on this sublunary, this turbulent spot, (as we called it not long since,) how little is this, or any thing like it, practicable? Fogs arise which dim our prospects, the cares of life perpetually molest us: is contemplation suited to a place like this?—It must be owned, said I, not extremely. —How, then, is it the sovereign good, which should be accommodate to every place?—I replied, it seemed not probable.

But, further, said he, can we enjoy the sovereign good, and be at the same time vexed, and agitated by passion? Does not this seem a paradox?—I answered, it did.—Suppose, then, an event were to happen, not an inundation or massacre, but an acquaintance only drop a disrespectful word;[p] a servant chance to break a favourite piece of furniture: what would instruct us to endure this? contemplation, theory, abstractions?—Why not? said I.—No, replied he, with warmth, (quoting the poet,) not

> Tho' all the stars
> Thou knew'st by name; and all the etherial powers.[q]

For does not experience teach us, abundantly teach us, that our deepest philosophers, as to temper and behaviour, are as very children for the most part, as the meanest and most illiterate? A little more arrogance, perhaps, from presumption of what they know, but not a grain more of magnanimity, of candour, and calm endurance.

You are somewhat too severe, said I, in censuring of all. There are better and worse among them, as among others.—The difference is no way proportioned, said he, to the quantity of their knowledge; so that whatever be its cause, it cannot be imputed to their speculations. Besides, can you really imagine, we came here only to think? [r]Is acting a circumstance which

[p] See Arrian Epict. l. iv. c. 4. which chapter is peculiarly addressed to the seekers of leisure, retirement, and study. Part of it has been already quoted, p. 49, note *l. καὶ τίς αὕτη ἡ εὔροια*, &c. See also the same author, l. iv. c. 1. p. 567. Πῶς ἀκούεις, &c. and of the Dialogue here commented, p. 45.

[q] Par. Lost, book xii. 576.

[r] Etenim cognitio contemplatioque naturæ manca quodammodo atque inchoata sit, si nulla actio rerum consequatur. Ea autem actio in hominum commodis tuendis maxime cernitur. Cic. de Offic. l. i. c. 43. The whole chapter, as well as the subsequent, is well worthy of perusal.

is foreign to our character? Why then so many social affections, which all of us feel, even in spite of ourselves? Are we to suppress them all, as useless and unnatural?—The attempt, replied I, must needs be found impracticable.—Were they once suppressed, said he, the consequences would be somewhat strange. We should hear no more of father, brother, husband, son, citizen, magistrate, and society itself. And were this ever the case, ill (I fear) would it fare with even contemplation itself. It would certainly be but bad speculating, among lawless barbarians, unassociated animals, where strength alone of body was to constitute dominion, and the contest came to be (as Horace describes it,[a])

glandem atque cubilia propter,
Unguibus et pugnis, dein fustibus.

—Bad enough, replied I, of all conscience.

It should seem, then, said he, that not even the best contemplative life, however noble its object, was agreeable to our present nature, or consistent with our present situation.—I confess, said I, you appear to have proved so.—But if this be allowed true of the best, the most excellent, what shall we say to the mockery of monkery, the farce of friars, the ridiculous mummery of being sequestered in a cloister? This surely is too low a thing, even to merit an examination.—I have no scruples here, said I, you need not waste your time.

VIII. If that, said he, be your opinion, let us look a little backward. For our memory's sake it may be proper to recapitulate.—I replied, it would be highly acceptable.—Thus, then, said he, we have examined the four grand lives which we find the generality of men embrace: the lucrative and the political, the pleasurable and the contemplative. And we have aimed at proving that, to such a being as man, with such a body, such affections, such senses, and such an intellect; placed in such a world, subject to such incidents; not one of these lives is productive of that good which we find all men to recognise through the same uniform preconceptions, and which, through one or other of these lives, they all of them pursue.

IX. You have justly, said I, collected the sum of your inquiries.—And happy, said he, should I think it, were they to terminate here.—I asked him, why?—Because, replied he, to insinuate first, that all mankind are in the wrong, and then to attempt afterwards to shew one's self only to be right, is a degree of arrogance which I would not willingly be guilty of.—I ventured here to say, that I thought he need not be so diffident; that a subject where one's own interest appeared concerned so nearly, would well justify every scruple, and even the severest inquiry.—There, said he, you say something, there you encourage me indeed. For what; are we not cautioned against

[a] Sat. 3. l. i. ver. 99.

counterfeits, even in matters of meanest value? If a piece of metal be tendered us, which seems doubtful, do we not hesitate?[t] do we not try it by the test, before we take it for current? And is this not deemed prudence? Are we not censured, if we act otherwise? How much more, then, does it behove us not to be imposed on here? To be diffident and scrupulously exact, where imposture, if once admitted, may tempt us to a far worse bargain than ever Glaucus made with Diomede?—What bargain, said I, do you mean?—The exchange, replied he, not of gold for brass, but of good for evil, and of happiness for misery. But enough of this: since you have encouraged me to proceed, we are seeking that good, which we think others have not found. Permit me thus to pursue my subject.

X. Every being on this our terrestrial dwelling, exists encompassed with infinite objects; exists among animals tame, and animals wild; among plants and vegetables of a thousand different qualities; among heats and colds, tempests and calms, the friendships and discords of heterogeneous elements. What say you? Are all these things exactly the same to it; or do they differ, think you, in their effects and consequences?—They differ, said I, widely.—Some perhaps then, said he, are apt, congruous, and agreeable to its natural state.—I replied, they were.—Others are inapt, incongruous, and disagreeable.—They are.—And others again are indifferent.—They are.

It should seem, then, said he, if this be allowed, that to every individual being, without the least exception, the whole mass of things external, from the greatest to the meanest, stood in the relations of either agreeable, disagreeable, or indifferent.—I replied, so it appeared.

But though this, continued he, be true in the general, it is yet as certain, when we descend to particulars, that what is agreeable to one species is disagreeable to another; and not only so, but perhaps indifferent to a third. Instances of this kind, he said, were too obvious to be mentioned.

I replied, it was evident.—Whence, then, said he, this diversity? It cannot arise from the externals, for water is equally water, whether to a man, or to a fish; whether, operating on the one, it suffocate, or on the other, it give life and vigour.—I replied, it was.—So is fire, said he, the same fire, however various in its consequences; whether it harden or soften, give pleasure or pain.—I replied, it was.—But if this diversity, continued he, be not derived from the externals, whence can it be else? Or can it possibly be derived otherwise than from the peculiar constitution, from the natural state of every species itself?—I replied, it appeared probable.

Thus, then, said he, is it that every particular species is, itself to itself, the measure of all things in the universe; that as things

[t] See Arr. Epict. l. i. c. 10. p. 110. Ὁρᾶτε καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ νομίσματος, &c.

vary in their relations to it, they vary too in their value; and that if their value be ever doubtful, it can no way be adjusted, but by recurring with accuracy to the natural state of the species, and to those several relations which such a state of course creates.—I answered, he argued justly.

XI. To proceed, then, said he: though it be true, that every species has a natural state, as we have asserted; it is not true, that every species has a sense or feeling of it. This feeling or sense is a natural eminence or prerogative, denied the vegetable and inanimate, and imparted only to the animal.—I answered, it was.

And think you, continued he, that as many as have this sense or feeling of a natural state, are alienated from it, or indifferent to it?[u] Or is it not more probable, that they are well affected to it?—Experience, said I, teaches us, how well they are all affected.—You are right, replied he. For what would be more absurd, than to be indifferent to their own welfare; or to be alienated from it, as though it was foreign and unnatural?—I replied, nothing could be more.—But, continued he, if they are well-affected to this their proper natural state, it should seem, too, they must be well-affected to all those externals which appear apt, congruous, and agreeable to it.—I answered, they must.—And if so, then ill-affected or averse to such as appear the contrary.—They must.—And to such as appear indifferent, indifferent.—They must.—But if this, said he, be allowed, it will follow, that in consequence of these appearances, they will think some externals worthy of pursuit, some worthy of avoidance, and some worthy of neither.—It was probable, said I, they should.

Hence, then, said he, another division of things external; that is, into pursuable, avoidable, and indifferent: a division only belonging to beings sensitive and animate, because all, below these, can neither avoid nor pursue.—I replied, they could not.

If, then, said he, man be allowed in the number of these sensitive beings, this division will affect man; or, to explain more fully, the whole mass of things external will, according to this division, exist to the human species in the relations of pursuable, avoidable, and indifferent.—I replied, they would.

Should we therefore desire, said he, to know what these things truly are, we must first be informed, what is man's truly natural constitution. For thus, you may remember, it was settled not long since, that every species was its own standard; and that when the value of things was doubtful, the species was

[u] Placet his, inquit, quorum ratio mihi probatur, simul atque natum sit animal (hinc enim est ordiendum) ipsum sibi conciliari, et commendari ad se conservandum, et suum statum, et ad ea, quæ conservantia sunt ejus status, diligenda; alienari autem ab interitu, iisque rebus, quæ interitum videantur afferre. Cic. de Fin. l. iii. c. 5. p. 211. edit. Dav. See also l. v. c. 9. De Offic. l. i. c. 4. *Οἰκειούμεθα πρὸς αὐτοὺς εὐθὺς γενόμενοι.* Plut. Mor. p. 1038. B.

to be studied, the relations to be deduced which were consequent to it, and in this manner the value of things to be adjusted and ascertained.—I replied, we had so agreed it.—I fear, then, said he, we are engaged in a more arduous undertaking, a task of more difficulty than we were at first aware of; but, *fortuna fortes*, we must endeavour to acquit ourselves as well as we are able.

XII. That man therefore has a body, of a figure and internal structure peculiar to itself; capable of certain degrees of strength, agility, beauty, and the like: this, I believe, is evident, and hardly wants a proof.—I answered, I was willing to own it.—That he is capable, too, of pleasure and pain; is possessed of senses, affections, appetites, and aversions: this also seems evident, and can scarcely be denied.—I replied, it was admitted.—We may venture, then, to range him in the tribe of animal beings.—I replied, we might.

And think you, said he, without society, you or any man could have been born?—Most certainly not.—Without society, when born, could you have been brought to maturity?—Most certainly not.—Had your parents then had no social affections towards you in that perilous state, that tedious infancy, (so much longer than the longest of other animals,) you must have inevitably perished through want and inability.[x]—I must.—You perceive, then, that to society you and every man are indebted, not only for the beginning of being, but for the continuance.—We are.

Suppose, then, we pass from this birth and infancy of man, to his maturity and perfection; is there any age, think you, so self-sufficient, as that in it he feels no wants?—What wants, answered I, do you mean?—In the first and principal place, said he, that of food; then perhaps that of raiment; and after this, a dwelling, or defence against the weather.—These wants, replied I, are surely natural at all ages.—And is it not agreeable to nature, said he, that they should at all ages be supplied?—Assuredly.—And is it not more agreeable to have them well supplied, than ill?—It is.—And most agreeable, to have them best supplied?—Certainly.—If there be then any one state better than all others for the supplying these wants, this state, of all others, must needs be most natural.—It must.

And what supply, said he, of these wants shall we esteem the meanest which we can conceive? Would it not be something like this? Had we nothing beyond acorns for food, beyond a rude skin for raiment, or beyond a cavern or hollow tree to provide us with a dwelling?—Indeed, said I, this would be bad enough.—And do you not imagine, as far as this, we might each supply ourselves, though we lived in woods, mere solitary savages?—I replied, I thought we might.

[x] Vid. Jambl. Protrept. 56.

Suppose, then, continued he, that our supplies were to be mended; for instance, that we were to exchange acorns for bread; would our savage character be sufficient here? Must we not be a little better disciplined? Would not some art be requisite? The baker's, for example.—It would.—And previously to the baker's, that of the miller?—It would.—And previously to the miller's, that of the husbandman?—It would.—Three arts, then, appear necessary, even upon the lowest estimation.—It is admitted.

But a question further, said he: can the husbandman work, think you, without his tools? Must he not have his plough, his harrow, his reap-hook, and the like?—He must.—And must not those other artists, too, be furnished in the same manner?—They must.—And whence must they be furnished? From their own arts? Or are not the making tools, and the using them, two different occupations?—I believe, said I, they are.—You may be convinced, continued he, by small recollection: does agriculture make its own plough, its own harrow? Or does it not apply to other arts for all necessaries of this kind?—It does.—Again: does the baker build his own oven, or the miller frame his own mill?—It appears, said I, no part of their business.

What a tribe of mechanics, then, said he, are advancing upon us: smiths, carpenters, masons, mill-wrights; and all these to provide the single necessary of bread. Not less than seven or eight arts, we find, are wanting at the fewest.—It appears so.—And what, if to the providing a comfortable cottage, and raiment suitable to an industrious hind, we allow a dozen arts more? It would be easy, by the same reasoning, to prove the number double.—I admit the number, said I, mentioned.

If so, continued he, it should seem, that towards a tolerable supply of the three primary and common necessaries, food, raiment, and a dwelling, not less than twenty arts were, on the lowest account, requisite.—It appears so.

And is one man equal, think you, to the exercise of these twenty arts? If he had even genius, which we can scarce imagine, is it possible he should find leisure?—I replied, I thought not.—If so, then a solitary, unsocial state, can never supply tolerably the common necessaries of life.—It cannot.

But what if we pass from the necessaries of life to the elegancies? to music, sculpture, painting, and poetry? What if we pass from all arts, whether necessary or elegant, to the large and various tribe of sciences? to logic, mathematics, astronomy, physics? Can one man, imagine you, master all this?—Absurd, said I, impossible.—And yet in this cycle of sciences and arts seem included all the comforts, as well as ornaments of life; included all conducive, either to being, or to well-being.—It must be confessed, said I, it has the appearance.

What, then, said he, must be done? In what manner must we be supplied?—I answered, I knew not, unless we made a dis-

tribution. Let one exercise one art, and another a different; let this man study such a science, and that man another. Thus the whole cycle (as you call it) may be carried easily into perfection. —It is true, said he, it may; and every individual, as far as his own art or science, might be supplied completely, and as well as he could wish. But what avails a supply in a single instance? What in this case are to become of all his numerous other wants? —You conceive, replied I, what I would have said, but partially. My meaning was, that artist trade with artist; each supply where he is deficient, by exchanging where he abounds; so that a portion of every thing may be dispersed throughout all.—You intend then a state, said he, of commutation and traffic.—I replied, I did.

If so, continued he, I see a new face of things. The savages, with their skins and their caverns, disappear: in their place I behold a fair community rising. No longer woods, no longer solitude; but all is social, civil, and cultivated. And can we doubt any further whether society be natural? Is not this evidently the state which can best supply the primary wants?—It has appeared so.—And did we not agree, some time since, that this state, whatever we found it, would be certainly of all others the most agreeable to our nature?—We did.—And have we not added, since this, to the weight of our argument, by passing from the necessary arts to the elegant; from the elegant to the sciences?—We have.—The more, said he, we consider, the more shall we be convinced, that all these, the noblest honours and ornaments of the human mind, without that leisure, that experience, that emulation, that reward, which the social state alone we know is able to provide them, could never have found existence, or been in the least recognised.—Indeed, said I, I believe not.

Let it not be forgot, then, said he, in favour of society,[y] that to it we owe, not only the beginning and continuation, but the well-being, and (if I may use the expression) the very elegance and rationality of our existence.—I answered, it appeared evident.

And what, then, continued he, if society be thus agreeable to our nature, is there nothing, think you, within us, to excite and lead us to it? No impulse, no preparation of faculties?—It would be strange, answered I, if there should not.—It would be a singular exception, said he, with respect to all other herding species. Let us, however, examine: pity, benevolence, friendship, love, the general dislike of solitude, and desire of company; are they natural affections which come of themselves, or are they taught us by art, like music and arithmetic?—I should think, replied I,

[y] The whole argument to prove society natural to man, from p. 58, is taken from the second book of Plato's Republic. See Plat. vol. ii. p. 369, &c. edit. Serrani. See also the same argument hinted at in the Protagoras of Plato, p. 322. C. edit. Serr. vol. i.

they were natural, because in every degree of men some traces of them may be discovered.—And are not the powers and capacities of speech, said he, the same?[z] Are not all men naturally formed to express their sentiments by some kind of language?—I replied, they were.

If, then, said he, these several powers and dispositions are natural, so should seem too their exercise.—Admit it.—And if their exercise, then so too that state where alone they can be exercised.—Admit it.—And what is this state but the social? Or where else is it possible to converse, or use our speech; to exhibit actions of pity, benevolence, friendship, or love; to relieve our aversion to solitude, or gratify our desire of being with others?—I replied, it could be nowhere else.

You see, then, continued he, a preparation of faculties is not

[z] The argument in favour of society, from our being possessed of λόγος, or the speaking faculty, seems to have been much insisted on by the best authors of antiquity.

Διότι δὲ πολιτικὸν ὁ Ἄνθρωπος ζῶον, πάσης μελίττης καὶ πάντος ἀγελαίου ζώου μᾶλλον, δῆλον. Οὐθὲν γὰρ, ὡς φάμεν, μάτην ἡ φύσις ποιεῖ· λόγον δὲ μόνον Ἄνθρωπος ἔχει τῶν ζώων. Ἡ μὲν οὖν φωνὴ τοῦ ἡδέος καὶ λυπηροῦ ἐστὶ σημεῖον. διὰ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὑπάρχει ζῶοις· μέχρι γὰρ τούτου ἡ φύσις αὐτῶν ἐλήλυθεν, ὥστε αἰσθάνεσθαι τοῦ λυπηροῦ καὶ ἡδέος, καὶ ταῦτα σημαίνειν ἀλλήλοις. Ὁ δὲ λόγος ἐπὶ τὸ δηλοῦν ἐστι τὸ σύμφερον, καὶ τὸ βλαβερόν. ὥστε καὶ τὸ δίκαιον, καὶ τὸ ἄδικον. Τοῦτο γὰρ πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα ζῶα τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἴδιον, τὸ μόνον ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ, καὶ δικαίου καὶ ἀδίκου αἴσθησιν ἔχειν· ἡ δὲ τούτων κοινωνία ποιεῖ οἰκίαν καὶ πόλιν. "The reason why man is a social animal, more than any bee, or any herding species whatever, is evident from hence. Nature, we say, makes nothing in vain; and man, of all animals, is only possessed of speech. Bare sound, indeed, may be the sign of what is pleasurable or painful, and for that reason it is common even to other animals also: for so far we perceive even their nature can go, that they have a sense of those feelings, and signify them to each other. But speech is made to indicate what is expedient, and what hurtful; and, in consequence of this, what is just and unjust. It is therefore given to men, because this, with respect to other animals, is to men alone peculiar, that of good and evil, just and unjust, they only possess a sense or feeling. Now it is the participation or community of these which makes and constitutes both a family and a polity." Aristot. Polit. l. i. c. 2.

Εἰκόνες γάρ εἰσιν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ τῶν πραγμάτων [τὰ νοήματα]· αἱ δὲ φωναὶ τῶν νοημάτων εἰσὶν ἐξαγγελτικαί· καὶ διὰ τοῦτο δίδονται ἡμῖν ὑπὸ τῆς φύσεως, πρὸς τὸ δι' αὐτῶν σημαίνειν ἡμᾶς ἀλλήλοις τῆς ψυχῆς τὰ νοήματα—ἵνα καὶ δυνάμεθα κοινωνεῖν ἀλλήλοις, καὶ συμπολιτεύεσθαι· κοινωνικὸν γὰρ ζῶον ὁ Ἄνθρωπος. "Ideas are images of things in the soul, and sounds are declarative of these ideas. And for this reason were these sounds imparted to us by nature, not only that we might indicate to each other these ideas, but that we might be enabled to communicate and live in associations: for man is by nature a social animal." Ammon. in l. de Interpr. p. 16. B.

Thus Cicero, speaking of human nature: Omitto opportunitates habilitatesque reliqui corporis, moderationem vocis, orationis vim, quæ conciliatrix est humanæ maxume societatis. De Legg. l. i. c. 9. p. 35. ed. Davis.

Again, in his Offices: Sed quæ natura principia sint communitatis et societatis humanæ, repetendum altius videtur. Est enim primum, quod cernitur in universi generis humani societate. Ejus enim vinculum est ratio, et oratio; quæ docendo, discendo, communicando, disceptando, dijudicando, conciliat inter se homines, conjungitque naturali quadam societate. De Offic. l. i. c. 16.

Thus too, in his treatise De Nat. Deor.: Jam vero domina rerum (ut vos soletis dicere) eloquendi vis quam est præclara, quamque divina? Quæ primum efficit ut ea, quæ ignoramus, discere, et ea, quæ scimus, alios docere possimus. Deinde hac cohortamur, hac persuademus, hac consolamur afflictos, hac deducimus perterritos a timore, hac gestientes comprimimus, hac cupiditates iracundiasque restinguimus: hæc, nos juris, legum urbium societate devinxit: hæc a vita immani et fera segregavit. De Nat. Deor. l. ii. c. 59. p. 243. ed. Davis. See also Quint. Inst. l. ii. c. 16. and Alex. Aphrod. περὶ ψυχ. p. 155. B. ed. Ald. Sanctii Min. l. i. c. 2. p. 15. Plat. in Sophista, p. 260. A. ed. Serr.

wanting. We are fitted with powers and dispositions which have only relation to society, and which, out of society, can nowhere else be exercised.—I replied, it was evident.—You have seen, too, the superior advantages of the social state above all others. —I have.

Let this then be remembered, said he, throughout all our future reasonings, remembered as a first principle in our ideas of humanity, that man by nature is truly a social animal.—I promised it should.

XIII. Let us now, said he, examine what further we can learn concerning him. As social, indeed, he is distinguished from the solitary and savage species; but in no degree from the rest, of a milder and more friendly nature.—It is true, replied I, he is not.—Does he then differ no more from these several social species, than they, each of them, differ from one another? Must we range them all, and man among the rest, under the same common and general genus?—I see no foundation, said I, for making a distinction.

Perhaps, said he, there may be none; and it is possible, too, there may. Consider a little: Do you not observe in all other species, a similarity among individuals? a surprising likeness, which runs through each particular? In one species they are all bold, in another all timorous; in one all ravenous, in another all gentle. In the bird kind only, what a uniformity of voice, in each species, as to their notes; of architecture, as to building their nests; of food, both for themselves and for supporting their young.—It is true, said I.—And do you observe, continued he, the same similarity among men? Are these all as uniform, as to their sentiments and actions?—I replied, by no means.

One question more, said he, as to the character of brutes, if I may be allowed the expression. Are these, think you, what we behold them, by nature or otherwise?—Explain, said I, your question, for I do not well conceive you.—I mean, replied he, is it by nature that the swallow builds her nest, and performs all the offices of her kind; or is she taught by art, by discipline, or custom?—She acts, replied I, by pure nature, undoubtedly.—And is not the same true, said he, of every other bird and beast in the universe?—It is.—No wonder, then, continued he, as they have so wise a governess, that a uniform rule of action is provided for each species. For what can be more worthy the wisdom of nature, than ever to the same substances to give the same law? —It appears, said I, reasonable.

But what, continued he, shall we say as to man? Is he too actuated by nature purely?—I answered, why not?—If he be, replied he, it is strange in nature, that with respect to man alone she should follow so different a conduct. The particulars in other species, we agree, she renders uniform; but in our's, every particular seems a sort of model by himself.—If nature, said I, do

not actuate us, what can we suppose else?—Are local customs, said he, nature? Are the polities and religions of particular nations, nature? Are the examples which are set before us, the preceptors who instruct us, the company and friends with whom we converse, all nature?—No, surely, said I.—And yet, said he, it is evident, that by these, and a thousand incidental circumstances, equally foreign to nature, our actions, and manners, and characters are adjusted. Who then can imagine, we are actuated by nature only?—I confess, said I, it appears contrary.

You see, then, said he, one remarkable distinction between man and brutes in general. In the brute, nature does all; in man, but part only.—It is evident, said I.

But further, continued he, let us consider the powers or faculties possessed by each. Suppose I was willing to give a brute the same instruction which we give a man. A parrot, perhaps, or ape, might arrive to some small degree of mimicry; but do you think, upon the whole, they would be much profited or altered?—I replied, I thought not.—And do you perceive the same, said he, with respect to man? Or does not experience shew us the very reverse? Is not education capable of moulding us into any thing, of making us greatly good or greatly bad, greatly wise or greatly absurd?—The fact, said I, is indisputable.

Mark, then, said he, the difference between human powers and brutal. The leading principle of brutes appears to tend in each species to one single purpose; to this, in general, it uniformly arrives; and here, in general, it as uniformly stops: it needs no precepts or discipline to instruct it; nor will it easily be changed, or admit a different direction. On the contrary, the leading principle of man is capable of infinite directions, is convertible to all sorts of purposes, equal to all sorts of subjects; neglected, remains ignorant, and void of every perfection; cultivated, becomes adorned with sciences and arts; can raise us to excel, not only brutes, but our own kind; with respect to our other powers and faculties, can instruct us how to use them, as well as those of the various natures which we see existing around us. In a word, to oppose the two principles to each other, the leading principle of man is multiform, originally uninstructed, pliant and docile: the leading principle of brutes is uniform, originally instructed, but, in most instances afterward, inflexible and indocile. Or does not experience plainly shew and confirm the truth of what we assert?—I made answer, it did.

You allow, then, said he, the human principle, and the brutal, to be things of different idea.—Undoubtedly.—Do they not each, then, deserve a different appellation?—I should think so.—Suppose therefore we call the human principle, reason; and the brutal, instinct: would you object to the terms?—I replied, I should not.—If not, continued he, then reason being peculiar to

man, or all the animals inhabiting this earth, may we not affirm of him, by way of distinction, that he is a rational animal?—I replied, we might justly.

Let this, too, then be remembered, said he, in the course of our inquiry, that man is by nature a rational animal.—I promised it should.

XIV. In consequence of this, said he, as often as there is occasion, I shall appeal as well to reason, as to nature, for a standard.—What, said I, do you mean by nature?—Its meanings, replied he, are many and various. As it stands at present opposed, it may be enough perhaps to say, that nature is that which is the cause of every thing, except those things alone which are the immediate effects of reason. In other words, whatever is not reason, or the effect of reason, we would consider as nature, or the effect of nature.—I answered, as he so distinguished them, I thought he might justly appeal to either.

And yet, continued he, there is a remarkable difference between the standard of reason, and that of nature; a difference, which at no time we ought to forget.—What difference, said I, do you mean?—It is this, answered he; in nature, the standard is sought from among the many; in reason, the standard is sought among the few.—You must explain, said I, your meaning, for I must confess you seem obscure.

Thus, then, said he: suppose, as an anatomist, you were seeking the structure of some internal part; to discover this, would you not inspect a number of individuals?—I should.—And would you not inform yourself, what had been discovered by others?—I should.—And suppose, after all, you should find a multitude of instances for one structure, and a few singular for a different: by which would you be governed?—By the multitude, said I, undoubtedly.—Thus, then, continued he, in nature the standard, you see, exists among the many.—I replied, it had so appeared.

And what, said he, were we to seek the perfection of sculpture, or of painting? Where should we inquire then? Among the numerous common artists, or among the few and celebrated?—Among the few, said I.—What if we were to seek the perfection of poetry, or oratory, where then?—Among the few, still.—What if we were to seek the perfection of true argument, or a sound logic; where then?—Still among the few.—And is not true argument, or a sound logic, one of reason's greatest perfections?—It is.—You see, then, continued he, whence the standard of reason is to be sought: it is from among the few,[a] as we said

[a] In omni enim arte, vel studio, vel quavis scientia, vel in ipsa virtute, optumum quodque rarissimum est. Cic. de Fin. l. ii. c. 25. p. 158. edit. Dav. Thus, too, Aristotle joins the rare and the excellent, *τὸ εὖ, καὶ σπάνιον, καὶ ἐπαίνετον, καὶ καλόν.* Eth. Nic. l. ii. c. 9. *τὸ γὰρ σπάνιον, ὃ Εὐθύδημε, τίμιον.* Plat. in Euthyd. p. 304. B. edit. Serr.

before, in contradistinction to the standard of nature.—I confess, said I, it appears so.

And happy, said he, for us, that Providence has so ordered it; happy for us, that what is rational, depends not on the multitude; nor is it to be tried by so pitiful a test as the bare counting of noses.—It is happy, said I, indeed: but whence, pray, the difference? Why are the many to determine in nature, and the few, only, in reason?—To discuss this at large, said he, would require some time. It might insensibly perhaps draw us from our present inquiry. I will endeavour to give you the reason in as few words as possible; which, should they chance to be obscure, be not too solicitous for an explanation.—I begged him to proceed his own way.

The case, said he, appears to be this: in natural works and natural operations, we hold but one efficient cause, and that consummately wise. This cause in every species recognising what is best, and working ever uniformly according to this idea of perfection,[b] the productions and energies, in every species where it acts, are for the most part similar and exactly correspondent. If an exception ever happen, it is from some hidden higher motive,[c] which transcends our comprehension, and which is seen so rarely, as not to injure the general rule, or render it doubtful and precarious. On the contrary, in the productions and energies of reason, there is not one cause, but infinite; as many, indeed, as there are agents of the human kind. Hence truth being but one, and error being infinite, and agents infinite also; what wonder they should oftener miss, than hit the mark? that multitudes should fail, where one alone succeeds, and truth be only the possession of the chosen, fortunate few?—You seem to have explained the difficulty, said I, with sufficient perspicuity.

Let us then go back, said he, and recollect ourselves; that we may not forget what it is we are seeking.—I replied, most willingly.—We have been seeking, continued he, the sovereign good. In consequence of this inquiry, we have discovered, that all things whatever exist to the human species in the relations

[b] Thus Boethius, addressing the Deity:
O qui perpetua mundum ratione gubernas,
Terrarum caliqne sator, qui tempus ab ævo
Ire jubes, stabilisque manens das cuncta moveri;
Quem non externæ pepulerunt fingere causæ
Materiæ fluitantis opes; verum insita summi
Forma boni, livore carens: tu cuncta superno
Ducis ab exemplo, pulchrum pulcherrimus ipse
Mundum mente gerens, similique in imagine formans.
Consol. Philos. l. iii. Metr. 9.

[c] Μήποτε δὲ μήδε ταῦτα [sc. τὰ τέρατα] παρὰ φύσιν εἰσὶν, ἀλλὰ τῇ μὲν μερικῇ φύσει οὐ φύσει, ἀλλὰ παρὰ φύσιν· τῇ δὲ καθόλου, καὶ φύσει καὶ κατὰ φύσιν. Ἡ μὲν γὰρ μερικὴ φύσις ἑνὸς εἴδους στοχάζεται, καὶ μίαν στέρησιν φεύγει. Διὰ τοῦτο τῇ μὲν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου φύσει τὸ τέρας οὔτε φύσει ἐστὶν, οὔτε κατὰ φύσιν· τῇ δ' ὅλῃ φύσει ἐπεὶ μηδὲν τῷ παντὶ παρὰ φύσιν (οὐδὲν γὰρ κακὸν ἐν τῷ παντὶ) οὐκ ἔστι παρὰ φύσιν, ἀλλὰ φύσει καὶ κατὰ φύσιν. Joannes Gram. in Aristot. lib. ii. Natural. Auscult. Nihil enim fieri sine causa potest: nec quicquam fit, quod fieri non potest: nec, si id factum est quod potuit fieri, portentum debet videri. Cic. de Divin. l. ii. c. 28. p. 189. edit. Davis.

of either pursuable, avoidable, or indifferent. To determine these relations with accuracy, we have been scrutinizing the human nature; and that, upon this known maxim, that every species was its own proper standard; and that where the value of things was dubious, there the species was to be studied, and the relations to be deduced, which naturally flow from it. The result of this scrutiny has been, that we have first agreed man to be a social animal; and since, to be a rational. So that if we can be content with a descriptive, concise sketch of human nature, it will amount to this, that man is a social rational animal.[d]—I answered, it had appeared so.

XV. If, then, said he, we pursue our disquisitions agreeably to this idea of human nature, it will follow, that all things will be pursuable, avoidable, and indifferent to man, as they respect the being and welfare of such a social, rational animal.—I replied, they must.

Nothing, therefore, in the first place, said he, can be pursuable, which is destructive of society.[e]—It cannot.—Acts, therefore, of fraud and rapine, and all acquired by them, whether wealth, power, pleasure, or any thing, are evidently, from their very

[d] Ζῶον λογικὸν καὶ πολιτικὸν, λογικὸν καὶ κοινωνικὸν, λογικὸν καὶ ἥμερον: these are descriptions of humanity, which we meet in every page of Epictetus and Antoninus.

It seems, indeed, to have been a received opinion of old, that so intimate was the relation between these two attributes, that wherever there was rationality, sociality followed of course. Thus Antoninus: ἔστι δὲ τὸ λογικὸν, εὐθὺς καὶ πολιτικόν. l. x. s. 2. And again, more fully: καὶ τοίνυν τῶν τὸ τῆς νοερᾶς φύσεως μέτοχον, πρὸς τὸ συγγενὲς ὁμοίως σπεύδει, ἢ καὶ μᾶλλον ὅσῳ γάρ ἐστι κρεῖττον παρὰ τὰ ἄλλα, τοσούτῳ καὶ πρὸς τὸ συγκρινᾶσθαι τῷ οἰκείῳ καὶ συγκεῖσθαι ἑτοιμότερον. l. ix. s. 9.

It is not perhaps foreign to the present subject to observe, that were the eyes of any two men whatever to view the same object, they would each, from their different place, and their different organization, behold it differently, and have a different image. But were all the minds in the universe to recognise the same truth, they would all recognise it as one, their recognition would be uniform, and themselves in a manner would be one also. The reason is, perception by the senses admits of more and less, better and worse; but perception by the intellect, like truth, its object, admits of no degrees, and is either nothing at all, or else total, uniform, complete, and one. Hence, therefore, one source of the society, and, as it were, communion of all minds, considered as minds; namely, the unity of truth, their common object.

Again, every just and perfect society stands on the basis of certain laws. But law is nothing more, than right and perfect reason, seen in bidding and forbidding, according to the nature and essence of those beings to which it is a law. If, therefore, this universe be one whole, or general society, there must be some common, general law for its conduct and welfare; and this law must, of consequence, be some right and perfect reason, which passes through all things, and extends to every part. Well therefore might Antoninus say, in the beginning of this note, that every thing rational, was of course social, since reason and law appear to be the same, and law to be the support and basis of all society. Thus, too, Cicero: Sequitur, ut eadem sit in his [sc. Diis] quæ humano generi ratio; eadem veritas utrobique sit; eademque lex, quæ est recti præceptio, pravique depulsio. De Nat. Deor. l. ii. c. 31. p. 180. See also the same author, De Leg. l. i. c. 8, 12, 15. p. 29, 41, 51. edit. Davis. De Fin. l. ii. c. 14. p. 123. See also Diog. Laert. l. vii. s. 86. M. Anton. l. v. c. 16. l. vi. c. 23. Aristot. Polit. as quoted in note *z*, p. 61.

[e] Si enim sic erimus affecti, ut propter suum quisque emolumentum spoliet, aut violet alterum, disrumpi necesse est eam, quæ maxime est secundum naturam, humani generis societatem. Cic. de Offic. l. iii. c. 5.

character, not fit to be pursued.—They are not.—But it is impossible not to pursue many such things, unless we are furnished with some habit or disposition of mind, by which we are induced to render to all men their own, and to regard the welfare and interest of society.—It is impossible.—But the habit or disposition of rendering to all their own, and of regarding the welfare and interest of society, is justice.—It is.—We may therefore fairly conclude, that nothing is naturally pursuable, but what is either correspondent to justice, or at least not contrary.—I confess, said I, so it appears.

But, further, said he, it is possible we may have the best disposition to society; the most upright intentions; and yet, through want of ability to discern and know the nature of particulars, we may pursue many things inconsistent, as well with our private interest, as the public. We may even pursue what is right, and yet pursue it in such a manner, as to find our endeavours fruitless, and our purposes to fail.—I answered, it was possible.—But this would ill befit the character of a rational animal.—It would.—It is necessary, therefore, we should be furnished with some habit or faculty, instructing us how to discern the real difference of all particulars, and suggesting the proper means by which we may either avoid or obtain them.—It is.—And what is this, think you, but prudence?—I believe, said, I, it can be no other.—If it be, said he, then it is evident from this reasoning, that nothing is pursuable, which is not correspondent to prudence.—I replied, he had shewn it could not.

But further still, said he, it is possible we may neither want prudence nor justice to direct us; and yet the impulses of appetite, the impetuosities of resentment, the charms and allurements of a thousand flattering objects, may tempt us, in spite of ourselves, to pursue what is both imprudent and unjust.—They may.—But if so, it is necessary, would we pursue as becomes our character, that we should be furnished with some habit which may moderate our excesses; which may temper our actions to the standard of a social state, and to the interest and welfare, not of a part, but of the whole man.—Nothing, said I, more necessary.—And what, said he, can we call this habit, but the habit of temperance?—You name it, said I, rightly.—If you think so, replied he, then nothing can be pursuable, which is not either correspondent to temperance, or at least not contrary.—I replied, so it seemed.

Once more, continued he, and we have done: it is possible that not only resentment and appetite, not only the charms and allurements of external objects, but the terrors, too, and dread of them, may mar the rectitude of our purposes.—It is possible.—Tyranny and superstition may assail us on one hand; the apprehensions of ridicule, and a false shame, on the other: it

is expedient, to withstand these, we should be armed with some habit, or our wisest best pursuits may else at all times be defeated.—They may.—And what is that generous, manlike, and noble habit, which sets us at all times above fear and danger; what is it but fortitude?—I replied, it was no other.—If so, then, continued he, besides our former conclusions, nothing further can be pursuable, as our inquiries now have shewn us, which is not either correspondent to fortitude, or at least not contrary.—I admit, said I, it is not.

Observe, then, said he, the sum, the amount of our whole reasoning: nothing is truly pursuable to such an animal as man, except what is correspondent, or, at least, not contrary to justice, prudence, temperance, and fortitude.—I allow, said I, it appears so.—But if nothing pursuable, then nothing avoidable or indifferent, but what is tried and estimated after the same manner. For contraries are ever recognised through the same habit,[f] one with another. The same logic judges of truth and falsehood; the same musical art, of concord and discord. So the same mental habitudes, of things avoidable and pursuable. I replied, it appeared probable.

To how unexpected a conclusion, then, said he, have our inquiries insensibly led us? In tracing the source of human action, we have established it to be those four grand virtues,[g] which are esteemed, for their importance, the very hinges of all morality.—We have.

But if so, it should follow, that a life, whose pursuings and avoidings are governed by these virtues, is that true and rational

[f] Δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ ἡ ἀπάτη, καὶ ἡ ἐπιστήμη τῶν ἐναντίων, ἡ αὐτὴ εἶναι: "There seems to be one and the same error, and one and the same science, with respect to things contrary." Arist. de Anim. l. iii. c. 3. This, by Themistius, in his Paraphrase, is thus illustrated: Τῶν ἐναντίων μία ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη, καὶ μία ἄγνοια· ὁ γὰρ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ὡς ὠφέλιμον γινώσκων, καὶ τὸ κακὸν ὅτι βλαβερὸν συνεπίσταται· καὶ ὁ περὶ θάτερον ἐξαπατώμενος, ἐξαπατᾶται καὶ περὶ θάτερον: "Of things contrary there is one science, and one ignorance. For thus, he who knows good to be something beneficial, knows evil, at the same time, to be something pernicious; and he who is deceived with respect to one of these, is deceived also with respect to the other." See the Io of Plato, p. 531. vol. i. edit. Serr.

[g] Stobæus, having told us, that of the virtues some were primary, some subordinate, adds: πρώτας δὲ τέτταρας εἶναι, φρόνησιν, σωφροσύνην, ἀνδρείαν, δικαιοσύνην καὶ τὴν μὲν φρόνησιν, περὶ τὰ καθήκοντα γίνεσθαι· τὴν δὲ σωφροσύνην περὶ τὰς ὁρμὰς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου· τὴν δὲ ἀνδρείαν, περὶ τὰς ὑπομονάς· τὴν δὲ δικαιοσύνην, περὶ τὰς ἀπονεμήσεις: "The primary virtues are four; prudence, temperance, fortitude, and justice: prudence is employed in moral offices; temperance, in men's natural appetites and pursuits; fortitude, in endurings; and justice, in distributions." Ecl. Ethic. p. 167.

That the life according to virtue, was deemed the life according to nature, appears from what is said by the same author, in the page following: Πασῶν δὲ τούτων τῶν ἀρετῶν τὸ τέλος εἶναι, τὸ ἀκολούθως τῇ φύσει ζῆν ἑκάστην δὲ τούτων διὰ τῶν ἰδίων παρέχεσθαι τυγχάνοντα τὸν ἄνθρωπον: "The end of all these virtues is, to live agreeably to nature; and each of them, by those means which are peculiar to itself, is found to put a man in possession of this end."

So likewise Cicero: Etenim quod summum bonum a Stoicis dicitur, "convenienter naturæ vivere," id habet hanc, ut opinor, sententiam, "cum virtute congruere semper." De Offic. l. iii. c. 3.

life, which we have so long been seeking; that life, where the value of all things is justly measured by those relations which they bear to the natural frame, and real constitution of mankind:[h] in fewer words, a life of virtue appears to be the life according to nature.—It appears so.

But, in such a life, every pursuit, every avoiding, (to include all,) every action, will of course admit of being rationally justified.—It will.—But that which, being done, admits of a rational justification,[i] is the essence or genuine character of an office, or moral duty. For thus, long ago, it has been defined by the best authorities.[k]—Admit it.—If so, then a life according to virtue, is a life according to moral offices or duties.—It appears so.—But we have already agreed it to be a life according to nature.—We have.—Observe, then: a life according to virtue, according to moral offices, and according to nature, mean all the same thing, though varied in the expression.—Your remark, said I, seems just.

XVI. We need never, therefore, replied he, be at a loss how to choose, though the objects of choice be ever so infinite and diversified. As far as nothing is inconsistent with such a life and such a character, we may justly set existence before death, prefer health to sickness, integrity of the limbs to being maimed and debilitated, pleasure to pain, wealth to poverty, fame to dishonour, free government to slavery, power and magistracy to subjection and a private state; universally, whatever tends either to *being*, or to *well-being*, we may be justified, when we prefer to whatever appears the contrary. And when our several energies, exerted according to the virtues just mentioned, have put us in possession of all that we require;[l] when we enjoy, subjoined to

[h] See pages 56, 58, 66, 82, 83.

[i] In the original, it is ὁ πραχθὲν εὔλογον ἔχει ἀνελογισμόν. Diog. Laert. l. vii. s. 107. ὅπερ πραχθὲν εὔλογον ἔχει τὴν ἀνελογίαν. Sext. Emp. Adv. Mathem. l. vii. Thus rendered by Cicero: Officium id esse dicunt, quod cur factum sit, ratio probabilis reddi possit. De Offic. l. i. c. 3. The reason of its Greek name, καθῆκον, is given by Simplicius: Καθήκοντά ἐστι τὰ γινόμενα κατὰ τὰ ἥκοντα καὶ ἐπιβάλλοντα: "Moral offices are those things which are done agreeably to what is fitting and expedient." Simplic. in Ench. c. 37.

[k] By Tully, in his Offices, and by other authors of antiquity.

[l] This was the idea of happiness adopted by the old academy, or Platonics: Secundum naturam vivere, sic affectum, ut optime affici possit, ad naturamque accommodatissime. Cic. de Fin. l. v. c. 9. p. 370. The Peripatetics, who were originally of the same school, held the same. Εἰ δ' οὕτω, τὸ ἀνθρώπινον ἀγαθὸν ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια γίγνεται κατ' ἀρετὴν—τὴν ἀρίστην καὶ τελειοτάτην—ἐν βίῳ τελείῳ: "If this be admitted, it follows, that human good or happiness is the energizing of the soul according to the best and most consummate virtue, in a perfect and complete life." Ethic. Nic. l. i. c. 7. A perfect and complete life, they explained to be such a life as was no way deficient either as to its duration, its bodily health, and its being attended with a proper competence of external goods, and prosperity. By the best and most consummate virtue, they not only meant that virtue which was in its kind most perfect, but which was the virtue also of that part which is in each of us most excellent. For there are virtues of the body, such as strength and agility; and there are virtues of the senses, such as accurate seeing, accurate tasting; and the same of every faculty, from the lowest to that which is supreme.

The sovereign good, or happiness, here spoken of, is again repeated, in other words

a right and honest mind, both health of body and competence of externals; what can there be wanting to complete our happiness, to render our state perfectly consonant to nature, or to give us a more sovereign good than that which we now enjoy? —Nothing, replied I, that I can at present think of.

There would be nothing, indeed, said he, were our energies never to fail; were all our endeavours to be ever crowned with due success. But suppose the contrary; suppose the worst success to the most upright conduct, to the wisest rectitude of energies and actions. It is possible, nay, experience teaches us it is too often fact, that not only the pursuers of what is contrary to nature, but that those who pursue nothing but what is strictly congruous to it, may miss of their aims, and be frustrated in their endeavours. Inquisitors and monks may detest them for their virtue, and pursue them with all the engines of malice and inhumanity. Without these, pests may afflict their bodies; inundations overwhelm their property; or, what is worse than inundations, either tyrants, pirates, heroes, or banditti. They may see their country fall, and with it their bravest countrymen; themselves pillaged, and reduced to extremities, or perishing with the rest in the general massacre.

Cadit et Ripheus, justissimus unus
Qui fuit in Teucris, et servantissimus æqui.[m]

—It must be owned, said I, this has too often been the case.

Or grant, continued he, that these greater events never happen; that the part allotted us be not in the tragedy of life, but in the comedy. Even the comic distresses are abundantly irksome: domestic jars, the ill offices of neighbours; suspicions, jealousies, schemes defeated; the folly of fools; the knavery of knaves:

page 71, where it is called, "the attaining the primary and just requisites of our nature, by a conduct suitable to virtue and moral office."

The primary and just requisites here mentioned, are all things requisite to the use and enjoyment of our primary and natural perfections. These primary and natural perfections, mean the natural accomplishments of both our mind and body. They were called by the Latins, prima naturæ, prima secundum naturam; by the Greeks, τὰ πρῶτα κατὰ φύσιν, τὰ πρῶτα τῆς φύσεως. In them were included health, strength, agility, beauty, perfect sensations, memory, docility, invention, &c. See Stob. Ecl. Eth. p. 163. Cic. de Fin. l. v. c. 7. p. 364. A. Gell. l. xii. c. 5.

A like sentiment of happiness, to this here spoken of, is that mentioned by Cicero: Virtute adhibita, frui primis a natura datis. De Fin. l. ii. c. 11. p. 113. It is there called, the opinion of the old Academics and Peripatetics. It is again repeated by the same author: Honeste vivere, fruentem rebus iis, quas primas homini natura conciliet. Acad. l. ii. c. 42. p. 240.

It is to be observed, that Cicero, speaking of this hypothesis, says, that it proposed an idea of happiness, which was not properly in our own power. Hoc non est positum in nostra actione: completur enim et ex eo genere vitæ, quod virtute finitur, et ex iis rebus quæ secundum naturam sunt, neque sunt in nostra potestate. De Fin. l. iv. c. 6. p. 287.

Hence, therefore, the deficiency of this doctrine. However justifiable, however laudable its end, it could not insure a due success to its endeavours. And hence, too, the force of what is objected to it in the Dialogue, in this and the following page.

[m] Æneid. l. ii. 426.

from which, as members of society, it is impossible to detach ourselves.

Where, then, shall we turn, or what have we to imagine? We have at length placed happiness, after much inquiry, in attaining the primary and just requisites of our nature, by a conduct suitable to virtue and moral office. But as to corresponding with our preconceptions, (which we have made the test,) does this system correspond better than those others which we have rejected? Has it not appeared, from various facts, too obvious to be disputed, that, in many times and places, it may be absolutely unattainable? That in many, where it exists, it may in a moment be cancelled, and put irretrievably out of our power, by events not to be resisted? If this be certain, and I fear it cannot be questioned, our specious long inquiry, however accurate we may believe it, has not been able to shew us a good, of that character which we require; a good durable, indeprivable, and accommodate to every circumstance: far from it, our speculations (I think) rather lead us to that low opinion of happiness which, you may remember, you expressed,[n] when we first began the subject. They rather help to prove to us, that instead of a sovereign good, it is the more probable sentiment, there is no such good at all.—I should indeed, said I, fear so.—For where, continued he, lies the difference, whether we pursue what is congruous to nature, or not congruous; if the acquisition of one be as difficult as of the other, and the possession of both equally doubtful and precarious? If Cæsar fall in attempting his country's ruin; and Brutus fare no better, who only fought in its defence?—It must be owned, said I, these are melancholy truths; and the instances which you allege too well confirm them.

We were in the midst of these serious thoughts, descanting upon the hardships and miseries of life, when, by an incident not worth relating, our speculations were interrupted. Nothing at the time, I thought, could have happened more unluckily; our question perplexed, its issue uncertain, and myself impatient to know the event. Necessity, however, was not to be resisted, and thus for the present our inquiries were postponed.

PART II.

"Brutus perished untimely, and Cæsar did no more." These words I was repeating the next day to myself, when my friend appeared, and cheerfully bade me good-morrow. I could not

[n] See page 44.

return his compliment with an equal gaiety, being intent, somewhat more than usual, on what had passed the day before. Seeing this, he proposed a walk into the fields.—The face of nature, said he, will perhaps dispel these glooms. No assistance on my part shall be wanting, you may be assured.—I accepted his proposal; the walk began, and our former conversation insensibly renewed.

Brutus, said he, perished untimely, and Cæsar did no more. It was thus, as I remember, not long since you were expressing yourself. And yet, suppose their fortunes to have been exactly parallel, which would you have preferred? Would you have been Cæsar or Brutus?—Brutus, replied I, beyond all controversy. —He asked me, why? Where was the difference, when their fortunes, as we now supposed them, were considered as the same?—There seems said I, abstract from their fortunes, something, I know not what, intrinsically preferable in the life and character of Brutus.—If that, said he, be true, then must we derive it, not from the success of his endeavours, but from their truth and rectitude. He had the comfort to be conscious that his cause was a just one: it was impossible the other should have any such feeling.—I believe, said I, you have explained it.

Suppose, then, continued he, (it is but merely an hypothesis,) suppose, I say, we were to place the sovereign good in such a rectitude of conduct;° in the conduct merely, and not in the

° As the conduct here mentioned implies a conduct under the direction of a befitting rule or law, and that, as opposed to wrong conduct, which has either no rule at all, or at least one erroneous, it may not be an improper place to inquire, what was the ancient opinion concerning law universal; that great and general law, which stood opposed to the municipal laws of particular cities and communities.

Est quidem vera lex, recta ratio, naturæ congruens, diffusa in omnes, constans, sempiterna, quæ vocet ad officium jubendo, vetando a fraude deterreat—nec erit alia lex Romæ, alia Athenis, alia nunc, alia posthac; sed et omnes gentes, et omni tempore una lex, et sempiterna, et immortalis continebit; unusque erit communis quasi magister, et imperator omnium Deus. Ille hujus legis inventor, disceptator, lator. Cui qui non parebit, ipse se fugiet, ac naturam hominis aspernabitur; hoc ipso luet maximas pœnas, etiamsi cætera supplicia, quæ putantur effugerit. Fragm. Cic. de Rep. l. iii.

Lex est ratio summa, insita in natura, quæ jubet ea quæ facienda sunt, prohibetque contraria. What follows is worth remarking. Eadem ratio, cum est in hominis mente confirmata et confecta, lex est. Cic. de Leg. l. i. c. 6. p. 22.

Again: Lex vera—ratio est recta summi Jovis. To which he subjoins, as above, Ergo ut illa divina mens summa lex est; ita cum in homine est, perfecta est in mente sapientia. De Leg. l. ii. c. 4, 5. p. 88.

It is in this sense the apostle tells us of the Gentiles, or mankind in general, that they "shew the work of the law written in their hearts, their conscience also bearing witness, and their thoughts the mean while accusing or else excusing one another." Rom. ii. 15.

As Cicero, in his book of laws above cited, follows the Stoic discipline, so is it agreeable to their reasoning, that he makes the original natural law, of which we here treat, to be the sovereign reason of the Deity himself. Thus Chrysippus: Idem [scil. Chrysippus] legis perpetuæ et æternæ vim, quæ quasi dux vitæ et magistra officiorum sit, Jovem dicit esse. Nat. Deor. l. i. c. 15. p. 41.

So, by the same philosophers, in Laertius, we are ordered to live according to nature: *οὐδὲν ἐνεργοῦντας ἢν ἀπαγορεύειν εἕωθεν ὁ νόμος ὁ κοινὸς, ὅσπερ ἐστὶν ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος διὰ πάντων ἐρχόμενος, ὁ αὐτὸς ὢν τῷ Διΐ, καθηγεμόνι τούτῳ τῆς τῶν ὄντων* (for *ὅλων*) *διοικήσεως ὄντι*: "doing nothing forbidden by the universal law; that is to say, by that right reason which passeth through all things, and which is the same with Jove

event. Suppose we were to fix our happiness, not in the actual attainment of that health, that perfection of a social state, that fortunate concurrence of externals which is congruous to our nature, and which we have a right all to pursue; but solely fix it in the mere doing whatever is correspondent to such an end, even though we never attain, or are near attaining it.[p] In fewer

himself, the governor and conductor of this universal administration." Laert. l. vii. s. 88. edit. Aldobrand.

Agreeably to this reasoning, Plutarch corrects those who made Δίκη a goddess, and the assessor of Jove; for, says he, ὁ Ζεὺς οὐκ ἔχει μὲν τὴν Δίκην πάρεδρον, ἀλλ' αὐτὸς Δίκη καὶ Θέμις ἐστὶ, καὶ νόμων ὁ πρεσβύτατος καὶ τελειότατος, "Jove has not Δίκη or right for his assessor, but is himself right, and justice, and of all laws the most ancient and perfect." Moral. p. 781. B.

Thus Antoninus: Τέλος δὲ λογικῶν ζώων, τὸ ἕπεσθαι τῷ τῆς πόλεως καὶ πολιτείας τῆς πρεσβυτάτης λόγῳ καὶ θεσμῷ: "The end of rational animals is to follow the reason and sacred law of that city and most ancient polity," [in which all rational beings are included.] l. ii. s. 16.

The most simple account of this law, which the Stoics gave, seems to be that recorded by Stobæus; according to which they called it λόγον, ὀρθὸν ὄντα, προσταακτικὸν μὲν τῶν ποιητέων, ἀπαγορευτικὸν δὲ τῶν οὐ ποιητέων, "right reason, ordaining what is to be done, and forbidding what is not to be done." Ecl. Ethic. 178. See also the notes of Turnebus and Davis upon Cic. de Leg. l. i. c. 6.

Having premised thus much concerning law universal, it remains to say something of that rectitude of conduct which is in this part of the dialogue proposed as our happiness. Rectitude of conduct is intended to express the term κατόρθωσις, which Cicero translates *recta effectio*: κατόρθωμα he translates *rectum factum*. See De Fin. l. iii. c. 14. p. 242. Now the definition of κατόρθωμα was νόμου πρόσταγμα, "a thing commanded by law;" to which was opposed ἁμάρτημα, "a sin or offence;" which was defined νόμου ἀπαγόρευμα, "a thing forbidden by law." Plut. Mor. 1037. C. What law is here meant, which thus commands or forbids, has been shewn above.

Hence, therefore, may be seen the reason why we have said thus much on the nature and idea of law universal; so intimate being the union between this and right conduct, that we find the latter is nothing more than a perfect obedience to the former.

Hence, too, we see the reason, why in one view it was deemed happiness, to be void of error or offence, ἀναμάρτητον εἶναι, as we find it in Arrian. Epict. l. iv. c. 8. p. 633. For to be thus inculpable was the necessary result of rectitude of conduct, or rather, in a manner, the same thing with it.

I cannot conclude this note without remarking on an elegant allusion of Antoninus to the primary signification of the word κατόρθωσις, that is to say, κατὰ ὀρθὸς, "right onwards, straight, and directly forwards." Speaking of the reasoning faculty, how, without looking further, it rests contented in its own energies, he adds, καθὰ κατορθώσεις αἱ τοιαῦται πράξεις ὀνομάζονται, τὴν ὀρθότητα τῆς ὁδοῦ σημαίνουσαι, "for which reason are all actions of this species called rectitudes, as denoting the directness of their progression right onwards." l. v. s. 14. So again, in the same sense, εὐθεῖαν περαίνειν, "to keep on the straight road." l. v. s. 3. l. x. s. 11.

One would imagine that our countryman, Milton, had this reasoning in view, when, in his nineteenth sonnet, speaking of his own blindness, he says, with a becoming magnanimity,

Yet I argue not
Against heaven's hand or will; nor bate one jot
Of heart or hope; but still bear up, and steer
Right onwards.

The whole sonnet is not unworthy of perusal, being both sublime and simple.

[p] Thus Epictetus in Arrian, speaking of address to men in power, and admitting such address, when justified by certain motives, adds, that such address ought to be made without admiration or flattery. Upon this, an objector demands of him, πῶς οὖν τύχω, οὗ δέομαι; "but how, then, am I to obtain that which I want?"—The philosopher answers, Ἐγὼ δέ σοι λέγω, ὅτι ὡς τευξόμενος ἀπέρχου· οὐχὶ δὲ μόνον, ἵνα πράξῃς τὸ σαυτῷ πρέπον; "Did I ever say to thee, that thou shouldst go and address, as though thou wert to succeed; and not, rather, with this only view, that thou mightest do that which is becoming thy character?" And soon after, when an objection is urged from appearance, and the opinion of mankind, he answers, Οὐκ οἶσθ' ὅτι ἀνὴρ καλὸς καὶ ἀγαθὸς οὐδὲν ποιεῖ τοῦ δόξαι ἕνεκα, ἀλλὰ τοῦ πέπραχθαι καλῶς; "Knowest thou not, that a fair and good man does nothing for the sake of appearance, but for the sake only of having done well and fairly?" Arr. Epict. l. iii. c. 24. p. 497, 498. This doctrine, indeed, seems

words, what if we make our natural state the standard only to determine our conduct, and place our happiness in the rectitude of this conduct alone?[q] On such an hypothesis (and we consider it as nothing further) we should not want a good, perhaps, to correspond to our preconceptions;[r] for this, it is evident, would be correspondent to them all.—Your doctrine, replied I, is so new and strange, that though you have been copious in explaining, I can hardly yet comprehend you.

It amounts all, said he, but to this: place your happiness where your praise is.—I asked, where he supposed that?—Not, replied he, in the pleasures which you feel, more than your disgrace lies in the pain; not in the casual prosperity of fortune, more than your disgrace in the casual adversity; but in just complete action throughout every part of life, whatever be the face of things, whether favourable or the contrary.

But why, then, said I, such accuracy about externals? So much pains, to be informed what are pursuable, what avoidable? —It behoves the pilot, replied he, to know the seas and the winds; the nature of tempests, calms, and tides. They are the subjects about which his art is conversant: without a just experience of them, he can never prove himself an artist. Yet we look not for his reputation either in fair gales or in adverse,[s] but

to have been the basis of the Stoic morals; the principle which included, according to these philosophers, as well honour and honesty, as good and happiness. Thus Cicero: Facere omnia, ut adipiscamur quæ secundum naturam sint, etsi ea non adsequamur, id esse et honestum, et solum per se expetendum et summum bonum Stoici dicunt. De Fin. l. v. c. 7. p. 365, 366. To this is consonant that sentiment of theirs in Plutarch: Τὴν μὲν φύσιν αὐτὴν ἀδιάφορον εἶναι· τὸ δὲ τῇ φύσει ὁμολογεῖν, ἀγαθόν. And again: Τὸ ζῆν κατὰ φύσιν, τέλος εἶναι—τὰ κατὰ φύσιν, ἀδιάφορα εἶναι. Plut. Mor. 1060. D. E. See below, note *s*. Socrates was of the same opinion, as appears from all parts of the Platonic and Xenophontean Dialogues. Take one example out of many: Τὸν δὲ ἀγαθὸν εἴτε καὶ καλῶς πράττειν ἃ ἂν πράττοι. τὸν δὲ εὖ πραττοντα, μακάριόντε καὶ εὐδαίμονα εἶναι. Gorg. Plat. p. 507. edit. Serr.

So Proclus: Πᾶσαι γὰρ αἱ τοῦ σπουδαίου πράξεις πρὸς αὐτὸν ἔχουσι τὴν ἀναφορὰν· ἐνεργήσας οὖν εὐεργετικῶς καὶ θεοπρεπῶς, ἐν τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ τὸ τέλος ἔχει: "All the actions of the virtuous man have reference to himself. When, therefore, he has energized beneficently and divinely, it is in the very energy itself that he obtains his end." This from the same MS. comment as is referred to, p. 46, note *i*.

[q] It is in this sense we find it elegantly said in Plutarch by the last-mentioned philosophers, στοιχεῖα τῆς εὐδαιμονίας τὴν φύσιν, καὶ τὸ κατὰ φύσιν, "that our natural state, and what is consonant to it, are the elements of happiness;" and just before, the same natural state is called τοῦ καθήκοντος ἀρχὴ, καὶ ὕλη τῆς ἀρετῆς, "the source of moral office, and the subject-matter of virtue." Plut. Mor. 1069. E. F. Atque etiam illud perspicuum est, constitui necesse esse initium, quod sapientia, cum quid agere incipiat, sequatur; idque initium esse naturæ accommodatum: nam aliter appetitio, etc. Cic. Acad. l. ii. c. 8. p. 85, 86. Initia proponi necesse esse apta et accommodata naturæ, quorum ex selectione virtus possit existere. De Fin. l. iv. c. 17. p. 316. Cum vero illa, quæ officia esse dixi, proficiscantur ab initiis naturæ; ea ad hæc referri necesse est: ut recte dici possit, omnia officia eo referri, ut adipiscamur principia naturæ; nec tamen ut hoc sit bonorum ultimum. De Fin. l. iii. c. 6. p. 217.

[r] Plutarch quotes the following sentiment of Chrysippus, who patronised this idea of good: τὸν περὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν λόγον, ὃν αὐτὸς εἰσάγει καὶ δοκιμάζει, συμφωνότατον εἶναί φησι τῷ βίῳ, καὶ μάλιστα τῶν ἐμφύτων ἅπτεσθαι προλήψεων. Plut. Mor. 1041. E.

[s] What Quintilian says of rhetoric, may with great propriety be transferred to morality. Noster orator, arsque a nobis finita,

in the skilfulness of his conduct, be these events as they happen. In like manner fares it with this the moral artist: he, for a subject, has the whole of human life;[t] health and sickness, pleasure and pain, with every other possible incident which can befall him during his existence. If his knowledge of all these be accurate and exact, so too must his conduct, in which we place his happiness; but if this knowledge be defective, must not his conduct be defective also?—I replied, so it should seem.—And if his conduct, then his happiness?—It is true.

You see, then, continued he, even though externals were as nothing; though it was true, in their own nature, they were neither good nor evil; yet an accurate knowledge of them is, from our hypothesis, absolutely necessary.—Indeed, said I, you have proved it.

He continued: inferior artists may be at a stand, because they want materials; from their stubbornness and intractability they may often be disappointed. But as long as life is passing, and nature continues to operate, the moral artist of life has, at all times, all he desires. He can never want a subject fit to exercise him in his proper calling; and that, with this happy motive to the constancy of his endeavours, that the crosser, the harsher, the more untoward the events, the greater his praise, the more illustrious his reputation.

All this, said I, is true, and cannot be denied: but one circumstance there appears, where your similes seem to fail. The praise, indeed, of the pilot we allow to be in his conduct; but it

non sunt posita in eventu. Tendit quidem ad victoriam, qui dicit: sed, cum bene dixit, etiamsi non vincat, id, quod arte continetur, efficit. Nam et gubernator vult salva nave in portum pervenire: si tamen tempestate fuerit abreptus, non ideo minus erit gubernator, dicetque notum illud; "dum clavum rectum teneam." Et medicus sanitatem ægri petit: si tamen aut valetudinis vi, aut intemperantia ægri, aliove quo casu summa non contingit; dum ipse omnis secundum rationem fecerit, medicinæ fine non excidit. Ita oratori bene dixisse, finis est. Nam est ars ea—in acta posita, non in eventu. Inst. Orat. l. ii. c. 17.

[t] Οὐσία τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, προαίρεσις ποιά· τοῦ κακοῦ προαίρεσις ποιά. Τί οὖν τὰ ἐκτός; Ὕλαι τῇ προαιρέσει, περὶ ἃς ἀναστρεφομένη τελέσεται τοῦ ἰδίου ἀγαθοῦ ἢ κακοῦ: "The essence of good is a peculiar direction of mind, and the essence of evil is a peculiar direction also. What, then, are externals? They serve as subjects to the mind's direction; from conversing with which it obtains its proper good or evil." Arr. Epict. l. i. c. 29. Again: Αἱ ὕλαι ἀδιάφοροι· ἡ δὲ χρῆσις αὐτῶν οὐκ ἀδιάφορος: "The subjects are indifferent, but not so the use of them. Arr. Epict. l. ii. c. 5.

Thus Horace:

Non possidentem multa vocaveris
Recte beatum; rectius occupat
Nomen beati, qui Deorum
Muneribus sapienter uti,
Duramque callet pauperiem pati,
Pejusque leto flagitium timet:
Non ille, etc.

Od. l. iv. 9.

Even the comic poet seems not to have been unacquainted with this doctrine:

CH. *Quid narrat?* CL. *Quid ille? miserum se esse.*

CH. *Miserum? quem minus credere est?*
Quid reliqui est, quin habeat quæ quidem in homine dicuntur bona?
Parentis, patriam incolumem, amicos, genus, cognatos, divitias:
Atque hæc perinde sunt ut illius animus, qui ea possidet:
Qui uti scit, ei bona; illi, qui non utitur recte, mala.

Heauton. act. i. s. 2. v. 18.

Vid. Platon. in Euthydemo, p. 281. edit. Serr. ἐν κεφαλαίῳ δ', ἔφην, ὦ Κλεινία, κινδύνευει.

is in the success of that conduct where we look for his happiness. If a storm arise, and the ship be lost, we call him not happy, how well soever he may have conducted. It is then only we congratulate him, when he has reached the desired haven.—Your distinction, said he, is just; and it is here lies the noble prerogative of moral artists above all others. But yet I know not how to explain myself, I fear my doctrine will appear so strange.—You may proceed, said I, safely, since you advance it but as an hypothesis.

Thus, then, continued he, the end in other arts is ever distant and removed:[u] it consists not in the mere conduct, much less in a single energy, but is the just result of many energies, each of which are essential to it. Hence, by obstacles unavoidable, it may often be retarded; nay, more, may be so embarrassed, as never possibly to be attained. But in the moral art of life, the very conduct is the end; the very conduct, I say, itself, throughout every its minutest energy; because each of these, however minute, partake as truly of rectitude, as the largest combination of them, when considered collectively. Hence, of all arts, is this the only one perpetually complete in every instant; because it needs not, like other arts, time to arrive at that perfection, at which, in every instant, it is arrived already. Hence, by duration, it is not rendered either more or less perfect; completion, like truth, admitting of no degrees, and being in no sense capable of either intension or remission. And hence, too, by necessary connection, (which is a greater paradox than all,) even that happiness, or sovereign good, the end of this moral art, is itself, too, in every instant, consummate and complete; is neither

[u] Sed in cæteris artibus cum dicitur artificiose, posterum quodam modo et consequens putandum est, quod illi ἐπιγεννηματικὸν appellant; quod autem in quo sapienter dicitur, id adprimo rectissime dicitur: quicquid enim a sapiente proficiscitur, id continuo debet expletum esse omnibus suis partibus; in eo enim positum est id, quod dicimus esse expetendum. Nam ut peccatum est patriam prodere, parentes violare, fana depeculari, quæ sunt in effectu: sic timere, sic mærere, sic in libidine esse, peccatum est, etiam sine effectu. Verum ut hæc, non in posteris et in consequentibus, sed in primis continuo peccata sunt: sic ea quæ proficiscuntur a virtute, susceptione prima, non perfectione, recta sunt judicanda. Cic. de Fin. l. iii. c. 9. p. 228. Τοῦ ἰδίου τέλους τυγχάνει [ἡ λογικὴ ψυχὴ] ὅπου ἂν τὸ τοῦ βίου πέρας ἐπιστῇ· οὐχ, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ ὀρχήσεως καὶ ὑποκρίσεως καὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἀτελὴς γίνεται ἡ ὅλη πρᾶξις, ἐάν τι ἐγκοψῇ, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ παντὸς μέρους, καὶ ὅπου ἂν καταληφθῇ, πλήρες καὶ ἀπροσδεὲς ἑαυτῇ τὸ προτεθὲν ποιεῖ· ὥστε εἰπεῖν, ἐγὼ ἀπέχω τὰ ἐμά. M. Ant. l. xi. s. 1. Et quemadmodum opportunitas (sic enim adpellemus εὐκαιρίαν) non fit major productione temporis (habent enim suum modum quæcunque opportuna dicuntur) sic recta effectio (κατόρθωσιν enim ita adpello, quoniam rectum factum κατόρθωμα) recta igitur effectio, item convenientia, denique ipsum bonum, quod in eo positum est ut naturæ consentiat, crescendi accessionem nullam habet. Ut enim opportunitas illa, sic hæc de quibus dixi, non fiunt temporis productione majora: ob eamque causam Stoicis non videtur optabilior nec magis expetenda vita beata, si sit longa, quam si brevis: utunturque simili, ut, si cothurni laus illa est ad pedem apte convenire, neque multi cothurni paucis anteponerentur, nec majores minoribus: sic quorum omne bonum convenientia atque opportunitate finitur, nec plura paucioribus, nec longinquiora brevioribus anteponentur. Cic. de Fin. l. iii. c. 14. p. 242. See also Dio. Laert. l. vii. s. 101. M. Ant. l. vi. s. 23. l. iii. s. 7. Senec. Epist. 66.

heightened or diminished by the quantity of its duration, but is the same to its enjoyers, for a moment or a century.

Upon this I smiled.—He asked me the reason.—It is only to observe, said I, the course of our inquiries. A new hypothesis has been advanced: appearing somewhat strange, it is desired to be explained: you comply with the request, and, in pursuit of the explanation, make it ten times more obscure and unintelligible than before.—It is but too often the fate, said he, of us commentators. But you know in such cases what is usually done: when the comment will not explain the text, we try whether the text will not explain itself; this method, it is possible, may assist us here. The hypothesis, which we would have illustrated, was no more than this: that the sovereign good lay in rectitude of conduct, and that this good corresponded to all our preconceptions. Let us examine, then, whether, upon trial, this correspondence will appear to hold; and, for all that we have advanced since, suffer it to pass, and not perplex us.—Agreed, said I, willingly, for now I hope to comprehend you.

II. Recollect, then, said he. Do you not remember that one preconception of the sovereign good was, to be accommodate to all times and places?[u]—I remember it.—And is there any time, or any place, whence rectitude of conduct may be excluded?[x] Is there not a right action in prosperity, a right action in adversity? May there not be a decent, generous, and laudable behaviour, not only in peace, in power, and in health; but in war, in oppression, in sickness, and in death?—There may.

And what shall we say to those other preconceptions; to being durable, self-derived, and indeprivable? Can there be any good so durable, as the power of always doing right? Is there any good conceivable, so entirely beyond the power of others? Or, if you hesitate, and are doubtful, I would willingly be informed, into what circumstances may fortune throw a brave and honest man, where it shall not be in his power to act bravely and honestly?[y] If there are no such, then rectitude of conduct, if a good, is a good indeprivable.—I confess, said I, it appears so.

But, further, said he, another preconception of the sovereign good was, to be agreeable to nature.—It was.—And can any thing be more agreeable to a rational and social animal, than rational and social conduct?—Nothing.—But rectitude of conduct is with us rational and social conduct.—It is.

Once more, continued he: another preconception of this good was, to be conducive, not to mere-being but to well-being.—

[u] In this and the subsequent pages, the general preconceptions of good are applied to the particular hypothesis of good, advanced in this treatise. See before, p. 46, 47, 49.

[x] Παντάχοῦ καὶ διηνεκῶς ἐπί σοί ἐστι, καὶ τῇ παρούσῃ συμβάσει θεοσεβῶς εὐαρεστεῖν, καὶ τοῖς παροῦσιν ἀνθρώποις κατὰ δικαιοσύνην προσφέρεσθαι. M. Ant. l. vii. s. 54.

[y] Μήκετι οὖν μοι λέγε, πῶς γένηται; ὅπως γὰρ ἂν γένηται, σὺ αὐτὸ θήσεις καλῶς, καὶ ἔσται σοι τὸ ἀποβὰν εὐτύχημα. Arrian. Epict. l. iv. c. 10. p. 650.

Admit it.—And can any thing, believe you, conduce so probably to the well-being of a rational social animal, as the right exercise of that reason, and of those social affections?—Nothing.—And what is this same exercise, but the highest rectitude of conduct? —Certainly.

III. You see, then, said he, how well our hypothesis, being once admitted, tallies with our original preconceptions of the sovereign good.—I replied, it indeed appeared so, and could not be denied. But who, think you, ever dreamt of a happiness like this? A happiness dependent, not on the success, but on the aim?—Even common and ordinary life, replied he, can furnish us with examples. Ask of the sportsman, where lies his enjoyment? Ask whether it be in the possession of a slaughtered hare, or fox? He would reject, with contempt, the very supposition: he would tell you, as well as he was able, that the joy was in the pursuit, in the difficulties which are obviated, in the faults which are retrieved, in the conduct and direction of the chase through all its parts; that the completion of their endeavours was so far from giving them joy, that instantly, at that period, all their joy was at an end.—For sportsmen, replied I, this may be no bad reasoning.—It is not the sentiment, said he, of sportsmen alone. The man of gallantry not unoften has been found to think after the same manner.

Meus est amor huic similis; nam
Transvolat in medio posita, et fugientia captat.[z]

To these we may add the tribe of builders and projectors. Or has not your own experience informed you of numbers, who, in the building and laying out, have expressed the highest delight; but shewn the utmost indifference to the result of their labours, to the mansion or gardens, when once finished and complete?

The truth, said I, of these examples is not to be disputed. But I could wish your hypothesis had better than these to support it. In the serious view of happiness, do you ever imagine there were any, who could fix it, (as we said before,) not on the success, but on the aim?—More, even in this light, said he, than perhaps at first you may imagine. There are instances innumerable, of men, bad as well as good, who having fixed, as their aim, a certain conduct of their own, have so far attached their welfare and happiness to it, as to deem all events in its prosecution, whether fortunate or unfortunate, to be mean, contemptible, and not worthy their regard.—I called on him for examples.[a]

What think you, said he, of the assassin who slew the first

[z] Hor. Sat. ii. lib. i. 107.

[a] See a long catalogue of these in Cicero's Tusculan Disputations: "Spartan boys, Barbarian sages, Indian wives, Egyptian devotees," &c. &c. The whole passage is worth reading. Tusc. Disp. l. v. c. 27. p. 400, 401, etc.

prince of Orange; and who, though brought by his conduct to the most exquisite tortures, yet, conscious of what he had done, could bear them all unmoved? Or (if you will have a better man) what think you of that sturdy Roman who would have despatched Porsenna, and who, full of his design, and superior to all events, could thrust a hand into the flames with the steadiest intrepidity?—I replied, that these indeed were very uncommon instances.

Attend, too, continued he, to Epicurus dying, the founder of a philosophy, little favouring of enthusiasm: "This I write you (says he,[b] in one of his epistles,) while the last day of life is passing, and that a happy one. The pains, indeed, of my body are not capable of being heightened. Yet to these we oppose that joy of the soul, which arises from the memory of our past speculations." Hear him, consonant to this, in another place asserting, that a rational adversity was better than an irrational prosperity.

And what think you? Had he not placed his good and happiness in the supposed rectitude of his opinions, would he not have preferred prosperity, at all rates, to adversity? Would not the pains, of which he died, have made his happiness perfect misery? And yet, you see, he disowns any such thing. The memory of his past life and of his philosophical inventions, were, even in the hour of death, it seems, a counterpoise to support him.—It must be owned, said I, that you appear to reason justly.

Pass from Epicurus, continued he, to Socrates. What are the sentiments of that divine man, speaking of his own unjust condemnation? "O Crito," says he, "if it be pleasing to the gods this way, then be it this way."[c] And again: "Anytus and Melitus, I grant, can kill me; but to hurt or injure me, is beyond their power." It would not have been beyond it, had he thought his welfare dependent on any thing they could do; for they were then doing their worst: whence then was it beyond them? Because his happiness was derived not from without, but from

[b] Τὴν μακαρίαν ἄγοντες καὶ ἅμα τελευταίαν ἡμέραν τοῦ βίου, ἐγράφομεν ὑμῖν ταῦτα· στραγγουρίαι παρηκολουθήκει καὶ δεσεντερικὰ πάθη, ὑπερβολὴν οὐκ ἀπολείποντα τοῦ ἐν ἑαυτοῖς μεγέθους· ἀντιπαρετάττετο δὲ πᾶσι τούτοις τὸ κατὰ ψυχὴν χαῖρον ἐπὶ τῇ τῶν γεγονότων ἡμῖν διαλογισμῶν μνήμῃ. Dio. Laert. l. x. s. 22. Cum ageremus vitæ beatum et eundem supremum diem, scribebamus hæc. Tanti autem morbi aderant vesicæ et viscerum, ut nihil ad eorum magnitudinem possit accedere. Compensabatur tamen cum his omnibus animi lætitia, quam capiebam memoria rationum inventorumque nostrorum. Cic. de Fin. l. ii. c. 30. p. 173.

Soon after, we have another sentiment of Epicurus, that a rational adversity was better than an irrational prosperity. The original words are, κρεῖττον εἶναι εὐλογίστως ἀτυχεῖν, ἢ ἀλογίστως εὐτυχεῖν. Dio. Laert. l. x. s. 135.

[c] The three quotations in this page are taken from Plato: the first, from the Crito, quoted by Epictetus at the end of the Enchiridion, and in many other places; the second, from the Apology, quoted as frequently by the same author; the third, from the Menexenus, or Epitaph. Plat. Opera, vol. ii. p. 248. edit. Serran. See also Cic. Tuscul. l. v. c. 12.

within; not from the success, which perhaps was due to the rectitude of his life, but from that rectitude alone, every other thing disregarded. He had not, it seems, so far renounced his own doctrine, as not to remember his former words: that "to whomever all things, conducive to happiness, are derived solely, or, at least, nearly from himself, and depend not on the welfare or adversity of others, from the variety of whose condition his own must vary also: he it is, who has prepared to himself the most excellent of all lives; he it is, who is the temperate, the prudent, and the brave; he it is, who, when wealth or children either come or are taken away, will best obey the wise man's precept; for neither will he be seen to grieve, nor to rejoice in excess, from the trust and confidence which he has reposed in himself." You have a sketch, at least, of his meaning, though far below his own Attic and truly elegant expression.—I grant, said I, your example; but this and the rest are but single instances. What are three or four in number, to the whole of human kind?

If you are for numbers, replied he, what think you of the numerous race of patriots, in all ages and nations, who have joyfully met death, rather than desert their country when in danger?[d] They must have thought surely on another happiness than success, when they could gladly go where they saw death often inevitable. Or what think you of the many martyrs for systems wrong as well as right, who have dared defy the worst, rather than swerve from their belief?[e]—You have brought, indeed, said I, more examples than could have been imagined.

Besides, continued he, what is that comfort of a good conscience, celebrated to such a height in the religion which we profess, but the joy arising from a conscience of right energies;[f] a conscience of having done nothing, but what is consonant to our duty?—I replied, it indeed appeared so.

Even the vulgar, continued he, recognise a good of this very character, when they say of an undertaking, though it succeed not, that they are contented; that they have done their best, and can

[d] Sed quid duces et principes nominem; cum legiones scribat Cato sæpe alacris in eum locum profectas, unde redituras se non arbitrarentur? Pari animo Lacedæmonii in Thermopylis occiderunt: in quos Simonides,

Dic hospes Spartæ, nos te hic vidisse jacentes,
Dum sanctis patriæ legibus obsequimur.

Tusc. Disp. l. i. c. 42.

[e] That there may be a bigotted obstinacy in favour of what is absurd, as well as a rational constancy in adhering to what is right, those Egyptians above mentioned may serve as examples. Ægyptiorum morem quis ignoret? quorum imbutæ mentes pravitatis erroribus quamvis carnificinam prius subierint, quam ibim aut aspidem aut felem aut canem aut crocodilum violent: quorum etiam si imprudentes quidpiam fecerint, pœnam nullam recusent. Tuscul. Disp. l. v. c. 27. p. 402. See before, note *a*, page 78.

[f] It is probable, that some analogies of this sort induced a father of the church (and no less a one than St. Jerome) to say of the Stoics, who made moral rectitude the only good, *Nostro dogmati in plerisque concordant.* Vid. Menag. in D. Laert. l. vii. s. 101. p. 300. and Gatak. Præfat. in M. Anton. See also of this treatise, p. 44. and below, note *i*.

accuse themselves of nothing. For what is this, but placing their content, their good, their happiness, not in the success of endeavours, but in the rectitude? If it be not the rectitude which contents them, you must tell me what it is else.—It appears, replied I, to be that alone.

I hope, then, continued he, that though you accede not to this notion of happiness which I advance, you will at least allow it not to be such a paradox as at first you seemed to imagine.—That, indeed, replied I, cannot be denied you.

IV. Granting me this, said he, you encourage me to explain myself. We have supposed the sovereign good to lie in rectitude of conduct.—We have.—And think you there can be rectitude of conduct, if we do not live consistently?—In what sense, said I, would you be understood?—To live consistently,[g] said he, is the same with me, as to live agreeably to some one single and consonant scheme, or purpose.—Undoubtedly, said I, without this, there can be no rectitude of conduct.—All rectitude of conduct, then, you say, implies such consistence.—It does.—And does all consistence, think you, imply such rectitude?—I asked

[g] To live consistently, is here explained to be living according to some one single consonant scheme or purpose; and our good or happiness is placed in such consistence, upon a supposition that those who live inconsistently, and without any such uniform scheme, are of consequence miserable and unhappy. Τὸ τέλος ὁ μὲν Ζήνων οὕτως ἀπέδοκε, τὸ ὁμολογουμένως ζῆν· τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ καθ' ἕνα λόγον καὶ σύμφωνον ζῆν, ὡς τῶν μαχομένως ζώντων κακοδαιμονούντων. Stob. Ecl. Ethic. p. 171.

This consistence was called in Greek ὁμολογία, in Latin *convenientia*, and was sometimes by itself alone considered as the end. Τὴν ὁμολογίαν λέγουσι τέλος εἶναι. Stob. Ecl. Ethic. p. 172. See also Cic. de Fin. l. iii. c. 6. p. 216. So also in the same last-named treatise, c. vii. p. 220. Ut enim histrioni actio, saltatori motus, non quivis, sed certus quidam est datus: sic vita agenda est certo genere quodam, non quolibet; quod genus conveniens consentaneumque dicimus. Nec enim gubernationi aut medicinæ similem sapientiam esse arbitramur, sed actioni illi potius, quam modo dixi, et saltationi; ut in ipsa arte insit, non foris petatur extremum, id est, artis effectio.

It is upon this principle we find it a precept in Cicero's Offices: In primis autem constituendum est, quos nos et quales esse velimus, et in quo genere vitæ. l. i. c. 32. So likewise in the Enchiridion of Epictetus, c. 33: τάξον τινὰ ἤδη χαρακτῆρα σαυτῷ καὶ τύπον, ὃν φυλάξῃς ἐπί τε σεαυτῷ ὢν, καὶ ἀνθρώποις ἐπιτυγχάνων: "ordain to thyself some character and model of life, which thou mayst maintain both by thyself, and when thou art conversant with mankind."

So much indeed was rested upon this principle of consistence, that even to be any thing consistently, was held better than the contrary. Thus Epictetus: ἕνα σε δεῖ ἄνθρωπον εἶναι, ἢ ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακόν· ἢ τὸ ἡγεμονικόν σε δεῖ ἐξεργάζεσθαι τὸ σαυτοῦ, ἢ τὰ ἐκτός: "it behoves thee to be one uniform man, either good or bad; either to cultivate thy own mind, or to cultivate things external." Arr. Epict. l. iii. c. 15. p. 421. And more fully than this does he express himself in a place subsequent; where, having first counselled against that false complaisance which makes us, to please mankind, forget our proper character, and having recommended, as our duty, a behaviour contrary, he adds, εἰ δὲ μὴ ἀρέσει ταῦτα, ὅλος ἀπόκλινον ἐπὶ τἀναντία· γενοῦ εἷς τῶν κιναίδων, εἷς τῶν μοιχῶν—Διάφορα δ' οὕτω πρόσωπα οὐ μίγνυται· οὐ δύνασαι καὶ Θερσίτην ὑποκρίνασθαι καὶ Ἀγαμέμνονα. Arr. Epict. l. iv. c. 2. p. 580. "But if what I recommend to thee do not please, then turn thee totally to all that is contrary; become a profligate of the most prostitute kind. Characters so different are not to be blended: thou canst not act at once Thersites and Agamemnon.

So, too, Horace:

Quanto constantior idem
In vitiis, tanto levius miser, ac prior ille
Qui jam contento, jam laxo fune laborat.
Sat. vii. l. ii. v. 18.

See also Characteristics, vol. i. p. 131.

him, why not?—It is possible, indeed, it may, said he, for aught we have discovered yet to the contrary: but what if it should be found that there may be numberless schemes, each in particular consistent with itself, but yet all of them different, and some, perhaps, contrary? There may, you know, be a consistent life of knavery, as well as a consistent life of honesty; there may be a uniform practice of luxury, as well as of temperance and abstemiousness. Will the consistence, common to all of these lives, render the conduct in each, right?—It appears, said I, an absurdity, that there should be the same rectitude in two contraries.—If so, said he, we must look for something more than mere consistence, when we search for that rectitude which we at present talk of. A consistent life indeed is requisite, but that alone is not enough: we must determine its peculiar species, if we would be accurate and exact.—It indeed appears, said I, necessary.

Nor is any thing, continued he, more easy to be discussed. For what can that peculiar consistence of life be else, than a life whose several parts are not only consonant to each other, but to the nature also of the being by whom that life has been adopted? Does not this last degree of consistence appear as requisite as the former?—I answered, It could not be otherwise.

You see, then, said he, the true idea of right conduct: it is not merely to live consistently, but it is to live consistently with nature.[h]—Allow it.

But what, continued he, can we live consistently with nature, and be at a loss how to behave ourselves?—We cannot.—And can we know how to behave ourselves, if we know nothing of what befalls us? nothing of those things and events which perpetually surround and affect us?—We cannot.—You see, then, continued he, how we are again fallen insensibly into that doctrine which proves the necessity of scrutinizing, and knowing the value of externals.—I replied, it was true.—If you assent, said he, to this, it will of course follow, that to live consistently with nature, is to live agreeably to a just experience of those things which happen around us.[i]—It appears so.

But further still, said he: think you any one can be deemed to live agreeably to such experience, if he select not, as far as possible, the things most congruous to his nature?—He cannot.—And, by the same rule, as far as possible, must he not reject

[h] *Ὁμολογουμένως τῇ φύσει ζῆν.* Cleanthes in Stob. Ecl. Eth. p. 171. Congruenter naturæ convenienterque vivere. Cic. De Fin. l. iii. c. 7. p. 221. The first description of our end [to live consistently] was deemed defective, and therefore was this addition made. See Stobæus, in the place cited. Arr. Epict. l. iii. c. 1. p. 352.

[i] *Τέλος ἐστὶ τὸ ὁμολογουμένως τῇ φύσει ζῆν ὅπερ ὁ Χρύσιππος σαφέστερον βουλόμενος ποιῆσαι, ἐξήνεγκε τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον, Ζῆν κατ' ἐμπειρίαν τῶν φύσει συμβαινόντων.* Stob. Ecl. Ethic. 171. Diog. Laert. l. vii. c. 87. His verbis [scil. vivere secundum naturam] tria significari Stoici dicunt. Unum ejusmodi, vivere adhibentem scientiam earum rerum, quæ natura evenirent. De Fin. l. iv. c. 6. p. 286. See also the same treatise, l. iii. c. 9. p. 227. l. ii. c. 11. p. 113. where it is expressed, Vivere cum intelligentia earum rerum quæ natura evenirent.

such as are contrary?—He must.—And that not occasionally, as fancy, happens to prompt; but steadily, constantly, and without remission.—I should imagine so.—You judge, said he, truly. Were he to act otherwise in the least instance, he would falsify his professions; he would not live according to that experience which we now suppose him to possess.—I replied, he would not.

It should seem, then, said he, from hence, as a natural consequence of what we have admitted, that the essence of right conduct lay in selection and rejection.—So, said I, it has appeared.—And that such selection and rejection should be consonant with our proper nature.—It is true.—And be steady and perpetual, not occasional and interrupted.—It is true.—But if this be the essence of right conduct, then too it is the essence of our sovereign good; for in such conduct we have supposed this good to consist.—We have.

See then, said he, the result of our inquiry. The sovereign good, as constituted by rectitude of conduct, has, on our strictest scrutiny, appeared to be this: to live perpetually selecting, as far as possible, what is congruous to nature, and rejecting what is contrary; making our end that selecting and that rejecting only.[k]—It is true, said I, so it appears.

V. Before we hasten, then, further, said he, let us stop to recollect, and see whether our present conclusions accord with our former. We have now supposed the sovereign good to be rectitude of conduct, and this conduct we have made consist in a certain selecting and rejecting.—We have.—And do you not imagine that the selecting and rejecting, which we propose, as they are purely governed by the standard of nature, are capable in every instance of being rationally justified?—I replied, I thought they were.—But if they admit a rational justification, then are they moral offices or duties; for thus you remember yesterday a moral office was defined.[l]—It was—But if so, to live in the practice of them will be to live in the discharge of moral offices.—It will.—But to live in the discharge of these, is the same as living according to virtue, and living according to nature. —It is.—So, therefore, is living in that selection, and in that rejection, which we propose.—It is.

[k] Ὁ τε Ἀντίπατρος,—τὸ τέλος κεῖσθαι, Ἐν τῷ διηνεκῶς καὶ ἀπαραβάτως ἐκλέγεσθαι μὲν τὰ κατὰ φύσιν, ἀπεκλέγεσθαι δὲ τὰ παρὰ φύσιν, ὑπολαμβάνει. Clem. Alex. Strom. l. ii. p. 497. edit. Potter. This sentiment was sometimes contracted, and expressed as follows: τὸ εὐλογιστεῖν ἐν ταῖς ἐκλογαῖς: sometimes more concisely still, by the single term τὸ εὐλογιστεῖν. See Plutarch, 1071, 1072. Cicero joins this and the foregoing descriptions of happiness together: Circumscriptis igitur his sententiis, quas posui, et si quæ similes earum sint; relinquitur, ut summum bonum sit, vivere scientiam adhibentem earum rerum, quæ natura eveniant, seligentem quæ secundum naturam, et quæ contra naturam sunt rejicientem, id est, convenienter congruenterque naturæ vivere. De Fin. l. iii. c. 9. p. 227. See also De Fin. l. ii. c. 11. p. 113. See also Diog. Laert. l. vii. c. 88. Stob. Ecl. Eth. 171.

[l] Sup. page 69.

We need never, therefore, be at a loss, said he, for a description of the sovereign good. We may call it, rectitude of conduct; if that be too contracted, we may enlarge, and say, it is to live perpetually selecting and rejecting according to the standard of our being.—If we are for still different views, we may say, it is to live in the discharge of moral offices;[m] to live according to na-

[m] Ἀρχέδημος δὲ (τέλος φησὶ) τὸ πάντα τὰ καθήκοντα ἐπιτελοῦντα ζῆν. Laert. l. vii. c. 88. Stob. Ecl. Eth. 171. Officia omnia—servantem vivere. Cic. de Fin. l. iv. c. 6. p. 286.

Soon after we meet the phrases, "to live according to nature;" "to live according to virtue." Ὁ Ζήνων—τέλος εἶπε, τὸ ὁμολογουμένως τῇ φύσει ζῆν, ὅπερ ἐστὶ κατ' ἀρετὴν ζῆν. Laert. l. vii. c. 87. Consentire naturæ; quod esse volunte virtute, id est, honestate vivere. De Fin. l. ii. c. 11. p. 113. Where, as has been already observed, page 69, and in the note, likewise, on the place, we find the lives, according to nature and virtue, are considered as the same.

However, to make this assertion plainer, (if it be not, perhaps, sufficiently plain already,) it may not be improper to consider what idea these philosophers had of virtue.

In Laertius, (where he delivers the sentiments of Zeno and his followers,) virtue is called διάθεσις ὁμολογουμένη, "a consistent disposition;" and soon after, ψυχὴ πεποιημένη πρὸς τὴν ὁμολογίαν παντὸς τοῦ βίου: "a mind formed to consistence through every part of life." Laert. l. vii. c. 89.

In Stobæus, (according to the sentiments of the same school,) it is called διάθεσις ψυχῆς σύμφωνος αὐτῇ περὶ ὅλον τὸν βίον: "a disposition of mind, consonant to itself throughout the whole of life." Ecl. Eth. p. 167.

So Cicero, in his Laws: Constans et perpetua ratio vitæ, quæ est virtus. l. i. c. 17. p. 55.

So Seneca, in his seventy-fourth epistle: Virtus enim convenientia constat: omnia opera ejus cum ipsa concordant, et congruunt.

Thus, therefore, consistence being the essence of virtue, and, upon the hypothesis here advanced, the essence also of happiness; it follows, first, that a virtuous life will be a happy life: but if a happy one, then, of course, a life according to nature; since nothing can be good which is contrary to nature, nor, indeed, which is not consonant, in strictest manner, to it.

And here (as a proper opportunity seems to offer) we cannot but take notice of the great similitude of sentiments: it may be even said, the unanimity of almost all philosophers, on this important subject concerning ends and happiness.

Those whose hypothesis we have followed in this Dialogue, supposed it to be virtue and consistent action, and that without regard to fortune or success. But even they, who, from their hypothesis, made some degree of success requisite; who rested it not merely on right action, but on a proportion of bodily welfare, and good fortune concomitant; even these made right action and virtue to be principal.

Thus Archytas, according to the doctrine of the Pythagorean school: εὐδαιμοσύνα χρᾶσις ἀρετᾶς ἐν εὐτυχίᾳ: "happiness is the use or exercise of virtue, attended with external good fortune." Opusc. Mytholog. p. 678. Consonant to this sentiment, he says, in the beginning of the same treatise, ὁ μὲν ἀγαθὸς ἀνὴρ οὐκ εὐθέως εὐδαίμων ἐξ ἀνάγκας ἐστίν· ὁ δὲ εὐδαίμων, καὶ ἀγαθὸς ἀνήρ ἐστι: "the good man is not of necessity happy; [because, upon this hypothesis, external fortune may be wanting;] but the happy man is of necessity good," [because, upon the same hypothesis, without virtue was no happiness.] Ibid. p. 673. Again: αἰεὶ μὲν γὰρ κακοδαιμονὲν ἀνάγκα τὸν κακὸν, αἴτε ἔχοι ὕλαν (κακῶς τε γὰρ αὐτῷ χρέεται) αἴτε στανίζοι: "the bad man (says he) must needs at all times be miserable, whether he have, or whether he want, the materials of external fortune; for if he have them, he will employ them ill." Ibid. p. 696. Thus we see this philosopher, though he make externals a requisite to happiness, yet still without virtue he treats them as of no importance. Again: δύο δ' ὁδοὶ τέμνονται ἐν τῷ βίῳ· ἃ μὲν σκυθροποτέρα, ἂν ὁ τλάμων ἐβάδιζεν Ὀδυσσεύς· ἃ δὲ εὐδιεινοτέρα, τὰν ἐπορεύετο Νέστωρ. Τὰν δὲν ἀρετάν φαμι δηλῆσθαι (lege δήλεσθαι, Dorice pro θέλειν) μὲν ταύταν, δύνασθαι δὲ καὶ τήναν: "there are two roads in life, distinct from each other; one the rougher, which the suffering Ulysses went; the other more smooth, which was travelled by Nestor. Now of these roads, (says he,) Virtue desires indeed the latter; and yet is she not unable to travel the former." Ibid. p. 696. From which last sentiment it appears, that he thought virtue, even in any fortune, was capable of producing at least some degree of happiness.

As for the Socratic doctrine on this subject, it may be sufficiently seen by what is

ture; to live according to virtue; to live according to just experience of those things which happen around us. Like some

quoted from it in the Dialogue, page 80. And as the sentiments, there exhibited, are recorded by Plato, they may be called, not only Socratic, but Platonic also. However, lest this should be liable to dispute, the following sentiment is taken from Xenocrates, one of Plato's immediate successors in the old academy by him founded: Ξενοκράτης φησὶν, Εὐδαίμονα εἶναι τὸν τὴν ψυχὴν ἔχοντα σπουδαίαν· ταύτην γὰρ ἑκάστῳ εἶναι δαίμονα: "Xenocrates held that he was *eudæmon*, or happy, who had a virtuous mind; for that the mind was every one's dæmon or genius." Arist. Top. l. ii. c. 6.

Here we see virtue made the principle of happiness, according to the hypothesis of the Dialogue. There is an elegant allusion in the passage to the etymology of the word Εὐδαίμων, which signifies both, [happy,] and [possessed of a good genius or dæmon;] an allusion which, in translating, it was not possible to preserve. See below, note *a*. p. 91.

As for the Peripatetic school, we find their idea of happiness, as recorded by Laertius, to be in a manner the same with that of the Pythagoreans. It was χρῆσις ἀρετῆς ἐν βίῳ τελείῳ, "the use or exercise of virtue in a complete and perfect life." Laert. l. v. c. 30. We have already, in note *l*, p. 69, cited the same doctrine (though somewhat varied in expression) from the founder of the Peripatetics, in his first book of Ethics. So, again, we learn from him, ὅτι πράξεις τινὲς καὶ ἐνέργειαι λέγονται τὸ τέλος, "that it is certain actions and energies which are to be deemed the end." Ethic. Nic. l. i. c. 8. And again: ἔστι γὰρ αὐτὴ ἡ εὐπραξία τέλος: "for it is the very rectitude of action which is itself the end." Ibid. l. vi. c. 5. And again: Ἡ εὐδαιμονία ἐνέργειά τίς ἐστι: "happiness is a certain energizing." l. ix. c. 9. And more explicitly than all these passages, in that elegant simile, l. i. c. 8. ὅσπερ δὲ Ὀλυμπιάσιν οὐχ οἱ κάλλιστοι καὶ ἰσχυρότατοι στεφανοῦνται, ἀλλ' οἱ ἀγωνιζόμενοι (τούτων γάρ τινες νικῶσιν·) οὕτω καὶ τῶν ἐν τῷ βίῳ καλῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν οἱ πράττοντες ὀρθῶς ἐπήβολοι γίγνονται: "for, as in the Olympic games, not those are crowned who are handsomest and strongest, but those who combat and contend, (for it is from among these come the victors;) so, with respect to things laudable and good in human life, it is the right actors only that attain the possession of them." Nay, so much did this philosopher make happiness depend on right action, that though he required some portion of externals to that felicity, which he held supreme; yet still it was honour and virtue which were its principal ingredients. Thus, speaking of the calamities and external casualties of life, which he confesses to be impediments to a happiness perfectly complete, he adds, ὅμως δὲ καὶ ἐν τούτοις διαλάμπει τὸ καλὸν, ἐπειδὰν φέρῃ τις εὐκόλως πολλὰς καὶ μεγάλας ἀτυχίας, μὴ δι' ἀναλγησίαν, ἀλλὰ γενναίδας ὢν καὶ μεγαλόψυχος. Εἰ δ' εἰσὶν αἱ ἐνέργειαι κύριαι τῆς ζωῆς, καθάπερ εἴπομεν, οὐδεὶς ἂν γένοιτο τῶν μακαρίων ἄθλιος· οὐδέποτε γὰρ πράξει τὰ μισητὰ καὶ φαῦλα. Τὸν γὰρ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἔμφρονα πάσας οἰόμεθα τὰς τύχας εὐσχημόνως φέρειν, καὶ ἐκ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων ἀεὶ τὰ κάλλιστα πράττειν· καθάπερ καὶ στρατηγὸν ἀγαθὸν τῷ παρόντι στρατοπέδῳ χρῆσθαι πολεμικώτατα, καὶ σκυτοτόμον ἐκ τῶν δοθέντων σκυτῶν κάλλιστον ὑπόδημα ποιεῖν, τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους τεχνίτας ἅπαντας. Εἰ δ' οὕτως, ἄθλιος μὲν οὐδέποτε γένοιτ' ἂν ὁ εὐδαίμων: "and yet, even in such incidents, the fair principle of honour and virtue shines forth, when a man, with becoming calmness, endures many and great misfortunes; and that not through insensibility, but being brave and magnanimous. Nay, more, if it be true, as we have already affirmed, that it is actions which are predominant in constituting a happy life, then can no one be completely miserable, who is happy in his right conduct, because he will never be the actor of what is detestable and base. For it is our opinion, that the man truly wise and good endures all fortunes with becoming decency, and from whatever happens to arise, still frames the fairest actions; like as the good commander uses the army which he happens to find, after the manner most agreeable to the rules of war; and the shoemaker, from such skins as others provide him, makes a shoe, the best that can be made from such materials; and so in the same manner all other artists beside. But if this be true, then he who is happy in this rectitude of genius, can in no instance be truly and strictly miserable." Eth. Nic. l. i. c. 10.

As for Epicurus, though he was an advocate for pleasure, yet so high was his opinion of a wise and right conduct, that he thought rational adversity better than irrational prosperity. See Dial. p. 197. Hence, too, he represented that pleasure, which he esteemed our sovereign happiness, to be as inseparable from virtue, as virtue was from that. Οὐκ ἔστιν ἡδέως ζῆν, ἄνευ τοῦ φρονίμως, καὶ καλῶς, καὶ δικαίως· οὐδὲ φρονίμως, καὶ καλῶς καὶ δικαίως, ἄνευ τοῦ ἡδέως. "It is

finished statue, we may behold it every way: it is the same object, though variously viewed; nor is there a view, but is natural, truly graceful, and engaging.

VI. I cannot deny, said I, but that as you now have explained it, your hypothesis seems far more plausible than when first it was proposed.—You will believe it, said he, more so still, by considering it with more attention. In the first place, though, perhaps, it esteem nothing really good but virtue, nothing really evil but vice, yet it in no manner takes away the difference and distinction of other things.[n] So far otherwise, it is for establishing their distinction to the greatest accuracy. For were this neglected, what would become of selection and rejection, those important energies which are its very soul and essence? Were there no difference, there could be no choice.—It is true, said I, there could not.

Again, said he. It is no meagre, mortifying system of self-denial; it suppresses no social and natural affections, nor takes away any social and natural relations;[o] it prescribes no ab-

impossible to live pleasurably, without living prudently, and honourably, and justly; or to live prudently, and honourably, and justly, without living pleasurably." Epict. in Laert. l. x. s. 132.

To conclude the whole, our countryman Thomas Hobbes, though he professedly explodes all this doctrine concerning ends, yet seems insensibly to have established an end himself, and to have founded it (like others) in a certain energy or action. For thus it is he informs us, in his treatise called Human Nature, that there can be no contentment, but in proceeding; and that felicity consisteth, not in having, but in prospering. And again, some time after, having admitted the comparison of human life to a race, he immediately subjoins, "but this race we must suppose to have no other goal, nor other garland, but being foremost and in it."

And thus much as to the concurring sentiments of philosophers on the subject of ends, here treated.

[n] Cum enim virtutis hoc proprium sit, earum rerum quæ secundum naturam sint, habere delectum; qui omnia sic exæquaverunt, ut in utramque partem ita paria redderent, uti nulla selectione uterentur, virtutem ipsam sustulerunt. Cic. de Fin. l. iii. c. 4. p. 207.

Quid autem apertius, quam, si selectio nulla sit ab iis rebus, quæ contra naturam sint, earum rerum quæ sint secundum naturam, tollatur omnis ea, quæ quæratur laudeturque prudentia? Cic. de Fin. l. iii. c. 9. p. 227.

Deinceps explicatur differentia rerum: quam si non ullam esse diceremus, confunderetur omnis vita, ut ab Aristone; nec ullum sapientiæ munus aut opus inveniretur, cum inter eas res, quæ ad vitam degendam pertinerent, nihil omnino interesset; neque ullum delectum haberi oporteret. Itaque cum esset satis constitutum, id solum esse bonum quod esset honestum, et id malum solum quod turpe; tum inter hæc et illa, quæ nihil valerent ad beate misereve vivendum, aliquid tamen, quo different, esse voluerunt, ut essent eorum alia æstimabilia, alia contra, alia neutrum. Ibid. l. iii. c. 15. p. 246.

Cætera autem, etsi nec bona nec mala essent, tamen alia secundum naturam dicebat, alia naturæ esse contraria: iis ipsis alia interjecta et media numerabat. Acad. l. i. c. 11. p. 46. See Dial. page 75.

[o] As much has been said concerning the Stoic apathy or insensibility with respect to passion, it may not be improper to inquire, what were their real sentiments on this subject.

Πάθος, which we usually render "a passion," is always rendered by Cicero, when speaking as a Stoic, *perturbatio*, "a perturbation." As such, therefore, in the first place, we say it ought always to be treated.

The definition of the term πάθος, as given by these philosophers, was ὁρμὴ πλεονάζουσα, translated by Cicero, *appetitus vehementior*. Tusc. l. iv. c. 9. p. 273. Now this definition may be more easily explained, if we first inquire, what they meant by ὁρμή. Ὁρμὴ they defined to be φορὰ ψυχῆς ἐπί τι, "a tendency or motion of the soul toward something." Stob. Ecl. Ethic. p. 175. A πάθος, therefore, or "per-

stainings, no forbearances out of nature; no gloomy, sad, and lonely rules of life, without which it is evident men may be as honest as with, and be infinitely more useful and worthy members of society. It refuses no pleasure, not inconsistent

turbation" must have been, according to their definition, a tendency or motion of the soul, which was excessive and beyond bounds. Stobæus, from whom this definition is taken, in commenting upon it, observes, *οὐ λέγει πεφυκυῖα πλεονάζειν, ἀλλ' ἤδη ἐν πλεονάσμῳ οὖσα· οὐ γὰρ δυνάμει, μᾶλλον δ' ἐνεργείᾳ*, "that Zeno (its author) does not call a *Πάθος*, something capable by nature to pass into excess, but something actually in excess already, as having its essence, not in mere capacity, but in actuality." Ecl. Eth. p. 159.

There is another definition of the same term, which makes it to be *ἡ ἄλογος καὶ παρὰ φύσιν ψυχῆς κίνησις*, "a motion of the soul, irrational and contrary to nature." D. Laert. l. vii. s. 110. Andronicus Rhodius adds, to this latter definition, the words, *δι' ὑπόληψιν κακοῦ ἢ ἀγαθοῦ*, "from the opinion of something good or evil." *Περὶ Πάθ.* p. 523. So that its whole idea is as follows: "A perturbation, or Stoic passion, is a motion of the soul irrational and contrary to nature, arising from the opinion of something good or evil." These last words, founding the *Πάθος*, or "perturbation," on opinion, correspond to what Cicero says, where he gives it as the sentiment of the Stoic philosophers, omnes perturbationes judicio fieri et opinione. Tusc. l. iv. c. 7. p. 276. Laertius informs us, that they even made the perturbations themselves to be judgments. *Δοκεῖ δὲ αὐτοῖς τὰ πάθη κρίσεις εἶναι.* Laert. l. vii. s. 111. He subjoins an instance to illustrate. *Ἥτε γὰρ φιλαργυρία ὑπόληψίς ἐστι τοῦ τὸ ἀργύριον καλὸν εἶναι.* "For thus (says he) the love of money is the judgment or opinion, that money is a thing good and excellent." Plutarch records the same sentiment of theirs, in a fuller and more ample manner. *Πάθος—λόγος πονηρὸς καὶ ἀκόλαστος, ἐκ φαύλης καὶ διημαρτημένης κρίσεως σφοδρότητα καὶ ῥώμην προσλαβών.* "A perturbation is a vicious and intemperate reasoning, which assumes vehemence and strength from bad and erroneous judgment." Mor. p. 441. D. To these testimonies may be added that of Themistius: *καὶ οὐ κακῶς οἱ ἀπὸ Ζηνώνος, τὰ πάθη τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης ψυχῆς τοῦ λόγου διαστροφὰς εἶναι τιθέμενοι, καὶ λόγου κρίσεις ἡμαρτημένας.* Themist. Paraph. in Aristot. de Anima, l. iii. p. 90. B. edit. Aldinæ.

The substance of what is said above, seems to amount to this; that *Πάθος*, in a Stoic sense, implied a perturbation, and not a passion; and that such perturbation meant an irrational and violent motion of the soul, founded on opinion or judgment which was erroneous and faulty.

Now from hence it follows, that the man of perfect character (according to their hypothesis) must of necessity be *ἀπαθής*, "apathetic," or void of perturbation. For such a character, as has been shewn, implies perfect rectitude of conduct. But perfect rectitude of conduct implies perfect rectitude of judgment; and such rectitude of judgment excludes all error and wrong judgment: but if error and wrong judgment, then perturbation, of consequence, which they suppose to be derived from thence alone.

That this was the sense, in which they understood apathy, we have their own authority, as given us by Laertius. *Φασὶ δὲ καὶ ἀπαθῆ εἶναι τὸν σοφὸν, διὰ τὸ ἀνέμπτωτον εἶναι.* Laert. l. vii. p. 117. "They say the wise man is apathetic, by being superior to error;" by being superior to error, if they may be credited themselves; not, as for the most part we absurdly imagine, by being superior to all sense, and feeling, and affection. The sentence immediately following the foregoing, looks as if these philosophers had foreseen how likely they were to be misunderstood. *Εἶναι δὲ καὶ ἄλλον ἀπαθῆ τὸν φαῦλον, ἐν ἴσῳ λεγόμενον τῷ σκληρῷ καὶ ἀτρέπτῳ.* "There is also another sort of apathetic man, who is bad; who is the same in character as the hard and inflexible." To the same purpose Epictetus. *Οὐ δεῖ γάρ με εἶναι ἀπαθῆ, ὡς ἀνδριάντα, ἀλλὰ τὰς σχέσεις τηροῦντα τὰς φυσικὰς καὶ ἐπιθέτους, ὡς εὐσεβῆ, ὡς υἱὸν, ὡς ἀδελφὸν, ὡς πατέρα, ὡς πολίτην:* "For I am not to be apathetic, like a statue, but I am withal to observe relations, both the natural and adventitious; as the man of religion, as the son, as the brother, as the father, as the citizen." Arr. Epict. l. iii. c. 2. p. 359.

Immediately before this, he tells us in the same chapter, *Πάθος γὰρ ἄλλως οὐ γίνεται, εἰ μὴ ὀρέξεως ἀποτυγχανούσης, ἢ ἐκκλίσεως περιπιπτούσης:* "that a perturbation in no other way ever arises, but either when a desire is frustrated, or an aversion falls into that which it would avoid." Where it is observable, that he does not make either desire or aversion, *Πάθη*, or "perturbations," but only the cause of perturbations, when erroneously conducted.

with temperance; it rejects no gain, not inconsistent with justice;[p] universally, as far as virtue neither forbids nor dissuades, it

Agreeably to this, in the second chapter of the Enchiridion, we meet with precepts about the conduct and management of these two affections, not a word is said about lopping off either; on the contrary, *aversion* we are directed how to employ immediately, and *desire* we are only ordered to suspend for the present, because we want a proper subject of fit excellence to excite it.

To this may be added, what the same philosopher speaks, in his own person, concerning himself. Arr. Epict. l. i. c. 21. Ἐγὼ μὲν ἀρκοῦμαι, ἂν ὀρέγωμαι καὶ ἐκκλίνω κατὰ φύσιν: "I, for my part, am satisfied and contented, if I can desire and avoid agreeably to nature." He did not remain, it seems, dissatisfied, till he had eradicated these affections; but he was satisfied in reducing them to their natural use.

In Laertius we read recorded for a Stoic sentiment, that as the vicious man had his πάθη, or "perturbations;" so, opposed to these, had the virtuous his εὐπαθείαι, his "eupathies," or well-feelings, translated by Cicero *constantiæ*. The three chief of these were βούλησις, "will," defined ὄρεξις εὔλογος, "rational desire;" εὐλάβεια, "caution," defined ἔκκλισις εὔλογος, "rational aversion;" and χαρὰ, "joy," defined ἔπαρσις εὔλογος, "rational exultation." To these three principal eupathies belonged many subordinate species; such as εὔνοια, ἀγάπησις, αἰδὼς, τέρψις, εὐφροσύνη, εὐθυμία, &c. See Laert. l. vii. s. 115, 116. Andron. Rhod. περὶ πάθων. Cic. Tusc. l. iv. c. 6.

Cicero makes Cato, under the character of a Stoic, and in explaining their system, use the following expressions. Pertinere autem ad rem arbitrantur, intelligi natura fieri, ut liberi a parentibus amentur: a quo initio profectam communem humani generis societatem persequuntur. De Fin. l. iii. c. 19. The same sentiment of the Stoics is recorded by Laertius. Φασὶ δὲ (οἱ Στωϊκοὶ) καὶ τὴν πρὸς τὰ τέκνα φιλοστοργίαν φυσικὴν εἶναι αὐτοῖς: "They say, parental affection is natural to them." l. vii. s. 120.

Again, soon after, in the same treatise De Finibus. Quodque nemo in summa solitudine vitam agere velit, ne cum infinita quidem voluptatum abundantia; facile intelligitur, nos ad conjunctionem congregationemque hominum, et ad naturalem communitatem esse natos. So Laertius: Ἀλλὰ μὲν οὐδ' ἐν ἐρημίᾳ (φασὶ) βιώσεται ὁ σπουδαῖος· κοινωνικὸς γὰρ φύσει, καὶ πρακτικός. "The virtuous man (say they, the Stoics) will never be for living in solitude; for he is by nature social, and formed for action." l. vii. s. 123.

Again, Cicero, in the above-cited treatise. Cum autem ad tuendos conservandosque homines hominem natum esse videamus; consentaneum est huic naturæ, ut sapiens velit gerere, et administrare rempublicam; atque ut e natura vivat, uxorem adjungere, et velle ex ea liberos. Ne amores quidem sanctos a sapiente alienos esse arbitrantur. Ut vero conservetur omnis homini erga hominem societas, conjunctio, caritas; et emolumenta et detrimenta—communia esse voluerunt. De Fin. l. iii. c. 20, 21.

In Epictetus, the leading duties or moral offices of man, are enumerated as follows. Πολιτεύεσθαι, γαμεῖν, παιδοποιεῖσθαι, θεὸν σέβειν, γονέων ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, καθόλου ὀρέγεσθαι, ἐκκλίνειν, ὁρμᾶν, ἀφορμᾶν, ὡς ἕκαστον τούτων δεῖ ποιεῖν, ὡς πεφύκαμεν. Arr. Epict. l. iii. c. 7. p. 336. The same sentiments may be found repeated both in Stobæus and Laertius.

I shall only add one more sentiment of these philosophers, and that is concerning friendship. Λέγουσι δὲ καὶ τὴν φιλίαν ἐν μόνοις τοῖς σπουδαίοις εἶναι: "They say, that friendship exists among the virtuous only." Laert. l. vii. s. 124.

The sum of these quotations appears to be this; that the Stoics, in the character of their virtuous man, included rational desire, aversion, and exultation; included love and parental affection; friendship, and a general charity or benevolence to all mankind; that they considered it as a duty, arising from our very nature, not to neglect the welfare of public society, but to be ever ready, according to our rank, to act either the magistrate or the private citizen; that their apathy was no more than a freedom from perturbation, from irrational and excessive agitations of the soul; and consequently that the strange apathy, commonly laid to their charge, and in the demolishing of which there have been so many triumphs, was an imaginary apathy, for which they were no way accountable.

[p] The Stoics were so far from rejecting wealth, when acquired fairly, that they allowed their perfect man, for the sake of enriching himself, to frequent the courts of kings, and teach philosophy for a stipend. Thus Plutarch from a treatise of Chrysippus: Τὸν μὲν σοφὸν καὶ βασιλεύσει συνέσεσθαι φησὶν ἕνεκα χρηματισμοῦ, καὶ σοφιστεύσειν ἐπ' ἀργυρίῳ. Mor. p. 1047. F.

endeavours to render life, even in the most vulgar acceptation, as cheerful, joyous, and easy as possible.[q] Nay, could it mend the condition of existence in any the most trivial circumstance, even by adding to the amplest possessions the poorest meanest utensil, it would in no degree contemn an addition even so mean.[r] Far otherwise: it would consider, that to neglect the least acquisition, when fairly in its power, would be to fall short of that perfect and accurate conduct which it ever has in view, and on which alone all depends.

And yet, though thus exact in every the minutest circumstance, it gives us no solicitude as to what rank we maintain in life. Whether noble or ignoble, wealthy or poor; whether merged in business, or confined to inactivity, it is equally consistent with every condition, and equally capable of adorning them all. Could it indeed choose its own life, it would be always that where most social affections might extensively be exerted, and most done to contribute to the welfare of society.[s] But if fate order otherwise, and this be denied; its intentions are the same, its endeavours are not wanting; nor are the social, rational powers forgotten, even in times and circumstances where they can least become conspicuous.

It teaches us to consider life as one great important drama, where we have each our part allotted us to act.[t] It tells us that

So likewise the Stoic Hecato, in his treatise of Offices, as quoted by Cicero. Sapientis esse, nihil contra mores, leges, instituta facientem, habere rationem rei familiaris. Neque enim solum nobis divites esse volumus, sed liberis, propinquis, amicis, maximeque reipublicæ. Singulorum enim facultates et copiæ, divitiæ sunt civitatis. De Offic. l. iii. c. 15.

[q] Etenim quod summum bonum a Stoicis dicitur, Convenienter naturæ vivere, id habet hanc (ut opinor) sententiam, Cum virtute congruere semper: cætera autem, quæ secundum naturam essent, ita legere, si ea virtuti non repugnarent. Cic. de Offic. l. iii. c. 3.

Alexander Aphrodisiensis, speaking of the Stoic doctrine concerning the external conveniencies and common utilities of life, delivers their sentiment in the following words: *Ἀλλὰ καὶ δίχα κειμένων ἀρετῆς τε σὺν τούτοις καὶ ἀρετῆς μόνης, μηδέποτ' ἂν τὸν σοφὸν τὴν κεχωρισμένην ἑλέσθαι, εἰ εἴη αὐτῷ δυνατὸν τὴν μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων λαβεῖν.* "Supposing there lay virtue on the one side, attended with these externals, and virtue on the other side, alone by herself, the wise man would never choose that virtue which was destitute and single, if it was in his power to obtain that other which was accompanied with these advantages." *Περὶ ψυχ.* p. 157.

[r] Si ad illam vitam, quæ cum virtute degatur, ampulla aut strigilis accedat, sumpturum sapientem eam vitam potius, cui hæc adjecta sint. De Fin. l. iv. c. 12. p. 300.

[s] Itemque magis est secundum naturam, pro omnibus gentibus (si fieri possit) conservandis aut juvandis maximos labores molestiasque suscipere, imitantem Herculem illum, quem hominum fama, beneficiorum memor, in concilio cœlestium conlocavit, quam vivere in solitudine, non modo sine ullis molestiis, sed etiam in maximis voluptatibus, abundantem omnibus copiis; ut excellas etiam pulchritudine et viribus. Quocirca optimo quisque et splendidissimo ingenio longe illam vitam huic anteponit. Cic. de Offic. l. iii. c. 5.

[t] Thus Aristo the Chian: *Εἶναι γὰρ ὅμοιον τῷ ἀγαθῷ ὑποκριτῇ τὸν σοφόν· ὃς ἄντε Θερσίτου ἄντε Ἀγαμέμνονος πρόσωπον ἀναλάβῃ, ἑκάτερον ὑποκρίνεται προσηκόντως.* "The wise man is like the good actor; who, whether he assume the character of Thersites or Agamemnon, acts either of the two parts with a becoming propriety." D. Laert. l vii. s. 160.

This comparison of life to a drama or stage-play, seems to have been a comparison much approved by authors of antiquity. See Epict. Enchirid. c. 17. and the notes of the late learned editor Mr. Upton. See

our happiness, as actors in this drama, consists not in the length of our part, nor in the state and dignity, but in the just, the decent, and the natural performance.

If its aims are successful, it is thankful to Providence. It accepts all the joys derived from their success, and feels them as fully as those who know no other happiness. The only difference is, that having a more excellent good in view, it fixes not, like the many, its happiness on success alone,[u] well knowing that in such case, if endeavours fail, there can be nothing left behind but murmurings and misery. On the contrary, when this happens, it is then it retires into itself, and reflecting on what is fair, what is laudable and honest, (the truly beatific vision, not of mad enthusiasts, but of the calm, the temperate, the wise, and the good,) it becomes superior to all events;[x] it acquiesces in the consciousness of its own rectitude; and, like that mansion founded not on the sands but on the rock, it defies all the terrors of tempest and inundation.

VII. Here he paused, and I took the opportunity to observe, how his subject had warmed him into a degree of rapture; how greatly it had raised both his sentiments and his style.—No wonder, said he. Beauty of every kind excites our love and admiration; the beauties of art, whether energies or works; the beauties of nature, whether animal or inanimate. And shall we expect less from this supreme beauty; this moral, mental, and original beauty; of which all the rest are but as types or copies? Not however by high flights to lose sight of our subject, the whole of what we have argued, may be reduced to this.

All men pursue good,[y] and would be happy, if they knew how; not happy for minutes, and miserable for hours, but happy, if possible, through every part of their existence. Either, therefore, there is a good of this steady durable kind, or there is none. If none, then all good must be transient and uncertain; and if so, an object of lowest value, which can little deserve either our attention or inquiry. But if there be a better good, such a good

also M. Anton. l. xii. s. 36; and the notes of Gataker. Plat. Gorg. p. 512. vol. i. edit. Serr.

[u] One of the wisest rules that ever was, with respect to the enjoyment of external good fortune, is that delivered by Epictetus; to enjoy it, *ὡς δέδοται, καὶ ἐφ' ὅσον δέδοται*, "in such manner as it is given, and for such time as it is given;" remembering that neither of these conditions we have the power to command. See Arr. Epict. l. iv. c. 1. p. 556. See also p. 573. of the same.

[x] See before, note *m*, p. 85; *ὅμως δὲ καὶ ἐν τούτοις διαλάμπει*, &c.

[y] This is a principle adopted by all the Stoics, and inculcated through every part of the dissertations of Epictetus. Take an example or two out of many. *Φύσις δ' αὕτη παντὸς, τὸ διώκειν τὸ ἀγαθὸν, φεύγειν τὸ κακὸν—τοῦ γὰρ ἀγαθοῦ συγγενέστερον οὐδέν.* "It is the nature of every one to pursue good, and fly evil—for nothing is more intimately allied to us than good." Arr. Epict. l. iv. c. 5. p. 606. Again, l. ii. c. 22. p. 313. *Πᾶν ζῶον οὐδενὶ οὕτως ὠκείωται, ὡς τῷ ἰδίῳ συμφέροντι.* "To nothing is every animal so intimately allied, as to its own peculiar welfare and interest."

So Cicero: Omnes enim expetimus utilitatem, ad eamque rapimur, nec facere aliter ullo modo possumus. De Offic. l. iii. c. 28. Platon. Gorg. p. 468. vol. i. edit. Serr. ibid. p. 499. E.

as we are seeking; like every other thing, it must be derived from some cause; and that cause must be either external, internal, or mixed, inasmuch as except these three, there is no other possible. Now a steady, durable good, cannot be derived from an external cause, by reason all derived from externals must fluctuate, as they fluctuate.[a] By the same rule, not from a mixture of the two: because the part which is external will proportionally destroy its essence. What, then, remains but the cause internal; the very cause which we have supposed, when we place the sovereign good in mind; in rectitude of conduct; in just selecting and rejecting?[a]—There seems, indeed, no other cause, said I, to which we can possibly assign it.

Forgive me, then, continued he, should I appear to boast. We have proved, or, at least, there is an appearance we have proved, that either there is no good except this of our own; or that, if there be any other, it is not worthy our regard.—It must be confessed, said I, you have said as much as the subject seems to admit.

VIII. By means, then, said he, of our hypothesis, behold one of the fairest, and most amiable of objects; behold the true and perfect man:[b] that ornament of humanity, that god-like being, who, without regard either to pleasure or pain, uninfluenced equally by either prosperity or adversity, superior to the world and its best and worst events, can fairly rest his all upon the rectitude of his own conduct, can constantly, and uniformly, and manfully maintain it; thinking that, and that alone, wholly sufficient to make him happy.

And do you seriously believe, said I, there ever was such a character?—And what, replied he, if I should admit there never was, is, or will be such a character? that we have been talking the whole time of a being not to be found?

A faultless monster, which the world ne'er saw?

Supposing, I say, we admit this, what then?—Would not your

[a] See before, pages 51, 52, 53.

[a] Dæmon, or genius, means every man's particular mind, and reasoning faculty. Δαίμων—οὗτος δέ ἐστιν ὁ ἑκάστου νοῦς καὶ λόγος. M. Anton. l. v. p. 27. Genium esse uniuscujusque animum rationalem; et ideo esse singulos singulorum. Varro in Fragm. It is from this interpretation of *genius*, that the word, which in Greek expresses *happiness*, is elegantly etymologized to mean "a goodness of genius or mind." Εὐδαιμονία ἐστὶ δαίμων ἀγαθός. M. Anton. l. vii. a. 17. See Gataker on the place. The sentiment came originally from the old Academics. See before, page 85, note *m*.

[b] Quam gravis vero, quam magnifica, quam constans conficitur persona sapientis? Qui, cum ratio docuerit, quod honestum esset, id esse solum bonum, semper sit necesse est beatus, vereque omnia ista nomina possideat, quæ inrideri ab imperitis solent. Rectius enim appellabitur rex, quam Tarquinius, qui nec se nec suos regere potuit: rectius magister populi, etc. Cic. de Fin. l. iii. c. 22. p. 269. Ergo hic, quisquis est, qui moderatione et constantia quietus animo est, sibique ipse placatus; ut nec tabescat molestiis, nec frangatur timore, nec sitienter quid expetens ardeat desiderio, nec alacritate futili gestiens deliquescat; is est sapiens, quem quærimus, is est beatus: cui nihil humanarum rerum aut intolerabile ad demittendum animum, aut nimis lætabile ad ecferendum videri potest. Quid enim videatur ei magnum, &c. Tusc. Disp. l. iv. c. 17. p. 298.

system in each a case, said I, a little border upon the chimerical?[c] I only ask the question.—You need not be so tender, he replied, in expressing yourself. If it be false, if it will not endure the test, I am as ready to give it up as I have been to defend it. He must be a poor philosopher, indeed, who, when he sees truth and a system at variance, can ever be solicitous for the fate of a system.

But tell me, I pray, Do you object to mine, from its perfection, or from its imperfection? From its being too excellent for human nature, and above it; or from its being too base, and below it?—It seems to require, said I, a perfection to which no individual ever arrived.—That very transcendence, said he, is an argument on its behalf. Were it of a rank inferior, it would not be that perfection which we seek.—Would you have it, said I, beyond nature?—If you mean, replied he, beyond any particular or individual nature, most undoubtedly I would. As you are a lover of painting, you shall hear a story on the subject.

"In ancient days,[d] while Greece was flourishing in liberty and arts, a celebrated painter, having drawn many excellent pictures for a certain free state, and been generously and honourably rewarded for his labours, at last made an offer to paint them an Helen, as a model and exemplar of the most exquisite beauty. The proposal was readily accepted, when the artist informed them, that in order to draw one fair, it was necessary he should contemplate many. He demanded, therefore, a sight of all their finest women. The state, to assist the work, assented to his request. They were exhibited before him, he selected the most beautiful, and from these formed his Helen, more beautiful than them all."

You have heard the fact, and what are we to infer? Or can there be any other inference than this, that the standard of perfection, with respect to the beauty of bodies, was not (as this artist thought) to be discovered in any individual; but being dispersed by nature in portions through the many, was from thence, and thence only, to be collected and recognised?—It appears, said I, he thought so.—The picture, continued he, is lost, but we have statues still remaining. If there be truth in the testimony of the best and fairest judges, no woman ever equalled the delicacy of the Medicean Venus, nor man the strength and dignity of the Farnhesian Hercules.—It is generally, said I, so believed.

[c] Chrysippus seems to have been sensible of this, if we may judge from a passage of his preserved in Plutarch. *Διὸ καὶ διὰ τὴν ὑπερβολὴν τοῦτε μεγέθους καὶ τοῦ κάλλους, πλάσμασι δοκοῦμεν ὅμοια λέγειν, καὶ οὐ κατὰ τὸν ἄνθρωπον καὶ τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην φύσιν.* "For this reason, through the excessive greatness and beauty of what we assert, we appear to say things which look like fictions, and not such as are suitable to man and human nature." Mor. 1041. F.

[d] See Cic. De Invent. l. ii. c. 1. See also Maximus Tyrius, Diss. xxiii. p. 277. of the late quarto edition, and Xenoph. Memor. l. iii. c. 10.

And will you, said he, from this unparalleled and transcendent excellence, deny these works of art to be truly and strictly natural?—Their excellence, replied I, must be confessed by all; but how they can be called natural, I must own a little startles me.—That the limbs and their proportions, said he, are selected from nature, you will hardly, I believe, doubt, after the story just related.—I replied, it was admitted.—The parts therefore of these works are natural.—They are.—And may not the same be asserted, as to the arrangement of these parts? Must not this, too, be natural, as it is analogous, we know, to nature?—It must. —If so, then is the whole natural.—So, indeed, said I, it should seem.—It cannot, replied he, be otherwise, if it be a fact beyond dispute, that the whole is nothing more than the parts under such arrangement.—Enough, said I, you have satisfied me.

If I have, said he, it is but to transfer what we have asserted of this subordinate beauty, to beauty of a higher order; it is but to pass from the external to the moral and internal. For here we say, by parity of reason, that nowhere, in any particular nature, is the perfect character to be seen entire.[e] Yet one is brave, another is temperate, a third is liberal, and a fourth is prudent. So that in the multitude of mixed imperfect characters, as before in the multitude of imperfect bodies, is expressed that idea, that moral standard of perfection, by which all are tried and compared to one another, and at last upon the whole are either justified or condemned; that standard of perfection, which cannot be but most natural, as it is purely collected from individuals of nature, and is the test of all the merit to which they aspire. —I acknowledge, said I, your argument.

I might add, said he, if there were occasion, other arguments which would surprise you. I might inform you of the natural preeminence and high rank of specific ideas;[f] that every indi-

[e] The Stoics themselves acknowledged, as we learn from Clemens of Alexandria, that their ὁ σοφὸς, or "perfect man," was difficult to be found to an exceeding great degree; δυσεύρετος πάνυ σφόδρα. Strom. p. 438. Sextus Empiricus gives it as their opinion, "that they had never as yet found him," μέχρι τοῦ νῦν ἀνευρέτου ὄντος κατ' αὐτοὺς τοῦ σοφοῦ. Adv. Phys. p. 582. edit. Lipsiens.

What Sextus says, seems to be confirmed by Cicero, who, speaking in his Offices the language of a Stoic, has the following expressions: Nec vero, cum duo Decii, aut duo Scipiones, fortes viri commemorantur, aut cum Fabricius Aristidesve justi nominantur; aut ab illis fortitudinis, aut ab his justitiæ, tanquam a sapientibus, petitur exemplum. Nemo enim horum sic sapiens est, ut sapientem volumus intelligi. Nec ii, qui sapientes habiti sunt, et nominati; M. Cato et C. Lælius, sapientes fuerunt; ne illi quidem septem: sed ex mediorum officiorum frequentia similitudinem quandam gerebant, speciemque sapientum. De Offic. l. iii. c. 4. Again, in his Lælius, speaking of the same consummate wisdom, he calls it, Sapientia quam adhuc mortalis nemo est consecutus.

So, too, Quintilian: Quod si defuit his viris summa virtus, sic quærentibus, an oratores fuerint, respondebo, quo modò Stoici, si interrogentur, an sapiens Zeno, an Cleanthes, an Chrysippus, respondeant; magnos quidem illos ac venerabiles; non tamen id, quod natura hominis summam habet, consecutos. Inst. Orat. l. xii. c. 1. p. 721, 722. edit. Caper.

So likewise Seneca: Scis, quem nunc bonum virum dicam? Hujus secundæ notæ. Nam ille alter fortasse, tanquam phœnix, semel anno quingentesimo nascitur. Epist. 42.

[f] See Cicero in his Orator, near the be-

vidual was but their type, or shadow; that the mind or intellect was the region of possibles; that whatever is possible, to the mind, actually is; nor any thing a nonenity, except what implies a contradiction; that the genuine sphere and genuine cylinder, though forms perhaps too perfect ever to exist conjoined to matter, were yet as true and real beings, as the grossest objects of sense; were the source of infinite truths, which wholly depend on them, and which, as truths, have a being most unalterable and eternal.[g] But these are reasonings which rather belong to another philosophy; and if you are satisfied without them, they are at best but superfluous.

He waited not for my answer, but proceeded as follows.—It is thus, said he, have I endeavoured, as far as in my power, to give you an idea of the perfect character; a character, which I am neither so absurd as to impute to myself, nor so rigorous and unfair as to require of others. We have proposed it only as an exemplar of imitation, which though none we think can equal, yet all at least may follow;[h] an exemplar of imitation, which in

ginning: Sed ego sic statuo, nihil esse in ullo genere tam pulchrum, quo non, &c. &c. See also the verses of Boethius before cited, note *b*. p. 65.

[g] *'Αλλ' ἥγε ἡμετέρα ψυχὴ πολλῷ καὶ ἀκριβέστερα καὶ καθαρώτερα τῶν φαινομένων ἐπινοεῖν δύναται, καὶ γεννᾷν τόν γ' οὗν φαινόμενον κύκλον ἐπιδιορθοῦται, καὶ λέγει, καθόσον οὗτος ἀπολείπεται τοῦ ἀκρίβους, καὶ δῆλον, ὡς ὁρῶσά τι τούτου κάλλιον ἄλλο καὶ τελειότερον εἶδος· οὐ γάρ που μηδενὸς ἐφαπτομένη, μηδὲ εἴς τι καθαρώτερον βλέπουσα, τοῦτο μὲν οὔ φησιν ὄντως εἶναι καλόν, τοῦτο δὲ οὐ πάντῃ ἴσον. αὐτῷ γὰρ τῷ λέγειν ταῦτα, δείκνυσιν ὡς ὁρᾷ τὸ πάντῃ κάλον καὶ πάντῃ ἴσον.* "Our soul is able both to perceive and to produce objects much more accurate and pure than those which are visibly apparent. It corrects, therefore, the apparent circle, and says, how much that circle wants of the perfect one; and this it evidently does, by beholding some form, which is fairer than the visible one, and more perfect. It is not, indeed, possible, that, without connexion with any thing else, or without looking upon something more pure, it should say that this is not really fair, this is not in every respect equal: for by these very assertions, it proves that it beholds that which is in every respect fair, and in every respect equal." From the MS. Comment of Proclus on the Parmenides, book iii.

The ancients held four methods or processes in their dialectic for the investigation of truth: first, the divisive, (*ἡ διαιρετική*,) by which we divide and separate the real attributes of being; next, the definitive, (*ἡ ὁριστική*,) by which we bring them again together, and by a just arrangement form them into definitions; thirdly, the demonstrative, (*ἡ ἀποδεικτική*,) in which we employ those definitions, and by syllogizing through them, descend from causes to effects; and, lastly, the analytic, (*ἡ ἀναλυτική*,) in which, by an inverse process, we unravel demonstrations, and so ascend from effects to causes.

Now to all these methods they held *εἴδη*, that is, specific forms or ideas, to be indispensably requisite, from their two important characters of permanence and comprehension.

Hence it is that Proclus, in the fifth book of his comment on the Parmenides, having gone through the several methods above mentioned, concludes with the following remark:

Εἰ ἄρα μή ἐστι τὰ εἴδη, οὐκ ἔσονται αἱ διαλεκτικοὶ μέθοδοι, καθ' ἃς τὰ ὄντα γιγνώσκομεν, οὐδ' ὅποι τρέψομεν τὴν διάνοιαν ἕξομεν· αὕτη γὰρ ἡ δύναμις τῆς ψυχῆς μάλιστα ποθοῦσα τὴν αἰτίαν ἐπὶ τὰ εἴδη καταφεύγει. "If therefore there are no specific ideas or forms, there can be none of those dialectic methods, by which we come to the knowledge of things, nor shall we know whither to direct our discursive faculty; for this is that power of the soul, which, desiring above all others the cause or reason of things, flies for that purpose to forms or specific ideas.

[h] Seneca gives it as a general confession of the greatest philosophers, that the doctrine they taught, was not quemadmodum ipse viverent, sed quemadmodum vivendum esset. De Vita Beata, c. 18.

There appears, indeed, to be one common

proportion as we approach, so we advance proportionably in merit and in worth; an exemplar which, were we most selfish, we should be fools to reject; if it be true, that to be happy is the ultimate wish of us all, and that happiness and moral worth so reciprocally correspond, that there can be no degree of the one, without an equal degree of the other.—If there be truth, said I, in your reasonings, it cannot certainly be otherwise.

He continued, by saying, the proficiency of Socrates, and, indeed, of every honest man, was sufficient to convince us, could we be stedfast to our purpose, that some progress, at least, might be made toward this perfection;[i] how far, we know not. The field was open, the race was free and common to all; nor was the prize, as usual, reserved only to the first; but all who run might depend on a reward, having the voice of nature, would they but listen, to assure them:[k]

Nemo ex hoc numero mihi non donatus abibit.[l]

IX. Here he paused, and left me to meditate on what he had

reasoning with respect to all models, exemplars, standards, correctors, whatever we call them, and whatever the subjects, which they are destined to adjust. According to this reasoning, if a standard be less perfect than the subject to be adjusted, such adjusting (if it may be so called) becomes a detriment. If it be but equally perfect, then is the adjusting superfluous. It remains, therefore, that it must be more perfect, and that to any transcendence, any accuracy conceivable. For suppose a standard as highly accurate as can be imagined. If the subjects to be adjusted have a nature suitable, then will they arrive, by such standard, to a degree of perfection, which through a standard less accurate they could never possibly attain. On the contrary, if the subjects be not so far capable, the accuracy of the standard will never be a hinderance, why they should not become as perfect as their nature will admit.

It seems to have been from some sentiments of this kind, that the Stoics adorned their *ὁ σοφὸς*, or "perfect character," with attributes so far superior to ordinary humanity. *Ἐκεῖνος ὄλβιος, ἐκεῖνος ἀπροσδεής, ἐκεῖνος αὐτάρκης, μακάριος, τέλειος:* "It was he was fortunate; it was he was above want; it was he was self-sufficient, and happy, and perfect." Plutarch. Mor. 1068. B. See note *e*, p. 93.

Some philosophers have gone so far as not to rest satisfied with the most perfect idea of humanity, but so substitute, for our exemplar, even the Supreme Being, God himself. Thus Plato, in his Theætetus, makes the great object of our endeavours to be *ὁμοίωσις τῷ θεῷ κατὰ τὸ δυνατὸν*, "the becoming like to God, as far as in our power." He immediately explains what this resemblance is: *Ὁμοίωσις δὲ, δίκαιον καὶ ὅσιον μετὰ φρονήσεως γενέσθαι.* "It is the becoming just and holy, along with wisdom or prudence." Plat. vol. i. p. 176. edit. Serrani. See this sentiment explained by Ammonius, in V. *Voces Porph.* p. 5. See also Aristotle's Ethics, l. x. c. 8. p. 465.

The gospel appears to favour the same hypothesis. "Be ye therefore perfect, even as your Father which is in heaven is perfect." Matt. v. 48.

What has been above said, will be, it is hoped, a sufficient apology for the transcendence of the character described in the Dialogue.

[i] See Diog. Laert. l. vii. c. 91. p. 420. *Τεκμήριον δὲ τὸ ὑπαρκτὴν εἶναι τὴν ἀρετὴν —τὸ γενέσθαι ἐν προκοπῇ τοὺς περὶ Σωκράτην, καὶ Διογένην,* &c.

[k] Verum ut transeundi spes non sit, magna tamen est dignitas subsequendi. Quinct. Inst. l. xii. c. 11. p. 760. Exigo itaque a me, non ut optimis par sim, sed ut malis melior. Senec. de Vita Beata, c. 17. *Οὐδὲ γὰρ Μίλων ἔσομαι, καὶ ὅμως οὐκ ἀμελῶ τοῦ σώματος· οὐδὲ Κροῖσος, καὶ ὅμως οὐκ ἀμελῶ τῆς κτήσεως· οὐδ' ἁπλῶς ἄλλου τινὸς τῆς ἐπιμελείας, διὰ τὴν ἀπόγνωσιν τῶν ἄκρων, ἀφιστάμεθα.* "For neither shall I be Milo, and yet I neglect not my body; nor Crœsus, and yet I neglect not my estate: nor in general do we desist from the proper care of any thing, through despair of arriving at that which is supreme." Arr. Epict. l. i. c. 2. See also Horat. Epist. i. l. i. 28, &c.

[l] Æneid. l. v. n. 305.

spoken. For some time we passed on in mutual silence, till observing me, on my part, little inclined to break it, What, said he, engages you with an attention so earnest?—I was wondering, said I, whence it should happen, that in a discourse of such a nature, you should say so little of religion, of providence, and a deity.—I have not, replied he, omitted them, because not intimately united to morals; but because whatever we treat accurately, should be treated separately and apart: multiplicity of matter naturally tends to confusion. They are weak minds, indeed, which dread a rational suspense; and much more so, when, in the event, it only leads to a surer knowledge, and often strengthens the very subject on which we suspend. Could I, however, repeat you the words of a venerable sage, (for I can call him no other,) whom once I heard disserting on the topic of religion, and whom still I hear whenever I think on him, you might accept, perhaps, my religious theories as candidly as you have my moral.—I pressed him to repeat them, with which he willingly complied.

The speaker, said he, whose words I am attempting to relate, and whom for the present I name Theophilus, was of a character truly amiable in every part. When young, he had been fortunate in a liberal education; had been a friend to the Muses, and approved himself such to the public. As life declined, he wisely retired, and dedicated his time almost wholly to contemplation; yet could he never forget the Muses, whom once he loved. He retained in his discourse (and so in the sequel you will soon find) a large portion of that rapturous, anti-prosaic style, in which those ladies usually choose to express themselves.

We were walking, not (as now) in the cheerful face of day, but late in the evening, when the sun had long been set. Circumstances of solemnity were not wanting to affect us; the poets could not have feigned any more happy: a running stream, an ancient wood, a still night, and a bright moonshine. I, for my own part, induced by the occasion, fell insensibly into a reverie about inhabitants in the moon; from thence I wandered to other heavenly bodies, and talked of states there, and empires, and I know not what.

Who lives in the moon, said he, is perhaps more than we can well learn; it is enough, if we can be satisfied, by the help of our best faculties, that intelligence is not confined to this little earth which we inhabit; that though men were not, the world would not want spectators to contemplate its beauty, and adore the wisdom of its Author.

"This whole universe itself is but one city or commonwealth;[m]

[m] Ὁ κόσμος οὗτος μία πόλις ἐστί. Arr. Epict. l. iii. c. 24. p. 486. This was a Stoic doctrine, of which Epictetus and the emperor Marcus made perpetual mention. See of the last, l. xii. s. 36.

So Cicero: Universus hic mundus una civitas communis Deorum atque hominum existumandus. De Leg. l. i. c. 7. p. 29. See De Fin. l. iii. c. 19. De Nat. Deor. l. ii. c. 62.

a system of substances variously formed, and variously actuated agreeably to those forms; a system of substances both immensely great and small, rational, animal, vegetable, and inanimate.

"As many families make one village, many villages one province, many provinces one empire; so many empires, oceans, wastes, and wilds combined, compose that earth on which we live. Other combinations make a planet or a moon; and these, again, united, make one planetary system. What higher combinations subsist, we know not: their gradation and ascent it is impossible we should discover. Yet the generous mind, not deterred by this immensity, intrepidly passes on through regions unknown, from greater system to greater, till it arrive at that greatest, where imagination stops, and can advance no further. In this last, this mighty, this stupendous idea, it beholds the universe itself, of which every thing is a part; and, with respect to which, not the smallest atom is either foreign or detached.[n]

"Wide as its extent, is the wisdom of its workmanship; not bounded and narrow, like the humbler works of art: these are all of origin no higher than human. We can readily trace them to their utmost limit, and with accuracy discern both their beginning and their end. But where the microscope that can shew us from what point wisdom begins in nature? Where the telescope that can descry to what infinitude it extends? The more diligent our search, the more accurate our scrutiny, the more only are we convinced, that our labours can never finish; that subjects inexhaustible remain behind, still unexplored.

"Hence the mind truly wise, quitting the study of particulars,[o]

[n] Οὐδὲν οὖν ἐστιν οὕτως ἄτιμον καὶ φαῦλον, ὃ μὴ μετέχει τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, κἀκεῖθεν ἔχει τὴν γένεσιν· ἐπεὶ κἂν τὴν ὕλην εἴποις, εὑρήσεις καὶ ταύτην ἀγαθόν· κἂν αὐτὸ τὸ κακὸν, εὑρήσεις καὶ τοῦτο μετέχον ἀγαθοῦ τινὸς, καὶ οὐδὲ ἄλλως ὑποστῆναι δυνάμενον, ἢ τῷ ἀγαθῷ χρωννύμενον, καὶ μεταλαμβάνον ἀγαθοῦ τινός. ἀλλ' αἱ μὲν τῶν ἀνθρώπων δόξαι σμικρὰ καὶ εὐτελῆ τῆς θείας αἰτίας ἐξάπτειν ἐξαισχύνονται, πρὸς τὴν τούτων ἀποβλέπουσαι φύσιν, οὐ πρὸς τὴν ἐκείνης δύναμιν, καὶ ὅτι τῶν μειζόνων οὖσα γεννητικὴ πολλῷ πλέον ἐστὶ τῶν ἐλασσόνων· οἱ δὲ ὄντως φιλόσοφοι, πάντα ὅσα πέρ ἐστιν ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ καὶ μεγάλα καὶ σμικρὰ προνοίας ἐξάψαντες, οὐδὲν ἄτιμον, οὐδὲ ἀποβλητὸν ἐν τῷ οἴκῳ τοῦ Διὸς ὁρῶσιν, ἀλλὰ πάντα ἀγαθὰ, καθόσον ἐκ προνοίας ὑφέστηκε, καὶ καλὰ, κατ' αἰτίαν γεγονότα τὴν θείαν. "There is, therefore, nothing ignoble and base, which doth not participate of the good principle, and hath not from thence its origin. Should you even instance matter, you will find even that to be good; should you instance evil itself, you will find that also participating of some good, and no otherwise able to subsist, than as coloured by good, and partaking of it. The opinions, indeed, of ordinary men are ashamed to refer little and contemptible things to the [primary and] divine cause, looking [in their reasonings] to the nature of the subjects, not to the power of the cause; and [to this necessary consequence] that if it be productive of the greater effects, much more so is it of the inferior. But those, on the contrary, who are truly philosophers, referring all things, both great and small, that exist in the universe, to a Providence, behold nothing fit to be rejected in this mansion of Jove; but all things good, as having been established by a Providence, and fair, as having been produced by a cause which is divine." Proclus, in his manuscript Comment on the Parmenides of Plato.

[o] The Platonics, considering science as something ascertained, definite, and steady, would admit nothing to be its object which was vague, infinite, and passing. For this reason they excluded all individuals, or objects of sense, and (as Ammonius expresses it) raised themselves, in their contemplations, from beings particular, to beings uni-

as knowing their multitude to be infinite and incomprehensible, turns its intellectual eye to what is general and comprehensive, and through generals learn to see and recognise whatever exists.

"It perceives, in this view, that every substance, of every degree, has its nature, its proper make, constitution, or form by which it acts, and by which it suffers. It perceives it so to fare with every natural form around us, as with those tools and instruments by which art worketh its wonders. The saw is destined to one act, the mallet to another; the wheel answers this purpose, and the lever answers a different: so nature uses the vegetable, the brute, and the rational, agreeably to the proper form and constitution of every kind. The vegetable proceeds with perfect insensibility; the brute possesses a sense of what is pleasurable and painful, but stops at mere sensation, and is unable to go further. The rational, like the brute, has all the powers of mere sensation, but enjoys, superadded, a further transcendent faculty, by which it is made conscious, not only of what it feels, but of the powers themselves, which are the sources of those very feelings: a faculty, which, recognising both itself and all things else, becomes a canon, a corrector, and a standard universal.[P]

versal; and which, as such, from their own nature, were eternal and definite. The whole passage is worth transcribing. Εἴρηται ὅτι ἡ φιλοσοφία, γνῶσις πάντων τῶν ὄντων ᾗ ὄντα ἐστίν. Ἐζήτησαν οὖν οἱ φιλόσοφοι, τίνα ἂν τρόπον γένωνται τῶν ὄντων ἐπιστήμονες· καὶ ἐπειδὴ ἑώρων τὰ κατὰ μέρος γενητὰ καὶ φθαρτὰ ὄντα, ἔτι δὲ καὶ ἄπειρα, ἡ δὲ ἐπιστήμη ἀΐδίωντε καὶ πεπερασμένων ἐστὶ γνῶσις (τὸ γὰρ γνωστὸν βούλεται ὑπὸ τῆς γνώσεως περιλαμβάνεσθαι· τὸ δὲ ἄπειρον, ἀπερίληπτον) ἀνήγαγον ἑαυτοὺς ἀπὸ τῶν μερικῶν ἐπὶ τὰ καθόλου, ἀΐδια ὄντα καὶ πεπερασμένα. Ὡς γάρ φησιν ὁ Πλάτων, Ἐπιστήμη εἴρηται, παρὰ τὸ εἰς Ἐπίστασιν ἡμᾶς καὶ ὅρον τινὰ προάγειν τῶν πραγμάτων· τοῦτο δὲ ποριζόμεθα διὰ τῆς εἰς τὰ καθόλου ἀναδρομῆς. Ammonius, in his Preface to Porphyry's Isagoge, p. 14. edit. 8vo.

Consonant to this, we learn, it was the advice of Plato, with respect to the progress of our speculations and inquiries, when we proceed synthetically, that is to say, from first principles downwards, that we should descend from those higher genera, which include many subordinate species, down to the lowest rank of species, those which include only individuals. But here it was his opinion that our inquiries should stop, and, as to individuals, let them wholly alone; because of these there could not possibly be any science. Διὸ μέχρι τῶν εἰδικωτάτων ἀπὸ τῶν γενικωτάτων κατίοντας παρεκελεύετο ὁ Πλάτων παύεσθαι—τὰ δὲ ἄπειρά φησιν ἐᾷν· μὴ δὲ γὰρ ἂν ποτε γενέσθαι τούτων ἐπιστήμην. Porphyr. Isagog. c. 2.

Such was the method of ancient philosophy. The fashion at present appears to be somewhat altered, and the business of philosophers to be little else than the collecting, from every quarter, into voluminous records, an infinite number of sensible, particular, and unconnected facts; the chief effect of which is to excite our admiration. So that if that well-known saying of antiquity be true, "it was wonder which induced men first to philosophize," we may say that philosophy now ends whence originally it began.

[P] See before, p. 63. In Epictetus, l. i. c. 1. p. 6. the δύναμις λογική, or "reasoning power," is called the power ἡ καὶ αὐτὴν θεωροῦσα, καὶ τ' ἄλλα πάντα. So Marcus: τὰ ἴδια τῆς λογικῆς ψυχῆς· ἑαυτὴν ὁρᾷ, ἑαυτὴν διαρθροῖ, &c.: "the properties of the reasoning soul are, it beholdeth itself, it formeth itself," &c. l. xi. c. 1. So again Epictetus: ὑπὲρ μὲν τοῦ ὁρᾶν καὶ ἀκούειν, καὶ νὴ Δία ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ τοῦ ζῆν, καὶ τῶν συνεργῶν πρὸς αὐτὸ, ὑπὲρ καρπῶν ξηρῶν, ὑπὲρ οἴνου, ὑπὲρ ἐλαίου εὐχαρίστει τῷ θεῷ· μέμνησο δ' ὅτι ἄλλο τί σοι δέδωκε κρεῖττον ἁπάντων τούτων, τὸ χρησόμενον αὐτοῖς, τὸ δοκιμάζον, τὸ τὴν ἀξίαν ἑκάστου λογιούμενον: "for seeing, for hearing, and, indeed, for life itself, and the various means which cooperate

"Hence to the rational alone is imparted that master-science, of what they are, where they are, and the end to which they are destined.[q]

"Happy, too happy, did they know their own felicity; did they reverence the dignity of their own superior character, and never wretchedly degrade themselves into natures to them subordinate.[r] And yet, alas! it is a truth too certain, that as the rational only are susceptible of a happiness truly excellent, so these only merge themselves into miseries past endurance.

"Assist us, then, thou Power Divine, with the light of that reason by which thou lightenest the world; by which grace and beauty is diffused through every part, and the welfare of the whole is ever uniformly upheld; that reason, of which our own is but a particle or spark,[s] like some Promethean fire, caught from heaven above. So teach us to know ourselves, that we may attain that knowledge which alone is worth attaining. Check our vain, our idle researches into the laws, and natures, and motions of other beings, till we have learnt and can practise those which peculiarly respect ourselves. Teach us to be fit actors in that general drama where thou hast allotted every being, great and small, its proper part, the due performance of which is the only end of its existence.[t]

"Enable us to curb desire within the bounds of what is natural. Enable us even to suspend it till we can employ it to our emolument. Be our first work to have escaped from wrong opinion and bad habit;[u] that the mind, thus rendered sincere

to its support; for the fruits of the earth, for wine and oil; for all these things be thankful to God: yet be mindful that he hath given thee something else, which is better than all these; something which is to use them, to prove them, to compute the value of each. Arr. Epict. l. ii. c. 23. p. 321.

[q] See Arr. Epict. l. ii. c. 24. p. 337. See also l. i. c. 6. p. 36; and Pers. Satyr. iii. 66.

[r] See Arr. Epict. l. i. c. 3. p. 21. *Διὰ ταύτην τὴν συγγένειαν, οἱ μὲν ἀποκλίνοντες, λύκοις ὅμοιοι γινόμεθα, ἄπιστοι καὶ ἐπίβουλοι καὶ βλαβεροί· οἱ δὲ λέουσιν, ἄγριοι καὶ θηριώδεις καὶ ἀνήμεροι· οἱ πλείους δ' ἡμῶν ἀλώπεκες, &c.* "Through this affinity, (he means our affinity to the body, or baser part,) some of us, degenerating, become, like wolves, faithless, and treacherous, and mischievous; others, like lions, fierce, and savage, and wild; but the greater part turn foxes, little, fraudulent, wretched animals." Cum autem duobus modis, id est, aut vi aut fraude fiat injuria; fraus, quasi vulpeculæ, vis, leonis videtur. Cic. de Offic. l. i. c. 19. See also Arr. Epict. l. ii. c. 9. p. 210. In our own language we seem to allude to this degeneracy of human nature, when we call men, by way of reproach, sheepish, bearish, hoggish, ravenous, &c.

[s] *Αἱ ψυχαὶ μὲν οὕτως εἰσὶν ἐνδεδεμέναι καὶ συναφεῖς τῷ θεῷ, ἅτε αὐτοῦ μόρια οὖσαι, καὶ ἀποσπάσματα.* Arr. Epict. l. i. c. 14. p. 81. *Ὁ δαίμων, ὃν ἑκάστῳ προστάτην καὶ ἡγεμόνα ὁ Ζεὺς ἔδωκεν, ἀπόσπασμα ἑαυτοῦ· οὗτος δέ ἐστιν ὁ ἑκάστου νοῦς καὶ λόγος.* Mar. Ant. l. v. s. 27. Humanus autem animus, decerptus ex mente divina, cum nullo alio nisi cum ipso Deo (si hoc fas est dictu) comparari potest. Tusc. Disp. l. v. c. 13. p. 371.

[t] See before, p. 89, and note *t*. See also Arr. Epict. l. iii. c. 22. p. 444. *Σὺ ἥλιος εἶ· δύνασαι, &c.* The passage is sublime and great, but too long to be here inserted.

[u] *Ἀπόσχου ποτὲ παντάπασιν ὀρέξεως, ἵνα ποτὲ καὶ εὐλόγως ὀρεχθῇς.* "Abstain for a time from desire altogether, that in time thou mayst be able to desire rationally." Arr. Epict. l. iii. c. 13. p. 414. Again the same author: *Σήμερον—ὀρέξει οὐκ ἐχρήσαμεν, ἐκκλίσει πρὸς μόνα τὰ προαιρετικά.* "To-day my faculty of desire I have not used at all; my aversion I have employed with respect only to things which are in my power," l. iv. c. 4. p. 588. See

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and incorrupt, may with safety proceed to seek its genuine good and happiness.

"When we are thus previously exercised, thus duly prepared, let not our love there stop where it first begins; but insensibly conduct it, by thy invisible influence, from lower objects to higher, till it arrive at that supreme, where only it can find what is adequate and full.[x] Teach us to love thee, and thy divine administration; to regard the universe itself as our true and genuine country, not that little casual spot where we first drew vital air.[y] Teach us each to regard himself but as a part of this great whole; a part which, for its welfare, we are as patiently to resign, as we resign a single limb for the welfare of our whole body.[z] Let our life be a continued scene of acquiescence and of gratitude: of gratitude for what we enjoy; of acquiescence in what we suffer; as both can only be referable to that concatenated order of events, which cannot but be best, as being by thee approved and chosen.

"Inasmuch as futurity is hidden from our sight,[a] we can have no other rule of choice, by which to govern our conduct, than what seems consonant to the welfare of our own particular natures. If it appear not contrary to duty and moral office, (and how should we judge but from what appears?) thou

also Enchir. c. 2. and Charact. v. iii. p. 202. Plat. Gorg. 505. B. vol. i. edit. Serr. Περὶ δὲ ψυχὴν—.

Horace seems also to have alluded to this doctrine:

Virtus est, vitium fugere; et sapientia prima,
Stultitia caruisse. Epist. i. l. i. v. 41.

[x] See Plat. Symp. p. 210. vol. iii. edit. Serrani. Δεῖ γάρ, ἔφη, τὸν ὀρθῶς ἰόντα ἐπὶ τοῦτο πρᾶγμα, ἄρχεσθαι, &c.

[y] See Arrian. Epict. l. i. c. 9. p. 51. Socrates quidem, cum rogaretur, cujatem se esse diceret, Mundanum, inquit: totius enim mundi se incolam et civem arbitrabatur. Tusc. Disp. l. v. c. 37. p. 427.

[z] Πῶς οὖν λέγεται τῶν ἐκτός τινα κατὰ φύσιν, &c. "In what sense, then, (says the philosopher, since all is referable to one universal Providence,) are some things called agreeable to our nature, and others the contrary? The answer is, They are so called, by considering ourselves as detached, and separate from the whole. For thus may I say of the foot, when considered so apart, that it is agreeable to its nature to be clean and free from filth. But if we consider it as a foot, that is, as something not detached, but the member of a body, it will behove it both to pass into the dirt, and to trample upon thorns, and even upon occasion to be lopped off for the preservation of the whole. Were not this the case, it would be no longer a foot. Something, therefore, of this kind should we conceive with respect to ourselves.—What art thou?—A man.—If thou consider thy being as something separate and detached, it is agreeable to thy nature, in this view of independence, to live to extreme age, to be rich, to be healthy. But if thou consider thyself as a man, and as the member of a certain whole; for the sake of that whole, it will occasionally behove thee, at one while to be sick, at another while to sail and risk the perils of navigation, at another while to be in want, and at last to die perhaps before thy time. Why, therefore, dost thou bear these events impatiently? Knowest thou not, that after the same manner as the foot ceaseth to be a foot, so dost thou, too, cease to be longer a man?" Arr. Epict. l. ii. c. 5. p. 191.

[a] Μέχρις ἂν ἄδηλά μοι ᾖ τὰ ἑξῆς, ἀεὶ τῶν εὐφυεστέρων ἔχομαι, πρὸς τὸ τυγχάνειν τῶν κατὰ φύσιν· αὐτὸς γάρ μ' ὁ θεὸς τοιοῦτον ἐκλεκτικὸν ἐποίησεν· εἰ δέ γε ᾔδειν, ὅτι νοσεῖν μοι καθείμαρται νῦν, καὶ ὁρμῶν ἂν ἐπ' αὐτό· καὶ γὰρ ὁ ποὺς, εἰ φρένας εἶχεν, ὅρμα ἂν ἐπὶ τὸ πηλοῦσθαι. Arr. Epict. l. ii. c. 6. p. 195. It appears that the above sentiment was of Chrysippus. In the tenth chapter of the same book we have it repeated, though in words somewhat different. Διὰ τοῦτο καλῶς λέγουσιν οἱ φιλόσοφοι, ὅτι, &c. So Seneca: Quicquid acciderit, sic ferre, quasi tibi volueris accidere. Debuisses enim velle, si scisses omnia ex decreto Dei fieri. Nat. Quæst. iii. in præfat.

canst not but forgive us, if we prefer health to sickness; the safety of life and limb to maiming or to death. But did we know that these incidents, or any other, were appointed us; were fated in that order of uncontrollable events by which thou preservest and adornest the whole; it then becomes our duty to meet them with magnanimity, to cooperate with cheerfulness in whatever thou ordainest; that so we may know no other will than thine alone, and that the harmony of our particular minds with thy universal, may be steady and uninterrupted through the period of our existence.[b]

"Yet since to attain this height, this transcendent height, is but barely possible, if possible, to the most perfect humanity;[c] regard what within us is congenial to thee; raise us above ourselves, and warm us into enthusiasm. But let our enthusiasm be such as befits the citizens of thy polity; liberal, gentle, rational, and humane—not such as to debase us into poor and wretched slaves, as if thou wert our tyrant, not our kind and common father; much less such as to transform us into savage beasts of prey, sullen, gloomy, dark, and fierce;[d] prone to persecute, to ravage, and destroy, as if the lust of massacre could be grateful to thy goodness. Permit us, rather, madly to avow villany in thy defiance, than impiously to assert it under colour of thy service. Turn our mind's eye from every idea of this character; from the servile, abject, horrid, and ghastly, to the generous, lovely, fair, and godlike.

"Here let us dwell; be here our study and delight. So shall we be enabled, in the silent mirror of contemplation, to behold those forms which are hidden to human eyes—that animating wisdom which pervades and rules the whole[e]—that law irresistible, immutable, supreme, which leads the willing, and compels the averse, to cooperate in their station to the general welfare—that magic divine,[f] which, by an efficacy past

[b] *Εἶναι δ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο τὴν τοῦ εὐδαίμονος ἀρετὴν καὶ εὔροιαν βίου, ὅταν πάντα πράττηται κατὰ τὴν συμφωνίαν τοῦ παρ' ἑκάστῳ δαίμονος πρὸς τὴν τοῦ ὅλου διοικητοῦ βούλησιν:* "The virtue of a happy man, and the felicity of life, is this; when all things are transacted in harmony of a man's genius, with the will of him who administers the whole." Diog. Laert. l. vii. c. 88. p. 418. This is what Epictetus calls *τὴν αὐτοῦ βούλησιν συνάρμοσαι τοῖς γινομένοις*, "to attune or harmonise one's mind to the things which happen." Diss. l. ii. c. 14. p. 242.

[c] See before, page 92, &c. See also notes *a*, p. 92; and *e*, p. 93.

[d] See before, note *r*, p. 99.

[e] This power is called by the emperor Marcus, *τὸν διὰ τῆς οὐσίας διήκοντα λόγον, καὶ—οἰκονομοῦντα τὸ πᾶν.* l. v. s. 32.

[f] *Καὶ τὸ χάσμα οὖν τοῦ λέοντος, καὶ τὸ δηλητήριον, καὶ πᾶσα κακουργία, ὡς ἄκανθα, ὡς βόρβορος, ἐκείνων ἐπιγεννήματα τῶν σεμνῶν καὶ καλῶν· μὴ οὖν αὐτὰ ἀλλότρια τούτου, οὗ σέβεις, φαντάζου· ἀλλὰ τὴν πάντων πηγὴν ἐπιλογίζου.* M. Ant. l. vi. s. 36. See also l. iv. s. 44; l. iii. s. 2. *Ὥσπερ γὰρ αἱ κωμῳδίαι (φησὶν) ἐπιγράμματα γελοῖα φέρουσιν, ἃ καθ' ἑαυτὰ μέν ἐστι φαῦλα, τῷ δὲ ὅλῳ ποιήματι χάριν τινὰ προστίθησιν· οὕτως ψέξειας ἂν αὐτὴν ἐφ' ἑαυτῆς τὴν κακίαν, τοῖς δ' ἄλλοις οὐκ ἄχρηστός ἐστι.* Chrysip. apud Plutarch. p. 1065. D.

Οὐδέ τι γίγνεται ἔργον ἐπὶ χθονὶ σοῦ δίχα, Δαίμων,
Οὔτε κατ' αἰθέριον θεῖον πόλον, οὔτ' ἐπὶ πόντῳ,
Πλὴν ὁπόσα ῥέζουσι κακοὶ σφετέρῃσιν ἀνοίαις.

comprehension, can transform every appearance, the most hideous, into beauty, and exhibit all things fair and good to thee, Essence Increate, who art of purer eyes than ever to behold iniquity.[g]

"Be these our morning, these our evening meditations—with these may our minds be unchangeably tinged[h]—that loving thee with a love most disinterested and sincere; enamoured of thy polity, and thy divine administration; welcoming every event with cheerfulness and magnanimity, as being best, upon the whole, because ordained of thee; proposing nothing of ourselves but with a reserve that thou permittest;[i] acquiescing in every obstruction, as ultimately referable to thy providence—in a word, that working this conduct, by due exercise, into perfect habit, we may never murmur, never repine; never miss what we would obtain, or fall into that which we would avoid;[k] but being happy with that transcendent happiness of which no one can deprive us, and blest with that divine liberty which no tyrant can annoy, we may dare address thee with pious confidence, as the philosophic bard of old,

> 'Conduct me, thou, of beings cause divine,
> Where e'er I'm destin'd in thy great design.
> Active I follow on: for should my will
> Resist, I'm impious; but must follow still.'"[l]

In this manner did Theophilus, said he, pursue the subject to which I had led him. He adorned his sentiments with expressions even more splendid than I have now employed. The

Ἀλλὰ σὺ καὶ τὰ περισσὰ ἐπίστασαι ἄρτια θεῖναι,
Καὶ κοσμεῖν τὰ ἄκοσμα· καὶ οὐ φίλα σοὶ φίλα ἔστιν.
Ὧδε γὰρ εἰς ἓν ἅπαντα συνήρμοκας ἐσθλὰ κακοῖσιν,
Ὥστ' ἕνα γίγνεσθαι πάντων λόγον αἰὲν ἐόντων. fora. *ἐόντα.*

Cleanthis Hymn. apud Steph. in Poesi Philos. p. 49, 50.

[The reader will observe, that the fourth of the above verses is supplied by the Miscell. Observationes Criticæ, vol. vii. from a manuscript of Vossius, at Leyden.]

[g] An ear that was to hear a musical discord alone, would have ideas of dissonance unknown to that ear which, along with the discord, was to hear its preparation and resolution. An eye that was to see only the words, "venis et cæco carpitur," would have ideas of absurdity unknown to the eye which was to behold the verse entire:

Vulnus alit venis, et cæco carpitur igni.

Numerous are the ideas of defect, error, absurdity, falsehood, &c. all referable to this class; ideas which arise purely from partial and incomplete comprehension, and which have no existence where the comprehension is universal and complete. It seems to be from this reasoning that Themistius asserts, *τιμιωτέρος γὰρ νοῦς, οὐχ ὁ τὰ πλείω νοῶν, ἀλλ' ὁ τὰ ἀμείνω:* "The more respectable mind is not that which perceiveth the greater number of objects, but the better and more excellent ones." Them. in Aristot. de Anim. p. 92. edit. Ald.

[h] *Βάπτεται γὰρ ὑπὸ τῶν φαντασιῶν ἡ ψυχή.* M. Ant. l. v. s. 16.

[i] *Μεθ' ὑπεξαιρέσεως.* See Epict. Enchirid. c. 2. M. Ant. l. iv. s. 1; l. v. s. 20. Seneca translates it, "cum exceptione." See De Beneficiis, l. iv. s. 34.

[k] *Μήτε ὀρεγόμενον ἀποτυγχάνειν, μήτ' ἐκκλίνοντα περιπίπτειν.* Arr. Epict. l. iii. c. 12. p. 404.

[l] *Ἄγε δέ μ', ὦ Ζεῦ, καὶ σύ γ' ἡ πεπραμένη,*
Ὅποι ποθ' ὑμῖν εἰμι διατεταγμένος.
Ὡς ἕψομαι γ' ἄοκνος· ἢν δέ γε μὴ θέλω,
Κακὸς γενόμενος, οὐδὲν ἧττον ἕψομαι.

Cleanthes in Epict. Ench. c. 52.

Thus translated by Seneca:

Duc me, parens, celsique dominator poli,
Quocunque placuit: nulla parendi mora est:
Adsum impiger, fac nolle: comitabor gemens,
Malusque patiar, quod bono licuit pati.

Epist. 107.

speaker, the speech, the happy circumstances which concurred, the night's beauty and stillness, with the romantic scene where we were walking, all together gave the whole such an energy and solemnity, as it is impossible you should feel from the coldness of a bare recital.—I, continued he, for my own part, returned home sensibly touched, and retained the strongest feelings of what I had heard till the following morning. Then the business of the day gently obliterated all, and left me by night as little of a philosopher as I had ever been before.

X. And is it possible, said I, so soon to have forgotten what seems so striking and sublime, as the subject you have been now treating?—It is habit, replied he, is all in all.[m] It is practice and exercise which can only make us truly any thing. Is it not evidently so in the most common vulgar arts? Did mere theory alone ever make the meanest mechanic? And is the supreme artist of life and manners to be formed more easily than such a one? Happy for us, could we prove it near so easy. But believe me, my friend, good things are not so cheap. Nothing is to be had gratis, much less that which is most valuable.[n]

Yet, however, for our comfort, we have this to encourage us, that, though the difficulty of acquiring habits be great and painful, yet nothing so easy, so pleasant, as their energies, when once wrought by exercise to a due standard of perfection. I know you have made some progress in music. Mark well what you can do, as a proficient this way: you can do that, which, without habit, as much exceeds the wisest man, as to walk upon the waves, or to ascend a cliff perpendicular. You can even do it with facility; and (lest you should think I flatter) not you yourself alone, but a thousand others beside, whose low rank and genius no way raise them above the multitude. If then you are so well assured of this force of habit in one instance, judge not in other instances by your own present insufficiency. Be not shocked at the apparent greatness of the perfect moral cha-

[m] Ἀλλὰ πολλῆς ἔχει χρείαν παρασκεῦης καὶ πόνου πολλοῦ καὶ μαθημάτων. Τί οὖν; ἐλπίζεις, ὅτι τὴν μεγίστην τέχνην ἀπὸ ὀλίγων ἐστὶν ἀπολαβεῖν: "But (says one, with respect to the virtuous character) there is need of much preparation, of much labour and learning. And what? Dost thou expect it should be possible (answers the philosopher) to obtain, by little pains, the chiefest, greatest art?" Arr. Epict. l. i. c. 20. p. 111. Ἄφνω δὲ ταῦρος οὐ γίνεται, οὐδὲ γενναῖος ἄνθρωπος· ἀλλὰ δεῖ χειμασκῆσαι, παρασκευάσασθαι, καὶ μὴ εἰκῇ προσκηδᾶν ἐπὶ τὰ μηδὲν προσήκοντα. "No robust and mighty animal is complete at once; nor more is the brave and generous man. It is necessary to undergo the severest exercise and preparation, and not rashly plunge into things which are no way suitable." Ejusd. Dissert. l. i. c. 2. p. 18. See also the same author, l. i. c. 15. p. 86; l. ii. c. 14. p. 243. Sed ut nec medici, nec imperatores, nec oratores, quamvis artis præcepta perceperint, quidquam magna laude dignum sine usu et exercitatione consequi possunt: sic officii conservandi præcepta traduntur illa quidem (ut facimus ipsi;) sed rei magnitudo usum quoque exercitationemque desiderat. Cic. de Offic. l. i. c. 18. Ἡ δ' ἠθικὴ ἐξ ἔθους περιγίνεται· ὅθεν καὶ τοὔνομα ἔσχηκε. Ethic. Nicom. l. ii. c. 1.

[n] Προῖκα οὐδὲν γίνεται. Arr. Epict. l. iv. c. 10. p. 653. The same sentiment is often repeated by the same author.

racter, when you compare it to the weakness and imperfection of your own. On the contrary, when these dark, these melancholy thoughts assail you, immediately turn your mind to the consideration of habit. Remember how easy its energies to those who possess it; and yet how impracticable to such as possess it not.

It must be owned, said I, that this is a satisfaction, and may be some kind of assistance in a melancholy hour. And yet this very doctrine naturally leads to another objection. Does not the difficulty of attaining habit too well support a certain assertion, that, defend virtue as we will, it is but a scheme of self-denial?

By self-denial, said he, you mean, I suppose, something like what follows: appetite bids me eat; reason bids me forbear. If I obey reason, I deny appetite; and appetite being a part of myself, to deny it, is a self-denial. What is true thus in luxury, is true also in other subjects; is evident in matters of lucre, of power, of resentment, or whatever else we pursue by the dictate of any passion.—You appear, said I, to have stated the objection justly.

To return then to our instance, said he, of luxury. Appetite bids me eat; reason bids me forbear. If I obey reason, I deny appetite; and if I obey appetite, do I not deny reason? Can I act either way, without rejecting one of them? And is not reason a part of myself, as notoriously as appetite?

Or to take another example: I have a deposit in my hands. Avarice bids me retain; conscience bids me restore. Is there not a reciprocal denial, let me obey which I will? And is not conscience a part of me, as truly as avarice?

Poor self indeed must be denied, take which party we will. But why should virtue be arraigned of thwarting it, more than vice her contrary? Make the most of the argument, it can come but to this: if self-denial be an objection to virtue, so is it to vice; if self-denial be no objection to vice, no more can it be to virtue. A wonderful and important conclusion indeed!

He continued, by saying, that the soul of man appeared not as a single faculty, but as compounded of many; that as these faculties were not always in perfect peace one with another, so there were few actions which we could perform, where they would be all found to concur. What then are we to do? Suspend till they agree? That were indeed impossible. Nothing therefore can remain, but to weigh well their several pretensions; to hear all that each has to offer in its behalf; and finally to pursue the dictates of the wisest and the best. This done, as for the self-denial, which we force upon the rest: with regard to our own character, it is a matter of honour and praise; with regard to the faculties denied, it is a matter of as small weight, as to contemn the noise and clamours of a mad and senseless

mob, in deference to the sober voice of the worthier, better citizens. And what man could be justified, should he reject these, and prefer a rabble?

XI. In this place he paused again, and I took occasion to acknowledge, that my objection appeared obviated. As the day advanced apace, he advised that we might return home; and walking along leisurely, thus resumed to himself the discourse.

I dare say, continued he, you have seen many a wise head shake, in pronouncing that sad truth, How we are governed all by interest.[o] And what do they think should govern us else? Our loss, our damage, our disinterest? Ridiculous, indeed! We should be idiots in such case, more than rational animals. The only question is, where interest truly lies? For if this once be well adjusted, no maxim can be more harmless.

"I find myself existing upon a little spot, surrounded every way by an immense unknown expansion. Where am I? What sort of place do I inhabit? Is it exactly accommodated, in every instance, to my convenience? Is there no excess of cold, none of heat, to offend me? Am I never annoyed by animals, either of my own kind, or a different? Is every thing subservient to me, as though I had ordered all myself? No, nothing like it; the furthest from it possible. The world appears not then originally made for the private convenience of me alone? It does not. But is it not possible so to accommodate it, by my own particular industry? If to accommodate man and beast, heaven and earth; if this be beyond me, it is not possible. What consequence then follows? Or can there be any other than this? If I seek an interest of my own, detached from that of others; I seek an interest which is chimerical, and can never have existence.

"How then must I determine? Have I no interest at all? If I have not, I am a fool for staying here. It is a smoky house, and the sooner out of it, the better.[p] But why no interest? Can I be contented with none, but one separate and detached? Is a social interest joined with others such an absurdity, as not to be admitted?[q] The bee, the beaver, and the tribes of herding

[o] See of the Dialogue, pages 90 and 105. See also notes *s* and *q*.

[p] Καπνός ἐστι· ἀπέρχομαι. M. Ant. l. v. c. 29. See Arr. Epict. l. i. c. 25. p. 129.

[q] As the Stoics, above all philosophers, opposed a lazy inactive life, so they were perpetually recommending a proper regard to the public, and encouraging the practice of every social duty. And though they made the original spring of every particular man's action, to be self-love, and the prospect of private interest; yet so intimately united did they esteem this private interest with the public, that they held it impossible to promote the former, and not at the same time promote the latter. Τοιαύτην φύσιν τοῦ λογικοῦ ζώου κατεσκεύασεν, ἵνα μηδενὸς τῶν ἰδίων ἀγαθῶν δύνηται τυγχάνειν, εἰ μή τι εἰς τὸ κοινὸν ὠφέλιμον προσφέρηται· οὕτως οὐκέτι ἀκοινώνητον γίνεται, τὸ πάντα αὐτοῦ ἕνεκα ποιεῖν. "God hath so framed the nature of the rational animal, that it should not be able to obtain any private goods, if it contribute not withal something profitable to the community. Thus is there no longer any thing unsocial, in doing all things for the sake of self." Arr. Epict. l. i. c. 19. p. 106.

The Peripatetic doctrine was much the same. Πάντων δὲ ἀμιλλωμένων πρὸς τὸ

animals, are enough to convince me, that the thing is, somewhere at least, possible. How then am I assured, that it is not equally true of man? Admit it; and what follows? If so, then honour and justice are my interest;[r] then the whole train of moral virtues are my interest; without some portion of which, not even thieves can maintain society.[s]

"But further still; I stop not here, I pursue this social interest as far as I can trace my several relations. I pass from my own stock, my own neighbourhood, my own nation, to the whole race of mankind, as dispersed throughout the earth. Am I not related to them all by the mutual aids of commerce, by the general intercourse of arts and letters, by that common nature of which we all participate? Again, I must have food and clothing. Without a proper genial warmth, I instantly perish. Am I not related, in this view, to the very earth itself? To the distant sun, from whose beams I derive vigour? to that stupendous course and order of the infinite host of heaven, by which the times and seasons ever uniformly pass on? Were this order once confounded, I could not probably survive a moment; so absolutely do I depend on this common general welfare.

"What then have I to do, but to enlarge virtue into piety?[t]

καλὸν, καὶ διατεινομένων τὰ κάλλιστα πράττειν, κοινῇ τ' ἂν παντὶ εἴη τὰ δέοντα, καὶ ἰδίᾳ ἑκάστῳ τὰ μέγιστα τῶν ἀγαθῶν, εἴπερ ἡ ἀρετὴ τοιοῦτόν ἐστι· ὥστε τὸν μὲν ἀγαθὸν, δεῖ φίλαυτον εἶναι· καὶ γὰρ αὐτὸς ὀνήσεται τὰ καλὰ πράττων, καὶ τοῦς ἄλλους ὠφελήσει: "Were all to aim jointly at the fair principle of honour, and ever strive to act what is fairest and most laudable, there would be to every one in common whatever was wanting, and to each man in particular of all goods the greatest, if virtue deserve justly to be so esteemed. So that the good man is necessarily a friend to self: for by doing what is laudable, he will always himself be profited, as well as at the same time be beneficial to others." Ethic. Nicom. l. ix. c. 8.

[r] Thus Cicero, after having supposed a social common interest to be the natural interest of man, subjoins immediately, Quod si ita est, una continemur omnes et eadem lege naturæ. Idque ipsum si ita est, certe violare alterum lege naturæ prohibemur. De Offic. l. iii. c. 6.

[s] Cujus (sc. Justitiæ) tanta vis est, ut ne illi quidem, qui maleficio et scelere pascuntur, possint sine ulla particula justitiæ vivere. Nam qui eorum cuipiam, qui una latrocinantur, furatur aliquid aut eripit, is sibi ne in latrocinio quidem relinquit locum. Ille autem qui archipirata dicitur, nisi æquabiliter prædam, &c. De Offic. l. ii. c. 11.

Ἀλλ' ἔστιν ἀνάγκη, φυσικῆς οὔσης τῆς κοινωνίας, εἶναι φύσει καὶ τὰ δίκαια, δι' ὃν ἐστιν ἡ κοινωνία. Ὅτι γὰρ τὸ δίκαιον συνέχει τὴν κοινωνίαν, δῆλόν ἐστιν ἐπὶ τῶν ἀδικωτάτων εἶναι δοκούντων· οὗτοι δέ εἰσιν οἱ λῃσταί· οἷς ἡ πρὸς ἀλλήλους κοινωνία ὑπὸ δικαιοσύνης σώζεται τῆς πρὸς ἀλλήλους. Διά τε γὰρ τὸ μὴ πλεονεκτεῖν ἀλλήλους, καὶ διὰ τὸ μὴ ψεύδεσθαι, καὶ διὰ τὸ τιμᾷν τὸ κρεῖττον δοκοῦν, καὶ τὸ τὰ συγκείμενα φυλάττειν, καὶ διὰ τὸ βοηθεῖν τοῖς ἀσθενεστέροις, διὰ ταῦτα ἡ πρὸς ἀλλήλους αὐτοῖς κοινωνία συμμένει· ὧν πᾶν τοὐναντίον εἰς οὓς ἀδικοῦσι ποιοῦσιν. "It is necessary, society being natural, that justice should be natural also, by which society exists. For that justice holds society together, is evident in those who appear of all the most unjust; such, I mean, as robbers or banditti, whose society with each other is preserved by their justice to each other. For by not aspiring to any unequal shares, and by never falsifying, and by submitting to what appears expedient, and by justly guarding the booty amassed together, and by assisting their weaker companions, by these things it is that their society subsists; the contrary to all which they do by those whom they injure." Alex. Aphrod. περὶ ψυχ. p. 156. edit. Ald. See also Plat. de Repub. l. i. p. 351. vol. xi. edit. Serrani.

[t] All manner of events, which any way affect a man, arise either from within himself, or from causes independent. In the former case, he maintains an active part; in the latter, a passive. The active part of

Not only honour and justice, and what I owe to man, is my interest; but gratitude also, acquiescence, resignation, adoration, and all I owe to this great polity, and its greater Governor, our common Parent.

"But if all these moral and divine habits be my interest, I need not surely seek for a better. I have an interest compatible with the spot on which I live: I have an interest which may exist, without altering the plan of Providence; without mending or marring the general order of events.[u] I can bear whatever happens with manlike magnanimity; can be contented, and fully happy in the good which I possess; and can pass through this turbid, this fickle, fleeting period, without bewailings, or envyings, or murmurings, or complaints."

And thus, my friend, have you my sentiments, as it were, abridged; my sentiments on that subject which engages every one of us. For who would be unhappy? Who would not, if he

his character seems chiefly to be the care of virtue, for it is virtue which teaches us what we are to act or do; the passive part seems to belong more immediately to piety, because by this we are enabled to resign and acquiesce, and bear with a manly calmness whatever befalls us. As therefore we are framed by nature both to act and to suffer, and are placed in a universe where we are perpetually compelled to both; neither virtue nor piety is of itself sufficient, but to pass becomingly through life, we should participate of each.

Such appears to have been the sentiment of the wise and good emperor. *Ἀνῆκεν ὅλον ἑαυτὸν, δικαιοσύνῃ μὲν εἰς τὰ ὑφ' ἑαυτοῦ ἐνεργούμενα, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἄλλοις συμβαίνουσι, τῇ τῶν ὅλων φύσει. Τί δ' ἐρεῖ τις, ἢ ὑπολήψεται περὶ αὐτοῦ, ἢ πράξει κατ' αὐτοῦ, οὐδ' εἰς νοῦν βάλλεται, δύο τούτοις ἀρκούμενος, αὐτὸς δικαιοπραγεῖν τὸ νῦν πρασσόμενον, καὶ φιλεῖν τὸ νῦν ἀπονεμόμενον ἑαυτῷ:* "He (the perfect man) commits himself wholly to justice, and the universal nature; to justice, as to those things which are done by himself; and in all other events, to the nature of the whole. What any one will say, or think about him, or act against him, he doth not so much as take into consideration; contented and abundantly satisfied with these two things, himself to do justly what is at this instant doing, and to approve and love what is at this instant allotted him. M. Anton. l. x. s. 11. *Πάντα ἐκεῖνα, ἐφ' ἃ διὰ περιόδου εὔχῃ ἐλθεῖν, ἤδη ἐχεῖν δύνασαι, ἐὰν μὴ σαυτῷ φθονῇς· τοῦτο δέ ἐστιν, ἐὰν πᾶν τὸ παρελθὸν καταλίπῃς, καὶ τὸ μέλλον ἐπιτρέψῃς τῇ προνοίᾳ, καὶ τὸ παρὸν μόνον ἀκενοθύμῃς πρὸς ὁσιότητα καὶ δικαιοσύνην· ὁσιότητα μὲν, ἵνα φιλῇς τὸ ἀπονεμόμενον· σοὶ γὰρ αὐτὸ ἡ φύσις ἔφερε, καὶ σὲ τούτῳ· δικαιοσύνην δὲ, ἵνα ἐλευθέρως καὶ χωρὶς περιπλοκῆς λέγῃς τε τ' ἀληθῆ, καὶ πράσσῃς τὰ κατὰ νόμον καὶ κατ' ἀξίαν:* "All those things, at which thou wishest to arrive by a road round about, thou mayst instantly possess, if thou dost not grudge them to thyself; that is to say, in other words, if every thing past thou entirely quit, if the future thou trust to Providence, and the present alone thou adjust according to piety and justice; according to piety, that so thou mayst approve and love what is allotted, (for whatever it be, it was nature brought it to thee, and thee to it;) according to justice, that so thou mayst generously and without disguise both speak the truth, and act what is consonant to [the general] law, and the real value of things." M. Ant. l. xii. c. 1. See also l. vii. c. 54; and Plato's Gorgias, p. 507. vol. i. edit. Serr. *καὶ μὴν ὅγε σώφρον, κ. τ. λ.*

[u] *Παιδεύεσθαι—τουτέστι τὸ μανθάνειν ἕκαστα οὕτω θέλειν, ὡς,* &c. "To be instructed; that is to say, to learn so to will all things, as in fact they happen. And how do they happen? As He, who ordains them, hath ordained. Now he hath ordained that there should be summer and winter, and plenty and famine, and virtue and vice, and all manner of contrarieties, for the harmony of the whole; and to each of us hath he given a body, and its members, and a fortune, and certain associates. Mindful therefore of this order, ought we to come for instruction; not indeed how we may alter what is already established, (for that neither is permitted us, nor would it be better so to be,) but how, while things continue around us, just as they are, and as it is their nature, we may still preserve our judgment in harmony with all that happens." Arr. Epict. l. i. c. 12. p. 74.

knew how, enjoy one perpetual felicity?[x] Who are there existing, who do not at every instant seek it? It is the wish, the employ, not of the rational man only, but of the sot, the glutton, the very lowest of our kind. For my own system, whether a just one, you may now examine, if you think proper. I can only say on its behalf, if it happen to be erroneous, it is a grateful error, which I cherish and am fond of.[y] And yet if really such, I shall never deem it so sacred, as not willingly, upon conviction, to resign it up to truth.

Little passed after this, worth relating. We had not far to walk, and we fell into common topics. Yet one observation of his I must not omit: it was what follows. When we are once, said he, well habituated to this chief, this moral science, then logic and physics become two profitable adjuncts:[z] logic, to secure to us the possession of our opinions; that, if an adversary attack, we may not basely give them up: physics, to explain the reason and economy of natural events, that we may know something of that universe where our dwelling has been appointed us. But let me add a saying, (and may its remembrance never escape you:) While you find this great, this master-science wanting, value logic but as sophistry, and physics but as raree-show; for both, assure yourself, will be found nothing better.

It was soon after this that our walk ended. With it ended a conversation which had long engaged us; and which, according to my promise, I have here endeavoured to transcribe.

[x] Ταύτης (sc. εὐδαιμονίας) γὰρ χάριν τὰ λοιπὰ πάντες πάντα πράττομεν. "It is for the sake of happiness, we all of us do all other things whatever." Ethic. Nicom. l. i. c. 12. sub. fin. See before, of the Dialogue, pages 90 and 105; and notes *e* and *q*. Plat. Protag. p. 358. vol. i. edit. Serr.

[y] Εἰ δὲ ἐξαπατηθέντα τινὰ ἔδει μαθεῖν, ὅτι τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀπροαιρέτων οὐδέν ἐστι πρὸς ἡμᾶς, ἐγὼ μὲν ἤθελον τὴν ἀπάτην ταύτην, ἐξ ἧς ἤμελλον εὐρόως καὶ ἀταράχως βιώσεσθαι. "Were a man to be deceived, in having learned concerning externals, that all beyond our power was to us as nothing; I, for my own part, would desire a deceit, which would enable me for the future to live tranquil and undisturbed." Arr. Epict. l. i. c. 4. p. 27.

[z] Ad easque virtutes, de quibus disputatum est, dialecticam etiam adjungunt et physicam, easque ambas virtutum nomine adpellant: alteram, quod habeat rationem ne cui falso adsentiamur, neve, &c. Cic. de Fin. l. iii. c. 21. p. 265.

The threefold division of philosophy into ethics, physics, and logic, was commonly received by most sects of philosophers. See Laert. l. vii. c. 39. See also Cicero, in his treatise de Legibus, l. i. c. 23. and in his Academics, l. i. c. 5. Fuit ergo jam accepta a Platone philosophandi ratio triplex, &c. Plutarch de Placit. Philos. p. 874.

HERMES:

OR

A PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY CONCERNING UNIVERSAL GRAMMAR.

PREFACE.

The chief end proposed by the author of this treatise in making it public, has been to excite his readers to curiosity and inquiry; not to teach them himself by prolix and formal lectures, (from the efficacy of which he has little expectation,) but to induce them, if possible, to become teachers to themselves, by an impartial use of their own understandings. He thinks nothing more absurd than the common notion of instruction, as if science were to be poured into the mind like water into a cistern, that passively waits to receive all that comes. The growth of knowledge he rather thinks to resemble the growth of fruit; however external causes may in some degree cooperate, it is the internal vigour and virtue of the tree that must ripen the juices to their just maturity.

This, then, namely, the exciting men to inquire for themselves into subjects worthy of their contemplation, this the author declares to have been his first and principal motive for appearing in print. Next to that, as he has always been a lover of letters, he would willingly approve his studies to the liberal and ingenuous. He has particularly named these, in distinction to others, because, as his studies were never prosecuted with the least regard to lucre, so they are no way calculated for any lucrative end. The liberal, therefore, and ingenuous, (whom he has mentioned already,) are those to whose perusal he offers what he has written. Should they judge favourably of his attempt, he may not, perhaps, hesitate to confess,

Hoc juvat et melli est.

For though he hopes he cannot be charged with the foolish love of vain praise, he has no desire to be thought indifferent or insensible to honest fame.

From the influence of these sentiments, he has endeavoured to treat his subject with as much order, correctness, and

perspicuity as in his power; and if he has failed, he can safely say, (according to the vulgar phrase,) that the failure has been his misfortune, and not his fault. He scorns those trite and contemptible methods of anticipating pardon for a bad performance, that "it was the hasty fruits of a few idle hours; written merely for private amusement; never revised; published against consent, at the importunity of friends, copies (God knows how) having by stealth gotten abroad;" with other stale jargon of equal falsehood and inanity. May we not ask such prefacers, If what they allege be true, what has the world to do with them and their crudities?

As to the book itself, it can say this in its behalf, that it does not merely confine itself to what its title promises, but expatiates freely into whatever is collateral; aiming on every occasion to rise in its inquiries, and to pass, as far as possible, from small matters to the greatest. Nor is it formed merely upon sentiments that are now in fashion, or supported only by such authorities as are modern. Many authors are quoted that now-a-days are but little studied; and some, perhaps, whose very names are hardly known.

The fate, indeed, of ancient authors (as we have happened to mention them) is not unworthy of our notice. A few of them survive in the libraries of the learned, where some venerable folio, that still goes by their name, just suffices to give them a kind of nominal existence. The rest have long fallen into a deeper obscurity; their very names, when mentioned, affecting us as little as the names, when we read them, of those subordinate heroes, Alcandrumque, Haliumque, Noemonaque, Prytanimque.

Now if an author, not content with the more eminent of ancient writers, should venture to bring his reader into such company as these last, among people (in the fashionable phrase) that nobody knows, what usage, what quarter can he have reason to expect? Should the author of these speculations have done this, (and it is to be feared he has,) what method had he best take in a circumstance so critical?—Let us suppose him to apologize in the best manner he can, and in consequence of this to suggest as follows:

He hopes there will be found a pleasure in the contemplation of ancient sentiments; as the view of ancient architecture,

though in ruins, has something venerable. Add to this, what from its antiquity is but little known has from that very circumstance the recommendation of novelty; so that here, as in other instances, extremes may be said to meet. Further still, as the authors whom he has quoted lived in various ages, and in distant countries, some in the full maturity of Grecian and Roman literature, some in its declension, and others in periods still more barbarous and depraved, it may afford, perhaps, no unpleasing speculation, to see how the same reason has at all times prevailed; how there is one truth, like one sun, that has enlightened human intelligence through every age, and saved it from the darkness both of sophistry and error.

Nothing can more tend to enlarge the mind, than these extensive views of men, and human knowledge; nothing can more effectually take us off from the foolish admiration of what is immediately before our eyes, and help us to a juster estimate both of present men, and present literature.

It is, perhaps, too much the case with the multitude in every nation, that as they know little beyond themselves and their own affairs, so out of this narrow sphere of knowledge they think nothing worth knowing. As we Britons, by our situation, live divided from the whole world, this, perhaps, will be found to be more remarkably our case. And hence the reason that our studies are usually satisfied in the works of our own countrymen; that in philosophy, in poetry, in every kind of subject, whether serious or ludicrous, whether sacred or profane, we think perfection with ourselves, and that it is superfluous to search further.

The author of this treatise would by no means detract from the just honours due to those of his countrymen, who, either in the present or preceding age, have so illustriously adorned it. But though he can with pleasure and sincerity join in celebrating their deserts, he would not have the admiration of these, or of any other few, to pass through blind excess into a contempt of all others. Were such admiration to become universal, an odd event would follow; a few learned men, without any fault of their own, would contribute in a manner to the extinction of letters.

A like evil to that of admiring only the authors of our own age, is that of admiring only the authors of one particular

science. There is, indeed, in this last prejudice, something peculiarly unfortunate, and that is, the more excellent the science, the more likely it will be found to produce this effect.

There are few sciences more intrinsically valuable than mathematics. It is hard, indeed, to say, to which they have more contributed, whether to the utilities of life, or to the sublimest parts of science. They are the noblest praxis of logic, or universal reasoning. It is through them we may perceive how the stated forms of syllogism are exemplified in one subject, namely, the predicament of quantity. By marking the force of these forms, as they are applied here, we may be enabled to apply them of ourselves elsewhere. Nay, further still, by viewing the mind, during its process in these syllogistic employments, we may come to know, in part, what kind of being it is; since mind, like other powers, can be only known from its operations. Whoever, therefore, will study mathematics in this view, will become not only by mathematics a more expert logician, and by logic a more rational mathematician, but a wiser philosopher, and an acuter reasoner, in all the possible subjects either of science or deliberation.

But when mathematics, instead of being applied to this excellent purpose, are used, not to exemplify logic, but to supply its place; no wonder if logic pass into contempt, and if mathematics, instead of furthering science, become in fact an obstacle. For when men, knowing nothing of that reasoning which is universal, come to attach themselves for years to a single species, a species wholly involved in lines and numbers only, they grow insensibly to believe these last as inseparable from all reasoning, as the poor Indians thought every horseman to be inseparable from his horse.

And thus we see the use, nay, the necessity of enlarging our literary views, lest even knowledge itself should obstruct its own growth, and perform in some measure the part of ignorance and barbarity.

Such, then, is the apology made by the author of this treatise, for the multiplicity of ancient quotations with which he has filled his book. If he can excite in his readers a proper spirit of curiosity; if he can help in the least degree to enlarge the bounds of science; to revive the decaying taste of ancient literature; to lessen the bigotted contempt of every thing not

modern; and to assert to authors of every age their just portion of esteem; if he can in the least degree contribute to these ends, he hopes it may be allowed that he has done a service to mankind. Should this service be a reason for his work to survive, he has confessed already it would be no unpleasing event. Should the contrary happen, he must acquiesce in its fate, and let it peaceably pass to those destined regions, whither the productions of modern wit are every day passing,

In vicum vendentem thus et odores.

HERMES:

OR

A PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY CONCERNING UNIVERSAL GRAMMAR.

BOOK I.

CHAPTER I.

INTRODUCTION.—DESIGN OF THE WHOLE.

If men by nature had been framed for solitude, they had never felt an impulse to converse one with another; and if, like lower animals, they had been by nature irrational, they could not have recognised the proper subjects of discourse. Since speech, then, is the joint energy of our best and noblest faculties,[a] (that is to say, of our reason, and our social affection,) being withal our peculiar ornament and distinction, as men; those inquiries may surely be deemed interesting, as well as liberal, which either search how speech may be naturally resolved, or how, when resolved, it may be again combined.

Here a large field for speculating opens before us. We may either behold speech, as divided into its constituent parts, as a statue may be divided into its several limbs; or else, as resolved into its matter and form, as the same statue may be resolved into its marble and figure.

These different analysings or resolutions constitute what we call "philosophical or universal grammar."[b]

When we have viewed speech thus analyzed, we may then consider it as compounded. And here, in the first place, we may contemplate that synthesis,[c] which, by combining simple

[a] See p. 58 to 66. See also note *z*, p. 61, and note *d*, p. 66.

[b] Grammaticam etiam bipartitam ponemus, ut alia sit literaria, alia philosophica, etc. Bacon, de Augm. Scient. vi. 1. And soon after he adds, Verumtamen hac ipsa re moniti, cogitatione complexi sumus grammaticam quandam, quæ non analogiam verborum ad invicem, sed analogiam inter verba et res sive rationem sedulo inquirat.

[c] Aristotle says, Τῶν δὲ κατὰ μηδεμίαν συμπλοκὴν λεγομένων οὐδὲν οὔτε ἀληθὲς οὔτε ψευδές ἐστιν· οἷον ἄνθρωπος, λεῦκος, τρέχει, νικᾷ: "Of those words which are spoken without connexion, there is no one either true or false; as, for instance, man, white, runneth, conquereth." Cat. c. iv. So again, in the beginning of his treatise De Interpretatione: Περὶ γὰρ σύνθεσιν καὶ διαίρεσιν ἔστι τὸ ψευδός τε καὶ τὸ ἀληθές:

terms, produces a truth; then, by combining two truths, produces a third; and thus others, and others, in continued demonstration, till we are led, as by a road, into the regions of science.

Now this is that superior and most excellent synthesis which alone applies itself to our intellect or reason; and which, to conduct according to rule, constitutes the art of logic.

After this we may turn to those inferior compositions,[d] which are productive of the pathetic and the pleasant, in all their kinds. These latter compositions aspire not to the intellect; but being addressed to the imagination, the affections, and the sense, become, from their different heightenings, either rhetoric or poetry.

Nor need we necessarily view these arts distinctly and apart; we may observe, if we please, how perfectly they coincide. Grammar is equally requisite to every one of the rest: and though logic may, indeed, subsist without rhetoric or poetry, yet so necessary to these last is a sound and correct logic, that without it they are no better than warbling trifles.

Now all these inquiries, (as we have said already,) and such others arising from them as are of still sublimer contemplations, (of which, in the sequel, there may be possibly not a few,) may with justice be deemed inquiries, both interesting and liberal.

"True and false are seen in composition and division." Composition makes affirmative truth, division makes negative; yet both alike bring terms together, and so far, therefore, may be called synthetical.

[d] Ammonius, in his comment on the treatise Περὶ Ἑρμηνείας, p. 53, gives the following extract from Theophrastus; which is here inserted at length, as well for the excellence of the matter, as because it is not (I believe) elsewhere extant.

Διττῆς γὰρ οὔσης τοῦ λόγου σχέσεως, (καθ' ἃ διώρισεν ὁ φιλόσοφος Θεόφραστος) τῆς τε πρὸς τοὺς ἀκροωμένους, οἷς καὶ σημαίνει τι, καὶ τῆς πρὸς τὰ πράγματα, ὑπὲρ ὧν ὁ λέγων πεῖσαι προτίθηται τοὺς ἀκροωμένους, περὶ μὲν οὖν τὴν σχέσιν αὐτοῦ τὴν πρὸς τοὺς ἀκροατὰς καταγίνονται ποιητικὴ καὶ ῥητορικὴ, διότι ἔργον αὐταῖς ἐκλέγεσθαι τὰ σεμνότερα τῶν ὀνομάτων, ἀλλὰ μὴ τὰ κοινὰ καὶ δεδημευμένα, καὶ ταῦτα ἐναρμονίως συμπλέκειν ἀλλήλοις, ὥστε διὰ τούτων καὶ τῶν τούτοις ἑπομένων, οἷον σαφηνείας, γλυκύτητος, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἰδεῶν, ἔτι τε μακρολογίας, καὶ βραχυλογίας, κατὰ καιρὸν πάντων παραλαμβανομένων, οἵσαί τε τὸν ἀκροατὴν, καὶ ἐκπλῆξαι. καὶ πρὸς τὴν πείθω χειρωθέντα ἔχειν· τῆς δέ γε πρὸς τὰ πράγματα τοῦ λόγου σχέσεως ὁ φιλόσοφος προηγουμένως ἐπιμελήσεται, τό τε ψεῦδος διελέγχων, καὶ τὸ ἀληθὲς ἀποδεικνύς. "The relation of speech being twofold, (as the philosopher Theophrastus hath settled it,) one to the hearers, to whom it explains something, and one to the things, concerning which the speaker proposes to persuade his hearers; with respect to the first relation, that which regards the hearers, are employed poetry and rhetoric. Thus it becomes the business of these two, to select the most respectable words, and not those that are common, and of vulgar use, and to connect such words harmoniously one with another; so as through these things and their consequences, such as perspicuity, delicacy, and the other forms of eloquence, together with copiousness and brevity, all employed in their proper season, to lead the hearer, and strike him, and hold him vanquished by the power of persuasion. On the contrary, as to the relation of speech to things, here the philosopher will be found to have a principal employ, as well in refuting the false, as in demonstrating the true."

Sanctius speaks elegantly on the same subject: Creavit Deus hominem rationis participem; cui, quia sociabilem esse voluit, magno pro munere dedit sermonem. Sermoni autem perficiendo tres opifices adhibuit. Prima est grammatica, quæ ab oratione solæcismos et barbarismos expellit; secunda dialectica, quæ in sermonis veritate versatur; tertia rhetorica, quæ ornatum sermonis tantum exquirit. Min. l. i. c. 2.

At present we shall postpone the whole synthetical part, (that is to say, logic and rhetoric,) and confine ourselves to the analytical; that is to say, universal grammar. In this we shall follow the order that we have above laid down: first dividing speech, as a whole, into its constituent parts; then resolving it, as a composite, into its matter and form: two methods of analysis very different in their kind, and which lead to a variety of very different speculations.

Should any one object, that, in the course of our inquiry, we sometimes descend to things which appear trivial and low, let him look upon the effects to which those things contribute, then, from the dignity of the consequences, let him honour the principles.

The following story may not improperly be here inserted. "When the fame of Heraclitus was celebrated throughout Greece, there were certain persons that had a curiosity to see so great a man. They came, and, as it happened, found him warming himself in a kitchen. The meanness of the place occasioned them to stop; upon which the philosopher thus accosted them—'Enter (says he) boldly, for here, too, there are gods.'"[e]

We shall only add, that as there is no part of nature too mean for the divine presence; so there is no kind of subject, having its foundation in nature, that is below the dignity of a philosophical inquiry.

CHAPTER II.

CONCERNING THE ANALYSING OF SPEECH INTO ITS SMALLEST PARTS.

Those things which are first to nature, are not first to man. Nature begins from causes, and thence descends to effects: human perceptions first open upon effects, and thence, by slow degrees, ascend to causes. Often had mankind seen the sun in eclipse, before they knew its cause to be the moon's interposition; much oftener had they seen those unceasing revolutions of summer and winter, of day and night, before they knew the cause to be the earth's double motion.[f] Even in matters of art and human crea-

[e] See Aristot. de Part. Animal. l. i. c. 5.

[f] This distinction of "first to man," and "first to nature," was greatly regarded in the Peripatetic philosophy. See Aristot. Phys. Auscult. l. i. c. 1. Themistius's Comment on the same, Poster. Analyt. l. i. c. 2. De Anima, l. ii. c. 2. It leads us, when properly regarded, to a very important distinction between intelligence divine, and intelligence human. God may be said to view the first, as first, and the last, as last; that is, he views effects through causes in their natural order. Man views the last as first, and the first as last; that is, he views causes through effects, in an inverse order. And hence the meaning of that passage in Aristotle, Ὥσπερ γὰρ τὰ τῶν νυκτερίδων ὄμματα πρὸς τὸ φέγγος ἔχει τὸ μεθ' ἡμέραν, οὕτω καὶ τῆς ἡμετέρας ψυχῆς ὁ νοῦς πρὸς τὰ τῇ φύσει φανερώτατα πάντων: "As are the eyes of bats to the light of the day, so is man's intelligence to those objects

tion, if we except a few artists and critical observers; the rest look no higher than to the practice and mere work, knowing nothing of those principles on which the whole depends.

Thus, in speech, for example: all men, even the lowest, can speak their mother-tongue; yet, how many of this multitude can neither write, nor even read? How many of those, who are thus far literate, know nothing of that grammar which respects the genius of their own language? How few, then, must be those who know grammar universal; that grammar which, without regarding the several idioms of particular languages, only respects those principles that are essential to them all?

It is our present design to inquire about this grammar; in doing which we shall follow the order consonant to human perception, as being for that reason the more easy to be understood.

We shall begin, therefore, first from a period or sentence, that combination in speech which is obvious to all; and thence pass, if possible, to those its primary parts, which, however essential, are only obvious to a few.

With respect, therefore, to the different species of sentences, who is there so ignorant, as, if we address him in his mother-tongue, not to know when it is we assert, and when we question; when it is we command, and when we pray or wish?

For example, when we read in Shakspeare,[g]

> The man that hath no music in himself,
> And is not moved with concord of sweet sounds,
> Is fit for treasons;

or in Milton,[h]

> O friends, I hear the tread of nimble feet,
> Hasting this way;

it is obvious that these are assertive sentences, one founded upon judgment, the other upon sensation.

When the witch in Macbeth says to her companions,

> When shall we three meet again,
> In thunder, lightning, or in rain?

this it is evident is an interrogative sentence.

that are by nature the brightest and most conspicuous of all things." Metaph. l. ii. c. 1. See also l. vii. c. 4. and Ethic. Nicom. l. i. c. 4. Ammonius, reasoning in the same way, says, very pertinently to the subject of this treatise, 'Αγαπητὸν τῇ ἀνθρωπίνῃ φύσει, ἐκ τῶν ἁπλουστέρων καὶ συνθέτων ἐπὶ τὰ ἁπλούστερα καὶ τελειότερα προϊέναι· τὰ γὰρ συνθέτα μᾶλλον συνήθη ἡμῖν, καὶ γνωριμώτερα· οὕτω γοῦν καὶ ὁ παῖς εἶναι μὲν λόγον, καὶ εἰπεῖν, Σωκράτης περιπατεῖ, οἶδε· τοῦτον δὲ ἀναλύσαι εἰς ὄνομα καὶ ῥῆμα, καὶ ταῦτα εἰς συλλαβὰς, κἀκεῖνα εἰς στοιχεῖα, οὐκέτι: "Human nature may be well contented to advance from the more imperfect and complex, to the more simple and perfect; for the complex subjects are more familiar to us, and better known. Thus, therefore, it is, that even a child knows how to put a sentence together, and say, 'Socrates walketh;' but how to resolve this sentence into a noun and verb, and these again into syllables, and syllables into letters or elements, here he is at a loss." Am. in Com. de Prædic. p. 29.

[g] Merchant of Venice.

[h] Paradise Lost, iv. 866.

When Macbeth says to the ghost of Banquo,

> Hence, horrible shadow!
> Unreal mockery, hence!

he speaks an imperative sentence, founded upon the passion of hatred.

When Milton says, in the character of his Allegro,

> Haste thee, nymph, and bring with thee
> Jest and youthful jollity,

he, too, speaks an imperative sentence, though founded on the passion, not of hatred, but of love.

When, in the beginning of the Paradise Lost, we read the following address:

> And chiefly thou, O Spirit, that dost prefer,
> Before all temples the upright heart, and pure,
> Instruct me, for thou know'st . . . . . .

this is not to be called an imperative sentence, though perhaps it bear the same form, but rather (if I may use the word) it is a sentence precative or optative.

What, then, shall we say? Are sentences to be quoted in this manner without ceasing; all differing from each other in their stamp and character? Are they no way reducible to certain definite classes? If not, they can be no objects of rational comprehension. Let us however try.

It is a phrase often applied to a man, when speaking, that "he speaks his mind;" as much as to say, that his speech or discourse is a publishing of some energy or motion of his soul. So it, indeed, is in every one that speaks, excepting alone the dissembler or hypocrite; and he, too, as far as possible, affects the appearance.

Now the powers of the soul (over and above the mere nutritive[1]), may be included, all of them, in those of perception, and those of volition. By the powers of perception, I mean the senses and the intellect; by the powers of volition, I mean, in an extended sense, not only the will, but the several passions and appetites; in short, all that moves to action, whether rational or irrational.

If, then, the leading powers of the soul be these two, it is plain that every speech or sentence, as far as it exhibits the soul, must of course respect one or other of these.

If we assert, then is it a sentence which respects the powers of perception. For what, indeed, is to assert, if we consider the examples above alleged, but to publish some perception either of the senses or the intellect?

Again, if we interrogate, if we command, if we pray, or if we wish, (which, in terms of art, is to speak sentences interrogative, imperative, precative, or optative,) what do we but publish so many different volitions? For who is it that questions?

[1] Vid. Aristot. de An. ii. 4.

he that has a desire to be informed. Who is it that commands? he that has a will, which he would have obeyed. What are those beings who either wish or pray? those who feel certain wants, either for themselves or others.

If, then, the soul's leading powers be the two above mentioned, and it be true that all speech is a publication of these powers, it will follow that every sentence will be either a sentence of assertion, or a sentence of volition. And thus, by referring all of them to one of these two classes, have we found an expedient to reduce their infinitude.[k]

The extensions of speech are quite indefinite, as may be seen if we compare the Æneid to an Epigram of Martial. But the longest extension with which grammar has to do, is the extension here considered, that is to say, a sentence. The greater extensions (such as syllogisms, paragraphs, sections, and complete works) belong not to grammar, but to arts of higher order; not to mention that all of them are but sentences repeated.

Now a sentence[l] may be sketched in the following description: "a compound quantity of sound significant, of which certain parts are themselves also significant."

Thus when I say "the sun shineth," not only the whole quantity of sound has a meaning, but certain parts also, such as "sun" and "shineth."

[k] Ῥητέον οὖν ὅτι τῆς ψυχῆς τῆς ἡμετέρας δυττὰς ἐχούσης δυνάμεις, τὰς μὲν γνωστικὰς, τὰς δὲ ζωτικὰς, τὰς καὶ ὀρεκτικὰς λεγομένας· (λέγω δὲ γνωστικὰς, μὲν, καθ' ἃς γινώσκομεν ἕκαστον τῶν ὄντων, οἷον νοῦν, διάνοιαν, δόξαν, φαντασίαν καὶ αἴσθησιν· ὀρεκτικὰς δὲ, καθ' ἃς ὀρεγόμεθα τῶν ἀγαθῶν, ἢ τῶν ὄντων, ἢ τῶν δοκούντων, οἷον βούλησιν λέγω, προαίρεσιν, θυμὸν, καὶ ἐπιθυμίαν) τὰ μὲν τέτταρα εἴδη τοῦ λόγου (τὰ παρὰ τὸν ἀποφαντικὸν) ἀπὸ τῶν ὀρεκτικῶν δυνάμεων προέρχονται τῆς ψυχῆς, οὐκ αὐτῆς καθ' αὐτὴν ἐνεργούσης, ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἕτερον ἀποτεινομένης (τὸν συμβάλλεσθαι δοκοῦντα πρὸς τὸ τυχεῖν τῆς ὀρέξεως) καὶ ἤτοι λόγον παρ' αὐτοῦ ζητούσης, καθάπερ ἐπὶ τοῦ πυσματικοῦ καὶ ἐρωτηματικοῦ καλουμένου λόγου, ἢ πρᾶγμα, καὶ εἰ πρᾶγμα, ἤτοι αὐτοῦ ἐκείνου τυχεῖν ἐφιεμένης, πρὸς ὃν ὁ λόγος, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τοῦ κλητικοῦ, ἢ τινὸς παρ' αὐτοῦ πράξεως· καὶ ταύτης, ἢ ὡς παρὰ κρείττονος, ὡς ἐπὶ τῆς εὐχῆς, ἢ ὡς παρὰ χείρονος, ὡς ἐπὶ τοῦ κυρίως καλουμένης προστάξεως· μόνον δὲ τὸ ἀποφαντικὸν ἀπὸ τῶν γνωστικῶν, καὶ ἔστι τοῦτο ἐξαγγελτικὸν τῆς γενομένης ἐν ἡμῖν γνώσεως τῶν πραγμάτων ἀληθῶς, ἢ φαινομένως, διὸ καὶ μόνον τοῦτο δεκτικόν ἐστιν ἀληθείας ἢ ψεύδους, τῶν δὲ ἄλλων οὐδέν. The meaning of the above passage being implied in the text, we take its translation from the Latin interpreter. Dicendum igitur est, cum anima nostra duplicem potestatem habeat, cognitionis, et vitæ, quæ etiam appetitionis ac cupiditatis appellatur, quæ vero cognitionis est, vis est, qua res singulas cognoscimus, ut mens, cogitatio, opinio, phantasia, sensus: appetitus vero facultas est, qua bona, vel quæ sunt, vel quæ videntur, concupiscimus, ut sunt voluntas, consilium, ira, cupiditas: quatuor orationis species, præter enunciantem, a partibus animi proficiscuntur, quæ concupiscunt; non cum animus ipse per se agit, sed cum ad alium se convertit, qui ei ad consequendum id, quod cupit, conducere posse videatur; atque etiam vel rationem ab eo exquirit, ut in oratione, quam percunctantem, aut interrogantem vocant; vel rem: sique rem, vel cum ipsum consequi cupit, quicum loquitur, ut in optante oratione, vel aliquam ejus actionem: atque in hac, vel ut a præstantiore, ut in deprecatione; vel ut ab inferiore, ut in eo, qui proprie *jussus* nominatur. Sola autem enuncians a cognoscendi facultate proficiscitur: hæcque nunciat rerum cognitionem, quæ in nobis est, aut veram, aut simulatam. Itaque hæc sola verum falsumque capit: præterea vero nulla. Ammon. in Libr. de Interpretatione.

[l] Λόγος δὲ φωνὴ συνθετὴ σημαντικὴ, ἧς ἔνια μέρη καθ' αὐτὰ σημαίνει τι. Arist. Poet. c. 20. See also De Interpret. c. 4.

But what shall we say? Have these parts again other parts, which are in like manner significant, and so may the progress be pursued to infinite? Can we suppose all meaning, like body, to be divisible, and to include within itself other meanings without end? If this be absurd, then must we necessarily admit that there is such a thing as a sound significant, of which no part is of itself significant. And this is what we call the proper character of a word.[m] For thus, though the words *sun* and *shineth* have each a meaning, yet is there certainly no meaning in any of their parts, neither in the syllables of the one, nor in the letters of the other.

If, therefore, all speech, whether in prose or verse, every whole, every section, every paragraph, every sentence, imply a certain meaning, divisible into other meanings, but words imply a meaning which is not so divisible; it follows that words will be the smallest parts of speech, inasmuch as nothing less has any meaning at all.

To know, therefore, the species of words, must needs contribute to the knowledge of speech, as it implies a knowledge of its minutest parts.

This, therefore, must become our next inquiry.

CHAPTER III.

CONCERNING THE SPECIES OF WORDS, THE SMALLEST PARTS OF SPEECH.

Let us first search for the species of words among those parts of speech commonly received by grammarians. For example, in one of the passages above cited.

> The man that hath no music in himself,
> And is not mov'd with concord of sweet sounds,
> Is fit for treasons.

Here the word *the* is an article; *man*, *no*, *music*, *concord*, *sweet*, *sounds*, *fit*, *treasons*, are all nouns, some substantive and some adjective; *that* and *himself* are pronouns; *hath* and *is* are verbs; *moved*, a participle; *not*, an adverb; *and*, a conjunction; *in*, *with*, and *for*, are prepositions. In one sentence we have all

[m] Φωνὴ σημαντική,—ἧς μέρος οὐδέν ἐστι καθ' αὑτὸ σημαντικόν. De Poetic. c. 20. De Interpret. c. 2 and 3. Priscian's definition of a word (lib. ii.) is as follows: Dictio est pars minima orationis constructæ, id est, in ordine compositæ. Pars autem, quantum ad totum intelligendum, id est, ad totius sensus intellectum. Hoc autem ideo dictum est, nequis conetur vires in duas partes dividere, hoc est, in vi et res; non enim ad totum intelligendum hæc fit divisio. To Priscian we may add Theodore Gaza:—Λέξις δὲ, μέρος ἐλάχιστον κατὰ σύνταξιν λόγου. Introd. Gram. l. iv. Plato shewed them this characteristic of a word. See Cratylus, p. 385. edit. Serr.

those parts of speech which the Greek grammarians are found to acknowledge. The Latins only differ in having no article, and in separating the interjection, as a part of itself, which the Greeks include among the species of adverbs.

What then shall we determine? why are there not more species of words? why so many? or if neither more nor fewer, why these and not others?

To resolve, if possible, these several queries, let us examine any sentence that comes in our way, and see what differences we can discover in its parts. For example, the same sentence above,

The man that hath no music, &c.

One difference soon occurs, that some words are variable, and others invariable. Thus the word *man* may be varied into *man's* and *men*; *hath*, into *have*, *hast*, *had*, &c. *Sweet* into *sweeter* and *sweetest*; *fit* into *fitter* and *fittest*. On the contrary, the words *the*, *in*, *and*, and some others, remain as they are, and cannot be altered.

And yet it may be questioned, how far this difference is essential. For, in the first place, there are variations which can be hardly called necessary, because only some languages have them, and others have them not. Thus the Greeks have the dual variation, which is unknown both to the moderns and to the ancient Latins. Thus the Greeks and Latins vary their adjectives by the triple variation of gender, case, and number; whereas the English never vary them in any of those ways, but through all kinds of concord preserve them still the same. Nay, even those very variations, which appear most necessary, may have their places supplied by other methods; some by auxiliars, as when for *Bruti*, or *Bruto*, we say "of Brutus," "to Brutus;" some by mere position, as when for *Brutum amavit Cassius*, we say, "Cassius loved Brutus." For here the accusative, which in Latin is known any where from its variation, is in English only known from its position or place.

If, then, the distinction of variable and invariable will not answer our purpose, let us look further, for some other more essential.

Suppose, then, we should dissolve the sentence above cited, and view its several parts as they stand separate and detached. Some, it is plain, still preserve a meaning, (such as *man*, *music*, *sweet*, &c.) others, on the contrary, immediately lose it, (such as *and*, *the*, *with*, &c.) Not that these last have no meaning at all, but in fact they never have it, but when in company or associated.

Now it should seem that this distinction, if any, was essential. For all words are significant, or else they would not be words; and if every thing not absolute is of course relative, then will all words be significant either absolutely or relatively.

With respect, therefore, to this distinction, the first sort of words may be called significant by themselves; the latter may be called significant by relation; or if we like it better, the first sort may be called principals, the latter accessories. The first are like those stones in the basis of an arch, which are able to support themselves, even when the arch is destroyed; the latter are like those stones in its summit or curve, which can no longer stand, than while the whole subsists.[n]

This distinction being admitted, we thus pursue our speculations. All things whatever either exist as the energies or affections of some other thing, or without being the energies or affections of some other thing. If they exist as the energies or affections of something else, then are they called *attributes*. Thus *to think* is the attribute of a man; *to be white*, of a swan; *to fly*, of an eagle; *to be four-footed*, of a horse. If they exist not after this manner, then are they called substances.[o] Thus *man*, *swan*, *eagle*, and *horse*, are none of them attributes, but all substances, because however they may exist in time and place, yet neither of these, nor of any thing else, do they exist as energies or affections.

And thus all things whatsoever, being either substances or attributes,[p] it follows of course that all words which are significant as principals, must needs be significant of either the one or the other. If they are significant of substances, they are called *substantives*; if of attributes, they are called *attributives*. So that all words whatever, significant as principals, are either substantives or attributives.

Again, as to words, which are only significant as accessories,

[n] Apollonius of Alexandria (one of the acutest authors that ever wrote on the subject of grammar) illustrates the different power of words, by the different power of letters. Ἔτι, ὃν τρόπον τῶν στοιχείων τὰ μέν ἐστι φωνήεντα, ἃ καὶ καθ' ἑαυτὰ φωνὴν ἀποτελεῖ· τὰ δὲ σύμφωνα, ἅπερ ἄνευ τῶν φωνηέντων οὐκ ἔχει ῥητὴν τὴν ἐκφώνησιν. τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ἐστὶν ἐπινοῆσαι κα' 'πὶ τῶν λέξεων. αἱ μὲν γὰρ αὐτὼν, τρόπον τινὰ τῶν φωνηέντων, ῥηταί εἰσι· καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ῥημάτων, ὀνομάτων, ἀντωνυμιῶν, ἐπιῤῥημάτων—αἱ δὲ, ὡσπερεὶ σύμφωνα, ἀναμένουσι τὰ φωνήεντα, οὐ δυνάμενα, κατ' ἰδίαν ῥητὰ εἶναι—καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν προθέσεων, τῶν ἄρθρων, τῶν συνδέσμων· τὰ γὰρ τοιαῦτα ἀεὶ τῶν μορίων συσσημαίνει. "In the same manner, as of the elements or letters, some are vowels, which of themselves complete a sound; others are consonants, which, without the help of vowels, have no express vocality; so likewise may we conceive as to the nature of words. Some of them, like vowels, are of themselves expressive, as is the case of verbs, nouns, pronouns, and adverbs; others, like consonants, wait for their vowels, being unable to become expressive by their own proper strength, as is the case of prepositions, articles, and conjunctions; for these parts of speech are always consignificant, that is, are only significant when associated to something else." Apollon. de Syntaxi, l. i. c. 3. Itaque quibusdam philosophis placuit nomen et verbum solas esse partes orationis; cætera vero, adminicula vel junctures earum: quomodo navium partes sunt tabulæ et trabes, cætera autem (id est, cera, stuppa, et clavi et similia) vincula et conglutinationes partium navis (hoc est, tabularum et trabium) non partes navis dicuntur. Prisc. l. xi. 913.

[o] Thus Aristotle: Νῦν μὲν οὖν τύπῳ εἴρηται, τί ποτ' ἐστὶν ἡ οὐσία, ὅτι τὸ μὴ καθ' ὑποκειμένου, ἀλλὰ καθ' οὗ τὰ ἄλλα. Metaph. Z. γ. p. 106. edit. Sylb.

[p] This division of things into substance and attribute seems to have been admitted by philosophers of all sects and ages. See Categor. c. 2. Metaphys. l. vii. c. 1. De Cœlo, l. iii. c. 1.

they acquire a signification either from being associated to one word, or else to many. If to one word alone, then, as they can do no more than in some manner define or determine, they may justly for that reason be called *definitives*. If to many words at once, then, as they serve to no other purpose than to connect, they are called for that reason by the name of *connectives*.

And thus it is that all words whatever are either principals or accessories; or under other names, either significant from themselves, or significant by relation. If significant from themselves, they are either substantives or attributives; if significant by relation, they are either definitives or connectives. So that under one of these four species, substantives, attributives, definitives, and connectives, are all words, however different, in a manner included.

If any of these names seem new and unusual, we may introduce others more usual, by calling the substantives, *nouns*; the attributives, *verbs*; the definitives, *articles*; and the connectives, *conjunctions*.

Should it be asked, what then becomes of pronouns, adverbs, prepositions, and interjections? the answer is, either they must be found included within the species above mentioned, or else must be admitted for so many species by themselves.

There were various opinions in ancient days, as to the number of these parts, or elements of speech.

Plato, in his Sophist,[q] mentions only two, the noun and the verb. Aristotle mentions no more, where he treats of prepositions.[r] Not that those acute philosophers were ignorant of the other parts, but they spoke with reference to logic or dialectic,[s] considering the essence of speech as contained in these two, because these alone combined make a perfect assertive sentence, which none of the rest without them are able to effect. Hence, therefore, Aristotle, in his treatise of Poetry,[t] (where he was to lay down the elements of a more variegated speech,) adds the article and conjunction to the noun and verb, and so adopts the same parts with those established in this treatise. To Aristotle's

[q] Vol. i. p. 261. edit. Ser.

[r] De Interpr. c. 2, 3.

[s] Partes igitur orationis sunt secundum dialecticos duæ, nomen et verbum; quia hæ solæ etiam per se conjunctæ plenam faciunt orationem; alias autem partes συγκατηγορήματα, hoc est, consignificantia appellabant. Priscian. l. ii. p. 574. edit. Putschii. Existit hic quædam quæstio, cur duo tantum, nomen et verbum, se (Aristoteles sc.) determinare promittat, cum plures partes orationis esse videantur. Quibus hoc dicendum est, tantum Aristotelem hoc libro diffinisse, quantum illi ad id, quod instituerat tractare, suffecit. Tractat namque de simplici enuntiativa oratione, quæ scilicet hujusmodi est, ut junctis tantum verbis et nominibus componatur.—Quare superfluum est quærere, cur alias quoque, quæ videntur orationis partes, non proposuerit, qui non totius simpliciter orationis, sed tantum simplicis orationis instituit elementa partiri. Boetius in Libr. de Interpretat. p. 295. Apollonius, from the above principles, elegantly calls the noun and verb, τὰ ἐμψυχότατα μέρη τοῦ λόγου, "the most animated parts of speech." De Syntaxi, l. i. c. 3. p. 24. See also Plutarch. Quæst. Platon. p. 1009.

[t] Poet. cap. 20.

authority (if indeed better can be required) may be added that also of the elder Stoics.[u]

The latter Stoics, instead of four parts made five, by dividing the noun into the appellative and proper. Others increased the number, by detaching the pronoun from the noun; the participle and adverb from the verb; and the preposition from the conjunction. The Latin grammarians went further, and detached the interjection from the adverb, within which by the Greeks it was always included, as a species.

We are told indeed by Dionysius of Halicarnassus[x] and Quintilian, that Aristotle, with Theodectes, and the more early writers, held but three parts of speech, the noun, the verb, and the conjunction. This, it must be owned, accords with the Oriental tongues, whose grammars (we are told[y]) admit no other. But as to Aristotle, we have his own authority to assert the contrary, who not only enumerates the four species which we have adopted, but ascertains them each by a proper definition.[z]

To conclude: the subject of the following chapters will be a distinct and separate consideration of the noun, the verb, the article, and the conjunction; which four, the better (as we apprehend) to express their respective natures, we choose to call substantives, attributives, definitives, and connectives.

CHAPTER IV.

CONCERNING SUBSTANTIVES, PROPERLY SO CALLED.

Substantives are all those principal words which are significant of substances, considered as substances.

The first sort of substances are the natural, such as animal, vegetable, man, oak.

There are other substances of our own making. Thus, by giving a figure not natural to natural materials, we create such substances, as house, ship, watch, telescope, &c.

[u] For this we have the authority of Dionysius of Halicarnassus, De Struct. Orat. sect. 2. whom Quintilian follows, Inst. l. i. c. 4. Diogenes Laertius and Priscian make them always to have admitted five parts. See Priscian, as before, and Laertius, l. vii. segm. 57.

[x] See the places quoted in the note immediately preceding.

[y] Antiquissima eorum est opinio, qui tres classes faciunt. Estque hæc Arabum quoque sententia—Hebræi quoque (qui, cum Arabes grammaticam scribere desinerent, artem eam demum scribere cœperunt, quod ante annos contigit circiter quadringentos) Hebræi, inquam, hac in re secuti sunt magistros suos Arabes.—Immo vero trium classium numerum aliæ etiam Orientis linguæ retinent. Dubium, utrum ea in re Orientales imitati sunt antiquos Græcorum, an hi potius secuti sunt Orientalium exemplum. Utut est, etiam veteres Græcos tres tantum partes agnovisse, non solum autor est Dionysius, &c. Voss. de Analog. l. i. c. 1. See also Sanctii Minerv. l. i. c. 2.

[z] Sup. p. 126, note *s*.

Again, by a more refined operation of our mind alone, we abstract any attribute from its necessary subject, and consider it apart, devoid of its dependence. For example, from body we abstract *to fly;* from surface, *the being white;* from soul, *the being temperate.*

And thus it is we convert even attributes into substances, denoting them on this occasion by proper substantives, such as *flight*, *whiteness*, *temperance;* or else by others more general, such as *motion*, *colour*, *virtue*. These we call abstract substances; the second sort we call artificial.

Now all those several substances have their genus, their species, and their individuals. For example, in natural substances, animal is a genus; man, a species; Alexander, an individual. In artificial substances, edifice is a genus; palace, a species; the Vatican, an individual. In abstract substances, motion is a genus; flight, a species; this flight or that flight are individuals.

As therefore, every genus may be found whole and entire in each one of its species,[a] (for thus man, horse, and dog, are each of them distinctly a complete and entire animal;) and as every species may be found whole and entire in each one of its individuals, (for thus Socrates, Plato, and Xenophon, are each of them completely and distinctly a man;) hence it is that every genus, though one, is multiplied into many; and every species, though one, is also multiplied into many, by reference to those beings which are their proper subordinates. Since then no individual has any such subordinates, it can never in strictness be considered as many, and so is truly an individual as well in nature as in name.

From these principles it is, that words following the nature and genius of things, such substantives admit of number as denote genera or species; while those which denote individuals,[b] in strictness admit it not.

[a] This is what Plato seems to have expressed in a manner somewhat mysterious, when he talks of *μίαν ἰδέαν διὰ πολλῶν, ἑνὸς ἑκάστου κειμένου χωρὶς, πάντῃ διατεταμένην, καὶ πολλὰς, ἑτέρας ἀλλήλων, ὑπὸ μιᾶς ἔξωθεν περιεχομένας.* Sophist. p. 253. edit. Serrani. For the common definition of genus and species, see the Isagoge, or Introduction of Porphyry to Aristotle's Logic.

[b] Yet sometimes individuals have plurality or number, from the causes following. In the first place, the individuals of the human race are so large a multitude, even in the smallest nation, that it would be difficult to invent a new name for every new-born individual. Hence then instead of one only being called Marcus, and one only Antonius, it happens that many are called Marcus and many called Antonius; and thus it is the Romans had their plurals, Marci and Antonii, as we in later days have our Marks and our Anthonies. Now the plurals of this sort may be well called accidental, because it is merely by chance that the names coincide.

There seems more reason for such plurals, as the Ptolemies, Scipios, Catos, or (to instance in modern names) the Howards, Pelhams, and Montagues; because a race or family is like a smaller sort of species; so that the family name extends to the kindred, as the specific name extends to the individuals.

A third cause which contributed to make proper names become plural, was the high character or eminence of some one individual, whose name became afterwards a

Besides number, another characteristic, visible in substances, is that of sex. Every substance is either male or female; or both male and female; or neither one nor the other. So that with respect to sexes and their negation, all substances conceivable are comprehended under this fourfold consideration.

Now the existence of Hermaphrodites being rare, if not doubtful; hence language, only regarding those distinctions which are more obvious, considers words denoting substances to be either masculine, feminine, or neuter.[c]

As to our own species, and all those animal species which have reference to common life, or of which the male and the female, by their size, form, colour, &c. are eminently distinguished, most languages have different substantives to denote the male and the female. But as to those animal species which either less frequently occur, or of which one sex is less apparently distinguished from the other, in these a single substantive commonly serves for both sexes.

In the English tongue it seems a general rule,[d] (except only when infringed by a figure of speech,) that no substantive is masculine, but what denotes a male animal substance; none feminine, but what denotes a female animal substance; and that where the substance has no sex, the substantive is always neuter.

But it is not so in Greek, Latin, and many of the modern tongues. These all of them have words, some masculine, some feminine, (and those, too, in great multitudes,) which have reference to substances where sex never had existence. To give one instance for many. Mind is surely neither male nor female, yet is *νοῦς*, in Greek, masculine, and *mens*, in Latin, feminine.

In some words, these distinctions seem owing to nothing else than to the mere casual structure of the word itself: it is of such a gender, from having such a termination, or from belonging perhaps to such a declension. In others we may imagine a a more subtle kind of reasoning, a reasoning which discerns,

kind of common appellative, to denote all those who had pretensions to merit in the same way. Thus every great critic was called an Aristarchus; every great warrior, an Alexander; every great beauty, a Helen, &c.

A Daniel come to judgment! yea, a Daniel, cries Shylock in the play, when he would express the wisdom of the young lawyer.

So Martial in that well known verse,

Sint Mæcenates, non deerunt, Flacce, Marones.

So Lucilius,

Αἰγίλιποι montes, Ætnæ omnes, asperi Athones.

πόσοι Φαέθοντες, ἢ Δευκαλίωνες. Lucian. in Timon. vol. i. p. 108.

[c] After this manner they are distinguished by Aristotle: *Τῶν ὀνομάτων τὰ μὲν ἄῤῥενα, τὰ δὲ θήλεα, τὰ δὲ μεταξύ.* Poet. cap. 21. Protagoras, before him, had established the same distinction, calling them *ἄῤῥενα, θήλεα, καὶ σκεύη.* Aristot. Rhet. l. iii. c. 5. Where mark what were afterwards called *οὐδέτερα*, or "neuters," were by these called *τὰ μεταξὺ καὶ σκεύη.*

[d] Nam quicquid per naturam sexui non adsignatur, neutrum haberi oporteret, sed id ars, &c. Consent. apud Putsch. p. 2023, 2024.

The whole passage, from Genera hominum, quæ naturalia sunt, &c. is worth perusing.

even in things without sex, a distant analogy to that great natural distinction, which (according to Milton) animates the world.[e]

In this view, we may conceive such substantives to have been considered as masculine, which were "conspicuous for the attributes of imparting or communicating; or which were by nature active, strong, and efficacious, and that indiscriminately, whether to good or to ill; or which had claim to eminence, either laudable or otherwise."

The feminine, on the contrary, were "such as were conspicuous for the attributes either of receiving, of containing, or of producing and bringing forth; or which had more of the passive in their nature than of the active; or which were peculiarly beautiful and amiable; or which had respect to such excesses as were rather feminine than masculine."

Upon these principles the two greater luminaries were considered, one as masculine, the other as feminine; the sun (Ἥλιος, "Sol") as masculine, from communicating light, which was native and original, as well as from the vigorous warmth and efficacy of his rays; the moon (Σελήνη, "Luna") as feminine, from being the receptacle only of another's light, and from shining with rays more delicate and soft.

Thus Milton:

> First in *his* east the glorious lamp was seen,
> Regent of day, and all th' horizon round
> Invested with bright rays; jocund to run
> *His* longitude thro' heav'n's high road: the gray
> Dawn, and the Pleiades before *him* danc'd,
> Shedding sweet influence. Less bright the moon
> But opposite, in levell'd west was set,
> *His* mirror, with full face borrowing *her* light
> From *him*; for other light *she* needed none. Par. Lost, vii. 370.

By Virgil they were considered as brother and sister, which still preserves the same distinction:

> Nec *fratris* radiis obnoxia surgere luna. Georg. i. 396.

The sky or ether is in Greek and Latin masculine, as being the source of those showers which impregnate the earth. The earth, on the contrary, is universally feminine, from being the grand receiver, the grand container, but above all from being the mother (either mediately or immediately) of every sublunary substance, whether animal or vegetable.[f]

Thus Virgil:

> Tum *Pater* omnipotens fœcundis imbribus *æther*
> *Conjugis* in gremium *lætæ* descendit, et omnes
> Magnus alit magno commixtus corpore fœtus. Georg. ii. 325.

[e] Mr. Linnæus, the celebrated botanist, has traced the distinction of sexes throughout the whole vegetable world, and made it the basis of his botanic method.

[f] Senecæ Nat. Quæst. iii. 14.

Thus Shakspeare:

> Common *mother*,[g] thou
> Whose womb unmeasurable, and infinite breast
> Teems and feeds all. Tim. of Athens.

So Milton:

> Whatever earth, all-bearing *mother*, yields. Par. Lost. b. v.

So Virgil:

> Non jam *mater* alit Tellus, viresque ministrat.[h] Æn. xi. 71.

Among artificial substances, the ship (*ναῦς*, "navis") is feminine, as being so eminently a receiver and container of various things, of men, arms, provisions, goods, &c. Hence sailors, speaking of their vessel, say always, "*she* rides at anchor," "*she* is under sail."

A city (*πόλις*, "civitas") and a country (*πατρις*, "patria") are feminine also, by being (like the ship) containers and receivers; and further by being, as it were, the mothers and nurses of their respective inhabitants.

Thus Virgil:

> Salve, *magna parens* frugum, Saturnia Tellus,
> *Magna* virum. Georg. ii. 173.

So, in that heroic epigram on those brave Greeks who fell at Chæronea:

> *Γαῖα δὲ πάτρις ἔχει κόλποις τῶν πλεῖστα καμόντων*
> *Σώματα.*
>
> "Their parent country in *her* bosom holds
> Their wearied bodies."[i]

So Milton:

> The city, which thou seest, no other deem
> Than great and glorious Rome, *queen* of the earth. Par. Reg. b. iv.

As to the ocean, though from its being the receiver of all rivers, as well as the container and productress of so many vegetables and animals, it might justly have been made (like the earth) feminine; yet its deep voice and boisterous nature have, in spite of these reasons, prevailed to make it male. Indeed, the very sound of Homer's

> *Μέγα σθένος Ὠκεανοῖο,*

would suggest to a hearer, even ignorant of its meaning, that the subject was incompatible with female delicacy and softness.

Time, (*χρόνος*,) from his mighty efficacy upon every thing around us, is by the Greeks and English justly considered as masculine. Thus in that elegant distich, spoken by a decrepit old man:

> [k] *Ὁ γὰρ χρόνος μ' ἔκαμψε, τέκτων οὐ σοφὸς,*
> *Ἅπαντα δ' ἐργαζόμενος ἀσθενέστερα.*[l]

[g] Παμμῆτορ γῆ χαῖρε. Græc. Anth. p. 281.

[h] *Διὸ καὶ ἐν τῷ ὅλῳ τὴν γῆς φύσιν, ὡς θηλὺ καὶ μητέρα νομίζουσιν· οὐρανὸν δὲ καὶ ἥλιον, καὶ εἴ τι τῶν ἄλλων τῶν τοιούτων, ὡς γενόντας καὶ πατέρας προσαγορεύουσι.* Arist. de Gener. Anim. i. c. 2.

[i] Demost. in Orat. de Corona.

[k] *Ὦ Χρόνε, παντοίων θνητῶν πανεπίσκοπε Δαῖμον.* Græc. Anth. p. 290.

[l] Stob. Ecl. p. 591.

"Me *time* hath bent, that sorry artist, *he*
That surely makes, whate'er he handles, worse."

So, too, Shakspeare, speaking likewise of time:

ORL. Whom doth *he* gallop withal?
ROS. With a thief to the gallows. As you like it.

The Greek *θάνατος* or *αἴδης*, and the English *death*, seem, from the same irresistible power, to have been considered as masculine. Even the vulgar with us are so accustomed to this notion, that a female death they would treat as ridiculous.[m]

Take a few examples of the masculine death.

Callimachus, upon the elegies of his friend Heraclitus:

Αἱ δὲ τεαὶ ζώουσιν ἀήδονες ἧσιν ὁ πάντων
Ἁρπάκτηρ ἀΐδης οὐκ ἐπὶ χεῖρα βαλεῖ.

"Yet thy sweet warbling strains
Still live immortal, nor on them shall death
His hand e'er lay, tho' ravager of all."

In the Alcestis of Euripides, *Θάνατος*, or "Death," is one of the persons of the drama: the beginning of the play is made up of dialogue between him and Apollo; and toward its end there is a fight between him and Hercules, in which Hercules is conqueror, and rescues Alcestis from his hands.

It is well known, too, that *sleep* and *death* are made brothers by Homer. It was to this old Gorgias elegantly alluded, when, at the extremity of a long life, he lay slumbering on his death-bed. A friend asked him, "How he did?" "Sleep (replied the old man) is just upon delivering me over to the care of his *brother*."[n]

Thus Shakspeare, speaking of life:

Merely thou art Death's fool;
For *him* thou labour'st by thy flight to shun,
And yet run'st towards *him* still. Meas. for Meas.

So Milton:

Dire was the tossing, deep the groans; Despair
Tended the sick, busiest from couch to couch:
And over them triumphant Death *his* dart
Shook; but delay'd to strike. Par. Lost, xi. 489.[o]

The Supreme Being (God, *Θεὸς*, Deus, Dieu, &c.) is in all languages masculine, inasmuch as the masculine sex is the superior and more excellent; and as he is the Creator of all, the Father of gods and men. Sometimes, indeed, we meet with such words as *Τὸ Πρῶτον*, *Τὸ Θεῖον*, *Numen*, *Deity*, (which last we English join to a neuter, saying Deity itself;) sometimes,

[m] Well, therefore, did Milton, in his Paradise Lost, not only adopt death as a person, but consider him as masculine: in which he was so far from introducing a phantom of his own, or from giving it a gender not supported by custom, that perhaps he had as much the sanction of national opinion for his masculine death, as the ancient poets had for many of their deities.

[n] *Ἤδη με ὁ ὕπνος ἔρχεται παρακατατίθεσθαι τ' Ἀδελφῷ.* Stob. Ecl. p. 600.

[o] Suppose in any one of these examples we introduce a female death; suppose we read,

And over them triumphant Death her *dart Shook*, &c.

What a falling off! How are the nerves and strength of the whole sentiment weakened!

I say, we meet with these neuters. The reason in these instances seems to be, that as God is prior to all things, both in dignity and in time, this priority is better characterized and expressed by a negation, than by any of those distinctions which are co-ordinate with some opposite; as male, for example, is co-ordinate with female, right with left, &c. &c. [p]

Virtue (ἀρετή, virtus) as well as most of its species, are all feminine, perhaps from their beauty and amiable appearance, which are not without effect even upon the most reprobate and corrupt.

> Abash'd the devil stood,
> And felt how awful goodness is, and saw
> Virtue in her shape how lovely; saw, and pin'd
> His loss. Par. Lost, iv. 846.

This being allowed, *vice* (κακία) becomes feminine of course, as being, in the συστοιχία, or "co-ordination of things," virtue's natural opposite. [q]

The fancies, caprices, and fickle changes of fortune would appear but awkwardly under a character that was male: but taken together, they make a very natural female; which has no small resemblance to the coquette of a modern comedy, bestowing, withdrawing, and shifting her favours, as different beaus succeed to her good graces.

> Transmutat incertos honores,
> Nunc mihi, nunc alii benigna. Hor.

Why the furies were made female is not so easy to explain, unless it be that female passions of all kinds were considered as susceptible of greater excess than male passions, and that the furies were to be represented as things superlatively outrageous.

> Talibus Alecto dictis exarsit in iras.
> At Juveni oranti subitus tremor occupat artus:
> Diriguere oculi: tot Erinnys sibilat Hydris,
> Tantaque se facies aperit: tum flammea torquens
> Lumina cunctantem et quærentem dicere plura
> Repulit, et geminos erexit crinibus angues,
> Verberaque insonuit, rabidoque hæc addidit ore:
> En! Ego victa situ, &c. Æn. vii. 455. [r]

[p] Thus Ammonius, speaking on the same subject: Τὸ πρῶτον λέγομεν, ἐφ' ᾧ μὴ δὲ τῶν διὰ μυθολογίας παραδόντων ἡμῖν τὰς θεολογίας ἐτόλμησέ τις ἢ ἀῤῥενωπὸν, ἢ θηλυπρεπῆ (lege θηλυπρεπῆ) διαμόρφωσιν φέρειν· καὶ τοῦτο εἰκότως· τῷ μὲν γὰρ ἄῤῥενι τὸ θῆλυ σύστοικον· τὸ (lege τῷ) δὲ πάντῃ, ἁπλῶς αἰτιῷ σύστοιχον οὐδὲν ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅταν ἀρσενικῶς τὸν Θεὸν ὀνομάζομεν, [πρὸς] τὸ σεμνότερον τῶν γενῶν τοῦ ὑφειμένου προτιμῶντες, οὕτως αὐτὸν προσαγορεύομεν. *Primum* dicimus, quod nemo etiam eorum, qui theologiam nobis fabularum integumentis obvolutam tradiderunt, vel maris vel fœminæ specie fingere ausus est: idque merito: conjugatum enim mari fœmininum est. Causæ autem omnino absolutæ ac simplici nihil est conjugatum. Immo vero cum Deum masculino genere appellamus, ita ipsum nominamus, genus præstantius submisso atque humili præferentes. Ammon. in lib. de Interpr. p. 30. B. Οὐ γὰρ ἐναντίον τῷ Πρώτῳ οὐδέν. Aristot. Metaph. A. p. 210. Sylb.

[q] They are both represented as females by Xenophon, in the celebrated story of Hercules, taken from Prodicus. See Memorab. l. ii. c. 1. As to the συστοιχία here mentioned, thus Varro: Pythagoras Samius ait omnium rerum initia esse bina: ut finitum et infinitum, bonum et malum, vitam et mortem, diem et noctem. De Ling. Lat. l. iv. See also Arist. Metaph. l. i. c. 5, and Ecclesiasticus, chap. lxii. ver. 24.

[r] The words above mentioned, *time, death,*

He that would see more on this subject, may consult Ammonius the Peripatetic, in his Commentary on the treatise *De Interpretatione*, where the subject is treated at large with respect to the Greek tongue. We shall only observe, that as all such speculations are at best but conjectures, they should therefore be received with candour, rather than scrutinized with rigour. Varro's words, on a subject near akin, are for their aptness and elegance well worth attending. Non mediocres enim tenebræ in silva, ubi hæc captanda; neque eo, quo pervenire volumus, semitæ tritæ; neque non in tramitibus quædam objecta, quæ euntem retinere possunt.[s]

To conclude this chapter. We may collect from what has been said, that both number and gender appertain to words, because, in the first place, they appertain to things; that is to say, because substances are many, and have either sex or no sex; therefore substantives have number, and are masculine, feminine, or neuter. There is, however, this difference between the two attributes: number in strictness descends no lower than to the last rank of species:[t] gender, on the contrary, stops not

fortune, virtue, &c. in Greek, Latin, French, and most modern languages, though they are diversified with genders in the manner described, yet never vary the gender which they have once acquired, except in a few instances where the gender is doubtful. We cannot say ἡ ἀρετὴ or ὁ ἀρετὴ, "hæc virtus," or "hic virtus," "la vertu," or "le vertu," and so of the rest. But it is otherwise in English. We in our own language say, Virtue is *its* own reward, or Virtue is *her* own reward; Time maintains *its* wonted pace, or Time maintains *his* wonted pace.

There is a singular advantage in this liberty, as it enables us to mark, with a peculiar force, the distinction between the severe or logical style, and the ornamental or rhetorical. For thus, when we speak of the above words, and of all others naturally devoid of sex, as neuters, we speak of them as they are, and as becomes a logical inquiry. When we give them sex, by making them masculine or feminine, they are from thenceforth personified; are a kind of intelligent beings, and become, as such, the proper ornaments either of rhetoric or of poetry.

Thus Milton:

The thunder,
Wing'd with red light'ning and impetuous rage,
Perhaps hath spent his *shafts.*
Par. Lost, i. 174.

The poet, having just before called the hail and thunder, "God's ministers of vengeance," and so personified them, had he afterwards said *its* shafts for *his* shafts, would have destroyed his own image, and approached withal so much nearer to prose.

The following passage is from the same poem:

Should intermitted vengeance arm again
His *red right hand.* Par. Lost, ii. 174.

In this place *his* hand is clearly preferable either to *her's* or *it's*, by immediately referring us to God himself, the avenger.

I shall only give one instance more, and quit this subject.

At his command th' up-rooted hills retir'd
Each to his *place: they heard his voice and went*
Obsequious: heav'n his *wonted face renew'd,*
And with fresh flow'rets hill and valley smil'd.
Par. Lost, b. vi.

See also ver. 54, 55, of the same book.

Here all things are personified; the hills hear, the valleys smile, and the face of heaven is renewed. Suppose, then, the poet had been necessitated by the laws of his language to have said, *Each hill retir'd to* its *place, Heaven renew'd* its *wonted face;* how prosaic and lifeless would these neuters have appeared; how detrimental to the prosopopeia which he was aiming to establish! In this, therefore, he was happy, that the language in which he wrote imposed no such necessity; and he was too wise a writer to impose it on himself. It were to be wished his correctors had been as wise on their parts.

[s] De Ling. Lat. l. iv.

[t] The reason why number goes no lower is, that it does not naturally appertain to individuals; the cause of which see before, p. 128.

here, but descends to every individual, however diversified. And so much for substantives, properly so called.

CHAPTER V.

CONCERNING SUBSTANTIVES OF THE SECONDARY ORDER.

We are now to proceed to a secondary race of substantives, a race quite different from any already mentioned, and whose nature may be explained in the following manner.

Every object which presents itself to the senses or the intellect, is either then perceived for the first time, or else is recognized as having been perceived before. In the former case it is called an object, *τῆς πρώτης γνώσεως*, "of the first knowledge," or acquaintance;[u] in the latter it is called an object, *τῆς δευτέρας γνώσεως*, "of the second knowledge," or acquaintance.

Now as all conversation passes between particulars or individuals, these will often happen to be reciprocally objects *τῆς πρώτης γνώσεως*, that is to say, "till that instant unacquainted with each other." What then is to be done? How shall the speaker address the other, when he knows not his name? or how explain himself by his own name, of which the other is wholly ignorant? Nouns, as they have been described, cannot answer the purpose. The first expedient upon this occasion seems to have been *Δείξις*, that is, "pointing, or indication by the finger or hand," some traces of which are still to be observed, as a part of that action which naturally attends our speaking. But the authors of language were not content with this. They invented a race of words to supply this pointing; which words, as they always stood for substantives or nouns, were characterized by the name of *ἀντωνυμίαι*, or "pronouns."[v] These, also, they distinguished by three several sorts, calling them pronouns of the first, the second, and the third person, with a view to certain distinctions, which may be explained as follows.

Suppose the parties conversing to be wholly unacquainted, neither name nor countenance on either side known, and the

[u] See Apoll. de Syntaxi, l. i. c. 16. p. 49; l. ii. c. 3. p. 103. Thus Priscian: Interest autem inter demonstrationem et relationem hoc; quod demonstratio, interrogationi reddita, *primam cognitionem* ostendit; *quis facit? Ego:* relatio vero *secundum cognitionem* significat, ut, *Is, de quo jam dixit.* Lib. xii. p. 936. edit. Putschii.

[v] *Ἐκεῖνο οὖν ἀντωνυμία, τὸ μετὰ δείξεως ἢ ἀναφορᾶς ἀντονομαζομένον* Apoll. de Synt. l. ii. c. 5. p. 106. Priscian seems to consider them so peculiarly destined to the expression of individuals, that he does not say they supply the place of any noun, but that of the proper name only. And this undoubtedly was their original, and still is their true and natural use. Pronomen est pars orationis, quæ pro nomine proprio uniuscujusque accipitur. Prisc. l. xii. See also Apoll. l. ii. c. 9. p. 117, 118.

subject of the conversation to be the speaker himself. Here, to supply the place of pointing by a word of equal power, they furnished the speaker with the pronoun *I*. *I write*, *I say*, *I desire*, &c.: and as the speaker is always principal with respect to his own discourse, this they called, for that reason, the pronoun of the first person.

Again, suppose the subject of the conversation to be the party addressed. Here, for similar reasons, they invented the pronoun *thou*. *Thou writest*, *thou walkest*, &c.: and as the party addressed is next in dignity to the speaker, or at least comes next with reference to the discourse, this pronoun they therefore called the pronoun of the second person.

Lastly, suppose the subject of conversation neither the speaker nor the party addressed, but some third object, different from both. Here they provided another pronoun. *He*, *she*, or *it*; which, in distinction to the two former, was called the pronoun of the third person.

And thus it was that pronouns came to be distinguished by their respective persons.[w]

As to number, the pronoun of each person has it: *I* has the plural *we*, because there may be many speakers at once of the same sentiment; as well as one, who, including himself, speaks the sentiment of many. *Thou* has the plural *you*, because a

[w] The description of the different persons here given is taken from Priscian, who took it from Apollonius. Personæ pronominum sunt tres; prima, secunda, tertia. Prima est, cum ipsa, quæ loquitur, de se pronuntiat; secunda, cum de ea pronunciat, ad quam directo sermone loquitur; tertia, cum de ea, quæ nec loquitur, nec ad se directum accipit sermonem. L. xii. p. 940. Theodore Gaza gives the same distinctions. Πρῶτον (πρόσωπον sc.) ᾧ περὶ ἑαυτοῦ φράζει ὁ λέγων· δεύτερον, ᾧ περὶ τοῦ, πρὸς ὃν ὁ λόγος· τρίτον, ᾧ περὶ ἑτέρου. Gaz. Gram. l. iv. p. 152.

This account of persons is far preferable to the common one, which makes the first the speaker, the second the party addressed, and the third the subject. For though the first and second be as commonly described, one the speaker, the other the party addressed; yet till they become subjects of the discourse they have no existence. Again, as to the third person's being the subject, this is a character which it shares in common with both the other persons, and which can never, therefore, be called a peculiarity of its own. To explain by an instance or two. When Æneas begins the narrative of his adventures, the second person immediately appears, because he makes Dido, whom he addresses, the immediate subject of his discourse.

Infandum, regina, jubes, renovare dolorem.

From henceforward, for fifteen hundred verses, (though she be all that time the party addressed,) we hear nothing further of this second person, a variety of other subjects filling up the narrative.

In the mean time, the first person may be seen everywhere, because the speaker everywhere is himself the subject. They were indeed events, as he says himself,

Quæque ipse miserrima vidi,
Et quorum pars magna fui.

Not that the second person does not often occur in the course of this narrative; but then it is always by a figure of speech, when those, who by their absence are in fact so many third persons, are converted into second persons by being introduced as present. The real second person (Dido) is never once hinted.

Thus far as to Virgil. But when we read Euclid, we find neither first person nor second in any part of the whole work. The reason is, that neither speaker nor party addressed (in which light we may always view the writer and his reader) can possibly become the subject of pure mathematics, nor indeed can any thing else, except abstract quantity, which neither speaks itself, nor is spoken to by another.

speech may be spoken to many, as well as to one. *He* has the plural *they*, because the subject of discourse is often many at once.

But though all these pronouns have number, it does not appear either in Greek, or Latin, or any modern language, that those of the first and second person carry the distinctions of sex. The reason seems to be, that the speaker and hearer being generally present to each other, it would have been superfluous to have marked a distinction by art, which from nature and even dress was commonly apparent on both sides.[x] But this does not hold with respect to the third person, of whose character and distinctions (including sex among the rest) we often know no more than what we learn from the discourse. And hence it is that in most languages the third person has its genders, and that even English (which allows its adjectives no genders at all) has in this pronoun the triple distinction of *he*, *she*, and *it*.[y]

Hence, too, we see the reason why a single pronoun to each person,[z] an *I* to the first, and a *thou* to the second, are abundantly sufficient to all the purposes of speech. But it is not so with respect to the third person. The various relations of the various objects exhibited by this (I mean relations of near and distant, present and absent, same and different, definite and indefinite, &c.) made it necessary that here there should not be one, but many pronouns, such as *he*, *this*, *that*, *other*, *any*, *some*, &c.

It must be confessed, indeed, that all these words do not always appear as pronouns. When they stand by themselves, and represent some noun, (as when we say, *This* is virtue, or δεικτικῶς, "give me *that*,") then are they pronouns. But when they are associated to some noun, (as when we say, *this* habit is virtue; or δεικτικῶς, "*that* man defrauded me,") then as they supply not the place of a noun, but only serve to ascertain one,

[x] Demonstratio ipsa secum genus ostendit. Priscian. l. xii. p. 942. See Apoll. de Syntax. l. ii. c. 7. p. 109.

[y] The utility of this distinction may be better found in supposing it away. Suppose, for example, we should read in history these words: "He caused him to destroy him," and that we were to be informed the *he*, which is here thrice repeated, stood each time for something different; that is to say, for a man, for a woman, and for a city, whose names were Alexander, Thais, and Persepolis. Taking the pronoun in this manner, divested of its genders, how would it appear which was destroyed, which was the destroyer, and which the cause that moved to the destruction? But there are not such doubts, when we hear the genders distinguished; when, instead of the ambiguous sentence, *he* caused *him* to destroy *him*, we are told, with the proper distinctions, that *she* caused *him* to destroy *it*. Then we know with certainty what before we could not: that the promoter was the woman; that her instrument was the hero; and that the subject of their cruelty was the unfortunate city.

[z] Quæritur tamen cur prima quidem persona et secunda singula pronomina habeant, tertiam vero sex diversæ indicent voces? Ad quod respondendum est, quod prima quidem et secunda persona ideo non egent diversis vocibus, quod semper præsentes inter se sunt, et demonstrativæ; tertia vero persona modo demonstrativa est, ut, hic, iste; modo relativa, ut, is, ipse, &c. Priscian. l. xii. p. 933.

they fall rather into the species of definitives or articles. That there is, indeed, a near relation between pronouns and articles, the old grammarians have all acknowledged, and some words it has been doubtful to which class to refer. The best rule to distinguish them is this: the genuine pronoun always stands by itself, assuming the power of a noun, and supplying its place; the genuine article never stands by itself, but appears at all times associated to something else, requiring a noun for its support, as much as attributives or adjectives.[a]

As to the coalescence of these pronouns, it is as follows. The first or second will, either of them, by themselves, coalesce with the third, but not with each other. For example, it is good sense, as well as good grammar, to say in any language, *I am he*, *Thou art he;* but we cannot say, *I am thou*, nor *Thou art I*. The reason is, there is no absurdity for the speaker to be the subject also of the discourse, as when we say, *I am he;* or for the person addressed, as when we say, *Thou art he*. But for the same person, in the same circumstances, to be at once the speaker and the party addressed, this is impossible; and so, therefore, is the coalescence of the first and second person.

And now, perhaps, we have seen enough of pronouns, to perceive how they differ from other substantives. The others are primary, these are their substitutes; a kind of secondary race, which were taken in aid, when, for reasons already mentioned,[b]

[a] Τὸ ἄρθρον μετὰ ὀνόματος, καὶ ἡ ἀντωνυμία ἀντ' ὀνόματος: "the article stands with a noun, but the pronoun stands for a noun." Apol. l. i. c. 3. p. 22. Αὐτὰ οὖν τὰ ἄρθρα, τῆς πρὸς τὰ ὀνόματα συναρτήσεως ἀποστάντα, εἰς τὴν ὑποτεταγμένην ἀντωνυμίαν μεταπίπτει; "now articles themselves, when they quit their connexion with nouns, pass into such pronoun as is proper upon the occasion." Ibid. Again, Ὅταν τὸ ἄρθρον μὴ μετ' ὀνόματος παραλαμβάνηται, ποιήσηται δὲ σύνταξιν ὀνόματος ἣν προεκτεθείμεθα, ἐκ πάσης ἀνάγκης εἰς ἀντωνυμίαν μεταληφθήσεται, εἴγε οὐκ ἐγγινόμενον μετ' ὀνόματος δυνάμει ἀντὶ ὀνόματος παρελήφθη: "when the article is assumed without the noun, and has (as we explained before) the same syntax which the noun has, it must of absolute necessity be admitted for a pronoun, because it appears without a noun, and yet is in power assumed for one." Ejusd. l. ii. c. 8. p. 113; l. i. c. 45. p. 96. Inter pronomina et articulos hoc interest, quod pronomina ea putantur, quæ, cum sola sint, vicem nominis complent, ut *quis*, *ille*, *iste:* articuli vero cum pronominibus, aut nominibus, aut participiis adjunguntur. Donat. Gram. p. 1753.

Priscian, speaking of the Stoics, says as follows: Articulis autem pronomina connumerantes, finitos ea articulos appellabant; ipsos autem articulos, quibus nos caremus, infinitos articulos dicebant. Vel, ut alii dicunt, articulos connumerabant pronominibus, et articularia eos pronomina vocabant, &c. Pris. l. i. p. 574. Varro, speaking of *quisque* and *hic*, calls them both articles, the first indefinite, the second definite. De Ling. Lat. l. vii. See also l. ix. p. 132. Vossius, indeed, in his Analogia, (l. i. c. 1.) opposes this doctrine, because *hic* has not the same power with the Greek article, ὁ. But he did not enough attend to the ancient writers on this subject, who considered all words as articles, which being associated to nouns (and not standing in their place) served in any manner to ascertain and determine their signification.

[b] See these reasons at the beginning of this chapter, of which reasons the principal one is, that "no noun, properly so called, implies its own presence. It is therefore to ascertain such presence, that the pronoun is taken in aid; and hence it is it becomes equivalent to δεῖξις, that is, to pointing or indication by the finger." It is worth remarking in that verse of Persius,

Sed pulchrum est digito monstrari, et dicier, hic est,

how the δεῖξις and the pronoun are intro-

the others could not be used. It is, moreover, by means of these, and of articles, which are nearly allied to them, that "language, though in itself only significant of general ideas, is brought down to denote that infinitude of particulars which are for ever arising, and ceasing to be." But more of this hereafter, in a proper place.

As to the three orders of pronouns already mentioned, they may be called prepositive, as may, indeed, all substantives, because they are capable of introducing or leading a sentence, without having reference to any thing previous. But besides those there is another pronoun, (in Greek ὃς, ὅστις·[c] in Latin, *Qui*; in English, *Who*, *Which*, *That*,) a pronoun having a character peculiar to itself, the nature of which may be explained as follows.

Suppose I was to say, "Light is a body, Light moves with great celerity." These would apparently be two distinct sentences. Suppose, instead of the second light, I were to place the prepositive pronoun *it*, and say, Light *is* a body; *it* moves with great celerity; the sentences would still be distinct and two. But if I add a connective, (as for example an *and*,) saying, Light is a body, *and* it moves with great celerity; I then by connexion make the two into one, as by cementing many stones I make one wall.

Now it is in the united powers of a connective and another pronoun, that we may see the force and character of the pronoun here treated. Thus, therefore, if in the place of *and it*, we substitute *that*, or *which*, saying Light is a body, *which* moves with great celerity; the sentence still retains its unity and perfection, and becomes if possible more compact than before. We may, with just reason, therefore, call this pronoun the subjunctive, because it cannot (like the prepositive) introduce an original sen-

duced together, and made to cooperate to the same end.

Sometimes, by virtue of δεῖξις, the pronoun of the third person stands for the first.

Quod si militibus parces, erit hic *quoque Miles.*

That is, "I also will be a soldier."

Tibul. l. ii. el. 6. v. 7. See Vulpius.

It may be observed, too, that even in epistolary correspondence, and indeed in all kinds of writing, where the pronouns *I* and *you* make their appearance, there is a sort of implied presence, which they are supposed to indicate, though the parties are, in fact, at ever so great a distance. And hence the rise of that distinction in Apollonius, τὰς μὲν τῶν ὄψεων εἶναι δεῖξεις, τὰς δὲ τοῦ νοῦ, "that some indications are ocular, and some are mental." De Syntaxi, l. ii. c. 3. p. 104.

[c] The Greeks, it must be confessed, call this pronoun ὑποτακτικὸν ἄρθρον, "the subjunctive article." Yet, as it should seem, this is but an improper appellation. Apollonius, when he compares it to the προτακτικὸν, or true "prepositive article," not only confesses it to differ, as being expressed by a different word, and having a different place in every sentence; but in syntax, he adds, it is wholly different. De Syntax, l. i. c. 43. p. 91. Theodore Gaza acknowledges the same, and therefore adds, ὅθεν δὴ καὶ οὐ κυρίως ἂν εἴη ἄρθρον ταυτί: "for these reasons this (meaning the subjunctive) cannot properly be an article." And just before he says, κυρίως γε μὴν ἄρθρον τὸ προτακτικόν: "however, properly speaking, it is the prepositive is the article." Gram. Introd. l. iv. The Latins, therefore, have undoubtedly done better in ranging it with the pronouns.

tence, but only serves to subjoin one to some other which is previous.[d]

The application of this subjunctive, like the other pronouns, is universal. It may be the substitute of all kinds of substantives, natural, artificial, or abstract; as well as general, special, or particular. We may say, the *animal*, *which*, &c.; the *man*, *whom*, &c.; the *ship*, *which*, &c.; *Alexander*, *who*, &c.; *Bucephalus*, *that*, &c.; *virtue*, *which*, &c. &c.

Nay, it may even be the substitute of all the other pronouns, and is of course, therefore, expressive of all three persons. Thus we say, *I*, *who* now read, have near finished this chapter; *thou*, *who* now readest; *he*, *who* now readeth, &c. &c.

And thus is this subjunctive truly a pronoun from its substitution, there being no substantive existing, in whose place it may not stand. At the same time, it is essentially distinguished from the other pronouns by this peculiar, that it is not only a substitute, but withal a connective.[e]

[d] Hence we see why the pronoun here mentioned is always necessarily the part of some complex sentence, which sentence contains, either expressed or understood, two verbs and two nominatives.

Thus in that verse of Horace,

Qui metuens vivit, liber mihi non erit unquam.

Ille non erit liber is one sentence, *qui metuens vivit* is another. *Ille* and *qui* are the two nominatives, *erit* and *vivit* the two verbs, and so in all other instances.

The following passage from Apollonius (though somewhat corrupt in more places than one) will serve to shew whence the above speculations are taken. *Τὸ ὑποτακτικὸν ἄρθρον ἐπὶ ῥῆμα ἴδιον φέρεται, συνδεδεμένον διὰ τῆς ἀναφορᾶς τῷ προκειμένῳ ὀνόματι· καὶ ἐντεῦθεν ἁπλοῦν λόγον οὐ παριστάνει κατὰ τὴν τῶν δύο ῥημάτων σύνταξιν (λέγω τὴν ἐν τῷ ὀνόματι, καὶ τὴν ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ ἄρθρῳ) ὅπερ πάλιν παρείπετο τῷ* ΚΑΙ *συνδέσμῳ. Κοινὸν μὲν* (lege ΤΟ ΚΑΙ *γὰρ κοινὸν μὲν*) *παρελάμβανε τὸ ὄνομα τὸ προκείμενον, σύμπλεκον δὲ ἕτερον λόγον πάντως καὶ ἕτερον ῥῆμα παρελάμβανε, καὶ οὕτω τὸ, παρεγένετο ὁ γραμματικὸς, ὃς διελεξάτο, δυνάμει τὸν αὐτὸν ἀποτελεῖ τοῦ* (fors. *τῷ*) *ὁ γραμματικὸς παρεγένετο, καὶ διελεξάτο.* "The subjunctive article (that is, the pronoun here mentioned) is applied to a verb of its own, and yet is connected withal to the antecedent noun. Hence it can never serve to constitute a simple sentence, by reason of the syntax of the two verbs; I mean, that which respects the noun or antecedent, and that which respects the article or relative. The same, too, follows as to the conjunction *and*. This copulative assumes the antecedent noun, which is capable of being applied to many subjects, and by connecting to it a new sentence, of necessity assumes a new verb also. And hence it is that the words, 'the grammarian came, *who* discoursed,' form in power nearly the same sentence, as if we were to say, 'the grammarian came, *and* discoursed.'" Apoll. de Syntaxi, l. i. c. 43. p. 92. See also an ingenious French treatise, called Grammaire Generale et Raisonnée, c. 9.

The Latins, in their structure of this subjunctive, seem to have well represented its compound nature of part pronoun and part connective, in forming their *qui* and *quis* from *que* and *is*, or (if we go with Scaliger to the Greek) from *καὶ* and *ὅς*, *καὶ* and *ὁ*. Scal. de Caus. Ling. Lat. c. 127.

Homer also expresses the force of this subjunctive, pronoun or article, by help of the prepositive and a connective, exactly consonant to the theory here established. See Iliad, Λ. ver. 270, 553. N. 571. Π. 54, 157, 158.

[e] Before we quit this subject, it may not be improper to remark, that in the Greek and Latin tongues the two principal pronouns, that is to say, the first and second person, the *ego* and the *tu*, are implied in the very form of the verb itself, *γράφω*, *γράφεις*, scribo, scribis,) and are for that reason never expressed, unless it be to mark a contradistinction; such as in Virgil,

Nos patriam fugimus; tu, Tityre, lentus in umbra
Formosam resonare doces, &c.

This, however, is true with respect only to the *casus rectus*, or nominitive of these pronouns, but not with respect to their oblique cases, which must always be added, because

And now to conclude what we have said concerning substantives. All substantives are either primary or secondary; that is to say, according to a language more familiar and known, are either nouns or pronouns. The nouns denote substances, and those either natural, artificial, or abstract.[f] They moreover denote things either general, or special, or particular. The pronouns, their substitutes, are either prepositive or subjunctive. The prepositive is distinguished into three orders, called the first, the second, and the third person. The subjunctive includes the powers of all those three, having superadded, as of its own, the peculiar force of a connective.

Having done with substantives, we now proceed to attributives.

CHAPTER VI.

CONCERNING ATTRIBUTIVES.

ATTRIBUTIVES are all those principal words, that denote attributes, considered as attributes. Such, for example, are the words *black*, *white*, *great*, *little*, *wise*, *eloquent*, *writeth*, *wrote*, *writing*, &c.[g]

though we see the *ego* in *amo*, and the *tu* in *amas*, we see not the *te* or *me* in *amat* or *amant*.

Yet even these oblique cases appear in a different manner, according as they mark contradistinction, or not. If they contradistinguish, then are they commonly placed at the beginning of the sentence, or at least before the verb, or leading substantive.

Thus Virgil:

Quid Thesea, magnum
Quid memorem Alciden? Et mi *genus ab Jove summo.*

Thus Homer:

Τμῶν μὲν θεοὶ δοῖεν . . . . .
Παῖδα δὲ ΜΟΙ λύσατε φίλην. Ἰλ. Α.

Where the ὑμῶν and the μοὶ stand, as contradistinguished, and both have precedence of their respective verbs, the ὑμῶν even leading the whole sentence. In other instances, these pronouns commonly take their place behind the verb, as may be seen in examples everywhere obvious. The Greek language went further still. When the oblique case of these pronouns happened to contradistinguish, they assumed a peculiar accent of their own, which gave them the name of ὀρθοτονουμέναι, or "pronouns uprightly accented." When they marked no such opposition, they not only took their place behind the verb, but even gave it their accent, and (as it were) inclined themselves upon it. And hence they acquired the name of ἐγκλιτικαί, that is, "leaning or inclining pronouns." The Greeks, too, had in the first person, ἐμοῦ, ἐμοί, ἐμέ, for contradistinctives, and μοῦ, μοί, μέ, for enclitics. And hence it was that Apollonius contended, that in the passage above quoted from the first Iliad, we should read παῖδα δ' ἐμοί, for παῖδα δὲ μοί, on account of the contradistinction which there occurs between the Grecians and Chryses. See Apoll. de Syntaxi, l. i. c. 3. p. 20; l. ii. c. 2. p. 102, 103.

This diversity between the contradistinctive pronouns and the enclitic, is not unknown even to the English tongue. When we say, *Give me content*, the *me* in this case is a perfect enclitic. But when we say, *Give me content, Give him his thousands*, the *me* and *him* are no enclitics, but as they stand in opposition, assume an accent of their own, and so become the true ὀρθοτονουμέναι.

[f] See before, p. 128.

[g] In the above list of words are included what grammarians called adjectives, verbs, and participles, inasmuch as all of them equally denote the attributes of substance. Hence it is, that as they are all from their very nature the predicates in a proposition, (being all predicated of some subject or substance, *Snow is white, Cicero writeth*, &c.) hence I say the appellation ῥῆμα or *verb* is employed by logicians in an extended sense

However, previously to these, and to every other possible attribute, whatever a thing may be, whether black or white, square or round, wise or eloquent, writing or thinking, it must first of necessity exist, before it can possibly be any thing else. For existence may be considered as an universal genus, to which all things of all kinds are at all times to be referred. The verbs, therefore, which denote it, claim precedence of all others, as being essential to the very being of every proposition, in which they may still be found, either expressed, or by implication; expressed, as when we say, *The sun is bright;* by implication, as when we say, *The sun rises*, which means, when resolved, *The sun is rising.*[h]

The verbs, *is*, *groweth*, *becometh*, *est*, *fit*, ὑπάρχει ἐστὶ, πέλει, γίγνεται, are all of them used to express this general genus. The Latins have called them *verba substantiva*, "verbs substantive," but the Greeks ῥήματα ὑπαρκτικὰ, "verbs of existence;" a name more apt, as being of greater latitude, and comprehending equally as well attribute, as substance. The principal of those verbs, and which we shall particularly here consider, is the verb ἐστὶ, *est*, *is*.

Now all existence is either absolute or qualified: absolute, as when we say, *B is;* qualified, as when we say, *B is an animal; B is black, is round*, &c.

With respect to this difference, the verb *is* can by itself express absolute existence, but never the qualified, without subjoining the particular form, because the forms of existence being in number infinite, if the particular form be not expressed, we cannot know which is intended. And hence it follows, that when *is* only serves to subjoin some such form, it has little more force than that of a mere assertion. It is under the same character, that it becomes a latent part in every other verb, by expressing that assertion which is one of their essentials. Thus, as was observed just before, *riseth* means, *is rising; writeth, is writing.*

Again: as to existence in general, it is either mutable, or immutable: mutable, as in the objects of sensation; immutable, as in the objects of intellection and science. Now mutable objects exist all in time, and admit the several distinctions of present, past, and future. But immutable objects know no such distinctions, but rather stand opposed to all things temporary.

to denote them all. Thus Ammonius, explaining the reason why Aristotle in his tract De Interpretatione calls λευκὸς a verb, tells us, πᾶσαν φωνὴν, κατηγορούμενον ὅρον ἐν προτάσει ποιοῦσαν, ῥῆμα καλεῖσθαι, "that every sound articulate, that forms the predicate in a proposition, is called a verb," p. 24. edit. Ven. Priscian's observation, though made on another occasion, is very pertinent to the present. Non declinatio, sed proprietas excutienda est significationis. Lib. ii. p. 576. And in another place he says, Non similitudo declinationis omnimodo conjungit vel discernit partes orationis inter se, sed vis ipsius significationis. Lib. xiii. p. 970.

[h] See Metaphys. Aristot. l. v. c. 7. edit. Du-Vall.

And hence two different significations of the substantive verb *is*, according as it denotes mutable, or immutable being.

For example, if we say, *This orange is ripe*, *is* meaneth, that *it existeth so now at this present*, in opposition to *past* time, when it was green, and to *future* time, when it will be rotten.

But if we say, *The diameter of the square is incommensurable with its side*, we do not intend by *is*, that it is incommensurable now, having been formerly commensurable, or being to become so hereafter; on the contrary, we intend that perfection of existence to which time and its distinctions are utterly unknown. It is under the same meaning we employ this verb, when we say, *Truth is*, or, *God is*. The opposition is not of time present to other times, but of necessary existence to all temporary existence whatever.[1] And so much for verbs of existence, commonly called verbs substantive.

We are now to descend to the common herd of attributives, such as *black* and *white*, *to write*, *to speak*, *to walk*, &c.; among which, when compared and opposed to each other, one of the most eminent distinctions appears to be this. Some, by being joined to a proper substantive, make, without further help, a perfect assertive sentence; while the rest, though otherwise perfect, are in this respect deficient.

To explain by an example. When we say, *Cicero eloquent*, *Cicero wise*, these are imperfect sentences, though they denote a substance and an attribute. The reason is, that they want an assertion, to shew that such attribute appertains to such substance. We must therefore call in the help of an assertion elsewhere, an *is*, or a *was*, to complete the sentence, saying, *Cicero is wise*, *Cicero was eloquent*. On the contrary, when we say, *Cicero writeth*, *Cicero walketh*, in instances like these there is no such occasion, because the words *writeth* and *walketh* imply in their own form not an attribute only, but an assertion likewise. Hence it is they may be resolved, the one into *is* and *writing*, the other into *is* and *walking*.

Now all those attributives which have this complex power of denoting both an attribute and an assertion, make that species of words which grammarians call verbs. If we resolve this complex power into its distinct parts, and take the attribute alone without the assertion, then have we participles. All other attributives, besides the two species before, are included together in the general name of adjectives.

[1] Cum enim dicimus, *Deus est*, non eum dicimus *nunc esse*, sed tantum *in substantia esse*, ut hoc ad immutabilitatem potius substantiæ, quam ad tempus aliquod referatur. Si autem dicimus, *dies est*, ad nullam diei substantiam pertinet, nisi tantum ad temporis constitutionem; hoc enim, quod significat, tale est, tanquam si dicamus, *nunc est*. Quare cum dicimus *esse*, ut substantiam designemus, simpliciter *est* addimus; cum vero ita ut aliquid præsens significetur, secundum tempus. Boeth. in lib. de Interpr. p. 307. See also Plat. Tim. p. 37, 38. edit. Serrani.

And thus it is, that all attributives are either verbs, participles, or adjectives.

Besides the distinctions above mentioned, there are others which deserve notice. Some attributes have their essence in motion; such are *to walk*, *to fly*, *to strike*, *to live*. Others have it in the privation of motion; such are *to stop*, *to rest*, *to cease*, *to die*. And, lastly, others have it in subjects which have nothing to do with either motion or its privation; such are the attributes of *great* and *little*, *white* and *black*, *wise* and *foolish*, and, in a word, the several quantities and qualities of all things. Now these last are adjectives; those which denote motions, or their privation, are either verbs or participles.

And this circumstance leads to a further distinction, which may be explained as follows. That all motion is in time, and therefore, wherever it exists, implies time as its concomitant, is evident to all, and requires no proving. But, besides this, all rest or privation of motion implies time likewise. For how can a thing be said to rest or stop, by being in one place for one instant only? So, too, is that thing, which moves with the greatest velocity.[k] To stop, therefore, or rest, is to be in one place for more than one instant; that is to say, during an extension between two instants, and this of course gives us the idea of time. As therefore motions and their privation imply time as their concomitant, so verbs, which denote them, come to denote time also.[l] And hence the origin and use of tenses, "which are so many different forms assigned to each verb, to shew, without altering its principal meaning, the various times in which such meaning may exist." Thus *scribit*, *scripsit*, *scripserat*, and *scribet*, denote all equally the attribute, *to write*, while the difference between them is, that they denote writing *in different times*.

Should it be asked, whether time itself may not become, upon occasion, the verb's principal signification; it is answered, No. And this appears, because the same time may be denoted by different verbs, (as in the words *writeth* and *speaketh*,) and different times by the same verb, (as in the words *writeth* and *wrote*,) neither of which could happen, were time any thing more than a mere concomitant. Add to this, that when words denote time, not collaterally, but principally, they cease to be verbs, and become either adjectives or substantives. Of the

[k] Thus Proclus, in the beginning of his treatise concerning motion: Ἠρεμοῦν ἐστι τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ τοπῷ ὂν, καὶ αὐτὸ, καὶ τὰ μέρη: "That thing is at rest, which for a time prior and subsequent is in the same place, both itself, and its parts."

[l] The ancient authors of dialectic or logic have well described this property. The following is part of their definition of a verb: ῥῆμα δέ ἐστι τὸ προσσημαῖνον χρόνον, "a verb is something, which signifies time over and above," (for such is the force of the preposition πρός.) If it should be asked, Over and above what? It may be answered, Over and above its principal signification, which is to denote some moving and energizing attribute. See Arist. de Interpret. c. 3. together with his commentators Ammonius and Boethius.

adjective kind are *timely*, *yearly*, *daily*, *hourly*, &c.; of the substantive kind are *time*, *year*, *day*, *hour*, &c.

The most obvious division of time is into present, past, and future, nor is any language complete whose verbs have not tenses to mark these distinctions. But we may go still further. Time past and future are both infinitely extended. Hence it is that in universal time past we may assume many particular times past, and in universal time future, many particular times future; some more, some less remote, and corresponding to each other under different relations. Even present time itself is not exempt from these differences, and as necessarily implies some degree of extension, as does every given line, however minute.

Here, then, we are to seek for the reason which first introduced into language that variety of tenses. It was not, it seems, enough to denote indefinitely (or by aorists) mere present, past, or future, but it was necessary, on many occasions, to define with more precision what kind of past, present, or future. And hence the multiplicity of futures, preterites, and even present tenses, with which all languages are found to abound, and without which it would be difficult to ascertain our ideas.

However, as the knowledge of tenses depends on the theory of time, and this is a subject of no mean speculation, we shall reserve it by itself for the following chapter.

CHAPTER VII.

CONCERNING TIME AND TENSES.

Time and space have this in common, that they are both of them by nature things continuous, and as such they both of them imply extension. Thus between London and Salisbury there is the extension of space, and between yesterday and tomorrow the extension of time. But in this they differ, that all the parts of space exist at once and together, while those of time only exist in transition or succession.[m] Hence, then, we may gain some idea of time, by considering it under the notion of a transient continuity. Hence also, as far as the affections and properties of transition go, time is different from space; but as to those of extension and continuity they perfectly coincide.

Let us take, for example, such a part of space as a line. In every given line we may assume anywhere a point, and there-

[m] See p. 18, note *n*. To which we may add what is said by Ammonius: *οὐδὲ γὰρ ὁ χρόνος ὅλος ἅμα ὑφίσταται, ἀλλ' ἢ κατὰ μόνον τὸ νῦν· ἐν γὰρ τῷ γίνεσθαι καὶ φθείρεσθαι τὸ εἶναι ἔχει.* "Time doth not subsist the whole at once, but only in a single now or instant; for it hath its existence in becoming and in ceasing to be." Amm. in Prædicam. p. 82. B.

fore in every given line there may be assumed infinite points. So in every given time we may assume anywhere a *now* or *instant*, and therefore in every given time there may be assumed infinite nows or instants.

Further still: a point is the bound of every finite line, and a now, or instant, of every finite time. But although they are bounds, they are neither of them parts, neither the point of any line, nor the now or instant of any time. If this appear strange, we may remember that the parts of any thing extended are necessarily extended also, it being essential to their character that they should measure their whole. But if a point or now were extended, each of them would contain within itself infinite other points, and infinite other nows, (for these may be assumed infinitely within the minutest extension,) and this, it is evident, would be absurd and impossible.

These assertions, therefore, being admitted, and both points and nows being taken as bounds, but not as parts,[n] it will follow, that in the same manner as the same point may be the end of one line, and the beginning of another, so the same now or instant may be the end of one time and the beginning of another. Let us suppose, for example, the lines A B, B C.



I say, that the point B is the end of the line A B, and the beginning of the line B C. In the same manner let us suppose A B, B C to represent certain times, and let B be a now or instant. In such case, I say, that the instant B is the end of the time A B, and the beginning of the time B C. I say likewise of these two times, that with respect to the now or instant, which they include, the first of them is necessarily past time, as being previous to it; the other is necessarily future, as being subsequent. As, therefore, every now or instant always exists in time, and without being time, is time's bound; the bound of completion to the past, and the bound of commencement to the future: from hence we may conceive its nature or end, which is to be the medium of continuity between the past and the future, so as to render time, through all its parts, one entire and perfect whole.[o]

[n] *Φανερὸν ὅτι οὐδὲ μόριον τὸ νῦν τοῦ χρόνου, ὥσπερ οὐδ' αἱ στιγμαὶ τῆς γραμμῆς· αἱ δὲ γραμμαὶ δύο τῆς μίας μόρια:* "It is evident that a now, or instant, is no more a part of time than points are of a line. The parts, indeed, of one line are two other lines." Natur. Ausc. l. iv. c. 17. And not long before: *Τὸ δὲ νῦν οὐ μέρος· μετρεῖ τε γὰρ τὸ μέρος, καὶ σύγκεισθαι δεῖ τὸ ὅλον ἐκ τῶν μερῶν· ὁ δὲ χρόνος οὐ δοκεῖ σύγκεισθαι ἐκ τῶν νῦν:* "A now is no part of time; for a part is able to measure its whole, and the whole is necessarily made up of its parts; but time doth not appear to be made up of nows." Ibid. c. 14.

[o] *Τὸ δὲ νῦν ἐστι συνέχεια χρόνου, ὥσπερ*

From the above speculations there follow some conclusions, which may be perhaps called paradoxes, till they have been attentively considered. In the first place, there cannot (strictly speaking) be any such thing as time present. For if all time be transient as well as continuous, it cannot, like a line, be present all together, but part will necessarily be gone and part be coming. If, therefore, any portion of its continuity were to be present at once, it would so far quit its transient nature, and be time no longer. But if no portion of its continuity can be thus present, how can time possibly be present, to which such continuity is essential?

Further than this: if there be no such thing as time present, there can be no sensation of time by any one of the senses. For all sensation is of the present only,[p] the past being preserved not by sense but by memory, and the future being anticipated by prudence only and wise foresight.

But if no portion of time be the object of any sensation; further, if the present never exist; if the past be no more; if the future be not as yet; and if these are all the parts out of which time is compounded; how strange and shadowy a being do we find it! How nearly approaching to a perfect nonentity![q] Let us try, however, since the senses fail us, if we have not faculties of higher power to seize this fleeting being.

The world has been likened to a variety of things, but it appears to resemble no one more than some moving spectacle (such as a procession or a triumph) that abounds in every part with splendid objects, some of which are still departing, as fast

ἐλέχθη. συνέχει γὰρ τὸν χρόνον τὸν παρελθόντα καὶ ἐσόμενον, καὶ ὅλως πέρας χρόνου ἐστίν· ἔστι γὰρ τοῦ μὲν ἀρχή, τοῦ δὲ τελευτή: "A now or instant is (as was said before) the continuity or holding together of time; for it makes time continuous, the past and the future, and is in general its boundary, as being the beginning of one time and the ending of another." Natur. Auscult. l. iv. c. 19. *Συνέχεια* in this place means not continuity, as standing for extension, but rather that junction, or holding together, by which extension is imparted to other things.

[p] *Ταυτῇ γὰρ (αἰσθήσει sc.) οὔτε τὸ μέλλον, οὔτε τὸ γενόμενον γνωρίζομεν, ἀλλὰ τὸ παρὸν μόνον:* "For by this faculty (namely, the faculty of sense) we neither know the future nor the past, but the present only." *Ἀριστ. περὶ Μνημ.* A. α.

[q] *Ὅτι μὲν οὖν ὅλως οὐκ ἔστιν, ἡ μόγις καὶ ἀμυδρῶς, ἐκ τῶν δέ τις ἂν ὑποπτεύσειε· τὸ μὲν γὰρ αὐτοῦ γέγονε, καὶ οὐκ ἔστι· τὸ δὲ μέλλει, καὶ οὔπω ἐστίν· ἐκ δὲ τούτων καὶ ὁ ἄπειρος καὶ ὁ ἀεὶ λαμβανόμενος χρόνος σύγκειται· τὸ δ' ἐκ μὴ ὄντων συγκείμενον, ἀδύνατον ἂν δόξειε κατέχειν ποτὲ οὐσίας:* "That therefore time exists not at all, or at least has but a faint and obscure existence, one may suspect from hence. A part of it has been, and is no more; a part of it is coming, and is not as yet; and out of these is made that infinite time which is ever to be assumed still further and further. Now that which is made up of nothing but nonentities, it should seem was impossible ever to participate of entity." Natural. Ausc. l. iv. c. 14. *Πῶς δὲ τοῖς μὴ οὖσι γειτνιάζει; Πρῶτον μὲν, ἐπειδὴ ἐνταῦθα τὸ παρελθόν ἐστι καὶ τὸ μέλλον, ταῦτα δὲ μὴ ὄντα· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἠφάνισται καὶ οὐκ ἔτι ἐστὶ, τὸ δὲ οὐπώ ἐστι· συμπαραθέει δὲ τῷ χρόνῳ τὰ φύσικα πάντα, μᾶλλον δὲ τῆς κινήσεως αὐτῶν παρακολούθημά ἐστι ὁ χρόνος:* "How therefore is it that they approach nearly to nonentities? In the first place, because here (where they exist) exists the past and the future, and these are nonentities; for the one is vanished and is no more, the other is not as yet. Now all natural substances pass away along with time, or rather it is upon their motion that time is an attendant." Philop. MS. Com. in Nicomach. p. 10.

as others make their appearance. The senses look on while the sight passes, perceiving as much as is immediately present, which they report with tolerable accuracy to the soul's superior powers. Having done this, they have done their duty, being concerned with nothing save what is present and instantaneous. But to the memory, to the imagination, and above all to the intellect, the several nows or instants are not lost, as to the senses, but are preserved and made objects of steady comprehension, however in their own nature they may be transitory and passing. "Now it is from contemplating two or more of these instants under one view, together with that interval of continuity which subsists between them, that we acquire insensibly the idea of time."[r] For example: The sun rises; this I remember: it rises again; this too I remember. These events are not together; there is an extension between them—not, however, of space, for we may suppose the place of rising the same, or at least to exhibit no sensible difference. Yet still we recognise some extension between them. Now what is this extension but a natural day? And what is that but pure time? It is after the same manner, by recognising two new moons, and the extension between these; two vernal equinoxes, and the extension between these; that we gain ideas of other times, such as months and years, which are all so many intervals, described as above; that is to say, passing intervals of continuity between two instants viewed together.

And thus it is the mind acquires the idea of time. But this time it must be remembered is past time only, which is always the first species that occurs to the human intellect. How then do we acquire the idea of time future? The answer is, we acquire it by anticipation. Should it be demanded still further, and what is anticipation? We answer, that in this case it is a kind of reasoning by analogy from similar to similar; from successions of events, that are past already, to similar successions,

[r] *Τότε φαμὲν γεγονέναι χρόνον, ὅταν τοῦ προτέρου καὶ ὑστέρου ἐν τῇ κινήσει αἴσθησιν λάβωμεν. Ὁρίζομεν δὲ τῷ ἄλλο καὶ ἄλλο ὑπολαβεῖν αὐτὰ, καὶ μεταξύ τι αὐτῶν ἕτερον· ὅταν γὰρ τὰ ἄκρα ἕτερα τοῦ μέσου νοήσωμεν, καὶ δύο εἴπῃ ἡ ψυχὴ τὰ νῦν, τὸ μὲν πρότερον, τὸ δὲ ὕστερον, τότε καὶ τοῦτο φαμὲν εἶναι χρόνον:* "It is then we say there has been time, when we can acquire a sensation of prior and subsequent in motion. But we distinguish and settle these two by considering one first, then the other, together with an interval between them different from both. For as often as we conceive the extremes to be different from the mean, and the soul talks of two nows, one prior and the other subsequent, then it is we say there is time, and this it is we call time." Natural. Auscult. l. iv. c. 16. Themistius's Comment upon this passage is to the same purpose. *Ὅταν γὰρ ὁ νοῦς ἀναμνησθεὶς τοῦ νῦν, ὃ χθὲς εἶπεν, ἕτερον πάλιν εἴπῃ τὸ τήμερον, τότε καὶ χρόνον εὐθὺς ἐνενόησεν, ὑπὸ τῶν δύο νῦν ὁριζόμενον, οἷον ὑπὸ περάτων δυοῖν· καὶ οὕτω λέγειν ἔχει, ὅτι ποσόν ἐστι πεντεκαίδεκα ὡρῶν, ἢ ἑκκαίδεκα, οἷον ἐξ ἀπείρου γραμμῆς πηχυαίαν δύο σημείοις ἀποτεμνόμενος:* "For when the mind, remembering the now, which it talked of yesterday, talks again of another now to-day, then it is it immediately has an idea of time, terminated by these two nows, as by two boundaries; and thus it is enabled to say, that the quantity is of fifteen or sixteen hours, as if it were to sever a cubit's length from an infinite line by two points." Themist. Op. edit. Ald. p. 45. B.

that are presumed hereafter. For example: I observe as far back as my memory can carry me, how every day has been succeeded by a night; that night, by another day; that day, by another night; and so downwards in order to the day that is now. Hence, then, I anticipate a similar succession from the present day, and thus gain the idea of days and nights in futurity. After the same manner, by attending to the periodical returns of new and full moons; of springs, summers, autumns, and winters, all of which, in time past, I find never to have failed, I anticipate a like orderly and diversified succession, which makes months, and seasons, and years, in time future.

We go further than this, and not only thus anticipate in these natural periods, but even in matters of human and civil concern. For example: having observed in many past instances how health had succeeded to exercise, and sickness to sloth; we anticipate future health to those, who, being now sickly, use exercise; and future sickness to those, who, being now healthy, are slothful. It is a variety of such observations, all respecting one subject, which when systematized by just reasoning, and made habitual by due practice, form the character of a master-artist, or man of practical wisdom. If they respect the human body, (as above,) they form a physician; if matters military, the general; if matters national, the statesman; if matters of private life, the moralist; and the same in other subjects. All these several characters, in their respective ways, may be said to possess a kind of prophetic discernment, which not only presents them the barren prospect of futurity, (a prospect not hid from the meanest of men,) but shews withal those events which are likely to attend it, and thus enables them to act with superior certainty and rectitude. And hence it is, that (if we except those who have had diviner assistances) we may justly say, as was said of old,

He's the best prophet who conjectures well.[a]

[a] *Μάντις δ' ἄριστος, ὅστις εἰκάζει καλῶς.* So Milton:

Till old experience do attain
To something like prophetic strain.

Et facile existimari potest, prudentiam esse quodammodo divinationem.
Corn. Nep. in Vit. Attici.

There is nothing appears so clearly an object of the mind or intellect only, as the future does, since we can find no place for its existence anywhere else. Not but the same, if we consider, is equally true of the past. For though it may have once had another kind of being, when (according to common phrase) it actually was, yet was it then something present, and not something past. As past, it has no existence but in the mind or memory, since, had it in fact any other, it could not properly be called past. It was this intimate connexion between time and the soul, that made some philosophers doubt, whether, if there was no soul, there could be any time, since time appears to have its being in no other region. *Πότερον δὲ μὴ οὔσης ψυχῆς εἴη ἂν ὁ χρόνος, ἀπορήσειεν ἄν τις, κ. τ. λ.* Natur. Auscult. l. iv. c. 20. Themistius, who comments the above passage, expresses himself more positively. *Εἰ τοίνυν διχῶς λέγεται τότε ἀριθμητὸν καὶ τὸ ἀριθμούμενον, τὸ μὲν τὸ ἀριθμητὸν δηλαδὴ δυνάμει, τὸ δὲ ἐνεργείᾳ, ταῦτα δὲ οὐκ ἂν ὑποσταίη, μὴ ὄντος τοῦ ἀριθμήσοντος μήτε δυνάμει μήτε ἐνεργείᾳ, φανερὸν ὡς οὐκ ἂν ὁ χρόνος εἴη, μὴ οὔσης ψυχῆς.* Them. p. 48. edit. Aldi. Vid. etiam ejusd. Comm. in Lib. de An. p. 94.

From what has been reasoned it appears, that knowledge of the future comes from knowledge of the past; as does knowledge of the past from knowledge of the present; so that their order to us is that of the present, past, and future.

Of these species of knowledge, that of the present is the lowest, not only as first in perception, but as far the more extensive, being necessarily common to all animal beings, and reaching even to Zoophytes, as far as they possess sensation. Knowledge of the past comes next, which is superior to the former, as being confined to those animals that have memory as well as senses. Knowledge of the future comes last, as being derived from the other two, and which is, for that reason, the most excellent as well as the most rare, since nature in her superadditions rises from worse always to better, and is never found to sink from better down to worse.[t]

And now having seen how we acquire the knowledge of time past and time future; which is first in perception, which first in dignity; which more common, which more rare; let us compare them both to the present *now* or instant, and examine what relations they maintain towards it.

In the first place, there may be times both past and future, in which the present *now* has no existence; as, for example, in yesterday and to-morrow.

Again, the present *now* may so far belong to time of either sort, as to be the end of the past, and the beginning of the future; but it cannot be included within the limits of either. For if it were possible, let us suppose C the present *now* included



within the limits of the past time A D. In such case, C D, part of the first time A D, will be subsequent to C, the present *now*, and so of course be future. But by the hypothesis it is past, and so will be both past and future at once, which is absurd. In the same manner we prove that C cannot be included within the limits of a future time, such as B E.

What, then, shall we say of such times, as *this* day, *this* month, *this* year, *this* century, all which include within them the present *now*? They cannot be past times or future, from what has been proved; and present time has no existence, as has been proved likewise.[u] Or shall we allow them to be present, from the present *now*, which exists within them; so that from the presence of that we call these also present, though the shortest among them has infinite parts always absent? If so, and in conformity to custom, we allow such times present, as present days, months, years, and centuries, each must of necessity be a compound of the past and the future, divided from each other by some present

[t] See below, note *l* of this chapter, p. 157.

[u] Sup. p. 147.

now or instant, and jointly called *present*, while that *now* remains within them. Let us suppose, for example, the time X Y, which

X A B C D E Y

f . . . . ——————————————————— . . . . *g*

let us call a day, or a century; and let the present *now* or *instant* exist at A. I say, inasmuch as A exists within XY, that therefore X A is time past, and AY time future, and the whole X A, AY, time present. The same holds, if we suppose the present *now* to exist at B, or C, or D, or E, or anywhere before Y. When the present now exists at Y, then is the whole XY *time past*, and still more so, when the *now* gets to *g*, or onwards. In like manner, before the *present now* entered X, as, for example, when it was at *f*, then was the whole X Y *time future*; it was the same, when the *present now* was at X. When it had passed that, then X Y became *time present*. And thus it is that time is present, while passing, in its present now or instant. It is the same indeed here, as it is in space. A sphere passing over a plane, and being for that reason present to it, is only present to that plane in a single point at once, while during the whole progression its parts absent are infinite.[v]

From what has been said, we may perceive that all time, of every denomination, is divisible and extended. But if so, then whenever we suppose a definite time, even though it be a time present, it must needs have a beginning, a middle, and an end. And so much for time.

Now from the above doctrine of time we propose, by way of hypothesis, the following theory of tenses.

[v] Place, according to the ancients, was either mediate or immediate. I am (for example) in Europe, because I am in England; in England, because in Wiltshire; in Wiltshire, because in Salisbury; in Salisbury, because in my own house; in my own house, because in my study. Thus far mediate place. And what is my immediate place? It is the internal bound of that containing body (whatever it be) which coincides with the external bound of my own body. Τοῦ περιέχοντος πέρας, καθ' ὃ περιέχει τὸ περιεχόμενον. Now as this immediate place is included within the limits of all the former places, it is from this relation that those mediate places also are called, each of them, *my place*, though the least among them so far exceed my magnitude. To apply this to time. The present century is present in the present year; that, in the present month; that, in the present day; that, in the present hour; that, in the present minute. It is thus by circumscription within circumscription that we arrive at that real and indivisible instant, which, by being itself the very essence of the present, diffuses presence throughout all, even the largest of times, which are found to include it within their respective limits. Nicephorus Blemides speaks much to the same purpose. Ἐνεστὼς οὖν χρόνος ἐστὶν ὁ ἐφ' ἑκάτερα παρακείμενος τῷ κυρίως νῦν· χρόνος μερικὸς, ἐκ παρεληλυθότος καὶ μέλλοντος συνεστὼς, καὶ διὰ τὴν πρὸς τὸ κυρίως νῦν γειτνίασιν, νῦν λεγόμενος καὶ αὐτός: "Present time, therefore, is that which adjoins to the *real now* or instant on either side, being a limited time made up of past and future, and from its vicinity to that *real now*, said to be *now* also itself." Ἐπιτ. φυσικῆς, Κεφ. θ'. See also Arist. Physic. l. vi. c. 2, 3, &c.

In the above note, mention is made of the *real now*, or instant, and its efficacy. To which we may add, that there is not only a necessary connexion between existence and the present instant, because no other point of time can properly be said to be, but also between existence and life, because whatever lives, by the same reason necessarily is. Hence Sophocles, speaking of time present, elegantly says of it,

Χρόνῳ τῷ ζώντι, καὶ παρόντι νῦν.
The living and now present time.
Trachin. v. 1185.

The tenses are used to mark present, past, and future time, either indefinitely without reference to any beginning, middle, or end; or else definitely, in reference to such distinctions.

If indefinitely, then have we three tenses; an aorist of the present, an aorist of the past, and an aorist of the future. If definitely, then have we three tenses to mark the beginnings of these three times; three to denote their middles; and three to denote their ends; in all nine.

The three first of these tenses we call the inceptive present, the inceptive past, and the inceptive future. The three next, the middle present, the middle past, and the middle future. And the three last, the completive present, the completive past, and the completive future.

And thus it is that the tenses in their natural number appear to be twelve; three to denote time absolute, and nine to denote it under its respective distinctions.

AORIST OF THE PRESENT.

Γράφω. Scribo. I write.

AORIST OF THE PAST.

Ἔγραψα. Scripsi. I wrote.

AORIST OF THE FUTURE.

Γράψω. Scribam. I shall write.

INCEPTIVE PRESENT.

Μέλλω γράφειν. Scripturus sum. I am going to write.

MIDDLE OR EXTENDED PRESENT.

Τυγχάνω γράφων. Scribo or *scribens sum.* I am writing.

COMPLETIVE PRESENT.

Γέγραφα. Scripsi. I have written.

INCEPTIVE PAST.

Ἔμελλον γράφειν. Scripturus eram. I was beginning to write.

MIDDLE OR EXTENDED PAST.

Ἔγραφον or *ἐτύγχανον γράφων. Scribebam.* I was writing.

COMPLETIVE PAST.

Ἐγεγράφειν. Scripseram. I had done writing.

INCEPTIVE FUTURE.

Μελλήσω γράφειν. Scripturus ero. I shall be beginning to write.

MIDDLE OR EXTENDED FUTURE.

Ἔσομαι γράφων. Scribens ero. I shall be writing.

COMPLETIVE FUTURE.

Ἔσομαι γεγραφώς. Scripsero. I shall have done writing.

It is not to be expected that the above hypothesis should be justified through all instances in every language. It fares with tenses as with other affections of speech; be the language upon the whole ever so perfect, much must be left, in defiance of all analogy, to the harsh laws of mere authority and chance.

It may not, however, be improper to inquire, what traces may be discovered in favour of this system, either in languages themselves, or in those authors who have written upon this part of grammar, or lastly in the nature and reason of things.

In the first place, as to aorists. Aorists are usually by grammarians referred to the past; such are ἦλθον, "I went;" ἔπεσον, "I fell," &c. We seldom hear of them in the future, and more rarely still in the present. Yet it seems agreeable to reason, that wherever time is signified without any further circumscription than that of simple present, past, or future, the tense is an aorist.

Thus Milton:

> Millions of spiritual creatures walk the earth
> Unseen, both when we wake and when we sleep. Par. Lost, iv. 277.

Here the verb *walk* means, not that they were walking at that instant only, when Adam spoke, but ἀορίστως, "indefinitely," take any instant whatever. So when the same author calls hypocrisy,

> the only evil that walks
> Invisible, except to God alone,

the verb *walks* hath the like aoristical or indefinite application. The same may be said in general of all sentences of the gnomologic kind, such as

> Ad pœnitendum properat, cito qui judicat.
> Avarus, nisi cum moritur, nil recte facit, &c.

All these tenses are so many aorists of the present.

Gnomologic sentences after the same manner make likewise aorists of the future:

> Tu nihil admittes in te, formidine pœnæ. Hor.

So too legislative sentences, Thou shalt not kill, Thou shalt not steal, &c.; for this means no one particular future time, but is a prohibition extended indefinitely to every part of time future.[x]

We pass from aorists to the inceptive tenses.

These may be found in part supplied (like many other tenses) by verbs auxiliar. *Μέλλω γράφειν. Scripturus sum.* "I am

[x] The Latin tongue appears to be more than ordinarily deficient as to the article of aorists. It has no peculiar form even for an aorist of the past, and therefore (as Priscian tells us) the *præteritum* is forced to do the double duty both of that aorist and of the perfect present, its application in particular instances being to be gathered from the context. Thus it is that *feci* means (as the same author informs us) both πεποίηκα and ἐποίησα, "I have done it," and "I did it;" *vidi* both ἑώρακα and εἶδον, "I have just seen it," and "I saw it once." Prisc. Gram. l. viii. p. 814, 838. edit. Putsch.

going to write." But the Latins go further, and have a species of verbs, derived from others, which do the duty of these tenses, and are themselves for that reason called inchoatives or inceptives. Thus from *Caleo*, "I am warm," comes *Calesco*, "I begin to grow warm;" from *Tumeo*, "I swell," comes *Tumesco*, "I begin to swell." These inchoative verbs are so peculiarly appropriated to the beginnings of time, that they are defective as to all tenses which denote it in its completion, and therefore have neither *perfectum*, *plusquam-perfectum*, or perfect future. There is likewise a species of verbs called in Greek ἐφετικὰ, in Latin *desiderativa*, the desideratives or meditatives, which if they are not strictly inceptives, yet both in Greek and Latin have a near affinity with them. Such are πολεμησείω, *bellaturio*, "I have a desire to make war;" βρωσείω, *esurio*, "I long to eat.[y] And so much for the inceptive tenses.

The two last orders of tenses which remain, are those we called the middle tenses,[z] (which express time as extended and passing,) and the perfect or completive, which express its completion or end.

Now for these the authorities are many. They have been acknowledged already in the ingenious accidence of Mr. Hoadly, and explained and confirmed by Dr. Samuel Clarke, in his rational edition of Homer's Iliad. Nay, long before either of these, we find the same scheme in Scaliger, and by him[a] ascribed to Grocinus,[b] as its author. The learned Gaza (who was himself a Greek, and one of the ablest restorers of that language in the western world) characterizes the tenses in nearly the same manner.[c] What Apollonius hints, is exactly consonant.[d]

[y] As all beginnings have reference to what is future, hence we see how properly these verbs are formed, the Greek ones from a future verb, the Latin from a future participle. From πολεμήσω and βρώσω come πολεμησείω and βρωσείω; from *bellaturus* and *esurus* come *bellaturio* and *esurio*. See Macrobius, p. 691. ed. Var. οὐ πάνυ γέ με νῦν δὴ γελασείοντα ἐποίησας γελάσαι. Plato in Phædone.

[z] Care must be taken not to confound these middle tenses, with the tenses of those verbs, which bear the same name among grammarians.

[a] Ex his percipimus Grocinum acute admodum tempora divisisse, sed minus commode. Tria enim constituit, ut nos, sed quæ bifariam secat, perfectum et imperfectum: sic, præteritum imperfectum, *amabam*: præteritum perfectum, *amaveram*. Recte sane. Et præsens imperfectum, *amo*. Recte hactenus; continuat enim amorem, neque absolvit. At præsens perfectum, *amavi*: quis hoc dicat? De futuro autem ut non male sentit, ita controversum est. Futurum, inquit, imperfectum, *amabo*: perfectum, *amavero*. Non male, inquam: significat enim *amavero*, amorem futurum et absolutum iri: *amabo* perfectionem nullam indicat. De Caus. Ling. Lat. c. 113.

[b] His name was William Grocin, an Englishman, contemporary with Erasmus, and celebrated for his learning. He went to Florence to study under Landin, and was professor at Oxford. Spec. Lit. Flor. p. 205.

[c] The present tense (as this author informs us in his excellent Grammar) denotes τὸ ἐνεστάμενον καὶ ἀτελὲς, "that which is now instant and incomplete;" the *perfectum*, τὸ παρεληλυθὸς ἄρτι, καὶ ἐντελὲς τοῦ ἐνεστῶτος, "that which is now immediately past, and is the completion of the present;" the *imperfectum*, τὸ παρατεταμένον καὶ ἀτελὲς τοῦ παρῳχημένου, "the extended and incomplete part of the past;" and the *plusquam-perfectum*, τὸ παρεληλυθὸς πάλαι, καὶ ἐντελὲς τοῦ παρακειμένου, "that which is past long ago, and is the completion of the *præteritum*." Gram. l. iv.

[d] Ἐντεῦθεν δὲ πειθόμεθα, ὅτι οὐ παρῳχημένου συντέλειαν σημαίνει ἡ παρακεί-

Priscian, too, advances the same doctrine from the Stoics, whose authority we esteem greater than all the rest, not only from the more early age when they lived, but from their superior skill in philosophy, and their peculiar attachment to dialectic, which naturally led them to great accuracy in these grammatical speculations.[e]

Before we conclude, we shall add a few miscellaneous observations, which will be more easily intelligible from the hypothesis here advanced, and serve withal to confirm its truth.

And first, the Latins used their *præteritum perfectum* in some instances after a very peculiar manner, so as to imply the very reverse of the verb in its natural signification. Thus, *vixit* signified "is dead;" *fuit* signified "now is not, is no more." It was in this sense that Cicero addressed the people of Rome, when he had put to death the leaders in the Catalinarian conspiracy. He appeared in the forum, and cried out, with a loud voice, *Vixerunt*.[f] So Virgil:

> [g] Fuimus Troes, fuit Ilium et ingens
> Gloria Dardanidum. Æn. ii.

μενος, τήν γε μὴν ἐνεστῶσαν: "Hence we are persuaded that the *perfectum* doth not signify the completion of the past, but present completion." Apollon. l. iii. c. 6. The reason which persuaded him to this opinion, was the application and use of the particle ἄν, of which he was then treating, and which, as it denoted potentiality or contingence, would assort (he says) with any of the passing, extended, and incomplete tenses, but never with this *perfectum*, because this implied such a complete and indefeasible existence, as never to be qualified into the nature of a contingent.

[e] By these philosophers the vulgar present tense was called the imperfect present, and the vulgar *præteritum*, the perfect present, than which nothing can be more consonant to the system that we favour. But let us hear Priscian, from whom we learn these facts. Præsens tempus proprie dicitur, cujus pars jam præteriit, pars futura est. Cum enim tempus, fluvii more, instabili volvatur cursu, vix punctum habere potest in præsenti, hoc est, in instanti. Maxima igitur pars ejus (sicut dictum est) vel præteriit vel futura est. Unde Stoici jure hoc tempus presens etiam imperfectum vocabant (ut dictum est) eo quod prior ejus pars, quæ præteriit, transacta est, deest autem sequens, id est, futura. Ut si in medio versu dicam, scribo versum, priore ejus parte scripta; cui adhuc deest extrema pars, præsenti utor verbo, dicendo, *scribo versum*: sed imperfectum est, quod deest adhuc versui, quod scribetur. Ex eodem igitur præsenti nascitur etiam perfectum. Si enim ad finem perveniat inceptum, statim utimur præterito perfecto; continuo enim, scripto ad finem versu, dico, *scripsi versum*. And soon after, speaking of the Latin *perfectum*, he says, Sciendum tamen, quod Romani præterito perfecto non solum in re modo completa utuntur, (in quo vim habet ejus, qui apud Græcos παρακείμενος, vocatur, quem Stoici τέλειον ἐνεστῶτα nominaverunt,) sed etiam pro ἀορίστου accipitur, &c. Lib. viii. p. 812, 813, 814.

[f] So among the Romans, when in a cause all the pleaders had spoken, the cryer used to proclaim *Dixerunt*, i. e. "they have done speaking." Ascon. Præd. in Verr. ii.

[g] So Tibullus, speaking of certain prodigies and evil omens:

> *Hæc* fuerint *olim. Sed tu, jam mitis, Apollo,*
> *Prodigia indomitis merge sub æquoribus.* Eleg. ii. 5. ver. 19.

"Let these events *have been* in days of old;" by implication therefore, "but henceforth let them be no more."

So Æneas in Virgil prays to Phœbus:

> *Hac Trojana tenus* fuerit *fortuna secuta.*

"Let Trojan fortune (that is, adverse, like that of Troy and its inhabitants) *have* so far *followed* us." By implication, therefore, "but let it follow us no further." "Here let it end," *Hic sit finis*, as Servius well observes in the place.

In which instances, by the way, mark not only the force of the tense, but of the mood, the precative or imperative, not in the future but in the past. See next chapter.

And again,

> Locus Ardea quondam
> Dictus avis, et nunc magnum manet Ardea nomen,
> Sed fortuna fuit.[h] Æn. vii.

The reason of these significations is derived from the completive power of the tense here mentioned. We see that the periods of nature, and of human affairs, are maintained by the reciprocal succession of contraries. It is thus with calm and tempest, with day and night, with prosperity and adversity, with glory and ignominy, with life and death. Hence, then, in the instances above, the completion of one contrary is put for the commencement of the other, and to say, *hath lived*, or *hath been*, has the same meaning with *is dead*, or *is no more*.

It is remarkable in Virgil,[i] that he frequently joins in the same sentence this complete and perfect present with the extended and passing present; which proves that he considered the two, as belonging to the same species of time, and therefore naturally formed to coincide with each other.

> Tibi jam brachia contrahit ardens
> Scorpius, et cœli justa plus parte reliquit. Georg. i.

> Terra tremit; fugere feræ. Georg. i.

> Præsertim si tempestas a vertice sylvis
> Incubuit, glomeratque ferens incendia ventus. Georg. ii.

> Illa noto citius, volucrique sagitta,
> Ad terram fugit, et portu se condidit alto. Æn. v.

In the same manner he joins the same two modifications of time in the past; that is to say, the complete and perfect past with the extended and passing.

> Inruerant Danai, et tectum omne tenebant. Æn. ii.

> Tres imbris torti radios, tres nubis aquosæ
> Addiderant, rutili tres ignis, et alitis austri.
> Fulgores nunc terrificos, sonitumque metumque
> Miscebant operi, flammisque sequacibus iras.[j] Æn. viii.

[h] *Certus in hospitibus non est amor; errat, ut ipsi:*
Cumque nihil speres firmius esse, fuit.
Epist. Ovid. Helen. Paridi. ver. 190.
Sive erimus, seu nos fata fuisse volent.
Tibull. iii. 5. 32.

[i] See also Spencer's Fairy Queen, book i. c. 3. st. 19; c. 3. st. 39; c. 8. st. 9.
He hath his shield redeem'd, and forth his sword he draws.

[j] The intention of Virgil may be better seen, in rendering one or two of the above passages into English.
Tibi jam brachia contrahit ardens
Scorpius, et cœli justa plus parte reliquit.
"For thee the scorpion is now contracting his claws, and hath already left thee more than a just portion of heaven." The poet, from a high strain of poetic adulation, supposes the scorpion so desirous of admitting Augustus among the heavenly signs, that though he has already made him more than room enough, yet he still continues to be making him more. Here then we have two acts, one perfect, the other pending, and hence the use of the two different tenses. Some editions read *relinquit;* but *reliquit* has the authority of the celebrated Medicean manuscript.
Illa noto citius, volucrique sagitta,
Ad terram fugit, et portu se condidit alto.
"The ship, quicker than the wind, or a swift arrow, continues flying to land, and is hid within the lofty harbour." We may suppose this harbour (like many others) to have been surrounded with high land. Hence the vessel, immediately on entering it, was completely hid from those specta-

As to the *imperfectum*, it is sometimes employed to denote what is usual and customary. Thus *surgebat* and *scribebat* signify, not only "he was rising, he was writing," but upon occasion they signify "he used to rise, he used to write." The reason of this is, that whatever is customary, must be something which has been frequently repeated. But what has been frequently repeated, must needs require an extension of time past, and thus we fall insensibly into the tense here mentioned.

Again, we are told by Pliny (whose authority likewise is confirmed by many gems and marbles still extant) that the ancient painters and sculptors, when they fixed their names to their works, did it *pendenti titulo*, "in a suspensive kind of inscription," and employed for that purpose the tense here mentioned. It was *Ἀπελλῆς ἐποίει*, *Apelles faciebat*, *Πολύκλειτος ἐποίει*, *Polycletus faciebat*, and never *ἐποίησε* or *fecit*. By this they imagined that they avoided the shew of arrogance, and had in case of censure an apology (as it were) prepared, since it appeared from the work itself that it was once indeed in hand, but no pretension that it was ever finished.[k]

It is remarkable that the very manner in which the Latins derive these tenses from one another, shews a plain reference to the system here advanced. From the passing present come the passing past and future: *Scribo*, *scribebam*, *scribam*. From the perfect present come the perfect past and future: *Scripsi*, *scripseram*, *scripsero*. And so in all instances, even where the verbs are irregular, as from *fero* come *ferebam* and *feram*; from *tuli* come *tuleram* and *tulero*.

We shall conclude by observing, that the order of the tenses, as they stand ranged by the old grammarians, is not a fortuitous order, but is consonant to our perceptions in the recognition of time, according to what we have explained already.[l] Hence it is that the present tense stands first; then the past tenses; and lastly the future.

And now having seen what authorities there are for aorists, or those tenses which denote time indefinitely, and what for

tors, who had gone out to see the ship-race, but yet might still continue sailing towards the shore within.

Inruerant Danai, et tectum omne tenebant. "The Greeks had entered and were then possessing the whole house;" as much as to say, "they had entered, and that was over," but their possession continued still.

[k] Plin. Nat. Hist. lib. i. The first printers, (who were most of them scholars and critics,) in imitation of the ancient artists, used the same tense. Excudebat H. Stephanus. Excudebat Guil. Morelius. Absolvebat Joan. Benenatus, which has been followed by Dr. Taylor in his late valuable edition of Demosthenes.

[l] See before, pages 148—150. Scaliger's observation upon this occasion is elegant. Ordo autem (temporum scil.) aliter est, quam natura eorum. Quod enim præteriit, prius est, quam quod est, itaque primo loco debere poni videbatur. Verum, quod primo quoque tempore offertur nobis, id creat primas species in animo: quamobrem præsens tempus primum locum occupavit; est enim commune omnibus animalibus. Præteritum autem iis tantum, quæ memoria prædita sunt. Futurum vero etiam paucioribus, quippe quibus datum est prudentiæ officium. De Caus. Ling. Lat. c. 113. See also Senecæ Epist. 124. Mutum animal sensu comprehendit præsentia; præteritorum, &c.

those tenses opposed to aorists, which mark it definitely, (such as the inceptive, the middle, and the completive,) we here finish the subject of time and tenses, and proceed to consider the verb in other attributes, which it will be necessary to deduce from other principles.

CHAPTER VIII.

CONCERNING MODES.

We have observed already,[m] that the soul's leading powers are those of perception and those of volition, which words we have taken in their most comprehensive acceptation. We have observed also, that all speech or discourse is a publishing or exhibiting some part of our soul, either a certain perception or a certain volition. Hence then, according as we exhibit it either in a different part or after a different manner, hence, I say, the variety of modes or moods.[n]

If we simply declare or indicate something to be or not to be, (whether a perception or volition, it is equally the same,) this constitutes that mode called the declarative or indicative.

A PERCEPTION.

Nosco crines, incanaque menta
Regis Romani. Virg. Æn. vi.

A VOLITION.

In nova fert animus mutatas dicere formas
Corpora. Ovid. Metam. i.

If we do not strictly assert, as of something absolute and certain, but as of something possible only, and in the number of contingents, this makes that mode which grammarians call the potential, and which becomes on such occasions the leading mode of the sentence.

Sed tacitus pasci si posset corvus, haberet
Plus dapis, &c. Hor.

Yet sometimes it is not the leading mode, but only subjoined to the indicative. In such case it is mostly used to denote the end, or final cause; which end, as in human life it is always a contingent, and may never perhaps happen, in despite of all our

[m] See chapter ii.

[n] Gaza defines a mode exactly consonant to this doctrine. He says it is *βούλημα, εἴτ' οὖν πάθημα ψυχῆς, διὰ φωνῆς σημαινόμενον*, "a volition or affection of the soul, signified through some voice, or sound articulate." Gram. l. iv. As therefore this is the nature of modes, and modes belong to verbs, hence it is Apollonius observes, *τοῖς ῥήμασιν ἐξαιρέτως παράκειται ἡ ψυχικὴ διάθεσις:* "the soul's disposition is in an eminent degree attached to verbs." De Synt. l. iii. c. 13. Thus, too, Priscian: Modi sunt diversæ inclinationes animi, quas varia consequitur declinatio verbi. Lib. viii. p. 821.

foresight, is therefore expressed most naturally by the mode here mentioned. For example,

> Ut jugulent homines, surgunt de nocte latrones. Hor.
> "Thieves rise by night, that they may cut men's throats."

Here that they *rise*, is positively asserted in the declarative or indicative mode; but as to their *cutting men's throats*, this is only delivered potentially, because how truly soever it may be the end of their rising, it is still but a contingent that may never perhaps happen. This mode, as often as it is in this manner subjoined, is called by grammarians, not the potential, but the subjunctive.

But it so happens, in the constitution of human affairs, that it is not always sufficient merely to declare ourselves to others. We find it often expedient, from a consciousness of our inability, to address them after a manner more interesting to ourselves, whether to have some perception informed, or some volition gratified. Hence then new modes of speaking: if we interrogate, it is the interrogative mode; if we require, it is the requisitive. Even the requisitive itself hath its subordinate species: with respect to inferiors, it is an imperative mode; with respect to equals and superiors, it is a precative or optative.[o]

And thus have we established a variety of modes: the indicative or declarative, to assert what we think certain; the potential, for the purposes of whatever we think contingent; the interrogative, when we are doubtful, to procure us information; and the requisitive, to assist us in the gratification of our volitions. The requisitive too appears under two distinct species, either as it is imperative to inferiors, or precative to superiors.[p]

[o] It was the confounding of this distinction that gave rise to a sophism of Protagoras. Homer (says he) in beginning his Iliad with, *Sing, Muse, the wrath;* when he thinks to pray, in reality commands. Εὔχεσθαι οἰόμενος, ἐπιτάττει. Aristot. Poet. c. 19. The solution is evident from the division here established, the grammatical form being in both cases the same.

[p] The species of modes in great measure depend on the species of sentences. The Stoics increased the number of sentences far beyond the Peripatetics. Besides those mentioned in chap. ii. note *k*, p. 122, they had many more, as may be seen in Ammonius de Interpret. p. 4. and Diogenes Laertius, l. vii, 66. The Peripatetics (and it seems too with reason) considered all these additional sentences as included within those which they themselves acknowledged, and which they made to be five in number; the vocative, the imperative, the interrogative, the precative, and the assertive. There is no mention of a potential sentence, which may be supposed to coincide with the assertive, or indicative. The vocative (which the Peripatetics called the εἶδος κλητικὸν, but the Stoics more properly προσαγορευτικὸν) was nothing more than the form of address in point of names, titles, and epithets, with which we apply ourselves one to another. As, therefore, it seldom included any verb within it, it could hardly contribute to form a verbal mode. Ammonius and Boethius, the one a Greek Peripatetic, the other a Latin, have illustrated the species of sentences from Homer and Virgil after the following manner.

Ἀλλὰ τοῦ λόγου πέντε εἰδῶν, τοῦ τε κλητικοῦ, ὡς τὸ,
Ὦ μάκαρ Ἀτρεΐδη.
καὶ τοῦ προστακτικοῦ, ὡς τὸ,
Βάσκ' ἴθι, Ἶρι ταχεῖα.
καὶ τοῦ ἐρωτηματικοῦ, ὡς τὸ,
Τίς, πόθεν εἰς ἀνδρῶν;
καὶ τοῦ εὐκτικοῦ, ὡς τὸ,
Αἴ γὰρ Ζεῦ τε πάτερ.
καὶ ἐπὶ τούτοις, τοῦ ἀποφαντικοῦ, καθ' ὃν ἀποφαινόμεθα περὶ ὁτουοῦν τῶν πραγμάτων, οἷον
Θεοὶ δέ τε πάντα ἴσασιν.
οὐ περὶ παντὸς, &c. Εἰς τὸ περὶ Ἑρμ. p. 4.

As therefore all these several modes have their foundation in nature, so have certain marks or signs of them been introduced into languages, that we may be enabled by our discourse to signify them one to another. And hence those various modes or moods of which we find in common grammar so prolix a detail, and which are, in fact, no more than "so many literal forms, intended to express these natural distinctions."[q]

All these modes have this in common, that they exhibit some way or other the soul and its affections. Their peculiarities and distinctions are in part, as follows.

The requisitive and interrogative modes are distinguished from the indicative and potential, that whereas these last seldom call for a return, to the two former it is always necessary.

If we compare the requisitive mode with the interrogative, we shall find these also distinguished, and that not only in the return, but in other peculiarities.

The return to the requisitive, is sometimes made in words, sometimes in deeds. To the request of Dido to Æneas,

Boethius's account is as follows. Perfectarum vero orationum partes quinque sunt: deprecativa, ut,

Jupiter omnipotens, precibus si flecteris ullis,
Da deinde auxilium, Pater, atque hæc omina firma.

Imperativa, ut,

Vade age, nate, voca Zephyros, et labere pennis.

Interrogativa, ut,

Dic mihi, Damæta, cujum pecus?

Vocativa, ut,

O! Pater, O! hominum rerumque æterna potestas.

Enuntiativa, in qua veritas vel falsitas invenitur, ut,

Principio arboribus varia est natura creandis.

Boeth. in lib. de Interp. p. 291.

In Milton the same sentences may be found, as follows. The precative,

Universal Lord! be bounteous still
To give us only good.

The imperative,

Go then, thou mightiest, in thy Father's might.

The interrogative,

Whence, and what art thou, execrable shape?

The vocative,

Adam, earth's hallow'd mould,
Of God inspir'd.

The assertive or enunciative,

The conquer'd also and enslav'd by war
Shall, with their freedom lost, all virtue lose.

[q] The Greek language, which is of all the most elegant and complete, expresses these several modes, and all distinctions of time likewise, by an adequate number of variations in each particular verb. These variations may be found, some at the beginning of the verb, others at its ending, and consist for the most part either in multiplying or diminishing the number of syllables, or else in lengthening or shortening their respective quantities, which two methods are called by grammarians the syllabic and the temporal. The Latin, which is but a species of Greek somewhat debased, admits in like manner a large portion of those variations, which are chiefly to be found at the ending of its verbs, and but rarely at their beginning. Yet in its deponents and passives it is so far defective, as to be forced to have recourse to the auxiliar, *sum*. The modern languages, which have still fewer of those variations, have been necessitated all of them to assume two auxiliars at least, that is to say, those which express in each language the verbs *have* and *am*. As to the English tongue, it is so poor in this respect as to admit no variation for modes, and only one for time, which we apply to express an aorist of the past. Thus from *write* cometh *wrote*; from *give*, *gave*; from *speak*, *spake*, &c. Hence, to express time and modes, we are compelled to employ no less than seven auxiliars, viz. *do*, *am*, *have*, *shall*, *will*, *may*, and *can*; which we use sometimes singly, as when we say, I *am* writing, I *have* written; sometimes two together, as, I *have been* writing, I *should have* written; sometimes no less than three, as, I *might have been* lost, He *could have been* preserved. But for these, and all other speculations relative to the genius of the English language, we refer the reader, who wishes for the most authentic information, to that excellent treatise of the learned Dr. Lowth, entitled, A short Introduction to English Grammar.

. . . . . a prima dic, hospes, origine nobis
Insidias Danaum . . . . .

the proper return was in words; that is, in an historical narrative. To the request of the unfortunate chief—*date obolum Belisario*—the proper return was in a deed; that is, in a charitable relief. But with respect to the interrogative, the return is necessarily made in words alone; in words, which are called a response or answer, and which are always actually or by implication some definitive assertive sentence. Take examples. Whose verses are these? the return is a sentence, These are verses of Homer. Was Brutus a worthy man? the return is a sentence, Brutus was a worthy man.

And hence (if we may be permitted to digress) we may perceive the near affinity of this interrogative mode with the indicative, in which last its response or return is mostly made. So near indeed is this affinity, that in these two modes alone the verb retains the same form,[r] nor are they otherwise distinguished, than either by the addition or absence of some small particle, or by some minute change in the collocation of the words, or sometimes only by a change in the tone, or accent.[s]

[r] "Ἡγε οὖν προκειμένη ὁριστικὴ ἔγκλισις, τὴν ἐγκειμένην κατάφασιν ἀποβάλλουσα, μεθίσταται τοῦ καλεῖσθαι ὁριστική—ἀναπληρωθεῖσα δὲ τῆς καταφάσεως, ὑποστρέφει εἰς τὸ εἶναι ὁριστική: "The indicative mode, of which we speak, by laying aside that assertion, which by its nature it implies, quits the name of indicative—when it reassumes the assertion, it returns again to its proper character." Apoll. de Synt. l. iii. c. 21. Theodore Gaza says the same, Introd. Gram. l. iv.

[s] It may be observed of the interrogative, that as often as the interrogation is simple and definite, the response may be made in almost the same words, by converting them into a sentence affirmative or negative, according as the truth is either one or the other. For example: Are these verses of Homer? Response: These verses are of Homer. Are those verses of Virgil? Response, Those are not verses of Virgil. And here the artists of language, for the sake of brevity and despatch, have provided two particles, to represent all such responses; Yes, for all the affirmative; No, for all the negative.

But when the interrogation is complex, as when we say, Are these verses of Homer, or of Virgil? much more, when it is indefinite, as when we say in general, Whose are these verses? we cannot then respond after the manner above mentioned. The reason is, that no interrogation can be answered by a simple Yes, or a simple No, except only those which are themselves so simple, as of two possible answers to admit only one. Now the least complex interrogation will admit of four answers, two affirmative, two negative, if not perhaps of more. The reason is, a complex interrogation cannot consist of less than two simple ones; each of which may be separately affirmed and separately denied. For instance: Are these verses Homer's or Virgil's? 1. They are Homer's; 2. They are not Homer's; 3. They are Virgil's; 4. They are not Virgil's; we may add, 5. They are of neither. The indefinite interrogations go still further; for these may be answered by infinite affirmatives, and infinite negatives. For instance: Whose are these verses? We may answer affirmatively, They are Virgil's, They are Horace's, They are Ovid's, &c.; or negatively, They are not Virgil's, They are not Horace's, They are not Ovid's, and so on, either way, to infinity. How then should we learn from a single Yes, or a single No, which particular is meant among infinite possibles? These therefore are interrogations which must be always answered by a sentence. Yet even here custom has consulted for brevity, by returning for answer only the single essential characteristic word, and retrenching by an ellipsis all the rest, which rest the interrogator is left to supply from himself. Thus, when we are asked, How many right angles equal the angles of a triangle? we answer in the short monosyllable, Two; whereas, without the ellipsis, the answer would have been, Two right angles equal the angles of a triangle.

The ancients distinguished these two

But to return to our comparison between the interrogative mode and the requisitive.

The interrogative (in the language of grammarians) has all persons of both numbers. The requisitive or imperative has no first person of the singular, and that from this plain reason, that it is equally absurd in modes for a person to request or give commands to himself, as it is in pronouns, for the speaker to become the subject of his own address.[t]

Again, we may interrogate as to all times, both present, past, and future. Who *was* founder of Rome? Who *is* king of China? Who *will* discover the longitude? But entreating and commanding (which are the essence of the requisitive mode) have a necessary respect to the future only.[u] For, indeed, what have they to do with the present or the past, the natures of which are immutable and necessary?

species of interrogation by different names. The simple they called ἐρώτημα, "interrogatio;" the complex, πύσμα, "percontatio." Ammonius called the first of these ἐρώτησις διαλεκτική: the other, ἐρώτησις πυσματική. See Am. in lib. de Interpr. p. 160. Diog. Laert. vii. 66. Quintil. Inst. ix. 2.

[t] Sup. p. 138.

[u] Apollonius's account of the future, implied in all imperatives, is worth observing. Ἐπὶ γὰρ μὴ γινομένοις ἢ μὴ γεγονόσιν ἡ πρόσταξις· τὰ δὲ μὴ γινόμενα ἢ μὴ γεγονότα, ἐπιτηδειότητα δὲ ἔχοντα εἰς τὸ ἔσεσθαι, μέλλοντος ἐστι: "A command has respect to those things which either are not doing, or have not yet been done. But those things, which being not now doing, or having not yet been done, have a natural aptitude to exist hereafter, may be properly said to appertain to the future." De Syntaxi, l. i. c. 36. Soon before this he says, Ἅπαντα τὰ προστακτικὰ ἐγκειμένην ἔχει τὴν τοῦ μέλλοντος διάθεσιν—χηδὸν γὰρ ἐν ἴσῳ ἐστὶ τὸ, ὁ τυραννοκτόνησας τιμᾶσθαι, τῷ τιμηθήσεται, κατὰ τὴν χρόνου ἔννοιαν· τῇ ἐκκλίσει διηλλαχὸς, καθὸ τὸ μὲν προστακτικὸν, τὸ δὲ ὁριστικόν: "All imperatives have a disposition within them, which respects the future: with regard therefore to time, it is the same thing to say, Let him, that kills a tyrant, be honoured; or, He, that kills one, shall be honoured; the difference being only in the mode, inasmuch as one is imperative, the other indicative or declarative." Apoll. de Syntaxi, l. i. c. 35. Priscian seems to allow imperatives a share of present time, as well as future. But if we attend, we shall find his present to be nothing else than an immediate future, as opposed to a more distant one. Imperativus vero præsens et futurum [tempus] naturali quadam necessitate videtur posse accipere. Ea etenim imperamus, quæ vel in præsenti statim volumus fieri sine aliqua dilatione, vel in futuro. Lib. viii. p. 806.

It is true, the Greeks in their imperatives admit certain tenses of the past, such as those of the perfectum, and of the two aorists. But then these tenses, when so applied, either totally lose their temporary character, or else are used to insinuate such a speed of execution, that the deed should be (as it were) done in the very instant when commanded. The same difference seems to subsist between our English imperative, Be gone, and those others of, Go, or Be going. The first (if we please) may be styled the imperative of the perfectum, as calling in the very instant for the completion of our commands: the others may be styled imperatives of the future, as allowing a reasonable time to begin first, and finish afterward.

It is thus Apollonius, in the chapter first cited, distinguishes between σκαπτέτω τὰς ἀμπέλους, "go to digging the vines," and σκαψάτω τὰς ἀμπέλους, "get the vines dug." The first is spoken (as he calls it) εἰς παράτασιν, "by way of extension, or allowance of time for the work;" the second, εἰς συντελείωσιν, "with a view to immediate completion." And in another place, explaining the difference between the same tenses, σκάπτε and σκάψον, he says of the last, οὐ μόνον τὸ μὴ γενόμενον προστάσσει, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ γινόμενον ἐν παρατάσει ἀπαγορεύει, "that it not only commands something, which has not been yet done, but forbids also that, which is now doing in an extension, that is to say, in a slow and lengthened progress." Hence, if a man has been a long while writing, and we are willing to hasten him, it would be wrong to say in Greek, γράφε, "write," (for that he is now, and has been long doing,) but

It is from this connexion of futurity with commands, that the future indicative is sometimes used for the imperative, and that to say to any one, You shall do this, has often the same force with the imperative, Do this. So in the decalogue, "Thou shalt not kill, Thou shalt not bear false witness," which denote (we know) the strictest and most authoritative commands.

As to the potential mode, it is distinguished from all the rest by its subordinate or subjunctive nature. It is also further distinguished from the requisitive and interrogative, by implying a kind of feeble and weak assertion, and so becoming, in some degree, susceptible of truth and falsehood. Thus, if it be said potentially, This may be, or This might have been, we may remark without absurdity, It is true, or It is false. But if it be said, Do this, meaning, Fly to heaven; or Can this be done? meaning, to square the circle; we cannot say in either case, It is true, or false, though the command and the question are about things impossible. Yet still the potential does not aspire to the indicative, because it implies but a dubious and conjectural assertion, whereas that of the indicative is absolute, and without reserve.

This, therefore, (the indicative, I mean,) is the mode, which, as in all grammars it is the first in order, so is truly first both in dignity and use. It is this which publishes our sublimest perceptions; which exhibits the soul in her purest energies, superior to the imperfection of desires and wants; which includes the whole of time, and its minutest distinctions; which, in its various past tenses, is employed by history, to preserve to us the remembrance of former events; in its futures is used by prophecy, or (in default of this) by wise foresight, to instruct and forewarn us, as to that which is coming; but above all in its present tense serves philosophy and the sciences, by just demonstrations to establish necessary truth; that truth, which from its nature only exists in the present; which knows no distinctions either of past or of future, but is everywhere and always invariably one.[x]

γράφον, "get your writing done; make no delays." See Apoll. l. iii. c. 24. See also Macrobius de Diff. Verb. Græc. et Lat. p. 680. edit. Varior. Latini non æstimaverunt, &c.

[x] See the quotation, note *i*, chapter vi. p. 143. Cum enim dicimus, Deus est, non eum dicimus nunc esse, sed, &c.

Boethius, author of the sentiment there quoted, was by birth a Roman of the first quality; by religion, a Christian; and by philosophy, a Platonic and Peripatetic; which two sects, as they sprang from the same source, were in the latter ages of antiquity commonly adopted by the same persons, such as Themistius, Porphyry, Iamblichus, Ammonius, and others. There were no sects of philosophy that lay greater stress on the distinction between things existing in time and not in time, than the two above mentioned. The doctrine of the Peripatetics on this subject (since it is these that Boethius here follows) may be partly understood from the following sketch.

"The things that exist in time are those whose existence time can measure. But if their existence may be measured by time, then there may be assumed a time greater than the existence of any one of them, as there may be assumed a number greater than the greatest multitude, that is capable of being numbered. And hence it is that

Through all the above modes, with their respective tenses, the verb being considered as denoting an attribute, has always reference to some person, or substance. Thus if we say, Went, or, Go, or Whither goeth, or Might have gone, we must add a person or substance, to make the sentence complete. Cicero went; Cæsar might have gone; Whither goeth the wind? Go! thou traitor! But there is a mode or form under which verbs sometimes appear, where they have no reference at all to persons or substances. For example, To eat is pleasant; but to fast is wholesome. Here the verbs, *to eat*, and *to fast*, stand alone by themselves, nor is it requisite or even practicable to prefix a person or substance. Hence the Latin and modern grammarians have called verbs under this mode, from this their indefinite nature, infinitives. Sanctius has given them the name of impersonals; and the Greeks that of *ἀπαρέμφατα*, from the same reason of their not discovering either person or number.

These infinitives go further. They not only lay aside the character of attributives, but they also assume that of substantives, and as such themselves become distinguished with their several attributes. Thus, in the instance above, *pleasant* is the attribute attending the infinitive *to eat; wholesome* the attribute attending the infinitive *to fast*. Examples in Greek and Latin of like kind are innumerable.

Dulce et decorum est pro patria mori.
Scire tuum nihil est.

Οὐ *κατθανεῖν γὰρ δεινὸν, ἀλλ' αἰσχρῶς θανεῖν.*[y]

things temporary have their existence, as it were limited by time; that they are confined within it, as within some bound; and that in some degree or other they all submit to its power, according to those common phrases, that time is a destroyer; that things decay through time; that men forget in time, and lose their abilities; and seldom that they improve, or grow young, or beautiful. The truth, indeed, is, time always attends motion. Now the natural effect of motion is to put something, which now is, out of that state in which it now is, and so far, therefore, to destroy that state.

"The reverse of all this holds with things that exist eternally. These exist not in time, because time is so far from being able to measure their existence, that no time can be assumed, which their existence doth not surpass. To which we may add, that they feel none of its effects, being no way obnoxious either to damage or dissolution.

"To instance in examples of either kind of being. There are such things at this instant, as Stonehenge and the Pyramids. It is likewise true at this instant, that the diameter of the square is incommensurable with its side. What then shall we say? Was there ever a time when it was not incommensurable, as it is certain there was a time when there was no Stonehenge, or Pyramids? or is it daily growing less incommensurable, as we are assured of decays in both those massy structures?" From these unchangeable truths, we may pass to their place, or region; to the unceasing intellection of the universal mind, ever perfect, ever full, knowing no remissions, languors, &c. See Nat. Ausc. l. iv. c. 19. Metaph. l. xiv. c. 6, 7, 8, 9, 10. edit. Du Val. and note *g*, p. 11. The following passage may deserve attention.

Τοῦ *γὰρ νοῦ ὁ μὲν νοεῖν πέφυκεν, καὶ μὴ νοῶν ὁ δὲ καὶ πέφυκε, καὶ νοεῖ. ἀλλὰ καὶ οὗτος οὔπω τέλεος, ἂν μὴ προσθῇς αὐτῷ τὸ καὶ νοεῖν ἀεὶ, καὶ πάντα νοεῖν, καὶ μὴ ἄλλοτε ἄλλα. ὅστε εἴη ἂν ἐντελέστατος ὁ νοῶν ἀεὶ καὶ πάντα, καὶ ἅμα.* Max. Tyr. Diss. xvii. p. 201. edit. Lond.

[y] It is from the infinitive thus participating the nature of a noun or substantive, that the best grammarians have called it sometimes *ὄνομα ῥηματικὸν*, "a verbal noun;" sometimes *ὄνομα ῥήματος*, "the

The Stoics in their grammatical inquiries had this infinitive in such esteem, that they held this alone to be the genuine *ῥῆμα*, or "verb," a name which they denied to all the other modes. Their reasoning was, they considered the true verbal character to be contained simple and unmixed in the infinitive only. Thus the infinitives, *περιπατεῖν*, *ambulare*, "to walk," mean simply that energy, and nothing more. The other modes, besides expressing this energy, superadd certain affections, which respect persons and circumstances. Thus *ambulo* and *ambula* mean not simply "to walk," but mean, "I walk," and "walk thou." And hence they are all of them resolvable into the infinitive, as their prototype, together with some sentence or word, expressive of their proper character. *Ambulo*, "I walk;" that is, *indico me ambulare*, "I declare myself to walk." *Ambula*, "walk thou;" that is, *impero te ambulare*, "I command thee to walk;" and so with the modes of every other species. Take away, therefore, the assertion, the command, or whatever else gives a character to any one of these modes, and there remains nothing more than the mere infinitive, which (as Priscian says) *significat ipsam rem, quam continet verbum.*[z]

The application of this infinitive is somewhat singular. It naturally coalesces with all those verbs that denote any tendence, desire, or volition of the soul, but not readily with others. Thus it is sense, as well as syntax, to say, *βούλομαι ζῆν*, *cupio vivere*, "I desire to live;" but not to say, *ἐσθίω ζῆν*, *edo vivere*, or even, in English, "I eat to live;" unless by an ellipsis, instead of "I eat for to live," as we say, *ἕνεκα τοῦ ζῆν*, or *pour vivre*. The reason is, that though different actions may unite in the same subject, and, therefore, be coupled together, (as when we say,

verb's noun." The reason of this appellation is in Greek more evident, from its taking the prepositive article before it in all cases; *τὸ γράφειν, τοῦ γράφειν, τῷ γράφειν*. The same construction is not unknown in English.

Thus Spencer:

For not to have been dipt in Lethe lake,
Could save the son of Thetis from to die.

Ἀπὸ τοῦ θανεῖν. In like manner we say, "He did it to be rich," where we must supply by an ellipsis the preposition *for*. "He did it for to be rich," the same as if we had said, "He did it for gain:" *ἕνεκα τοῦ πλουτεῖν, ἕνεκα τοῦ κέρδους*, in French, *pour s'enrichir*. Even when we speak such sentences as the following, "I choose to philosophize, rather than to be rich," *τὸ φιλοσοφεῖν βούλομαι, ἤπερ τὸ πλουτεῖν*, the infinitives are in nature as much accusatives, as if we were to say, "I choose philosophy rather than riches," *τὴν φιλοσοφίαν βούλομαι, ἤπερ τὸν πλοῦτον*. Thus, too, Priscian, speaking of infinitives, Currere enim est cursus; et scribere, scriptura; et legere, lectio. Itaque frequenter et nominibus adjunguntur, et aliis casualibus, more nominum; ut Persius,

Sed pulcrum est digito monstrari, et dicier, hic est.

And soon after, Cum enim dico, bonum est legere, nihil aliud significo, nisi, bona est lectio. l. xviii. p. 1130. See also Apoll. l. i. c. 8. Gaza Gram. l. iv. *Τὸ δὲ ἀπαρέμφατον, ὄνομά ἐστι ῥήματος, κ. τ. λ.*

[z] See Apollon. l. iii. 13. *Καθόλου πᾶν παρηγμένον ἀπό τινος, κ. τ. λ.* See also Gaza, in the note before. Igitur a constructione quoque vim rei verborum (id est, nominis, quod significat ipsam rem) habere infinitivum possumus dignoscere; res autem in personas distributa facit alios verbi motus. Itaque omnes modi in hunc, id est, infinitivum, transumuntur sive resolvuntur. Prisc. l. xviii. p. 1131. From these principles Apollonius calls the infinitive *ῥῆμα γενικώτατον*, and Priscian, verbum generale.

"He walked and discoursed,") yet the actions, notwithstanding, remain separate and distinct. But it is not so with respect to volitions and actions. Here the coalescence is often so intimate, that the volition is unintelligible till the action be expressed: *cupio, volo, desidero;* "I desire, I am willing, I want"—What! The sentences, we see, are defective and imperfect. We must help them then by infinitives, which express the proper actions to which they tend. *Cupio legere, Volo discere, Desidero videre:* "I desire to read, I am willing to live, I want to see." Thus is the whole rendered complete, as well in sentiment as in syntax.[a]

And so much for modes, and their several species. We are to attempt to denominate them according to their most eminent characters; it may be done in the following manner. As every necessary truth, and every demonstrative syllogism, (which last is no more than a combination of such truths,) must always be expressed under positive assertions, and as positive assertions only belong to the indicative, we may denominate it, for that reason, the mode of science.[b] Again: as the potential is only conversant about contingents, of which we cannot say with certainty that they will happen or not, we may call this mode the mode of conjecture. Again: as those that are ignorant and would be informed, must ask of those that already know, this being the natural way of becoming proficients; hence we may call the interrogative, the mode of proficiency.

> Inter cuncta leges, et percontabere doctos,
> Qua ratione queas traducere leniter ævum,
> Quid pure tranquillet, &c. Hor.

Further still: as the highest and most excellent use of the requisitive mode is legislative command, we may style it, for this reason, the mode of legislature. *Ad divos adeunto caste*, says Cicero, in the character of a Roman lawgiver; "Be it therefore enacted," say the laws of England; and in the same mode speak the laws of every other nation. It is also in this mode that the geometrician, with the authority of a legislator, orders lines to be bisected, and circles described, as preparatives to that science which he is about to establish.

There are other supposed affections of verbs, such as number and person; but these, surely, cannot be called a part of their essence, nor, indeed, are they the essence of any other attribute, being, in fact, the properties, not of attributes, but of substances. The most that can be said, is, that verbs in the more elegant languages are provided with certain terminations, which respect

[a] Priscian calls these verbs, which naturally precede infinitives, *verba voluntativa;* they are called in Greek *προαιρετικά*. See l. xviii. 1129; but more particularly see Apollonius, l. iii. c. 13, where this whole doctrine is explained with great accuracy. See also Macrobius de Diff. Verb. Gr. et Lat. p. 685. edit. Var.

Nec omne ἀπαρέμφατον cuicunque verbo, &c.

[b] Ob nobilitatem præivit indicativus, solus modus aptus scientiis, solus pater veritatis. Scal. de Caus. L. Lat. c. 116.

the number and person of every substantive, that we may know with more precision, in a complex sentence, each particular substance, with its attendant verbal attributes. The same may be said of sex, with respect to adjectives. They have terminations which vary, as they respect beings, male or female, though substances past dispute are alone susceptible of sex.[c] We therefore pass over these matters, and all of like kind, as being rather among the elegancies, than the essentials of language,[d] which essentials are the subject of our present inquiry. The principal of these now remaining, is the difference of verbs as to their several species, which we endeavour to explain in the following manner.

CHAPTER IX.

CONCERNING THE SPECIES OF VERBS, AND THEIR OTHER REMAINING PROPERTIES.

All verbs, that are strictly so called, denote energies;[e] now, as all energies are attributes, they have reference, of course, to certain energizing substances. Thus it is impossible there should be such energies, as to love, to fly, to wound, &c. if there were not such beings as men, birds, swords, &c. Further, every energy doth not only require an energizer, but is necessarily conversant about some subject. For example: if we say, Brutus loves, we must needs supply, loves Cato, Cassius, Portia, or some one. The sword wounds, i. e. wounds Hector, Sarpedon, Priam, or some one. And thus is it, that every energy is necessarily situate between two substantives; an energizer, which

[c] It is somewhat extraordinary, that so acute and rational a grammarian as Sanctius should justly deny genders, or the distinction of sex to adjectives, and yet make persons appertain, not to substantives, but to verbs. His commentator, Perizonius, is much more consistent, who says, At vero si rem recte consideres, ipsis nominibus et pronominibus vel maxime, imo unice inest ipsa persona; et verba se habent in personarum ratione ad nomina plane sicuti adjectiva in ratione generum ad substantiva, quibus solis autor (Sanctius scil. l. i. c. 7.) et recte genus adscribit, exclusis adjectivis. Sanct. Minerv. l. i. c. 12. There is, indeed, an exact analogy between the accidents of sex and person. There are but two sexes, that is to say, the male and the female; and but two persons, (or characters essential to discourse,) that is to say, the speaker and the party addressed. The third sex and third person are improperly so called, being, in fact, but negations of the other two.

[d] Whoever would see more upon a subject of importance, referred to in many parts of this treatise, and particularly in note *a* of this chapter, p. 163, may consult Letters concerning Mind, an octavo volume, published 1750, the author Mr. John Petvin, vicar of Ilsington in Devon; a person who, though from his retired situation little known, was deeply skilled in the philosophy both of the ancients and moderns, and, more than this, was valued by all that knew him for his virtue and worth.

[e] We use this word *energy*, rather than *motion*, from its more comprehensive meaning; it being a sort of genus, which includes within it both motion and its privation. See before, p. 144.

is active, and a subject, which is passive. Hence, then, if the energizer leads the sentence, the energy follows its character, and becomes what we call a verb active: thus we say, *Brutus amat*, "Brutus loves." On the contrary, if the passive subject be principal, it follows the character of this, too, and then becomes what we call a verb passive: thus we say, *Portia amatur*, "Portia is loved." It is in like manner that the same road between the summit and foot of the same mountain, with respect to the summit is ascent, with respect to the foot is descent. Since then every energy respects an energizer, or a passive subject; hence the reason why every verb, whether active or passive, has in language a necessary reference to some noun for its nominative case.[f]

But to proceed still further from what has been already observed. Brutus loved Portia. Here Brutus is the energizer; loved, the energy; and Portia, the subject. But it might have been, Brutus loved Cato, or Cassius, or the Roman republic; for the energy is referable to subjects infinite. Now, among these infinite subjects, when that happens to occur, which is the energizer also, as when we say Brutus loved himself, slew himself, &c. in such case the energy hath to the same being a double relation, both active and passive. And this it is which gave rise among the Greeks to that species of verbs called verbs middle;[g] and such was their true and original use, however in many instances they may have since happened to deviate. In other languages the verb still retains its active form, and the passive subject (*se* or "himself") is expressed like other accusatives.

Again: in some verbs it happens that the energy always keeps within the energizer, and never passes out to any foreign extraneous subject. Thus when we say, Cæsar walketh, Cæsar sitteth, it is impossible the energy should pass out, (as in the case of those verbs called by the grammarians verbs transitive,) because both the energizer and the passive subject are united in the same person. For what is the cause of this walking or sitting? It is the will and vital powers belonging to Cæsar. And what is the subject, made so to move or sit? It is the body and limbs belonging also to the same Cæsar. It is this, then, forms that species of verbs, which grammarians have thought fit to call verbs neuter, as if, indeed, they were void both of action

[f] The doctrine of impersonal verbs has been justly rejected by the best grammarians, both ancient and modern. See Sanct. Min. l. i. c. 12; l. iii. c. 1; l. iv. c. 3. Priscian. l. xviii. p. 1134. Apoll. l. iii. sub. fin. In which places the reader will see a proper nominative supplied to all verbs of this supposed character.

[g] Τὰ γὰρ καλούμενα μεσότητος χήματα συνέμπτωσιν ἀνεδέξατο ἐνεργετικῆς καὶ παθητικῆς διαθέσεως: "The verbs, called verbs middle, admit a coincidence of the active and passive character." Apollon. l. iii. c. 7. He that would see this whole doctrine, concerning the power of the middle verb, explained and confirmed with great ingenuity and learning, may consult a small treatise of that able critic, Kuster, entitled De vero Usu Verborum Mediorum. A neat edition of this scarce piece has been lately published.

and passion, when, perhaps, (like verbs middle,) they may be rather said to imply both. Not, however, to dispute about names, as these neuters in their energizer always discover their passive subject,[h] which other verbs cannot, their passive subjects being infinite; hence the reason why it is as superfluous in these neuters to have the subject expressed, as in other verbs it is necessary, and cannot be omitted. And thus it is that we are taught in common grammars that verbs active require an accusative, while neuters require none.

Of the above species of verbs, the middle cannot be called necessary, because most languages have done without it. The species of verbs therefore remaining, are the active, the passive, and the neuter, and those seem essential to all languages whatever.[i]

[h] This character of neuters the Greeks very happily express by the terms *αὐτοπάθεια* and *ἰδιοπάθεια*, which Priscian renders "quæ ex se in seipsa fit intrinsecus passio." l. viii. p. 790. Consentii Ars apud Putsch. p. 2051.

It may be here observed, that even those verbs, called actives, can upon occasion lay aside their transitive character; that is to say, can drop their subsequent accusative, and assume the form of neuters, so as to stand by themselves. This happens when the discourse respects the mere energy or affection only, and has no regard to the subject, be it this thing or that. Thus we say, *οὐκ οἶδεν ἀναγινώσκειν οὗτος*, "this man knows not how to read," speaking only of the energy, in which we suppose him deficient. Had the discourse been upon the subjects of reading, we must have added them, *οὐκ οἶδεν ἀναγινώσκειν τὰ Ὁμήρου*, "he knows not how to read Homer, or Virgil, or Cicero," &c.

Thus Horace:

Qui cupit aut metuit, juvat illum sic domus aut res,
Ut lippum pictæ tabulæ . . . .

"He that desires or fears, (not this thing, in particular, nor that, but, in general, he within whose breast these affections prevail,) has the same joy in a house or estate, as the man with bad eyes has in fine pictures." So Cæsar, in his celebrated laconic epistle of Veni, Vidi, Vici, where two actives, we see, follow one neuter in the same detached form as that neuter itself. The glory, it seems, was in the rapid sequel of the events. Conquest came as quick as he could come himself, and look about him. Whom he saw, and whom he conquered, was not the thing of which he boasted. See Apol. l. iii. c. 31. p. 279.

[i] The Stoics, in their logical view of verbs, as making part in propositions, considered them under the four following sorts.

When a verb, coinciding with the nominative of some noun, made without further help a perfect assertive sentence, as *Σωκράτης περιπατεῖ*, "Socrates walketh;" then as the verb in such case implied the power of a perfect predicate, they called it for that reason *κατηγόρημα*, "a predicable;" or else, from its readiness, *συμβαίνειν*, to coincide with its noun in completing the sentence, they called it *σύμβαμα*, "a coincider."

When a verb was able with a noun to form a perfect assertive sentence, yet could not associate with such noun, but under some oblique case, as *Σωκράτει μεταμέλει*, *Socratem pœnitet*: such a verb, from its near approach to just coincidence, and predication, they called *παρασύμβαμα* or *παρακατηγόρημα*.

When a verb, though regularly coinciding with a noun in its nominative, still required, to complete the sentiment, some other noun under an oblique case, as *Πλάτων φιλεῖ Δίωνα*, "Plato loveth Dio," (where without *Dio*, or some other, the verb *loveth* would rest indefinite;) such verb, from this defect, they called *ἧττον ἢ σύμβαμα*, or *ἢ κατηγόρημα*, "something less than a coincider, or less than a predicable."

Lastly, when a verb required two nouns in oblique cases, to render the sentiment complete; as when we say *Σωκράτει Ἀλκιβιάδου μέλει*, *Tædet me vitæ*, or the like; such verb they called *ἧττον*, or *ἔλαττον ἢ παρασύμβαμα*, or *ἢ παρακατηγόρημα*, "something less than an imperfect coincider, or an imperfect predicable."

These were the appellations which they gave to verbs, when employed along with nouns to the forming of propositions. As to the name of *ῥῆμα*, or "verb," they denied it to them all, giving it only to the infinitive, as we have shewn already. See page 165. See

There remains a remark or two further, and then we quit the subject of verbs. It is true, in general, that the greater part of them denote attributes of energy and motion. But there are some which appear to denote nothing more than a mere simple adjective joined to an assertion. Thus *ἰσάζει* in Greek, and "equalleth" in English, mean nothing more than *ἴσός ἐστι*, "is equal." So *albeo*, in Latin, is no more than *albus sum*.

Campique ingentes ossibus albent. Virg.

The same may be said of *tumeo*. *Mons tumet*, i. e. *tumidus est*, "is tumid." To express the energy in these instances we must have recourse to the inceptives.

Fluctus uti primo cœpit cum albescere vento. Virg.

Freta ponti
Incipiunt agitata tumescere. Virg.

There are verbs also to be found which are formed out of nouns. So that, as in abstract nouns, (such as *whiteness* from *white*, *goodness* from *good*,) as also in the infinitive modes of verbs, the attributive is converted into a substantive; here the substantive on the contrary is converted into an attributive. Such are *κυνίζειν*, from *κύων*, "to act the part of a dog, or be a cynic;" *Φιλιππίζειν* from *Φίλιππος*, "to Philippize, or favour Philip;" *Syllaturire*, from *Sylla*, "to meditate acting the same part as Sylla did." Thus, too, the wise and virtuous emperor, by way of counsel to himself—*ὅρα μὴ ἀποκαισαρωθῇς*, "beware thou beest not be-Cæsar'd;" as though he said, "beware, that by being emperor, thou dost not dwindle into a mere Cæsar."[k] In like manner one of our own witty poets,

Sternhold himself he out-Sternholded.

And long before him the facetious Fuller, speaking of one Morgan, a sanguinary bishop in the reign of Queen Mary, says of him, that he out-Bonner'd even Bonner himself.[l]

And so much for that species of attributes called verbs in the strictest sense.

CHAPTER X.

CONCERNING THOSE OTHER ATTRIBUTIVES, PARTICIPLES AND ADJECTIVES.

THE nature of verbs being understood, that of participles is no way difficult. Every complete verb is expressive of an attribute, of time, and of an assertion. Now if we take away the

also Ammon. in lib. de Interpret. p. 37. Apollon de Syntaxi, l. i. c. 8. l. iii. c. 31. p. 279. c. 32. p. 295. Theod. Gaz. Gram. l. iv.

From the above doctrine it appears, that all verbs neuter are *συμβάματα*; verbs active, *ἤττονα ἢ συμβάματα*.

[k] Marc. Antonin. l. vi. sec. 30.

[l] Church Hist. b. viii. p. 21.

assertion, and thus destroy the verb, there will remain the attribute and the time, which make the essence of a participle. Thus take away the assertion from the verb, γράφει, "writeth," and there remains the participle, γράφων, "writing," which (without the assertion) denotes the same attribute, and the same time. After the same manner, by withdrawing the assertion, we discover γράψας in ἔγραψε, γράψων in γράψει, for we choose to refer to the Greek, as being of all languages the most complete, as well in this respect as in others.

And so much for participles.[m]

The nature of verbs and participles being understood, that of adjectives becomes easy. A verb implies (as we have said) both an attribute, and time, and an assertion; a participle only implies an attribute and time; and an adjective only implies an attribute; that is to say, in other words, an adjective has no assertion, and only denotes such an attribute as has not its essence either in motion or its privation. Thus in general the attributes of quantity, quality, and relation, (such as *many* and *few*, *great* and *little*, *black* and *white*, *good* and *bad*, *double*, *treble*, *quadruple*, &c.) are all denoted by adjectives.

It must indeed be confessed, that sometimes even those attributes which are wholly foreign to the idea of motion, assume an assertion and appear as verbs. Of such we gave instances before, in *albeo*, *tumeo*, ἰσάζω, and others. These, however, compared to the rest of verbs, are but few in number, and may be called, if thought proper, verbal adjectives. It is in like manner that participles insensibly pass too into adjectives. Thus *doctus* in Latin, and *learned* in English, lose their power as participles, and mean a person possessed of an habitual quality. Thus *vir eloquens* means, not "a man now speaking," but a man "who possesses the habit of speaking," whether he speak or no. So when we say in English, "he is a thinking man, an understanding man," we mean, not a person whose mind is in actual

[m] The Latins are defective in this article of participles. Their active verbs ending in *or*, (commonly called deponents,) have active participles of all times, (such as *loquens*, *locutus*, *locuturus*,) but none of the passive. Their actives ending in *o*, have participles of the present and future, (such as *scribens* and *scripturus*,) but none of the past. On the contrary, their passives have participles of the past, (such as *scriptus*,) but none of the present or future, unless we admit such as *scribendus* and *docendus* for futures, which grammarians controvert. The want of these participles they supply by a periphrasis; for γράψας, they say *cum scripsisset*; for γραφόμενος, *dum scribitur*, &c. In English we have sometimes recourse to the same periphrasis; and sometimes we avail ourselves of the same auxiliars, which form our modes and tenses.

The English grammar lays down a good rule with respect to its participles of the past, that they all terminate in *d*, *t*, or *n*. This analogy is perhaps liable to as few exceptions as any. Considering, therefore, how little analogy of any kind we have in our language, it seems wrong to annihilate the few traces that may be found. It would be well, therefore, if all writers who endeavour to be accurate, would be careful to avoid a corruption, at present so prevalent, of saying, *it was wrote*, for *it was written*; *he was drove*, for *he was driven*; *I have went*, for *I have gone*, &c.: in all which instances a verb is absurdly used to supply the proper participle, without any necessity from the want of such word.

energy, but whose mind is enriched with a larger portion of those powers. It is indeed no wonder, as all attributives are homogeneous, that at times the several species should appear to interfere, and the difference between them be scarcely perceptible. Even in natural species, which are congenial and of kin, the specific difference is not always to be discerned, and in appearance at least they seem to run into each other.

We have shewn already[n] in the instances of *Φιλιππίζειν*, *Syllaturire*, *Ἀποκαισαρωθῆναι*, and others, how substantives may be transformed into verbal attributives. We shall now shew how they may be converted into adjectives. When we say the party of Pompey, the style of Cicero, the philosophy of Socrates, in these cases the party, the style, and the philosophy spoken of, receive a stamp and character from the persons whom they respect. Those persons, therefore, perform the part of attributes, that is, stamp and characterize their respective subjects. Hence, then, they actually pass into attributes, and assume as such the form of adjectives. And thus it is we say, the Pompeian party, the Ciceronian style, and the Socratic philosophy. It is in like manner for a trumpet *of brass*, we say a *brazen* trumpet; for a crown *of gold*, a *golden* crown, &c. Even pronominal substantives admit the like mutation. Thus, instead of saying, the book *of me*, *of thee*, and *of him*, we say, *my* book, *thy* book, and *his* book; instead of saying, the country *of us*, *of you*, and *of them*, we say, *our country*, *your* country, and *their* country; which words may be called so many pronominal adjectives.

It has been observed already, and must needs be obvious to all, that adjectives, as marking attributes, can have no sex.[o] And yet their having terminations conformable to the sex, number, and case of their substantive, seems to have led grammarians into that strange absurdity of ranging them with nouns, and separating them from verbs, though with respect to these they are perfectly homogeneous; with respect to the others quite contrary. They are homogeneous with respect to verbs, as both sorts denote attributes; they are heterogeneous with respect to nouns, as never properly denoting substances. But of this we have spoken before.[p]

The attributives hitherto treated, that is to say, verbs, participles, and adjectives, may be called attributives of the first order. The reason of this name will be better understood, when we have more fully discussed attributives of the second order, to which we now proceed in the following chapter.

[n] Sup. p. 170.
[o] Sup. p. 167.
[p] Sup. c. vi. note *g*, p. 141. See also c. iii. p. 125.

CHAPTER XI.

CONCERNING ATTRIBUTIVES OF THE SECOND ORDER.

As the attributives hitherto mentioned denote the attributes of substances, so there is an inferior class of them, which denote the attributes only of attributes.

To explain by examples in either kind: when we say, "Cicero and Pliny were both of them eloquent; Statius and Virgil, both of them wrote;" in these instances the attributives, *eloquent* and *wrote*, are immediately referable to the substantives, Cicero, Virgil, &c. As therefore denoting the attributes of substances, we call them attributives of the first order. But when we say, "Pliny was moderately eloquent, but Cicero exceedingly eloquent; Statius wrote indifferently, but Virgil wrote admirably;" in these instances, the attributives, *moderately*, *exceedingly*, *indifferently*, *admirably*, are not referable to substantives, but to other attributives, that is, to the words *eloquent* and *wrote*. As therefore denoting attributes of attributes, we call them attributives of the second order.

Grammarians have given them the name of *ἐπιῤῥήματα*, *adverbia*, "adverbs." And indeed if we take the word *ῥῆμα*, or "verb," in its most comprehensive signification, as including not only verbs properly so called, but also participles and adjectives, [an usage which may be justified by the best authorities,[q]] we shall find the name *ἐπίῤῥημα*, or "adverb," to be a very just appellation, as denoting a part of speech, the natural appendage of verbs. So great is this dependence in grammatical syntax, that an adverb can no more subsist without its verb, than a verb can subsist without its substantive. It is the same here, as in certain natural subjects. Every colour for its existence as much requires a superficies, as the superficies for its existence requires a solid body.[r]

[q] Thus Aristotle, in his treatise De Interpretatione, instances *ἄνθρωπος* as "a noun," and *λεῦκος* as "a verb." So Ammonius: *Κατὰ τοῦτο τὸ σημαινόμενον, τὸ μὲν καλὸς καὶ δίκαιος καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα—ῥήματα λέγεσθαι καὶ οὐκ ὀνόματα:* "According to this signification, (that is, of denoting the attributes of substance and the predicate in propositions,) the words *fair*, *just*, and the like, are called verbs, and not nouns." Am. in libr. De Interp. p. 37. B. Arist. de Interp. l. i. c. 1. See also of this treatise, c. vi. note *g*, p. 141.

In the same manner the Stoics talked of the participle. Nam participium connumerantes verbis, participiale verbum vocabant vel casuale. Priscian. l. i. p. 574.

[r] This notion of ranging the adverb under the same genus with the verb, (by calling them both attributives,) and of explaining it to be the verb's epithet or adjective, (by calling it the attributive of an attributive,) is conformable to the best authorities. Theodore Gaza defines an adverb as follows: *Μέρος λόγου ἄπτωτον, κατὰ ῥήματος λεγόμενον, ἢ ἐπιλεγόμενον ῥήματι, καὶ οἷον ἐπίθετον ῥήματος:* "A part of speech devoid of cases, predicated of a verb, or subjoined to it, and being as it were the verb's adjective." l. iv. (where, by the way, we may observe, how properly the adverb is made an *aptote*, since its principal some-

Among the attributes of substance are reckoned quantities and qualities. Thus we say, "a white garment," "a high mountain." Now some of these quantities and qualities are capable of intension and remission. Thus we say, "a garment *exceedingly* white;" "a mountain *tolerably* high, or *moderately* high." It is plain, therefore, that intension and remission are among the attributes of such attributes. Hence then one copious source of secondary attributives, or adverbs, to denote these two; that is, intension and remission. The Greeks have their *θαυμαστῶς*, *μάλιστα*, *πάνυ*, *ἥκιστα:* the Latins their *valde*, *vehementer*, *maxime*, *satis*, *mediocriter:* the English, their *greatly*, *vastly*, *extremely*, *sufficiently*, *moderately*, *tolerably*, *indifferently*, &c.

Further than this, where there are different intensions of the same attribute, they may be compared together. Thus, if the garment A be *exceeedingly* white, and the garment B be *moderately* white, we may say, "the garment A is *more* white than the garment B."

In these instances, the adverb *more* not only denotes intension, but *relative intension*. Nay, we stop not here. We not only denote intension merely relative, but relative intension, than which there is none greater. Thus we not only say, "the mountain A is *more* high than the mountain B," but "that it is the *most* high of all mountains." Even verbs, properly so called, as they admit simple intensions, so they admit also these comparative ones. Thus in the following example: "fame he loveth more than riches, but virtue of all things he loveth most;" the words *more* and *most* denote the different comparative intensions of the verbal attributive *loveth*.

And hence the rise of comparison, and of its different degrees; which cannot well be more than the two species above mentioned, one to denote simple excess, and one to denote superlative. Were we indeed to introduce more degrees than these, we ought perhaps to introduce infinite, which is absurd. For why stop at a limited number, when in all subjects, susceptible of intension, the intermediate excesses are in a manner infinite? There are infinite degrees of *more* white, between the *first simple white*, and the superlative, *whitest;* the same may be said of *more* great, *more* strong, *more* minute, &c. The doctrine of grammarians about three such degrees, which they call the positive, the comparative, and the superlative, must needs be absurd; both because in their positive there is no comparison at all,[s] and

times has cases, as in *valde sapiens;* sometimes has none, as in *valde amat.*) Priscian's definition of an adverb is as follows: Adverbium est pars orationis indeclinabilis, cujus significatio verbis adjicitur. Hoc enim perficit adverbium verbis additum, quod adjectiva nomina appellativis nominibus adjuncta; ut prudens homo; prudenter egit; felix vir; feliciter vivit. l. xv. p. 1003. And before, speaking of the Stoics, he says, Etiam adverbia nominibus vel verbis connumerabant, et quasi adjectiva verborum nominabant. l. i. p. 574. See also Apoll. de Synt. l. i. c. 3. sub. fin.

[s] Qui (scil. gradus positivus) quoniam perfectus est, a quibusdam in numero graduum non computatur. Consentii ars apud Putsch. p. 2022.

because their superlative is a comparative, as much as their comparative itself. Examples to evince this may be found everywhere. "Socrates was the *most wise* of all the Athenians; Homer was the *most sublime* of all poets."

> Cadit et Ripheus, justissimus unus
> Qui fuit in Teucris. Virg.

It must be confessed, these comparatives, as well the simple as the superlative, seem sometimes to part with their relative nature, and only retain their intensive. Thus in the degree, denoting simple excess,

> Tristior, et lacrymis oculos suffusa nitentes. Virg.
> Rusticior paulo est. Hor.

In the superlative this is more usual. Vir doctissimus, vir fortissimus, "a most learned man, a most brave man;" that is to say, not the bravest and most learned man that ever existed, but a man possessing those qualities in an eminent degree.

The authors of language have contrived a method to retrench these comparative adverbs, by expressing their force in the primary attributive. Thus, instead of *more fair*, they say *fairer;* instead of *most fair*, *fairest;* and the same holds true both in the Greek and Latin. This practice however has reached no further than to adjectives, or at least to participles, sharing the nature of adjectives. Verbs perhaps were thought too much diversified already, to admit more variations without perplexity.

As there are some attributives which admit of comparison, so there are others which admit of none. Such for example are those, which denote that quality of bodies arising from their figure; as when we say, "a circular table, a quadrangular court, a conical piece of metal," &c. The reason is, that a million of things, participating the same figure, participate it equally, if they participate it at all. To say, therefore, that while A and B are both quadrangular, A is more or less quadrangular than B, is absurd. The same holds true in all attributives, denoting definite quantities, whether continuous or discrete, whether absolute or relative. Thus the two-foot rule A, cannot be more a two-foot rule than any other of the same length. Twenty lions cannot be more twenty than twenty flies. If A and B be both triple or quadruple to C, they cannot be more triple, or more quadruple, one than the other. The reason of all this is, there can be no comparison without intension and remission; there can be no intension and remission in things always definite; and such are the attributives which we have last mentioned.

In the same reasoning we see the cause, why no substantive is susceptible of these comparative degrees. A mountain cannot be said more to be, or to exist, than a mole-hill, but the more and less must be sought for in their quantities. In like manner, when we refer many individuals to one species, the lion A cannot be called more a lion than the lion B; but if more any thing,

he is more fierce, more speedy, or exceeding in some such attribute. So again, in referring many species to one genus, a crocodile is not more an animal than a lizard, nor a tiger more than a cat; but if any thing, they are more bulky, more strong, &c. the excess, as before, being derived from their attributes. So true is that saying of the acute Stagirite, "that substance is not susceptible of more and less."[t] But this by way of digression; to return to the subject of adverbs.

Of the adverbs, or secondary attributives already mentioned, these denoting intension or remission may be called adverbs of quantity continuous: *once*, *twice*, *thrice*, are adverbs of quantity discrete; *more* and *most*, *less* and *least*, to which may be added *equally*, *proportionally*, &c. are adverbs of relation. There are others of quality, as when we say, *honestly* industrious, *prudently* brave, they fought *bravely*, he painted *finely*, a portico formed *circularly*, a plain cut *triangularly*, &c.

And here it is worth while to observe, how the same thing, participating the same essence, assumes different grammatical forms from its different relations. For example, suppose it should be asked, how differ *honest*, *honestly*, and *honesty*. The answer is, they are in essence the same, but they differ, inasmuch as *honest* is the attributive of a substantive; *honestly*, of a verb; and *honesty*, being divested of these its attributive relations, assumes the power of a substantive, so as to stand by itself.

The adverbs, hitherto mentioned, are common to verbs of every species; but there are some which are peculiar to verbs, properly so called; that is to say, to such as denote motion or energy, with their privations. All motion and rest imply time and place, as a kind of necessary coincidents. Hence, then, if we would express the place or time of either, we must needs have recourse to the proper adverbs; *of place*, as when we say, he stood *there*, he went *hence*, he travelled *far*, &c.: *of time*, as when we say, he stood *then*, he went *afterward*, he travelled *formerly*, &c. Should it be asked, Why adverbs of time, when verbs have tenses? The answer is, though tenses may be sufficient to denote the greater distinctions of time, yet to denote them all by tenses would be a perplexity without end. What a variety of forms to denote *yesterday*, *to-day*, *to-morrow*, *formerly*, *lately*, *just now*, *now*, *immediately*, *presently*, *soon*, *hereafter*, &c.? It was this, then, that made the temporal adverbs necessary, over and above the tenses.

To the adverbs just mentioned, may be added those which denote the intensions and remissions peculiar to motion, such as

[t] Οὐκ ἂν ἐπιδέχοιτο ἡ οὐσία τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἧττον. Categor. c. 5. See also Sanctius, l. i. c. 11; l. ii. c. 10, 11. where the subject of comparatives is treated in a very masterly and philosophical manner. See also Priscian, p. 598. Derivantur igitur comparativa a nominibus adjectivis, &c.

speedily, *hastily*, *swiftly*, *slowly*, &c.; as also adverbs of place, made out of prepositions, such as *ἄνω* and *κάτω*, from *ἀνὰ* and *κατὰ*, in English *upward* and *downward*, from *up* and *down*. In some instances the preposition suffers no change, but becomes an adverb by nothing more than its application; as when we say, *circa equitat*, "he rides *about*;" *prope cecidit*, "he was *near* falling;" *verum ne post conferas culpam in me*, "but do not *after* lay the blame on me." [a]

There are likewise adverbs of interrogation, such as *where*, *whence*, *whither*, *how*; of which there is this remarkable, that when they lose their interrogative power, they assume that of a relative, so as even to represent the relative or subjunctive pronoun. Thus Ovid,

> Et seges est, *ubi* Troja fuit:

translated in our old English ballad,

> "And corn doth grow, *where* Troy town stood."

That is to say, *seges est in eo loco*, *in quo*, &c. "corn groweth in that place, in which," &c.; the power of the relative being implied in the adverb. Thus Terence,

> Hujusmodi mihi res semper comminiscere,
> *Ubi* me excarnufices: Heaut. iv. 6.

where *ubi* relates to *res*, and stands for *quibus rebus*.

It is in like manner that the relative pronoun, upon occasion, becomes an interrogative, at least in Latin and English. Thus Horace,

> *Quem* virum aut heroa lyra, vel acri
> Tibia sumes celebrare, Clio?

So Milton,

> *Who* first seduc'd them to that foul revolt?

The reason of all this is as follows. The pronoun and adverbs here mentioned are all alike, in their original character, relatives. Even when they become interrogatives, they lose not this character, but are still relatives, as much as ever. The difference is, that without an interrogation, they have reference to a subject, which is antecedent, definite, and known; with an interrogation, to a subject which is subsequent, indefinite, and unknown, and which it is expected that the answer should express and ascertain.

> *Who* first seduc'd them?

The very question itself supposes a seducer, to which, though unknown, the pronoun *who*, has a reference.

> Th' infernal serpent.

Here, in the answer, we have the subject, which was indefinite, ascertained; so that the *who* in the interrogation is (we see) as much a relative, as if it had been said originally, without any interrogation at all, "it was the infernal serpent *who* first seduced them."

[a] Sosip. Charisii Inst. Gram. p. 170. Terent. Eun. act. ii. sc. 3.

And thus is it that interrogatives and relatives mutually pass into each other.

And so much for adverbs, peculiar to verbs properly so called. We have already spoken of those which are common to all attributives. We have likewise attempted to explain their general nature, which we have found to consist in being the attributes of attributes. There remains only to add, that adverbs may be derived from almost every part of speech: from prepositions, as when from *after* we derive *afterwards*; from participles, and through these from verbs, as when from *know* we derive *knowing*, and thence *knowingly*; from *scio*, *sciens*, and thence *scienter*: from adjectives, as when from *virtuous* and *vicious*, we derive *virtuously* and *viciously*; from substantives, as when from πίθηκος, "an ape," we derive πιθήκειον βλέπειν, "to look apishly;" from λέων, "a lion," λεοντωδῶς, "leoninely:" nay, even from proper names, as when from *Socrates* and *Demosthenes*, we derive *Socratically* and *Demosthenically*. "It was Socratically reasoned," we say; "it was Demosthenically spoken."[x] Of the same sort are many others, cited by the old grammarians, such as *Catiliniter* from *Catilina*, *Sisenniter* from *Sisenna*, *Tulliane* from *Tullius*, &c.[y]

Nor are they thus extensive only in derivation, but in signification also. Theodore Gaza in his Grammar informs us,[z] that adverbs may be found in every one of the predicaments, and that the readiest way to reduce their infinitude, was to refer them by classes to those ten universal genera. The Stoics, too, called the adverb by the name of πανδέκτης, and that from a view to the same multiform nature. *Omnia in se capit quasi collata per satiram, concessa sibi rerum varia potestate.* It is thus that Sosipater explains the word,[a] from whose authority we know it to be Stoical. But of this enough.

And now having finished these principal parts of speech, the substantive and the attributive, which are significant when alone, we proceed to those auxiliary parts, which are only significant, when associated. But as these make the subject of a book by themselves, we here conclude the first book of this treatise.

[x] Aristotle has Κυκλοπικῶς, "Cyclopically," from Κύκλωψ, "a Cyclops." Eth. Nic. x. 9.

[y] See Prisc. l. xv. p. 1022. Sos. Charis. 161. edit. Putschii.

[z] Διὸ δὴ καὶ ἄμεινον ἴσως δέκα καὶ τῶν ἐπιῤῥημάτων γένη θέσθαι ἐκεῖνα, οὐσίαν, ποιὸν, ποσὸν, πρός τι, κ. τ. λ. Gram. Introd. l. ii.

[a] Sosip. Char. p. 175. edit. Putschii.

BOOK II.

CHAPTER I.

CONCERNING DEFINITIVES.

What remains of our work is a matter of less difficulty, it being the same here as in some historical picture; when the principal figures are once formed, it is an easy labour to design the rest.

Definitives, the subject of the present chapter, are commonly called by grammarians, "articles," *articuli*, ἄρθρα. They are of two kinds, either those properly and strictly so called, or else the pronominal articles, such as *this*, *that*, *any*, &c.

We shall first treat of those articles more strictly so denominated, the reason and use of which may be explained as follows.

The visible and individual substances of nature are infinitely more numerous than for each to admit of a particular name. To supply this defect, when any individual occurs which either wants a proper name, or whose proper name is not known, we ascertain it as well as we can by referring it to its species; or if the species be unknown, then at least to some genus. For example: A certain object occurs, with a head and limbs, and appearing to possess the powers of self-motion and sensation. If we know it not as an individual, we refer it to its proper species, and call it *dog*, or *horse*, or *lion*, or the like. If none of these names fit, we go to the genus, and call it *animal*.

But this is not enough. The thing at which we are looking is neither a species nor a genus. What is it then? An individual. Of what kind? Known or unknown? Seen now for the first time, or seen before, and now remembered? It is here we shall discover the use of the two articles, *a* and *the*: *a* respects our primary perception, and denotes individuals as unknown; *the* respects our secondary perception, and denotes individuals as known. To explain by an example: I see an object pass by which I never saw till now. What do I say? "There goes *a* beggar with *a* long beard." The man departs, and returns a week after. What do I say then? "There goes *the* beggar with *the* long beard." The article only is changed, the rest remains unaltered.

Yet mark the force of this apparently minute change. The individual once vague, is now recognised as something known, and that merely by the efficacy of this latter article, which tacitly insinuates a kind of previous acquaintance, by referring the present perception to a like perception already past.[a]

[a] See b. i. c. 5. p. 135.

The truth is, the articles *a* and *the* are both of them definitives, as they circumscribe the latitude of genera and species by reducing them for the most part to denote individuals. The difference, however, between them is this: the article *a* leaves the individual itself unascertained, whereas the article *the* ascertains the individual also, and is for that reason the more accurate definitive of the two.

It is perhaps owing to the imperfect manner in which the article *a* defines, that the Greeks have no article correspondent to it, but supply its place by a negation of their article ὁ. Ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἔπεσεν, "the man fell," ἄνθρωπος ἔπεσεν, "a man fell," without any thing prefixed, but only the article withdrawn.[b] Even in English, where the article *a* cannot be used, as in plurals, its force is expressed by the same negation. "Those are *the* men," means those are individuals of which we possess some previous knowledge. "Those are men," the article apart, means no more than that they are so many vague and uncertain individuals, just as the phrase *a man*, in the singular, implies one of the same number.

But though the Greeks have no article correspondent to the article *a*, yet nothing can be more nearly related than their ὁ to the article *the*. Ὁ βασιλεύς, "*the* king;" τὸ δῶρον, "*the* gift," &c. Nor is this only to be proved by parallel examples, but by the attributes of the Greek article as they are described by Apollonius, one of the earliest and most acute of the old grammarians now remaining.

Ἔστιν οὖν καθὸ καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις ἀπεφηνάμεθα, ἴδιον ἄρθρων ἡ ἀναφορά, ἥ ἐστι προκατειλεγμένου προσώπου παραστατική: "Now the peculiar attribute of the article, as we have shewn elsewhere, is that reference which implies some certain person already mentioned." Again: Οὐ γὰρ δήγε τὰ ὀνόματα ἐξ αὐτῶν ἀναφορὰν παρίστησιν, εἰ μὴ συμπαραλάβοιεν τὸ ἄρθρον, οὗ ἐξαίρετός ἐστιν ἡ ἀναφορά: "For nouns of themselves imply not reference, unless they take to them the article, whose peculiar character is reference." Again: Τὸ ἄρθρον προϋφεστῶσαν γνῶσιν δηλοῖ: "The article indicates a pre-established acquaintance."[c]

[b] Τὰ γὰρ ἀοριστωδῶς πότε νοούμενα, ἡ τοῦ ἄρθρου παράθεσις ὑπὸ ὁρισμὸν τοῦ προσώπου ἄγει: "those things which are at times understood indefinitely, the addition of the article makes to be definite as to their person." Apoll. l. iv. c. 1. See of the same author, l. i. c. 6, 36. ποιεῖ (τὸ ἄρθρον sc.) δ' ἀνακόλησιν προεγνωσμένου τοῦ ἐν τῇ συντάξει· οἷον εἰ μὲν λέγοι τις, ἄνθρωπος ἦκε, ἄδηλον τίνα ἄνθρωπον λέγει. εἰ δὲ ὁ ἄνθρωπος, δῆλον, προεγνωσμένον γάρ τινα ἄνθρωπον λέγει. Τοῦτο δὲ αὐτὸ βούλονται καὶ οἱ φάσκοντες τ' ἄρθρον σημαντικὸν πρώτης γνώσεως καὶ δευτέρας: "the article causes a review within the mind of something known before the texture of the discourse. Thus if any one says, ἄνθρωπος ἦκε, 'man came,' (which is the same as when we say in English, 'a man came,') it is not evident of whom he speaks. But if he says, ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἦκε, 'the man came,' then it is evident; for he speaks of some person known before. And this is what those mean, who say that the article is expressive of the first and second knowledge together." Theod. Gazæ, l. iv.

[c] Apoll. de Synt. l. i. c. 6, 7. His account of reference is as follows: Ἴδιωμα ἀνα-

His reasoning upon proper names is worth remarking. Proper names (he tells us) often fall into homonymie, that is, different persons often go by the same name. To solve this ambiguity we have recourse to adjectives or epithets. For example, there were two Grecian chiefs who bore the name of Ajax. It was not, therefore, without reason, that Menestheus uses epithets, when this intent was to distinguish the one of them from the other.

> Ἀλλὰ περ οἷος ἔτω Τελαμώνιος ἄλκιμος Αἴας. Hom.
> "If both Ajaxes (says he) cannot be spared,
> . . . . . at least alone
> Let mighty Telamonian Ajax come."

Apollonius proceeds: even epithets themselves are diffused through various subjects, inasmuch as the same adjective may be referred to many substantives.

In order, therefore, to render both parts of speech equally definite, that is to say, the adjective as well as the substantive, the adjective itself assumes an article before it, that it may indicate a reference to some single person only, *μοναδικὴ ἀναφορὰ*, according to the author's own phrase. And thus it is we say, *Τρύφων ὁ γραμματικὸς*, "Trypho the grammarian;" *Ἀπολλόδωρος ὁ Κυρηναῖος*, "Apollodorus the Cyrenean," &c. The author's conclusion of this section is worth remarking. *Δεόντως ἄρα καὶ κατὰ τὸ τοιοῦτον ἡ πρόσθεσίς ἐστι τοῦ ἄρθρου, συνιδιάζουσα τὸ ἐπιθετικὸν τῷ κυρίῳ ὀνόματι.* "It is with reason, therefore, that the article is here also added, as it brings the adjective to an individuality as precise as the proper name."[d]

We may carry this reasoning further, and shew how by help of the article even common appellatives come to have the force of proper names, and that unassisted by epithets of any kinds. Among the Athenians, *πλοῖον* meant "ship;" *ἕνδεκα*, "eleven;" and *ἄνθρωπος*, "man." Yet add but the article, and *τὸ πλοῖον*, "the ship," meant that particular ship which they sent annually to Delos; *οἱ ἕνδεκα*, "the eleven," meant certain officers of justice; and *ὁ ἄνθρωπος*, "the man," meant their public executioner. So in English, *city* is a name common to many places; and *speaker*, a name common to many men. Yet if we prefix the article, *the* city, means our metropolis; and *the* speaker, a high officer in the British parliament.

And thus it is by an easy transition that the article, from denoting reference, comes to denote eminence also; that is to say, from implying an ordinary pre-acquaintance, to presume a kind of general and universal notoriety. Thus among the Greeks, *ὁ ποιητής*, "the poet," meant Homer;[e] and *ὁ Σταγει-*

φορᾶς προκατειλεγμένου προσώπου δευτέρα γνῶσις: "The peculiar character of reference is the second or repeated knowledge of some person already mentioned." Lib. ii. c. 3.

[d] See Apoll. l. i. c. 12. where by mistake *Menelaus* is put for *Menestheus*.

[e] There are so few exceptions to this observation, that we may fairly admit it to be generally true. Yet Aristotle twice

ριτης, "the Stagyrite," meant Aristotle; not that there were not many poets beside Homer, and many Stagyrites beside Aristotle, but none equally illustrious for their poetry and philosophy.

It is on a like principle that Aristotle tells us, it is by no means the same thing to assert *εἶναι τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀγαθὸν*, or, *τὸ ἀγαθὸν*, that "pleasure is *a* good," or "*the* good." The first only makes it a common object of desire, upon a level with many others which daily raise our wishes; the last supposes it that supreme and sovereign good, the ultimate scope of all our actions and endeavours.[f]

But to pursue our subject. It has been said already, that the article has no meaning but when associated to some other word. To what words then may it be associated? To such as require defining, for it is by nature a definitive. And what words are these? Not those which already are as definite as may be. Nor yet those which, being indefinite, cannot properly be made otherwise. It remains then they must be those which, though indefinite, are yet capable, through the article, of becoming definite.

Upon these principles we see the reason, why it is absurd to say, *ὁ ἐγὼ*, "the I," or *ὁ σὺ*, "the thou," because nothing can make those pronouns more definite than they are.[g] The same may be asserted of proper names: and though the Greeks say, *ὁ Σωκράτης, ἡ Ξάνθιππη*, and the like, yet the article is a mere pleonasm, unless perhaps it serve to distinguish sexes. By the same rule we cannot say in Greek *οἱ ἀμφοτέροι*, or in English, "the both," because these words in their own nature are each of them perfectly defined, so that to define them further would be quite superfluous. Thus, if it be said, "I have read both poets," this plainly indicates a definite pair, of whom some mention has been made already; *δυὰς ἐγνωσμένη*, "a known duad," as Apollonius expresses himself,[h] when he speaks of this subject. On the contrary, if it be said, "I have read two poets," this may mean any pair out of all that ever existed. And hence this numeral, being in this sense indefinite, (as indeed are all others, as well as itself,) is forced to assume the article, whenever it would become definite.[i] And thus it is, *the two* in English, and *οἱ δυὸ*

denotes Euripides by the phrase *ὁ ποιητής*, once at the end of the seventh book of his Nicomachian Ethics, and again in his Physics, l. ii. 2. Plato, also, in his tenth book of Laws, (p. 901. edit. Serr.) denotes Hesiod after the same manner.

[f] Analyt. Prior. l. i. c. 40.

[g] Apollonius makes it part of the pronoun's definition, to refuse coalescence with the article. *Ἐκεῖνο οὖν Ἀντωνυμία, τὸ μετὰ δείξεως ἢ ἀναφορᾶς ἀντονομαζόμενον, ᾧ οὐ σύνεστι τὸ ἄρθρον:* "That therefore is a pronoun, which with indication or reference is put for a noun, and with which the article doth not associate." l. ii. c. 5. So Gaza, speaking of pronouns, *πάντη δὲ— οὐκ ἐπιδέχονται ἄρθρον.* l. iv. Priscian says the same: Jure igitur apud Græcos prima et secunda persona pronominum, quæ sine dubio demonstrativæ sunt, articulis adjungi non possunt; nec tertia, quando demonstrativa est. l. xii. p. 938. In the beginning of the same book, he gives the true reason of this: Supra omnes alias partes orationis finit personas pronomen.

[h] Apollon. l. i. c. 16.

[i] This explains Servius on Æneid. xii. 511. where he tells us that *duorum* is put for

in Greek, mean nearly the same thing as *both* or *ἀμφοτέροι*. Hence also it is, that as *two*, when taken alone, has reference to some primary and indefinite perception, while the article *the*, has reference to some secondary and definite;[k] hence, I say, the reason why it is bad Greek to say *δυὸ οἱ ἀνθρώποι*, and bad English to say *two the men*. Such syntax is in fact a blending of incompatibles; that is to say, of a defined substantive with an undefined attributive. On the contrary, to say in Greek, *ἀμφοτέροι οἱ ἀνθρώποι*, or in English, *both the men*, is good and allowable, because the substantive cannot possibly be less apt, by being defined, to coalesce with an attributive, which is defined as well as itself. So, likewise, it is correct to say, *οἱ δυὸ ἀνθρώποι*, "*the* two men," because here the article, being placed in the beginning, extends its power as well through substantive as attributive, and equally contributes to define them both.

As some of the words above admit of no article, because they are by nature as definite as may be, so there are others which admit it not, because they are not to be defined at all. Of this sort are all interrogatives. If we question about substances, we cannot say, *ὁ τὶς οὗτος*, "the who is this;" but *τὶς οὗτος*, "who is this?[l] The same as to qualities and both kinds of quantity. We say without an article, *ποιὸς*, *ποσοὶ*, *πήλικος*; in English, "what sort of, how many, how great?" The reason is, that the articles *ὁ* and *the*, respect beings already known; interrogatives respect beings about which we are ignorant; for as to what we know, interrogation is superfluous.

In a word, the natural associators with articles are all those common appellatives which denote the several genera and species of beings. It is these, which, by assuming a different article, serve either to explain an individual upon its first being perceived, or else to indicate, upon its return, a recognition, or repeated knowledge.[m]

We shall here subjoin a few instances of the peculiar power of articles.

Every proposition consists of a subject and a predicate. In English these are distinguished by their position, the subject standing first, the predicate last. "Happiness is pleasure:" here,

amborum. In English or Greek, the article would have done the business, for "the two," or *τοῦν δυοῦν*, are equivalent to "both" or *ἀμφοτέρων*; but not so *duorum*, because the Latins have no articles to prefix.

The passage in Virgil of which Servius here speaks, is a description of Turnus's killing two brothers, Amycus and Diores; after which, the poet says of him,

. . . . . *curru abscissa duorum*
Suspendit capita . . . . .

This, literally translated, is, "he hung up on his chariot the heads of *two* persons, which were cut off;" whereas the sense requires, "of *the* two persons," that is to say, of Amycus and Diores. Now this by *amborum* would have been expressed properly, as *amborum* means "*the* two;" by *duorum* is expressed improperly, as it means only "*two* indefinitely."

[k] Sup. p. 179.

[l] Apollonius calls *τὶς*, *ἐναντιώτατον τῶν ἄρθρων*, a part of speech, "most contrary, most averse to articles." l. iv. c. 1.

[m] What is here said respects the two articles which we have in English. In Greek, the article does no more than imply a recognition. See before, p. 180.

happiness is the subject; *pleasure*, the predicate. If we change their order, and say, "pleasure is happiness;" then *pleasure* becomes the subject, and *happiness* the predicate. In Greek, these are distinguished not by any order or position, but by help of the article, which the subject always assumes, and the predicate in most instances (some few excepted) rejects. "Happiness is pleasure," *ἡδονὴ ἡ εὐδαιμονία:* "pleasure is happiness," *ἡ ἡδονὴ εὐδαιμονία:* "fine things are difficult," *χαλεπὰ τὰ καλά:* "difficult things are fine," *τὰ χαλεπὰ καλά.*

In Greek, it is worth attending, how in the same sentence, the same article, by being prefixed to a different word, quite changes the whole meaning. For example: *ὁ Πτολεμαῖος γυμνασιαρχήσας ἐτιμήθη*, "Ptolemy, having presided over the games, was publicly honoured." The participle *γυμνασιαρχήσας* has here no other force, than to denote to us the time when Ptolemy was honoured, viz. after having presided over the games. But if, instead of the substantive, we join the participle to the article, and say, *ὁ γυμνασιαρχήσας Πτολεμαῖος ἐτιμήθη*, our meaning is then, "the Ptolemy, who presided over the games, was honoured." The participle in this case, being joined to the article, tends tacitly to indicate not one Ptolemy but many, of which number a particular one participated of honour.[n]

In English likewise it deserves remarking, how the sense is changed by changing of the articles, though we leave every other word of the sentence untouched. "And Nathan said unto David, Thou art the man."[o] In that single *the*, that dimunitive particle, all the force and efficacy of the reason is contained. By that alone are the premises applied, and so firmly fixed, as never to be shaken. It is possible this assertion may appear at first somewhat strange; but let him who doubts it only change the article, and then see what will become of the prophet and his reasoning. "And Nathan said unto David, Thou art a man." Might not the king well have demanded, upon so impertinent a position,

> Non dices hodie, quorsum hæc tam putida tendant?

But enough of such speculations. The only remark which we shall make on them is this; that "minute change in principles leads to mighty change in effects; so that well are principles entitled to our regard, however in appearance they may be trivial and low."

The articles already mentioned are those strictly so called; but besides these there are the pronominal articles, such as *this*, *that*, *any*, *other*, *some*, *all*, *no*, or *none*, &c. Of these we have spoken already in our chapter of pronouns,[p] where we have

[n] Apollon. l. i. c. 33, 34.

[o] Σὺ εἶ ὁ ἀνηρ. Βασιλ. β'. κεφ. ιβ'.

[p] See b. i. c. 5. p. 137, 8. It seems to have been some view of words, like that here given, which induced Quintilian to say of the Latin tongue, Noster sermo articulos non desiderat; ideoque in alias partes orationis sparguntur. Inst. Orat. l. i. c. 4.

shewn, when they may be taken as pronouns, and when as articles. Yet in truth it must be confessed, if the essence of an article be to define and ascertain, they are much more properly articles than any thing else, and as such should be considered in universal grammar. Thus when we say, "*this* picture I approve, but *that* I dislike," what do we perform by the help of these definitives, but bring down the common appellative to denote two individuals, the one as the more near, the other as the more distant? So when we say, "*some* men are virtuous, but *all* men are mortal," what is the natural effect of this *all* and *some*, but to define that universality and particularity which would remain indefinite, were we to take them away? The same is evident in such sentences as, "*some* substances have sensation, *others* want it;" "choose *any* way of acting, and *some* men will find fault," &c. For here, *some*, *other*, and *any*, serve all of them to define different parts of a given whole; *some*, to denote a definite part; *any*, to denote an indefinite; and *other*, to denote the remaining part, when a part has been assumed already. Sometimes this last word denotes a large indefinite portion, set in opposition to some single, definite, and remaining part, which receives from such opposition no small degree of heightening. Thus Virgil,

> Excudent *alii* spirantia mollius æra;
> (Credo equidem) vivos ducent de marmore vultus;
> Orabunt causas melius, cœlique meatus
> Describent radio, et surgentia sidera dicent:
> *Tu* regere imperio populos, *Romane*, memento, &c. Æn. vi.

Nothing can be stronger or more sublime than this antithesis; one act set as equal to many other acts taken together, and the Roman singly (for it is *Tu Romane*, not *Vos Romani*) to all other men; and yet this performed by so trivial a cause, as the just opposition of *alii* to *tu*.

But here we conclude, and proceed to treat of connectives.

CHAPTER II.

CONCERNING CONNECTIVES, AND FIRST THOSE CALLED CONJUNCTIONS.

Connectives are the subject of what follows; which, according as they connect either sentences or words, are called by the

So Scaliger: His declaratis, satis constat Græcorum articulos non neglectos a nobis, sed eorum usum superfluum. Nam ubi aliquid præscribendum est, quod Græci per articulum efficiunt (ἔλεξεν ὁ δοῦλος) expletur a Latinis per *is* aut *ille;* is, aut, ille servus dixit, de quo servo antea facta mentio sit, aut qui alio quo pacto notus sit. Additur enim articulus ad rei memoriam renovandam, cujus antea non nescii sumus, aut ad præscribendam intellectionem, quæ latius patere queat; veluti cum dicimus *C. Cæsar, is qui postea dictator fuit.* Nam alii fuere C. Cæsares. Sic Græce Καῖσαρ ὁ αὐτοκράτωρ. De Caus. Ling. Lat. c. 131.

different names of conjunctions or prepositions. Of these names, that of the preposition is taken from a mere accident, as it commonly stands in connection before the part which it connects. The name of the conjunction, as is evident, has reference to its essential character.

Of these two we shall consider the conjunction first, because it connects not words but sentences. This is conformable to the analysis with which we began this inquiry,[q] and which led us, by parity of reason, to consider sentences themselves before words. Now the definition of a conjunction is as follows: a part of speech, void of signification itself, but so formed as to help signification, by making two or more significant sentences to be one significant sentence.[r]

[q] Sup. p. 120.

[r] Grammarians have usually considered the conjunction as connecting rather single parts of speech than whole sentences, and that, too, with the addition of like with like, tense with tense, number with number, case with case, &c. This Sanctius justly explodes: Conjunctio neque casus, neque alias partes orationis (ut imperiti docent) conjungit, ipsæ enim partes inter se conjunguntur—sed conjunctio orationes inter se conjungit. Miner. l. iii. c. 14. He then establishes his doctrine by a variety of examples. He had already said as much, l. i. c. 18; and in this he appears to have followed Scaliger, who had asserted the same before him. Conjunctionis autem notionem veteres paullo inconsultius prodidere; neque enim, quod aiunt, partes alias conjungit, (ipsæ enim partes per se inter se conjunguntur,)—sed conjunctio est, quæ conjungit orationes plures. De Caus. Ling. Lat. c. 165.

This doctrine of theirs is confirmed by Apollonius, who, in the several places, where he mentions the conjunction, always considers it in syntax as connecting sentences, and not words, though in his works now extant he has not given us its definition. See l. i. c. 2. p. 14; l. ii. c. 12. p 124; l. iii. c. 15. p. 234.

But we have stronger authority than this to support Scaliger and Sanctius, and that is Aristotle's definition, as the passage has been corrected by the best critics and manuscripts. A conjunction, according to him, is *φωνὴ ἄσημος, ἐκ πλειόνων μὲν φωνῶν μιᾶς, σημαντικῶν δὲ, ποιεῖν πεφυκυῖα μίαν φωνὴν σημαντικήν:* "an articulate sound, devoid of signification, which is so formed as to make one significant articulate sound out of several articulate sounds, which are each of them significant." Poet. c. 20. In this view of things, the one significant articulate sound, formed by the conjunction, is not the union of two or more syllables in one simple word, nor even of two or more words in one simple sentence; but of two or more simple sentences in one complex sentence, which is considered as one, from that concatenation of meaning effected by the conjunctions. For example, let us take the sentence which follows: "If men are by nature social, it is their interest to be just, though it were not so ordained by the laws of their country." Here are three sentences. 1. "Men are by nature social." 2. "It is man's interest to be just." 3. "It is not ordained by the laws of every country that man should be just." The first two of these sentences are made one by the conjunction *if;* these, one with the third sentence, by the conjunction *though;* and the three, thus united, make that *φωνὴ μία σημαντική*, "that one significant articulate sound," of which Aristotle speaks, and which is the result of the conjunctive power.

This explains a passage in his Rhetoric, where he mentions the same subject: *Ὁ γὰρ σύνδεσμος ἓν ποιεῖ τὸ πολλά· ὥστε ἐὰν ἐξαιρεθῇ, δῆλον ὅτι τουναντίον ἔσται τὸ ἓν πολλά:* "The conjunction makes many *one;* so that if it be taken away, it is then evident on the contrary that one will be *many.*" Rhet. iii. c. 12. His instance of a sentence, divested of its conjunctions, and thus made many out of one, is, *ἦλθον, ἀπήντησα, ἐδεόμην, veni, occurri, rogavi,* where, by the way, the three sentences, resulting from this dissolution, (for *ἦλθον, ἀπήντησα,* and *ἐδεόμην,* are each of them, when unconnected, so many perfect sentences,) prove that these are the proper subjects of the conjunction's connective faculty.

Ammonius's account of the use of this part of speech is elegant: *Διὸ καὶ τῶν λόγων ὁ μὲν ὕπαρξιν μίαν σημαίνων, ὁ κυρίως εἶς, ἀνάλογος ἂν εἴη τῷ μηδέπω τετμημένῳ ξύλῳ, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἑνὶ λεγομένῳ· ὁ δὲ πλείονας ὑπάρξεις δηλῶν, ἕνα* (lege *διὰ*) *τινὰ δὲ σύνδεσμον ἡνῶσθαι*

This, therefore, being the general idea of conjunctions, we deduce their species in the following manner. Conjunctions, while they connect sentences, either connect also their meanings, or not. For example: let us take these two sentences, "Rome was enslaved, Cæsar was ambitious," and connect them together by the conjunction *because*. "Rome was enslaved *because* Cæsar was ambitious." Here the meanings, as well as the sentences, appear to be connected. But if I say, "manners must be reformed, *or* liberty will be lost," here the conjunction *or*, though it join the sentences, yet, as to their respective meanings, is a perfect disjunctive. And thus it appears, that though all conjunctions conjoin sentences, yet with respect to the sense, some are conjunctive, and some disjunctive; and hence it is that we derive their different species.[s]

The conjunctions, which conjoin both sentences and their meanings, are either copulatives, or continuatives. The principal copulative in English is *and*. The continuatives are *if*, *because*, *therefore*, *that*, &c. The difference between these is this: the copulative does no more than barely couple sentences, and is therefore applicable to all subjects whose natures are not incompatible. Continuatives, on the contrary, by a more intimate connection, consolidate sentences into one continuous whole, and are therefore applicable only to subjects which have an essential coincidence.

To explain by examples: It is no way improper to say, "Lysippus was a statuary, *and* Priscian was a grammarian," "the sun shineth, *and* the sky is clear," because these are things that may coexist, and yet imply no absurdity. But it would be absurd to say, "Lysippus was a statuary, *because* Priscian was a grammarian;" though not to say, "the sun shineth, *because* the sky is clear." The reason is, with respect to the first, the coincidence is merely accidental; with respect to the last, it is essential, and founded in nature. And so much for the distinction between copulatives and continuatives.[t]

As to continuatives, they are either suppositive, such as *if;*

τινὸς δοκῶν, ἀναλογεῖ τῇ νηὶ τῇ ἐκ πολλῶν συγκειμένῃ ξύλων, ὑπὸ δὲ τῶν γόμφων φαινομένην ἐχούσῃ τὴν ἕνωσιν: "Of sentences that, which denotes one existence simply, and which is strictly *one*, may be considered as analogous to a piece of timber not yet severed, and called on this account *one*. That, which denotes several existences, and which appears to be made *one* by some conjunctive particle, is analogous to a ship made up of many pieces of timber, and which, by means of the nails, has an apparent unity." Am. in Lib. de Interpret. p. 54, 6.

[s] Thus Scaliger: Aut ergo sensum conjungunt, ac verba; aut verba tantum conjungunt, sensum vero disjungunt. De Caus. Ling. Lat. c. 167.

[t] Copulativa est, quæ copulat tam verba, quam sensum. Thus Priscian, p. 1026. But Scaliger is more explicit: Si sensum conjungunt (conjunctiones sc.) aut necessario, aut non necessario: et si non necessario, tum fiunt copulativæ, &c. De Caus. Ling. Lat. c. 167. Priscian's own account of continuatives is as follows. Continuativæ sunt, quæ continuationem et consequentiam rerum significant. *Ibid.* Scaliger's account is, Causam aut præstituunt, aut subdunt. *Ibid.* c. 168. The Greek name for the copulative was *σύνδεσμος συμπλεκτικός:* for the continuative, *συναπτικός:* the etymologies of which words justly distinguish their respective characters.

or positive, such as *because*, *therefore*, *as*, &c. Take examples of each: "You will live happily, *if* you live honestly;" "you live happily, *because* you live honestly." The difference between these continuatives is this: the suppositives denote connection, but assert not actual existence; the positives imply both the one and the other.[u]

Further than this, the positives above mentioned are either causal, such as *because*, *since*, *as*, &c. or collective, such as *therefore*, *wherefore*, *then*, &c. The difference between these is this: the causals subjoin causes to effects; "The sun is in eclipse, *because* the moon intervenes:" the collectives subjoin effects to causes, "The moon intervenes, *therefore* the sun is in eclipse." Now we use causals in those instances where, the effect being conspicuous, we seek its cause; and collectives, in demonstrations, and science properly so called, where the cause being known first, by its help we discern consequences.[x]

All these continuatives are resolvable into copulatives. Instead of "*Because* it is day, it is light," we may say, "It is day, *and* it is light." Instead of, "*If* it be day, it is light," we may say, "*It* is at the same time necessary to be day *and* to be light;" and so in other instances. The reason is, that the power of the copulative extends to all connections, as well to the essential, as to the casual or fortuitous. Hence, therefore, the continuative may be resolved into a copulative, and something more; that is to say, into a copulative implying an essential coincidence in the subjects conjoined.[y]

[u] The old Greek grammarians confined the name *συναπτικοί*, and the Latins that of *continuativæ*, to those conjunctions which we have called suppositive or conditional, while the positive they called *παρασυναπτικοί*, or *subcontinuativæ*. They agree, however, in describing their proper characters. The first, according to Gaza, are, *οἱ ὑπαρξιν μὲν οὐ, ἀκολουθίαν δέ τινα καὶ τάξιν δηλοῦντες.* l. iv. Priscian says, they signify to us, Qualis est ordinatio et natura rerum, cum dubitatione aliqua essentiæ rerum. p. 1027. And Scaliger says, they conjoin sine subsistentia necessaria; potest enim subsistere; et non subsistere utrumque enim admittunt. *Ibid.* c. 168. On the contrary of the positive, or *παρασυναπτικοί*, (to use his own name,) Gaza tells us, *ὅτι καὶ ὑπαρξιν μετὰ τάξεως σημαίνουσιν οὗτοιγε.* And Priscian says, Causam continuationis ostendunt consequentem cum essentia rerum. And Scaliger, Non ex hypothesi, sed ex eo, quod subsistit, conjungunt. *Ibid.*

It may seem at first somewhat strange, why the positive conjunctions should have been considered as subordinate to the suppositive, which by their ancient names appears to have been the fact. Is it, that the positive are confined to what actually is; the suppositive extend to possibles, nay, even as far as to impossibles? Thus it is false to affirm, "As it is day, it is light," unless it actually be day. But we may at midnight affirm, "If it be day, it is light," because the *if* extends to possibles also. Nay, we may affirm, by its help, (if we please,) even impossibles. We may say, "If the sun be cubical, then is the sun angular; if the sky fall, then shall we catch larks." Thus, too, Scaliger, upon the same occasion: Amplitudinem continuativæ percipi ex eo, quod etiam impossibile aliquando præsupponit. De Caus. Ling. Lat. c. 168. In this sense, then, the continuative, suppositive, or conditional conjunction, is (as it were) superior to the positive, as being of greater latitude in its application.

[x] The Latins called the causals, *causales* or *causativæ*; the collectives, *collectivæ* or *illativæ*; the Greeks called the former *αἰτιολογικοί*, and the latter *συλλογιστικοί*.

[y] Resolvuntur autem in copulativas omnes hæ, propterea quod causa cum effectu suapte natura conjuncta est. Scal. de Caus. Ling. Lat. c. 169.

As to causal conjunctions, (of which we have spoken already,) there is no one of the four species of causes which they are not capable of denoting; for example: the material cause, "the trumpet sounds, *because* it is made of metal;" the formal, "the trumpet sounds, *because* it is long and hollow;" the efficient, "the trumpet sounds, *because* an artist blows it;" the final, "the trumpet sounds, *that* it may raise our courage." Where it is worth observing, that the three first causes are expressed by the strong affirmation of the indicative mode; because, if the effect actually be, these must of necessity be also. But the last cause has a different mode, namely, the contingent, or potential: the reason is, that the final cause, though it may be first in speculation, is always last in event; that is to say, however it may be the end, which set the artist first to work, it may still be an end beyond his power to obtain, and which, like other contingents, may either happen, or not.[a] Hence, also, it is connected by conjunctions of a peculiar kind, such as *that*, *ἵνα*, *ut*, &c.

The sum is, that all conjunctions, which connect both sentences and their meanings, are either copulative or continuative: the continuatives are either conditional or positive; and the positives are either causal or collective.

And now we come to the disjunctive conjunctions, a species of words which bear this contradictory name, because, while they disjoin the sense, they conjoin the sentences.[a]

With respect to these, we may observe, that as there is a principle of union diffused throughout all things, by which this whole is kept together, and preserved from dissipation; so there is a principle of diversity diffused in like manner, the source of distinction, of number, and of order.[b]

[a] See b. i. c. 8. p. 158, 9. See also note *h*, p. 14. For the four causes, see note *u*, p. 23.

[a] *Οἱ δὲ διαζευκτικοὶ τὰ διαζευγμένα συστιθέασι, καὶ ἢ πρᾶγμα ἀπὸ πράγματος, ἢ πρόσωπον ἀπὸ προσώπου διαζευγνύντες, τὴν φράσιν ἐπισυνδοῦσιν.* Gazæ Gram. l. iv. Disjunctivæ sunt, quæ, quamvis dictiones conjungant, sensum tamen disjunctum habent. Prisc. l. xvi. p. 1029. And hence it is that a sentence connected by disjunctives has a near resemblance to a simple negative truth: for though this, as to its intellection, be disjunctive, (its end being to disjoin the subject from the predicate,) yet, as it combines terms together into one proposition, it is as truly synthetical as any truth that is affirmative. See chap. i. note *b*, p. 117.

[b] The diversity which adorns nature may be said to heighten by degrees, and as it passes to different subjects to become more and more intense. Some things only differ when considered as individuals, but if we recur to their species, immediately lose all distinction: such, for instance, are *Socrates* and *Plato*. Others differ as to species, but as to genus are the same: such are *man* and *lion*. There are others, again, which differ as to genus, and coincide only in those transcendental comprehensions of *ens*, *being*, *existence*, and the like: such are quantities and qualities; as, for example, *an ounce*, and the colour *white*. Lastly, all being whatever differs, as *being*, from *non-being*.

Further: in all things different, however moderate their diversity, there is an appearance of opposition with respect to each other, inasmuch as each thing is itself, and not any of the rest. But yet in all subjects this opposition is not the same. In relatives, such as greater and less, double and half, father and son, cause and effect; in these it is more striking than in ordinary subjects, because these always shew it, by necessarily inferring each other. In contraries, such as black and white, even and odd, good and bad, virtuous and vicious; in these the opposition goes still further, because these not only differ, but are even destructive of each other. But the most potent opposition is

Now it is to express, in some degree, the modifications of this diversity, that disjunctive conjunctions seem first to have been invented.

Of these disjunctives, some are simple, some adversative: simple, as when we say, "*Either* it is day, *or* it is night;" adversative, as when we say, "It is not day, *but* it is night." The difference between these is, that the simple do no more than merely disjoin; the adversative disjoin, with an opposition concomitant. Add to this, that the adversative are definite; the simple, indefinite. Thus, when we say, "The number of three is not an even number, *but* an odd," we not only disjoin two opposite attributes, but we definitely affirm one, and deny the other; but when we say, "The number of the stars is *either* even *or* odd," though we assert one attribute to be, and the other not to be, yet the alternative, notwithstanding, is left indefinite. And so much for simple disjunctives.[c]

As to adversative disjunctives, it has been said already that they imply opposition. Now there can be no opposition of the same attribute in the same subject, as when we say, "Nireus was beautiful;" but the opposition must be either of the same attribute in different subjects, as when we say, "Brutus was a patriot, *but* Cæsar was not;" or of different attributes in the same subject, as when we say, "Gorgias was a sophist, *but* not a philosopher;" or of different attributes in different subjects, as when we say, "Plato was a philosopher, *but* Hippias was a sophist."

The conjunctions used for all these purposes may be called absolute adversatives.

But there are other adversatives, besides these; as when we say, "Nireus was more beautiful *than* Achilles; Virgil was *as* great a poet, *as* Cicero was an orator." The character of these latter is, that they go further than the former, by marking, not only opposition, but that equality, or excess, which arises among

that of ἀντίφασις, or "contradiction," when we oppose proposition to proposition, truth to falsehood, asserting of any subject, either it is, or it is not. This, indeed, is an opposition which extends itself to all things; for every thing conceivable must needs have its negative, though multitudes by nature have neither relatives nor contraries.

Besides these modes of diversity, there are others that deserve notice: such, for instance, as the diversity between the name of a thing and its definition; between the various names which belong to the same thing, and the various things which are denoted by the same name; all which diversities, upon occasion, become a part of our discourse. And so much, in short, for the subject of diversity.

[c] The simple disjunctive ἤ, or *vel*, is mostly used indefinitely, so as to leave an alternative; but when it is used definitely, so as to leave no alternative, it is then a perfect disjunctive of the subsequent from the previous, and has the same force with καὶ οὐ, or *et non*. It is thus Gaza explains that verse of Homer,

Βούλομ' ἐγὼ λαὸν σόον ἔμμεναι, ἢ ἀπολέσθαι. Iliad. A.

That is to say, "I desire the people should be saved, *and not* be destroyed;" the conjunction ἤ being ἀναιρετικὸς, or "sublative." It must, however, be confessed, that this verse is otherwise explained by an ellipsis, either of μᾶλλον, or αὐτὶς, concerning which, see the commentators.

subjects from their being compared; and hence it is they may be called adversatives of comparison.

Besides the adversatives here mentioned, there are two other species, of which the most eminent are *unless* and *although*. For example: "Troy will be taken, *unless* the Palladium be preserved; Troy will be taken, *although* Hector defend it." The nature of these adversatives may be thus explained: as every event is naturally allied to its cause, so by parity of reason it is opposed to its preventive; and as every cause is either adequate[d] or inadequate, (inadequate, when it endeavours without being effectual,) so in like manner is every preventive. Now adequate preventives are expressed by such adversatives as *unless*; "Troy will be taken, *unless* the Palladium be preserved;" that is, this alone is sufficient to prevent it. The inadequate are expressed by such adversatives as *although*; "Troy will be taken, *although* Hector defend it;" that is, Hector's defence will prove ineffectual.

The names given by the old grammarians to denote these last adversatives, appear not sufficiently to express their natures.[e] They may be better, perhaps, called adversatives adequate, and inadequate.

And thus it is that all disjunctives, that is, conjunctions, which conjoin sentences, but not their meanings, are either simple or adversative; and that all adversatives are either absolute or comparative, or else adequate or inadequate.

We shall finish this chapter with a few miscellany observations.

In the first place it may be observed, through all the species of disjunctives, that the same disjunctive appears to have greater or less force, according as the subjects, which it disjoins, are more or less disjoined by nature. For example: if we say, "Every number is even *or* odd, every proposition is true *or* false," nothing seems to disjoin more strongly than the disjunctive, because no things are in nature more incompatible than the subjects. But if we say, "That object is a triangle, *or* figure contained under three right lines;" the *or*, in this case, hardly seems to disjoin, or, indeed, to do more than distinctly to express the thing; first by its name, and then by its definition. So if we say, "That figure is a sphere, *or* a globe, *or* a ball," the disjunctive, in this case, tends no further to disjoin, than as it distinguishes the several names which belong to the same thing.[f]

[d] This distinction has reference to common opinion, and the form of language consonant thereto. In strict metaphysical truth, no cause that is not adequate is any cause at all.

[e] They called them for the most part, without sufficient distinction of their species, *adversativæ*, or ἐναντιωματικοί.

[f] The Latins had a peculiar particle for this occasion, which they called *subdisjunctiva*, "a subdisjunctive," and that was *sive*. *Alexander sive Paris*; *Mars sive Mavors*. The Greek εἴτ' οὖν seems to answer the same end. Of these particles, Scaliger thus speaks: Et sane nomen subdisjunctivarum recte acceptum est, neque enim tam plane disjungit, quam disjunctivæ. Nam disjunctivæ sunt in contrariis—subdisjunctivæ

Again: the words *when* and *where*, and all others of the same nature, such as *whence*, *whither*, *whenever*, *wherever*, &c. may be properly called adverbial conjunctions, because they participate the nature both of adverbs and conjunctions: of conjunctions, as they conjoin sentences; of adverbs, as they denote the attributes either of time or of place.

Again: these adverbial conjunctions, and perhaps most of the prepositions, (contrary to the character of accessory words, which have strictly no signification, but when associated with other words,) have a kind of obscure signification, when taken alone, by denoting those attributes of time and place. And hence it is, that they appear in grammar like Zoophytes in nature; a kind of middle beings,[g] of amphibious character, which, by sharing the attributes of the higher and the lower, conduce to link the whole together.[h]

And so much for conjunctions, their genus, and their species.

autem etiam in non contrariis, sed diversis tantum; ut, Alexander sive Paris. De Caus. Ling. Lat. c. 170.

[g] Πολλαχοῦ γὰρ ἡ φύσις δῆλη γίνεται κατὰ μικρὸν μεταβαίνουσα, ὥστε ἀμφισβητεῖσθαι ἐπὶ τίνων, πότερον ζῶον ἢ φυτόν: "Nature, in many instances, appears to make her transition by little and little, so that in some beings it may be doubted, whether they are animal or vegetable." Themist. p. 74. edit. Ald. See also Arist. de Animal. Part. l. x. p. 93. edit. Syll.

[h] It is somewhat surprising that the politest and most elegant of the Attic writers, and Plato above all the rest, should have their works filled with particles of all kinds, and with conjunctions in particular; while in the modern polite works, as well of ourselves as of our neighbours, scarce such a word as a particle or conjunction is to be found. Is it, that where there is connexion in the meaning, there must be words had to connect; but that where the connexion is little or none, such connectives are of little use? That houses of cards, without cement, may well answer their end, but not those houses where one would choose to dwell? Is this the cause? or have we attained an elegance to the ancients unknown?

Venimus ad summam fortunæ, &c.

[i] The Stoic name for a preposition was προθετικὸς σύνδεσμος, *præpositiva conjunctio*, "a prepositive conjunction." Ὡς μὲν οὖν καὶ κατὰ τὰς ἄλλας παραθέσεις αἱ προθέσεις συνδεσμικῆς συντάξεως γίνονται παρεμφατικαί, λέλεκται ἡμῖν· ἐξ ὧν καὶ ἀφορμὴ εὕρηται παρὰ τοῖς Στωικοῖς τοῦ καλεῖσθαι αὐτὰς προθετικοὺς συνδέσμους: "Now in what manner, even in other applications, (besides the present,) prepositions give proof of their conjunctive syntax, we have mentioned already; whence, too, the Stoics took occasion to call them prepositive conjunctions." Apollon. l. iv. c. 5. p. 313. Yet is this, in fact, rather a descriptive sketch, than a complete definition, since there are other conjunctions which are prepositive as well as these. See Gaz. l. iv. de Præposit. Prisc. l. xiv. p. 983.

CHAPTER III.

CONCERNING THOSE CONNECTIVES CALLED PREPOSITIONS.

Prepositions by their name express their place, but not their character. Their definition will distinguish them from the former connectives. A preposition is a part of speech, devoid itself of signification, but so formed as to unite two words that are significant, and that refuse to coalesce or unite of themselves.[i] This connective power (which relates to words only,

and not sentences) will be better understood from the following speculations.

Some things coalesce and unite of themselves; others refuse to do so without help and, as it were, compulsion. Thus, in works of art, the mortar and the stone coalesce of themselves, but the wainscot and the wall not without nails and pins. In nature this is more conspicuous. For example; all quantities and qualities coalesce immediately with their substances. Thus it is we say, "a fierce lion," "a vast mountain;" and from this natural concord of subject and accident, arises the grammatical concord of substantive and adjective. In like manner, actions coalesce with their agents, and passions with their patients. Thus it is we say, "Alexander conquers," "Darius is conquered." Nay, as every energy is a kind of medium between its agent and patient, the whole three, agent, energy, and patient, coalesce with the same facility; as when we say, "Alexander conquers Darius." And hence, that is, from these modes of natural coalescence, arises the grammatical regimen of the verb by its nominative, and of the accusative by its verb. Further than this, attributives themselves may be most of them characterized; as when we say of such attributives as *ran*, *beautiful*, *learned*, he *ran swiftly*, she was *very beautiful*, he was *moderately learned*, &c. And hence the coalescence of the adverb with verbs, participles, and adjectives.

The general conclusion appears to be this. "Those parts of speech unite of themselves in grammar, whose original archetypes unite of themselves in nature." To which we may add, as following from what has been said, that the great objects of natural union are substance and attribute. Now though substances naturally coincide with their attributes, yet they absolutely refuse doing so one with another.[k] And hence those known maxims in physics, that body is impenetrable; that two bodies cannot possess the same place; that the same attribute cannot belong to different substances, &c.

From these principles it follows, that when we form a sentence, the substantive without difficulty coincides with the verb, from the natural coincidence of substance and energy—"the sun warmeth." So likewise the energy with the subject, on which it operates—"warmeth the earth." So likewise both substance and energy with their proper attributes—"the splendid sun,—genially warmeth—the fertile earth." But suppose we were desirous to add other substantives, as, for instance, *air*, or *beams*. How would these coincide, or under what character could they be introduced? Not as nominatives or accusatives, for both

[k] Causa, propter quam duo substantiva non ponuntur sine copula, e philosophia petenda est: neque enim duo substantialiter unum esse potest, sicut substantia et accidens; itaque non dicas, *Cæsar*, *Cato pugnat*. Scal. de Caus. Ling. Lat. c. 177.

those places are already filled; the nominative by the substance *sun*; the accusative by the substance *earth*. Not as attributes to these last, or to any other thing; for attributes by nature they neither are, nor can be made. Here then we perceive the rise and use of prepositions. By these we connect those substantives to sentences, which at the time are unable to coalesce of themselves. Let us assume, for instance, a pair of these connectives, *through* and *with*, and mark their effect upon the substances here mentioned. "The splendid sun *with* his beams genially warmeth *through* the air the fertile earth." The sentence, as before, remains entire and one; the substantives required are both introduced; and not a word, which was there before, is detruded from its proper place.

It must here be observed, that most, if not all prepositions seem originally formed to denote the relations of place.[1] The reason is, this is that grand relation which bodies or natural substances maintain at all times one to another, whether they are contiguous or remote, whether in motion or at rest.

It may be said, indeed, that in the continuity of place they form this universe, or visible whole, and are made as much one by that general comprehension, as is consistent with their several natures and specific distinctions. Thus it is we have prepositions to denote the contiguous relation of body, as when we say, "Caius walketh *with* a staff; the statue stood *upon* a pedestal; the river ran *over* a sand:" others for the detached relation, as when we say, "he is going *to* Italy; the sun is risen *above* the hills; these figs came *from* Turkey." So as to motion and rest, only with this difference, that here the preposition varies its character with the verb. Thus if we say, "that lamp hangs *from* the ceiling," the preposition *from* assumes a character of quiescence. But if we say, "that lamp is falling *from* the ceiling," the preposition in such case assumes a character of motion. So in Milton,

> To support uneasy steps
> *Over* the burning marle. Par. Lost, i.

Here *over* denotes *motion*.

Again,

> He, with looks of cordial love
> Hung *over* her enamour'd. Par. Lost, iv.

Here *over* denotes *rest*.

But though the original use of prepositions was to denote the relations of place, they could not be confined to this office only. They, by degrees, extended themselves to subjects incorporeal, and came to denote relations, as well intellectual as local. Thus,

[1] Omne corpus aut movetur aut quiescit: quare opus fuit aliqua nota, quæ τὸ ποῦ significaret, sive esset inter duo extrema, inter quæ motus fit, sive esset in altero extremorum, in quibus fit quies. Hinc eliciemus præpositionis essentialem definitionem. Scal. de Caus. Ling. Lat. c. 152.

because, in place, he who is above, has commonly the advantage over him who is below, hence we transfer *over* and *under* to dominion and obedience; of a king we say, "he ruled *over* his people;" of a common soldier, "he served *under* such a general." So, too, we say, "*with* thought, *without* attention, thinking *over* a subject, *under* anxiety, *from* fear, *out of* love, *through* jealousy," &c. All which instances, with many others of like kind, shew that the first words of men, like their first ideas, had an immediate reference to sensible objects, and that in after-days, when they began to discern with their intellect, they took those words which they found already made, and transferred them by metaphor to intellectual conceptions. There is indeed no method to express new ideas, but either this of metaphor, or that of coining new words; both which have been practised by philosophers and wise men, according to the nature and exigence of the occasion.[m]

In the foregoing use of prepositions, we have seen how they are applied, *κατὰ παράθεσιν*, "by way of juxta-position," that is to say, where they are prefixed to a word without becoming a part of it: but they may be used also, *κατὰ σύνθεσιν*, "by way of composition," that is, they may be prefixed to a word, so as to become a real part of it.[n] Thus in Greek we have *ἐπίστασθαι*, in Latin, *intelligere*, in English, "to understand;" so also, to *foretell*, *to overact*, *to undervalue*, *to outgo*, &c., and in Greek and Latin, other instances innumerable. In this case, the prepositions commonly transfuse something of their own meaning into the word with which they are compounded; and this imparted meaning, in most instances, will be found ultimately resolvable into some of the relations of place,[o] as used either in its proper or metaphorical acceptation.

[m] Among the words new coined we may ascribe to Anaxagoras, *ὁμοιομέρεια:* to Plato, *ποιότης:* to Cicero, *qualitas:* to Aristotle, *ἐντελέχεια:* to the Stoics, *οὔτις*, *κεράτις*, and many others. Among the words transferred by metaphor from common to special meanings, to the Platonics we may ascribe *ἰδέα:* to the Pythagoreans and Peripatetics, *κατηγορία* and *κατεγορεῖν:* to the Stoics, *κατάληψις*, *ὑπόληψις*, *καθῆκον:* to the Pyrrhonists, *ἔξεστι*, *ἐνδέχεται*, *ἐπέχω*, &c.

And here I cannot but observe, that he who pretends to discuss the sentiments of any one of these philosophers, or even to cite and translate him, (except in trite and obvious sentences,) without accurately knowing the Greek tongue in general; the nice differences of many words apparently synonymous; the peculiar style of the author whom he presumes to handle; the new coined words, and new significations given to old words, used by such author and his sect; the whole philosophy of such sect, together with the connections and dependencies of its several parts, whether logical, ethical, or physical; he, I say, that, without this previous preparation, attempts what I have said, will shoot in the dark; will be liable to perpetual blunders; will explain, and praise, and censure merely by chance; and though he may possibly to fools appear as a wise man, will certainly among the wise, ever pass for a fool. Such a man's intellect comprehends ancient philosophy, as his eye comprehends a distant prospect. He may see, perhaps, enough to know mountains from plains, and seas from woods; but from an accurate discernment of particulars, and their character, this, without further helps, it is impossible he should attain.

[n] See Gaz. Gram. l. iv. cap. de Præposit.

[o] For example, let us suppose some given space; *e* and *ex* signify "*out* of that space;" *per*, "*through* it," from beginning to end;

Lastly, there are times when prepositions totally lose their connective nature, being converted into adverbs, and used in syntax accordingly. Thus Homer:

> Γέλασσε δὲ πᾶσα περὶ χθών.
> "And earth smiled all around." Iliad. T. 362.

But of this we have spoken in a preceding chapter.[P] One thing we must, however, observe, before we finish this chapter, which is, that whatever we may be told of cases in modern languages, there are, in fact, no such things; but their force and power is expressed by two methods, either by situation, or by prepositions; the nominative and accusative cases, by situation; the rest, by prepositions. But this we shall make the subject of a chapter by itself, concluding here our inquiry concerning prepositions.

CHAPTER IV.

CONCERNING CASES.

As cases, or at least their various powers, depend on the knowledge, partly of nouns, partly of verbs, and partly of prepositions, they have been reserved till those parts of speech had been examined and discussed, and are for that reason made the subject of so late a chapter as the present.

There are no cases in the modern languages, except a few among the primitive pronouns, such as *I* and *me*, *je* and *moy*; and the English genitive, formed by the addition of *s*, as when from *lion*, we form *lion's*; from *ship*, *ship's*. From this defect,

in, "within it;" *sub*, "under it." Hence, then, *e* and *per*, in composition, "augment;" *enormis*, "something, not simply big, but big in excess;" something got out of the rule, and beyond the measure; *dico*, "to speak;" *edico*, "to speak out;" whence *edictum*, "an edict," something so effectually spoken, as all are supposed to hear, and all to obey. So Terence:

> *Dico, edico vobis.* Eun. v. 5, 20.

which (as Donatus tells us in his Comment) is an ἀξίωσις. *Fari*, "to speak;" *effari*, "to speak out." Hence *effatum*, "an axiom," or self-evident proposition; something addressed, as it were, to all men, and calling for universal assent. Cic. Acad. ii. 29. *Permagnus, perutilis*, "great throughout, useful through every part."

On the contrary, *in* and *sub* diminish and lessen. *Injustus, iniquus*, "unjust, inequitable," that lies within justice and equity, that reaches not so far, that falls short of them; *subniger*, "blackish;" *subrubicundus*, "reddish;" tending to black, and tending to red, but yet under the standard, and below perfection.

Emo originally signified, "to take away;" hence it came to signify *to buy*, because he, who buys, takes away his purchase. *Inter*, "between," implies *discontinuance*; for in things continuous there can nothing lie between. From these two comes *interimo*, "to kill;" that is to say, to take a man away in the midst of life, by making a discontinuance of his vital energy. So also *perimo*, "to kill" a man; that is to say, to take him away thoroughly; for, indeed, what more thorough taking away can well be supposed? The Greek verb, ἀναιρεῖν, and the English verb, "to take off," seem both to carry the same allusion. And thus it is that prepositions become parts of other words.

P See before, p. 177.

however, we may be enabled to discover, in some instances, what a case is; the periphrasis, which supplies its place, being the case (as it were) unfolded. Thus *equi* is analysed into *du cheval*, "of the horse;" *equo* into *au cheval*, "to the horse." And hence we see that the genitive and dative cases imply the joint power of a noun and preposition; the genitive's preposition being *a*, *de*, or *ex;* the dative's preposition being *ad*, or *versus*.

We have not this assistance as to the accusative, which, in modern languages, (a few instances excepted,) is only known from its position, that is to say, by being subsequent to its verb in the collocation of the words.

The vocative we pass over, from its little use, being not only unknown to the modern languages, but often in the ancient being supplied by the nominative.

The ablative, likewise, was used by the Romans only; a case they seem to have adopted to associate with their prepositions, as they had deprived their genitive and dative of that privilege; a case certainly not necessary, because the Greeks do as well without it, and because with the Romans themselves it is frequently undistinguished.

There remains the nominative, which, whether it were a case or no, was much disputed by the ancients. The Peripatetics held it to be no case, and likened the noun, in this its primary and original form, to a perpendicular line, such, for example, as the line A B.



The variations from the nominative they considered as if A B were to fall from its perpendicular; as, for example, to A C, or A D. Hence, then, they only called these variations, πτῶσεις, *casus*, "cases," or "fallings." The Stoics, on the contrary, and the grammarians with them, made the nominative a case also: words they considered (as it were) to fall from the mind, or discursive faculty. Now when a noun fell thence in its primary form, they then called it πτῶσις ὀρθὴ, *casus rectus*, "an erect, or upright case or falling;" such as A B, and by this name they distinguished the nominative. When it fell from the mind under any of its variations, as, for example, in the form of a genitive, a dative, or the like, such variations they called πτῶσεις πλαγίαι, *casus obliqui*, "oblique cases, or sidelong fallings," (such as A C, or A D,) in opposition to the other, (that is, A B,) which was erect and perpendicular.[q] Hence, too, grammarians called the method of enumerating the various cases of a noun,

[q] See Ammon. in Libr. de Interpr. p. 35.

κλίσις, *declinatio*, "a declension;" it being a sort of progressive descent from the noun's upright form through its various declining forms; that is, a descent from A B to A C, A D, &c.

Of these cases we shall treat but of four, that is to say, the nominative, the accusative, the genitive, and the dative.

It has been said already, in the preceding chapter, that the great objects of natural union are substance and attribute. Now from this natural concord arises the logical concord of subject and predicate, and the grammatical concord of substantive and attributive.[r] These concords in speech produce propositions and sentences, as that previous concord in nature produces natural beings. This being admitted, we proceed by observing, that when a sentence is regular and orderly, nature's substance, the logician's subject, and the grammarian's substantive, are all denoted by that case which we call the nominative. For example: *Cæsar pugnat, æs fingitur, domus ædificatur.* We may remark, too, by the way, that the character of this nominative may be learnt from its attributive. The action implied in *pugnat* shews its nominative *Cæsar* to be an active efficient cause; the passion implied in *fingitur* shews its nominative *æs* to be a passive subject, as does the passion in *ædificatur* prove *domus* to be an effect.

As therefore every attributive would, as far as possible, conform itself to its substantive, so for this reason, when it has cases, it imitates its substantive, and appears as a nominative also. So we find it in such instances as *Cicero est eloquens; vitium est turpe; homo est animal*, &c. When it has no cases, (as happens with verbs,) it is forced to content itself with such assimilations as it has, those of number and person;[s] as when we say, *Cicero loquitur; nos loquimur; homines loquuntur.*

From what has been said, we may make the following observations: that as there can be no sentence without a substantive, so that substantive, if the sentence be regular, is always denoted by a nominative; that on this occasion all the attributives, that have cases, appear as nominatives also; that there may be a regular and perfect sentence without any of the other cases, but that without one nominative, at least, this is utterly impossible. Hence, therefore, we form its character and description: the nominative is that case, without which there can be no regular and perfect sentence.[t] We are now to search after another case.

When the attributive in any sentence is some verb denoting action, we may be assured the principal substantive is some active efficient cause; so we may call Achilles and Lysippus in

[r] See before, p. 193.

[s] What sort of number and person verbs have, see before, p. 170, 1.

[t] We have added regular, as well as perfect, because there may be irregular sentences, which may be perfect without a nominative. Of this kind are all sentences, made out of those verbs called by the Stoics παρασυμβάματα, or παρακατηγορήματα: such as Σωκράτει μεταμέλει, *Socratem pœnitet*, &c. See before, p. 169.

such sentences as *Achilles vulneravit, Lysippus fecit.* But though this be evident and clearly understood, the mind is still in suspence, and finds its conception incomplete. Action, it well knows, not only requires some agent, but it must have a subject also to work on, and it must produce some effect. It is, then, to denote one of these (that is, the subject or the effect) that the authors of language have destined the accusative. *Achilles vulneravit Hectorem;* here the accusative denotes the subject. *Lysippus fecit statuas;* here the accusative denotes the effect. By these additional explanations the mind becomes satisfied, and the sentences acquire a perfection which before they wanted. In whatever other manner, whether figuratively, or with prepositions, this case may have been used, its first destination seems to have been that here mentioned, and hence therefore we shall form its character and description: the accusative is that case which to an efficient nominative and verb of action subjoins either the effect or the passive subject. We have still left the genitive and the dative, which we investigate as follows.

It has been said in the preceding chapter,[u] that when the places of the nominative and the accusative are filled by proper substantives, other substantives are annexed by the help of prepositions. Now though this be so far true in the modern languages, that (a very few instances excepted) they know no other method; yet is not the rule of equal latitude with respect to the Latin or Greek, and that from reasons which we are about to offer.

Among the various relations of substantives denoted by prepositions, there appear to be two principal ones; and these are, the term or point which something commences from, and the term or point which something tends to. These relations the Greeks and Latins thought of so great importance, as to distinguish them, when they occurred, by peculiar terminations of their own, which expressed their force without the help of a preposition. Now it is here we behold the rise of the ancient genitive and dative: the genitive being formed to express all relations commencing from itself; the dative all relations tending to itself. Of this there can be no stronger proof than the analysis of these cases in the modern languages which we have mentioned already.[v]

It is on these principles that they say in Greek, *δεομαί σου, δίδωμί σοι,* "of thee I ask," "to thee I give." The reason is, in requests, the person requested is one whom something is expected *from;* in donations, the person presented is one whom something passes *to.* So again, *πεποίηται λίθου,*[x] "it is made of stone." Stone was the passive subject, and thus it appears in

[u] See before, p. 194.

[v] See before, p. 196, 7.

[x] *Χρυσοῦ πεποιημένος καὶ ἐλέφαντος,* "made of gold and ivory." So says Pausanias of the Olympian Jupiter, L. v. p. 400. See also Hom. Iliad. Ζ. 574.

the genitive as being the term *from*, or *out of which*. Even in Latin, where the syntax is more formal and strict, we read,

> Implentur veteris Bacchi, pinguisque ferinæ. Virg.

The old wine and venison were the funds or stores *of* or *from* which they were filled. Upon the same principles, *Πίνω τοῦ ὕδατος*, is a phrase in Greek; and *Je bois de l'eau*, a phrase in French; as much as to say, "I take some or a certain part, *from* or *out* of a certain whole."

When we meet in language such genitives as "the son of a father;" "the father of a son;" "the picture of a painter;" "the painter of a picture," &c., these are all relatives, and therefore each of them reciprocally a term or point to the other, *from* or *out of* which it derives its essence, or at least its intellection.[y]

The dative, as it implies *tendency to*, is employed among its other uses to denote the final cause, that being the cause to which all events, not fortuitous, may be said to tend. It is thus used in the following instances among innumerable others.

> *Tibi* suaveis dædala tellus
> Submittit flores. Lucret.
>
> *Tibi* brachia contrahit ardens
> Scorpius. Virg. Georg. i.
>
> *Tibi* serviat ultima thule. Ibid.

And so much for cases, their origin and use; a sort of forms or terminations which we could not well pass over, from their great importance both in the Greek and Latin tongues;[z] but which, however, not being among the essentials of language, and therefore not to be found in many particular languages, can be hardly said to fall within the limits of our inquiry.

CHAPTER V.

CONCERNING INTERJECTIONS. RECAPITULATION. CONCLUSION.

Besides the parts of speech before mentioned, there remains the interjection. Of this kind among the Greeks are *Ὦ*, *Φεῦ*, *Αἶ*,

[y] All relatives are said to reciprocate, or mutually infer each other, and therefore they are often expressed by this case, that is to say, the genitive. Thus Aristotle: *Πάντα δὲ τὰ πρός τι πρὸς ἀντιστρέφοντα λέγεται, οἷον ὁ δοῦλος δεσπότου δοῦλος, καὶ ὁ δεσπότης δούλου δεσπότης λέγεται εἶναι, καὶ τὸ διπλάσιον ἡμίσεος διπλάσιον, καὶ τὸ ἥμισυ διπλασίου ἥμισυ:* Omnia vero, quæ sunt ad aliquid, referuntur ad ea, quæ reciprocantur. Ut servus dicitur domini servus; et dominus, servi dominus; necnon duplum, dimidii duplum; et dimidium, dupli dimidium. Categor. c. vii.

[z] Annon et illud observatione dignum (licet nobis modernis spiritus nonnihil redundat) antiquas linguas plenas declinationum, casuum, conjugationum, et similium fuisse; modernas, his fere destitutas, plurima per præpositiones et verba auxiliaria segniter expedire? Sane facile quis conjiciat (utcunque nobis ipsi placeamus) ingenia priorum seculorum nostris fuisse multo acutiora et subtiliora. Bacon. de Augm. Scient. vi. 1.

&c.; among the Latins, *Ah! Heu! Hei!* &c.; among the English, *Ah! Alas! Fie!* &c. These the Greeks have ranged among their adverbs; improperly, if we consider the adverbial nature, which always coincides with some verb as its principal, and to which it always serves in the character of an attributive. Now interjections coincide with no part of speech, but are either uttered alone, or else thrown into a sentence, without altering its form, either in syntax or signification. The Latins seem therefore to have done better in separating them by themselves,[a] and giving them a name by way of distinction from the rest.

Should it be asked, if not adverbs, what then are they? It may be answered, not so properly parts of speech, as adventitious sounds; certain voices of nature, rather than voices of art, expressing those passions and natural emotions which spontaneously arise in the human soul, upon the view or narrative of interesting events.[b]

"And thus we have found that all words are either significant by themselves, or only significant when associated; that those significant by themselves, denote either substances or attributes, and are called for that reason substantives and attributives; that the substantives are either nouns or pronouns; that the attributives are either primary or secondary; that the primary attributives are either verbs, participles, or adjectives; the secondary, adverbs. Again, that the parts of speech, only significant when associated, are either definitives or connectives; that the definitives are either articular or pronominal; and that the connectives are either prepositions or conjunctions."

And thus have we resolved language as a whole into its constituent parts, which was the first thing that we proposed in the course of this inquiry.[c]

[a] Vid. Servium in Æneid. xii. 486.

[b] Interjectiones a Græcis ad adverbia referuntur, atque eos sequitur etiam Boethius. Et recte quidem de iis, quando casum regunt. Sed quando orationi solum inseruntur, ut nota affectus, velut suspirii aut metus, vix videntur ad classem aliquam pertinere, ut quæ naturales sint notæ; non, aliarum vocum instar, ex instituto significant. Voss. de Anal. l. i. c. 1. Interjectio est vox affectum mentis significans, ac citra verbi opem sententiam complens. Ibid. c. 3. Restat classium extrema, interjectio. Hujus appellatio non similiter se habet ac conjunctionis. Nam cum hæc dicatur conjunctio, quia conjungat; interjectio tamen, non quia interjacet, sed quia interjicitur, nomen accepit. Nec tamen de οὐσίᾳ ejus est, ut interjiciatur; cum per se compleat sententiam, nec raro ab ea incipiat oratio. Ibid. l. iv. c. 28. Interjectionem non esse partem orationis sic ostendo: quod naturale est, idem est apud omnes: sed gemitus et signa lætitiæ idem sunt apud omnes: sunt igitur naturales. Si vero naturales, non sunt partes orationis. Nam eas partes, secundum Aristotelem, ex instituto, non natura, debent constare. Interjectionem Græci adverbiis adnumerant; sed falso. Nam neque, &c. Sanct. Miner. l. i. c. 2. Interjectionem Græci inter adverbia ponunt, quoniam hæc quoque vel adjungitur verbis, vel verba ei subaudiuntur. Ut si dicam—*papæ! quid video*—vel per se—*papæ!*—etiamsi non addatur, *miror;* habet in se ipsius verbi significationem. Quæ res maxime fecit Romanorum artium scriptores separatim hanc partem ab adverbiis accipere; quia videtur affectum habere in sese verbi, et plenam motus animi significationem, etiamsi non addatur verbum, demonstrare. Interjectio tamen non solum illa, quæ dicunt Græci σχετλιασμὸν, significat; sed etiam voces, quæ cujuscunque passionis animi pulsu per exclamationem interjiciuntur. Prisc. l. xv.

[c] See before, p. 119.

But now, as we conclude, methinks I hear some objector demanding, with an air of pleasantry and ridicule, "Is there no speaking, then, without all this trouble? Do we not talk every one of us, as well unlearned as learned, as well poor peasants as profound philosophers?" We may answer, by interrogating on our part, Do not those same poor peasants use the lever and the wedge, and many other instruments, with much habitual readiness? And yet have they any conception of those geometrical principles from which those machines derive their efficacy and force? And is the ignorance of these peasants a reason for others to remain ignorant, or to render the subject a less becoming inquiry? Think of animals and vegetables that occur every day; of time, of place, and of motion; of light, of colours, and of gravitation; of our very senses and intellect, by which we perceive every thing else: that they are we all know, and are perfectly satisfied; what they are is a subject of much obscurity and doubt. Were we to reject this last question, because we are certain of the first, we should banish all philosophy at once out of the world.[d]

But a graver objector now accosts us. "What (says he) is the utility? Whence the profit, where the gain?" Every science whatever (we may answer) has its use. Arithmetic is excellent for the gauging of liquors; geometry, for the measuring of estates; astronomy, for the making of almanacks; and grammar, perhaps, for the drawing of bonds and conveyances.

Thus much to the sordid. If the liberal ask for something better than this, we may answer and assure them, from the best authorities, that every exercise of the mind upon theorems of science, like generous and manly exercise of the body, tends to call forth and strengthen nature's original vigour. Be the subject itself immediately lucrative or not, the nerves of reason are braced by the mere employ, and we become abler actors in the drama of life, whether our part be of the busier or of the sedater kind.

Perhaps, too, there is a pleasure even in science itself, distinct from any end to which it may be further conducive. Are not health and strength of body desirable for their own sakes, though we happen not to be fated either for porters or draymen? and have not health and strength of mind their intrinsic worth also,

[d] Ἀλλ' ἔστι πολλὰ τῶν ὄντων, ἃ τὴν μὲν ὕπαρξιν ἔχει γνωριμωτάτην, ἀγνωστοτάτην δὲ τὴν οὐσίαν· ὥσπερ ἥτε κίνησις, καὶ ὁ τόπος, ἔτι δὲ μᾶλλον ὁ χρόνος. Ἑκάστου γὰρ τούτων τὸ μὲν εἶναι γνώριμον καὶ ἀναμφίλεκτον· τις δὲ ποτέ ἐστιν αὐτῶν ἡ οὐσία, τῶν χαλεπωτάτων δραθήναι. Ἔστι δὲ δή τι τῶν τοιούτων καὶ ἡ ψυχή· τὸ μὲν γὰρ εἶναι τι τὴν ψυχήν, γνωριμώτατον καὶ φανερώτατον· τι δὲ ποτέ ἐστιν, οὐ ῥᾴδιον καταμαθεῖν: "There are in the number of things, many which have a most known existence, but a most unknown essence; such for example as *motion*, *place*, and, more than either of them, *time*. The existence of each of these is known and indisputable, but what their essence is, or nature, is among the most difficult things to discern. The soul also is in the same class: that it is something, is most evident; but what it is, is a matter not so easy to learn." Alex. Aphrod. de Anima, p. 142.

though not condemned to the low drudgery of sordid emolument? Why should there not be a good (could we have the grace to recognise it) in the mere energy of our intellect, as much as in energies of lower degree? The sportsman believes there is good in his chase, the man of gaiety in his intrigue, even the glutton in his meal. We may justly ask of these, Why they pursue such things? but if they answer, "they pursue them because they are good," it would be folly to ask them further, Why they pursue what is good? It might well, in such case, be replied on their behalf, (how strange soever it may at first appear,) "that if there was not something good, which was in no respect useful, even things useful themselves could not possibly have existence." For this is in fact no more than to assert, that some things are ends, some things are means; and that if there were no ends, there could be, of course, no means.

It should seem, then, the grand question was, What is good? that is to say, what is that which is desirable, not for something else, but for itself? for whether it be the chase, or the intrigue, or the meal, may be fairly questioned, since men in each instance are far from being agreed.

In the mean time, it is plain, from daily experience, there are infinite pleasures, amusements, and diversions; some for summer, others for winter; some for country, others for town; some easy, indolent, and soft; others boisterous, active, and rough; a multitude diversified to every taste, and which for the time are enjoyed as perfect good, without a thought of any end that may be further obtained. Some objects of this kind are at times sought by all men, excepting alone that contemptible tribe, who, from a love to the means of life, wholly forgetting its end, are truly, for that reason, called misers, or miserable.

If there be supposed, then, a pleasure, a satisfaction, a good, a something valuable for itself without view to any thing further, in so many objects of the subordinate kind; shall we not allow the same praise to the sublimest of all objects? Shall the intellect alone feel no pleasures in its energy, when we allow them to the grossest energies of appetite and sense? Or if the reality of all pleasures and goods were to be controverted, may not the intellectual sort be defended, as rationally as any of them? Whatever may be urged in behalf of the rest (for we are not now arraigning them) we may safely affirm of intellectual good, that it is "the good of that part which is most excellent within us; that it is a good accommodated to all places and times; which neither depends on the will of others, nor on the affluence of external fortune; that it is a good which decays not with decaying appetites, but often rises in vigour when those are no more."[e]

There is a difference, we must own, between this intellectual

[e] See before, p. 48.

virtue, and moral virtue. Moral virtue, from its employment, may be called more human, as it tempers our appetites to the purposes of human life. But intellectual virtue may be surely called more divine, if we consider the nature and sublimity of its end.

Indeed, for moral virtue, as it is almost wholly conversant about appetites and affections, either to reduce the natural ones to a proper mean, or totally to expel the unnatural and vicious, it would be impious to suppose the Deity to have occasion for such an habit, or that any work of this kind should call for his attention. Yet God is, and lives. So we are assured from scripture itself. What then may we suppose the divine life to be? Not a life of sleep, as the fables tell us of Endymion. If we may be allowed, then, to conjecture, with a becoming reverence, what more likely than a perpetual energy of the purest intellect about the first, all-comprehensive objects of intellection, which objects are no other than that intellect itself? For in pure intellection it holds the reverse of all sensation, that the perceiver and thing perceived are always one and the same.[f]

It was speculation of this kind concerning the Divine Nature which induced one of the wisest among the ancients to believe, "that the man who could live in the pure enjoyment of his mind, and who properly cultivated that divine principle, was happiest in himself, and most beloved by the gods. For if the gods had any regard to what passed among men, (as it appeared they had,) it was probable they should rejoice in that which was most excellent, and by nature the most nearly allied to themselves; and as this was mind, that they should requite the man who most loved and honoured this, both from his regard to that which was dear to themselves, and from his acting a part which was laudable and right."[g]

And thus in all science there is something valuable for itself, because it contains within it something which is divine.

[f] *Εἰ οὖν οὕτως εὖ ἔχει, ὡς ἡμεῖς ποτὲ, ὁ Θεὸς ἀεὶ, θαυμαστόν· εἰ δὲ μᾶλλον, ἔτι θαυμασιώτερον· ἔχει δὲ ὧδε, καὶ ζωὴ δέ γε ὑπάρχει· ἡ γὰρ Νοῦ ἐνέργεια, ζωή· ἐκεῖνος δὲ, ἡ ἐνέργεια· ἐνέργεια δὲ ἡ καθ' αὑτὴν, ἐκείνου ζωὴ ἀρίστη καὶ ἀΐδιος. Φαμὲν δὲ τὸν Θεὸν εἶναι ζῶον ἀΐδιον, ἄριστον· ὥστε ζωὴ καὶ αἰὼν συνεχὴς καὶ ἀΐδιος ὑπάρχει τῷ Θεῷ, τοῦτο γὰρ ὁ Θεός. Τῶν μετὰ τὰ φυσ· Λ'. ζ'.* It is remarkable in scripture, that God is peculiarly characterized as a living God, in opposition to all false and imaginary deities, of whom some had no pretensions to life at all; others to none higher than to vegetables or brutes; and the best were nothing better than illustrious men, whose existence was circumscribed by the short period of humanity.

To the passage above quoted, may be added another, which immediately precedes it. *Αὐτὸν δὲ νοεῖ ὁ νοῦς κατὰ μετάληψιν τοῦ νοητοῦ· νοητὸς γὰρ γίνεται, θιγγάνων καὶ νοῶν· ὥστε ταὐτὸν νοῦς καὶ νόητον.*

[g] *Ἠθικ· Νικομαχ· τὸ Κ'. κεφ. η'.*

BOOK III.

CHAPTER I.

INTRODUCTION. DIVISION OF THE SUBJECT INTO ITS PRINCIPAL PARTS.

Some things the mind performs through the body; as, for example, the various works and energies of art. Others it performs without such medium; as, for example, when it thinks, and reasons, and concludes. Now though the mind, in either case, may be called the principle or source, yet are these last more properly its own peculiar acts, as being immediately referable to its own innate powers. And thus is mind ultimately the cause of all; of every thing at least that is fair and good.

Among those acts of mind more immediately its own, that of mental separation may be well reckoned one. Corporeal separations, however accurate otherwise, are in one respect incomplete, as they may be repeated without end. The smallest limb, severed from the smallest animalcule, (if we could suppose any instrument equal to such dissection,) has still a triple extension of length, breadth, and thickness; has a figure, a colour, with perhaps many other qualities, and so will continue to have though thus divided to infinity. But the mind surmounts all power of concretion,[a] and can place in the simplest manner every attribute by itself: convex without concave; colour without superficies; superficies without body; and body without its accidents; as distinctly each one as though they had never been united.

And thus it is that it penetrates into the recesses of all things, not only dividing them, as wholes, into their more conspicuous parts, but persisting till it even separate those elementary principles, which, being blended together after a more mysterious manner, are united in the minutest part as much as in the mightiest whole.[b]

Now if matter and form are among these elements, and deserve perhaps to be esteemed as the principal among them, it may not be foreign to the design of this treatise, to seek whether these, or any things analogous to them, may be found in speech or language.[c] This, therefore, we shall attempt after the following method.

[a] Itaque naturæ facienda est prorsus solutio et separatio; non per ignem certe, sed per mentem, tanquam ignem divinum. Bacon. Organ. l. ii. 16.

[b] See below, p. 207, note c.

[c] See before, p. 117, 119. "Matter" and "form" (in Greek ὕλη and εἶδος) were terms of great import in the days of ancient philosophy, when things were scrutinized rather at their beginning than at their end. They have been but little regarded by modern philosophy, which almost wholly employs itself about the last order of substance, that is to say, the tangible, corporeal,

Every thing in a manner, whether natural or artificial, is in its constitution compounded of something common and some-

or concrete, and which acknowledges no separations even in this, but those made by mathematical instruments or chemical process.

The original meaning of the word ὕλη, was *sylva*, "a wood." Thus Homer:

Τρέμε δ' οὔρεα μακρὰ καὶ ὕλη,
Ποσσὶν ὑπ' ἀθανάτοισι Ποσειδάωνος ἰόντος.
As Neptune past, the mountains and the wood
Trembled beneath the god's immortal feet.

Hence as *wood* was perhaps the first and most useful kind of materials, the word ὕλη, which denoted it, came to be by degrees extended, and at length to denote matter or materials in general. In this sense brass was called the ὕλη or "matter" of a statue; stone, the ὕλη or "matter" of a pillar; and so in other instances. The Platonic Chalcidius, and other authors of the latter Latinity, use *sylva* under the same extended and comprehensive signification.

Now as the species of matter here mentioned (stone, metal, wood, &c.) occur most frequently in common life, and are all nothing more than natural substances or bodies, hence by the vulgar, *matter* and *body* have been taken to denote the same thing; *material* to mean *corporeal; immaterial, incorporeal*, &c. But this was not the sentiment of philosophers of old, by whom the term *matter* was seldom used under so narrow an acceptation. By these, every thing was called ὕλη, or "matter," whether corporeal or incorporeal, which was capable of becoming something else, or of being moulded into something else, whether from the operation of art, of nature, or a higher cause.

In this sense, they not only called brass the ὕλη of a statue, and timber of a boat, but letters and syllables they called the ὕλαι of words; words, or simple terms, the ὕλαι of propositions; and propositions themselves the ὕλαι of syllogisms. The Stoics held all things out of our own power, (τὰ οὐκ ἐφ' ἡμῖν,) such as wealth and poverty, honour and dishonour, health and sickness, life and death, to be the ὕλαι, or materials of virtue or moral goodness, which had its essence in a proper conduct with respect to all these. (Vid. Arr. Epict. l. i. c. 29. Also the Dialogue concerning Happiness, p. 75, and note *t*. M. Ant. xii. 29; vii. 29; x. 18, 19; where the ὑλικὸν and αἰτιῶδες are opposed to each other.) The Peripatetics, though they expressly held the soul to be ἀσώματος, or "incorporeal," yet still talked of a νοῦς ὑλικὸς, "a material mind" or "intellect." This to modern ears may possibly sound somewhat harshly. Yet if we translate the words, "natural capacity," and consider them as only denoting that original and native power of intellection, which being previous to all human knowledge, is yet necessary to its reception; there seems nothing then to remain that can give us offence. And so much for the idea of ὕλη, or "matter." See Alex. Aphrod. de Anim. p. 144. b. 145. Arist. Metaph. p. 121, 122, 141. edit. Sylb. Procl. in Euclid. p. 22, 23.

As to εἶδος, its original meaning was that of "form" or "figure," considered as denoting visible symmetry and proportion; and hence it had its name from εἶδω, "to see;" beauty of person being one of the noblest and most excellent objects of sight. Thus Euripides,

Πρῶτον μὲν εἶδος ἄξιον τυραννίδος.
Fair form *to empire gave the first pretence.*

Now as the form or figure of visible beings tended principally to distinguish them, and to give to each its name and essence; hence in a more general sense, whatever of any kind (whether corporeal or incorporeal) was peculiar, essential, and distinctive, so as by its accession to any beings, as to its ὕλη or "matter," to mark them with a character which they had not before, was called by the ancients εἶδος, or "form." Thus not only the shape given to the brass was called the εἶδος, or "form" of the statue; but the proportion assigned to the drugs was the εἶδος or "form" of the medicine; the orderly motion of the human body was the εἶδος or "form" of the dance; the just arrangement of the propositions, the εἶδος or "form" of the syllogism. In like manner, the rational and accurate conduct of a wise and good man, in all the various relations and occurrences of life, made that εἶδος or "form" described by Cicero to his son: Formam quidam ipsam, Marce fili, et tanquam faciem honesti vides: quæ, si oculis cerneretur, mirabiles amores (ut ait Plato) excitaret sapientiæ, &c. De Offic. i.

We may go further still: the Supreme Intelligence which passes through all things, and which is the same to our capacities as light is to our eyes, this Supreme Intelligence has been called εἶδος εἰδῶν, "the form of forms," as being the fountain of all symmetry, of all good, and of all truth; and as imparting to every being those essential and distinctive attributes which make it to be itself, and not any thing else.

And so much concerning *form*, as before concerning *matter*. We shall only add, that it is in the uniting of these that every thing generable begins to exist; in their separating, to perish, and be at an end;

thing peculiar; of something common, and belonging to many other things; and of something peculiar, by which it is distinguished, and made to be its true and proper self.

Hence language, if compared according to this notion to the murmurs of a fountain, or the dashings of a cataract, has in common this, that, like them, it is a sound. But then, on the contrary, it has in peculiar this, that whereas those sounds have no meaning or signification, to language a meaning or signification is essential. Again, language, if compared to the voice of irrational animals, has in common this, that, like them, it has a meaning. But then it has this in peculiar to distinguish it from them, that whereas the meaning of those animal sounds is derived from nature, that of language is derived, not from nature, but from compact.[d]

From hence it becomes evident, that language, taken in the most comprehensive view, implies certain sounds, having certain meanings; and that of these two principles, the sound is as the matter, common (like other matter) to many different things; the meaning as that peculiar and characteristic form, by which the nature or essence of language becomes complete.

that while the two co-exist, they co-exist not by juxta-position, like the stones in a wall, but by a more intimate coincidence, complete in the minutest part; that hence, if we were to persist in dividing any substance (for example marble) to infinity, there would still remain after every section both *matter* and *form*, and these as perfectly united as before the division began: lastly, that they are both pre-existent to the beings which they constitute; the *matter* being to be found in the world at large; the *form*, if artificial, pre-existing within the artificer, or if natural, within the Supreme Cause, the sovereign artist of the universe.

Pulchrum pulcherrimus ipse
Mundum mente gerens, similique in imagine formans.

Even without speculating so high as this, we may see among all animal and vegetable substances, the form pre-existing in their immediate generating cause; oak being the parent of oak, lion of lion, man of man, &c.

Cicero's account of these principles is as follows:

MATTER.

Sed subjectam putant omnibus sine ulla specie, atque carentem omni illa *qualitate* (faciamus enim tractando usitatius hoc verbum et tritius) *materiam* quandam, ex qua omnia expressa atque efficta sint: (quæ tota omnia accipere possit, omnibusque modis mutari atque ex omni parte) eoque etiam interire, non in nihilum, &c. Acad. i. 8.

FORM.

Sed ego sic statuo, nihil esse in ullo genere tam pulchrum, quo non pulchrius id sit, unde illud, ut ex ore aliquo, quasi imago, exprimatur, quod neque oculis, neque auribus, neque ullo sensu percipi potest: cogitatione tantum et mente complectimur. *Has rerum formas* appellat ideas ille non intelligendi solum, sed etiam dicendi gravissimus auctor et magister, Plato: easque gigni negat, et ait semper esse, ac ratione et intelligentia contineri: cætera nasci occidere, fluere, labi; nec diutius esse uno et eodem statu. Quidquid est igitur, de quo ratione et via disputetur, id est ad ultimam sui generis formam speciemque redigendum. Cic. ad M. Brut. Orat.

[d] The Peripatetics (and with just reason) in all their definitions, as well of words as of sentences, made it a part of their character to be significant κατὰ συνθήκην, "by compact." See Aristot. de Interp. c. 2. 4. Boethius translates the words κατὰ συνθήκην, "ad placitum," or "secundum placitum," and thus explains them in his comment: *Secundum placitum* vero est, quod secundum quandam positionem, placitumque ponentis aptatur; nullum enim nomen naturaliter constitutum est, neque unquam, sicut subjecta res a natura est, ita quoque a natura veniente vocabulo nuncupatur. Sed hominum genus, quod et ratione, et oratione vigeret, nomina posuit, eaque quibus libuit literis syllabisque conjungens, singulis subjectarum rerum substantiis dedit. Boeth. in lib. de Interpret. p. 308.

CHAPTER II.

UPON THE MATTER, OR COMMON SUBJECT OF LANGUAGE.

THE ὕλη, or "matter of language," comes first to be considered; a subject which order will not suffer us to omit, but in which we shall endeavour to be as concise as we can. Now this ὕλη, or "matter," is sound; and sound is that sensation peculiar to the sense of hearing, when the air hath felt a percussion adequate to the producing such effect.*

As the causes of this percussion are various, so from hence sound derives the variety of its species.

Further, as all these causes are either animal or inanimate, so the two grand species of sounds are likewise animal or inanimate.

There is no peculiar name for sound inanimate; nor even for that of animals, when made by the trampling of their feet, the fluttering of their wings, or any other cause, which is merely accidental. But that which they make by proper organs, in consequence of some sensation or inward impulse, such animal sound is called a *voice*.

As language therefore implies that sound called *human voice*, we may perceive that to know the nature and powers of the human voice, is in fact to know *the matter* or common subject of language.

Now the voice of man, and it should seem of all other animals, is formed by certain organs between the mouth and the lungs, and which organs maintain the intercourse between these two. The lungs furnish air, out of which the voice is formed; and the mouth, when the voice is formed, serves to publish it abroad.

What these vocal organs precisely are, is not in all respects agreed by philosophers and anatomists. Be this as it will, it is certain that the mere primary and simple voice is completely formed, before ever it reach the mouth, and can therefore (as well as breathing) find a passage through the nose, when the mouth is so far stopped, as to prevent the least utterance.

Now pure and simple voice, being thus produced, is (as before

* This appears to be Priscian's meaning when he says of a voice, what is more properly true of sound in general, that it is, suum sensibile aurium, id est, quod proprie auribus accidit. Lib. i. p. 537.

The following account of the Stoics, which refers the cause of sound to an undulation in the air propagated circularly, as when we drop a stone into a cistern of water, seems to accord with the modern hypothesis, and to be as plausible as any: Ἀκούειν δὲ, τοῦ μεταξὺ τοῦ τε φωνοῦντος καὶ τοῦ ἀκούοντος ἀέρος πληττομένου σφαιροειδῶς, εἶτα κυματουμένου, καὶ ταῖς ἀκοαῖς προσκίπτοντος, ὡς κυματοῦται τὸ ἐν τῇ δεξαμενῇ ὕδωρ κατὰ κύκλους ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐμβληθέντος λίθου: "Porro audire, cum is, qui medius inter loquentem, et audientem est, aer verberatur orbiculariter, deinde agitatus auribus influit, quemadmodum et cisternæ aqua per orbes injecto agitatur lapide." Diog. Laert. vii.

was observed) transmitted to the mouth. Here, then, by means of certain different organs, which do not change its primary qualities, but only superadd others, it receives the form or character of articulation. For articulation is in fact nothing else, than that form or character, acquired to simple voice, by means of the mouth and its several organs, the teeth, the tongue, the lips, &c. The voice is not by articulation made more grave or acute, more loud or soft, (which are its primary qualities,) but it acquires to these characters certain others additional, which are perfectly adapted to exist along with them.[f]

The simplest of these new characters are those acquired through the mere openings of the mouth, as these openings differ in giving the voice a passage. It is the variety of configurations in these openings only, which gives birth and origin to the several vowels; and hence it is they derive their name, by being thus eminently vocal,[g] and easy to be sounded of themselves alone.

There are other articulate forms, which the mouth makes not by mere openings, but by different contacts of its different parts;

[f] The several organs above mentioned not only serve the purposes of speech, but those very different ones likewise of mastication and respiration; so frugal is nature in thus assigning them double duty, and so careful to maintain her character of doing nothing in vain.

He that would be informed how much better the parts here mentioned are framed for discourse in man, who is a discursive animal, than they are in other animals, who are not so, may consult Aristotle in his treatise de Animal. Part. lib. ii. c. 17; lib. iii. c. 1. 3. De Anima, lib. ii. c. 8. s. 23, &c.

And here, by the way, if such inquirer be of a genius truly modern, he may possibly wonder how the philosopher, considering (as it is modestly phrased) the age in which he lived, should know so much, and reason so well. But if he have any taste or value for ancient literature, he may with much juster cause wonder at the vanity of his contemporaries, who dream all philosophy to be the invention of their own age, knowing nothing of those ancients still remaining for their perusal, though they are so ready on every occasion to give the preference to themselves.

The following account from Ammonius will shew whence the notions in this chapter are taken, and what authority we have to distinguish voice from mere sound; and articulate voice from simple voice.

Καὶ ψόφος μέν ἐστι πληγὴ ἀέρος αἰσθητὴ ἀκοῇ· φωνὴ δὲ, ψόφος ἐξ ἐμψύχου γινόμενος, ὅταν διὰ τῆς συστολῆς τοῦ θώρακος ἐκθλιβόμενος ἀπὸ τοῦ πνεύμονος ὁ εἰσπνευθεὶς ἀὴρ προσπίπτῃ ἀθρόως τῇ καλουμένῃ τραχείᾳ ἀρτηρίᾳ, καὶ τῇ ὑπερώᾳ, ἤτοι τῷ γαργαρεῶνι, καὶ διὰ τῆς πληγῆς ἀποτελῇ τινα ἦχον αἰσθητὸν, κατά τινα ὁρμὴν τῆς ψυχῆς· ὅπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἐμπνευστῶν παρὰ τοῖς μουσικοῖς καλουμένων ὀργάνων συμβαίνει, οἷον αὐλῶν καὶ συρίγγων· τῆς γλώττης, καὶ τῶν ὀδόντων, καὶ χειλέων πρὸς μὲν τὴν διάλεκτον ἀναγκαίων ὄντων, πρὸς δὲ τὴν ἁπλῶς φωνὴν οὐ πάντως συμβαλλομένων: "Estque sonus, ictus aeris qui auditu sentitur: vox autem est sonus, quem animans edit, cum per thoracis compressionem aer attractus a pulmone, elisus simul totus in arteriam, quam asperam vocant, et palatum, aut gurgulionem impingit, et ex ictu sonum quendam sensibilem pro animi quodam impetu perficit. Id quod in instrumentis quæ quia inflant, ideo ἐμπνευστὰ a musicis dicuntur, usu venit, ut in tibiis, ac fistulis contingit, cum lingua, dentes, labiaque ad loquelam necessaria sint, ad vocem vero simplicem non omnino conferant." Ammon. in lib. De Interpr. p. 25. B. Vid. etiam Boerhaave Institut. Medic. sect. 626. 630.

It appears that the Stoics (contrary to the notion of the Peripatetics) used the word φωνὴ, to denote sound in general. They defined it therefore to be, τὸ ἴδιον αἰσθητὸν ἀκοῆς, which justifies the definition given by Priscian, in the note preceding. Animal sound they defined to be, ἀὴρ, ὑπὸ ὁρμῆς πεπληγμένος. "air struck (and so made audible) by some animal impulse;" and human or rational sound, they defined, ἔναρθρος καὶ ἀπὸ διανοίας ἐκπεμπομένη, "sound articulate and derived from the discursive faculty." Diog. Laert. vii. 55.

[g] Φωνήεντα.

such, for instance, as it makes by the junction of the two lips, of the tongue with the teeth, of the tongue with the palate, and the like.

Now as all these several contacts, unless some opening of the mouth either immediately precede, or immediately follow, would rather occasion silence, than to produce a voice; hence it is, that with some such opening, either previous or subsequent, they are always connected. Hence also it is, that the articulations so produced are called consonant, because they sound not of themselves, and from their own powers, but at all times in company with some auxiliary vowel.[h]

There are other subordinate distinctions of these primary articulations, which to enumerate would be foreign to the design of this treatise.

It is enough to observe, that they are all denoted by the common name of element,[i] inasmuch as every articulation of every other kind is from them derived, and into them resolved. Under their smallest combination they produce a syllable; syllables properly combined produce a word; words properly combined produce a sentence; and sentences properly combined produce an oration or discourse.

And thus it is, that to principles apparently so trivial,[k] as

[h] Σύμφωνα.

[i] The Stoic definition of an element is as follows: ἔστι δὲ στοιχεῖον, ἐξ οὗ πρώτου γίνεται τὰ γινόμενα, καὶ εἰς ὃ ἔσχατον ἀναλύεται: "an element is that out of which, as their first principle, things generated are made, and into which, as their last remains, they are resolved." Diog. Laert. vii. 176. What Aristotle says upon elements, with respect to the subject here treated, is worth attending to: φωνῆς στοιχεῖα, ἐξ ὧν σύγκειται ἡ φωνή, καὶ εἰς ἃ διαιρεῖται ἔσχατα· ἐκεῖνα δὲ μηκέτ' εἰς ἄλλας φωνὰς ἑτέρας τῷ εἴδει αὐτῶν: "the elements of articulate voice are those things out of which the voice is compounded, and into which, as its last remains, it is divided: the elements themselves being no further divisible into other articulate voices, differing in species from them." Metaph. v. c. 3.

[k] The Egyptians paid divine honours to the inventor of letters, and regulator of language, whom they called Theuth. By the Greeks he was worshipped under the name of Hermes, and represented commonly by a head alone without other limbs, standing upon a quadrilateral basis. The head itself was that of a beautiful youth, having on it a *petasus*, or bonnet, adorned with two wings.

There was a peculiar reference in this figure to the Ἑρμῆς λόγιος, "the Hermes of language or discourse." He possessed no other part of the human figure but the head, because no other was deemed requisite to rational communication. Words, at the same time, the medium of this communication, being (as Homer well describes them) ἔπεα πτεροέντα, "winged words," were represented in their velocity by the wings of his bonnet.

Let us suppose such a Hermes, having the front of his basis (the usual place for inscriptions) adorned with some old alphabet, and having a veil flung across, by which that alphabet is partly covered. Let a youth be seen drawing off this veil; and a nymph, near the youth, transcribing what she there discovers.

Such a design would easily indicate its meaning. The youth we might imagine to be the genius of man, (naturæ Deus humanæ, as Horace styles him;) the nymph to be μνημοσύνη, or "memory;" as much as to insinuate that "man, for the preservation of his deeds and inventions, was necessarily obliged to have recourse to letters; and that memory, being conscious of her own insufficiency, was glad to avail herself of so valuable an acquisition."

As to Hermes, his history, genealogy, mythology, figure, &c. vid. Platon. Phileb. vol. ii. p. 18. edit. Serran. Diod. Sic. l. i. Horat. od. x. l. 1. Hesiod. Theog. v. 937. cum Comment. Joan. Diaconi. Thucyd. vi. 27. et Scholiast. in loc. Pighium apud Gronov. Thesaur. vol. ix. p. 1164.

For the value and importance of princi-

about twenty plain elementary sounds, we owe that variety of articulate voices, which have been sufficient to explain the sentiments of so innumerable a multitude, as all the present and past generations of men.

It appears, from what has been said, that the matter or common subject of language is that species of sounds called voices articulate.

What remains to be examined in the following chapter, is language under its characteristic and peculiar form, that is to say, language considered, not with respect to sound, but to meaning.

CHAPTER III.

UPON THE FORM, OR PECULIAR CHARACTER, OF LANGUAGE.

When to any articulate voice there accedes by compact a meaning or signification, such voice by such accession is then called a word; and many words, possessing their significations (as it were) under the same compact,[1] unite in constituting a particular language.

ples, and the difficulty in attaining them, see Aristot. de Sophist. Elench. c. 34.

The following passage, taken from that able mathematician Tacquet, will be found peculiarly pertinent to what has been said in this chapter concerning elementary sounds, p. 324, 325.

Mille milliones scriptorum mille annorum millionibus non scribent omnes 24 litterarum alphabeti permutationes, licet singuli quotidie absolverent 40 paginas, quarum unaquæque contineret diversos ordines litterarum 24. Tacquet Arithmeticæ Theor. p. 381. edit. Antverp. 1663.

[1] See before, note *d*, p. 207. See also p. 27, note *c*; and p. 28, note *b*.

The following quotation from Ammonius is remarkable: Καθάπερ οὖν τὸ μὲν κατὰ τόπον κινεῖσθαι, φύσει, τὸ δὲ ὀρχεῖσθαι, θέσει καὶ κατὰ συνθήκην, καὶ τὸ μὲν ξύλον, φύσει, ἡ δὲ θύρα, θέσει· οὕτω καὶ τὸ μὲν φωνεῖν, φύσει, τὸ δὲ δι' ὀνομάτων ἢ ῥημάτων σημαίνειν, θέσει—καὶ ἔοικε τὴν μὲν φωνητικὴν δύναμιν, ὄργανον οὖσαν τῶν ψυχικῶν ἐν ἡμῖν δυνάμεων γνωστικῶν, ἢ ὀρεκτικῶν, κατὰ φύσιν ἔχειν ὁ ἄνθρωπος παραπλησίως τοῖς ἀλόγοις ζώοις· τὸ δὲ ὀνόμασιν, ἢ ῥήμασιν, ἢ τοῖς ἐκ τούτων συγκειμένοις λόγοις χρῆσθαι πρὸς τὴν σημασίαν (οὐκέτι φύσει οὖσιν, ἀλλὰ θέσει) ἐξαίρετον ἔχειν πρὸς τὰ ἄλογα ζῶα, διότι καὶ μόνος τῶν θνητῶν αὐτοκινήτου μετέχει ψυχῆς, καὶ τέχνικῶς ἐνεργεῖν δυναμένης, ἵνα καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ φωνεῖν ἡ τεχνικὴ αὐτῆς διακρίνηται δύναμις· δηλοῦσι δὲ ταῦτα οἱ εἰς κάλλος συντιθέμενοι λόγοι μετὰ μέτρων, ἢ ἄνευ μέτρων: "In the same manner, therefore, as local motion is from nature, but dancing is something positive; and as timber exists in nature, but a door is something positive; so is the power of producing a vocal sound founded in nature, but that of explaining ourselves by nouns, or verbs, something positive. And hence it is, that as to the simple power of producing vocal sound, (which is, as it were, the organ or instrument to the soul's faculties of knowledge or volition,) as to this vocal power, I say, man seems to possess it from nature, in like manner as irrational animals: but as to the employing of nouns, or verbs, or sentences composed out of them, in the explanation of our sentiments, (the thing thus employed being founded not in nature, but in position,) this he seems to possess by way of peculiar eminence, because he alone, of all mortal beings, partakes of a soul, which can move itself, and operate artificially; so that even in the subject of sound, his artificial power shews itself; as the various elegant compositions, both in metre and without metre, abundantly prove." Ammon. de Interpr. p. 51. A.

It must be observed, that the operating artificially, (ἐνεργεῖν τεχνικῶς,) of which

It appears from hence, that a word may be defined, "a voice articulate and significant by compact;" and that language may be defined, "a system of such voices, so significant."

It is from notions like these concerning language and words, that one may be tempted to call language a kind of picture of the universe, where the words are as the figures or images of all particulars.

And yet it may be doubted how far this is true. For if pictures and images are all of them imitations, it will follow, that whoever has natural faculties to know the original, will, by help of the same faculties, know also its imitations. But it by no means follows, that he who knows any being, should know, for that reason, its Greek or Latin name.

The truth is, that every medium through which we exhibit any thing to another's contemplation, is either derived from natural attributes, and then it is an imitation; or else from accidents quite arbitrary, and then it is a symbol.[m]

Now if it be allowed, that in far the greater part of things, not any of their natural attributes are to be found in articulate voices, and that yet through such voices things of every kind are exhibited, it will follow, that words must of necessity be symbols, because it appears that they cannot be imitations.

But here occurs a question, which deserves attention: "Why, in the common intercourse of men with men, have imitations been neglected, and symbols preferred, although symbols are only known by habit or institution, while imitations are re-

Ammonius here speaks, and which he considers as a distinctive mark peculiar to the human soul, means something very different from the mere producing works of elegance and design; else it could never be a mark of distinction between man and many other species of animals, such as the bee, the beaver, the swallow, &c. See before, p. 3, 4, and 62.

[m] *Διαφέρει δὲ τὸ ὁμοίωμα τοῦ συμβόλου, καθόσον τὸ μὲν ὁμοίωμα τὴν φύσιν αὐτὴν τοῦ πράγματος κατὰ τὸ δυνατὸν ἀπεικονίζεσθαι βούλεται, καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν ἐφ' ἡμῖν αὐτὸ μετακλάσαι· τὸ γὰρ ἐν τῇ εἰκόνι γεγραμμένου τοῦ Σωκράτους, ὁμοίωμα, εἰ μὴ καὶ τὸ φαλακρὸν, καὶ τὸ σιμὸν, καὶ τὸ ἐξόφθαλμον ἔχει τοῦ Σωκράτους, οὐκέτ' ἂν αὐτοῦ λέγοιτο εἶναι ὁμοίωμα· τὸ δέ γε σύμβολον, ἤτοι σημεῖον, (ἀμφότερα γὰρ ὁ φιλόσοφος αὐτὸ ὀνομάζει) τὸ ὅλον ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἔχει, ἅτε καὶ ἐκ μόνης ὑφιστάμενον τῆς ἡμετέρας ἐπινοίας· οἷον, τοῦ πότε δεῖ συμβάλλειν ἀλλήλοις τοὺς πολεμοῦντας, δύναται σύμβολον εἶναι καὶ σάλπιγγος ἀπήχησις, καὶ λαμπάδος ῥίψις, καθάπερ φησὶν Εὐριπίδης,*

Ἐπεὶ δ' ἀφείθη πυρσὸς, ὡς τυρσηνικῆς
Σάλπιγγος ἦχος, σῆμα φοινίου μάχης.

Δύναται δέ τις ὑποθέσθαι καὶ δόρατος ἀνάτασιν, καὶ βέλους ἄφεσιν, καὶ αλλὰ μυρία: "A representation, or resemblance, differs from a symbol, inasmuch as the resemblance aims, as far as possible, to represent the very nature of the thing, nor is it in our power to shift or vary it. Thus, a representation intended for Socrates, in a picture, if it have not those circumstances peculiar to Socrates, the bald, the flat-nosed, and the eyes projecting, cannot properly be called a representation of him. But a symbol, or sign, (for the philosopher Aristotle uses both names,) is wholly in our own power, as depending singly for its existence on our imagination. Thus, for example, as to the time when two armies should engage, the symbol or sign may be the sounding of a trumpet, the throwing of a torch, (according to what Euripides says,

But when the flaming torch was hurled,
the sign
Of purple fight, as when the trumpet sounds, &c.)

or else one may suppose the elevating of a spear, the darting of a weapon, and a thousand ways beside." Ammon. in Lib. de Interp. p. 17. B.

cognised by a kind of natural intuition?" To this it may be answered, that if the sentiments of the mind, like the features of the face, were immediately visible to every beholder, the art of speech or discourse would have been perfectly superfluous. But now, while our minds lie enveloped and hid, and the body (like a veil) conceals every thing but itself, we are necessarily compelled, when we communicate our thoughts, to convey them to each other through a medium which is corporeal.[n] And hence it is that all signs, marks, imitations, and symbols must needs be sensible, and addressed as such to the senses.[o] Now the senses, we know, never exceed their natural limits; the eye perceives no sounds; the ear perceives no figures nor colours. If, therefore, we were to converse, not by symbols but by imitations, as far as things are characterized by figure and colour, our imitation would be necessarily through figure and colour also. Again, as far as they are characterized by sounds, it would, for the same reason, be through the medium of sounds. The like may be said of all the other senses, the imitation still shifting along with the objects imitated. We see, then, how complicated such imitation would prove.

If we set language, therefore, as a symbol, in opposition to such imitation; if we reflect on the simplicity of the one, and the multiplicity of the other; if we consider the ease and speed with which words are formed, (an ease which knows no trouble or fatigue, and a speed[p] which equals the progress of our very thoughts,) if we oppose to this the difficulty and length of imitations; if we remember that some objects are capable of no imitations at all, but that all objects universally may be typified by symbols; we may plainly perceive an answer to the question here proposed, "Why, in the common intercourse of men with men, imitations have been rejected, and symbols preferred."

Hence, too, we may perceive a reason, why there never was a language, nor indeed can possibly be framed one, to express the properties and real essences of things, as a mirror exhibits their figures and their colours. For if language of itself imply nothing more than certain species of sounds, with certain motions concomitant; if to some beings sound and motion are no attributes at all; if to many others, where attributes, they are no way essential, (such as the murmurs and wavings of a tree

[n] Αἱ ψυχαὶ αἱ ἡμέτεραι, γυμναὶ μὲν οὖσαι τῶν σωμάτων, ἠδύναντο δι' αὐτῶν τῶν νοημάτων σημαίνειν ἀλλήλαις τὰ πράγματα· Ἐπειδὴ δὲ σώμασι συνδέδενται, δίκην νέφους περικαλύπτουσιν αὐτῶν τὸ νοερὸν, δεδέθησαν τῶν ὀνομάτων, δι' ὧν σημαίνουσιν ἀλλήλαις τὰ πράγματα: "Animi nostri a corporis compage secreti res vicissim animi conceptionibus significare possent: cum autem corporibus involuti sint, perinde ac nebula, ipsorum intelligendi vis obtegitur: quocirca opus eis fuit nominibus, quibus res inter se significarent." Ammon. in Prædicam. p. 18. A.

[o] Quicquid scindi possit in differentias satis numerosas, ad notionum varietatem explicandam (modo differentiæ illæ sensui perceptibiles sint) fieri potest vehiculum cogitationum de homine in hominem. Bacon. de Augm. Scient. vi. 1.

[p] Ἔπεα πτεροέντα. See before, p. 211.

during a storm,) if this be true—it is impossible the nature of such beings should be expressed, or the least essential property be any way imitated, while between the medium and themselves there is nothing connatural.[q]

It is true, indeed, when primitives were once established, it was easy to follow the connection and subordination of nature, in the just deduction of derivatives and compounds. Thus the sounds *water* and *fire*, being once annexed to those two elements, it was certainly more natural to call beings participating of the first *watery*, of the last *fiery*, than to commute the terms, and call them by the reverse. But why, and from what natural connections the primitives themselves might not be commuted, it will be found, I believe, difficult to assign a reason, as well in the instances before us, as in most others. We may here also see the reason why all language is founded in compact, and not in nature; for so are all symbols, of which words are a certain species.

The question remains, if words are symbols, then symbols of what? If it be answered "Of things;" the question returns, "Of what things?" If it be answered, "Of the several individuals of sense, the various particular beings which exist around us:" to this, it is replied, may be raised certain doubts. In the first place, every word will be in fact a proper name. Now if all words are proper names, how came lexicographers, whose express business is to explain words, either wholly to omit proper names, or, at least, to explain them, not from their own art, but from history?

Again, if all words are proper names, then, in strictness, no word can belong to more than one individual. But if so, then, as individuals are infinite, to make a perfect language, words must be infinite also. But if infinite, then incomprehensible, and never to be attained by the wisest men; whose labours in language upon this hypothesis would be as idle as that study of infinite written symbols, which missionaries (if they may be credited) attribute to the Chinese.

Again, if all words are proper names, or (which is the same) the symbols of individuals; it will follow, as individuals are not only infinite, but ever passing, that the language of those who lived ages ago will be as unknown now as the very voices of the speakers. Nay, the language of every province, of every town, of every cottage, must be everywhere different and everywhere changing, since such is the nature of individuals which it follows.

Again, if all words are proper names, the symbols of individuals, it will follow that in language there can be no general proposition, because upon the hypothesis all terms are particular; nor any affirmative proposition, because no one individual in nature is another. It remains, there can be no propositions but particular negatives. But if so, then is language incapable

[q] See before, p. 32.

of communicating general affirmative truths; if so, then of communicating demonstration;[r] if so, then of communicating sciences, which are so many systems of demonstrations; if so, then of communicating arts, which are the theorems of science applied practically; if so, we shall be little better for it either in speculation or in practice.[s] And so much for this hypothesis; let us now try another.

If words are not the symbols of external particulars, it follows, of course, they must be the symbols of our ideas; for this is evident, if they are not symbols of things without, they can only be symbols of something within.

Here then the question recurs, if symbols of ideas, then of what ideas? Of sensible ideas. Be it so, and what follows? Every thing, in fact, which has followed already from the supposition of their being the symbols of external particulars; and that from this plain and obvious reason, because the several ideas which particulars imprint, must needs be as infinite and mutable as they are themselves.

If, then, words are neither the symbols of external particulars, nor yet of particular ideas, they can be symbols of nothing else, except of general ideas, because nothing else, except these, remains. And what do we mean by general ideas? We mean such as are common to many individuals; not only to individuals which exist now, but which existed in ages past, and will exist in ages future; such, for example, as the ideas belonging to the words *man*, *lion*, *cedar*. Admit it, and what follows? It follows, that if words are the symbols of such general ideas, lexicographers may find employ, though they meddle not with proper names.

It follows, that one word may be not homonymously, but truly and essentially common to many particulars, past, present, and future; so that however these particulars may be infinite and ever fleeting, yet language, notwithstanding, may be definite and steady. But if so, then attainable even by ordinary capacities, without danger of incurring the Chinese absurdity.[t]

Again, it follows that the language of those who lived ages ago, as far as it stands for the same general ideas, may be as intelligible now as it was then. The like may be said of the same language being accommodated to distant regions, and even to distant nations, amidst all the variety of ever new and ever changing objects.

Again, it follows that language may be expressive of general truths; and if so, then of demonstration, and sciences, and arts; and if so, become subservient to purposes of every kind.[u]

[r] See p. 94, and note *g*.

[s] The whole of Euclid (whose elements may be called the basis of mathematical science) is founded upon general terms and general propositions, most of which are affirmative. So true are those verses, however barbarous as to their style,

Syllogizari non est ex particulari,
Neve negativis, recte concludere si vis.

[t] See p. 214.

[u] See before, note *s*.

Now if it be true "that none of these things could be asserted of language, were not words the symbols of general ideas; and it be further true that these things may be all undeniably asserted of language;" it will follow, (and that necessarily,) that words are the symbols of general ideas.

And yet, perhaps, even here may be an objection. It may be urged, if words are the symbols of general ideas, language may answer well enough the purpose of philosophers who reason about general and abstract subjects; but what becomes of the business of ordinary life? Life, we know, is merged in a multitude of particulars, where an explanation by language is as requisite as in the highest theorems. The vulgar, indeed, want it to no other end. How then can this end in any respect be answered, if language be expressive of nothing further than general ideas?

To this it may be answered, that arts surely respect the business of ordinary life; yet so far are general terms from being an obstacle here, that without them no art can be rationally explained. How, for instance, should the measuring artist ascertain to the reapers the price of their labours, had not he first, through general terms, learned those general theorems that respect the doctrine and practice of mensuration?

But suppose this not to satisfy a persevering objector; suppose him to insist, that, admitting this to be true, there were still a multitude of occasions for minute particularizing, of which it was not possible for mere generals to be susceptible; suppose, I say, such an objection, what should we answer? That the objection was just; that it was necessary to the perfection and completion of language, that it should be expressive of particulars as well as of generals. We must however add, that its general terms are by far its most excellent and essential part, since from these it derives "that comprehensive universality, that just proportion of precision and permanence, without which it could not possibly be either learned or understood, or applied to the purposes of reasoning and science;" that particular terms have their utility and end, and that therefore care too has been taken for a supply of these.

One method of expressing particulars is that of proper names. This is the least artificial, because proper names being in every district arbitrarily applied, may be unknown to those who know the language perfectly well, and can hardly therefore with propriety be considered as parts of it. The other, and more artificial method, is that of definitives or articles,[x] whether we assume the pronominal, or those more strictly so called. And here we cannot enough admire the exquisite art of language, which, without wandering into infinitude, contrives how to denote things infinite; that is to say, in other words, which, by

[x] See before, p. 137, 8, and 184, 5.

the small tribe of definitives properly applied to general terms, knows how to employ these last, though in number finite, to the accurate expression of infinite particulars.

To explain what has been said by a single example. Let the general term be *man*. I have occasion to apply this term to the denoting of some particular. Let it be required to express this particular, as unknown, I say *a* man; known, I say *the* man; indefinite, *any* man; definite, *a certain* man; present and near, *this* man; present and distant, *that* man; like to some other, *such a* man; an indefinite multitude, *many* men; a definite multitude, *a thousand* men; the ones of a multitude, taken throughout, *every* man; the same ones, taken with distinction, *each* man; taken in order, *first* man, *second* man, &c.; the whole multitude of particulars taken collectively, *all* men; the negation of this multitude, *no* man. But of this we have spoken already, when we inquired concerning definitives.

The sum of all is, that words are the symbols of ideas both general and particular; yet of the general, primarily, essentially, and immediately; of the particular, only secondarily, accidentally, and mediately.

Should it be asked, "Why has language this double capacity?" May we not ask, by way of return, Is it not a kind of reciprocal commerce, or intercourse of our ideas? Should it not therefore be framed so as to express the whole of our perception? Now can we call that perception entire and whole, which implies either intellection without sensation, or sensation without intellection? If not, how should language explain the whole of our perception, had it not words to express the objects proper to each of the two faculties?

To conclude: as in the preceding chapter we considered language with a view to its matter, so here we have considered it with a view to its form. Its matter is recognised, when it is considered as a voice; its form, as it is significant of our several ideas; so that, upon the whole, it may be defined, "A system of articulate voices, the symbols of our ideas, but of those principally which are general or universal."

CHAPTER IV.

CONCERNING GENERAL OR UNIVERSAL IDEAS.

Much having been said in the preceding chapter about general or universal ideas, it may not, perhaps, be amiss to inquire, by what process we come to perceive them, and what kind of beings they are; since the generality of men think so meanly of their existence, that they are commonly considered as little better than

shadows. These sentiments are not unusual, even with the philosopher, now-a-days, and that from causes much the same with those which influence the vulgar.

The vulgar, merged in sense from their earliest infancy, and never once dreaming any thing to be worthy of pursuit, but what either pampers their appetite, or fills their purse, imagine nothing to be real, but what may be tasted or touched. The philosopher, as to these matters being of much the same opinion, in philosophy looks no higher than to experimental amusements, deeming nothing demonstration, if it be not made ocular. Thus, instead of ascending from sense to intellect, (the natural progress of all true learning,) he hurries, on the contrary, into the midst of sense, where he wanders at random without any end, and is lost in a labyrinth of infinite particulars. Hence, then, the reason why the sublimer parts of science, the studies of mind, intellection, and intelligent principles, are in a manner neglected; and, as if the criterion of all truth were an alembic or an air-pump, what cannot be proved by experiment is deemed no better than mere hypothesis.

And yet it is somewhat remarkable, amid the prevalence of such notions, that there should still remain two sciences in fashion, and these having their certainty of all the least controverted, which are not in the minutest article depending upon experiment: by these I mean arithmetic and geometry.[y] But to come to our subject concerning general ideas.

Man's first perceptions are those of the senses, inasmuch as they commence from his earliest infancy. These perceptions, if not infinite, are at least indefinite, and more fleeting and transient than the very objects which they exhibit, because they not only

[y] The many noble theorems (so useful in life, and so admirable in themselves) with which these two sciences so eminently abound, arise originally from principles the most obvious imaginable; principles so little wanting the pomp and apparatus of experiment, that they are self-evident to every one possessed of common sense. I would not be understood in what I have here said, or may have said elsewhere, to undervalue experiment, whose importance and utility I freely acknowledge in the many curious nostrums and choice receipts with which it has enriched the necessary arts of life. Nay, I go further: I hold all justifiable practice in every kind of subject to be founded in experience, which is no more than the result of many repeated experiments. But I must add, withal, that the man who acts from experience alone, though he act ever so well, is but an empiric or quack, and that not only in medicine, but in every other subject. It is then only that we recognise art, and that the empiric quits his name for the more honourable one of artist, when to his experience he adds science, and is thence enabled to tell us, not only what is to be done, but why it is to be done; for art is a composite of experience and science, experience providing it materials, and science giving them a form.

In the mean time, while experiment is thus necessary to all practical wisdom; with respect to pure and speculative science (as we have hinted already) it has not the least to do. For who ever heard of logic, or geometry, or arithmetic being proved experimentally? It is, indeed, by the application of these that experiments are rendered useful; that they are assumed into philosophy, and in some degree made a part of it, being otherwise nothing better than puerile amusements. But that these sciences themselves should depend upon the subjects on which they work, is, as if the marble were to fashion the chisel, and not the chisel the marble.

depend upon the existence of those objects, but because they cannot subsist without their immediate presence. Hence, therefore, it is, that there can be no sensation of either past or future, and consequently, had the soul no other faculties than the senses, it never could acquire the least idea of time.[a]

But, happily for us, we are not deserted here. We have, in the first place, a faculty called imagination or fancy, which however as to its energies it may be subsequent to sense, yet is truly prior to it, both in dignity and use: this it is which retains the fleeting forms of things, when things themselves are gone, and all sensation at an end.

That this faculty, however connected with sense, is still perfectly different, may be seen from hence: we have an imagination of things that are gone and extinct, but no such things can be made objects of sensation; we have an easy command over the objects of our imagination, and can call them forth in almost what manner we please, but our sensations are necessary, when their objects are present, nor can we control them but by removing either the objects or ourselves.[a]

As the wax would not be adequate to its business of signature, had it not a power to retain, as well as to receive; the same holds of the soul, with respect to sense and imagination. Sense is its receptive power, imagination its retentive. Had it sense without imagination, it would not be as wax, but as water; where though all impressions may be instantly made, yet as soon as made they are as instantly lost.

Thus, then, from a view of the two powers taken together, we may call sense (if we please) a kind of transient imagination; and imagination, on the contrary, a kind of permanent sense.[b]

[a] See before, p. 147. See also p. 149, note z.

[a] Besides the distinguishing of sensation from imagination, there are two other faculties of the soul, which, from their nearer alliance, ought carefully to be distinguished from it, and these are μνήμη and ἀνάμνησις, "memory" and "recollection."

When we view some relict of sensation reposed within us, without thinking of its rise, or referring it to any sensible object, this is fancy or imagination.

When we view some such relict, and refer it, withal, to that sensible object which in time past was its cause and original, this is memory.

Lastly, the road which leads to memory through a series of ideas, however connected, whether rationally or casually, this is recollection. I have added casually, as well as rationally, because a casual connection is often sufficient. Thus, from seeing a garment I think of its owner, thence of his habitation, thence of woods, thence of timber, thence of ships, sea-fights, admirals, &c.

If the distinction between memory and fancy be not sufficiently understood, it may be illustrated by being compared to the view of a portrait. When we contemplate a portrait without thinking of whom it is the portrait, such contemplation is analogous to fancy; when we view it with reference to the original, whom it represents, such contemplation is analogous to memory.

We may go further: imagination or fancy may exhibit (after a manner) even things that are to come. It is here that hope and fear paint all their pleasant and all their painful pictures of futurity; but memory is confined in the strictest manner to the past.

What we have said may suffice for our present purpose. He that would learn more may consult Aristot. de Anima, l. iii. c. 3, 4. and his treatise De Mem. et Reminisc.

[b] Τί τοίνυν ἐστὶν ἡ φαντασία ἐξὸς ἂν

Now as our feet in vain venture to walk upon the river, till the frost bind the current, and harden the yielding surface; so does the soul in vain seek to exert its higher powers, the powers, I mean, of reason and intellect, till imagination first fix the fluency of sense, and thus provide a proper basis for the support of its higher energies.

After this manner, in the admirable economy of the whole, are natures subordinate made subservient to the higher. Were there no things external, the senses could not operate; were there no sensations, the imagination could not operate; and were there no imagination, there could be neither reasoning nor intellection, such at least as they are found in man, where they have their intensions and remissions in alternate succession, and are at first nothing better than a mere capacity or power: Whether every intellect begins thus, may be perhaps a question; especially if there be any one of a nature more divine, to which "intension and remission and mere capacity are unknown."[c] But not to digress.

γνωρίσαιμεν· δεῖ νοεῖν ἐν ἡμῖν ἀπὸ τῶν ἐνεργειῶν τῶν περὶ τὰ αἰσθητὰ, οἷον τύπτον (lege τύπον) τινὰ καὶ ἀναζωγράφημα ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ αἰσθητηρίῳ, ἐγκατάλειμμά τι τῆς ὑπὸ τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ γινομένης κινήσεως, ὃ καὶ μηκέτι τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ παρόντος, ὑπομένει τε καὶ σώζεται, ὃν ὥσπερ εἰκόν τις αὐτοῦ, ὃ καὶ τῆς μνήμης ἡμῖν σωζόμενον αἴτιον γίνεται· τὸ τοιοῦτον ἐγκατάλειμμα, καὶ τὸν τοιοῦτον ὥσπερ τύπον, φαντασίαν καλοῦσιν. "Now, what fancy or imagination is, we may explain as follows: we may conceive to be formed within us, from the operations of our senses about sensible subjects, some impression (as it were) or picture in our original sensorium, being a relict of that motion caused within us by the external object; a relict, which, when the external object is no longer present, remains, and is still preserved, being as it were its image, and which, by being thus preserved, becomes the cause of our having memory. Now such a sort of relict and (as it were) impression, they call fancy or imagination." Alex. Aphrod. de Anima, p. 135. B. edit. Ald.

[c] See p. 164, note *x*. The life, energy, or manner of man's existence, is not a little different from that of the Deity. The life of man has its essence in motion. This is not only true with respect to that lower and subordinate life, which he shares in common with vegetables, and which can no longer subsist than while the fluids circulate, but it is likewise true in that life which is peculiar to him as man. Objects from without first move our faculties, and thence we move of ourselves either to practice or contemplation. But the life or existence of God (as far as we can conjecture upon so transcendent a subject) is not only complete throughout eternity, but complete in every instant, and is for that reason immutable and superior to all motion.

It is to this distinction that Aristotle alludes, when he tells us, Οὐ γὰρ μόνον κινήσεώς ἐστιν ἐνέργεια, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀκινησίας· καὶ ἡδονὴ μᾶλλον ἐν ἠρεμίᾳ ἐστὶν, ἢ ἐν κινήσει· μεταβολὴ δὲ πάντων γλυκὺ, κατὰ τὸν ποιητὴν, διὰ πονηρίαν τινά· ὥσπερ γὰρ ἄνθρωπος εὐμετάβολος ὁ πονηρὸς, καὶ ἡ φύσις ἡ δεομένη μεταβολῆς· οὐ γὰρ ἁπλῆ, οὐδ' ἐπιεικής: "For there is not only an energy of motion, but of immobility; and pleasure or felicity exists rather in rest than in motion; change of all things being sweet (according to the poet) from a principle of pravity in those who believe so. For in the same manner as the bad man is one fickle and changeable, so is that nature bad that requireth variety, inasmuch as such nature is neither simple nor even." Eth. Nicom. vii. 14. and Ethic. Eudem. vi. sub. fin.

It is to this unalterable nature of the Deity that Boethius refers, when he says, in those elegant verses,

. . . . . *Tempus ab Ævo*
Ire jubes stabilisque manens das cuncta moveri.

From this single principle of immobility may be derived some of the noblest of the divine attributes; such as that of impassive, incorruptible, incorporeal, &c. Vide Aristot. Physic. viii. Metaphys. xiv. c. 6, 7. 9, 10. edit. Du Val. See also p. 11, note *g*; also p. 65, note *b*, where the verses of Boethius are quoted at length.

It is then on these permanent phantasms that the human mind first works, and by an energy as spontaneous and familiar to its nature, as the seeing of colour is familiar to the eye, it discerns at once what in many is one; what in things dissimilar and different is similar and the same.[d] By this it comes to

It must be remembered, however, that though we are not gods, yet as rational beings we have within us something divine, and that the more we can become superior to our mutable, variable, and irrational part, and place our welfare in that good which is immutable, permanent, and rational, the higher we shall advance in real happiness and wisdom. This is (as an ancient writer says) ὁμοίωσις τῷ Θεῷ κατὰ τὸ δυνατὸν, "the becoming like to God, as far as in our power." Τοῖς μὲν γὰρ θεοῖς πᾶς ὁ βίος μακάριος· τοῖς δ' ἀνθρώποις, ἐφ' ὅσον ὁμοίωμά τι τῆς τοιαύτης ἐνεργείας ὑπάρχει: "For to the gods (as says another ancient) the whole of life is one continued happiness; but to men, it is so far happy, as it rises to the resemblance of so divine an energy." See Plat. in Theætet. Arist. Eth. x. 8.

[d] This connective act of the soul, by which it views one in many, is perhaps one of the principal acts of its most excellent part. It is this removes that impenetrable mist, which renders objects of intelligence invisible to lower faculties. Were it not for this, even the sensible world (with the help of all our sensations) would appear as unconnected as the words of an index. It is certainly not the figure alone, nor the touch alone, nor the odour alone, that makes the rose, but it is made up of all these, and other attributes united; not an unknown constitution of insensible parts, but a known constitution of sensible parts, unless we choose to extirpate the possibility of natural knowledge.

What then perceives this constitution or union? Can it be any of the senses? No one of these, we know, can pass the limits of its own province. Were the smell to perceive the union of the odour and the figure, it would not only be smell, but it would be sight also. It is the same in other instances. We must necessarily therefore recur to some higher collective power, to give us a prospect of nature, even in these her subordinate wholes, much more in that comprehensive whole, whose sympathy is universal, and of which these smaller wholes are all no more than parts.

But nowhere is this collecting, and (if I may be allowed the expression) this unifying power more conspicuous, than in the subjects of pure truth. By virtue of this power, the mind views one general idea in many individuals; one proposition in many general ideas; one syllogism in many propositions; till at length, by properly repeating and connecting syllogism with syllogism, it ascend into those bright and steady regions of science,

Quas neque concutiunt venti, neque nubila nimbis
Adspergunt, &c. Lucr.

Even negative truths and negative conclusions cannot subsist, but by bringing terms and propositions together, so necessary is this uniting power to every species of knowledge. See pages 117 and 189.

He that would better comprehend the distinction between sensitive perception, and intellective, may observe that when a truth is spoken, it is heard by our ears, and understood by our minds. That these two acts are different, is plain, from the example of such, as hear the sounds, without knowing the language. But to shew their difference still stronger, let us suppose them to concur in the same man, who shall both hear and understand the truth proposed. Let the truth be, for example, the angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles. That this is one truth, and not two or many truths, I believe none will deny. Let me ask, then, in what manner does this truth become perceptible (if at all) to sensation? The answer is obvious; it is by successive portions of little and little at a time. When the first word is present, all the subsequent are absent; when the last word is present, all the previous are absent; when any of the middle words are present, then are there some absent, as well of one sort as the other. No more exists at once than a single syllable, and the remainder as much is not, (to sensation at least,) as though it never had been, or never was to be. And so much for the perception of sense, than which we see nothing can be more dissipated, fleeting, and detached. And is that of the mind similar? Admit it, and what follows? It follows, that one mind would no more recognise one truth, by recognising its terms successively and apart, than many distant minds would recognise it, were it distributed among them, a different part to each. The case is, every truth is one, though its terms are many. It is in no respect true by parts at a time, but it is true of necessity at once and in an instant. What powers therefore recognise this oneness, or unity?

behold a kind of superior objects; a new race of perceptions, more comprehensive than those of sense; a race of perceptions, each one of which may be found entire and whole in the separate individuals of an infinite and fleeting multitude, without departing from the unity and permanence of its own nature.

Where even does it reside, or what makes it? Shall we answer, with the Stagirite, τὸ δὲ ἐν ποιοῦν τοῦτο ὁ νοῦς ἕκαστον. If this be allowed, it should seem, where sensation and intellection appear to concur, that sensation was of many, intellection was of one; that sensation was temporary, divisible, and successive; intellection, instantaneous, indivisible, and at once.

If we consider the radii of a circle, we shall find at the circumference that they are many; at the centre that they are one. Let us then suppose sense and mind to view the same radii, only let sense view them at the circumference, mind at the centre; and hence we may conceive, how these powers differ, even where they jointly appear to operate in perception of the same object.

There is another act of the mind, the very reverse of that here mentioned; an act, by which it perceives not one in many, but many in one. This is that mental separation, of which we have given some account in the first chapter of this book; that resolution or analysis which enables us to investigate the causes, and principles, and elements of things. It is by virtue of this, that we are enabled to abstract any particular attribute, and make it by itself the subject of philosophical contemplation. Were it not for this, it would be difficult for particular sciences to exist; because otherwise they would be as much blended, as the several attributes of sensible substances. How, for example, could there be such a science as optics, were we necessitated to contemplate colour concreted with figure, two attributes which the eye can never view, but associated? I mention not a multitude of other sensible qualities, some of which still present themselves, whenever we look on any coloured body.

Those two noble sciences, arithmetic and geometry, would have no basis to stand on, were it not for this separative power. They are both conversant about quantity; geometry about continuous quantity, arithmetic about discrete. Extension is essential to continuous quantity; monads, or units, to discrete. By separating from the infinite individuals, with which we are surrounded, those infinite accidents, by which they are all diversified, we leave nothing but those simple and perfectly similar units, which being combined make number, and are the subject of arithmetic. Again, by separating from body every possible subordinate accident, and leaving it nothing but its triple extension of length, breadth, and thickness, (of which were it to be deprived, it would be body no longer,) we arrive at that pure and unmixed magnitude, the contemplation of whose properties makes the science of geometry.

By the same analytical or separate power, we investigate definitions of all kinds, each one of which is a developed word, as the same word is an inveloped definition.

To conclude: in composition and division consists the whole of science; composition making affirmative truth, and shewing us things under their similarities and identities; division making negative truth, and presenting them to us under their dissimilarities and diversities.

And here, by the way, there occurs a question. If all wisdom be science, and it be the business of science as well to compound as to separate, may we not say that those philosophers took half of wisdom for the whole, who distinguished it from wit, as if wisdom only separated, and wit only brought together? Yet so held the philosopher of Malmsbury, and the author of the Essay on the Human Understanding.

Philoponus, from the philosophy of Plato and Pythagoras, seems to have far excelled these moderns in his account of wisdom or philosophy, and its attributes, or essential characters. Ἴδιον γὰρ φιλοσοφίας τὸ ἐν τοῖς πολλοῖς ἔχουσι διαφορὰν δεῖξαι τὴν κοινωνίαν, καὶ τὸ ἐν τοῖς πολλοῖς ἔχουσι κοινωνίαν δεῖξαι τίνι διαφέρουσιν· οὐ γὰρ δυσχερὲς τὸ δεῖξαι φάττης (lege φάττης) καὶ περιστερᾶς κοινωνίαν (παντὶ γὰρ προῦπτον), ἀλλ' οὐ (lege ὅπου) τὸ διάφορον τούτων εἰπεῖν· οὐδὲ κυνὸς καὶ ἵππου διαφορὰν, ἀλλὰ τί κοινὸν ἔχουσιν: "It is the proper business of philosophy to shew in many things, which have difference, what is their common character; and in many things, which have a common character, through what it is they differ. It is indeed no difficult matter to shew the common character of a wood-pigeon and a dove, (for this is evident to every one,) but rather to tell where lies the difference; nor to tell the difference between a dog and a horse, but rather to shew what they possess in common." Philop. Com. MS. in Nicomach. Arithm.

And thus we see the process by which we arrive at general ideas; for the perceptions here mentioned are, in fact, no other. In these, too, we perceive the objects of science and real knowledge, which can by no means be, but of that which is general, and definite, and fixed.* Here, too, even individuals, however

* The very etymologies of the words ἐπιστήμη, *scientia*, and "understanding," may serve in some degree to shew the nature of these faculties, as well as of those beings, their true and proper objects. Ἐπιστήμη ὀνόμασται, διὰ τὸ ἐπὶ στάσιν καὶ ὅρον τῶν πραγμάτων ἄγειν ἡμᾶς, τῆς ἀορατίας καὶ μεταβολῆς τῶν ἐπὶ μέρους ἀπάγουσα· ἡ γὰρ ἐπιστήμη περὶ τὰ καθόλου καὶ ἀμετάβατα καταγίνεται: "Science (ἐπιστήμη) has its name from bringing us (ἐπὶ στάσιν) to some stop and boundary of things, taking us away from the unbounded nature and mutability of particulars; for it is conversant about subjects that are general and invariable." Niceph. Blem. Epit. Logic. p. 21.

This etymology, given by Blemmides, and long before him adopted by the Peripatetics, came originally from Plato, as may be seen in the following account of it from his Cratylus. In this dialogue, Socrates, having first (according to the Heraclitean philosophy, which Cratylus favoured) etymologized a multitude of words with a view to that flow and unceasing mutation, supposed by Heraclitus to run through all things, at length changes his system, and begins to etymologize from another, which supposed something in nature to be permanent and fixed. On this principle he thus proceeds: Ἴκοστῶμεν δή, ἐξ αὐτῶν ἀναλαβόντες πρῶτον μὲν τοῦτο τὸ ὄνομα τὴν ἐπιστήμην, ὡς ἀμφιβόλον ἐστι, καὶ μᾶλλον ἔοικε σημαῖνόν τι ὅτι ἵστησιν ἡμῶν ἐπὶ τοῖς πράγμασι τὴν ψυχήν, ἢ ὅτι συμπεριφέρεται: "Let us consider, then, (says he,) some of the very words already examined; and, in the first place, the word *science;* how disputable is this, (as to its former etymology,) how much more naturally does it appear to signify, that it stops the soul at things, than that it is carried about with them." Plat. Cratyl. p. 437. edit. Serr.

The disputable etymology, to which he here alludes, was a strange one of his own making in the former part of the dialogue, adapted to the flowing system of Heraclitus there mentioned. According to this notion, he had derived ἐπιστήμη from ἕπεσθαι and μένειν, as if it kept along with things by perpetually following them in their motions. See Plato as before, p. 412.

As to *scientia*, we are indebted to Scaliger for the following ingenious etymology: Ratiocinatio, motus quidam est: scientia, quies: unde et nomen, tum apud Græcos, tum etiam nostrum. Παρὰ τὸ ἐπὶ ἵστασθαι, ἐπιστήμη. Sistitur enim mentis agitatio, et fit species in animo. Sic Latinum *scientia*, ὅτι γίνεται σχέσις τοῦ ὄντος. Nam Latini, quod nomen entis simplex ab usu abjecerunt atque repudiarunt, omnibus activis participiis idem adjunxerunt. Audiens, ἀκούων ὤν. Sciens, σχῶν ὤν. Scal. in Theophr. de Causis Plant. lib. i. p. 17.

The English word "understanding," means not so properly knowledge, as that faculty of the soul where knowledge resides. Why may we not, then, imagine, that the framers of this word intended to represent it as a kind of firm basis, on which the fair structure of sciences was to rest, and which was supposed to stand under them, as their immoveable support?

Whatever may be said of these etymologies, whether they are true or false, they at least prove their authors to have considered science and understanding, not as fleeting powers of perception, like sense, but rather as steady, permanent, and durable comprehensions. But if so, we must somewhere or other find for them certain steady, permanent, and durable objects; since, if perception of any kind be different from the thing perceived, (whether it perceive straight as crooked, or crooked as straight; the moving as fixed, or the fixed as moving,) such perception must of necessity be erroneous and false. The following passage from a Greek Platonic, (whom we shall quote again hereafter,) seems on the present occasion not without its weight: Εἰ ἐστὶ γνῶσις ἀκριβεστέρα τῆς αἰσθήσεως, εἴη ἂν καὶ γνωστὰ ἀληθεστέρα τῶν αἰσθητῶν: "If there be a knowledge more accurate than sensation, there must be certain objects of such knowledge more true than objects of sense.

The following, then, are questions worth considering: what these objects are? where they reside? and how they are to be discovered? Not by experimental philosophy, it is plain; for that meddles with nothing but what is tangible, corporeal, and mutable: nor even by the more refined and rational speculation of mathematics; for this, at its very commencement, takes such objects for granted. We can only add, that if they reside in our own minds, (and who, that has never looked there, can affirm they do

of themselves unknowable, become objects of knowledge, as far as their nature will permit: for then, only, may any particular be said to be known, when by asserting it to be *a man*, or *an animal*, or the like, we refer it to some such comprehensive or general idea.

Now it is of these comprehensive and permanent ideas, the genuine perceptions of pure mind, that words of all languages, however different, are the symbols. And hence it is, that as the perceptions include, so do these their symbols express, not this or that set of particulars only, but all indifferently, as they happen to occur. Were, therefore, the inhabitants of Salisbury to be transferred to York, though new particular objects would appear on every side, they would still no more want a new language to explain themselves, than they would want new minds to comprehend what they beheld. All, indeed, that they would want, would be the local proper names; which names, as we have said already,[f] are hardly a part of language, but must equally be learnt, both by learned and unlearned, as often as they change the place of their abode.

It is upon the same principles we may perceive the reason why the dead languages (as we call them) are now intelligible; and why the language of modern England is able to describe ancient Rome; and that of ancient Rome to describe modern England.[g] But of these matters we have spoken before.

II. And now, having viewed the process by which we acquire general ideas, let us begin anew from other principles, and try to discover (if we can prove so fortunate) whence it is that these ideas originally come. If we can succeed here, we may discern, perhaps, what kind of beings they are, for this at present appears somewhat obscure.

Let us suppose any man to look for the first time upon some work of art, as, for example, upon a clock, and having sufficiently viewed it, at length to depart. Would he not retain, when absent, an idea of what he had seen? And what is it to retain such idea? It is to have a form internal correspondent to the external; only with this difference, that the internal form is devoid of the matter; the external is united with it, being seen in the metal, the wood, and the like.

Now if we suppose this spectator to view many such machines, and not simply to view, but to consider every part of

not?) then will the advice of the satirist be no ways improper,

. . . . *Nec te quæsiveris extra.* Pers.

[f] Sup. p. 216.

[g] As far as human nature, and the primary genera both of substance and accident are the same in all places, and have been so through all ages, so far all languages share one common identity. As far as peculiar species of substance occur in different regions; and much more, as far as the positive institutions of religious and civil polities are everywhere different; so far each language has its peculiar diversity. To the causes of diversity here mentioned, may be added the distinguishing character and genius of every nation, concerning which we shall speak hereafter.

them, so as to comprehend how these parts all operate to one end, he might be then said to possess a kind of intelligible form, by which he would not only understand and know the clocks which he had seen already, but every work also, of like sort, which he might see hereafter. Should it be asked, "which of these forms is prior, the external and sensible, or the internal and intelligible?" the answer is obvious, that the prior is the sensible.

Thus, then, we see, there are intelligible forms, which to the sensible are subsequent.

But further still: if these machines be allowed the work, not of chance, but of an artist, they must be the work of one who knew what he was about. And what is it to work, and know what one is about? It is to have an idea of what one is doing; to possess a form internal, corresponding to the external, to which external it serves for an exemplar, or archetype.

Here then we have an intelligible form, which is prior to the sensible form; which, being truly prior, as well in dignity as in time, can no more become subsequent, than cause can to effect.

Thus, then, with respect to works of art, we may perceive, if we attend, a triple order of forms: one order, intelligible and previous to these works; a second order, sensible and concomitant; and a third, again, intelligible and subsequent. After the first of these orders, the maker may be said to work; through the second, the works themselves exist, and are what they are; and in the third they become recognised as mere objects of contemplation. To make these forms by different names more easy to be understood, the first may be called the maker's form; the second, that of the subject; and the third, that of the contemplator.

Let us pass from hence to works of nature. Let us imagine ourselves viewing some diversified prospect, "a plain, for example, spacious and fertile; a river winding through it; by the banks of that river, men walking, and cattle grazing; the view terminated with distant hills, some craggy, and some covered with wood." Here, it is plain, we have plenty of forms natural. And could any one quit so fair a sight, and retain no traces of what he had beheld? And what is it to retain traces of what one has beheld? It is to have certain forms internal correspondent to the external, and resembling them in every thing, except the being merged in matter: and thus, through the same retentive and collective powers, the mind becomes fraught with forms natural, as before with forms artificial. Should it be asked, "which of these natural forms are prior, the external ones viewed by the senses, or the internal existing in the mind?" the answer is obvious, that the prior are the external.

Thus, therefore, in nature, as well as in art, there are intelligible forms, which to the sensible are subsequent. Hence

then we see the meaning of that noted school axiom, *Nil est in intellectu quod non prius fuit in sensu;* an axiom which we must own to be so far allowable, as it respects the ideas of a mere contemplator.

But to proceed somewhat further. Are natural productions made by chance or by design? Let us admit by design, not to lengthen our inquiry. They are certainly more exquisite than any works of art,[h] and yet these we cannot bring ourselves to suppose made by chance. Admit it, and what follows? We must of necessity admit a mind also, because *design* implies *mind*, wherever it is to be found.[i] Allowing therefore this,

[h] Μᾶλλον δ' ἐστι τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα καὶ τὸ καλὸν ἐν τοῖς τῆς φύσεως ἔργοις, ἢ ἐν τοῖς τῆς τεχνῆς: "The principles of design and beauty are more in the works of nature, than they are in those of art." Arist. de Part. Animal. l. i. c. 1.

[i] The following quotation, taken from the third book of a manuscript comment of Proclus, on the Parmenides of Plato, is here given for the sake of those who have curiosity with regard to the doctrine of ideas, as held by ancient philosophers.

Εἰ δὲ δεῖ συντόμως εἰπεῖν τὴν αἰτίαν τῆς τῶν ἰδεῶν ὑποθέσεως, δι' ἣν ἐκείνοις ἤρεσε, ῥητέον ὅτι ταῦτα πάντα ὅσα ὁρατὰ, οὐράνια καὶ ὑπὸ σελήνην, ἢ ἀπὸ ταυτομάτου ἐστὶν, ἢ κατ' αἰτίαν· ἀλλ' ἀπὸ ταυτομάτου ἀδύνατον· ἔστι γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ὑστέροις τὰ κρείττονα, νοῦς, καὶ λόγος, καὶ αἰτία, καὶ τὰ αἰτίας, καὶ οὕτω τὰ ἀποτελέσματα κρείττω τῶν ἀρχῶν, πρὸς τῷ καὶ ὃ φησιν ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης· δεῖ πρὸ τῶν κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς αἰτίων εἶναι τὰ καθ' αὑτὰ, τούτων γὰρ ἔκβασις τὸ κατὰ συμβεβηκός· ὥστε τοῦ ἀπὸ ταυτομάτου πρεσβύτερον ἂν ἦν τὸ κατ' αἰτίαν, εἰ καὶ ἀπὸ ταυτομάτου τὰ Θειότατα ἦν τῶν φανερῶν: "If, therefore, we are to relate concisely the cause, why the hypothesis of ideas pleased them, (namely Parmenides, Zeno, Socrates, &c.) we must begin by observing, that all the various visible objects around us, the heavenly as well as the sublunary, are either from chance, or according to a cause. From chance is impossible; for then the more excellent things (such as mind, and reason, and cause, and the effects of cause) will be among those things that come last, and so the endings of things will be more excellent than their beginnings. To which too may be added what Aristotle says; that essential causes ought to be prior to accidental, inasmuch as every accidental cause is a deviation from them; so that whatever is the effect of such essential cause [as is indeed every work of art and human ingenuity] must needs be prior to that which is the effect of chance, even though we were to refer to chance the most divine of visible objects, [the heavens themselves.]

The philosopher, having thus proved a definite cause of the world in opposition to chance, proceeds to shew, that from the unity and concurrent order of things this cause must be one. After which he goes on as follows:

Εἰ μὲν οὖν ἄλογον τοῦτο, ἄτοπον. ἔσται γάρ τι πάλιν τῶν ὑστέρων τῆς τούτων αἰτίας κρεῖττον, τὸ κατὰ λόγον καὶ γνῶσιν ποιοῦν, εἴσω τοῦ παντὸς ὂν, καὶ τοῦ ὅλου μέρος, ὃ ἐστιν ἀπ' αἰτίας ἀλόγου τοιοῦτο. Εἰ δὲ λόγον ἔχον, καὶ αὐτὸ γινῶσκον, οἶδεν ἑαυτὸ δήπου τῶν πάντων αἴτιον ὂν, ἢ τοῦτο ἀγνοοῦν, ἀγνοήσει τὴν ἑαυτοῦ φύσιν. Εἰ δὲ οἶδεν, ὅτι κατ' οὐσίαν ἐστὶ τοῦ παντὸς αἴτιον, τὸ δὲ ὡρισμένως εἶδος θάτερον, καὶ θάτερον οἶδεν ἐξ ἀνάγκης, οἶδεν ἄρα καὶ οὗ ἔστιν αἴτιον ὡρισμένως· οἶδεν οὖν καὶ τὸ πᾶν, καὶ πάντα ἐξ ὧν τὸ πᾶν, ὧν ἐστι καὶ αἴτιον. Καὶ εἰ τοῦτο, ἤτοι εἰς ἑαυτὸ ἄρα βλέπον, ἑαυτὸ γινῶσκον, οἶδε τὰ μετ' αὐτό. Λόγοις ἄρα καὶ εἴδεσιν ἀΐδιοις οἶδε τοὺς κοσμικοὺς λόγους, καὶ τὰ εἴδη, ἐξ ὧν τὸ πᾶν, καὶ ἔστιν ἐν αὐτῷ τὸ πᾶν, ὡς ἐν αἰτίῳ, χωρὶς τῆς ὕλης: "Now if this cause be void of reason, that indeed would be absurd; for then again there would be something among those things which came last in order, more excellent than their principle or cause. I mean, by more excellent, something operating according to reason and knowledge, and yet within that universe, and a part of that whole, which is what it is from a cause devoid of reason.

"But if, on the contrary, the cause of the universe be a cause, having reason and knowing itself, it of course knows itself to be the cause of all things; else, being ignorant of this, it would be ignorant of its own nature. But if it know, that from its very essence it is the cause of the universe, and if that, which knows one part of a relation definitely, knows also of necessity the other, it knows for this reason definitely the thing of which it is the cause. It knows therefore the universe, and all things out of

what do we mean by the term *mind?* We mean something, which, when it acts, knows what it is going to do; something stored with ideas of its intended works, agreeably to which ideas those works are fashioned.[k]

which the universe is composed, of all which also it is the cause. But if this be true, it is evident that by looking into itself, and by knowing itself, it knows what comes after itself, and is subsequent. It is, therefore, through certain reasons and forms devoid of matter that it knows those mundane reasons and forms out of which the universe is composed, and that the universe is in it, as in a cause, distinct from and without the matter."

[k] It is upon these principles that Nicomachus, in his Arithmetic, p. 7, calls the Supreme Being an artist: *ἐν τῇ τοῦ τεχνίτου Θεοῦ διανοίᾳ, in Dei artificis mente.* Where Philoponus, in his manuscript Comment, observes as follows: *τεχνίτην φησὶ τὸν Θεὸν, ὡς πάντων τὰς πρότας αἰτίας καὶ τοὺς λόγους αὐτῶν ἔχοντα:* "He calls God an artist, as possessing within himself the first causes of all things, and their reasons or proportions." Soon after, speaking of those sketches, after which painters work and finish their pictures, he subjoins: *ὅσπερ οὖν ἡμεῖς, εἰς τὰ τοιαῦτα σκιαγραφήματα βλέποντες, ποιοῦμεν τόδέ τι, οὕτω καὶ ὁ δημιουργὸς, πρὸς ἐκεῖνα ἀποβλέπων, τὰ τῆδε πάντα κεκόσμηκεν· ἀλλ' ἰστέον, ὅτι τὰ μὲν τῆδε σκιαγραφήματα ἀτελῆ εἰσιν, ἐκεῖνοι δὲ οἱ ἐν τῷ Θεῷ λόγοι ἀρχέτυποι καὶ παντέλειοί εἰσιν:* "As therefore we, looking upon such sketches as these, make such and such particular things; so also the Creator, looking at those sketches of his, hath formed and adorned with beauty all things here below. We must remember, however, that the sketches here are imperfect; but that the others, those reasons or proportions which exist in God, are archetypal and all-perfect."

It is according to this philosophy that Milton represents God, after he had created this visible world, contemplating

How it shew'd
In prospect from his throne, how good, how fair,
Answ'ring his great idea.

Par. Lost, vii. 556.

Proclus proves the existence of these general ideas, or universal forms, by the following arguments: *εἰ τοίνυν ἐστὶν αἰτία τοῦ παντὸς αὐτῷ τῷ εἶναι ποιοῦσα, τὸ δὲ αὐτῷ τῷ εἶναι ποιοῦν ἀπὸ τῆς ἑαυτοῦ ποιεῖ οὐσίας τοῦτό ἐστι πρότως, ὅπερ τὸ ποιούμενον δευτέρως καὶ ὃ ἐστι πρότως, δίδωσι τῷ ποιουμένῳ δευτέρως· οἷον τὸ πῦρ καὶ δίδωσι θερμότητα ἄλλῳ, καὶ ἔστι θερμὸν, ἡ ψυχὴ δίδωσι ζωὴν, καὶ ἔχει ζωὴν, καὶ ἐπὶ πάντων ἴδοις ἂν ἀληθῆ τὸν λόγον, ὅσα αὐτῷ τῷ εἶναι ποιεῖ. καὶ τὸ αἴτιον οὖν τοῦ παντὸς αὐτῷ τῷ εἶναι ποιοῦν τοῦτό ἐστι πρότως, ὅπερ ὁ κόσμος δευτέρως. εἰ δὴ ὁ κόσμος πλήρωμα εἰδῶν ἐστὶ παντοίων, εἴη ἂν καὶ ἐν τῷ αἰτίῳ τοῦ κόσμου ταῦτα πρότως· τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ αἴτιον καὶ ἥλιον, καὶ σελήνην, καὶ ἄνθρωπον ὑπέστησε, καὶ ἵππον, καὶ ὅλως τὰ εἴδη, τὰ ἐν τῷ παντί. ταῦτα ἄρα πρότως ἐστὶν ἐν τῇ αἰτίᾳ τοῦ παντὸς, ἄλλος ἥλιος παρὰ τὸν ἐμφανῆ, καὶ ἄλλος ἄνθρωπος, καὶ τῶν εἰδῶν ὁμοίως ἕκαστον. ἔστιν ἄρα τὰ εἴδη πρὸ τῶν αἰσθητῶν, καὶ αἴτια αὐτῶν τὰ δημιουργικὰ κατὰ τὸν εἰρημένον λόγον, ἐν τῇ μιᾷ τοῦ κόσμου παντὸς αἰτίᾳ προϋπάρχοντα:* "If, therefore, the cause of the universe be a cause which operates merely by existing, and if that which operates merely by existing, operate from its own proper essence, such cause is primarily what its effect is secondarily, and that which it is primarily, it giveth to its effect secondarily. It is thus that fire both giveth warmth to something else, and is itself warm; that the soul giveth life and possesseth life; and this reasoning you may perceive to be true in all things whatever, which operate merely by existing. It follows, therefore, that the cause of the universe, operating after this manner, is that primarily which the world is secondarily. If therefore the world be the plenitude of forms of all sorts, these forms must also be primarily in the cause of the world, for it was the same cause which constituted the sun, and the moon, and man, and horse, and in general all the forms existing in the universe. These, therefore, exist primarily in the cause of the universe; another sun besides the apparent, another man, and so with respect to every form else. The forms, therefore, previous to the sensible and external forms, and which according to this reasoning are their active and efficient causes, are to be found pre-existing in that one and common cause of all the universe." Procli Com. MS. in Plat. Parmenid. l. iii.

We have quoted the above passages for the same reason as the former; for the sake of those who may have a curiosity to see a sample of this ancient philosophy, which (as some have held) may be traced up from Plato and Socrates to Parmenides, Pythagoras, and Orpheus himself.

If the phrase, "to operate merely by existing," should appear questionable, it must be explained upon a supposition, that in the Supreme Being no attributes are

That such exemplars, patterns, forms, ideas, (call them as you please,) must of necessity be, requires no proving, but follows of course, if we admit the cause of nature to be *a mind*, as above mentioned. For take away these, and what a mind do we leave without them? Chance, surely, is as knowing as mind without ideas; or rather mind without ideas is no less blind than chance.

The nature of these ideas is not difficult to explain, if we once come to allow a possibility of their existence. That they are exquisitely beautiful, various, and orderly, is evident from the exquisite beauty, variety, and order seen in natural substances, which are but their copies or pictures. That they are mental is plain, as they are of the essence of mind, and consequently no objects to any of the senses, nor therefore circumscribed either by time or place.

Here, then, on this system, we have plenty of forms intelligible, which are truly previous to all forms sensible. Here, too, we see that nature is not defective in her triple order, having (like art) her forms previous, her concomitant, and her subsequent.[1]

secondary, intermittent, or adventitious, but all original, ever perfect and essential. See p. 164, note *x*, and p. 220.

That we should not therefore think of a blind unconscious operation, like that of fire here alluded to, the author had long before prepared us, by uniting knowledge with natural efficacy, where he forms the character of these divine and creative ideas.

But let us hear him in his own language: ἀλλ' εἴπερ ἐθέλοιμεν τὴν ἰδιότητα αὐτῶν (sc. ἰδεῶν) ἀφορίσασθαι διὰ τῶν γνωριμωτέρων, ἀπὸ μὲν τῶν φυσικῶν λόγων λάβωμεν τὸ αὐτῷ τῷ εἶναι ποιητικὸν, ὧν δὴ καὶ ποιούσι· ἀπὸ δὲ τῶν τεχνικῶν, τὸ γνωστικὸν, ὧν ποιοῦσιν, εἰ καὶ μὴ αὐτῷ τῷ εἶναι ποιοῦσι, καὶ ταύτα ἑνώσαντες φῶμεν αἰτίας εἶναι τὰς ἰδέας δημιουργικὰς ἅμα καὶ νοερὰς πάντων τῶν κατὰ φύσιν ἀποτελουμένων: "But if we should choose to define the peculiar character of ideas by things more known to us than themselves, let us assume from natural principles the power of effecting, merely by existing, all the things that they effect; and from artificial principles the power of comprehending all that they effect, although they did not effect them merely by existing; and then uniting those two, let us say that ideas are at once the efficient and intelligent causes of all things produced according to nature." From book the second of the same Comment.

The schoolman, Thomas Aquinas, a subtle and acute writer, has the following sentence, perfectly corresponding with this philosophy: Res omnes comparantur ad Divinum Intellectum, sicut artificiata ad artem.

The verses of Orpheus on this subject may be found in the tract De Mundo, ascribed to Aristotle, p. 23. edit. Sylburg.

Ζεὺς ἄρσην γένετο, Ζεὺς, κ. τ. λ.

[1] Simplicius, in his commentary upon the Predicaments, calls the first order of these intelligible forms, τὰ πρὸ τῆς μεθέξεως, "those previous to participation;" and at other times, ἡ ἐξῃρημένη κοινότης, "the transcendent universality," or "sameness:" the second order he calls τὰ ἐν μεθέξει, "those which exist in participation," that is, those merged in matter; and at other times he calls them ἡ κατατεταγμένη κοινότης, "the subordinate universality" or "sameness:" lastly, of the third order he says, that they have no independent existence of their own, but that ἡμεῖς ἀφελόντες αὐτὰ ἐν ταῖς ἡμετέραις ἐννοίαις, καθ' ἑαυτὰ ὑπεστήσαμεν, "we ourselves abstracting them in our own imaginations, have given them by such abstraction an existence as of themselves." Simp. in Prædic. p. 17. In another place he says, in a language somewhat mysterious, yet still conformable to the same doctrine, Μήποτε οὖν τριττὸν λεπτέον τὸ κοινὸν, τὸ μὲν ἐξῃρημένον τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα, καὶ αἴτιον τῆς ἐν αὐτοῖς κοινότητος, κατὰ τὴν μίαν ἑαυτοῦ φύσιν, ὥσπερ καὶ τῆς διαφορότητος κατὰ τὴν πολυειδῆ προλήψιν—δεύτερον δέ ἐστι τὸ κοινὸν, τὸ ἀπὸ κοινοῦ αἰτίου τοῖς διαφόροις εἴδεσιν ἐνδιδόμενον, καὶ ἐνυπάρχον αὐτοῖς—τρίταν δὲ, τὸ ἐν ταῖς ἡμετέραις διανοίαις ἐξ ἀφαιρέσεως ὑφιστάμενον, ὑστερογενὲς ὄν: "Perhaps, therefore, we must admit a triple order of what is universal and the same; that of the

That the *previous* may be justly so called is plain, because they are essentially prior to all things else. The whole visible first order, transcendent and superior to particulars, which through its uniform nature is the cause of that sameness existing in them, as through its multiform preconception it is the cause of their diversity: that of the second order, what is infused from the first universal cause into the various species of beings, and which has its existence in those several species: that of the third order, what subsists by abstraction in our own understandings, being of subsequent origin to the other two." *Ibid.* p. 21.

To Simplicius we shall add the two following quotations from Ammonius and Nicephorus Blemmides, which we have ventured to transcribe, without regard to their uncommon length, as they so fully establish the doctrine here advanced, and the works of these authors are not easy to be procured.

Ἐννοείσθω τοίνυν δακτύλιός τις ἐκτύπωμα ἔχων, εἰ τύχοι, Ἀχιλλέως, καὶ κηρία πολλὰ παρακείμενα· ὁ δὲ δακτύλιος σφραγιζέτω τοὺς κηροὺς πάντας· ὕστερον δέ τις εἰσελθὼν καὶ θεασάμενος τὰ κηρία, ἐπιστήσας ὅτι πάντα ἐξ ἑνός εἰσιν ἐκτυπώματος, ἐχέτω παρ' αὐτῷ τὸ ἐκτύπωμα τῇ διανοίᾳ. Ἡ τοίνυν σφραγὶς ἡ ἐν τῷ δακτυλίῳ λέγεται πρὸ τῶν πολλῶν εἶναι· ἡ δὲ ἐν τοῖς κηρίοις, ἐν τοῖς πολλοῖς· ἡ δὲ ἐν τῇ διανοίᾳ τοῦ ἀπομαξαμένου, ἐπὶ τοῖς πολλοῖς, καὶ ὑστερογενής. Τοῦτο οὖν ἐννοείσθω καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν γενῶν καὶ εἰδῶν· ὁ γὰρ Δημιουργὸς, ποιῶν πάντα, ἔχει παρ' ἑαυτῷ τὰ πάντων παραδείγματα· οἷον, ποιῶν ἄνθρωπον, ἔχει τὸ εἶδος παρ' ἑαυτῷ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, πρὸς ὃ ἀφορῶν, πάντας ποιεῖ. Εἰ δέ τις ἐνσταίη λέγων, ὡς οὐκ εἰσὶ παρὰ τῷ Δημιουργῷ τὰ εἴδη, ἀκουέτω ταῦτα, ὡς ὁ Δημιουργὸς δημιουργεῖ, ἢ εἰδὼς τὰ ὑπ' αὐτοῦ δημιουργούμενα, ἢ οὐκ εἰδώς. Ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν μὴ εἰδὼς, οὐκ ἂν δημιουργήσει. Τις γὰρ, μέλλων ποιήσειν τι, ἀγνοεῖ ὃ μέλλει ποιεῖν; οὐ γὰρ, ὡς ἡ φύσις, ἀλόγῳ δυνάμει ποιεῖ. (ὅθεν καὶ ποιεῖ ἡ φύσις, οὐκ ἐφιστάνουσα γνωστικῶς τῷ γιγνομένῳ) Εἰ δέ τι καθ' ἕξιν λογικὴν ποιεῖ, οἴδεπου πάντως τὸ γιγνόμενον ὑπ' αὐτοῦ. Εἰ τοίνυν μὴ χεῖρον, ἢ κατὰ ἄνθρωπον, ὁ Θεὸς ποιεῖ, οἶδε τὸ ὑπ' αὐτοῦ γιγνόμενον. εἰ δὲ οἶδεν ὃ ποιεῖ, αὐτόθι δῆλον, ὡς ἔστιν ἐν τῷ Δημιουργῷ τὰ εἴδη. Ἔστι δὲ τὸ εἶδος ἐν τῷ Δημιουργῷ, ὡς ὁ ἐν τῷ δακτυλίῳ τύπος· καὶ λέγεται τοῦτο τὸ εἶδος πρὸ τῶν πολλῶν, καὶ χωριστὸν τῆς ὕλης. Ἔστι δὲ τὸ εἶδος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου καὶ ἐν τοῖς καθ' ἕκαστον ἀνθρώποις, ὡς τὰ ἐν τοῖς κηροῖς ἐκτυπώματα· καὶ λέγεται τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐν τοῖς πολλοῖς εἶναι, καὶ ἀχώριστα τῆς ὕλης. Θεάσαμενοι δὲ τοὺς κατὰ μέρος ἀνθρώπους, ὅτι πάντες τὸ αὐτὸ εἶδος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἔχουσιν, (ὡς ἐπὶ τοῦ ὕστερον ἐλθόντος, καὶ θεασαμένου τὰ κηρία) ἀνεμαξάμεθα αὐτὸ ἐν τῇ διανοίᾳ· καὶ λέγεται τοῦτο ἐπὶ τοῖς πολλοῖς, ἤγουν μετὰ τὰ πολλὰ, καὶ ὑστερογενές: "Intelligatur annulus, qui alicujus, utpote Achillis, imaginem insculptam habeat: multæ insuper ceræ sint, et ab annulo imprimantur: veniat deinde quispiam, videatque ceras omnes unius annuli impressione formatas, annulique impressionem in mente contineat: sigillum annulo insculptum, *ante multa* dicetur: in cerulis impressum, in multis: quod vero in illius, qui illo venerat, intelligentia remanserit, *post multa*, et posterius genitum dicetur. Idem in generibus et formis intelligendum censeo: etenim ille optimus procreator mundi Deus, omnium rerum formas, atque exempla habet apud se: ut si hominem efficere velit, in hominis formam, quam habet, intueatur, et ad illius exemplum cæteros faciat omnes. At si quis restiterit, dicatque rerum formas apud Creatorem non esse: quæso ut diligenter attendat: opifex, quæ facit, vel cognoscit, vel ignorat: sed ia, qui nesciet, nunquam quicquam faciet: quis enim id facere aggreditur, quod facere ignorat? Neque enim facultate quadam rationis experte aliquid aget, prout agit natura (ex quo conficitur, ut natura etiam agat, etsi quæ faciat, non advertat:) si vero ratione quadam aliquid facit, quodcunque ab eo factum est omnino cognovit. Si igitur Deus non pejore ratione, quam homo, facit quid, quæ fecit cognovit: si cognovit quæ fecit, in ipso rerum formas esse perspicuum est. Formæ autem in opifice sunt perinde ac in annulo sigillum, hæcque forma *ante multa*, et avulsa a materia dicitur. Atqui hominis species in unoquoque homine est, quemadmodum etiam sigilla in ceris; et *in multis*, nec avulsa a materia dicitur. At cum singulos homines animo conspicimus, et eandem in unoquoque formam atque effigiem videmus, illa effigies in mente nostra insidens *post multa*, et posterius genita dicetur: veluti in illo quoque dicebamus, qui multa sigilla in cera uno et eodem annulo impressa conspexerat." Ammon. in Porphyr. Introduct. p. 29. B.

Λέγονται δὲ τὰ γένη καὶ τὰ εἴδη πρὸ τῶν πολλῶν, ἐν τοῖς πολλοῖς, ἐπὶ τοῖς πολλοῖς· οἷον ἐννοείσθω τι σφραγιστήριον, ἔχον καὶ ἐκτύπωμα τὸ τυχὸν, ἐξ οὗ κηρία πολλὰ μεταλαβέτω τοῦ ἐκτυπώματος, καί τις ὑπ' ὄψιν ἀγαγέτω ταῦτα, μὴ προκατιδὼν μηδ' ὅλως τὸ σφραγιστήριον· ἑωρακὼς δὲ τὰ ἐν οἷς τὸ ἐκτύπωμα, καὶ ἐπιστήσας ὅτι πάντα τοῦ αὐτοῦ μετέχουσιν ἐκτυπώματος, καὶ τὰ δοκοῦντα πολλὰ τῷ λόγῳ συναθροίσας εἰς ἕν, ἐχέτω τοῦτο κατὰ διάνοιαν.

ideas, by a kind of lopping and pruning, are made ideas intelligible, whether specific or general. Thus should they admit that *mind* was coeval with *body*, yet till *body* gave it ideas, and awakened its dormant powers, it could at best have been nothing more than a sort of dead capacity; for innate ideas it could not possibly have any.

At another time we hear of bodies so exceedingly fine, that their very exility makes them susceptible of sensation and knowledge; as if they shrunk into intellect by their exquisite subtlety, which rendered them too delicate to be bodies any longer. It is to this notion we owe many curious inventions, such as subtle æther, animal spirits, nervous ducts, vibrations, and the like; terms which modern philosophy, upon parting with occult qualities, has found expedient to provide itself, to supply their place.

But the intellectual scheme, which never forgets Deity, postpones every thing corporeal to the primary mental cause. It is here it looks for the origin of intelligible ideas, even of those which exist in human capacities. For though sensible objects may be the destined medium to awaken the dormant energies of man's understanding, yet are those energies themselves no more contained in sense, than the explosion of a cannon in the spark which gave it fire.°

° The following note is taken from a manuscript commentary of the Platonic Olympiodorus, (quoted before, p. 224,) upon the Phædo of Plato; which though perhaps some may object to from inclining to the doctrine of Platonic reminiscence, yet it certainly gives a better account, how far the senses assist in the acquisition of science, than we can find given by vulgar philosophers.

Οὐδέποτε γὰρ τὰ χείρω καὶ δεύτερα ἀρχαὶ ἢ αἰτίαι εἰσὶ τῶν κρειττόνων· εἰ δὲ δεῖ καὶ ταῖς ἐγκυκλίοις ἐξηγήσεσι πείθεσθαι, καὶ ἀρχὴν εἰπεῖν τὴν αἴσθησιν τῆς ἐπιστήμης, λέξομεν αὐτὴν ἀρχὴν οὐχ ὡς ποιητικὴν, ἀλλ' ὡς ἐρεθίζουσαν τὴν ἡμετέραν ψυχὴν εἰς ἀνάμνησιν τῶν καθόλου—κατὰ ταύτην δὲ τὴν ἐννοίαν εἴρηται καὶ τὸ ἐν Τιμαίῳ, ὅτι δι' ὄψεως καὶ ἀκοῆς τὸ τῆς φιλοσοφίας ἐπορισάμεθα γένος, διότι ἐκ τῶν αἰσθητῶν εἰς ἀνάμνησιν ἀφικνούμεθα. "Those things which are inferior and secondary, are by no means the principles or causes of the more excellent; and though we admit the common interpretations, and allow sense to be a principle of science, we must, however, call it a principle, not as if it was the efficient cause, but as it rouses our soul to the recollection of general ideas. According to the same way of thinking is it said in the Timæus, that through the sight and hearing we acquire to ourselves philosophy, because we pass from objects of sense to reminiscence, or recollection."

And in another passage he observes: Ἐπειδὴ γὰρ πάμμορφον ἄγαλμά ἐστιν ἡ ψυχὴ, πάντων τῶν ὄντων ἔχουσα λόγους, ἐριθιζομένη ὑπὸ τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἀναμιμνήσκεται ὧν ἔνδον ἔχει λόγων, καὶ τούτους προβάλλεται: "For inasmuch as the soul, by containing the principles of all beings, is a sort of omniform representation or exemplar; when it is roused by objects of sense, it recollects those principles, which it contains within, and brings them forth."

Georgius Gemistius, otherwise called Pletho, writes upon the same subject in the following manner: Τὴν ψυχὴν φασὶν οἱ τὰ εἴδη τιθέμενοι ἀναλαμβάνουσαν ἔσγε ἐπιστήμην τοὺς ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς λόγους, ἀκριβέστερον αὐτοὺς ἔχοντας καὶ τελεώτερον ἐν ἑαυτῇ ἴσχειν, ἢ ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς ἔχουσι. Τὸ οὖν τελεώτερον τοῦτο καὶ ἀκριβέστερον οὐκ ἂν ἀπὸ τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἴσχειν τὴν ψυχὴν, ὅγε μὴ ἐστὶν ἐν αὐτοῖς. Οὐ δ' αὖ μηδαμοῦ ἀλλόθι ὂν αὐτὴν ἐξ αὐτῆς διανοεῖσθαι· οὐ δὲ γὰρ πεφυκέναι τὴν ψυχὴν μηδαμῆ ὄν, τι διανοεῖσθαι· τὰς γὰρ ψευδεῖς τῶν δοξῶν οὐχὶ μὴ ὄντων ἀλλ' ὄντων μὲν, ἄλλων δὲ κατ' ἄλλων εἶναι συνθέσεις τινὰς, οὐ κατὰ τὸ ὀρθὸν γινομένας. Λείπεσθαι δὲ ἀφ' ἑτέρας τινὸς φύσεως πολλῷ ἔτι κρείττονός τε καὶ τελεωτέρας

In short, all minds that are, are similar and congenial; and so too are their ideas, or intelligible forms. Were it otherwise, there could be no intercourse between man and man, or (what is more important) between man and God.

For what is conversation between man and man? It is a mutual intercourse of speaking and hearing. To the speaker, it is to teach; to the hearer, it is to learn. To the speaker, it is to descend from ideas to words; to the hearer, it is to ascend from words to ideas. If the hearer, in this ascent, can arrive at no ideas, then is he said not to understand; if he ascend to ideas dissimilar and heterogeneous, then is he said to misunderstand. What then is requisite, that he may be said to understand? That he should ascend to certain ideas, treasured up within himself, correspondent and similar to those within the speaker. The same may be said of a writer and a reader; as when any one reads to-day or to-morrow, or here or in Italy, what Euclid wrote in Greece two thousand years ago.

Now, is it not marvellous, there should be so exact an identity of our ideas, if they were only generated from sensible objects, infinite in number, ever changing, distant in time, distant in place, and no one particular the same with any other?

Again: do we allow it possible for God to signify his will to men, or for men to signify their wants to God? In both these cases there must be an identity of ideas, or else nothing is done, either one way or the other. Whence, then, do these common

ἀφήκειν τῇ ψυχῇ τὸ τελεώτερον τοῦτο τῶν ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς λόγων. "Those who suppose ideal forms, say that the soul, when she assumes, for the purposes of science, those proportions which exist in sensible objects, possesses them with a superior accuracy and perfection, than that to which they attain in those sensible objects. Now this superior perfection or accuracy, the soul cannot have from sensible objects, as it is, in fact, not in them; nor yet can she conceive it herself as from herself, without its having existence anywhere else. For the soul is not formed so as to conceive that which has existence nowhere, since even such opinions as are false, are all of them compositions irregularly formed, not of mere non-beings, but of various real beings, one with another. It remains, therefore, that this perfection, which is superior to the proportions existing in sensible objects, must descend to the soul from some other nature, which is by many degrees more excellent and perfect." Pleth. de Aristotel. et Platonic. Philosoph. Diff. edit. Paris. 1541.

The λόγοι, or "proportions," of which Gemistius here speaks, mean not only those relative proportions of equality and inequality which exist in quantity, (such as double, sesquialter, &c.) but, in a larger sense, they may be extended to mathematical lines, angles, figures, &c.; of all which λόγοι, or "proportions," though we possess in the mind the most clear and precise ideas, yet it may be justly questioned, whether any one of them ever existed in the sensible world.

To these two authors we may add Boethius, who, after having enumerated many acts of the mind, or intellect, wholly distinct from sensation, and independent of it, at length concludes,

Hæc est efficiens magis
Longe causa potentior,
Quam quæ materiæ modo
Impressas patitur notas.
Præcedit tamen excitans,
Ac vires animi movens,
Vivo in corpore passio.
Cum vel lux oculos ferit,
Vel vox auribus instrepit;
Tum mentis vigor excitus,
Quas intus species tenet,
Ad motus simileis vocans,
Notis applicat exteris,
Introrsumque reconditis
Formis miscet imagines.

De Consolat. Philosoph. l. v.

identic ideas come? Those of men, it seems, come all from sensation. And whence come God's ideas? Not, surely, from sensation too: for this we can hardly venture to affirm, without giving to body that notable precedence of being prior to the intellection of even God himself. Let them, then, be original; let them be connate and essential to the Divine Mind: if this be true, is it not a fortunate event, that ideas of corporeal rise, and others of mental, (things derived from subjects so totally distinct,) should so happily coincide in the same wonderful identity?

Had we not better reason thus upon so abstruse a subject? Either all minds have their ideas derived, or all have them original; or some them have them original, and some derived. If all minds have them derived, they must be derived from something, which is itself not *mind*, and thus we fall insensibly into a kind of atheism. If all have them original, then are all minds divine; an hypothesis by far more plausible than the former. But if this be not admitted, then must one mind (at least) have original ideas, and the rest have them derived. Now, supposing this last, whence are those minds, whose ideas are derived, most likely to derive them? From mind or from body? From mind, a thing homogeneous; or from body, a thing heterogeneous? From mind, such as (from the hypothesis) has original ideas; or from body, which we cannot discover to have any ideas at all?[p] An examination of this kind, pursued with accuracy and temper, is the most probable method of solving these doubts. It is thus we shall be enabled with more assurance to decide, whether we are to admit the doctrine of the Epicurean poet,

> Corporea natura animum constare, animamque;

or trust the Mantuan bard, when he sings, in divine numbers,

> Igneus est ollis vigor, et cœlestis origo
> Seminibus.

But it is now time to quit these speculations. Those who would trace them further, and have leisure for such studies, may perhaps find themselves led into regions of contemplation, affording them prospects both interesting and pleasant. We have at present said as much as was requisite to our subject, and shall therefore pass from hence to our concluding chapter.

[p] Νοῦν δὲ οὐδὲν σῶμα γεννᾶ· πῶς γὰρ ἂν τὰ ἀνόητα νοῦν γεννήσοι; "Nobody produces mind: for how should things devoid of mind produce mind? Sallust. de Diis et Mundo, c. 8.

CHAPTER V.

SUBORDINATION OF INTELLIGENCE. DIFFERENCE OF IDEAS, BOTH IN PARTICULAR MEN AND IN WHOLE NATIONS. DIFFERENT GENIUS OF DIFFERENT LANGUAGES. CHARACTER OF THE ENGLISH, THE ORIENTAL, THE LATIN, AND THE GREEK LANGUAGES. SUPERLATIVE EXCELLENCE OF THE LAST. CONCLUSION.

ORIGINAL truth having the most intimate connexion with the Supreme Intelligence,[q] may be said (as it were) to shine with unchangeable splendor, enlightening throughout the universe every possible subject, by nature susceptible of its benign influence. Passions and other obstacles may prevent, indeed, its efficacy, as clouds and vapours may obscure the sun; but itself neither admits diminution nor change, because the darkness respects only particular percipients. Among these, therefore, we must look for ignorance and error, and for that subordination of intelligence which is their natural consequence.

We have daily experience in the works of art, that a partial knowledge will suffice for contemplation, though we know not enough to profess ourselves artists. Much more is this true with respect to nature; and well for mankind is it found to be true, else never could we attain any natural knowledge at all. For if the constitutive proportions of a clock are so subtle, that few conceive them truly but the artist himself; what shall we say to those seminal proportions, which make the essence and

[q] Those philosophers, whose ideas of being and knowledge are derived from body and sensation, have a short method to explain the nature of truth. It is a factitious thing, made by every man for himself; which comes and goes, just as it is remembered and forgot; which in the order of things makes its appearance the last of any, being not only subsequent to sensible objects, but even to our sensations of them. According to this hypothesis, there are many truths which have been, and are no longer; others that will be, and have not been yet; and multitudes that possibly may never exist at all.

But there are other reasoners, who must surely have had very different notions; those, I mean, who represent truth, not as the last, but the first of beings; who call it immutable, eternal, omnipresent; attributes that all indicate something more than human. To these it must appear somewhat strange, how men should imagine that a crude account of the method how they perceive truth was to pass for an account of truth itself; as if to describe the road to London could be called a description of that metropolis.

For my own part, when I read the detail about sensation and reflection, and am taught the process at large how my ideas are all generated, I seem to view the human soul in the light of a crucible, where truths are produced by a kind of logical chemistry. They may consist (for aught we know) of natural materials, but are as much creatures of our own as a bolus or elixir.

If Milton by his Urania intended to represent truth, he certainly referred her to a much more ancient, as well as a far more noble origin.

Heavenly born!
Before the hills appear'd, or fountains flow'd,
Thou with Eternal Wisdom didst converse,
Wisdom thy sister; and with her didst play
In presence of th' almighty Father, pleas'd
With thy celestial song.

Paradise Lost, vii.

See Prov. viii. 22, &c. Jer. x. 10. Marc. Antonin. ix. 1.

character of every natural subject? Partial views, the imperfections of sense; inattention, idleness, the turbulence of passions; education, local sentiments, opinions, and belief, conspire in many instances to furnish us with ideas; some too general, some too partial, and (what is worse than all this) with many that are erroneous, and contrary to truth. These it behoves us to correct as far as possible, by cool suspense and candid examination.

Νῆφε, καὶ μέμνησ' ἀπιστεῖν, ἄρθρα ταῦτα τῶν φρενῶν.

And thus, by a connexion perhaps little expected, the cause of letters and that of virtue appear to coincide; it being the business of both to examine our ideas, and to amend them by the standard of nature and of truth.[r]

In this important work we shall be led to observe, how nations, like single men, have their peculiar ideas; how these peculiar ideas become the genius of their language, since the symbol must of course correspond to its archetype;[s] how the wisest nations, having the most and best ideas, will consequently have the best and most copious languages;[t] how others, whose languages are motley and compounded, and who have borrowed from different countries different arts and practices, discover by words to whom they are indebted for things.

To illustrate what has been said, by a few examples. We Britons in our time have been remarkable borrowers, as our multiform language may sufficiently shew. Our terms in polite literature prove, that this came from Greece; our terms in music and painting, that these came from Italy; our phrases in cookery and war, that we learnt these from the French; and our phrases in navigation, that we were taught by the Flemings and Low Dutch. These many and very different sources of our language may be the cause why it is so deficient in regularity and analogy. Yet we have this advantage to compensate the defect, that what we want in elegance we gain in copiousness; in which last respect few languages will be found superior to our own.

Let us pass from ourselves to the nations of the East. The eastern world,[u] from the earliest days, has been at all times the

[r] How useful to ethic science, and, indeed, to knowledge in general, a grammatical disquisition into the etymology and meaning of words was esteemed by the chief and ablest philosophers, may be seen by consulting Plato in his Cratylus; Xenoph. Mem. iv. 5, 6. Arrian. Epict. i. 17. ii. 10. Marc. Anton. iii. 11. v. 8. x. 8.

[s] *Ἠθοῦς χαράκτηρ ἔστι τ' ἀνθρώπου λόγος.* Stob. Capiuntur signa haud levia, sed observatu digna (quod fortasse quispiam non putarit) de ingeniis et moribus populorum et nationum ex linguis ipsorum. Bacon. de Augm. Scient. vi. 1. Vid. etiam. Quinctil. l. xi. p. 675. edit. Capperon. Diog. l. i. p. 58. et Men. Com. Tusc. Disp. v. 16.

[t] It is well observed by Muretus, Nulli unquam, qui res ignorarent, nomina, quibus eas exprimerent, quæsierunt. Var. Lect. vi. 1.

[u] *Διὰ γὰρ τὸ δουλικώτεροι εἶναι τὰ ἤθη οἱ μὲν Βάρβαροι τῶν Ἑλλήνων, οἱ δὲ περὶ τὴν Ἀσίαν τῶν περὶ τὴν Εὐρώπην, ὑπομένουσι τὴν δεσποτικὴν ἀρχὴν, οὐδὲν δυσχεραίνοντες.* "For the Barbarians, by being more slavish in their manners than the Greeks, and those of Asia than those of Europe, submit to despotic government without murmuring or discontent." Arist. Polit. iii. 4.

seat of enormous monarchy: on its natives fair liberty never shed its genial influence. If at any time civil discords arose among them, (and arise there did innumerable,) the contest was never about the form of their government, (for this was an object of which the combatants had no conception;) it was all from the poor motive of who should be their master, whether a Cyrus or an Artaxerxes, a Mahomet or a Mustapha.

Such was their condition: and what was the consequence? Their ideas became consonant to their servile state, and their words became consonant to their servile ideas. The great distinction, for ever in their sight, was that of tyrant and slave; the most unnatural one conceivable, and the most susceptible of pomp and empty exaggeration. Hence they talked of kings as gods, and of themselves as the meanest and most abject reptiles. Nothing was either great or little in moderation, but every sentiment was heightened by incredible hyperbole. Thus, though they sometimes ascended into the great and magnificent,[x] they as frequently degenerated into the tumid and bombast. The Greeks too of Asia became infected by their neighbours, who were often, at times, not only their neighbours but their masters; and hence that luxuriance of the Asiatic style, unknown to the chaste eloquence and purity of Athens. But of the Greeks we forbear to speak now, as we shall speak of them more fully when we have first considered the nature or genius of the Romans.

And what sort of people may we pronounce the Romans?—A nation engaged in wars and commotions, some foreign, some domestic, which for seven hundred years wholly engrossed their thoughts. Hence, therefore, their language became, like their ideas, copious in all terms expressive of things political, and well adapted to the purposes both of history and popular eloquence. But what was their philosophy?[y]—As a nation it was none, if we may credit their ablest writers. And hence the unfitness of their language to this subject; a defect which even Cicero is compelled to confess, and more fully makes appear, when he writes philosophy himself, from the number of terms which he is obliged to invent.[z] Virgil seems to have judged the most truly of his

[x] The truest sublime of the East may be found in the scriptures, of which, perhaps, the principal cause is the intrinsic greatness of the subjects there treated; the creation of the universe, the dispensations of Divine Providence, &c.

[y] Muretus has the following passage upon the Roman taste for philosophy: Beati autem illi, et opulenti, et omnium gentium victores Romani, in petendis honoribus, et in prensandis civibus, et in exteris nationibus verbo componendis, re compilandis occupati, philosophandi curam servis aut libertis suis, et Græculis esurientibus relinquebant. Ipsi, quod ab avaritia, quod ab ambitione, quod a voluptatibus reliquum erat temporis, ejus si partem aliquam aut ad audiendum Græcum quempiam philosophum, aut ad aliquem de philosophia libellum vel legendum vel scribendum contulissent, jam se ad eruditionis culmen pervenisse, jam victam a se et profligatam jacere Græciam somniabant. Var. Lect. vi. 1.

[z] See Cic. de Fin. i. c. 1, 2, 3; iii. c. 1, 2. 4, &c.; but in particular Tusc. Disp. i. 3. where he says, Philosophia jacuit usque ad hanc ætatem, nec ullum habuit lumen literarum Latinarum; quæ illustranda et excitanda nobis est; ut si, &c. See also Tusc.

countrymen, when, admitting their inferiority in the more elegant arts, he concludes at last with his usual majesty,

Disp. iv. 3. and Acad. i. 2. where it appears, that until Cicero applied himself to the writing of philosophy, the Romans had nothing of the kind in their language, except some mean performances of Amafanius the Epicurean, and others of the same sect. How far the Romans were indebted to Cicero for philosophy, and with what industry, as well as eloquence, he cultivated the subject, may be seen, not only from the titles of those works that are now lost, but much more from the many noble ones still fortunately preserved.

The Epicurean poet Lucretius, who flourished nearly at the same time, seems by his silence to have overlooked the Latin writers of his own sect; deriving all his philosophy, as well as Cicero, from Grecian sources; and, like him, acknowledging the difficulty of writing in philosophy in Latin, both from the poverty of the tongue, and from the novelty of the subject.

Nec me animi fallit, Graiorum obscura reperta
Difficile inlustrare Latinis versibus esse,
(Multa novis rebus præsertim quam sit agendum,)
Propter egestatem linguæ et rerum novitatem:
Sed tua me virtus tamen, et sperata voluptas
Suavis amicitiæ quemvis perferre laborem
Suadet. Lucr. i. 137.

In the same age, Varro, among his numerous works, wrote some in the way of philosophy; as did the patriot Brutus a treatise Concerning Virtue, much applauded by Cicero; but these works are now lost.

Soon after the writers above mentioned came Horace, some of whose satires and epistles may be justly ranked amongst the most valuable pieces of Latin philosophy, whether we consider the purity of their style, or the great address with which they treat the subject.

After Horace, though with as long an interval as from the days of Augustus to those of Nero, came the satirist Persius, the friend and disciple of the Stoic Cornutus; to whose precepts as he did honour by his virtuous life, so his works, though small, shew an early proficiency in the science of morals. Of him it may be said, that he is almost the single difficult writer among the Latin classics, whose meaning has sufficient merit to make it worth while to labour through his obscurities.

In the same degenerate and tyrannic period, lived also Seneca; whose character, both as a man and a writer, is discussed with great accuracy by the noble author of the Characteristics, to whom we refer.

Under a milder dominion, that of Adrian and the Antonines, lived Aulus Gellius, or (as some call him) Agellius, an entertaining writer in the miscellaneous way, well skilled in criticism and antiquity; who, though he can hardly be entitled to the name of a philosopher, yet deserves not to pass unmentioned here, from the curious fragments of philosophy interspersed in his works.

With Aulus Gellius we range Macrobius, not because a contemporary, (for he is supposed to have lived under Honorius and Theodosius,) but from his near resemblance in the character of a writer. His works, like the other's, are miscellaneous; filled with mythology and ancient literature, some philosophy being intermixed. His Commentary upon the Somnium Scipionis of Cicero may be considered as wholly of the philosophical kind.

In the same age with Aulus Gellius flourished Apuleius of Madaura in Africa, a Platonic writer, whose matter in general far exceeds his perplexed and affected style, too conformable to the false rhetoric of the age when he lived.

Of the same country, but of a later age and a harsher style, was Martianus Capella, if indeed he deserve not the name rather of a philologist, than of a philosopher.

After Capella, we may rank Chalcidius the Platonic, though both his age, and country, and religion are doubtful. His manner of writing is rather more agreeable than that of the two preceding, nor does he appear to be their inferior in the knowledge of philosophy, his work being a laudable commentary upon the Timæus of Plato.

The last Latin philosopher was Boethius, who was descended from some of the noblest of the Roman families, and was consul in the beginning of the sixth century. He wrote many philosophical works, the greater part in the logical way: but his ethic piece, On the Consolation of Philosophy, and which is partly prose and partly verse, deserves great encomiums, both for the matter and for the style; in which last he approaches the purity of a far better age than his own, and is in all respects preferable to those crabbed Africans already mentioned. By command of Theodoric king of the Goths, it was the hard fate of this worthy man to suffer death: with whom the Latin tongue, and the last remains of Roman dignity, may be said to have sunk in the western world.

There were other Romans who left philosophical writings, such as Musonius Rufus,

Tu regere imperio populos, Romane, memento,
(Hæ tibi erunt artes) pacisque imponere morem,
Parcere subjectis, et debellare superbos.

From considering the Romans, let us pass to the Greeks. The Grecian commonwealths, while they maintained their liberty, were the most heroic confederacy that ever existed. They were the politest, the bravest, and the wisest of men. In the short space of little more than a century, they became such statesmen, warriors, orators, historians, physicians, poets, critics, painters, sculptors, architects, and (last of all) philosophers, that one can hardly help considering that golden period as a providential event in honour of human nature, to shew to what perfection the species might ascend.[a]

and the two emperors Marcus Antoninus and Julian; but as these preferred the use of the Greek tongue to their own, they can hardly be considered among the number of Latin writers.

And so much (by way of sketch) for the Latin authors of philosophy; a small number for so vast an empire, if we consider them as all the product of near six successive centuries.

[a] If we except Homer, Hesiod, and the lyric poets, we hear of few Grecian writers before the expedition of Xerxes. After that monarch had been defeated, and the dread of the Persian power was at an end, the effulgence of Grecian genius (if I may use the expression) broke forth, and shone till the time of Alexander the Macedonian, after whom it disappeared, and never rose again. This is that golden period spoken of above. I do not mean that Greece had not many writers of great merit subsequent to that period, and especially of the philosophic kind; but the great, the striking, the sublime, (call it as you please,) attained at that time to a height to which it never could ascend in any after age.

The same kind of fortune befell the people of Rome. When the Punic wars were ended, and Carthage, their dreaded rival, was no more, then (as Horace informs us) they began to cultivate the politer arts. It was soon after this, their great orators and historians and poets arose, and Rome, like Greece, had her golden period, which lasted to the death of Octavius Cæsar.

I call these two periods, from the two greatest geniuses that flourished in each; one the Socratic period, the other the Ciceronian.

There are still farther analogies subsisting between them. Neither period commenced, as long as solicitude for the common welfare engaged men's attentions, and such wars impended as threatened their destruction by foreigners and barbarians. But when once these fears were over, a general security soon ensued, and instead of attending to the arts of defence and self-preservation, they began to cultivate those of elegance and pleasure. Now as these naturally produced a kind of wanton insolence, (not unlike the vicious temper of high-fed animals,) so by this the bands of union were insensibly dissolved. Hence, then, among the Greeks, that fatal Peloponnesian war, which, together with other wars, its immediate consequence, broke the confederacy of their commonwealths, wasted their strength, made them jealous of each other, and thus paved a way for the contemptible kingdom of Macedon to enslave them all, and ascend in a few years to universal monarchy.

A like luxuriance of prosperity sowed discord among the Romans, raised those unhappy contests between the senate and the Gracchi, between Sylla and Marius, between Pompey and Cæsar; till at length, after the last struggle for liberty by those brave patriots Brutus and Cassius at Philippi, and the subsequent defeat of Anthony at Actium, the Romans became subject to the dominion of a fellow-citizen.

It must indeed be confessed, that after Alexander and Octavius had established their monarchies, there were many bright geniuses, who were eminent under their government. Aristotle maintained a friendship and epistolary correspondence with Alexander. In the time of the same monarch lived Theophrastus, and the cynic, Diogenes. Then also Demosthenes and Æschines spoke their two celebrated orations. So likewise in the time of Octavius, Virgil wrote his Æneid; and with Horace, Varius, and many other fine writers, partook of the protection and royal munificence. But then it must be remembered, that these men were bred and educated in the principles of a free government. It was hence they derived that high and manly spirit,

Now the language of these Greeks was truly like themselves, it was conformable to their transcendent and universal genius. Where matter so abounded, words followed of course, and those exquisite in every kind, as the ideas for which they stood. And hence it followed, there was not a subject to be found, which could not with propriety be expressed in Greek.

Here were words and numbers for the humour of an Aristophanes; for the native elegance of a Philemon or Menander; for the amorous strains of a Mimnermus or Sappho; for the rural lays of a Theocritus or Bion; and for the sublime conceptions of a Sophocles or Homer. The same in prose. Here Isocrates was enabled to display his art, in all the accuracy of periods, and the nice counterpoise of diction. Here Demosthenes found materials for that nervous composition, that manly force of unaffected eloquence, which rushed, like a torrent, too impetuous to be withstood.

Who were more different in exhibiting their philosophy than Xenophon, Plato, and his disciple Aristotle? Different, I say, in their character of composition; for as to their philosophy itself, it was in reality the same. Aristotle, strict, methodic, and orderly; subtle in thought; sparing in ornament; with little address to the passions or imagination; but exhibiting the whole with such a pregnant brevity, that in every sentence we seem to read a page. How exquisitely is this all performed in Greek? Let those who may imagine it may be done as well in another language, satisfy themselves either by attempting to translate him, or by perusing his translations already made by men of learning. On the contrary, when we read either Xenophon or Plato, nothing of this method or strict order appears. The formal and didactic is wholly dropped. Whatever they may teach, it is without professing to be teachers; a train of dialogue and truly polite address, in which, as in a mirror, we behold human life, adorned in all its colours of sentiment and manners.

And yet, though these differ in this manner from the Stagirite, how different are they likewise in character from each other? Plato, copious, figurative, and majestic; intermixing at times the facetious and satiric; enriching his works with tales and fables, and the mystic theology of ancient times. Xenophon, the pattern of perfect simplicity; everywhere smooth, harmonious, and pure; declining the figurative, the marvellous, and

which made them the admiration of after-ages. The successors and forms of government left by Alexander and Octavius, soon stopped the growth of any thing further in the kind. So true is that noble saying of Longinus: *Θρέψαι τε γὰρ ἱκανὴ τὰ φρονήματα τῶν μεγαλοφρόνων ἡ ἐλευθέρια, καὶ ἐπελπίσαι, καὶ ἅμα διωθεῖν τὸ πρόθυμον τῆς πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἔριδος, καὶ τῆς περὶ τὰ πρωτεῖα φιλοτιμίας:* "It is liberty that is formed to nurse the sentiments of great geniuses; to inspire them with hope; to push forward the propensity of contest one with another, and the generous emulation of being the first in rank." De Subl. sect. 44.

the mystic; ascending but rarely into the sublime; nor then so much trusting to the colours of style, as to the intrinsic dignity of the sentiment itself.

The language, in the meantime, in which he and Plato wrote, appears to suit so accurately with the style of both, that when we read either of the two, we cannot help thinking, that it is he alone who has hit its character, and that it could not have appeared so elegant in any other manner.

And thus is the Greek tongue, from its propriety and universality, made for all that is great, and all that is beautiful, in every subject, and under every form of writing.

> Graiis ingenium, Graiis dedit ore rotundo
> Musa loqui.

It were to be wished, that those amongst us who either write or read, with a view to employ their liberal leisure, (for as to such as do either from views more sordid, we leave them, like slaves, to their destined drudgery,) it were to be wished, I say, that the liberal (if they have a relish for letters) would inspect the finished models of Grecian literature; that they would not waste those hours, which they cannot recall, upon the meaner productions of the French and English press; upon that fungous growth of novels and of pamphlets, where, it is to be feared, they rarely find any rational pleasure, and more rarely still, any solid improvement.

To be competently skilled in ancient learning, is by no means a work of such insuperable pains. The very progress itself is attended with delight, and resembles a journey through some pleasant country, where every mile we advance new charms arise. It is certainly as easy to be a scholar, as a gamester, or many other characters equally illiberal and low. The same application, the same quantity of habit, will fit us for one, as completely as for the other. And as to those who tell us, with an air of seeming wisdom, that it is men, and not books, we must study to become knowing; this I have always remarked, from repeated experience, to be the common consolation and language of dunces. They shelter their ignorance under a few bright examples, whose transcendent abilities, without the common helps, have been sufficient of themselves to great and important ends. But, alas!

> Decipit exemplar vitiis imitabile.

In truth, each man's understanding, when ripened and mature, is a composite of natural capacity, and of super-induced habit. Hence the greatest men will be necessarily those who possess the best capacities, cultivated with the best habits. Hence also moderate capacities, when adorned with valuable science, will far transcend others the most acute by nature, when either

neglected, or applied to low and base purposes. And thus for the honour of culture and good learning, they are able to render a man, if he will take the pains, intrinsically more excellent than his natural superiors.

And so much at present as to general ideas; how we acquire them; whence they are derived; what is their nature; and what their connection with language. So much, likewise, as to the subject of this treatise, Universal Grammar.

PHILOSOPHICAL ARRANGEMENTS.

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PHILOSOPHICAL ARRANGEMENTS.

PHILOSOPHICAL ARRANGEMENTS,

ADDRESSED TO THE RIGHT HONOURABLE THOMAS LORD HYDE, CHANCELLOR OF THE DUCHY OF LANCASTER, ETC.

CHAPTER I.

INTRODUCTION—SCOPE OR END OF THE INQUIRY—BEGINS FROM THE ARRANGEMENT OF SIMPLE, OR SINGLE TERMS—CHARACTER OF THESE TERMS—NATURE AND MULTITUDE OF THE OBJECTS WHICH THEY REPRESENT.

PHILOSOPHY, taking its name from the love of wisdom, and having for its end the investigation of truth, has an equal regard both to practice and speculation, inasmuch as truth of every kind is similar and congenial. Hence we find that some of the most illustrious actors upon the great theatre of the world have been engaged at times in philosophical speculation. Pericles, who governed Athens, was the disciple of Anaxagoras; Epaminondas spent his youth in the Pythagorean school; Alexander the Great had Aristotle for his preceptor; and Scipio made Polybius his companion and friend. Why need I mention Cicero, or Cato, or Brutus? The orations, the epistles, and the philosophical works of the first, shew him sufficiently conversant both in action and contemplation. So eager was Cato for knowledge,[a] even when surrounded with business, that he used to read philosophy in the senate-house, while the senate was assembling: and as for the patriot Brutus, though his life was a continual scene of the most important action, he found time not only to study, but to compose a treatise upon Virtue.[b]

[a] Thus Cicero describes him: Quippe qui, ne reprehensionem quidem volgi inanem reformidans, in ipsa curia soleret legere sæpe, dum senatus cogeretur, nihil operæ reipublicæ detrahens. De Fin. iii. 2. Where it is worth remarking, that Cato considered his application to literature as no way obstructing his duty to the commonwealth. The studious character and the political in him were united.

[b] Thus the same Cicero: Placere enim tibi (Bruto scil.) admodum sensi, et ex eo libro quem ad me accuratissime scripsisti, et ex multis sermonibus tuis, virtutem ad beate vivendum se ipsa esse contentam. Tuscul. Disput. v. 1. And again: Provocatus gratissimo mihi libro, quem de Virtute scripsisti. De Fin. l. iii.

One or two short fragments of this treatise of Brutus are preserved in Seneca, De Consolat. ad Helv. c. 9.

As to Pericles, Epaminondas, and the other great names mentioned in the same page with Cato and Brutus, see note *e* in the following page.

When these were gone, and the worst of times succeeded, Thrasea Pætus and Helvidius Priscus were at the same period both senators and philosophers, and appear to have supported the severest trials of tyrannic oppression by the manly system of the Stoic moral.[c] The best emperor whom the Romans, or perhaps any nation, ever knew, Marcus Antoninus, was involved during his whole life in business of the last consequence; sometimes conspiracies forming, which he was obliged to dissipate; formidable wars arising at other times, when he was obliged to take the field. Yet during none of these periods did he forsake philosophy, but still persisted in meditation,[d] and in committing his thoughts to writing, during moments gained by stealth from the hurry of courts and campaigns.

If we descend to later ages, and search our own country, we shall find sir Thomas More, sir Philip Sidney, sir Walter Raleigh, lord Herbert of Cherbury, Milton, Algernon Sidney, sir William Temple, and many others, to have been all of them eminent in public life, and yet at the same time conspicuous for their speculations and literature. If we look abroad, examples of like character will occur in other countries. Grotius, the poet, the critic, the philosopher, and the divine, was employed by the court of Sweden as ambassador to France: and De Witt, that acute but unfortunate statesman, that pattern of parsimony and political accomplishments, was an able mathematician, wrote upon the elements of curves, and applied his algebra with accuracy to the trade and commerce of his country.

And so much in defence of philosophy, against those who may possibly undervalue her, because they have succeeded without her; those I mean (and it must be confessed they are many) who, having spent their whole lives in what Milton calls "the busy hum of men," have acquired to themselves habits of amazing efficacy, unassisted by the helps of science and erudition. To such the retired student may appear an awkward being, because they want a just standard to measure his merit. But let them recur to the bright examples before alleged; let them remember that these were eminent in their own way; were men of action and business; men of the world; and yet they did not disdain to cultivate philosophy, nay, were many of them perhaps indebted to her for the splendor of their active character.[e]

[c] See Arr. Epictet. lib. i. c. 1, 2. and the notes of my late worthy friend, the learned editor, Upton. See also Mrs. Carter's excellent translation.

[d] See the original, particularly in Gataker's edition. See also the learned and accurate translation of Meric Casaubon.

[e] The following authorities may serve to confirm the truth of this assertion.

In Plutarch's Life of Pericles we read as follows: *Ὁ δὲ πλεῖστα Περικλεῖ συγγενόμενος, καὶ μάλιστα περιθεὶς ὄγκον αὐτῷ καὶ φρόνημα δημαγωγίας ἐμβριθέστερον, ὅλως τε μετεωρίσας καὶ συνεξάρας τὸ ἀξίωμα τοῦ ἤθους, Ἀναξαγόρας ἦν ὁ Κλαζομένιος, ὃν οἱ τότ' ἄνθρωποι νοῦν προσηγόρευον:* "But he who was most conversant with Pericles, and most contributed to give him a grandeur of mind, and to make his high spirit for governing the popular assemblies more weighty and authoritative; in a word, who exalted his ideas,

This reasoning has a further end. It justifies me in the address of these philosophical arrangements, as your lordship

and raised at the same time the dignity of his behaviour: the person who did this was Anaxagoras, the Clazomenian, whom the people of that age used to call νοῦς, or "mind." Plut. in Vit. Periclis, p. 154. B. edit. Xyland.

Plutarch soon after gives good reasons for this appellation of Anaxagoras, viz. his great abilities, and his being the first who made mind or intellect (in opposition to chance) a principle in the formation and government of the universe.

The words of Anaxagoras on this subject, though well known, are well worth citing: Πάντα χρήματα ἦν ὁμοῦ· εἶτα νοῦς ἐλθὼν αὐτὰ διεκόσμησε: "All things were blended together: then came *mind* (or an intelligent principle) and gave them arrangement." Diog. Laert. ii. 6.

Epaminondas, in his political capacity, was so great a man, that he raised his country, the commonwealth of Thebes, from a contemptible state to take the lead in Greece; a dignity which the Thebans had never known before, and which fell, upon his loss, never to rise again. The same man was a pattern in private life of every thing virtuous and amiable; so that Justin well remarks, Fuit autem incertum, vir melior, an dux, esset.

Cornelius Nepos, having recorded the other parts of his education, adds, At philosophiæ præceptorem habuit Lysim, Tarentinum, Pythagoreum; cui quidem sic fuit deditus, ut adolescens tristem et severum senem omnibus æqualibus suis in familiaritate anteposuerit, neque prius eum a se dimiserit, quam doctrinis tanto antecessit condiscipulos, ut facile intelligi posset pari modo superaturum omnes in cæteris artibus. Corn. Nep. in Vit. Epaminon. c. 2. Justin. Hist. vi. 8. Cicer. de Orat. iii. 34.

As for Alexander the Great, we may form a judgment, what sort of education his father Philip wished him to have, from that curious epistle which he wrote to Aristotle, upon Alexander's birth. It is in its character so simple and elegant, that we have given it entire, as preserved by Aulus Gellius:

Φίλιππος Ἀριστοτέλει χαίρειν.

Ἴσθι μοι γεγονότα υἱόν· πολλὴν οὖν τοῖς θεοῖς χάριν ἔχω, οὐχ οὕτως ἐπὶ τῇ γενέσει τοῦ παιδὸς ὡς ἐπὶ τῷ κατὰ τὴν σὴν ἡλικίαν αὐτὸν γεγονέναι· ἐλπίζω γὰρ αὐτὸν, ὑπὸ σοῦ τραφέντα καὶ παιδευθέντα, ἄξιον ἔσεσθαι καὶ ἡμῶν, καὶ τῆς τῶν πραγμάτων διαδοχῆς.

"Philip to Aristotle greeting.

"Know that I have a son born. On this account I am greatly thankful to the gods, not so much for the birth of the child, as for his being born during your times: for I hope that by his being bred, and educated under you, he will become worthy of us, and worthy to succeed in the management of affairs." A. Gell. ix. 3.

What in fact this education was, we may learn not only from Alexander's history, but from an observation of Plutarch, in answer to an objection, "how Alexander could venture to attack such an immense power as the Persian with such contemptible forces of his own." Plutarch says, that no forces could be greater or fairer than the several accomplishments of Alexander's mind; and concludes, "that he marched against the Persians with better supplies from his preceptor Aristotle, than from his father Philip:" πλείονας παρὰ Ἀριστοτέλους τοῦ καθηγητοῦ, ἢ παρὰ Φιλίππου τοῦ πατρὸς ἀφορμὰς ἔχων, διέβαινεν ἐπὶ Πέρσας. Plut. de Alex. Fort. p. 327. edit. Xyland.

As for Scipio, the illustrious conqueror of Carthage, we have this account of him and his companion Polybius (to whom we may add also Panætius) from Velleius Paterculus: Scipio tam elegans liberalium studiorum, omnisque doctrinæ et auctor et admirator fuit, ut Polybium Panætiumque, præcellentes ingenio viros, domi militiæque secum habuerit. Neque enim quisquam hoc Scipione elegantius intervalla negotiorum otio dispunxit, semperque aut belli, aut pacis serviit artibus; semperque inter arma et studia versatus, aut corpus periculis, aut animum disciplinis exercuit. Vell. Paterc. Histor. l. i. p. 19. edit. Lipsii.

During the campaigns of Scipio, Polybius attended him even in the time of action or engagement; as, for example, in that bold attempt, when Scipio, with Polybius and thirty soldiers only, undermined one of the gates of Carthage. See Ammian. Marcel. l. xxiv. 2.

During more quiet intervals, Polybius did not forget the duties of a friend, or the dignity of a philosopher, but gave advice, and that suitable to the character which Scipio wished to support in the commonwealth. Among other things, he advised him (as Plutarch informs us) "never to quit the forum, or place of public resort, before he had made himself some friend, who was intimately conversant in the conduct of his fellow-citizens:" μὴ πρότερον ἐξ ἀγορᾶς ἀπελθεῖν, ἢ φίλον τινὰ ποιήσασθαι, σύνεγγυς ὄντα τῶν πράξεων τῶν πολιτῶν. Plut. Symposiac. l. iii. p. 659. edit. Xyl.

To these instances we may add the peculiar regard which Cæsar had for the phi-

has been distinguished in either character, I mean in your public one, as well as in your private. Those who know the history of our foreign transactions, know the reputation that you acquired both in Poland and in Germany:[f] and those who are honoured with your nearer friendship, know that you can speculate as well as act, and can employ your pen both with elegance and instruction.

It may not, perhaps, be unentertaining to your lordship to see, in what manner the preceptor of Alexander the Great arranged his pupil's ideas, so that they might not cause confusion for want of accurate disposition. It may be thought, also, a fact worthy of your notice, that he became acquainted with this method from the venerable Pythagoras, who, unless he drew it from remoter sources, to us unknown, was, perhaps, himself its inventor and original teacher.[g]

Poets relate, that Venus was wedded to Vulcan, the goddess of beauty to the god of deformity. The tale, as some explain it, gives a double representation of art; Vulcan shewing us the progressions of art, and Venus the completions. The progressions, such as the hewing of stone, the grinding of colours, the fusion of metals, these, all of them, are laborious, and many times disgustful: the completions, such as the temple, the palace, the picture, the statue, these, all of them, are beauties, and justly call for admiration.

losopher Aristo, and Pompey for the philosopher Cratippus. Ælian well remarks, on these two great Romans, that "they did not, because their power was great, despise those who had the power of doing them the greatest services:" *οὐ γὰρ, ἐπεὶ μέγα ἐδύναντο, ὑπερεφρόνουν τῶν τὰ μέγιστα αὐτοὺς ὀνῆσαι δυναμένων.* Ælian. Var. Hist. vii. 21.

In the same author, l. iii. c. 17. there is an express dissertation on this subject, worthy of perusal, as being filled with examples both from the Grecian and Roman history.

To these citations I shall add only one or two more: Et certe non tulit ullos hæc civitas aut gloria clariores, aut auctoritate graviores, aut humanitate politiores, P. Africano, C. Lælio, L. Furio, qui secum eruditissimos homines ex Græcia palam semper habuerunt. Cic. de Orat. ii. 37.

In the same work, to prove the union of the philosophical character and the political, we have the following testimony, taken from the history of those sages, so much celebrated in antiquity, Pittacus, Bias, Solon, &c. Hi omnes, præter Milesium Thalem, civitatibus suis præfuerunt. De Orator. iii. 34.

See also Cicero's tract styled Orator, sect. 15. p. 137. edit. Oxon. and the Phædrus of Plato, p. 1237, edit. Ficini: in both which places, the intimacy above mentioned between Pericles and Anaxagoras is recorded, and the importance also of this intimacy, as to the weight it gave Pericles in the commonwealth of Athens.

[f] The treaty of Warsaw, negotiated and signed by lord Hyde, was made in January, 1745; that of Dresden, made under lord Hyde's mediation, was signed the December following. By this last treaty, not only the peace of Germany was restored, but the Austrian Netherlands, and the king of Sardinia's territories, were in consequence of it preserved.

[g] From Pythagoras it passed to his disciples, and among others to Archytas, who wrote upon the subject in the Doric dialect, the dialect generally used by Pythagoras and his followers. This treatise of Archytas is in part still extant, though but little known, large quotations out of it being inserted by Simplicius into that valuable but rare book, his Commentaries on the Predicamenta, from which many of them are transferred into the notes upon the different chapters of this work.

Fabricius, in his Bibliotheca Græca, vol. i. p. 394, mentions a tract upon this subject, published at Venice, anno 1571, under the name of Archytas; but he informs us withal, that its authenticity is doubted, because the above-mentioned quotations from Archytas, made by Simplicius, are not to be found there. This tract I have never seen.

Now if logic be one of those arts which help to improve human reason, it must necessarily be an art of the progressive character; an art which, not ending with itself, has a view to something further. If, then, in the following speculations, it should appear dry rather than elegant, severe rather than pleasing, let it plead, by way of defence, that, though its importance may be great, it partakes, from its very nature, (which cannot be changed,) more of the deformed god, than of the beautiful goddess.

The subject commences in the manner following.

The vulgar can give reasons to a certain degree,[h] and can examine, after a manner, the reasons given them by others. And what is this, but natural logic? If, therefore, these efforts of theirs have an effect, and nothing happen without a cause, this effect must, of necessity, be derived from certain principles.

The question, then, is, What these principles are; for if these can be once investigated, and then knowingly applied, we shall be enabled to do by rule, what others do by hazard; and in what we do, as much to excel the uninstructed reasoner, as a disciplined boxer surpasses an untaught rustic.

Now, in the investigation of these principles, we are first taught to observe, that every science (as arithmetic, geometry, music, astronomy) may be resolved into its theorems; every theorem into its syllogisms; every syllogism into its propositions; and every proposition into certain simple or single terms.

If this be admitted, it is not difficult to see, that, in order to know science, a man must know first what makes a theorem; in order to know theorems, he must know first what makes a syllogism; in order to know syllogisms, he must know first what makes propositions; and to acquire a general knowledge of these, he must first know simple or single terms, since it is out of these that propositions are all of them compounded.

And thus we may perceive, that where these several resolutions end, it is hence precisely the disquisition is to begin.[i] It

[h] Πάντες γὰρ μέχρι τινὸς καὶ ἐξετάζειν καὶ ὑπέχειν λόγον, καὶ ἀπολογεῖσθαι καὶ κατηγορεῖν ἐγχειροῦσιν. Τῶν μὲν οὖν πολλῶν οἱ μὲν εἰκῇ, κ. τ. λ. "Omnes enim quadam tenus et exquirere et sustinere rationem, et defendere, et accusare aggrediuntur. At ex imperita quidem multitudine alii temere," &c. Arist. Rhetor. l. i. c. 1. See also, p. 46, note *h*.

[i] There is an elegant simile, taken from architecture, to illustrate this speculation. The quotation from the original author (Ammonius) may be found in the Dialogue concerning Art, p. 14, note *h*, to which a translation is there subjoined.

Ammonius, after he has produced his similitude, applies it as follows.

Οὕτως οὖν καὶ ὁ φιλόσοφος ποιεῖ· βουλόμενος γὰρ ποιῆσαι ἀπόδειξιν, φησὶ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν, βούλομαι περὶ ἀποδείξεως εἰπεῖν. Ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ ἡ ἀπόδειξις συλλογισμός ἐστιν ἐπιστημονικὸς, ἀδύνατον εἰπεῖν περὶ τούτου τὸν μὴ πρότερον εἴποντα, τί ἐστι συλλογισμός· τὸν δὲ ἁπλῶς συλλογισμὸν οὐκ ἂν μαθοῖμεν, οὐ μαθόντες, τί ἐστι πρότασις· λόγοι μὲν γὰρ τινές εἰσιν αἱ προτάσεις· τῶν δὲ τοιούτων λόγων συλλογή ἐστιν ὁ συλλογισμός· ὥστε ἄνευ τοῦ γνῶναι τὰς προτάσεις, ἀδύνατον μαθεῖν τὸν συλλογισμόν· ἐκ γὰρ τούτων σύγκειται· ἀλλ' οὐδὲ τὴν πρότασιν, ἄνευ τῶν ὀνομάτων καὶ τῶν ῥημάτων, ἐξ ὧν συνέστηκε πᾶς λόγος· τὰ δὲ ὀνόματα, καὶ ῥήματα ἄνευ τῶν ἁπλῶν φωνῶν· ἕκαστον γὰρ τούτων φωνή ἐστι σημαντική. Δεῖ οὖν πρότερον περὶ τῶν ἁπλῶν φωνῶν εἰπεῖν. Ἐνταῦθα οὖν ἡ

must begin where they end, that is to say, from simple terms; because, if it were to begin sooner, it would begin in the middle; and because, if the resolutions did not stop somewhere, there could be no beginning at all.

Now as to the subject, whence the disquisition is to begin, (I mean the contemplation of simple terms,) it is obvious it must be widely different from the several subjects that precede it. The preceding subjects, such as theorems, syllogisms, propositions, may all of them be resolved, because they are all of them compound: but terms cannot be resolved, because they are simple or single. The most we can do, as their multitude is large, is to seek after some method, by which they may be classed or arranged; and if different methods of arrangement occur, then to adopt, out of the several, that which appears to be the best.

It being therefore adjusted, from what subject we are to begin, (namely, from simple or single terms,) and after what manner we are to begin, (namely, by classing or arranging them,) a further question occurs before we proceed, and that is, What is it that these terms represent?

There seem but three classes possible, and these three are either words, or ideas, or things, that is to say, individuals.

Now they cannot represent merely words, for then the treatise would be grammatical; nor yet merely ideas, for then the treatise would be metaphysical; nor yet merely things or individuals, for then the treatise would be physical.

θεωρία κατέληξε, καὶ γίγνεται τοῦτο τῆς πράξεως ἀρχή. Πρότερον γὰρ διαλέγεται περὶ τῶν ἁπλῶν φωνῶν ἐν ταῖς κατηγορίαις. Εἶθ' οὕτω περὶ ὀνομάτων, καὶ ῥημάτων, καὶ προτάσεως, ἐν τῷ περὶ Ἑρμηνείας· εἶτα περὶ τοῦ ἁπλῶς συλλογισμοῦ, ἐν τοῖς προτέροις ἀναλυτικοῖς. εἶθ' οὕτω περὶ ἀποδείξεως, ἐν τοῖς ὑστέροις ἀναλυτικοῖς. Ἐνταῦθα οὖν τὸ τέλος τῆς πράξεως, ὅπερ ἦν ἀρχὴ τῆς θεωρίας: "And thus also the philosopher does: being willing to form a demonstration, he says to himself, I am willing to speak concerning demonstration. But, inasmuch as demonstration is a scientific syllogism, it is impossible to say any thing concerning it, without first saying what is a syllogism; nor can we learn what is simply a syllogism, without having first learned what is a proposition: for propositions are certain sentences; and it is a collection of such sentences that forms a syllogism: so that without knowing propositions, it is impossible to learn what is a syllogism, because it is out of these that a syllogism is compounded. Further than this, it is impossible to know a proposition, without knowing nouns and verbs, out of which is composed every species of sentence; or to know nouns or verbs without knowing sounds articulate, or simple words, inasmuch as each of these is a sound articulate, having a meaning. It is necessary, therefore, in the first place, to say something concerning simple words."

Here, then, ends the theory, and it is this which becomes the beginning of the practice, (that is, from this last part the theory is to be carried into execution.)

First, therefore, (with a view to the practical part,) he disserts concerning simple articulate sounds in his Predicaments: after that, concerning nouns, and verbs, and propositions, in his treatise concerning Interpretation: then, concerning syllogism, simply so called, in his first Analytics: and finally, concerning demonstration, in his latter Analytics. And here is the end of the practice, which end (as we have shewn above) was the beginning of the theory. Ammon. in Prædic. p. 16. ed. 8vo.

We have made this large extract from Ammonius, not only as it fully explains the subject of this treatise, but as it gives a concise, and yet an elegant view of that celebrated work of Aristotle, his Organon, and of that just and accurate order in which its several parts stand arranged.

How, then, shall we decide? Shall we deny that simple terms represent any one of these? Or shall we rather assume the contrary, and say they represent them all? If so, and this be, as it will appear, the more plausible hypothesis, we may affirm of simple terms, (the subject of this inquiry,) that they are words representing things, through the medium of our ideas.[k]

That this, in fact, is their character, may appear from the many logical, metaphysical, and physical theorems, and to these (as man is a part of nature) we may add also ethical speculations, which are occasionally interspersed in the course of this inquiry.[l]

But to return to our subject, the contemplation of simple terms.

As they appear to be words, and not only words, but words which represent things through the medium of our ideas, it may not be improper to observe something upon the several objects thus represented, and that with respect both to their nature and to their multitude.

As to their nature, (without being too philosophically minute,) it is enough to observe, that some of them are sensible objects, and some of them are intelligible; that the sensible are perceived by our several senses, and make up the tribe of external individuals: that the intelligible are more immediately our own, and arise within us, when the mind, by marking what is common to many individuals, forms to itself a species; or, when by marking what is common to many species, it forms to itself a genus.

[k] Ammonius, in his excellent Commentary upon these Predicaments of Aristotle, informs us, there were different sentiments of different philosophers as to the subject, concerning which these predicaments were conversant. Some, as Alexander of Aphrodisæum, confined them wholly to words: others, as Eustathius, wholly to things: a third set, of which was Porphyry, wholly to our thoughts or ideas. Ammonius appears to have supposed that they all erred, and that, not so much in the respective subjects they adopted, as in the restriction or limitation to one subject only. For this reason he immediately subjoins:

Οἱ δὲ ἀκριβέστερον λέγοντες, ὧν εἷς ἐστι καὶ Ἰάμβλιχος, φασὶν ὡς οὔτε περὶ νοημάτων μόνων ἐστὶν αὐτῷ ὁ λόγος, οὔτε περὶ φωνῶν μόνων, οὔτε περὶ πραγμάτων μόνων, ἀλλ' ἔστιν ὁ σκοπὸς τῶν κατηγοριῶν περὶ φωνῶν σημαινουσῶν πράγματα, διὰ μέσων νοημάτων: "But those who speak more accurately, of which number Iamblichus is one, say that Aristotle discourses not upon ideas alone, nor upon words alone, nor upon things alone; but that the scope or end of his categories is, concerning words, signifying things, through the medium of our thoughts or ideas." Ammon. in Prædicam. p. 14. 6. ed. 8vo.

[l] Thus Boethius: Hæc quoque nobis de decem prædicamentis inspectio, et in physica Aristotelis doctrina, et in moralis philosophiæ cognitione perutilis est; quod per singula currentibus magis liquebit. Boeth. in Cat. p. 113. edit. fol. Basil.

Ammonius speaks to the same purpose in fuller and more general terms: Ὅτι δὲ χρήσιμόν ἐστι τὸ βιβλίον εἴς τε τὸ θεωρητικὸν φιλοσοφίας μέρος, καὶ τὸ πρακτικόν, ἐκ τῶν προειρημένων δῆλον, εἴπερ καὶ τὴν ἀπόδειξιν, ἣν εδείξαμεν, ἄνευ τῶν ἁπλῶν φωνῶν οὐκ ἔστι γνῶναι, καὶ ὅτι περὶ τῶν κοινοτήτων διαλαμβάνει, εἰς ἃ τὰ ὄντα πάντα διαιρεῖται: "That the book is useful both to the speculative part of philosophy and the practical, is evident from what has been said, if it be true both that demonstration, as we have shewn, cannot be known without simple words, and that the book also treats concerning those common characters or attributes, into which all beings are divided." Ammon. in Præd. p. 16. edit. Venet. 8vo.

Nor are these mental productions the mere efforts of art, the ingenious inventions of human sagacity; but, under the original guidance of pure nature, even children in their early days spontaneously fashion them, and spontaneously refer them to individuals as they occur, saying of this individual, it is a horse; of another, it is a dog; of a third, it is a sparrow.[m]

If from the nature of these objects (which we have now supposed to be either sensible or intelligible) we pass to their multitude, we shall find the genera to be fewer than the species, and that from this plain reason, because many species are included within one genus; we shall find also the species to be fewer than the individuals, and that by parity of reason, because many individuals are included within one species. But as for individuals themselves, these we shall find to be truly infinite; and not only infinite, but changing every moment, as the old are incessantly perishing, the new incessantly arising.

Yet it is these that compose that universe in which we exist; and without knowing something of these we may be considered as living like the Cimmerians in Homer,

Ἠέρι καὶ νεφέλῃ κεκαλυμμένοι.[n]
"Covered with mist and cloud."

If, therefore, all science be something definite and steady, (for without this character it would not merit the name,) how can it possibly bear relation to such a multitude as this; a multitude in character so truly contrary to its own, a multitude everywhere fleeting, everywhere infinite and vague? How indeed should the fleeting be known steadily, or how should the vague and infinite be known definitely?[o]

As this can hardly be supposed, it is for this reason that logic, which is justly called the organ or instrument of the sciences,[p]

[m] See Hermes, b. iii. c. 4. where the doctrine of general or universal ideas is discussed more largely.

See also the Εἰσαγωγὴ, or Introduction of Porphyry, where the subject of genus and species is treated in a perspicuous and easy method. This tract is usually prefixed to Aristotle's Logic.

[n] Ὀδυσσ. Λ. 15.

[o] Infinitorum nulla cognitio est; infinita namque animo comprehendi nequeunt; quod autem ratione mentis circumdari non potest, nullius scientiæ fine concluditur: quare infinitorum scientia nulla est. Boeth. in Præd. p. 113. edit. Bas.

Such was the doctrine of Boethius, who, according to the practice of the age in which he lived, united the Platonic and the Peripatetic philosophies. But Aristotle himself taught the same doctrine many centuries before.

Εἰ δὴ τὸ μὲν ἄπειρον, ᾗ ἄπειρον, ἄγνωστον, τὸ μὲν κατὰ τὸ πλῆθος ἢ μέγεθος ἄπειρον, ἄγνωστον ποσόν τι· τὸ δὲ κατ' εἶδος ἄπειρον, ἄγνωστον ποιόν τι· τῶν δ' ἀρχῶν ἀπείρων οὐσῶν καὶ κατὰ πλῆθος καὶ κατ' εἶδος, ἀδύνατον εἰδέναι τὰ ἐκ τούτων. οὕτω γὰρ εἰδέναι τὸ σύνθετον ὑπολαμβάνομεν, ὅταν εἰδῶμεν ἐκ τίνων καὶ πόσων ἐστίν. Arist. Phys. l. i. p. 12. edit. Sylb. "If therefore infinite, considered as infinite, be unknowable, then that which is infinite in multitude or magnitude is unknowable as to quantity, and that which is infinite in form is unknowable as to quality. But the principles being infinite both in multitude and in quality, it is impossible to know the beings derived out of them. For then it is we conceive that we know any being composite, when we know out of what things and how many things it is compounded."

[p] The Stoics held logic to be a part of philosophy, the Peripatetics held it no more than an organ or instrument; Plato held it to be both, as well a part as an organ. His reasoning, according to Ammonius, was as

has for its first employment to reduce infinitude; and this it does by establishing certain definitive arrangements, or classes, to some of which all particulars may be referred, however numerous, however diversified—the past, the present, the future, all alike.

And thus we return to classing and arranging, the process already suggested to be the proper one.

It remains to inquire, whether there are more methods of arrangement than one; and if more, then, from among them, which method we ought to prefer.

But this will be the subject of the following chapter.

CHAPTER II.

A METHOD OF ARRANGEMENT PROPOSED—REJECTED, AND WHY. ANOTHER METHOD PROPOSED—ADOPTED, AND WHY. GENERAL REMARKS. PLAN OF THE WHOLE.

ONE method of arrangement is as follows:

The multitude of ideas treasured up in the human mind, and which, bearing reference to things, are expressed by words, may be arranged and circumscribed under the following characters. They all denote either *substance* or *attribute;* and substance and attribute may be each of them modified under the different characters of *universal* and *particular*, as best befits the purposes of reasoning and science. Thus *man* is an universal substance; *Alexander*, a particular one; *valour*, an universal attribute; *the valour of Alexander*, a particular one.

And hence there arises a quadruple arrangement of terms; an arrangement of them into substance universal, and substance particular; into attribute universal, and attribute particular; to some one of which four, not only our words and our ideas, but the innumerable tribe of individuals may all of them be reduced.[q]

follows: *Καθάπερ γάρ φησιν ὁ ξέστης διττὸς, ὁ μὲν μετρῶν, ὁ δὲ μετρούμενος, καὶ ὁ μὲν μετρῶν ὄργανόν ἐστι τῆς μετρήσεως, ὁ δὲ μετρούμενος μέρος τοῦ ὅλου ὑγροῦ. ὡσαύτως καὶ ἡ λογικὴ ἄνευ μὲν τῶν πραγμάτων οὖσα, ὄργανόν ἐστι τῆς φιλοσοφίας, συμβιβαζομένη δὲ τοῖς πράγμασι, μέρος ἐστι τῆς φιλοσοφίας.* "As the quart, says he, is twofold, one that which measures, the other that which is measured; and as that which measures is the organ of mensuration, that which is measured the part of some whole or entire fluid: in like manner also, logic, when taken apart from things, is an organ of philosophy; when connected with them, is a part of philosophy."

Thus Ammonius on the Categories, p. 8. where we may find also the reasonings both of the Stoics and the Peripatetics.

[q] This method may be found in the beginning of Aristotle's Predicaments, before he comes to the actual enumeration of the predicaments themselves.

See Aristot. Prædic. p. 23. edit. Sylb. *Τῶν ὄντων τὰ μὲν καθ' ὑποκειμένου κ.τ.λ.*

The Stagirite, in giving this quadruple arrangement, explains himself not by names, but by descriptions. Substance universal he describes as follows: *καθ' ὑποκειμένου τινὸς λέγεται, ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ δ' οὐδενί ἐστι:* attribute particular, *ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ μέν ἐστι, καθ' ὑποκειμένου δὲ οὐδενὸς λέγεται:* attribute general, *καθ' ὑποκειμένου τε λέγεται, καὶ ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ ἐστίν:* substances particular, *οὔτε ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ ἐστὶν, οὔτε καθ' ὑποκειμένου τινὸς λέγεται.*

A large reduction this, yet a reduction which may possibly lead us into another extreme, by rendering that multitude, which we would confine, too limited, too abridged. Suppose, therefore, we were to inquire whether this reduction might not be enlarged, and a second and more perfect method than the last be established.

The world, as we see, is filled with various substances. Each of these possesses its proper attributes, and is at the same time encompassed with certain circumstantials. Not to speak of intelligible substances, (which belong rather to metaphysics,) natural substances appear all to be extended; nor that simply, but under a certain external figure, and internal organization. A lion and an oak agree, as they are both extended; yet have they each a figure and organization peculiar. A *living* lion and a *brazen* lion may have the same external figure, but within there is a wide difference, from the possession of organization on one side, and the want of it on the other. If then we call the attribute of extension *quantity*, that of figure and organization *quality*, we may set down these two (I mean quantity and quality) as the two great essential attributes belonging to every substance, whether natural or artificial.

Again: every substance, whether natural or artificial, either from will or from appetite, or, where these are wanting, from such lower causes as its figure or mere quantity has (in an enlarged use of the words) a power to act. Thus it is through *will* that men study, through *appetite* that brutes eat, through its *figure* that the clock goes, and through its *quantity* that the stone descends. Nor are they only thus capable of acting, but also of being acted upon; and that, too, each of them, according to its respective character. The mind is acted upon by truth, the appetite by pleasure, the clock by a spring, and the stone by gravitation. Thus, then, besides quantity and quality, we have found two other attributes, common to all substances, and these are *action* and *passion*.

Again: it often happens when substances are not present to us, that we are desirous to know when and where they existed: *When*, we ask, lived Homer? *Where*, we ask, stood the ancient Memphis? In the answer to these questions we learn the time and place which circumscribed the existence of these beings. Now as all sensible substances are circumscribed after these manners, hence we may consider the *when* and the *where* as two circumstantials that inseparably attend them. And thus have we added two more attributes to the number already established.

Further still: in contemplating where things exist, we are

Those who would see an explanation of those several descriptions, and why Aristotle prefers them to their peculiar names, may consult his Greek commentator, Ammonius, and his Latin one, Boethius, who are both of them copious and accurate upon the subject.

often led to consider their position, and that more especially in living substances possessing the power of self-motion. There is a manifest difference between reclining and sitting, between sitting and standing; and there are other circumstances of position which extend to all substances whatever. And thus must *position* or *situation* be subjoined as another different attribute.

Add to this, when substances are superinduced upon substances, we consider them under the character of *clothing*, or *habit*. Thus, in the strict sense of the word, the glove covering our hand, the shoe our foot, the coat our body, are so many species of habit. By a more distant analogy, the corn may be said to clothe the fields, the woods to clothe the mountains; and by an analogy still more remote than that, the sciences and virtues to be habits that clothe the mind.

Last of all, in the variety of co-existing substances and attributes, there are many whose very existence infers the existence of some other. Thus, in substances, the existence of *son* infers that of *father*, of *servant* that of *master;* in quantity, the existence of *greater* infers that of *less;* in position, *above* infers *below;* and in the time *when*, *subsequent* has a necessary respect to *prior*. It is when we view things in these mutual dependencies, in these reciprocal inferences, that we discover another attribute, the attribute of *relation*.

And thus, instead of confining ourselves to the simple division of substance and attribute, we have divided attribute itself into nine distinct sorts; some of which we have considered as essential, others as circumstantial, and thus made, upon the whole, (by setting substance at their head) ten comprehensive and universal genera, called, with reference to their Greek name, *categories;* with reference to their Latin name, *predicaments;* and styled in the title of this work, "Philosophical Arrangements."[r]

[r] The ancients gave to these arrangements different names, and made also the number of them different. Some, as Archytas, called them καθόλου λόγοι, "universal denominations;" others, as Quintilian, *elementa*, "elements;" others, as Aristotle, σχήματα κατηγορίας, "figures, or forms of predication;" κατηγορίαι, "predicaments;" γένη γενικώτατα, "the most general or comprehensive genera;" τὰ πρῶτα γένη, "the primary genera." They differed also as to their number. Some made them two, subject and accident, or (which is the same) substance and attribute; others made them three, dividing accidents into the inherent and circumstantial; the Stoics held them to be four, ὑποκείμενα, ποῖα, πῶς ἔχοντα, καὶ πρός τι πῶς ἔχοντα, "subjects, things distinguished by qualities, distinguished by being peculiarly circumstanced within themselves, distinguished by being so with reference to something else;" Plato said they were five, οὐσία, ταυτότης, ἑτερότης, κίνησις, καὶ στάσις, "substance, identity, diversity, motion, rest;" others made seven; lastly, the Pythagoreans and Peripatetics maintained the number usually adopted, that is to say, those ten which make the subject of this treatise.

See Aristot. Prædic. p. 24, et Metaphys. p. 79. 100. 104, &c. edit. Sylburg. Quintil. l. iii. c. 6. Ammon. in Prædicam. p. 16, 17, &c. edit. Venet. 8vo. 1545. Simplic. in Prædicam. p. 16. V. edit. Basil. fol. 1551.

As words, by signifying things, through the medium of our ideas, are essential to logic, and are the materials of every proposition, the present work may be called logical. But as the speculations extend to physics, to ethics, and even to the first philosophy, they become for that reason something more than logical, and have been called, with a view to this their compre-

When enumerated,[s] their several names are in order, as they follow: *substance*, *quality*, *quantity*, *relation*, *action*, *passion*, *when*, *where*, *position*, and *habit*.

As each of these ten predicaments has its subordinate distinctions, the basis of our knowledge will be now so amply widened, that we shall find space sufficient on which to build, be our plan diversified and extensive as it may.

We cannot conclude this chapter without observing, that the doctrine of these categories, these predicaments, these primary genera, or Philosophical Arrangements, is a valuable, a copious, and a sublime theory; a theory which, when well understood, leads by analogy from things sensible to things intelligible; from effect to cause; from that which is passive, unintelligent, and subordinate, to that which is active, intelligent, and supreme: a theory which prepares us not only to study every thing else with advantage, but makes us knowing withal, in one respect, where particular studies are sure to fail; knowing in the relative value of things when compared one to another; and modest, of course, in the estimate of our own accomplishments.[t]

This is, in fact, the necessary consequence of being shewn to what portion of being every art or science belongs; and how limited that portion, when compared to what remains. The want of this general knowledge leads to an effect the very reverse; so that men who possess it not, though profoundly knowing in a single art or a single science, are too often carried by such partial knowledge to a blameable arrogance, as if the rest of mankind were busied in pursuits of no value, and themselves the monopolizers of wisdom and of truth. But this by the way.

The distinct discussion of each one of these categories, predicaments, arrangements, or genera, will become the business of the following chapters; which discussion, joined to what has been already premised, as well as to such future inquiries as shall naturally arise in consequence, will include all we have to offer upon this interesting subject.[u]

As for propositions, which have for their materials the simple

hensive character, not logical, but Philosophical Arrangements.

[s] Τῶν κατὰ μηδεμίαν συμπλοκὴν λεγομένων, ἕκαστον ἤτοι οὐσίαν σημαίνει, ἢ ποσὸν, ἢ ποιὸν, ἢ πρός τι, ἢ που, ἢ ποτὲ, ἢ κεῖσθαι, ἢ ἔχειν, ἢ ποιεῖν, ἢ πάσχειν. Aristot. Præd. p. 24. edit. Sylb. The passage needs no other translation than what appears in the text.

[t] See the last chapter of this treatise.

[u] The Greek logicians divided their speculations on this subject into three τμήματα, or sections, calling the first section τὰ πρὸ τῶν κατηγοριῶν; the second, τὰ περὶ αὐτῶν κατηγοριῶν; the third, τὰ μετὰ τὰς κατηγορίας. Ammon. in Prædic. p. 146.

The Latins, adhering to the same division, coined new names: *ante-prædicamenta*, or *præ-prædicamenta*, *prædicamenta*, and *post-prædicamenta*. Sanderson, p. 22. 51. 55. edit. Oxon. 1672.

In the present work, the first section begins from chapter the first, the second section from chapter the third, the third section from chapter the fifteenth. Of these sections, the second (which discusses the predicaments, or philosophical arrangements) makes the real and essential part of the speculation: the first and third sections are only subservient to it; the first to prepare, the third to explain.

terms here enumerated, and for syllogisms, which have for their materials the several species of propositions, both these naturally make subsequent and distinct parts of logic, and must therefore be consigned to some future speculation.

If we go back further, and recur to theorems of science, or to sciences themselves, these will be found not properly parts of logic, but works of a different and higher character; works where logic serves the philosopher for an instrument or organ, as the chisel serves the statuary, the pencil serves the painter.

At present we are to proceed to the speculation concerning substance.

CHAPTER III.

CONCERNING SUBSTANCE NATURAL—HOW CONTINUED, OR CARRIED ON. PRINCIPLES OF THIS CONTINUATION, TWO—INCREASED TO THREE—REDUCED AGAIN TO TWO. THESE LAST TWO, FORM AND A SUBJECT, OR RATHER FORM AND MATTER.

To explain how natural substances originally began, is a task too arduous for unassisted philosophy. But to inquire after what manner, when once begun, they have been continued, is a work better suited to human abilities: because to a portion of this continuity we are personally present; nay, within it we ourselves are all included, as so many parts.

Now as to the manner, in which subsists the continuity of natural substances, and as to the causes[x] by which that continuity is maintained, there is no one, it is probable, who imagines every birth, every recent production that daily happens in the universe, to be an absolutely fresh creation; a realizing of nonentity; an evocation (if it may be so described) of something out of nothing. What then is it? It is a change or mutation out of something which was before. It appears, therefore, that to inquire how natural substances are continued, is to inquire what are the principles of mutation or change.

First, then, let us observe, what is in fact most obvious, that there can be no mutation or change, were every thing to remain

[x] The doctrine of causes, and their different species, is treated at large through the whole Treatise upon Art, and in the notes subjoined to the same, particularly page 59.

The author desires to inform his readers, that in the subsequent disquisitions he hath not confined himself merely to logic, but has interspersed many speculations of different kinds; acting in this view differently from the model set him by the Stagirite. The Stagirite left no part of philosophy unexplored, and of course had separate and distinct treatises for logic, physics, and the many other branches of science, as well the practical as the speculative. Not so the author of this treatise: he by no means pretends to emulate the comprehensive variety of that sublime and acute genius, whose writings made him for more than two thousand years the admiration of Grecians, Romans, Arabians, Jews, and Christians. Such esteem could not have been the effect either of fashion or of chance.

mutes, through these hath established the whole of its art. And this is what appears to have been the meaning of that obscure philosopher Heraclitus. You are, says he, to connect the perfect and the imperfect, the agreeing and the disagreeing, the consonant and the dissonant; and *out of all things, one; and out of one, all things.*"

Thus far this ingenious author, with regard to whose doctrine, as well as that of the many others already mentioned, we cannot but remark, that whatever may have caused such an unanimity of opinion, whether it were that men adopted it from one another by a sort of tradition, or were insensibly led to it by the latent force of truth; all philosophers, of all ages, appear to have favoured contrariety, and given their sanction to the hypothesis, that principles are contraries.[f]

But further still: "It is impossible for contrarieties to co-exist, in the same place, at the same instant." It is impossible, for example, that in the same place and instant should co-exist cold and hot, crooked and straight, dispersion and combination, disorder and order. As therefore the principles of change are contraries, and contraries cannot co-exist, it follows that one principle must necessarily depart, as the other accedes. Thus in the mutation out of disorder into order, when the principle *into which*, that is, *order* accedes, the principle *out of which*, that is, *disorder* departs. The same happens in all other instances.

A question then arises. If one of them necessarily depart as soon as the other accedes, how can nature possibly maintain the continuity of her productions? To depart, is to be no more, a sort of annihilation, or death; to accede, is to pass into being, a sort of production, or birth. They cannot co-exist, because they are absolutely incompatible;[g] so that upon this hypothesis there can be no continuity at all, but every new production must be a realizing of nonentity, a fresh and genuine evocation of something out of nothing.

If this in the continuity of beings appear a difficulty, let us try whether we can remove it by any aid not yet suggested. Crooked, we are told, is changed into straight, a contrary into a

[f] Πάντες γὰρ τὰ στοιχεῖα καὶ τὰς ὑπ' αὐτῶν καλουμένας ἀρχὰς, καίπερ ἄνευ λόγου τιθέντες, ὅμως τἀναντία λέγουσιν, ὥσπερ ὑπ' αὐτῆς τῆς ἀληθείας ἀναγκασθέντες: "For all philosophers hold the elements and those other causes, which they call principles, (though they suppose them, without giving a reason,) to be contraries, compelled, as it were, to do so by truth itself." Aristot. Phys. l. i. c. 5. p. 15.

[g] Τὸ μὴ ποιεῖν δύο μόνον, ἔχει τινὰ λόγον· ἀπορήσειε γὰρ ἄν τις, πῶς ἡ πυκνότης τὴν μανότητα ποιεῖν πέφυκεν, ἢ αὐτὴ τὴν πυκνότητα· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἄλλη ὁποιανοῦν ἐναντιότης: "That we should not make two principles only, has some appearance of reason: for a man may well doubt, how density should be formed by nature to make rarity, or this last, density; and so in like manner with respect to any other contrariety whatever." Arist. Phys. l. i. c. 6. p. 16.

Simplicius well observes—τὸ μὲν γὰρ ποιοῦν εἰς ὑπομένον τι ποιεῖ· τὸ δὲ ἐναντίον οὐχ ὑπομένει τὸ ἐναντίον: "That which acts, acts upon something which remains; but contrary does not remain and wait for contrary." Simpl. in Prad. p. 43. B. edit. Basil. 1551.

contrary; one of which necessarily departs, and the other accedes. We admit it. But is there not something which, during the change, neither departs nor accedes? Something which remains, and is all along still one and the same.[h]

The stick, for example, changes from crooked into straight; and if there was not a stick, or something analogous, no such change could be effected. Yet is it less a stick for becoming straight; or was it more so when crooked? Does it not remain,[i] considered as a stick, precisely, in either case, one and the same? As therefore the stick is to crooked and straight, so is the bar of iron to hot and cold; the brass of the statue to figure and deformity; the stones of the palace to order and confusion; and something, analogous in other changes, to other contraries, not enumerated.

If, therefore, we were right in what we asserted before, and are so in what we assert now, it should seem that the principles of change or mutation were three:[k] one, *that which de-*

[h] Καὶ τοῦτο ὀρθῶς λέγει Διογένης, ὅτι εἰ μὴ ἐξ ἑνὸς ἅπαντα, οὐκ ἂν ἦν τὸ ποιεῖν καὶ πάσχειν ὑπ' ἀλλήλων· οἷον τὸ θερμὸν ψύχεσθαι, καὶ τοῦτο θερμαίνεσθαι πάλιν· οὐ γὰρ ἡ θερμότης μεταβάλλει καὶ ἡ ψυχρότης εἰς ἀλλήλα, ἀλλὰ δῆλον, ὅτι τὸ ὑποκείμενον· ὥστε ἐν οἷς τὸ ποιεῖν ἐστὶ καὶ τὸ πάσχειν, ἀνάγκη τούτων μίαν εἶναι τὴν ὑποκειμένην φύσιν: "And this is rightly said by Diogenes, that if all things were not out of one thing, it would not be possible for them to act, or be acted upon by one another: for example, that what is hot should become cold; or reciprocally, that this should become hot; for it is not the heat or the coldness which change into one another, but it is that evidently changes which is the subject of these affections: whence it follows, that in those things where there is acting, and being acted upon, it is necessary there should belong to them some one nature, their common subject." Arist. de Gener. et Cor. lib. i. c. 6. p. 20. edit. Sylb.

Aristotle, who gives this quotation, well remarks, that it was too much to affirm this of all things, but that it should be confined to such things only as reciprocally act, and are acted upon; and so in his comment we may perceive he restrains them.

See more of this one being, the common subject, or substratum, in the following chapter.

The Diogenes here mentioned was a contemporary of Anaxagoras, and lived many years before the cynic of the same name. See Diog. Laert. ix. 57.

[i] Ὅτι δεῖ ἀεί τι ὑποκεῖσθαι τὸ γιγνόμενον, καὶ τοῦτο εἰ καὶ ἀριθμῷ ἐστιν ἕν, ἀλλ' εἴδει γε οὐχ ἕν· (τὸ γὰρ εἶδει λέγω, καὶ λόγῳ ταὐτόν.) οὐ γὰρ ταὐτὸν ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ τῷ ἀμούσῳ εἶναι· καὶ τὸ μὲν ὑπομένει, τὸ δ' οὐχ ὑπομένει· τὸ μὲν ὑποκείμενον ὑπομένει· (ὁ γὰρ ἄνθρωπος ὑπομένει) τὸ δὲ ἄμουσον οὐχ' ὑπομένει: "It is necessary that in every production there should be a subject, [or a substratum,] and this, though one numerically, yet not one in form, (I mean, by one in form, the same as one in reason, in detail, or definition.) Thus it is not the same thing to be a man, and to be a being immusical, or void of musical art. [In the formation of a musician,] the one remains, the other remains not; the subject or substratum remains, (for man remains;) the being immusical, or void of musical art, remains not," [for that is lost as soon as he becomes an artist.] Arist. Phys. l. i. c. 7. p. 18. edit. Sylb.

The production, or formation here spoken of, means the becoming a musician by the acquisition of the musical art. The same reasoning may be applied to any other art or science, which man, as man, is capable of acquiring.

Again, the same philosopher: Ἔτι τὸ μὲν ὑπομένει, τὸ δ' ἐναντίον οὐχ ὑπομένει· ἔστιν ἄρα τὶ τρίτον παρὰ τὰ ἐναντία: "Add to this (says he) there is something [in productions of all kinds] which remains; but the contrary does not remain; there is therefore some third thing over and above the contraries." Metaph. A. p. 196. edit. Sylb.

If there appear a difficulty in the first quotation of this note, concerning a subject being one numerically, but not so in form, or character, see note on the word *privation*, in the first part of the following chapter.

[k] Διόπερ, εἴ τις τόν τε πρότερον ἀληθῆ νομίσειεν εἶναι λόγον, καὶ τοῦτον· ἀναγκαῖον, εἰ μέλλει διασώσειν ἀμφοτέρους αὐτοὺς,

parts; another, *that which accedes;* and a third, *that which remains.* Take an example or two from man. *The healthful* departs; *the morbid* accedes; *the body* remains. *The morbid* departs; *the healthful* accedes; *the body* remains. It is thus we change reciprocally as well to better as to worse.

It may be observed of these three principles, that two of them, being contraries, maintain a perpetual warfare;

Haud bene conveniunt, nec in una sede morantur:

the third, like a neutral power, preserves an intercourse with both, and sometimes associates with one, and sometimes with the other. It may be observed also of the two hostile or contrary principles, that one of them appertains, for the most part, to the better co-arrangement[1] of things, and one to the baser:

ὑποτιθέναι τι τρίτον: "If any one, therefore, think the former reasoning, and the present reasoning, to be each of them true; it is necessary, in order to preserve both of them entire and unimpeached, to lay down and establish some third principle."

He soon after adds: Τὸ μὲν οὖν τρία φάναι τὰ στοιχεῖα εἶναι, ἔκ τε τούτων καὶ ἐκ τοιούτων ἄλλων ἐπισκοποῦσι δόξειεν ἂν ἔχειν τινὰ λόγον: "To say, therefore, that the elements [or principles of things] are three, may appear to have some foundation to those who speculate from these and other reasonings of like sort." Arist. Phys. l. i. c. 6. p. 16, 17. edit. Sylb.

And again more explicitly in his Metaphysics: Τρία δὴ τὰ αἴτια, καὶ τρεῖς αἱ ἀρχαί· δύο μὲν ἡ ἐναντίωσις (ἧς τὸ μὲν λόγος καὶ εἶδος, τὸ δὲ στέρησις·) τὸ δὲ τρίτον ἡ ὕλη: "Wherefore the causes of things are three, and the principles are three; two, the contrariety, (of which contrariety one part is the definition and form; the other part, the privation;) and the third principle, the matter." Metaph. Λ. p. 197. edit. Sylb.

[1] "Co-arrangement."—So I here ventured to translate the word συστοιχία, or συστοιχεία, for it is written both ways in Aristotle. See Metaph. l. i. c. 5. p. 13; l. iii. c. 2. p. 52. edit. Sylb.

The Pythagoreans, observing through the world a difference in things as to better and worse, and that this difference often led to a sort of contrariety or opposition, arranged them into two classes, a better class and a worse; and, placing the two classes by the side of each other, called them συστοιχίαι, or "co-arrangements." In the better class they put *unity, bound, friendship, good,* &c.; in the other they put *multitude, boundless, strife, evil,* &c. Some of this school limited the number, others left it indefinite, considering all things as double, one against another, according to the language of Ecclesiasticus, chap. xxxiii. 14, 15. and xlii. 24.

See (besides the quotations mentioned already) Ethic. Nicom. l. i. c. 6. p. 15. edit. Oxon. 1716; and Eustratii Com. in Ethic. Nic. p. 13. B.

To the quotations given above may be added the following one from Varro.

Pythagoras Samius ait omnium rerum initia esse Bina: ut finitum et infinitum, bonum et malum, vitam et mortem, diem et noctem; quare item duo, status et motus. Quod stat aut agitur, corpus: ubi agitatur locus: dum agitatur, tempus: quod est in agitatu, actio. Quadripartitio magis sic elucebit: corpus est, ut cursor: locus, stadium qua currit: tempus, hora qua currit: actio, cursio. Quare fit, ut omnia fere sint quadripartita, et ea æterna; quod neque unquam tempus, quin fuerit motus (ejus enim intervallum tempus;) neque motus, ubi non locus et corpus; (quod alterum est, quod movetur; alterum, ubi;) neque, ubi sit agitatus, non actio ibi. Igitur initiorum quadrigæ, *locus* et *corpus*, *tempus* et *actio*.

Pythagoras, the Samian, says, that the principles of all things are two and two, or double: as, for example, finite and infinite, good and evil, life and death, day and night; and by the same rule, rest and motion. [In these last] that which rests or is agitated is *body;* the where it is agitated, is *place;* the whilst it is agitated, is *time;* and in the agitation itself we view the *action*.

This fourfold division will better appear as follows: Call *body*, the person who runs; call *place*, the course over which he runs; call *time*, the hour during which he runs; and let the race, or running, be called the *action*.

Now it happens, that almost all things are in this manner fourfold, and this fourfold division is as it were eternal. The reason is, there never was time, but there

to the better appertains figure; to the baser, deformity: to the better, order; to the baser, confusion: to the better, health; to the baser, disease. Now if we call those of the better tribe by the common name of *form*, and those of the other tribe by the common name of *privation*,[m] distinguishing the neutral principle withal by the name of *subject*, we shall then find the three principles of mutation, or change, to be *form*, *privation*, and a *subject*.

Of these three, if we compare *form* to *privation*, we shall find *form* to be definite and simple; *privation* to be infinite and vague. Thus there are infinite ways of being diseased, though but one of being healthy; infinite ways of being vicious, though but one of being virtuous.[n]

Should it be asked, how *privation* is *one*, having this infinite and vague character; we may answer, because as *privation*, it is nothing more than the simple absence of that *form* to which it is opposed. Thus to be diseased, (though the ways are infinite,) is nothing more than the absence of health; to be vicious, (though the ways are infinite,) nothing more than the absence of virtue.

And hence, perhaps, it may be possible to reject *privation* for a principle, and supply its place, when wanted, by its opposite, that is to say, *form*; not however by the specific form then actually tending to existence, but by every other congenial form, of which this specific form is the privation. Thus in the producing of the sphere, its privation may be found in the presence of the pyramid, or of any figure, besides the sphere, whether regular or irregular. Thus in the producing of that harmony called the diapason, its privation may be found in the presence of the *diapente*, or of any other tensions, besides those of the octave, be they consonant or dissonant. It is certain that by such a reciprocal acceding and receding of all possible forms, by such an absence and presence,[o] by such a continued revolution

must have been motion, (of which time, indeed, is but the interval;) nor motion, but where there must have been place and body; (one of which is the thing moved; the other, that where it is moved;) nor agitation, but where there must have been action.

And hence it follows, that *place* and *body*, *time* and *action*, form, as it were, a joint quaternion of principles. Varr. de Ling. Lat. l. iv. p. 7. edit. Amstel.

We have given this passage at length, not only as it explains *co-arrangement*, but as it exhibits to us four of those predicaments, or arrangements, which make parts of this treatise, viz. *substance*, *when*, *where*, *action*.

[m] Τῶν ἐναντίων ἡ ἑτέρα συστοιχία, στέρησις: "The other co-arrangement of contraries is privation." Aristot. Metaph. l. iii. c. 2. p. 52. edit. Sylb.

By the word *other*, he means the baser and subordinate class, to which class he gives the common name of *privation*, as including all the genera therein enumerated, *strife*, *evil*, &c. And hence it is, that privation is in this treatise soon after called infinite and vague; for τὸ ἄπειρον, "infinite," made one in this baser arrangement. See Blemmidæ Epitom. Physic. p. 60. Philop. in Arist. Phys. l. i. sub. fin.

[n] Ἐσθλοὶ μὲν γὰρ ἁπλῶς, παντοδαπῶς δὲ κακοί. Theognis.

[o] Ἱκανὸν γὰρ ἔσται τὸ ἕτερον τῶν ἐναντίων ποιεῖν τῇ ἀπουσίᾳ καὶ παρουσίᾳ τὴν μεταβολήν: "One of the two contraries (that is to say, *form*) will be sufficiently able, by its absence and its presence, to

and periodical succession, supposing a proper *subject* withal to receive and give them up, we may conceive how changes may be performed, and new substances produced, though (as we have said already) the principle of privation were to be withdrawn. No harm accrues to the doctrine from a supposition like this; only, if we admit it, we again reduce the principles from three to two; not however the former two, those that exist in contrariety, for now we adopt the more amicable ones, those of a *form* and a *subject*,[p] or (if we take *matter* in its proper meaning) those of *form* and *matter*.

It is in these we behold the elements of those composite beings, *natural substances*. The disquisition makes it expedient to consider each of the two apart, and this we shall therefore do by beginning with *matter*.

effect mutation." Aristot. Phys. l. i. c. 7. p. 20. edit. Sylb.

On this passage, Themistius thus comments. Having inserted the words above quoted, he subjoins—*ὥστε τὸ εἶδος τὴν χώραν ἀποπληροῖ καὶ τῆς στερήσεως· ἡ γὰρ στέρησις οὐ φύσις τις καὶ εἶδος ἐστὶν, ἀλλ' ἀπουσία τοῦ εἴδους:* "So that the form supplies also the place of the privation; for the privation is itself no particular nature or form, but rather *the absence of the form*" [which is then passing into existence.] Themist. in Arist. Phys. p. 21. B. edit. Ald.

Simplicius on this occasion explains himself as follows: *Οὐ μέντοι ἠξίωσεν ἐν τοῖς στοιχείοις θεῖναι τὴν στέρησιν καὶ τὸ κατ' αὐτὴν μὴ ὂν, διότι ἀπουσία μόνον ἐστὶ τοῦ πεφυκότος, οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἑαυτῇ συνεισάγουσα· ἠρκέσθη δὲ τῷ εἴδει μόνῳ καὶ αὐτὸς, τῇ παρουσίᾳ τῇ ἑαυτοῦ καὶ τῇ ἀπουσίᾳ δυναμένῳ τὴν γένεσιν καὶ τὴν φθορὰν ἀποδιδόναι:* "Aristotle has not deigned to place among the elements [of natural productions] *privation*, and that mode of non-being which is consonant to it; because privation is no more than the absence of the thing produced, introducing along with itself no other particular attribute. He himself also has been satisfied with the *form* alone, as being able by its presence and its absence to effect both generation and dissolution." Simplic. in Aristot. Phys. lib. i. p. 54. edit. Ald. fol. 1526.

Perhaps Simplicius alludes to what Aristotle says in the following passage: *Ἡ δέ γε μόρφη καὶ ἡ φύσις διχῶς λέγεται· καὶ γὰρ ἡ στέρησις εἶδός πως ἐστίν:* "the terms *form* and *nature* have a double meaning: for in one sense even *privation* is *form*." Physic. Aristot. l. ii. c. 1.

Philoponus gives a pertinent instance to explain how *privation* may be *form*. He tells us, *Ἡ γὰρ Λύδιος ἁρμονία γίγνεται ἐκ τῆς ἀναρμοστίας τῆς Λυδίου. ἀλλ' ἡ Λύδιος ἀναρμοστία δύναται εἶναι Φρύγιος ἁρμονία, ἢ ἑτέρα τις· δύναται δὲ καὶ ἁπλῶς ἀναρμοστία εἶναι τῶν χορδῶν ὁπωσοῦν ἐχουσῶν, καὶ τοῦτο ποικίλως ἄλλοτε ἄλλως ἐπιτεταμένων μᾶλλον, ἢ ἀνειμένων:* "The Lydian mode or harmony is made out of Lydian dissonance, [that is, before the strings of a lyre were tuned to that mode, they were tuned after another manner, which manner he calls properly, Lydian dissonance.] Now Lydian dissonance may be the Phrygian mode or harmony, or it may be any other of the modes, [Doric, Ionic, &c.;] it may also be simply the dissonance of the strings under any casual tension, and that in various and different ways, either as they are more stretched, or more relaxed," [that is, either sharper or flatter.] Philop. in Physic. l. i. p. 45.

This shews that the Phrygian mode in this example, though clearly a form of harmony, is nevertheless, when referred to the Lydian mode, as much a privation as any casual tension of the strings, totally void of all concord.

[p] This is implied in the words—*ὅτι γίγνεται ἅπαν ἔκ τε τοῦ ὑποκειμένου καὶ τῆς μορφῆς:* "that every thing is made or produced out of a subject and a figure." Arist. Physic. l. i. c. 7. p. 19.

"Figure," *μορφὴ*, means the same with *εἶδος*, "form;" *ὑποκείμενον*, "subject," means the same with *ὕλη*, "matter." See the treatise just quoted, particularly towards the conclusion of the first book.

CHAPTER IV.

CONCERNING MATTER—AN IMPERFECT DESCRIPTION OF IT—ITS NATURE, AND THE NECESSITY OF ITS EXISTENCE, TRACED OUT AND PROVED—FIRST BY ABSTRACTION—THEN BY ANALOGY—ILLUSTRATIONS FROM MYTHOLOGY.

MATTER is that elementary constituent in composite substances, which appertains in common to them all,[q] without distinguishing them from one another. But it is fitting to be more explicit.

Every thing generated or made, whether by nature or art, is generated or made out of something else; and this something else is called its *subject* or *matter*. Such is iron to the saw; such is timber to the boat.

Now this subject or matter of a thing, being necessarily previous to that thing's existence, is necessarily different from it, and not the same. Thus iron, as iron, is not a saw; and timber, as timber, is not a boat. Hence then one character of every subject or matter, that is, the character of *negation* or *privation*.

Again, though the subject or matter of a thing be not that thing, yet were it incapable of becoming so, it could not be called its subject or matter. Thus iron is the subject or matter of a saw, because, though not a saw, it may still become a saw. On the contrary, timber is not the subject or matter of a saw, because it not only (as timber) is no saw, but can never be made one, from its very nature and properties. Hence, then, besides privation, another character of every subject or matter, and that is the character of *aptitude* or *capacity*.

Again, when one thing is the subject or matter of many things, it implies a privation of them all, and a capacity to them all.[r] Thus iron, being the subject or matter of the saw,

[q] If we compare the beginning of this chapter with the beginning of the following, it will appear that, though *matter* and *form* are the elements, or inherent parts of every composite substance, yet they essentially differ, inasmuch as *matter* being common, *form* peculiar, *form* gives every such substance its character, while *matter* gives it none.

Thus Philoponus: Κατ' αὐτὸ γὰρ [τὸ εἶδος scil.] χαρακτηρίζονται τὰ πράγματα, κατὰ δὲ τὴν ὕλην οὐδὲν ἀλλήλων διαφέρουσι: "By *form*, things are characterised; by *matter*, they differ not one from another." Com. in Physic. Arist. p. 55. D. And soon after, Διότι αὐτὸ χαρακτηριστικόν ἐστι τῆς ἑκάστου οὐσίας· ἡ γὰρ ὕλη, κοινή: "This [that is, the *form*] is characteristic of every being's essence; for as to the *matter*, it is common" [and runs through all.]

Ammonius says expressly, Ἡ μὲν γὰρ ὕλη κοινωνίας ἐστὶν αἰτία τοῖς πράγμασι, τὸ δὲ εἶδος διαφορᾶς: "*Matter*, with regard to things, is the cause of their general community, or common nature; *form*, the cause of their peculiar difference." Ammon. in Cat. p. 25. B.

[r] *Privation* and *capacity* are essential to every thing which bears the name of *matter*; and this is the meaning of the following passage: ἐστὶ δὲ τὸ ὑποκείμενον ἀριθμῷ μὲν ἕν, εἴδει δὲ δύο: "the subject or matter is *one* numerically, but in cha-

the axe, and the chisel, implies privation and capacity with respect to all three.

Again, we can change a saw into a chisel, but not into a boat; we can change a boat into a box, but not into a saw. The reason is, there can be no change or mutation of one thing into another, where the two changing beings do not participate the same matter.[8] But even here, were the boat to moulder and turn to earth, and that earth by natural process to metallize and become iron, through such progression as this we might suppose even the boat to become a saw. Hence therefore it is, that all change is by immediate or mediate participation of the same matter.

Having advanced thus far, we must be careful to remember, first, that every subject or matter implies, as such, *privation* and *capacity*; and next, that all change or mutation of beings into one another, is by means of their participating the same common matter. This we have chosen to illustrate from works of art, as falling more easily under human cognizance and observation. It is however no less certain as to the productions of nature, though the superior subtlety in these renders examples more difficult.

The question then is, whether in the world which we inhabit, it be not admitted from experience, as well as from the confession of all philosophers, that substances of every kind, whether natural or artificial, either immediately or mediately pass one into another; that we suppose at present no realizings of nonentity, but that reciprocal deaths, dissolutions, and diges-

racter it is *two*;" that is to say, *two*, as it has a capacity to become a thing, and yet is under a privation, till it actually become so. Aristot. Physic. l. i. p. 17. And soon after, he says: *ἕτερον γὰρ τὸ ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ τῷ ἀμούσῳ εἶναι, καὶ τῷ ἀσχηματίστῳ καὶ χαλκῷ:* "it is a different thing to be a man, and to be void of the musical art; it is a different thing to be void of figure, and to be brass." As much as if he had said, that the man, before he became a musical artist, had both a capacity for that character, and a privation of it; the brass a similar capacity and privation, before it was cast into a statue.

Thus too Themistius: *Καί τοι λέγομεν τῆς ὕλης τὸ εἶναι ἐν τῷ δυνάμει· ἡ δὲ δύναμις δηλονότι μετὰ στερήσεως· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἔτι δύναμις εἴη, μὴ σὺν αὐτῇ πάντως καὶ τῆς στερήσεως νοουμένης:* "We say the essence of matter is in capacity; and capacity is evidently connected with privation; since it would no longer be capacity, could privation in no sense be understood, as existing with it." Themist. in Aristot. Physic. p. 21. edit. Ald.

See p. 263, note *i*, and note *t*, p. 269.

[8] This reasoning has reference to what the ancients called *ὕλη προσεχής*, "the immediate matter," in opposition to *ὕλη πρώτη*, "the remote or primary matter," of which more will be said in the course of this speculation.

It is of the immediate matter we must understand the following passage: *Ἐνδέχεται δὲ, μιᾶς τῆς ὕλης οὔσης ἕτερα γίγνεσθαι διὰ τὴν κινοῦσαν αἰτίαν· οἷον ἐκ ξύλου καὶ κιβωτὸς καὶ κλινή· ἐνίων δὲ ἑτέρα ἡ ὕλη ἐξ ἀνάγκης, ἑτέρων ὄντων. οἷον πρίων οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο ἐκ ξύλου, οὐδ' ἐπὶ τῇ κινούσῃ αἰτίᾳ τοῦτο:* "It is possible, that, the matter being one and the same, different things by the efficient cause should be formed out of it; as, for example, that out of wood should be formed a box and a bed. But then with regard to some things, which are different, the matter is of necessity different also. It is thus, for example, that a saw cannot be made out of wood; nor is this a work in the power of the efficient cause." Arist. Metaph. H. κεφ. δ'. p. 138. edit. Sylb.

tions, support by turns all substances out of each other, so that, as Hamlet says, from the idea of this rotation,

> Imperial Cæsar, dead and turn'd to clay,
> May stop a hole, to keep the winds away.

The question, in short, is, whether, in this world which we inhabit, there be not an universal mutation of all things into all.[t] If there be, then must there be some one primary matter, common to all things; I say, some one primary matter, and that common to all things, since, without some such matter, such mutation would be wholly impossible.

But if there be some one primary matter, and that common to all things; this matter must imply, not (as particular and subordinate matters do) a particular privation, and a particular capacity, but, on the contrary, *universal privation*, and *universal capacity*.[u]

If the notion of such a being appear strange and incomprehensible, we may further prove the necessity of its existence from the following considerations.

Either there is no such general change, as here spoken of, which is contrary to fact, and would destroy the sympathy and

[t] The Peripatetics, according to the erroneous astronomy by them adopted, supposed the fixed stars, the planets, the sun, and the moon, to move all of them round the earth, attached to different spheres, which moved and carried them round, the earth itself being immoveable, and placed in the centre of the universe. This motion, purely and simply local, was the only one they allowed to these celestial bodies, which in essence they held to be perfectly unchangeable. Things on the surface of this earth, (such as plants and animals,) and things between that surface and the moon, (such as clouds, meteors, winds, &c.) these they supposed obnoxious to motions of a more various and complicated character; motions which changed them in their qualities and quantities, and which even led to their generation and dissolution, to life and to death. Hence the whole tribe of these mutable and perishable beings were called sublunary, because the region of their existence was beneath the sphere of the moon. It was here existed those elements which, as Milton tells us,

> . . . . . *in quaternion run*
> *Perpetual circle, multiform, and mix*
> *And nourish all things.* Par. Lost.

It was here that Aristotle held—ὅτι πᾶν ἐκ παντὸς γίνεσθαι πέφυκε, "that every thing was naturally formed to arise out of every thing." Lib. de Ortu et Int. p. 39. edit. Sylb.

Ocellus Lucanus (from whom, and from Archytas, Timæus, and the other Pythagoreans, both Plato and Aristotle borrowed much of their philosophy) elegantly calls this imaginary sphere of the moon's orbit, ἰσθμὸς ἀθανασίας καὶ γενήσεως, "the isthmus of immortality and generation;" that is, the boundary which lies between things immortal and things transitory. Gale's Opusc, Mythog. p. 516.

The Stoics went further than this isthmus. They did not confine these changes to a part only of the universe; they supposed them to pass through the whole; and to continue without ceasing, till all was at length lost in their ἐκπύρωσις, or "general conflagration;" after which came a new world, and then a new conflagration, and so on periodically. Diog. Laert. vii. 135, 141, 142.

[u] Τὸ πρῶτον ὑποκείμενον, δυνάμενον ἁπάσας δέχεσθαι τὰς μορφὰς, ἐν στερήσει μέν ἐστιν ἁπασῶν: "The primary subject or matter, having a capacity to admit all forms, exists in a privation of them all." Themist. in Aristot. Physic. p. 21.

Themistius well distinguishes between two words, expressing the same being; I mean, ὑποκείμενον and ὕλη. The first he makes the subject or substratum of something actually existing; the other, that matter which has a *capacity* of becoming many things, before it actually becomes any one of them.

This is that *one* being, mentioned by Diogenes, whose words we have quoted in the preceding chapter, p. 263, note *k*.

congeniality of things; or if there be, there must be a matter of the character here established, because without it (as we have said) such change would be impossible.

Add to this, however hard universal privation may appear, yet had the primary matter in its proper nature any one particular attribute, so as to prevent its privation from being unlimited and universal, such attribute would run through all things, and be conspicuous in all. If it were white, all things would be white; if circular, they would be circular; and so as to other attributes, which is contrary to fact.[x] Add to this, that the opposite to such attribute could never have existence, unless it were possible for the same thing to be at once and in the same instance both white and black, circular and rectilinear, &c. since this inseparable attribute would necessarily be everywhere, because the matter, which implies it, is itself everywhere; at least, may be found in all things that are generated and perishable.

Here, then, we have an idea (such as it is) of that singular being, ὕλη πρώτη, the "primary matter;" a being which those philosophers, who are immerged in sensible objects, know not well how to admit, though they cannot well do without it;[y] a being, which flies the perception of every sense, and which is at best even to the intellect but a negative object, no otherwise comprehensible than either by analogy or abstraction.

[x] This argument is taken from Plato. Speaking of the primary matter, he says, Ὅμοιον γὰρ ὂν τῶν ἐκεισιόντων τινὶ, τὰ τῆς ἐναντίας, τό τε τῆς παράσαν ἄλλην φύσεως, ἐκεῖ' ἴλθοι, δεχόμενον, καιῶς ἂν ἀφομοιοῖ, τὴν αὐτοῦ παρεμφαίνων ἰδέαν: "Were it like any of those things that enter into it, in such case, when it came to receive things of a nature contrary and totally different from itself, it would exhibit them ill, by shewing its own nature along with them at the same time." Plat. Tim. p. 50.

Thus Chalcidius, in commenting the passage here quoted: Si sit aliquid candidum, ut ψιμύθιον, deinde oporteat hoc transferri in alium colorem, vel diversum, ut ruborem sive pallorem, vel contrarium, ut atrum; tunc candor non patietur introeuntes colores synceros perseverare, sed permixtione sui faciet interpolatos. Chalcid. in Tim. Com. p. 434.

Hence we see the propriety of those descriptions which make the primary matter to be "void of body, of quality, of bulk, of figure," &c.: ἀσώματος, ἄποιος, ἀμεγέθης, ἀσχημάτιστος, ἄμορφος, κ. τ. λ.

[y] So strange a being is it, and so little comprehensible to common ideas, that the Greeks had no name for it in their language, until ὕλη came to be adopted as the proper word, which was at first only assumed by way of metaphor, from signifying "timber" or "wood," the common materials in many works of art. Hence it was that Ocellus, Timæus, and Plato employ various words, and all of them after the same metaphorical manner, when they would express the nature of this mysterious being. Ocellus calls it, πανδεχὲς καὶ ἐκμαγεῖον τῆς γενέσεως, "the universal recipient, and impression of things generated," as wax receives impressions from various seals. Timæus uses the word ὕλα in the Doric dialect, and explains it (like Ocellus) by ἐκμαγεῖον, to which he adds the appellations of ματέρα καὶ τιθήνην, "mother and nurse." Plato calls it, first, πάσης γενέσεως ὑποδοχὴν, οἷον τιθήνην, "the receptacle of all generation, as its nurse;" then, παντὸς αἰσθητοῦ μητέρα καὶ ὑποδοχὴν, "the mother and receptacle of every sensible object." Gale's Opusc. Mytholog. p. 516. 544. Platon. Tim. p. 47. 51. edit. Serr. See Hermes, p. 205, note c.

Aristotle also observes, consistently with one of the above expressions, ἡ μὲν γὰρ ὑπομένουσα, συναιτία τῇ μορφῇ τῶν γινομένων ἐστὶν, ὥσπερ μήτηρ: "that the matter, by remaining, is in concurrence with the form, a cause of things generated, under the character of a mother." Phys. l. i. c. 9. p. 22. edit. Sylb.

We gain a glimpse of it by abstraction, when we say that the first matter is not the lineaments and complexion, which make the beautiful face; nor yet the flesh and blood, which make those lineaments, and that complexion; nor yet the liquid and solid aliments, which make that flesh and blood; nor yet the simple bodies of earth and water, which make those various aliments; but something which, being below all these, and supporting them all, is yet different from them all, and essential to their existence.[z]

We obtain a sight of it by analogy, when we say, that as is the brass to the statue, the marble to the pillar, the timber to the ship, or any one secondary matter to any one peculiar form; so is the first and original matter to all forms in general.[a]

[z] Abstraction appears to have been used by Plato: Διὸ τὴν τοῦ γεγονότος ὁρατοῦ καὶ παντὸς αἰσθητοῦ μητέρα καὶ ὑποδοχὴν μήτε γῆν, μήτε ἀέρα, μήτε πῦρ, μήτε ὕδωρ λέγομεν, μήτε ὅσα ἐκ τούτων, μήτε ἐξ ὧν ταῦτα γέγονεν· ἀλλ' ἀόρατον εἶδός τι καὶ ἄμορφον, πανδεχές· μεταλαμβάνον δὲ ἀπορώτατά πῃ τοῦ νοητοῦ, καὶ δυσαλωστότατον αὐτὸ λέγοντες, οὐ ψευσόμεθα: "Let us therefore say, that the mother and receptacle of every visible, nay, of every sensible production, is neither earth, nor air, nor fire, nor water, nor any of the things which arise out of these, nor out of which these arise, but a certain invisible and formless being, the universal recipient; concerning which being, if we say it is in a very dubious way intelligible, and something most hard to be apprehended, we shall not speak a falsehood." Plat. Tim. p. 51. edit. Serr.

Thus Chalcidius: Sublatis quæ sunt singulis, quod solum remanet, ipsum esse, quod quæritur. In Tim. Com. p. 371.

[a] The method of reasoning on this subject by analogy was used by Aristotle. Ἡ δ' ὑποκειμένη φύσις ἐπιστητὴ κατὰ ἀναλογίαν· ὡς γὰρ πρὸς ἀνδριάντα χαλκὸς, ἢ πρὸς κλίνην ξύλον, ἢ πρὸς τῶν ἄλλων τι τῶν ἐχόντων μορφὴν ἡ ὕλη καὶ τὸ ἄμορφον ἔχει, πρὶν λαβεῖν τὴν μορφὴν· οὕτως αὕτη πρὸς οὐσίαν ἔχει, καὶ τὸ τόδε τι, καὶ τὸ ὄν. Phys. l. i. c. 7. p. 20. edit. Sylb. "The subject, *nature*, (that is, the primary matter,) is knowable in the way of analogy: for as is the brass to the statue, the timber to the bed, or the immediate and formless material to any of those things which have form before it assumes that form, so is this [general and primary] matter to substance, and to each particular thing, and to each particular being."

Not that Aristotle rejected the argument from abstraction. Λέγω δ' ὕλην ἣ καθ' αὑτὴν μήτε τί, μήτε ποσὸν, μήτε ἄλλο μηδὲν εἰς ἃ ὥρισται τὸ ὄν· ἔστι γάρ τι, καθ' οὗ κατηγορεῖται τούτων ἕκαστον, ᾧ τὸ εἶναι ἕτερον, καὶ τῶν κατηγοριῶν ἑκάστῃ: "I mean, by *matter*, that which of itself is not denominated either this particular substance, or that particular quantity, or any other of those attributes, by which being is characterized. It is indeed that, of which each one of these is predicated, and which has an essence different from every one of the predicaments." Metaph. Z. p. 106. edit. Sylb.

And here we may observe, that as abstraction and analogy are the two methods by which this strange being (as it has been called) was investigated by the ancient philosophers, so for that reason Timæus tells us, that it was made known to us, λογισμῷ νόθῳ, "by a spurious kind of reasoning," p. 545. Plato says the same, only he is more full. Matter, according to him, was μετ' ἀναισθησίας ἁπτὸν, λογισμῷ τινὶ νόθῳ μόγις πιστόν: "Something tangible without sensation, something hard to be believed, and that by means of a spurious kind of reasoning." Tim. Plat. p. 52. edit. Serr.

This spurious reasoning is explained by Timæus, who says, that matter is so comprehended, τῷ μήκει κατ' εὐθυωρίαν νοεῖσθαι, "by its not being understood in a direct way, but only obliquely, and by implication." Opusc. Myth. Gale, p. 545.

As to the being "tangible without sensation," this means, that though it be an essential to *body*, which appears to make it tangible, yet the abstraction makes it stand under the same character to the touch, as darkness stands to the sight, silence to the hearing; we cannot be said to see the one, nor to hear the other; and yet without the help of those two senses we could have no comprehension of those two negations, or, perhaps more properly, those two sensible privations.

Both Timæus and Plato drop expressions, as if they considered *matter* to be *place*.

And here, if a digression may be permitted, let us reflect for a moment on the character of old Proteus.

> Omnia transformat sese in miracula rerum,
> Ignemque, horribilemque feram, fluviumque liquentem. Georg. iv.

Thus Virgil: thus, before him, Homer;

> Πάντα δὲ γιγνόμενος πειρήσεται, ὅσσ' ἐπὶ γαῖαν
> Ἕρπετὰ γίνονται, καὶ ὕδωρ, καὶ θεσπιδαὲς πῦρ. Ὀδυσσ. Δ. 417.

> "Made into all things, all he'll try; become
> Each living thing, that creeps on earth; will glide
> A liquid stream, or blaze a flaming fire."[b]

What wonder, if this singular deity suggests to us that singular being, which we have been just attempting to describe? The allegory was too obvious to escape the writers of any age, and there are many, we find, by whom it has been adopted.[c]

Timæus calls it τόπος and χώρα; Plato calls it χώρα and ἕδρα. Opusc. Myth. p. 544. Plat. Tim. p. 52.

Chalcidius elegantly shews, how in this negative manner it attends all the predicaments, and serves for a support to each. Essentia est, ut opinor, cum eam species, &c. See Com. in. Tim. p. 438.

[b] To the poets here quoted may be added, Horace Sat. lib. ii. s. 3. v. 73. Ovid. Metam. viii. 730.

That great parent of mythology as well as poetry, Homer, not only informs us concerning Proteus, but concerning his daughter Eidothea, who discovered her father's abode.

We shall perceive in the explanations which follow, how this fable applies itself to the subject of the present chapter.

[c] "Some," says Eustathius, when he comments the passage above cited from Homer, hold "Proteus to be that original matter, which is the receptacle of forms; that, which being in actuality no one of these forms, is yet in capacity all of them; which Proteus (they add) Eidothea, his daughter, is elegantly said to discover, by leading him forth out of capacity into actuality; that is, she is that principle of motion which contrives to make him rush into form, and be moved and actuated."

Heraclides Ponticus, having adopted the same method of explaining, subjoins: "That hence it was with good reason, that the formless matter was called Proteus; and that providence, which modified each being with its peculiar form and character, was called Eidothea."

The words of Eustathius, in the original, are—Πρωτέα τὴν πρωτόγονον εἶναι ὕλην, τὴν τῶν εἰδῶν δεχάδα, τὴν ἐνεργείᾳ μὲν οὖσαν μηδὲν τῶν εἰδῶν, δυνάμει δὲ τὰ πάντα—ὃ δὴ Πρωτέα καλῶς λέγεται ἡ Εἰδοθέα ἐκφαίνειν, διὰ τῆς ἐκ τοῦ δυνάμει εἰς τὴν ἐνέργειαν προαγωγῆς· ἤγουν ἡ κίνησις, ἡ εἰς εἶδος θέειν αὐτὸν, καὶ κινεῖσθαι μηχανωμένη. Eustath. in Hom. Odyss. p. 177. edit. Basil.

We shall only remark, as we proceed, that the etymology here given of Eidothea, εἰς εἶδος θέειν, "to rush into form," is invented, like many other ancient etymologies, more to explain the word *philosophically*, than to give us its real origin. It is, perhaps, more profitable, though not equally critical, to etymologize after this manner; and such appears to have been the common practice of Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics.

The words of Heraclides are—Ὥστε ηὐλόγον, τὴν μὲν ἄμορφον ὕλην Πρωτέα καλεῖσθαι, τὴν δ' εἰδωλοπλαστήσασαν ἕκαστα Πρόνοιαν Εἰδοθέαν. Heraclid. Pontic. p. 490. Gale's Opusc. Mythog. 8vo.

To these Greeks may be subjoined a respectable countryman of our own.

Lord Verulam tells us of Proteus, that he had his herd of seals, or sea-calves; that these it was his custom every day to tell over, and then to retire into a cavern, and repose himself. Of this we read the following explanation: "That under the person of Proteus is signified *matter*, the most ancient of all things, next to the Deity; that the herd of Proteus was nothing else, than the ordinary species of animals, plants, and metals, into which *matter* appears to diffuse, and, as it were, to consume itself; so that after it has formed and finished those several species, (its task being in a manner complete,) it appears to sleep and be at rest, nor to labour at, attempt, or prepare any species further." De Sapientia Vet. c. 13.

The author's own words are, Sub Protei enim persona materia significatur, omnium rerum post Deum antiquissima. Pecus autem, sive grex Protei non aliud videtur esse, quam species ordinariæ animalium, plantarum, metallorum, in quibus materia

CHAPTER V.

CONCERNING FORM—AN IMPERFECT DESCRIPTION OF IT. PRIMARY FORMS, UNITED WITH MATTER, MAKE BODY. BODY MATHEMATICAL—BODY PHYSICAL—HOW THEY DIFFER. ESSENTIAL FORMS. TRANSITION TO FORMS OF A CHARACTER SUPERIOR TO THE PASSIVE AND ELEMENTARY.

FORM is that elementary constituent in every composite substance, by which it is distinguished and characterized, and known from every other.[d] But to be more explicit.

The first and most simple of all extensions is a line. This, when it exists united with a second extension, makes a superficies; and these two, existing together with a third, make a solid. Now this last and complete extension we call the first and simplest *form;* and when this first and simplest form accedes to the first and simplest matter, the union of the two produces *body*, which is for that reason defined to be "matter triply extended." And thus we behold the rise of *pure* and original *body*.[e]

videtur se diffundere, et quasi consumere; adeo ut, postquam istas species effinxerit, et absolverit, (tanquam penso completo,) dormire et quiescere videatur, nec alias amplius species moliri, tentare, aut parare.

[d] See the first note in the preceding chapter, and page 275.

[e] Original body, when we look downwards, has reference to the primary matter, its substratum; when we look upwards, becomes itself a ὕλη, or "matter to other things;" to the elements, as commonly called air, earth, water, &c.; and in consequence to all the variety of natural productions.

Hence it is, that Ammonius, speaking of the first matter, says, *αὕτη οὖν, ἐξογκωθεῖσα κατὰ τὰς τρεῖς διαστάσεις, ποιεῖ τὸ δεύτερον ἄποιον σῶμα:* "this [that is, the first matter] being embulked with three extensions, makes the second matter or subject, that is to say, body void of quality.

After having shewn how natural qualities and attributes stood in need of such a subject for their existence, he adds, (which is worth remarking,) *οὐχ ὅτι ἦν ποτε ἐνεργείᾳ ἡ ὕλη ἀσώματος, ἢ σῶμα ἄποιον, ἀλλὰ τὴν εὔτακτον τῶν ὄντων γένεσιν θεωροῦντες φαμὲν, τῇ ἐπινοίᾳ διαιροῦντες ταῦτα, τὰ τῇ φύσει ἀχώριστα:* "not that there ever was in actuality either matter without body, or body without quality; but we say so, as we contemplate the well ordered generation of things, dividing those things in imagination, which are by nature inseparable." Ammon. in Præd. p. 62.

Συνεχὲς μὲν οὖν ἐστι τὸ διαιρετὸν εἰς ἀεὶ διαιρετά· σῶμα δὲ, τὸ πάντῃ διαιρετόν· μεγέθους δὲ, τὸ μὲν ἐφ' ἓν, γραμμή· τὸ δ' ἐπὶ δύο, ἐπίπεδον· τὸ δ' ἐπὶ τρία, σῶμα· καὶ παρὰ ταῦτα οὐκ ἔστιν ἄλλο μέγεθος, διὰ τὸ τὰ τρία πάντα εἶναι, καὶ τὸ τρὶς πάντῃ: "*Continuous* is that, which is divisible into parts infinitely divisible; *body* is that which is every way divisible. Of extensions, that which is divisible one way, is a *line;* that which is divisible two ways, is a *superficies;* that which is divisible three ways, is *body;* and besides these there is no other extension, because *three* are *all*, and *thrice* [divisible] is *every way* [divisible.] Aristot. de Cœlo, l. i. c. 1.

In support of this last idea, (that the term *three* implies *all*,) Aristotle refers to the common practice of his own language—*Τὰ μὲν γὰρ δύο ἀμφὼ λέγομεν, καὶ τοὺς δύο ἀμφοτέρους, πάντα δ' οὐ λέγομεν· ἀλλὰ κατὰ τῶν τριῶν ταύτην τὴν προσηγορίαν φαμὲν πρῶτον:* "We call (says he) *two things*, or *two persons, both;* but we do not call them *all;* it is with regard to *three* that we first apply this appellation," (viz. the appellation of *all*.) Arist. in loc.

This is true likewise in Latin; and is true also in English. Even the vulgar, with us, would be surprised were they to

It must be remembered, however, that body under this character is something indefinite and vague, and scarcely to be made an object of scientific contemplation. It is necessary to this end, that its extension should be bounded; for as yet we have treated it without such regard. Now the bound or limit of simple body is figure; and thus it is that *figure*, with regard to body, becomes the next form after extension.

In body thus bounded by figure, every other of its attributes being abstracted and withdrawn, we behold that species of body called *body mathematical;* a name so given it, because the mathematician, as such, considers no other attributes of body, except it be these two primary, its extension and its figure.[f]

But though the bounding of body by figure is one step towards rendering it more definite and knowable, yet is not this sufficient for the purposes of nature. It is necessary here, that not only its external should be duly bounded, but that a suitable regard should be likewise had to its internal. This internal adjustment, disposition, or arrangement, (denominate it as you please,) is called *organization*, and may be considered as the third form, which appertains to body. By its accession we behold the rise of *body physical* or *natural*, for every such body is some way or other organized.

And thus may we affirm that these three, that is to say, *extension*, *figure*, and *organization*, are the three original forms to body physical or natural; figure having respect to its external, organization to its internal, and extension being common both to one and to the other. It is more than probable, that from the variation in these universal, and, as I may say, primary forms, arise most of those secondary forms usually called *qualities sensible*, because they are the proper objects of our several sensations. Such are roughness and smoothness, hardness and softness, the tribes of colours, savours and odours, not to mention those powers of character more subtle, the powers electric, magnetic, medicinal, &c.

Here therefore we may answer the question, how natural bodies are distinguished. Not a single one among them consists

hear any one say, Give me *all two*, instead of Give me *both*.

For the grammatical idea of *both*, see Hermes, p. 182.

The French, by a strange solecism, say *tous deux;* a fault which we should not expect in an elegant language, corrected and refined by so many able writers.

See next page.

[f] In body mathematical all qualities being abstracted but figure and extension, we may hence perceive the reason why the contemplation of such body (which contemplation makes so large a part of the mathematical sciences) is more accurate and certain than that of any other body. It is, because of all bodies, mathematical body has the fewest, the most obvious, and the most precise attributes.

Hence, too, we may perceive the difference between a mathematician and a natural philosopher. They differ as their subjects differ; as the subject of the first is simple, of the last is complicated; as the attributes of mathematical body are few and known, of physical body are unknown and infinite. Vid. Arist. Phys. l. ii. c. 2.

of materials in chaos, but of materials wrought up after the most exquisite manner, and that conspicuous in their organization,[g] or in their figure, or in both.

As therefore every natural body is distinguished by the differences just described; and as these differences have nothing to do with the original matter, which being everywhere similar, can afford no distinctions at all: may we not hence infer the expediency of *essential forms*, that every natural substance may be essentially characterized? It is with deference to my contemporaries, that I surmise this assertion. I speak perhaps of spectres, as shocking to some philosophers, as those were to Æneas, which he met in his way to hell:

Terribiles visu formæ.

Yet we hope to make our peace, by declaring it our opinion, that we by no means think these forms *self-existent;* things which matter may slip off, and fairly leave to themselves,

Ut veteres ponunt tunicas æstate cicadæ. Lucr. iv. 56.

They rather mean something, which, though differing from matter, can yet never subsist without it;[h] something, which, united with it, helps to produce every composite being; that is to say, in other words, every natural substance in the visible world.

It must be remembered however (as we have said before) that it is the *form* in this union, which is the source of all distinction.[i] It is by this, that the ox is distinguished from the horse, not by that grass on which they subsist, the common matter to both. To which also may be added, that as figures and sensible qualities are the only objects of our sensations, and these all are parts of natural form; so therefore (contrary to the

[g] Nowhere, perhaps, is the force of organisation more conspicuous, than when we perceive different grafts, upon the same tree, to produce different species of fruit.

[h] *Matter* and *attribute* are essentially distinct; yet, like convex and concave, they are by nature inseparable.

We have already spoken as to the inseparability of *attributes:* we now speak as to that of *matter*.

Ἡμεῖς δὲ φαμὲν ὕλην τινὰ τῶν σωμάτων τῶν αἰσθητῶν· ἀλλὰ ταύτην οὐ χωριστὴν, ἀλλ' ἀεὶ μετ' ἐναντιώσεως: "We say, there is a certain *matter* belonging to all bodies, the objects of sense; a matter, not separable, but ever existing with some contrariety.

Soon after: Ἀρχὴν μὲν καὶ πρώτην ὑποθεμένους εἶναι τὴν ὕλην, τὴν ἀχώριστον μὲν, ὑποκειμένην δὲ τοῖς ἐναντίοις: "First, and for a principle, we lay down *matter*, which is inseparable from the contraries, and is their subject, or substratum. Arist. de Gen. et Corr. lib. ii. p. 34, 35. edit Sylb.

By contraries, in this place, he means the several attributes of *matter*, such as *hot* and *cold*, *black* and *white*, *moist* and *dry*, &c., which are all of them contrary one to the other, from some or other of which *matter* is always inseparable.

See note the second of this chapter. It is a uniform position in the physics of the old Peripatetics, ὅτι ἀχώριστα τὰ πάθη, "that the affections [of body] are inseparable from it." See Arist. Phys. l. i. It is one thing to be a cube, another thing to be iron, or silver, or wood, or ivory. The cube is most evidently and certainly no one of these, yet is it absurd and impossible to suppose the cube should ever exist without one of these, or something similar to support it. See before, page 271.

[i] Pages 267, 273.

sentiment of the vulgar, who dream of nothing but of matter,) it is form which is in truth the whole, that we either hear, see, or feel; nor is mere matter any thing better, than an obscure imperfect being, knowable only to the reasoning faculty by the two methods already explained, I mean that of analogy, and that of abstraction.[k]

Here therefore we conclude with respect to *sensible forms;* that is to say, forms immerged in matter, and ever inseparable from it. In these and matter we place *the elements of natural substance,*[l] and thus finish the first part of the inquiry we proposed.

We are now to engage in speculations of another kind, and from the elements of natural substance to inquire after its *efficient cause;*[m] that is to say, that cause which associates those elements, and which employs them, when associated, according to their various and peculiar characters.

CHAPTER VI.

CONCERNING FORM, CONSIDERED AS AN EFFICIENT ANIMATING PRINCIPLE. HARMONY IN NATURE BETWEEN THE LIVING AND THE LIFELESS. OVID, A PHILOSOPHICAL POET. FURTHER DESCRIPTION OF THE ANIMATING PRINCIPLE FROM ITS OPERATIONS, ENERGIES, AND EFFECTS. VIRGIL. THE ACTIVE AND THE PASSIVE PRINCIPLE RUN THROUGH THE UNIVERSE. MIND, REGION OF FORMS. CORPOREAL CONNECTIONS, WHERE NECESSARY, WHERE OBSTRUCTIVE. MEANS AND ENDS—THEIR DIFFERENT PRECEDENCE ACCORDING TO DIFFERENT SYSTEMS—EMPEDOCLES, LUCRETIUS, PRIOR, GALEN, CICERO, ARISTOTLE, ETC. PROVIDENCE.

LET us suppose an artificial substance, for example a musical pipe, and let us suppose to this pipe the art of the piper to be

[k] See before, p. 271.

[l] Elements are τὰ ἐνυπάρχοντα αἴτια, "the inherent," or (if I may use the expression) "the in-existing causes," such as *matter* and *form*, of which we have been treating. There are other causes, such as the tribe of *efficient causes*, which cannot be called elements, because they make no part of the substances which they generate or produce. Thus the statuary is no part of his statue; the painter, of his picture. Hence it appears, that all elements are causes; but not all causes, elements.

[m] Aristotle having reduced his three principles of natural productions to two, which two we have treated in this and the preceding chapter, adheres not so strictly to this reduction, but that he still admits the three. Thus, in his Metaphysics, he tells us, ὅτι ἀρχαί εἰσι τρεῖς, τὸ εἶδος, καὶ ἡ στέρησις καὶ ἡ ὕλη, "that the form, the privation, and the matter, are three principles." He calls them elements, because they have no existence, but in the substance to which they belong. To these he adds the efficient cause, which as it exists externally, that is, without the subject, he will not for that reason allow to be an element. Hence he observes, ὥστε στοιχεῖα μὲν τρία, αἰτίαι δὲ καὶ ἀρχαὶ τέσσαρες, "that the elements were three; the causes and principles were four." His instances are, health, *the form;* disease, *the privation;* the human body, *the subject.* In these three causes we have the elements: add to these causes the fourth, that is, *the efficient*, the

united, not separated as now, but vitally united, so that the pipe by its own election might play whenever it pleased. Would not this union render it a kind of living being, where the art would be an active principle, the pipe a passive, both reciprocally fitted for the purposes of each other? And what, if instead of the piper's art, we were to substitute that of the harper? Would this new union also be natural like the former? Or would not rather the inaptitude of the constituents prevent any union at all? It certainly would prevent it, and all melody consequent; so that we could now by no analogy consider the pipe as animated.

It is in these and other arts, considered as efficient habits, we gain a glimpse of those forms, which characterize not by visible qualities, but by their respective powers, their operations and their energies. As is the piper's art to the pipe, the harper's to the harp, so is the soul of the lion to the body leonine, the soul of man to the body human; because in neither case it is possible to commute or make an exchange, without subverting the very end and constitution of the animal.[n]

And thus are we arrived at a new order of forms, the tribe of animating principles;[o] for there is nothing which distinguishes so eminently as these; and it is on the power of distinction that we rest the very essence of form.

It is here we view form in a higher and nobler light, than in that of a passive elementary constituent, a mere inactive and sensible attribute. It is here it assumes the dignity of a living motive power, of a power destined by its nature to use, and not be used. It is to the diversity of powers in these animating forms, that the diversity of the organizations in the corporeal world has reference. That strong and nervous leg, so well armed with tearing fangs, how perfectly is it correspondent to the fierce instincts of the lion? Had it been adorned, like the human arm, with fingers instead of fangs, the natural energies

art of medicine; and then we have the four causes required. Again, call the plan of the house, the *form;* the previous want of order, the *privation;* the bricks, the *materials;* add to these the fourth cause, the architect's *art*, and again we have the four causes required. Metaph. A. p. 198, 199. edit. Sylb.

It is this efficient cause, that will make the subject of the following chapter.

[n] See Arist. de An. l. i. c. 3. p. 13. edit. Sylb.

The Stagirite uses upon this occasion the following similitude: *παραπλήσιον γὰρ λέγουσιν, ὥσπερ εἴ τις φαίη τὴν τεκτονικὴν εἰς αὔλους ἐνδύεσθαι· δεῖ γὰρ τὴν μὲν τεχνὴν χρῆσθαι τοῖς ὀργάνοις, τὴν δὲ ψυχὴν τῷ σώματι:* "They [who adopt the notion of placing any soul in any body] talk the same as if a person was to say, the carpenter's art might enter into a musician's pipe: now it is necessary that every art should use its proper instruments, and every soul its proper body.

[o] Alexander Aphrodisiensis has an express dissertation to prove, *ὅτι εἶδος ἡ ψυχή*, "that the soul is a form." Alex. p. 124. B. edit. Ald. Ven. 1534. It was so called, not with the least view to its having a figure, as if, for example, it were a spherical body, but because it was able not only by its perceptive powers to secrete forms, but by its productive powers to impart them; whence, being considered as full of them, it was elegantly described to be *τόπος εἰδῶν*, "the region of forms." Arist. de Anim. l. iii. c. 4. See also l. ii. c. 1.

See Hermes, p. 205, 6, 7, note *a*.

of a lion had been all of them defeated. That more delicate structure of an arm, terminating in fingers so nicely diversified, how perfectly does it correspond to the pregnant invention of the human soul? Had these fingers been fangs, what had become of poor art, that by her operations procures us so many elegancies and utilities? It is here we behold the harmony between the visible world and the invisible, between the passive and the active, between the lifeless and the living. The whole variety in bodies, as well natural as artificial, is solely referable to the previous variety in these their animating forms. It is for the sake of these they exist; it is by these they are employed; and without them they would be as useless as the shoe without the foot.

It was perhaps owing to this use of the word *form*, in order to denote an animating principle, that the poet Ovid (who appears by his works not unacquainted with philosophy) opens his Metamorphosis with those lines, so perplexing to his commentators:

> In nova fert animus mutatas dicere formas
> Corpora.

"My mind (says he) carries me to tell of *forms* changed into *new bodies;*" not of bodies changed into new forms, but of forms, that is to say, souls, transferred into new bodies. The bodies, it seems, were new, but the souls or forms remained the same, of which throughout his work we have perpetual testimony. Thus, when he speaks of Callisto,

> Mens antiqua tamen facta quoque mansit in ursa. Metam. ii. 485.

Of Arachne,

> Antiquas exercet Aranea telas. Ibid. vi. 145.

Of the ants that became men,

> Mores, quos ante gerebant,
> Nunc quoque habent; parcumque genus, patiensque laborum. Ibid. vii. 656.

And so in many other places,[p] which those who favour this conjecture may easily discover.

As nothing can become known by that which it has not, so it would be absurd to attempt describing these animating forms by any visible or other qualities, the proper objects of our sensations. The sculptor's art is not figure, but it is that through which figure is imparted to something else. The harper's art is not sound, but it is that through which sounds are called forth from something else. They are of themselves no objects either of the ear or of the eye; but their nature or character is understood in this, that were they never to exert their proper energies on their

[p] Ovid appears by these quotations to have used the word *forma*, when he opens his poem, in a sense truly philosophical. His doctrine, that this form or soul might be transferred from one body into another, was Pythagorean, but which the Peripatetics rejected from the reasons above alleged, in the first note of this chapter.

proper subjects, the marble would remain for ever shapeless, the harp would remain for ever silent.[q]

It is the same in natural beings.[r] The animating form of a natural body is neither its organization, nor its figure, nor any other of those inferior forms which make up the system of its visible qualities; but it is the power which, not being that organization, nor that figure, nor those qualities, is yet able to produce, to preserve, and to employ them. It is, therefore, the power which first moves, and then conducts that latent process, by which the acorn becomes an oak, the embryo becomes a man. It is the power, by which the aliment of plants and animals is digested, and by such digestion transformed into a part of themselves. It is the power, as oft as the body is either mutilated or sick, that cooperates with the medicine in effecting the cure. It is the power, which departing, the body ceases to live, and the members soon pass into putrefaction and decay.

Further still, as putrefaction and decay will necessarily come, and nature would be at an end, were she not maintained by a supply; it is therefore the power that enables every being to produce another like itself, the lion to produce a lion, the oak to produce an oak; so that, while individuals perish, the species still remains, and the corruptible, as far as may be, partakes of the eternal and divine.[s]

[q] See Maximus Tyrius, Diss. i. who eloquently applies this reasoning to the Supreme Being, the Divine Artist of the universe: Εἰ δὲ καὶ νῦν ἤδη μαθεῖν ἐρᾷς τὴν ἐκείνου φύσιν, πῶς τίς αὐτὴν διηγήσηται; καλὸν μὲν γὰρ εἶναι τὸν θεὸν, καὶ τῶν καλῶν τὸ φανότατον· ἀλλ' οὐ σῶμα καλὸν, ἀλλ' ὅθεν καὶ τῷ σώματι ἐπιῤῥεῖ τὸ κάλλος· οὐδὲ λειμῶν καλὸς, ἀλλ' ὅθεν καὶ ὁ λειμὼν καλός· καὶ ποταμοῦ κάλλος, καὶ θαλάττης, καὶ οὐρανοῦ, καὶ τῶν ἐν οὐρανῷ θεῶν, πῶν τὸ κάλλος τοῦτο ἐκεῖθεν ῥεῖ, οἷον ἐκ πηγῆς ἀενάου καὶ ἀκηράτου· καθόσον αὐτοῦ μετέσχεν ἕκαστα, καλὰ, καὶ ἐδραῖα, καὶ σωζόμενα· καὶ καθόσον αὐτοῦ ἀπολείπεται, αἰσχρὰ, καὶ διαλυόμενα, καὶ φθειρόμενα: "But if even now you wish to learn the nature of this Sovereign Being, after what manner shall any one be able to explain it? Divinity itself is surely beauteous, and of all beauties," &c. &c.

These who choose to see the remaining part of this elegant original, elegantly translated, may find it in the second volume of Lord Shaftesbury's Characteristics, p. 295.

[r] Here an attempt is made to explain the three great principles of the soul, anciently called τὸ νοητικὸν, τὸ αἰσθητικὸν, τὸ θρεπτικὸν, "the intellective, the sensitive, and the nutritive." The nutritive is treated first, then the sensitive, then the intellective.

See below, note *t*, on the word *intellective*, p. 280.

[s] "This eternal and divine is what," as Aristotle says, "all beings desire, and for the sake of which they act whatever they act agreeably to nature." Πάντα γὰρ ἐκείνου (scil. τοῦ ἀεὶ καὶ τοῦ θείου) ὀρέγεται, κἀκείνου ἕνεκα πράττει ὅσα κατὰ φύσιν πράττει. De Anim. l. ii. c. 4. p. 28. edit. Sylb.

Immediately afterwards he subjoins the following remarkable passage, by which he appears to refer the whole system of natural production or generation to that one great principle: Ἐπεὶ οὖν κοινωνεῖν ἀδυνατεῖ τοῦ ἀεὶ καὶ τοῦ θείου τῇ συνεχείᾳ, διὰ τὸ μηδὲν ἐνδέχεσθαι τῶν φθαρτῶν τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ἓν ἀριθμῷ διαμένειν, ᾗ μετέχειν δύναται ἕκαστον, ταύτῃ κοινωνεῖ, τὸ μὲν μᾶλλον, τὸ δὲ ἧττον· καὶ διαμένει οὐκ αὐτὸ, ἀλλ' οἷον αὐτό· ἀριθμῷ μὲν οὐχ ἓν, εἴδει δὲ ἕν: "Inasmuch, therefore, as these beings (meaning the subordinate and inferior) cannot participate of the eternal and the divine in uninterrupted continuity, from its being impossible that any thing perishable and transient should remain the same and one numerically; hence it follows, that as far as each is capable of sharing it, so far it participates, one thing in a greater degree, and another in a less; and that each thing remains not precisely the same, but as it were

In all the energies here enumerated, it extends through vegetables as well as animals. But with animals, taken apart, it is that higher active faculty, which, by employing the organs of sense, peculiar to them as animals, distinguishes them, as beings sensitive, from vegetables and plants. Further than this, with man alone above the rest it is that still superior and more noble faculty, which, by its own divine vigour, unassisted perhaps with organs, makes and denominates him a being intellective and rational.[t]

And so much for the description of those forms, which, being purely invisible, and (it may be said) totally insensible, are no otherwise to be known, consciousness alone excepted, than by sensible operations and energies,[u] perceived in things corporeal.

As in their very essence they imply activity, as much as matter, upon which they operate, implies passivity; hence in every natural composite we may discern the influence of two

the same, not numerically one, but one in species."

To this Virgil alludes,

At genus immortale manet. Georg. iv.

See Plat. Conviv. p. 1197. C. edit. Fic.

[t] *Τῶν δὲ δυνάμεων τῆς ψυχῆς αἱ λεχθεῖσαι τοῖς μὲν ἐνυπάρχουσι πᾶσαι, καθάπερ εἴπομεν, τοῖς δὲ τινὲς αὐτῶν, ἐνίοις δὲ μία μόνη:* "As to the powers of the soul here described, they exist all of them in some beings; some of them only in other beings; and in some beings only one of them." Arist. de An. l. ii. c. 3. p. 26. edit. Sylb. That is to say, man possesses all; brutes possess some; plants, one only. Man has the vegetative, the sensitive, and the intellective faculty; brutes only the vegetative and the sensitive; plants, the vegetative alone.

See soon after, p. 28, *Ἄνευ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ θρεπτικοῦ, κ. τ. λ.*

Ideoque ob consortium corporis est inter homines, bestiasque, et cætera vita carentia, societas communioque corporeorum proventuum. Siquidem nasci, nutriri, crescere commune est hominibus cum cæteris; sentire vero et appetere, commune demum hominibus et mutis tantum, et ratione carentibus animalibus. Cupiditas porro atque iracundia vel agrestium vel mansuetorum, appetitus irrationabilis est: hominis vero, cujus est proprium rationi mentem applicare, rationabilis: ratiocinandi enim atque intelligendi, sciendique verum appetitus proprius est hominis, quia a cupiditate atque iracundia plurimum distat. Illa quippe etiam in mutis animalibus, et multo quidem acriora, cernuntur: rationis autem perfectio et intellectus, propria Dei et hominis tantum. Chalcid. in Plat. Tim. p. 345. edit. Fabric.

[u] See the passage just before quoted from Maximus Tyrius. Nothing can be of greater importance than a due attention to this distinction; I mean, the distinction between effects and causes; between effects which are visible, and causes which are invisible; between effects, the natural objects of all our sensations; and causes, which are objects of no sensation at all.

It is with reference to this distinction that Cyrus is made to reason in his last moments by Xenophon, his philosophical historian, who thus describes him addressing his children: *Οὐ γὰρ δήπου τοῦτό γε σαφῶς δοκεῖτε εἰδέναι, ὡς οὐδὲν ἔσομαι ἐγὼ ἔτι, ἐπειδὰν τοῦ ἀνθρωπίνου βίου τελευτήσω· οὐδὲ γὰρ νῦν τοι τήν γ' ἐμὴν ψυχὴν ἑωρᾶτε, ἀλλ' οἷς διεπράττετο, τούτοις αὐτὴν ὡς οὖσαν κατεφωρᾶτε.* Thus excellently translated by my honourable relation, Mr. Ashley: "You ought not to imagine you certainly know, that, after I have closed the period of human life, I shall no longer exist. For neither do you now see my soul; but you conclude from its operations, that it does exist." Cyropædia, l. viii.

Cicero has translated the same passage with great elegance, but in a manner less strict, less confined to the original:

Nolite arbitrari, O mihi carissimi filii, me, cum a vobis discessero, nusquam aut nullum fere; nec enim, dum eram vobiscum, animum meum videbatis, sed cum esset in hoc corpore, ex iis rebus, quas gerebam, intelligebatis: eundem igitur esse creditote, etiamsi nullum vibebitis. De Senect. c. 22.

Nothing is more certain than that many things, which have no sensible qualities, may be described accurately, and comprehended adequately, by their energies and operations upon sensible objects.

such principles, while, under different proportions, and in different degrees, the active enlivens the passive, and the passive depresses the active.

It is to this that Virgil nobly alludes, when he tells us, that to every enlivened substance, every animated being, there was something appertaining of ethereal vigour and heavenly origin, as far forth as not retarded by its mortal and earthly members.

> Igneus est ollis vigor, et cœlestis origo
> Seminibus, quantum nos noxia corpora tardant,
> Terrenique hebetant artus, moribundaque membra. Æn. vi.

Could we penetrate that mist, which hides so much from human eyes, and follow these composites to their different and original principles, we might gain, perhaps, a glimpse of two objects worth contemplating; of that which is first, and that which is last, in the general order of being; of pure energy in the Supreme Mind, the first mover of all efficients; of pure passivity in the lowest matter, the ultimate basis of all subjects.[x]

But lest these should be esteemed speculations rather foreign, it is sufficient to mark the analogy between things natural and artificial; how, that as there are no forms of art which did not pre-exist in the mind of man, so are there no forms of nature which did not pre-exist in the mind of God. It is through this we comprehend, how mind or intellect is the region of forms,[y]

[x] Thus the Stoics: Δοκεῖ δ' αὐτοῖς ἀρχὰς εἶναι τῶν ὅλων δύο, τὸ ποιοῦν καὶ τὸ πάσχον. τὸ μὲν οὖν πάσχον εἶναι τὴν ἄποιον οὐσίαν, τὴν ὕλην, τὸ δὲ ποιοῦν, τὸν ἐν αὐτῇ λόγον, τὸν θεόν: "Their opinion is, that the principles of all things are two, the active principle and the passive; that the passive principle is that substance void of all quality, *matter;* the active principle, that reason which exists within it, *God.*" Diog. Laert. vii. 134.

The following passage from Ammonius is remarkable, and well applies to the present subject: Διὰ φασὶ τὴν ὕλην τῷ θείῳ ἀνομοίως ὁμοιοῦσθαι. ὁμοιοῦσθαι μὲν, ὅτι δι' ἀποφάσεως τῶν ἄλλων σημαίνεται ἑκάτερον, ἀνομοίως δὲ, ὅτι τοῦ μὲν, κρείττονος ὄντος, ἢ κατὰ πάντα τὰ ὄντα, ἀποφάσκομεν πάντα, τῆς δὲ ὕλης, χείρονος οὔσης ἢ κατὰ πάντα, ταῦτα ἀποφάσκομεν: "For this reason they say that matter is dissimilarly similar to the divinity; is similar, because each of them is explained by a negation of all other things; dissimilarly so, inasmuch as we deny all things of the divinity, by its being better than all things; we deny them of matter, by its being worse." Ammon. in Prædic. p. 50. B.

Archytas thus expresses himself in his Doric dialect: Τὸ μὲν ἐντὶ ποιέον, τὸ δὲ πάσχον· οἷον ἐν τοῖς φυσικοῖς ποιέον μὲν ὁ θεὸς, πάσχον δὲ ἁ ὕλα, καὶ ποιέον καὶ πάσχον, τὰ στοιχεῖα: "There is something, which is agent; and something, which is patient; thus among natural beings, God is the agent; matter, the patient; but the elements are both agent and patient united."

Upon this Simplicius observes, Σαφοῦς δὲ ὄντος τοῦ λεγομένου, παραδείγματα ἀρχηγικώτατα παρέθετο, ποιεῖν μὲν τὸν θεὸν εἰπὼν, ᾧ καὶ τὰ ἄλλα τὰ ποιητικὰ αἴτια συνέπεται, πάσχειν δὲ τὴν ὕλην, δι' ἣν καὶ τὰ ἄλλα μετέχει τοῦ πάσχειν, καὶ ποιεῖν δὲ καὶ πάσχειν τὰ στοιχεῖα, ὡσὰν δὴ μετέχοντα καὶ ὕλης καὶ εἴδους: "Though what has been said is evident, he has adduced (to explain himself) the two highest and most leading instances, saying, that God is agent, whom all other active causes follow; and matter, patient, through which other beings partake of passion; and that the elements are both agents and patients, inasmuch as they participate both of matter and of form." Simpl. in Præd. p. 84. edit. Basil. 1551.

[y] See Aristotle, already quoted, p. 277, in his tract *De Anima*, l. iii. 4. p. 57. edit Sylb. In the eighth chapter of the same book, p. 62, he calls the soul, εἶδος εἴδων, "the form of forms;" and that not only from its being that supreme characterizing power which gives to subordinate beings their peculiar form or character, but as it uses them, when made, agreeably to their respective natures. In this last acceptation it is the form of forms, as the hand appears to be

in a far more noble and exalted sense, than by being their passive receptacle through impressions from objects without. It is their region, not by being the spot into which they migrate as strangers, but in which they dwell as *αὐτοχθόνες*, the "original natives" of the country. It is in mind they first exist, before matter can receive them;[a] it is from mind, when they adorn matter, that they primarily proceed: so that, whether we contemplate the works of art, or the more excellent works of nature, all that we look at as beautiful, or listen to as harmonious, is the genuine effluence or emanation of mind.[a]

And now to recapitulate what we have said concerning *form*. We have traced its variety, from the lifeless and inanimate up to the living and animating; from figures, colours, and sensible qualities, up to the powers only knowable through their energies and operations; in other words, from those forms which are but passive elements, up to those which are efficient causes.

Even in these active, animating, and efficient forms, besides the differences which we have remarked, there is still another worth regarding. Some of them cannot act without corporeal connections, while to others such connections appear to be no way requisite. What, for example, is the vegetative power in plants, without a natural body for it to nourish and enliven? What the sensitive powers of hearing or of seeing, without the corporeal organs of an ear, or an eye? These are animating forms,[b] which though themselves not body, are yet so far in-

the organ of organs; to be that superior instrument which uses the rest, the chisel, the pencil, the lyre, &c.; all which inferior organs or instruments, without this previous and superior one to employ them, would be inefficacious and dead, and incapable of producing any single effect—*ἡ ψυχὴ ὥσπερ ἡ χείρ ἐστι· καὶ γὰρ ἡ χεὶρ ὄργανόν ἐστιν ὀργάνων.* Arist. in loc.

[a] In the scriptural account of creation, light, previously to its existence, is commanded to exist: "And God said, Let their be light, and there was light." So also vegetables and animals, previously to their existing, are commanded to exist. Now, whether by these commands we suppose certain verbal orders, or (what seems far more probable) only a divine volition, respect must needs have been had to certain pre-existing forms, else such words or such volitions must have been devoid of all meaning.

[a] A proof, that these transcendent objects are of an origin truly mental, is, that nothing but mind or intellect can recognise or comprehend them. And hence it follows, that, if this intellective faculty be wanting, as it is to inferior animals, or be unhappily debased, as too often happens to our own species; though their sensitive organs may be exquisite to a degree, yet are such beings to such objects, as if they had no organs at all. "Eyes have they, and see not," &c.

And hence the meaning of that fine trochaic verse in the Sicilian poet and philosopher, Epicharmus:

Νοῦς ὁρᾷ καὶ νοῦς ἀκούει· τ' ἄλλα κωφὰ καὶ τυφλά.

It is mind alone that sees, that hears; all things besides are deaf and blind.

Clem. Alex. vol. i. p. 442. edit. Pott. Max. Tyr. edit. 8vo. p. 12. edit. 4to. p. 203.

[b] *Ὅσων γάρ ἐστιν ἀρχῶν ἡ ἐνέργεια σωματική, δῆλον ὅτι ταύτας ἄνευ σώματος ἀδύνατον ὑπάρχειν· οἷον βαδίζειν ἄνευ ποδῶν. ὥστε καὶ θύραθεν εἰσιέναι ἀδύνατον —λείπεται δὲ τὸν νοῦν μόνον θύραθεν ἐπεισιέναι, καὶ θεῖον εἶναι μόνον· οὐδὲ γὰρ αὐτοῦ τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ κοινωνεῖ σωματικὴ ἐνέργεια:* "As many faculties or principles of the soul as require bodily or corporeal energy, [that is, which require a body or an organ to enable them to act,] these, it is evident, cannot exist without a body; as, for example, the locomotive faculty of walking cannot exist without feet: so that for such faculties to pass into the body from without [originally separate and detached from it] is a thing impossible: it remains, therefore, that mind or intellect

separable from it, that were their connection dissolved, they would be as unable to exert themselves, as the painter deprived of his pencil, or the harper of his harp. It is not so with that perceptive power, unmixed and pure intelligence, the objects of which being purely intelligible, are all congenial with itself. Corporeal connections appear so little wanted here, that perhaps it is then in its highest vigour, when it is wholly separated and detached. It is in this part of our animating form, that we must look for the immortal and divine;[c] it is this indeed is all of it

alone should pass into us from without, [that is, be separate and wholly detached,] and should alone be something divine; because with the energy of this faculty bodily energy has no communication; that is, there is no want of corporeal organs for reasoning and thinking, as there is want of eyes for seeing, or of ears for hearing." Arist. de Animal. Gen. l. ii. c. 3. p. 208, 209. edit. Sylb.

In another place, speaking of those parts of the soul which are inseparable from body, because they cannot energize without it, he adds, "there is however no objection why some parts should not be separable; and that, because they are the energies of no one body whatever. Besides (he goes on and says) it is not yet evident, whether the soul may be not the life and energy of the body, in the same manner as the pilot is the life and energy of the ship:" *οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' ἔνιά γε οὐδὲν κωλύει, διὰ τὸ μηδενὸς εἶναι σώματος ἐντελέχειας. Ἔτι δὲ ἄδηλον, εἰ οὕτως ἐντελέχεια τοῦ σώματος ἡ ψυχὴ, ὥσπερ πλωτὴρ πλοίου.* Arist. de Anima, ii. c. 1.

In this last instance he gives a fine illustration of the supreme and divine part of the soul, that is, the mind or intellect. It belongs (it seems) to the body, as a pilot does to the ship; within which ship though the pilot exist, and which said ship though the pilot govern, yet is the pilot notwithstanding no part of the ship: he may leave it without change either in the ship or in himself; and may still (we know) exist when the ship is no more.

[c] *Ὁ δὲ νοῦς ἔοικεν ἐγγίνεσθαι, οὐσία τις οὖσα, καὶ οὐ φθείρεσθαι:* "mind seems to be implanted [into the body,] being a peculiar substance of itself, and not to be corrupted or to perish," (as the body does.) Arist. de An. l. i. c. 4. p. 15. And soon after, when he has told us that the passions perish with the body, to which they are inseparably united, he adds—*ὁ δὲ νοῦς ἴσως θειότερόν τι καὶ ἀπαθές:* "but the mind perhaps is something more divine, and free from passion, or being acted upon."

In another part of the same work, he distinguishes between the original capacity of the sensitive part, and that of the intellective part: "sensation (he tells us) is impaired by the violence of sensible objects; excessive sounds, excessive light, excessive smells, prevent us from hearing, from seeing, or from smelling." *Ἀλλ' ὁ νοῦς, ὅταν τι νοήσῃ σφόδρα νοητὸν, οὐχ ἧττον νοεῖ τὰ ὑποδεέστερα, ἀλλὰ καὶ μᾶλλον· τὸ μὲν γὰρ αἰσθητικὸν οὐκ ἄνευ σώματος, ὁ δὲ νοῦς χωριστός:* "but mind, when it contemplates any thing clearly and strongly intelligible, does not for that reason less comprehend inferior objects of intellection, but even more; the cause is, the sensitive principle exists not without a body, (its organs being all bodily;) but mind, on the contrary, is separable and detached." Ibid. l. iii. c. 4.

Cyrus, in the speech attributed to him by Xenophon, and quoted before, page 280, speaks as follows.

Οὗτοι ἔγωγε, ὦ παῖδες, οὐδὲ τοῦτο πώποτε ἐπείσθην, ὡς ἡ ψυχὴ, ἕως μὲν ἂν ἐν θνητῷ σώματι ᾖ, ζῇ· ὅταν δὲ τούτου ἀπαλλαγῇ, τέθνηκεν. Ὁρῶ γὰρ, ὅτι καὶ τὰ θνητὰ σώματα, ὅσον ἂν ἐν αὐτοῖς χρόνον ᾖ ἡ ψυχὴ, ζῶντα παρέχεται. Οὐδέ γε, ὅπως ἄφρων ἔσται ἡ ψυχὴ, ἐπειδὰν τοῦ ἄφρονος σώματος δίχα γένηται, οὐδὲ τοῦτο πέπεισμαι· ἀλλ' ὅταν ἄκρατος καὶ καθαρὸς ὁ νοῦς ἐκκριθῇ, τότε καὶ φρονιμώτατον εἰκὸς αὐτὸν εἶναι. Διαλυομένου δὲ ἀνθρώπου, δῆλά ἐστιν ἕκαστα ἀπίοντα πρὸς τὸ ὁμοφύλον, πλὴν τῆς ψυχῆς· αὕτη δὲ μόνη οὔτε παροῦσα οὔτε ἀπιοῦσα ὁρᾶται. Ξενοφ. Κύρου Παιδ. H. p. 655. edit. Hutchinson. 4to. Oxon. 1727.

Thus translated by the above-mentioned excellent translator.

"No, children, I can never be persuaded, that the soul lives no longer than it dwells in this mortal body, and that it dies on separation. For I see that the soul communicates vigour and motion to mortal bodies, during its continuance in them. Neither can I be persuaded, that the soul is divested of intelligence, on its separation from this gross senseless body; but it is probable, that when the soul is separated, it becomes pure and entire, and is then more intelligent. It is evident, that, on man's dissolution, every part of him returns

that a rational man would wish to preserve, when he would be rather thankful to find his passions and his appetites extinct.

And thus having traced the various order of forms, from the lowest and basest up to the highest and best, and considered how, though differing, they all agree in this, that they give to every being its peculiar and distinctive character, we shall here conclude our speculations concerning form, the second species of substance, and which appears in part to be *an element*, in part *an efficient cause*.[d]

And yet we cannot quit these speculations, the latter part of them at least, without a few observations on their dignity and importance.

Their principal object has been to shew, that in the great intellectual system of the universe, means do not lead to ends, but ends lead to means; that it was not the organization of the sheep's body which produced the gentle instincts of the sheep; nor that of the lion's body which produced the ferocious instincts of the lion;[e] but because, in the divine economy of the whole, such respective animating and active principles were wanting, it was therefore necessary that they should be furnished with such peculiarly organized bodies, that they might be enabled to act, and to perform their part, agreeably to their respective natures, and their proper business in the world.

The ancient system of atheism supposed the organs to come first, before any thing further was thought of;[f] which organs,

to what is of the same nature with itself, except the soul: that alone is invisible, both during its presence here, and at its departure." Cyropæd. p. 326, 327.

Thus translated by Cicero: Mihi quidem nunquam persuaderi potest animos, dum in corporibus essent mortalibus, vivere; cum exissent ex iis, emori: nec vero tum animum esse insipientem, cum ex insipienti corpore evasisset sed, cum, omni admixtione corporis liberatus, purus et integer esse cœpisset, tum esse sapientem. Atque etiam, cum hominis natura morte dissolvitur, cæterarum rerum perspicuum est quo quæque discedant; abeunt enim illuc omnia, unde orta sunt: animus autem solus, nec cum adest, nec cum discedit, apparet. De Senectute, cap. 22.

These speculations of Cyrus may more properly be called the speculations of Xenophon, who derived them without doubt (as he did the rest of his philosophy) from his great master, Socrates. They passed also into other systems of philosophy, derived from the same original; such, for example, as the philosophy of Aristotle, who was a hearer and a disciple as well of Socrates as of Plato.

Besides what has been offered in the beginning of this note, the following remark and quotation may perhaps inform us further in the sentiments of the Stagirite, and his school.

The human intellect was supposed by the Peripatetics to be pure and absolute capacity; to be no particular thing, till it began to comprehend things; nor to be blended with body, because, if it were, it would have some quality of body adhere to it, (such as hot, cold, and the like,) which quality would of course obstruct its operations. On the contrary, they held it to receive its impressions, ὥσπερ ἐν γραμματείῳ, ᾧ μηδὲν ὑπάρχει ἐντελεχείᾳ γεγραμμένον, "as impressions are made in a writing tablet, where nothing as yet is in actuality written." Aristot. de Anima, lib. iii. c. 4. p. 58. edit. Sylb.

But this in the way of digression: it is only the short specimen of an ancient speculation, which gives us reasons, why the human intellect can have no innate ideas.

[d] See the two last notes of the preceding chapter.

[e] See before, in the beginning of this chapter, p. 278.

[f] See Hermes, p. 232.

being all of them formed fortuitously, some of them luckily answered an end, and others answered none: those that answered, for a while subsisted; those that failed, immediately perished.

Empedocles (which is somewhat surprising, if we consider some of his better and more rational doctrines) appears to have favoured this opinion: *καὶ τὰ μόρια τῶν ζώων ἀπὸ τύχης γενέσθαι τὰ πλεῖστα φησίν:* "he says, (as Aristotle tells us,) that the limbs of animals were the greater part of them made by chance." Soon after this, Aristotle proceeds in explaining this strange system: *ὅπου μὲν οὖν ἅπαντα συνέβη, ὥσπερ κἂν εἰ ἕνεκά του ἐγίγνετο, ταῦτα μὲν ἐσώθη, ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου συστάντα ἐπιτηδείως. ὅσα δὲ μὴ οὕτως, ἀπώλετο καὶ ἀπόλλυται, καθάπερ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς λέγει τὰ βουγενῆ καὶ ἀνδρόπρωρα:* "when therefore these limbs all coincided, as if they had been made for the purpose, they were then saved and preserved, having been thus aptly put together by the operation of chance; but such as coincided not, these were lost, and still [as far as they arise] are lost; according to what Empedocles says concerning [those monstrous productions] the bull species with human heads." Arist. Physic. l. ii. c. 4. 8.

Lucretius advances the same doctrine, which was indeed suitable to his ideas of the world's production. The earth, he tells us, in his account of creation, aimed at the time to create many portentous beings, some with strange faces and members; others deficient, without either feet or hands; but the endeavours were fruitless, for nature could not support, and carry them on to maturity:

> Multaque tum Tellus etiam portenta creare
> Conata est, mira facie, membrisque coorta;
> Orba pedum partim, manuum viduata vicissim:
>
> Nequicquam, quoniam Natura absterruit auctum,
> Nec potuere cupitum ætatis tangere florem,
> Nec reperire cibum, &c. Lucret. v. 835, &c.

It is more expressly in contradiction to the doctrines inculcated through this whole tract, that he denies final causes; that he holds, eyes were not made for seeing, nor feet for walking, &c.; that he calls such explanations a preposterous and inverted order, the existence of the use (according to him) not leading to the production of the thing, but the casual production of the thing leading to the existence of the use.

> Lumina ne facias oculorum clara creata,
> Prospicere ut possimus, et, ut proferre viai
> Proceros passus, ideo, &c.
>
> Cætera de genere hoc inter quæcunque pretantur,
> Omnia perversa præpostera sunt ratione:
> Nil adeo quoniam natum'st in corpore, ut uti
> Possimus; sed quod natum'st, id procreat usus. Lucret. iv. 822. 30.

An elegant poet of our own, states this doctrine with his usual humour:

Note here, Lucretius dares to teach
(As all our youths may learn from Creech)
That eyes were made, but could not view,
Nor hands embrace, nor feet pursue;
But heedless Nature did produce
The members first, and then the use:
What each must act, was yet unknown,
Till all was moved by Chance alone.
A man first builds a country seat,
Then finds the walls not fit to eat;
Another plants, and wond'ring sees
Nor books, nor medals on his trees.
Yet poet and philosopher
Was he, who durst such whims aver.
Blest, for his sake, be human reason,
Which came at last, tho' late, in season. Prior's Alma, canto i.

The poet had cause to be thankful, that a time came, when men of sense opposed reason to such sophistry; but the opposition was not so late, nor so long in coming, as he imagined. Galen, many centuries ago, in his excellent treatise *De Usu Partium;* Cicero, in the best and most conclusive part of his treatise *De Natura Deorum;* and before them both, as well as before Lucretius, Aristotle, through every part of his works, and, above all, in those respecting the history of the members, and the progression of animals, had inculcated, with irresistible strength of argument, the great doctrine of final causes; which if we allow with regard to ourselves, but deny to nature, we totally annihilate through the universe any divine or intelligent principle. For nothing can be divine, which is not intelligent; nor any thing intelligent, which has not a meaning; nor any being have a meaning, which has no scope, or final cause, to govern and direct its energies and operations.

A painter, painting a hundred portraits, succeeds in ninety-nine, and fails in one. We may possibly impute the single failure to chance; but can we possibly impute to chance his success in the ninety-nine? How then can we dream of chance in the operations of nature; operations so much more accurate, though withal so much greater, and more numerous, than those of the painter? Chance is never thought of in that which happens always; nor in that which happens for the most part; but, if any where, in that which happens unexpectedly and rarely.[g]

And so much for those philosophers, recorded for having hardily denied a Providence.

[g] See the note, p. 12, 13, where the doctrine of *chance* and *fortune* is discussed at large upon the Peripatetic principles; and where an attempt is made to explain that most subtle and ingenious argument of the Stagirite, by which he proves that *chance* and *fortune* are so far from supplanting *mind*, or *an intelligent principle*, that the existence of the two former necessarily infers the existence of the latter.

It was consonant to the reasoning there held, that Plato, long before, is said to have called fortune *σύμπτωμα φύσεως ἢ προαιρέσεως:* "a symptom, or thing co-incident either with nature or the human will." See Suidas in the word Εἱμαρμένη. Plato's account will be better understood, perhaps, by recurring to the quotation in the former part of this note.

There are others, who, though they have not denied one, have yet made systems that would do without one; seeming to think, concerning the trouble of governing a world, as queen Dido did of old,

> Scilicet is superis labor est; ea cura quietos
> Sollicitat?[h] Virg. Æn. iv.

A third sort, with more decency, have neither denied a Providence, nor omitted one; yet have seldom recurred to it, but upon pressing occasions, when difficulties arose, which they either happened to find, or had happened to make. They appear to have conducted themselves by Horace's advice:

> Nec Deus intersit, nisi dignus vindice nodus. Hor. Art. Poet.

A fourth philosopher remains, and a respectable one he is, who supposes Providential wisdom never to cease for a single moment; and who says to it with reverence, what Ulysses did to Minerva,

> οὐδέ σε λήθω
> Κινήμενος.[i]
>
> Nor can I move, and 'scape
> Thy notice.[k]

But to quit philosophers and poets, and return from a digression, to which we have been led insensibly by the latent connection of many different ideas.

There remains nothing further, in the treating of *substance*,

[h] It was the advice of the Epicureans, with regard to "themselves, not to marry, not to have children, not to engage in public affairs:" οὐ γὰρ γαμητέον, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ παιδοποιητέον, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ πολιτευτέον. Arrian. Epict. iii. 7. p. 384. edit. Upt. The political life, according to them, was, like that of Sisiphus, a life of labour which knew no end.

Hoc est adverso nixantem tundere monte
Saxum, quod tamen a summo jam vertice rursum
Volvitur, et plani raptim petit æquora campi.
Lucret. iii. 1013, &c.

Hence, with regard to their gods, they provided them a similar felicity; a felicity, like their own, detached from all attention. Thus Horace, when an Epicurean:

Deos didici securum agere ævum,
Nec, si quid miri faciat natura, deos id
Tristes ex alto cœli demittere tecto.
Hor. lib. i. sat. 5.

Thus Epicurus himself: τὸ μακάριον καὶ ἄφθαρτον οὔτε αὐτὸ πράγματα ἔχει, οὔτε ἄλλῳ παρέχει: "that which is blessed and immortal (meaning the Divine Nature) has neither itself any business, nor does it find business for any other." Diog. Laert. x. 139.

Ausonius has translated the sentiment in two iambics, Ep. cxvi.

Quod est beatum, morte et æternum carens,
Nec sibi parit negotium, nec alteri.

See also Lucretius i. 57. vi. 83, whom Horace seems to have copied in the verses above quoted.

It is true, this idea destroyed that of a Providence; but to them, who derived the world from a fortuitous concourse of atoms, such a consequence was of small importance.

[i] Hom. Iliad. x. ver. 279. See Arrian's Epictetus, lib. i. c. 12, both in the original, and in Mrs. Carter's excellent translation. See also the comment of my worthy and learned friend Upton, on this chapter, in his valuable edition of that author, vol. ii. p. 40, 41. See also Psalm cxxxix.

[k] To the citations in note *t*, p. 293, may be added the following fine sentiment of Thales: Ἠρώτησέ τις αὐτὸν, εἰ λήθοι θεοὺς ἄνθρωπος ἀδικῶν· ἀλλ' οὐδὲ διανοούμενος, ἔφη: "One asked him, If a man might escape the knowledge of the gods, when he was *committing* injustice? No, says he, not even when he is *meditating* it." Diog. Laert. i. 36.

than to say something of those characters which are usually ascribed to it by Aristotle and his followers, when they consider it not in a physical, but in a logical view.

CHAPTER VII.

CONCERNING THE PROPERTIES OF SUBSTANCE, ATTRIBUTED TO IT IN THE PERIPATETIC LOGIC.

THE ancient logicians, or rather Aristotle and his school, have given us of substance the following characters.

They inform us, that, as substance, it is not susceptible of more and less.[1] Thus a lion is not more or less a lion, by being more or less bulky; a triangle is not more or less a triangle, by being more or less acute-angled. The intensions and remissions are to be found in their accidents; the essences remain simply and immutably the same, and either absolutely are, or absolutely are not.

Again; substance, they tell us, admits of no contraries.[m] It is to this that Milton alludes, when, after having personified substance, he tells us,

> To find a foe it shall not be his hap,
> And peace shall lull him in her flow'ry lap. Milt. Poems, No. ii.

The assertion is evident in compound beings, that is to say, in substances natural; for what is there contrary to man considered as man, or to lion considered as lion? This is true also in the relation borne by matter to form; for while contraries by their coincidence destroy each other, these two, matter and form, coalesce so kindly, that no change to either arises from their union. Thus the marble, when adorned with the form of a statue, is as precisely marble as it was before; and the oak, when fashioned into the form of a ship, is as truly oak as when it flourished in the forest. If there be any contrariety in substance, it is that of form to privation, where privation nevertheless is nearly allied to nonentity.

Lastly; substance, they tell us, is something, which, though it have no contrary, yet is by nature susceptible of all contraries, itself still remaining one and the same.[n]

We cannot forget that description, given by Virgil, of the Cumæan prophetess:

> Subito non vultus, non color unus,
> Non comptæ mansere comæ; sed pectus anhelum,
> Et rabie fera corda tument. Æn. vi.

[1] Δοκεῖ δὲ ἡ οὐσία μὴ ἐπιδέχεσθαι τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἧττον. Arist. Præd. p. 28. edit. Sylb. See Hermes, p. 175.

[m] Ὑπάρχει δὲ ταῖς οὐσίαις καὶ τὸ μηδὲν αὐταῖς ἐναντίον εἶναι. Arist. Præd. p. 28. edit. Sylb.

[n] Μάλιστα δὲ ἴδιον τῆς οὐσίας δοκεῖ εἶναι τὸ ταυτὸν καὶ ἓν ἀριθμῷ ὂν τῶν ἐναντίων εἶναι δεκτικόν. Arist. Præd. p. 29. edit. Sylb.

Here we see her countenance and complexion perpetually changing, her hair dishevelled, her breast panting, and a transition too in her manners from sobriety to distraction. How different is all this from the appearance of that sibyl, who first so courteously received Æneas at Cumæ, and afterwards so prudently attended him to the shades? Yet, amidst all these contrarieties, was she still the same sibyl; she was susceptible of them all, without becoming another woman.

This last character of substance appears to be the most essential: for what is the support of contraries, or indeed of every attribute, but substance? Motion and rest, heat and cold, health and sickness, vigour and decay, are all to be found at times in each individual of the human race. Most of the same contraries are to be found among brutes, and some of them descend even to the race of vegetables.

If we descend from these minuter substances to our terraqueous globe, here tempest and calm, frost and thaw, rain and drought, light and darkness, have each their turn; yet leave it, when they depart, after all their seeming contest, the same individual globe, and not another. Thus the poet, we have already quoted, still considering substance as a person:

> Yet he shall live in strife, and at his door
> Devouring war shall never cease to roar:
> Yea, it shall be his nat'ral property,
> To harbour those that are at enmity. Milt. Poems, No. ii.

If we extend our views beyond the spot which we inhabit, what is the whole visible universe but the comprehensive receptacle of every contrary conceivable? Within this immense whole they all distributively exist, while each of them by succession fulfils its allotted period, without disturbing the general order, or impairing the general beauty.

But if we ascend from passive and material substances up to such as are active and immaterial, here we shall find no distribution, no succession of contraries; but motion and rest, equality and inequality, similarity and dissimilarity, identity and diversity, will appear, each pair co-existing with the same being in the same instant, and that by an amazing connexion of both together under one.

It is by virtue only of this combining, this unifying comprehension, (and which for that reason can only belong to a being unextended and indivisible,) that the mind or intellect pronounces that A is not B, that C is unequal to D, that E is unlike to F. Were such propositions, instead of being comprehended at once by something indivisible and one, to be comprehended in portions by the different parts of something divisible; or were they to be comprehended by a power indivisible, yet not at once, but in a succession; it would be as impossible either way to comprehend the real propositions, as it would if they were to

be recognised in part by a man in England, in part by one in China; or else in part by a man in the present century, in part by one of the succeeding. It may be asked, in such instances, who is it that comprehends the whole?[o]

Lastly, much more in the Supreme Mind may we find such coincidence, since here, not only contraries, but all things whatever co-exist, and that, too, after a manner peculiarly transcendent; not by a knowledge which is partial, but by one which is universal; not with occasional remissions, but in one uniform unremitting energy;[p] not by subsequent impressions from things already pre-existing, but by that original causality, through which it makes all things to exist.

A noble field for speculating opens upon this occasion; which, though arising out of our subject, yet naturally leading us beyond it, we shall omit, and return to our logical inquiries, concluding here what we have to advance in our theory concerning substance.[q]

We are now to consider the remaining genera, predicaments, or arrangements; that is to say, quality, quantity, relation, site, &c.

Some of these are at all times no higher than accidents; such, for example, as site or position, the time when, and the place where. Others, upon occasion, characterize and essentiate; such, for example, as magnitude, figure, colour, and many qualities. Thus a triply extended magnitude is essential to body, angularity to a cube, heat to fire, and colour to every superficies not transparent. In all such instances they make a part of the characteristic form, and in that sense are to be considered rather as substances than as accidents. However, as this holds not always, and that they are sometimes as merely and as strictly accidents

[o] This reasoning, and that in Hermes, p. 221, note *d*, abundantly shew the supremacy of the mind among the faculties of the human soul. It is mind that sees the difference, not only between black and white, bitter and sweet, but (which no sense is equal to) the difference between black and bitter, white and sweet, and the various tribes of heterogeneous attributes. Nor does it shew this supremacy in these recognitions only, but likewise when under one and the same view it recognises objects of sense and of intellect united, as in case of syllogisms made of propositions particular and universal; such as (if I may be permitted to speak after so scholastic a manner) the syllogisms *Darii* and *Ferio* in the first figure.

To this may be added, that this joint recognition of things multiform, contrary, and heterogeneous, and that by the same faculty, and in the same undivided instant, seems to prove in the strongest manner that such faculty (by this faculty I mean the mind or intellect) must be incorporeal; for body, being infinitely divisible, is by no means susceptible of such a simple and perfect unity, as this recognition must necessarily be. See Hermes, l. iii. c. 4. note *d*. See also Aristot. de Anima, l. iii. c. 2. p. 52. edit. Sylb. Themist. Paraph. p. 85. *a*, *b*.

[p] See the chapter on Quality, where the verses of Empedocles are quoted.

[q] The author, in the representing of ancient opinions, has endeavoured, as far as he was able, to make all his treatises consistent and explanatory one of another. Those who would see what he has already written on the two great elements of substance, discussed in this and the three preceding chapters, may search the index of Hermes for the words *Matter* and *Form*; and the index of Dialogue Concerning Art for the word *Cause*.

as any of those which are so always, we choose under that common denomination to speculate upon them all, beginning, according to order, first from the first.

CHAPTER VIII.

CONCERNING QUALITIES—CORPOREAL AND INCORPOREAL—NATURAL AND ACQUIRED—OF CAPACITY AND COMPLETION—TRANSITIONS IMMEDIATE, AND THROUGH A MEDIUM—DISPOSITIONS, HABITS—GENIUS—PRIMARY AND IMPERFECT CAPACITY—SECONDARY AND PERFECT—WHERE IT IS THAT NO CAPACITIES EXIST—QUALITIES, PENETRATING AND SUPERFICIAL—ESSENTIAL FORM—FIGURE AN IMPORTANT QUALITY—FIGURES INTELLECTUAL, NATURAL, ARTIFICIAL, FANTASTIC—COLOUR, ROUGHNESS, SMOOTHNESS, ETC.—PERSONS OF QUALITY—PROPERTIES OF QUALITY—SOME REJECTED, ONE ADMITTED, AND WHY.

As substance justly holds the first rank among these predicaments, or universal arrangements, by being the single one among them that exists of itself, so the next in order, as some have asserted,[r] is quality, because quality is said to be an attribute from which no substance is exempt.

There may be substances, they tell us, devoid of quantity; such, for example, if we admit them, as the intellective, or immaterial; but that there should be substances devoid of quality is a thing hardly credible, because they could not then be characterized and distinguished one from another.

On this reasoning it is maintained, that although we have no idea of quantity suggested to us in that animating principle, the soul, yet can we discern that this principle has many different qualities, and that animals from these qualities derive their distinct and specific characters. There is, for example, a social sympathy in the soul of man, which prompts the individuals of our species to congregate, and form themselves into tribes.

> Homo sum, humani nihil a me alienum puto.
>
> Terent. Heauton. act. i.

We can trace the same congregating quality in the bee, in the beaver, and even in the ferocious wolf. It is, however, less fre-

[r] This was the opinion of Archytas: πρῶτα μὲν τέτακται οὐσία—δευτέρα δὲ ἁ ποιότας: "the first in order is *substance*, the second *quality*." Simplic. in Præd. Quantitat. p. 31. edit. Basil. Simplicius adds, ὅσπερ ἡ οὐσία τοῦ ποσοῦ προυπάρχει, διότι τὸ εἶναι τῷ ποσῷ ἀπὸ τῆς οὐσίας ἐνδίδοται. οὕτως καὶ μετὰ τὸ ποιὸν ἂν εἴη τὸ ποσόν, ἐπειδὴ τὸν χαρακτῆρα αὐτὸν, καὶ τὴν ἰδιότητα ἀπὸ τῆς ποιότητος ἔχει: "as substance precedes quantity, because being is imparted to quantity from substance, so also must quantity succeed and come after quality, inasmuch as it derives from quality its very character and distinctive peculiarity." Ibid. Τὸ ποιὸν λέγεται ἡ διαφορὰ τῆς οὐσίας: "The difference which attends each substance is called *quality*." Arist. Metaph. Δ. c. 14. He explains it immediately: "man is a biped animal; horse, a quadruped."

quent in those of ferocious character; the greater part of whom, if we except those seasons while they breed and nurture their young, seem to feel no other instincts but such as lead them to be solitary. It was under this unfeeling and gloomy character that Homer describes Polypheme and his giant-brethren:

> Θεμιστεύει δὲ ἕκαστος
> Παίδων, ἠδ' ἀλόχων· οὐδ' ἀλλήλων ἀλέγουσι. Odys. ix. 114.

> "Each lords it o'er
> His children and his wives; nor care they aught
> One for another."

It is no less obvious, on the other hand, that there are *qualities* which may be considered as peculiar to *body*. If we admit figures, colours, and odours for qualities, and such undoubtedly they are, we must admit, of course, that among animal bodies there is one figure to the serpent, another to the horse; one colour to the swan, another to the parrot. Even in the vegetable race, the rose has one odour, the jessamine another; there is one figure to the orange, another to the fig.

It follows, therefore, that as qualities help to distinguish not only one soul from another soul, and one body from another body, but (in a more general view) every soul from every body, it follows (I say) that qualities, by having this common reference to both, are naturally divided into *corporeal* and *incorporeal*.

It was the judgment of Shakspeare to unite them in the character of Richard the Third, when he makes Buckingham relate in what manner he recommended him to the citizens of London:

> Withal I did infer your lineaments,
> Being the right idea of your father,
> Both in your form, and nobleness of mind.

Virgil does the same with respect to Æneas, when he makes his heroic virtue and his graceful person have so powerful an effect upon the unfortunate Dido:

> Quis novus hic nostris successit sedibus hospes?
> Quam sese ore ferens, quam forti pectore et armis?
> Æn. iv. 10, 11.

The qualities above mentioned admit of another division, and that is into *natural* and *acquired*. Thus, in the mind, docility may be called a natural quality; science, an acquired one: in the human body, beauty may be called a natural quality; gentility, an acquired one. This distinction descends even to bodies inanimate. To transmit objects of vision is a quality natural to crystal; but to enlarge them, while transmitted, is a character adventitious. Even the same quality may be natural in one substance, as attraction in the magnet; and acquired in another, as the same attraction in the magnetic bar.

All the above qualities have not only their completion, but their capacity.[8] Thus not only the grape when complete, (that

[8] Thus we translate the words ἐντελέχεια and δύναμις: sometimes we read τὰ μὲν δυνάμει, τὰ δὲ ἐνεργείᾳ. Δύναμις, "power," is seen in ὕλη, "matter;" ἐν-

is to say, when mature,) possesses a delicious flavour; but there is a capacity also to produce it, residing in a simple grape-stone. Even in artificial substances there are in like manner capacities. A grain of gunpowder has the capacity of explosion; a musical instrument, that of rendering harmony. If, leaving these artificial and vegetative substances, we go still higher, we shall in animals find capacities, commonly known by the name of instincts; to which the frame of every species is peculiarly accommodated, and which frame such instincts internally actuate.

> Dente lupus, cornu taurus petit; unde nisi intus
> Monstratum? Horat. Sat. ii. 1. 52.

In man there is a capacity to science and virtue; and well would it be for him, if not also to their contraries. Yet such is our nature, such the peculiar character of the reasoning faculty, belonging to us as men; it is capable of either direction,[t] and may be employed, like the same weapon, as well to evil as to good.

Nor are there such qualities only as capacities, but there is a contrary and negative sort, which may be called *incapacities*;[u] and these also of different kinds, some for better, some for worse; so that where the capacities do honour, there the incapacities debase; where the capacities debase, there their opposites do honour. Thus to the power of being taught, an honourable capacity, is opposed the incapacity of being taught, a debasing one; and hence is man distinguished from an insect, and the one called *docile*, the other *indocile*. Again, to the power of dying, a debasing capacity, is opposed the inability of dying, a superior one; and thus are superior beings called immortal in the way of excellence,[x] whilst man is called mortal, with a view to subordination.

The transition from qualities of capacity to those of completion, is sometimes immediate, sometimes through a medium. Thus in a grain of gunpowder, the transition from the power of exploding, to actual explosion, is immediate; so from the power

τελέχεια, "completion," in εἶδος, "form." The division above mentioned into corporeal and incorporeal is taken from Plotinus, as we learn from Simplicius, in Præd. p. 69. B.

[t] Ἐπαμφοτερίζει πᾶσα ἡ λογοειδὴς [δύναμις:] "Every power of the rational kind has a capacity either way, that is, a double capacity." Ammon. in Præd. p. 127. Αἱ μὲν οὖν μετὰ λόγου δυνάμεις, αἱ αὐταὶ πλειόνων καὶ τῶν ἐναντίων: "The powers that are connected with the reasoning faculty, are the same with respect to various and contrary operations." Aristot. de Interpr. p. 75. edit. Sylb.

It is thus medicine, as an art, can cause sickness as well as health; music, as an art, can cause discord as well as harmony. And why this?—because they are both founded in reason; and it is the same reason, in all instances, which shews us the thing, and shews us also its privation: ὁ δὲ λόγος ὁ αὐτὸς δηλοῖ τὸ πρᾶγμα, καὶ τὴν στέρησιν. Arist. Metaph. ix. 2. p. 143. edit. Sylb. See also pages 147, 153, of the same work.

[u] Δυνάμεις, ἀδυναμίαι. Arist. Præd. p. 41. edit. Sylb.

[x] Sappho, the celebrated poetess, has a singular sentiment upon this subject: Τὸ ἀποθνήσκειν κακόν· οἱ θεοὶ γὰρ οὕτω κεκρίκασιν· ἀπεθνήσκον γὰρ ἄν: "To die, is an evil; the gods have so determined it, or else they would die themselves." Arist. Rhet. l. ii. c. 22. s. 27.

of hearing, to actual hearing; from the power of seeing, to actual sight; and the same in the other senses,[y] all which we seem to possess in a sort of perfection from the beginning. But there are other capacities, and those none of the meanest, where the transition to completion is necessarily through a medium.

> Qui studet optatam cursu contingere metam,
> Multa tulit, fecitque puer. Hor. Art. Poet. 412.

If an art be our end, there are many energies to be practised; if a science, many theorems to be understood; if moral virtue, many appetites to be curbed, many opinions to be eradicated, before we can attain the wished-for goal. The qualities, which distinguish any being, during this changeable period, may be called *tendencies*, *dispositions*, or *progressive qualities*. They are, too, as well as capacities, of a different colour, some good, some bad. There is a kind of laudable progression, before we arrive at perfect virtue; as there is a kind of degenerating interval, before we sink into perfect vice.

Our tendencies during these intervals are easy to be interrupted. As the wiles of pleasure, and an ill-directed shame, are often fatal checks to a young proficient in virtue; so are conscience and a better shame to young beginners in vice. And hence we may perceive the true character of these tendencies; which is, that of all qualities they are the least steady and permanent. Horace well describes this state of fluctuation:

> Si toga dissidet impar,
> Rides: quid, mea cum pugnat sententia secum;
> Quod petiit, spernit; repetit, quod nuper omisit;
> Æstuat, et vitæ disconvenit ordine toto. Horat. Epist. l. i. 96.

It is to the same mutable condition that Epictetus alludes,

[y] The Peripatetics made two sorts of capacity, both of which have a foundation in nature, and yet are evidently distinguished the one from the other. Man, as a rational being, is capable of geometry. This is the first capacity. After he has acquired the science of geometry, he possesses it, even when he does not geometrize. This is the second capacity; a capacity acquired indeed by labour, but when once acquired, called forth in an instant; a capacity founded on the original one, but yet in every view of it far superior and more valuable.

All this holds with regard to the intellect or mind, but by no means with regard to the senses, for these are perfect, or nearly so, from the beginning, and require neither time, nor teaching, for their maturity.

Ὅταν δὲ γεννηθῇ, ἔχει ἤδη ὥσπερ ἐπιστήμην καὶ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι, καὶ τὸ κατ' ἐνέργειαν ὁμοίως λέγεται τῷ θεωρεῖν: "As soon as any one is born, he immediately possesses sense, as he would actual science; and the energy of sensation has a similar meaning with that of actual scientific speculating." Arist. de An. ii. 5. He means by this, that every man originally sees with the same ease, as an able geometrician goes through a theorem. There is none of the fatigue and labour and delay of a learner: seeing and hearing have no need to be taught us.

Animum autem reliquis rebus ita perfecit, ut corpus: sensibus enim ornavit ad res percipiendas idoneis, ut nihil aut non multum adjumento ullo ad suam conformationem indigeret. Quod autem in homine præstantissimum et optimum est, id, &c. Cic. de Fin. l. v. c. 21.

And here, by the way, we may perceive a capital distinction between those two powers or faculties of the soul, sense and intellect, which faculties in vulgar speculations are too often confounded. In intellect there is an advance to better and more complete; a progression wholly unknown to the powers of sense, which is complete from the very beginning, through all its operations.

where having spoken upon proficiency, he subjoins the following advice: "That after a certain time his young philosopher should exhibit himself, to see how far the fancies overpowered him, as they did before; and how far he was now able to resist their influence. He advises him, however, to fly at first such conflicts, as would put his virtue to a trial too severe; and quotes the proverb on the occasion, that the metal pot and the stone pot do not with safety accord."[z]

Such therefore is the character of these tendencies, or dispositions.[a] But different is the case when their course is finished, and when they may be said to have attained their maturity and completion. The man completely virtuous dreads no allurements; the man completely vicious feels no compunctions. Like sturdy oaks, they defy that force which could easily have bent them while they were but saplings.

And hence, as we are not said to have an estate, because we are walking upon it, or to have a picture, because we are holding it; but to have them, implies a superior, a more permanent possession, such as either cannot be defeated, or at least not easily; hence, I say, these completions, whether virtuous or vicious, are called, from their steadiness and permanence, *habits*.[b] They are possessions, which their owner may properly be said to have, and by which we call him habitually good, or habitually bad. The professors of medicine find this distinction in human bodies. It is not any health, (such as health just recovered, or with difficulty preserved,) but it is confirmed and steady health, which they call a *good habit of body*. They have reference in diseases to the same permanence, when they talk of *hectic* coughs, and *hectic* fevers, complaints not casual, but which make a part (as it were) of the constitution.

And thus, besides the distinctions of *corporeal* and *incorporeal*, of *natural* and *acquired*, may all *qualities* be considered as *capacities*, as *tendencies*, and as *habits*; as capacities only and habits, where the transition is immediate; as all three successively, where the transition is through a medium.

It is worth while to observe in the human mind the successive appearance of these qualities, where during the transition there exists a medium or interval. The original power which

[z] Arrian. Epict. l. iii. c. 12.

[a] Διάθεσις, "disposition;" ἕξις, "habit." Arist. Cat. p. 40. edit. Sylb.

[b] Διαφέρει ἕξις διαθέσεως τῷ τὴν μὲν εὐκίνητον εἶναι, τὴν δὲ πολυχρονιώτερον, καὶ δυσκινητότερον: "Habit differs from disposition, as the latter is easily moveable, the former is of longer duration, and more difficult to be moved." Arist. Præd. p. 40. edit. Sylb.

And just after, having spoken of warmth and cold, of health and sickness, and shewn how far these, when they are mutable and shift easily, may be called *dispositions*, he subjoins, that so it is: ἢν μή τις καὶ αὐτῶν τούτων τυγχάνει διὰ χρόνου πλῆθος ἤδη συμπεφυσιωμένη καὶ ἀνίατος (legitur ἀκίνητος,) ἢ πάνυ δυσκίνητος οὖσα, ἣν ἄντις ἴσως ἕξιν ἤδη προσαγορεύοι: "Unless any one of these very affections should by length of time become naturalized, and grow either immoveable, or only to be removed with difficulty; which perfection then perhaps we may call a *habit*." Arist. Præd. p. 41. edit. Sylb.

the mind possesses of being taught, we call *natural capacity;* and this in some degree is common to all men. The superior facility of being taught, which some possess above the rest, we call *genius.* The first transition, or advances from natural power, we call *proficiency;* and the end or completion of proficiency, we call *habit.*

If such habit be conversant about matter purely speculative, it is then called *science;* if it descend from speculation to practice, it is then called *art;* and if such practice be conversant in regulating the passions and affections, it is then called *moral virtue.*

Even all these habits, after having been thus acquired, can return at times into capacity, and there lie dormant and for a time unperceived.

> Alfenus vafer, omni
> Abjecto instrumento artis, clausaque taberna,
> Sutor erat. Horat. Sat. i. 3. 130.

Wide however is the difference between this habitual, secondary capacity,[c] and that which is natural and original. The habitual can pass at once, when it pleases, into perfect energy; the natural, only through the medium of institution and repeated practice.

The several qualities thus variously distinguished are to be found only in beings of subordinate nature. But if there be a being, whose existence is all-perfect and complete, and such must that Being necessarily be, the source of perfection to all others; with the nature of such being this variety will be incompatible. In him are no powers or dormant capacities, no proficiencies or transitions from worse to better, and still much less from better to worse; but a full and immutable energy through every part of space. It was concerning this divine principle that Empedocles sung of old:

> Οὔτε γὰρ ἀνδρομέῃ κεφαλῇ κατὰ γυῖα κέκασται,
> Οὐ μὲν ἄπαλ νώτων γε δύο κλάδοι ἀΐσσουσιν,
> Οὐ πόδες, οὐ θόα γοῦνα, οὐ μήδεα λαχνήεντα,
> Ἀλλὰ φρὴν ἱερή, καὶ ἀθέσφατος ἔπλετο μοῦνον,
> Φροντίσι κόσμον ἅπαντα καταΐσσουσα θοῇσι.
>
> No limbs hath he, with human head adorned;
> Nor from his shoulders branch two sprouting arms;
> To him belong nor feet nor pliant knees;
> But *mind alone* he was; ineffable,
> And *holy mind:* that rapidly pervades
> With providential cares the mighty world.[d]

[c] See before, note *y*, p. 294. Οὐχ ἁπλοῦ ὄντος τοῦ δυνάμει λεγομένου, ἀλλὰ τοῦ μὲν ὥσπερ ἂν εἴπομεν τὸν παῖδα δύνασθαι στρατηγεῖν, τοῦ δὲ ὡς τὸν ἐν ἡλικίᾳ ὄντα: "*Capacity* or *power* is not a simple term of one meaning only, but there is one sort, when we say of a child, he has a capacity to be a military leader; another, when we say so of a man, who is in complete maturity." Arist. de An. l. ii. c. 5. p. 33. edit. Sylb.

[d] See Ammon. in lib. de Interpret. p. 199. B. and Poes. Philosoph. Hen. Step. p. 30. where, instead of οὔτε γὰρ ἀνδρομέῃ, we read οὐ μὲν γὰρ βροτέῃ.

And here it may be observed, by way of digression, that in this part of Ammonius, a part truly valuable, and deeply phi-

The speculations of this genus, or arrangement, having now carried us to the sublimest of all objects, ought here to end. But as there still remain a few observations, and besides these a disquisition into the properties of the genus, and that the apparent as well as the real; we cannot quit the subject till these inquiries have been first satisfied. Thus then the treatise proceeds.

With respect to qualities purely corporeal, they may be considered either as penetrating body, such as gravitation, heat, flavour, and the like; or else as confined to the surface, such as figure, colour, smoothness, roughness, &c. Those internal qualities which pervade the whole, (whether they arise merely from organization, or include that and something more,) constitute what we call essential form or natural essence. And hence the just idea of natural essence, or essential form,[e] which consists in giving a character to the subject which it pervades. It is through this internally pervading character, that substances are what they are; that they become not only distinguished from one another, but from the nicest mimicries of art; the real orange from the orange of wax, the living lion from the lion painted.

Indeed one of the capital distinctions between operations natural and artificial is, that nature penetrates, while art stops at the surface. It is the surface of the canvas, which the painter covers; the surface of the gem, which the jeweller polishes; the surface of the steel, to which the smith gives a figure; and the surface of the string, to which the musician applies his bow. There is hardly any deviation from this rule with respect to arts, if we except those only, (such as cookery and medicine,) the business of which consists principally in compounding natural materials. Here indeed the proportions pass through the whole composition, and the more accurate these proportions, the greater of course the merit of each artist.

It must be remembered, however, that though artificial qualities are mostly superficial, yet are not all natural qualities to be considered as internal. The form or essence of every natural substance (that is to say, in other words, its system of internal qualities) extends itself outwardly[f] every way from within; and,

losophical, we meet in the printed text two chasms, which much impair the meaning. The first occurs, p. 199. B. line 19, between the words *τῶν—καὶ τῶν*. Here a MS. collation supplies the word *ἀφανῶν*. The second occurs p. 200, line 2, after the word *συνιέντων*. Here the same MS. supplies the following valuable reading, which lies far beyond the reach of the most acute conjecture. The words are—*οὐ συνιέντων* [*ὅτι περιπετάσματα τῆς ἀληθείας εἰσι.*]

There is a third reading, from the same authority, in the fourth line of the same page, which is *ἀπ' ἐκείνων*, instead of *ἐπ' ἐκείνων*, a reading manifestly better, though not so important as the former.

The edition of Ammonius, here referred to, is that of Venice, in 12mo., in the year 1545. The same places may be found in the edition of Aldus, at Venice, in 12mo., in the year 1546, p. 172. B. p. 173. and in the folio edition of the same Aldus, in the year 1503, where the pages are not marked, but where the above chasms easily shew themselves to the reader's eye.

[e] See before, p. 275.

[f] *Ὥσπερ δὲ τῆς διαστάσεως τὸ τέλος ἐστὶ τὸ σχῆμα, οὕτως ἡ τοῦ ὅλου εἶδους*

as it must necessarily stop somewhere, (every individual being finite,) so according to the different points at which it stops in its evolution, it communicates to each substance a different and peculiar figure. And hence the true character of every natural and specific figure, which ought not to be considered merely as a surface, but as a bound; the bound to which the internal essence or form every way extends itself, and at which, when it is arrived, it finally terminates.

For this reason it is, that of all the external qualities there is none so capital, so characteristic, as *figure*. It is a kind of universal signature, by which nature makes known to us the several species of her productions; the primary and obvious test, by which we pronounce this a vegetable, and that an animal; this an oak, and that a lion: so that if we neither suspect fraud, nor the fallibility of our own organs, we commonly rest here, and inquire no further.

If we pass from these natural subjects to contemplate *figure* in works of art, we shall discover it to be almost all that art is able to communicate. It is to this that the painter arrives by addition; the sculptor by detraction; the founder by fusion; and the stucco-artist by moulding. Even when we contemplate the tools of art, it will appear, that as it is by virtue of their figure alone the saw divides, the hammer drives, and the pincers extract; so is it from these several figures, that they derive their character and their name, not from their matter, which matter is often the same, when the tools are totally different and distinct one from another.[g]

Nor are these artificial the only figures with which man is found conversant. Among the various possibilities which the mind suggests, there is a more accurate tribe of figures, which it recognises and defines, and which, it may be justly questioned, whether matter ever possessed; for example, the perfect triangle, the perfect circle, the perfect pyramid, the perfect sphere, with the rest of those figures commonly called mathematical.[h] These are not sought out by experiments, nor are the truths dependent on them derived from experiments, being in fact the result of a more authentic knowledge, that is to say, in other words, of the purest demonstration. On these figures, and their dependent truths, rests the whole of mechanics, so highly useful to human life; rest astronomy and optics, and a large part of physics, some of the noblest subjects among the corporeal for contemplation.

ἀποτελεύτησις ἄχρι τῆς ἀνιφανείας τὴν μορφὴν ἀναγάνησεν, οὖσαν αὐτὴν τὸ φαινόμενον ἴχνος τοῦ εἴδους, καὶ τελευταίαν ἔκτασιν τῆς τοῦ λόγου ἐπὶ τὰ ἐκτὸς προόδου. Simplic. in Præd. p. 69. B. edit. Basil. "For as the end or extremity of any extension is the figure, so the ending of a complete form, at its surface, produces shape; shape being itself the apparent vestige of that form, and the ultimate extent of that progression, which the internal ratio makes outwards."

[g] See before, chap. iv.

[h] See p. 94, and note *g*.

The industry of man stops not even here, but prompts him to search for figures, not only in his intellect, but in a lower faculty.

> The poet's eye, in a fine frenzy rolling,
> Doth glance from heaven to earth, from earth to heaven,
> And as imagination bodies forth
> The forms of things unknown, the poet's pen
> Turns them to shapes, and gives to airy nothings
> A local habitation and a name.
>
> Shaksp. Mids. Night's Dream, act v. sc. 1.

And hence that tribe of figures, which are neither natural, nor artificial, nor intellectual, but which make a fourth sort, that may be called *fantastic*, or *imaginary;* such as centaurs, satyrs, sphinxes, hydras, &c.

And so much for figure, that most capital quality of all the superficial.

The next quality of this sort after figure is *colour*, the source, like figure, of many varieties and distinctions. Yet that it is inferior to figure is obvious from this: in the sketches of a painter we know things by their figures alone, without their colours; but not by their colours alone, when divested of their figures.

As for roughness, smoothness, hardness, softness, though they may be said, perhaps, to penetrate further than the surface, yet are they, to man's sensation at least, so many qualities superficial.

And now with respect to all kinds of qualities, whether corporeal or incorporeal, there is one thing to be observed, that some degree of permanence is always requisite; else they are not so properly qualities, as incidental affections.[1] Thus we call not a man passionate, because he has occasionally been angered, but because he is prone to frequent anger; nor do we say a man is of a pallid or a ruddy complexion, because he is red by immediate exercise, or pale by sudden fear, but when that paleness or redness may be called constitutional.

We have said already, that it was the essence of all qualities to characterize and distinguish. And hence the origin of that phrase, "a person of quality;" that is to say, a person distinguished from the vulgar by his valour, his wisdom, or some other capital accomplishment. As these were the primary sources of those external honours paid to eminent men in precedences, titles, and various other privileges; it followed that these honours by degrees grew to represent the things honoured; so that as virtue

[1] These Aristotle calls Πάθη. *Οὔτε γὰρ ὁ ἐρυθριῶν διὰ τὰ αἰσχύνεσθαι, ἐρυθρίας λέγεται, οὔτε ὁ ὠχριῶν διὰ τὸ φοβεῖσθαι, ὠχρίας· ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον πεπονθέναι τι· ὥστε πάθη μὲν τὰ τοιαῦτα λέγεται, ποιότητες δὲ οὔ:* "Neither is the man who blushes from being ashamed, called of a reddish complexion; nor is he who turns pale from being frightened, called of a palish complexion, but they are rather said to have been particularly affected; for which reason such events are called incidental affections, and not qualities." Arist. Præd. p. 43. edit. Sylb.

led originally to rank, rank in after-days came to infer virtue; particular ranks, particular virtues: that of a prince, serenity; of an ambassador, excellence; of a duke, grace; of a pope, holiness; of a justice or mayor, worship, &c. &c.

As to the general properties of quality, they may be found among the following.

Contrariety appertains to it.[j] Thus in the corporeal qualities, hot is contrary to cold, and black to white. So, too, in mental qualities, wisdom is contrary to folly, and virtue to vice: subordinate virtues to subordinate vices; liberality to avarice, courage to cowardice. Even vices themselves are contrary one to another; cowardice to temerity, avarice to profusion. It may be doubted, however, whether this character of quality be universal; for what among figures is there contrary in one figure to another, either in the square to the circle, or in the circle to the square?

Another property of qualities is *to admit of intension and remission.*[k] Thus of two persons handsome, there may be one the handsomer; and among many handsome, one the handsomest.

> Πασάων δ' ὕπερ ἥγε κάρη ἔχει ἠδὲ μέτωπα,
> Ῥεῖα δ' ἀριγνώτη πέλεται, καλαὶ δέ τε πᾶσαι. Hom. Odys. Z. 107.
> "Far above all she bears her tow'ring head,
> With ease distinguish'd, tho' they all are fair."

So sir John Falstaff, speaking to his companion, the young prince—"I am not John a Gaunt, your grandfather; and yet I am no coward."[l]

It appears, however, that the above-mentioned species of quality, called figure, no more admits this property than it did contrariety. The figures which are triangles, are not more so one than another; no more are the circles, circles; the squares, squares, &c.: which seems, indeed, to arise from their definitude and precision.[m]

But there is a property to be found which may justly deserve the name, by being common at least to the whole genus, if not peculiar to that only: and this property is, that *by virtue of their qualities things are denominated like and unlike.*[n] It is thus that the swan by his quality of whiteness resembles the snow; that Achilles by his quality of fierceness resembles a mastiff; and that the earth by her quality of figure is like to a bowl.

From this property we see the reason why there is no arrangement to which the poets are so much indebted as to this; since hence they derive those innumerable images which so strongly distinguish poetry from every other species of writing. For example: let us suppose a young hero just slain; let us

[j] Ὑπάρχει δὲ ἐναντιότης κατὰ τὸ ποιὸν, κ. τ. λ. Arist. Præd. p. 44. edit. Sylb.

[k] Ἐπιδέχεται δὲ τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἧττον τὰ ποιά· κ. τ. λ. Arist. Præd. p. 45. edit. Sylb.

[l] Shaksp. Hen. IV.

[m] See Hermes, p. 175.

[n] Ὅμοια δὲ ἡ ἀνόμοια κατὰ μόνας τὰς ποιότητας λέγεται· ὅμοιον γὰρ ἕτερον ἑτέρῳ οὐκ ἔστι κατ' ἄλλο οὐδὲν, ἢ καθ' ὃ ποιόν ἐστιν. Arist. Præd. p. 45. edit. Sylb.

suppose him lying, with a drooping head, a face divested of life and bloom, yet still retaining traces both of beauty and of youth. The poet would illustrate this pathetic image by finding something that resembles it. And where is he to search, but where he can discover similar qualities? He finds at length an assemblage of them in a flower just gathered: the same drooping head, the same lifeless fade, the same relicts of a form that was once fair and flourishing.

Thus then Virgil, speaking of young Pallas:

> Qualem virgineo demessum pollice florem
> Seu mollis violæ, seu languentis hyacinthi,
> Cui neque fulgor adhuc, necdum sua forma recessit;
> Non jam mater alit tellus, viresque ministrat. Æn. xi. 68.

Again, what would Milton have us conceive, when he describes the tremendous shield of Satan? Those conspicuous characters of brightness, vastness, and rotundity. To what subject then ought he to refer, that we may comprehend what he would describe? It must be to one that eminently possesses an assemblage of the same qualities. Let the poet, in his own words, inform us what this subject is:

> The broad circumference
> Hung on his shoulders, like the moon. Par. Lost, i. 286.

The reason of this property may be, perhaps, as follows. *To be like* is something *less* than to be perfectly *the same*, and something more than to be perfectly different. And hence it is, that when two things are called *like*, there is implied in their nature something of sameness, and something of diversity. If it be asked what the sameness is; we answer, it must be something more definitive than those transcendental samenesses which run through all things. We say not that a piece of ebony is like a swan, because they both *are*; or that a crow resembles a snowball, because each of them is *one*, and not two. The identity must be sought from among the number of those qualities, the nature of which is less extensive, and more confined to particular species. Let blackness, for example, be a quality of this character in that union of qualities which constitutes ebony; and let the same quality be one also in that union which constitutes a crow. So far, then, the ebony and the crow are the same; through every other quality perhaps they are different; and through sameness, thus tempered by diversity, they become, and are called *like*.[o]

The same happens to the earth and a bowl, from their common rotundity; to the hero and the mastiff, from their common ferocity.

And so much for the second universal genus, arrangement, or predicament, the genus of *quality*, its various *species*, and its different *properties*.

[o] See note *h*, p. 275, and note *v*, p. 305.

CHAPTER IX.

CONCERNING QUANTITY—ITS TWO SPECIES—THEIR CHARACTERS. TIME AND PLACE—THEIR CHARACTERS. PROPERTY OF QUANTITY, WHAT. QUANTITIES RELATIVE. FIGURE AND NUMBER, THEIR EFFECT UPON QUANTITY—IMPORTANCE OF THIS EFFECT. SCIENCES MATHEMATICAL APPERTAIN TO IT—THEIR USE, ACCORDING TO PLATO. HOW OTHER BEINGS PARTAKE OF QUANTITY. ANALOGY, FOUND IN MIND. COMMON SENSE AND GENIUS, HOW DISTINGUISHED. AMAZING EFFICACY OF THIS GENUS IN AND THROUGH THE WORLD. ILLUSTRATIONS.

The attribute of substance, standing in arrangement next to quality, is *quantity;* the former having precedence, as being supposed more universal; while the latter, at least in appearance, seems not to extend beyond body.

Out of natural bodies is the visible world composed, and we may contemplate them in different manners; either one body, taken by itself and alone; or many bodies, taken collectively and at once. When Virgil says of the oak,

> Quantum vertice ad auras
> Ætherias, tantum radice ad Tartara tendit; Geor. ii. 291.

or when Milton informs us, that

> Behemoth, biggest born of earth, unheaved
> His vastness; Par. Lost, vii. 471.

in these instances we have only one body, taken by itself and alone, and this naturally suggests the idea of magnitude. But when in Virgil we read,

> Quam multa in sylvis autumni frigore primo
> Lapsa cadunt folia; Æn. vi. 309.

or when in Milton,

> Thick as autumnal leaves, that strew the brooks
> In Vallombrosa; Par. Lost, i. 302.

in these instances we have many bodies taken collectively and at once, and this naturally suggests the idea of multitude.

Horace gives the two species together in his fine address to Augustus:

> Cum tot sustineas et tanta negotia. Horat. Epist. l. ii. 1.

Now in *magnitude* and *multitude* we behold these two primary, these two grand and comprehensive species, into which the genus of quantity is divided; *magnitude*, from its union, being called *quantity continuous; multitude*, from its separation, *quantity discrete.*[P]

[P] Τοῦ δὲ ποσοῦ τὸ μέν ἐστι διωρισμένον, τὸ δὲ συνεχές. Aristot. Præd. p. 30. edit. Sylb.

Of the continuous kind is every solid; also the bound of every solid, that is, a superficies; and the bound of every superficies, that is, a line; to which may be added those two concomitants of every body, namely, time and place. Of the discrete kind are fleets, armies, herds, flocks, the syllables of sounds articulate, &c.

We have mentioned formerly,[q] when we treated of time, that every now or present instant was a boundary or term at which the past ended and the future began; and that it was in the perpetuity of this connection that time became continuous. In like manner within every line may be assumed infinite such connectives, under the character of points; and within every superficies, under the character of lines; and within every solid, under the character of superficies; to which connectives these quantities owe their continuity. And hence a specific distinction, attending all quantities continuous, that their several parts everywhere coincide in a common boundary or connective.[r]

It is not so with quantities discrete; for here such coincidents is plainly impossible. Let us suppose, for example, a multitude of squares, *x*, *y*, *z*. &c.



Here if the line AB, where the square *x* ends, were the same with the line CD, where the square *y* begins, and EF in like manner the same with GH, they would no longer be a multitude of squares, but one continuous parallelogram; such as



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Another specific character belonging to the solid body, the superficies, and the line, (all of which are quantities continuous,) is, that their parts have a definite position within some definite whole;[s] while in quantities discrete, that is in multitudes, such position is no way requisite. In the most perfect continuous quantities, such as beams of timber, blocks of marble, &c. it is with difficulty the parts can change position, without destruction to the quantity, taken as continuous. But a herd of cattle, or an army of soldiers, may change position as often as they please, and no damage arise to the multitude, considered as a multitude.

It must be remembered, however, that this character of po-

[q] See Hermes, lib. i. c. 7. p. 146.

[r] See Arist. Prædic. p. 31. edit. Sylb. Ἡ δὲ γραμμὴ συνεχής ἐστιν, κ.τ.λ. This character is described to be πρός τινα κοινὸν ὅρον συνάπτειν. Ibid.

[s] Ἔτι, τὰ μὲν ἐκ θέσιν ἐχόντων πρὸς ἄλληλα τῶν ἐν αὐτοῖς μορίων συνέστηκε· οἷον τὰ μὲν τῆς γραμμῆς μόρια θέσιν ἔχει πρὸς ἄλληλα, κ.τ.λ. Arist. Præd. p. 31. edit. Sylb.

sition extends not to time, though time be a continuous subject. How, indeed, should the parts of time have position, which are so far from being permanent, that they fly as fast as they arrive? Here, therefore, we are rather to look for a sequel in just order;[t] for a continuity not by position, as in the limbs of an animal, but for a continuity by succession:

> Velut unda supervenit undam. Horat. Epist. ii. 2. 176.

And thus are the two species of quantity, the continuous and the discrete, distinguished from each other.

Besides this, among the continuous themselves there is a further distinction. Body and its attributes, the superficies and the line, are continuous quantities, capable all of them of being divided; and by being divided, of becoming a multitude; and by becoming a multitude, of passing into quantity discrete. But those continuous quantities, *time* and *place*, admit not, like the others, even the possibility of being divided. For grant place to be divided, as Germany is divided from Spain; what interval can we suppose, except it be other place? Again: suppose time to be divided, as the age of Sophocles from that of Shakspeare; what interval are we to substitute, except it be other time? Place, therefore, and time, though continuous like the rest, are incapable of being divided, because they admit not, like the rest, to have their continuity broken.[u]

But to proceed. Let us imagine, as we are walking, that at a distance we view a mountain, and at our feet a molehill: the mountain we call *great*, the molehill *little;* and thus we have

[t] Ὁ δὲ μή ἐστιν ὑπομένον, πῶς ἂν τοῦτο θέσιν τινὰ ἔχοι; ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τάξιν τινὰ εἴποις ἂν ἔχειν, τῷ τὸ μὲν πρότερον εἶναι τοῦ χρόνου, τὸ δὲ ὕστερον. Arist. Præd. p. 32. edit. Sylb.

[u] They cannot be divided actually, from the reasons here given; but they may be be divided in power, else they could not be continuous; nor could there exist such terms as a month, a year, a cubit, a furlong, &c.

In this sense of potential division they may be divided infinitely, as appears from the following theorem:



Let A and B be two spheres that are moving, and let A be the quicker moving sphere, B the slower; and let the slower have moved through the space $\gamma\,\delta$ in the time $\zeta\,\eta$; it is evident that the quicker will have moved through the same space in a less time. Let it have moved through it in the time $\zeta\,\theta$. It is thus the sphere A divides the time. Again: inasmuch as the quicker A has in the time $\zeta\,\theta$ passed through the whole space $\gamma\,\delta$, the slower B in the same time will have passed through a smaller space. Let this be $\gamma\,\kappa$. It is thus the sphere B divides the space. Again: inasmuch as the slower sphere B in the time $\zeta\,\theta$ has passed through the space $\gamma\,\kappa$, the quicker sphere A will have passed through it in a less time; so that the time $\zeta\,\theta$ will be again divided by the quicker body. But this being so divided, the space $\gamma\,\kappa$ will be divided also by the slower body, according to the same ratio. And thus it will always be, as often as we repeat successively what has been already demonstrated: for the quicker body will after this manner divide the time, and the slower body will divide the space; and that, in either case, to infinite, because their continuity is infinitely divisible in power. See the original of this theorem in Aristotle's Physics, lib. vi. cap. 2. p. 111. edit. Sylb. Ἔστω τὸ μὲν ἐφ' ᾧ α, κ. τ. λ.

two opposite attributes in *quantity continuous*. Again: in a meadow we view a herd of oxen grazing, in a field we see a yoke of them ploughing the land: the herd we call *many*, the yoke we call *few*; and thus have we two *similar opposites* in *quantity discrete*.

Of these four attributes, great and many fall under the common name of excess; little and few under the common name of defect. Again: excess and defect, though they include these four, are themselves included under the common name of inequality. Further still, even inequality itself is but a species of diversity; as its opposite, equality, is but a species of identity. They are subordinate species confined always to quantity, while *identity* and *diversity* (their genera) may be found to pass through all things.[x]

Now it is here, namely, in these two, equality and inequality, that we are to look for that property by which this genus is distinguished. It is from *quantity only* that things are denominated *equal* or *unequal*.[y]

Further still: whatever is equal, is equal to something else; and thus is equality a relative term. Again: if we resolve inequality into its several excesses and defects, it will be apparent that each of these is a relative term also. It is with reference to little that great is called great; with reference to few that many are called many; and it is by the same habitudes inverted exist little and few. And thus is it that, through the property here mentioned, the attribute of quantity passes insensibly into that of relation;[z] a fact not unusual in other attributes as well as these, from the universal sympathy and congeniality of nature.

Nay, so merely relative are many of these excesses and defects, that the same subject, from its different relations, may be found susceptible of both at once. The mountain, which by its relation to the molehill was great,[a] by its relation to the earth is

[x] The following characters of the three first great arrangements, or universal genera, are thus described by Aristotle: Ταυτὰ μὲν γὰρ, ὧν μία ἡ οὐσία· ὅμοια δ', ὧν ἡ ποιότης μία· ἴσα δὲ, ὧν τὸ ποσὸν ἕν: "Things are the same, of which the substance is one; similar, of which the quality is one; equal, of which the quantity is one." Metaph. Δ. κεφ. ιε'. p. 88. edit. Sylb.

[y] Ἴδιον δὲ μάλιστα τοῦ ποσοῦ, τὸ ἴσον καὶ ἄνισον λέγεσθαι. Arist. Præd. p. 34.

[z] Aristotle says expressly of the things here mentioned, that no one of them is quantity, but exists rather among the tribe of relatives, inasmuch as nothing is great or little of itself, but merely with reference to something else. Τούτων δὲ οὐδέν ἐστι ποσὸν, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τῶν πρός τι, οὐδὲν γὰρ αὐτὸ καθ' αὑτὸ, κ.τ.λ. Arist. Præd. p. 33. edit. Sylb.

[a] This may be true with regard to mountains and molehills, and the other more indefinite parts of nature; but with regard to the more definite parts, such as vegetables and animals, here the quantities are not left thus vague, but are, if not ascertained precisely, at least ascertained in some degree.

Thus Aristotle: Ἔστι γάρ τι πᾶσι τοῖς ζώοις πέρας τοῦ μεγέθους· διὸ καὶ τῆς τῶν ὀστῶν αὐξήσεως. Εἰ γὰρ ταῦτ' εἶχεν αὔξησιν ἀεὶ, καὶ τῶν ζώων ὅσα ἔχει ὀστοῦν ἢ τὸ ἀνάλογον, ἠυξάνετ' ἂν ἕως ἔζη: "All animals have a certain bound or limit to their bulk; for which reason the bones have a certain bound or limit to their growth. Were the bones, indeed, to grow for ever, then, of course, as many animals as have bone, or something analogous to it, would continue to grow as long as they lived."

little; and the herd, which were many by their relation to the single yoke, are few by their relation to the sands of the sea-shore.[b] And hence it appears that the excesses and defects which belong to quantity are not of a relative nature only, but of an indefinite one likewise. The truth of this will become still more evident, when it is remembered that every magnitude is infinitely divisible, and that every multitude is infinitely augmentable.

What, then, is to be done? How is it possible that such attributes should become the objects of science? It is then only we are said to know, when our perception is definite;[c] since whatever falls short of this, is not knowledge, but opinion. Can, then, the knowledge be definite, when its object is indefinite? Is not this the same, as if we were to behold an object as straight, which was in itself crooked; or an object as quiescent, which was in itself moving? We may repeat, therefore, the question, and demand, what is to be done? It may be answered as follows: quantity continuous is circumscribed by figure, which, being the natural boundary both of the superficies and the solid, gives them the distinguishing names of triangle, square, or circle; of pyramid, cube, or sphere, &c. By these figures, not only the infinity of magnitude is limited, but the means also are furnished for its most exact mensuration. Again; the infinity of quantity discrete is ascertained by number, the very definition of which is *πλῆθος ὡρισμένον*, that is, "multitude circumscribed or defined." Thus, if, in describing a battle, we are told that many of the enemy were slain, and but few saved; our knowledge (if it deserve the name) is perfectly vague and indefinite. But if these indefinite multitudes are defined by number, and we are

Arist. de Anim. Gener. ii. 6. p. 227. edit. Sylb.

What follows from Simplicius is to the same purpose; only where he mentions *form*, we must understand that efficient animating principle described in the sixth chapter of this work.

Ἕκαστον εἶδος συνυπάγει, μετὰ τῆς οἰκείας ἰδιότητος, καὶ ποσοῦ τι μέτρον σύμμετρον τῇ ἰδιότητι· οὐ γὰρ σχῆμα μόνον ἐπιφέρει μεθ' ἑαυτοῦ τὸ εἶδος, ἀλλὰ καὶ μέγεθος, ὁ μετὰ διαστάσεως εἰς τὴν ὕλην παραγίγνεται. Πλάτος δὲ ἔχει καὶ τοῦτο ἐνθάδε διὰ τὸ ἀόριστον πῶς τῆς ἐνύλου φύσεως. Ἐὰν δὲ πολὺ τὸν ὅρον παραλλάξῃ, ἢ πρὸς τὸ μεῖζον, ἢ πρὸς τὸ ἔλαττον, τέρας νομίζεται: "Every form introduces, along with its own original peculiarity, a certain measure of quantity, bearing proportion to that peculiarity; for it brings with itself, not a *figure* only, but a *magnitude* also, which passes into the matter by giving it extent. Now even here this magnitude has a sort of latitude, from the indefinite nature of the material principle [with which it is united.] But yet, notwithstanding if it change the bound or limit, either as to greater or to less, in a remarkable degree, the being [by such deviation] is esteemed a monster." Simplic. in Præd. p. 37. A. edit. Basil.

Simplicius gives examples of this deviation in the case of giants and of dwarfs.

[b] Aristotle's instance goes further, and shews how a smaller number may be called many, a larger number be called few. *Ἐν μὲν τῇ κώμῃ πολλοὺς ἀνθρώπους φαμὲν εἶναι, ἐν Ἀθήναις δὲ ὀλίγους, πολλαπλασίους αὐτῶν ὄντας· καὶ ἐν μὲν τῇ οἰκίᾳ πολλοὺς, ἐν δὲ τῷ θεάτρῳ ὀλίγους, πολλῷ πλείους αὐτῶν ὄντας:* "We say, there are many men in a village, and but few in Athens, though the number in this last be many times larger; so, too, we say, there are many persons in a house, and but few in the theatre, though the number in this last may be many times more. Ibid.

[c] See before, page 254, and Hermes, p. 223.

told that the slain were a thousand, the saved a hundred; in such case our knowledge becomes adequate and complete.

It is in the contemplation of these two quantities thus defined, the continuous by figure, the discrete by number, that we behold them rendered subjects for the two noblest of sciences, the first of them for geometry, the second for arithmetic;[d] from which two, (and not from mere experiments, as some have hastily asserted,) both the knowledge of nature, and the utilities of common life, are in the greatest part derived.

It is here we see the rise of those mathematical sciences, arithmetic, geometry, music, &c. which the ancients esteemed so essential to a liberal education. Nor can we believe there is any one now but must acknowledge, that a mind properly tinged with such noble speculations, (supposing there be no want of genius, or of courage,) is qualified to excel in every superior scene of life. Far more honourable they surely are, than the arts of riding a horse, or of wielding a sword, those accomplishments usually assigned to our youth of distinction, and for the sake of which alone they are often sent into distant countries, as if there were nothing to be taught them at home, nor any thing in a gentleman worth cultivating but his body. We would not undervalue these bodily accomplishments, (for perfection of every sort is certainly worth aiming at;) but we would wish them to be rated as much below the mental, as the body itself is inferior to the mind.

There is an elegant account of the sciences above mentioned in the Republic of Plato. Glaucus (one of the persons of the dialogue) takes pains to recommend them from their usefulness in human life: arithmetic for accounts and distributions; geometry for encampments and mensurations; music for solemn festivals in honour of the gods; and astronomy for agriculture, for navigation, and the like. Socrates, on his part, denies not the truth of all this, but still insinuates, that they were capable of answering an end more sublime. "You are pleasant," says he, "in your seeming to fear the multitude, lest you should be thought to enjoin certain sciences that are useless. It is, indeed, no contemptible matter, though a difficult one, to believe, that through these particular sciences the soul has an organ purified and enlightened, which is destroyed and blinded by studies of other kind; an organ better worth saving than a thousand eyes; inasmuch as truth becomes visible through this alone."[e]

These, that we have here mentioned, appear to be the only

[d] See Hermes, p. 218, and note, p. 222.

[e] The above is an attempt to translate the following elegant passage of Plato: Ἡδὺς εἶ, ὅτι ἔοικας δεδιότι τοὺς πολλοῦς, μὴ δοκῇς ἄχρηστα μαθήματα προστάττειν· Τὸ δ' ἐστὶν οὐ πάνυ φαῦλον, ἀλλὰ χαλεπὸν πιστεῦσαι, ὅτι ἐν τούτοις τοῖς μαθήμασιν ἑκαστοῖς ὄργανόν τι ψυχῆς ἐκκαθαίρεται, καὶ ἀναζωπυρεῖται, ἀπολλύμενον καὶ τυφλούμενον ὑπὸ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιτηδευμάτων, κρεῖττον ὂν σωθῆναι μυρίων ὀμμάτων· μόνῳ γὰρ αὐτῷ ἀλήθεια ὁρᾶται. Plat. de Repub. lib. vii. p. 527. edit Serran. Hermes, page 202.

species of quantity; inasmuch as other things are called quantities, not from themselves, but with reference to these. Thus we say, that there is much white, because the superficies, which it covers, is much; and that an action was long, because the time was long during which it was transacted. And hence it is, that, if any one is to explain the quantity of an action, as, for example, the length of the Trojan war, he explains it by the time, saying, it was a war of ten years. So when we give the quantity of any thing white, we define it by the superficies, because, as that is in quantity, so also is the white.[f]

We further observe, that quantity continuous and discrete may be said to blend themselves with all things. Thus in substances, let Mount Athos represent the former; the army of Xerxes, the latter. In colours, let us view the former in the uniform blueness of a clear sky; the latter, in the many and diversified tints of a rainbow. In sounds we find quantity discrete belonging to speech or language, it being the essence of articulation, that every syllable should be distinct. The continuous, on the contrary, naturally suggests itself to our ears, when we hear yellings, howlings, and heavy psalmody. In motions, when a grasshopper moves by leaps, we behold quantity discrete; when a ship sails smoothly, we behold quantity continuous. The motion of all animals, that have feet, (whether they leap or not,) by being alternate, is of the discrete kind: but it is fabled of the gods, that, when they moved as gods, it was under one continued progression of their whole frame together; to which Virgil, they say, alludes, in speaking of Venus,

Et vera incessu patuit dea. Æn. i. 411.

The mind, though devoid of corporeal extension, admits what is analogous to these two species of quantity, and recognises their force even within the sacred recesses of itself. For what can be more truly united in perfect continuity, than the terms which compose a self-evident truth? And how is this continuity still further extended, when by the union of two such truths there is produced a third, under the indissoluble connection of a demonstrative syllogism? If there was not this syllogistic continuity, there might indeed be other continuities, but it would never be in our power to prove any thing concerning them. Again, when we consider either many propositions, without reference to a syllogism; or many independent terms, without reference to a proposition; what have we then but quantity discrete? *Philosophical arrangements?* Treasures, as capable of being numbered, estimated, and recorded, as those which the miser commits to his coffers.

[f] Κυρίως δὲ ποσὰ ταῦτα λέγεται μόνα τὰ εἰρημένα, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα πάντα κατὰ συμβεβηκός· εἰς ταῦτα γὰρ ἀποβλέποντες καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ποσὰ λέγομεν· οἷον πολὺ τὸ λεῦκον λέγεται, τῷγε τὴν ἐπιφάνειαν πολλὴν εἶναι· καὶ ἡ πρᾶξις μακρὰ, τῷγε τὸν χρόνον, κ. τ. λ. Aristot. Præd. p. 32. edit. Sylb.

It is, indeed, by the help of an innate power of distinction that we recognise the differences of things, as it is by a contrary power of composition that we recognise their identities.[g] These powers, in some degree, are common to all minds; and as they are the basis of our whole knowledge, (which is, of necessity, either affirmative or negative,) they may be said to constitute what we call *common sense*.[h] On the contrary, to possess these powers in a more eminent degree, so as to be able to perceive identity in things widely different, and diversity in things nearly the same; this it is that constitutes what we call genius, that power divine, which through every sort of discipline renders the difference so conspicuous between one learner and another.

It was from speculations of this kind, that some of the ancients were induced to consider quantity in a far higher rank than is usual in common speculations. "They considered both species under the common character of a *bound* or *measure*, and as such to be conspicuous throughout the whole universe; the nature of the continuous, called *magnitude*, being seen in *union* and *connection*; that of the discrete, called *multitude*, in *accumulation* and *juxtaposition*; that by virtue of magnitude, the world or universe was one; was extended and connected everywhere, through its most distant parts; that by virtue of multitude it was diversified with that order and fair arrangement, seen in the amazing variety of stars, of elements, of plants, of animals; of contrarieties on one side, and of similarities on the other; that if these quantities were thus distinguishable in the copy or image, (for such was this world, when compared to its archetype,) much more so were they in those pure and immaterial forms, the invariable and immediate objects of the Supreme Intellect. The whole production of quantity (as of every thing else) they referred with reason to this primary intelligent cause; whose virtual efficacy, as far as it passes through all things without dividing itself or stopping, they supposed to generate continuity and union; as far as it stops in its progress at every particular, and communicates to each a peculiar form of its own, they held to generate *distinction* and *multitude*; and as far as it perpetually exerts at once these two distinct and opposite energies, they considered as for ever rendering the universe both many and one; many, through its order and fair variety; one, through its connection and general sympathy."[i]

[g] See p. 221, note *d*.

[h] See p. 46, note *h*.

[i] The authors from whom the preceding sentiments are taken, are Plotinus and Iamblichus, in the commentary of Simplicius upon this predicament of quantity. Ἔτι δὲ ὁ Πλωτῖνος—ἰδία γὰρ καὶ φύσις ἑκάστῳ, ὡς καὶ ἐν τῷ παντὶ κόσμῳ θεωρεῖται, τοῦ μὲν συνεχοῦς ἡ φύσις, ἥτις καλεῖται μέγεθος, κατὰ ἕνωσιν καὶ ἀλληλουχίαν· τοῦ δὲ διωρισμένου, ἥτις καλεῖται πλῆθος, κατὰ σώρειαν καὶ παράθεσιν· καὶ γὰρ κατὰ μὲν τὴν τοῦ μεγέθους οὐσίαν, εἷς ὁ κόσμος ἐστί τε καὶ νοεῖται, σφαιρικὸς καὶ συμπεφυκὼς ἑαυτῷ, διατεταμένος τε καὶ ἀλληλουχούμενος· κατὰ δὲ τὸ πλῆθος, ἥτε σύνταξις καὶ ἡ διακόσμησις, ἡ ἐκ τοσῶνδε φέρε εἰπεῖν στοιχείων, καὶ ζώων ἢ φυτῶν

And so much for the third universal genus, or predicament, that of *quantity*, its various species, and its peculiar properties.[k]

We cannot however quit this and the preceding predicament (I mean the predicaments of quality and quantity) without observing that, as they are diffused in a conspicuous manner throughout the universe, so writers both sacred and profane, both poetic and prosaic, appear to have expressed their force, and that often at the same time, as the predicaments themselves often exist so in nature.

"O Lord, how manifold are thy works! in wisdom hast thou made them all."[l]

Here [manifold] denotes the quantity of the divine works; [made in wisdom] denotes their quality.

Nam et qualis in cujusque rei natura, et quæ forma, quæritur: an immortalis anima, an humana specie deus: et de magnitudine et numero: quantus, sol; an unus, mundus.[m]

Where the critic not only delineates the two great predicaments here mentioned, but divides also quantity into its two capital species, I mean magnitude and number.

Cicero goes further in his Tusculan Disputations, not only producing quality and quantity, but substance also, their support; which he places first, according to its proper order. Si quid sit hoc, non vides; at quale sit, vides: si ne id quidem; at quantum sit, profecto vides.[n]

Even comic writers have expressed the force of these two predicaments.

> Quantam et quam veram laudem capiet Parmeno? Terent. Eun. v. 4. 3.
>
> "How great, and how true praise will Parmeno acquire?"

Great indicates *quantity*: *true* indicates *quality*; for what quality in praise is more valuable than truth?

The poets, who dealt in subjects more exalted than comedy, appear many of them to have employed the same language.

θεωρεῖται, καὶ ἐναντιωτήτων ἢ ὁμοιοτήτων τόσων καὶ τόσως· εἰ οὖν ἐν ταῖς εἰκόσιν οὕτω ταῦτα κεχώρισται, πολὺ πρότερον ἐν τοῖς νοουμένοις γένεσι· καὶ πρὸ τούτων, ἐν τοῖς καθ' αὐτὰ ἀΰλοις εἴδεσι διέστηκε, κοινὸν ἔχοντα, ὡς εἴρηται, τὸ μέτρον καὶ τὸ πέρας. Simplic. in Præd. p. 32. B. edit. Basil. 1551.

Ὁ δὲ θεῖος Ἰάμβλιχος—ἐπειδὴ γὰρ ἡ τοῦ ἑνὸς δύναμις ἀφ' οὗ πᾶν τὸ ποσὸν ἀπογεννᾶται, διατείνεται δι' ὅλων ᾗ αὐτή, καὶ ὁρίζει ἕκαστον προϊοῦσα ἀφ' ἑαυτῆς, ᾗ μὲν δι' ὅλων δήκει παντάπασιν ἀδιαιρέτως, τὸ συνεχὲς ὑφίστησι, καὶ ᾗ τὴν πρόοδον ποιεῖται μίαν, καὶ ἀδιαίρετον καὶ ἄνευ διωρισμοῦ· ᾗ καὶ προϊοῦσα ἵσταται καθ' ἕκαστον τῶν εἰδῶν, καὶ ᾗ ὁρίζει ἕκαστον, καὶ ἕκαστον ἐν ποιεῖ, ταυτῇ τὸ διωρισμένον παράγει.—ἐπεὶ δὲ ἅμα καὶ μένει καὶ πρόεισι, τὰ δύο ἀπογεννᾷ. περιέχει γὰρ ἡ τῶν νοητῶν μέτρων δύναμις ἅμα ἀμφότερα τὰ μένοντα καὶ προϊόντα ἐν ἑνὶ τῷ αὐτῷ. Simplic. in Præd. p. 34. edit. Basil. 1551.

As the above sentiments are expressed in the text, a verbal translation of them is omitted. It may, however, be acceptable to the curious to see them in their originals, and for that reason they have been subjoined.

[k] See before, note *z*, p. 305.

[l] Psalm civ. 24.

[m] Quintil. Instit. Orat. l. vii. c. 4.

[n] Tusc. Disp. l. i. 25.

Thus Tibullus, speaking of Bacchus:

Qualis quantusque minetur. Tibul. l. iii. eleg. vi. 23.

Ovid, of Jupiter:

Quantusque et qualis ab alta
Junone excipitur. Metam. iii. 204.

Virgil, of Venus:

Qualisque videri
Cœlicolis, et quanta solet. Æn. ii. 589.

The same, of Polypheme:

Qualis, quantusque cavo Polyphemus in antro. Æn. v. 641.

Homer, (whom it is probable the rest all copied,) speaking of Achilles:

Ἤτοι Δαρδανίδης Πρίαμος θαύμαζ' Ἀχιλῆα,
Ὅσσος ἔην, οἷός τε· θεοῖσι γὰρ ἄντα ἐῴκει. Iliad. Ω. 629.

"Nor less the royal guest the hero eyes,
His godlike aspect, and majestic size."[o]

These attributes, given by poets to gods and heroes, have been found by Euclid in figures geometrical. He has a problem to teach us how to describe a rectilineal figure, which to one given rectilineal figure shall be similar, to another shall be equal.[p]

Similar is a property of *quality; equal*, of *quantity*.[q]

But it is time to finish, and proceed to the arrangement next in order.

CHAPTER X.

CONCERNING RELATIVES[r]—THEIR SOURCE—RELATIVES APPARENT—REAL—THEIR PROPERTIES, RECIPROCAL—INFERENCE, AND CO-EXISTENCE—FORCE OF RELATION IN ETHICS—IN MATTERS DRAMATIC—IN NATURE, AND THE ORDER OF BEING—RELATIONS, AMICABLE AND HOSTILE—EVIL—WANT—FRIENDSHIP—STRIFE—RELATION OF ALL TO THE SUPREME CAUSE—EXTENT AND USE OF THIS PREDICAMENT, OR ARRANGEMENT.

THROUGH the three universal genera, predicaments, or arrangements, already described, subordinate beings may be said to

[o] Pope's Homer, book xxiv. ver. 798. The translation, we see, renders the words ὅσσος and οἷος by a periphrasis, and it should seem with some propriety, as "the god-like aspect" of Achilles is clearly among his qualities, and his "majestic size" evidently respects his magnitude, that is to say, his quantity. It must be confessed, however, that much of the force of the original will necessarily be lost in the translation, where single words in one language cannot be found corresponding to single words in the other.

[p] Euclid, vi. 25.

[q] See before, pages 300, and 305.

[r] The title of this arrangement is expressed by a plural, and not a singular, (like quality and quantity,) because all relation is necessarily between two: ἡ δὲ σχέσις τοὐλάχιστον ἐν δυσὶ πράγμασι θεωρεῖται. Ammon. in Cat. p. 94. B.—Ἴδιον γὰρ τῆς σχέσεως μόνης, τὸ ἐν πολλοῖς ὑφεστάναι μόνως. ὅπερ οὐδεμιᾷ πρόσεστι τῶν ἄλλων κατηγοριῶν: "it is a peculiarity of relation only, to have its existence in many, which is the case with no one else of the predicaments." Simpl. in Præd. p. 41. B. edit. Basil. 1551.

attain their completion; through *substance* they exist; through *quality* they are distinguished; and through *quantity* they acquire a *magnitude*, and become a certain *multitude*.

Yet when beings are thus produced, we must not imagine them to exist, like pebbles upon the shore, dispersed and scattered, without dependence or mutual sympathy. It would be difficult out of such to compose a universe or perfect whole, because every perfect whole has a respect to its parts, as well as the parts a respect both to such whole, and to each other. Hence then the rise of that genus called *relation*, a genus which runs through all things, holding all of them together, inasmuch as there is no member of the universe either so great or so minute, that it can be called independent, and detached from the rest.

Now in all relation there must be a subject whence it commences; for example, snow: another, where it terminates; for example, a swan: the *relation itself;* for example, *similitude:* and lastly, the *source* of that relation; for example, *whiteness:*[s] the swan is related to snow, by being both of them white.

The requisites to relation being in this manner explained, it will appear that those only are the true relatives, which express in their very structure the relative source, and whose very essence may be found in this their reciprocal habitude.[t] But this perhaps will be better understood by a few examples.

The swan (it was said before) was in whiteness like snow. Here the swan and the snow were produced as relatives. We produce others of like kind, when we assert that London is larger than York, a lemon equal to an orange, &c.

But the truth is, these subjects are none of them properly relatives of themselves, but then only become such (as indeed may every thing else) when a relation is raised between them through the medium of a relative attribute. London, we say,

[s] This source may be sought for among the differential characters of being, in whatever predicament or arrangement they happen to exist, be it in quality, as the character of whiter; in quantity, as that of greater, that of more numerous; in time, as that of older; in place, as that of upper, &c.

This is what Simplicius means when he says, ἀνάγκη αὐτὴν (scil. τὴν σχέσιν) ἐν τῷ κατὰ διαφορὰν χαρακτῆρι ἐνυπάρχειν. Simpl. in Cat.

Hence, too, we may see why relation stands next to quantity; for, in strictness, the predicaments which follow are but different modes of relation, marked by some peculiar character of their own, over and above the relative character, which is common to them all.

Even in the two predicaments that precede this of relatives, I mean quality and quantity, though they have an existence void of relation, we cannot say so of their characteristic peculiarities; for *like* is a relative term, and so is *equal*. Hence Simplicius, ἄλλο γὰρ τὸ ἴσον παρὰ τὸ ποσὸν, καὶ ἄλλο τὸ ὅμοιον παρὰ τὸ ποιόν: "*equal* is something else beside *quantity*; *like*, something else beside *quality*." Simpl. in Præd. By something else, he means they are relatives.

[t] Πρός τι τὰ τοιαῦτα λέγεται, ὅσα, αὐτὰ ἅπερ ἐστὶν, ἑτέρων εἶναι λέγεται· ἢ ὁτιοσοῦν ἄλλως πρὸς ἕτερον: "Such things as these are said to be relatives; namely, as many as are said to be what they are, by being things belonging to other things, or which in any other sense have reference to something else." Arist. Præd. p. 34. edit. Sylb.

is larger than York. The relation subsists in *larger*, which being attributed to London, makes it a relative to York, which is in fact something less. The same holds in the lemon and orange, and in all possible instances. To whatever subject we associate any of the relative attributes, we immediately render the subject by such association a relative. Such a subject therefore is only a relative incidentally.

But the true and real relatives are those attributes themselves, the terms *larger*, *equal*, *like*, &c.; for these in their very structure express the relative source, and only exist in a joint and reciprocal habitude one to another.

There are also relative substances, as well as relative attributes; that is to say, terms which indicate at once both a substance and a relative. Such are master and servant, preceptor and disciple: *master* implies *a man;* and not only that, but *a man having dominion: servant* implies *a man*, and not only that, but *a man rendering service;* and the same may be said of the other example alleged.

Now a distinguishing property of these real relatives is, that they reciprocate in their predication.[u] Every master is the master of a servant, and every servant the servant of a master; every preceptor the preceptor of a disciple; and every disciple the disciple of a preceptor. The same holds in the relative attributes as well as in the substances, greater being always greater than less, and less being always less than greater. That this is a property which never fails, will better appear, if from any relative substance we subtract the relative attribute, and substitute in its room the substance alone. For example, from the relative substance, master, let us subtract the relative attribute, dominion, so that man only shall remain, divested of that attribute. We cannot affirm of every man, as we can of every master, that merely as a man, he is the master of a servant.[x]

From this necessity of reciprocal predication, another property of relation follows, that we cannot understand one relative, without understanding its companion; and that in proportion as our knowledge of one relative is more precise, so is that likewise of the other.[y] I cannot know, for example, that A is greater

[u] Πάντα δὲ τὰ πρός τι πρὸς ἀντιστρέφοντα λέγεται. Arist. Præd. p. 35.

[x] Aristotle finds an instance in the same term, servant: Οἷον ὁ δοῦλος, ἐὰν μὴ δεσπότου ἀποδοθῇ δοῦλος, ἀλλὰ ἀνθρώπου, ἢ δίποδος, ἢ ὁτουοῦν τῶν τοιούτων, οὐκ ἀντιστρέφει· οὐ γὰρ οἰκεία ἡ ἀπόδοσίς ἐστιν: "For example, the term *servant*, if he be not described as the servant of a master, but of a man, or of a biped, or of any other such thing, does not reciprocate, because the description returned is not necessary and essential; that is, we cannot say, the man of a servant, or the biped of a servant, as we say, the master of a servant." Arist. Præd. p. 37, where much more is subjoined, worth reading.

[y] Relata sunt simul cognitione. Cognito proinde alterutro, cognoscitur alterum; (idque eodem plane modo, et mensura cognitionis) et ignorato ignoratur. Logic. Compend. Saunderson, p. 41. edit. Oxon. 1672.

I have quoted Saunderson, as he was an accurate logician, but Aristotle's own words are as follows: Ἐάν τις εἰδῇ τι ὡρισμένως τῶν πρός τι, κἀκεῖνο, πρὸς ὃ λέγεται, ὡρισμένως εἴσεται: "If any one know with precision any one of two relatives, he

than B, without knowing that B is less than A; and if with more precision I know that A is double, I necessarily know withal that B is half: and if with still further precision I know the measure of A to be eight, I know with equal precision the measure of B to be four.[z]

And this naturally leads to that fundamental property of relation, on which the rest all depend, namely, the necessary and universal co-existence of relatives,[a] which always commence together, subsist together, and cease together. Ulysses, in his speech to Thersites, says in anger, May I lose my son Telemachus, if I do not seize, &c. And how does he express this sentiment!

> Μηδέτι Τηλεμάχοιο πατὴρ κεκλημένος εἴην. Iliad. B. 260.
>
> "May I no longer be called the father of Telemachus."

He well knew he could only lose that relative denomination, by losing his son, with whose birth and duration it was indissolubly connected. It was not that Ulysses might not have survived Telemachus, or Telemachus, Ulysses; the co-existence being only attached to the relative characters, those of father and son.

And hence we may collect, that the co-existence here mentioned is not like that of substance, and its essential properties, (as rationality, for example, co-exists with man, or sensation with animal;) but a co-existence less intimate by far than that is, because it subsists between beings actually distinct one from another.

And hence it has followed, that some logicians have treated it as possessing less of the real, than any one of the other genera. They tell us, *Relatio est ens minimæ entitatis.*[b]

Yet we must be careful how we undervalue it,[c] in consequence

will know also the other relative which it refers to, with equal precision." Arist. Prædic. p. 39. edit. Sylb.

[z] And here, by the way, it is worth observing, that as all relatives are recognised in combination, while every object of sense is perceived distinct and independent; it follows, that all relatives are properly objects of the intellect, and that, if it were not for this faculty, we should know nothing concerning them. Let A, for example, be supposed the master of B, and let A be tall, well-proportioned, ruddy, &c. These last characters only are visible to the eye, nor does the eye see more, while the relation subsists, or less, when the servant dies, and the relation is at an end. Were there a change in the master's person, were he to become deformed from being well-shaped, or pale from being ruddy, then would the eye be able to recognise what had happened. But it is a singular property of this genus, that a relative may change, or lose its relations, without change or loss within itself. Let the corresponding relative but vary, or cease to exist; let the master lose his servant, or the preceptor his disciple; let those who stood on my right remove themselves to my left; or those who stood above me, place themselves below; and it is easy to conceive a subject, after having lost or varied every one of these relations, still to remain itself invariably the same.

[a] Δοκεῖ δὲ τὰ πρός τι ἅμα τῇ φύσει εἶναι. Arist. Prædi. p. 37.

[b] Fell's Logic, p. 92.

[c] Thus Simplicius, in his comment on this categoric: Διὰ ταῦτα δὲ, ὡς παραφυομένην ταῖς ἄλλαις κατηγορίαις, τὴν τοῦ πρός τι ἐπεισοδιώδη νομίζουσι· καί τοι προηγουμένην οὖσαν, καὶ κατὰ διαφορὰν οἰκείαν θεωρουμένην. Αὕτη γὰρ κοινότης ἐστὶ διὰ πάντων διήκουσα, τῶνδε ἐναντίων, καὶ τῶν ὁτωσοῦν διαφερόντων, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων γενῶν, καὶ τῶν ὑπ' αὐτὰ τεταγμένων· ἥτις εἰ μὴ παρῆν, διεστάσθη ἂν πάντη (l. πάντα) ἀπὸ

of such a notion; since with those who well attend to its amazing efficacy, it is more likely to acquire a rank perhaps above its real merit.

What ought we to think, should it appear the basis of morality? "Moral duties (says Epictetus) are in general measured by relations. Is he a father? The relation ordains, that he must be taken care of: that thou yield to him in all things; bear with him, when he reproaches, when he strikes, &c. But he is a bad father. And wert thou then by nature connected with a good father? No; but with a father. Thus, therefore, out of neighbour, out of citizen, out of magistrate, wilt thou trace the moral duty, if thou make it a custom to contemplate the relations."[d]

The Stoic emperor Antoninus inculcates the same doctrine: "There are (says he) three relations; one to the proximate cause, which immediately surrounds us; one to the divine cause, from which all things happen to all; and one to those, along with whom we live."[e] So important is the knowledge of relations (according to these philosophers) in a subject which so much concerns us, I mean an upright and a virtuous conduct.

It is to a subordinate end, that Horace applies this knowledge, when he makes it an essential to dramatic poets, and as a philosophical critic teaches them, that it is through this knowledge

πάντων: "And hence some conceive the predicament of relation, by its growing on, as it were, to the rest, to be something episodic and adventitious, although it be in fact truly principal, and an object of contemplation from its own distinctive character. It is this, indeed, is that band of community which passes through all things; through contraries, through things in any way different, through whole genera, and through the several beings, arranged beneath them; that principle, which, were we to suppose away, all things in that instant would be dissipated and torn from all things." Simplic. in Prædic. p. 44. B. edit. Basil. 1551.

See also the same author in the same comment: Οὔτε γὰρ τὰ γένη, οὔτε τὰ ὑπ' αὐτῶν ὄντα, κοινωνίαν ἕξει τινὰ πρὸς ἄλληλα, εἰ μή τις σχέσεως ἢ λόγος ἐν τοῖς οὖσιν. Ἄτοπον δὲ τὴν κοινωνίαν ἀναιρεῖν τῶν διαφερόντων πρὸς ἄλληλα· ἄτοπον δὲ καὶ τὴν ἁρμονίαν ἀναίρειν, οὐ τὴν ἐν τοῖς φθόγγοις μόνην, οὐδὲ τὴν ἐν τοῖς ἀριθμοῖς, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν ἐν ταῖς οὐσίαις καὶ δυνάμεσι πάσαις καὶ ἐνεργείαις, ἥτις ἐγγινομένη τοῖς οὖσι, συνήγαγεν εἰς ταυτὸν, καὶ σχέσιν ἔχειν πρὸς ἄλληλα ἀπειργάσατο· ἀναιρεθήσεται δὲ καὶ τὸ σύμμετρον καὶ ἴσον, καὶ ἐπιστητὸν, καὶ ἐπιστήμη. Εἰ δὲ καὶ γεωμετρία καὶ μουσικὴ περὶ σχέσεις ἔχουσιν, ἀνυπόστατοι δὲ αὗται· καταγέλαστοι ἂν εἶεν ἐκεῖναι περὶ τὰ ἀνυπόστατα κατατριβόμεναι. Πῶς δὲ καὶ ἐφετὸν πᾶσιν ὁ θεὸς λέγεται, εἰ μηδεμία σχέσις ἐστὶ πρὸς τὸ ἐφετὸν τῷ ἐφιεμένῳ: "For neither the universal genera, nor the things included under them, can have any connection one with another, if there exist not in things the ratio of habitude or relation. But it is absurd to take away the connection of things that differ one from another: absurd also to take away harmony, not that only which exists in sounds, nor that which exists in numbers, but that also which exists in substances, and in all the variety of capacities and energies; that, which having been implanted in beings, has brought them together, and effected, that they should have the relation here spoken of to each other. [Further than this, by taking away relation] there will be taken away the proportionate, the equal, the knowable, and knowledge. If geometry and music are employed about relations, and these last have no existence; then will those sciences be ridiculous, in being employed about nonentities. How also can God himself be called 'an object of desire to all beings,' if there be no relation between the thing desired, and that which desires?" Simplic. in Præd. p. 43. B.

[d] Epict. Ench. c. 30.

[e] M. Ant. viii. 27.

only they can truly delineate characters. The verses are well known:

Qui didicit, patriæ quid debeat, &c.

It is thus, too, that Shakspeare, either by knowledge acquired, or (what is more probable) by the dictates of an innate superior genius,[f] makes Macbeth shudder at the thoughts of murdering Duncan, when he reflects on the many duties he owed him, arising from the many relations he stood in, all of which duties he was then basely going to violate:

He's here in double trust;
First, as I am his kinsman, and his subject,
Strong both against the deed: then, as his host,
Who should against his murderer shut the door,
Not bear the knife myself.

And here I cannot help remarking upon this excellent tragedy, that it is not only admirable as a poem, but is perhaps at the same time one of the most moral pieces existing. It teaches us the danger of venturing, though but for once, upon a capital offence, by shewing us that it is impossible to be wicked by halves; that we cannot stop; that we are in a manner compelled to proceed; and yet that, be the success as it may, we are sure in the event to become wretched and unhappy.[g]

But to return to our subject, I mean that of relation.

If we quit mankind, and view its more general extent, we shall find, that, where continuity fails, there relation supplies its office, connecting as it were all things the most remote and heterogeneous. Were they indeed combined under an union more intimate, were it the same with that continuity, seen in a living body and its limbs, the whole universe would be no more than one immense animal. But it is not so: and those who have explained its nature have rather called it one city, or one commonwealth;[h] a very different species of monad from one animal, or living being. It is here, then, (as we have said,) relation intervenes, and under a thousand different ties connects all things together.

The ties indeed are many, though the sources are few. Every subordinate being, as it is by nature subject to wants, (indigence and imperfection being essential to its constitution,) has a connection with those beings through whom such wants may be supplied. Hence, then, one source of relation. Again: every being whatever, that has power to supply such wants, has a connection with those beings to whom it can thus become subservient. Hence, then, another source of relation. Now in the

[f] The author has in this place considered Shakspeare as Aristotle did Homer, and has left it uncertain, to what cause his transcendent merit should be ascribed. Aristotle, speaking of Homer's superiority, says, in like manner, that it was ἤτοι διὰ τέχνην, ἢ διὰ φύσιν, "either through art, or through nature." Vid. Arist. Poet. c. 8.

[g] See the remarks on this tragedy in that elegant book, the *Essay on the Writings and Genius of Shakspeare.*

[h] See p. 96, and note *m*.

divine economy of the whole it is so admirably contrived, that every being in different degrees possesses this double character, and not only needs assistance, but is able in its turn to afford it. Nothing is so mighty, as to subsist without help; nothing so minute, as not at times to have its use. Thus as connections reciprocate, and are everywhere blended, the concatenation of relations grows in fact universal, and the world becomes (as above described) one city or commonwealth.

Instances of this double relation occur (as we have said) in every particular being. The ewe is related to the grass, as to the being which supplies her wants; to her lamb, as to the being whose wants she herself supplies. The grass again is related to the earth, as to the being which affords it aliment; while it is related to the ewe, by becoming itself aliment to her. The earth is related to vegetables, as she is both their parent and their nurse; while she is related to the sun, as to the fountain of her genial warmth. The relations of the sun are finely represented by Epictetus, who makes the Sovereign of the Universe thus address that noble luminary: "Thou (saith he) art sun: thou art able, by going round, to form the year and the seasons; to enlarge and nourish the fruits; to raise and still the winds; to warm in due degree the bodies of men: arise, go round, and beginning from the greatest, extend after this manner thy influence to the most minute."[i]

Nor, when we mention the earth, ought we to forget that equitable discharge of her relations, for which Virgil well distinguishes her by the character of *most just:*

Fundit humo facilem victum justissima tellus. Georg. ii. 460.

The Attic historian and philosopher will be found the best commentator on this elegant passage of the Roman poet: "The earth, too, (says Xenophon,) being a divinity, teacheth those that can learn it of her, justice: for such as cultivate her best, she requiteth with most goods."[k]

When we view the relation of the male to the female, and of the female to the male, and add to this the common relation extending from both to their offspring, we view the rise of families through the whole animal race. Among the more social, such as sheep and cattle, these families by fresh relations are combined into larger multitudes, under the name of flocks and herds. Among those of higher order still, (such as the bee,[l] the ant, the beaver, and, above all, the social and rational

[i] Arrian. Epict. l. iii. c. 24. p. 444. edit. Upton. Σὺ ἥλιος εἶ· δύνασαι, κ. τ. λ.

[k] Ἔτι δὲ ἡ γῆ, θεὸς οὖσα, τοὺς δυναμένους καταμανθάνειν, καὶ δικαιοσύνην διδάσκει· τοὺς γὰρ ἄριστα θεραπεύοντας αὐτὴν, πλεῖστα ἀγαθὰ ἀντιποιεῖ. Xenoph. Œconom. p. 35. edit. Oxon.

[l] Virgil speaks of the bee, as he would of man:

Mores et studia et populos et prœlia dicam.
Georg. iv.

Aristotle, distinguishing these animals from those which do no more than barely herd together, elegantly calls them ζῶα πο-

being, man,) these herds and flocks by relations more excellent are improved into civil polities, where there is a general interest or common good, a good to which either willingly or unwillingly every individual cooperates.[m]

If we descend below animals down to vegetables, we shall discover in the vine, the ivy, the woodbine, and all the plants of slender stalk, a manifest relation to those of a trunk more solid, such as the oak, the elm, and the several trees of the forest. It is with a power which appears almost a conscious one, that the former of these tribes, recognising their relation, apply to the latter for a support, and spontaneously twine their bodies, or at least their tendrils, around them.[n]

λιτικὰ, "political or civil animals;" animals formed for a life of civil association, where the business is one, and that common to the whole tribe; ὧν ἕν τι, κ. τ. λ. Histor. Anim. p. 5. edit. Sylb.

[m] . . . . . ἢν δὲ μὴ θέλω,
Κακὸς γενόμενος, οὐδὲν ἧττον ἕψομαι.
Epict. Enchirid. c. 52.

See page 102, and note *b*.

[n] Τὰ τέλη, ἐφ' ἃ τῶν φύσει γιγνομένων ἕκαστα ἕεται, οὐ καὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν εὐθὺς φυομένοις πάρεστιν αὐτοῖς, ἀλλ' ὕστατα δήπου παραγίγνεται. Σκοπῶμεν δ' αὐτὸ ἐφ' ἑνὸς τοῦδε· τῇ ἀμπέλου ἕλικι τέλος ἐστὶ, τὸ ἑτέρου φυτοῦ πτορθῷ περιελιχθεῖσαν, ἐκείνῳ τὴν ἄμπελον ἀναδῆσαι τῷ φυτῷ, ταύτην ἐν τοῖς φυτοῖς τὴν φύσιν εἰληχυῖαν, ἐπαλλόκαυλον εἶναι. Οὐκοῦν τὸ ἑτέρου φυτοῦ πτορθῷ τὴν ἕλικα περιελιχθεῖσαν ἀναδῆσαι τὴν ἄμπελον, οὔτε τῇ ἀμπέλῳ φυομένῃ, οὔτε τῇ ἕλικι εὐθὺς πάρεστιν, ἀλλ' ὕστατόν γε παραγίγνεται· οὐδὲν μέντοι ἧττον τοῦ φύεσθαι ὅλως ἕλικα τῇ ἀμπέλῳ αἴτιον τελικὸν ἡ ἐφ' ἑτέρῳ φυτῷ ἀνάδεσις αὐτῆς ἐστιν. Ἀμήχανον δὲ τὸ μηδέπω ὂν, μηδ' ἐν τοῖς οὖσι τεταγμένον, ὄντος τοῦ ἤδη αἴτιον γίγνεσθαι· εἶναι γὰρ δεῖ τὸ αἴτιον τοῦ γιγνομένου, οὐχὶ μὴ εἶναι. Προειλῆφθαι ἄρα δεῖ ἕν τινι νῷ τὴν ἀμπέλου ἐφ' ἑτέρῳ φυτῷ ἀνάδεσιν, ὃς αὐτῇ ἐπιστατῶν, ὥσπερ δημιουργὸς ἀνὴρ σκευαστοῖς, καὶ τὴν ἕλικα αὐτῇ τῆς τοιαύτης ἕνεκα ἀναδέσεως φύσει· ἢ καὶ θαυμασίως, ἐὰν μὲν μηδέν τι αὐτῇ τοιοῦτον παρακέηται οἷῳ περιελιχθῆναι, ἐπ' εὐθύ πως φαίνεται φερομένη· ἐὰν δὲ πτορθός τις παρῇ, εὐθὺς περιειλιχθῇ. Οὔτ' οὖν τὴν ἕλικα τῇ ἀμπέλῳ μὴ οὐ τούτου ἕνεκα φύεσθαι, ὅπως ἑτέρῳ αὐτὴν φυτῷ ἀναδήσῃ, νοῦν ἔχει μὴ ἀξιοῦν· οὔτε τὸ μὴ νοῦν τοῖς τοιούτοις ἐφιστάναι ἔχοι ἂν καὶ ὀντινοῦν λόγον: "The ends, to which the several vegetable productions tend, are not instantly present to them, as soon as they begin to grow, but some way or other accrue to them subsequently. We may perceive this in a single instance. The end to the vine's tendril is, by twining round the branch of another vegetable, to bind the vine to that vegetable; which vine, among the vegetable tribe, possesses this natural character, that it should rest upon another for its support. Now that the tendril, by twining round the branch of another vegetable, should bind the vine on, neither belongs to the vine, when it first begins to grow, nor yet to its tendril; but is something which accrues subsequently: and yet, nevertheless, the binding of it to another vegetable is the final cause why the tendril should grow at all, and belong to the vine. But it is impossible that what as yet is not, and has no arrangement in the order of things, (I mean the binding,) should be the cause of something which now is, (I mean the tendril of the vine, when it first appears.) The cause of any thing produced must have an actual existence, and not be a nonentity. This binding therefore of the vine to some other vegetable must have been preconceived in some mind or intellect, who presiding over it (as any man, being an artist, presides over his works) makes the tendril grow to it for the sake of such binding: which tendril also wonderfully, if there be nothing adjoining of a nature for it to twine round, appears in some sort to shoot upwards; but if any branch be near, instantly deviates and twines round it. It is therefore irrational to suppose that the tendril did not grow to the vine, that it might hereafter bind it to another vegetable; nor can there be any degree of reason for asserting, that some mind or intelligence did not preside over such operations."

The force of this argument is as follows: things exist before their ends; that is, before that the ends of their existence take place. The tendril exists, before it binds the vine; the minute-hand exists, before it indicates the minutes. And yet is this binding, and this indicating so necessary, that the things themselves would never have existed, but for the sake of these only.

When therefore we contemplate the various relations already hinted, and mark in how friendly a manner they bring the most distant beings together, we may be tempted to say with the philosopher, that "all things are full of friendly principles."[o] But we must not suffer this sentiment to carry us too far, Things are not only full of friendly principles, but of hostile likewise.

The fangs of the lion are as much the work of nature as the tendrils of the vine, or the nurturing teats of the ewe. To what then have these formidable weapons relation; for nature, we are assured, makes nothing in vain?[p] If to offence, then is the lion himself a source of hostile relation; if to defence, then is he the object of injury from some other; so that hostility in either case is necessarily implied. Were it possible to doubt as to the offensive here, we could never doubt as to the structure of the spider's web; a structure clearly taught her by nature for offence alone. These and the like preparations, such as the boar's tusk,

Where, then, were these ends, when the things themselves first appeared? In external and visible nature? This from the hypothesis is impossible, for the hypothesis makes them subsequent. No other place then remains, but either the Sovereign Mind, or a mind subordinate, according as the work itself is a work of nature or of art." See before, p. 281, 282.

I have taken the preceding extract from a manuscript of that able scholar and philosopher George Gemistus, otherwise called Pletho, who flourished in the fifteenth century, both before and after the taking of Constantinople. If it apply not immediately to the subject, it has at least the merit of being something rare and ingenious. It is a morsel of that controversy among the learned Greeks of this period, whether the preference in philosophy was due to Plato or to Aristotle. Scholarius, among others, was for Aristotle; Pletho for Plato; from whose work on this subject (which was an answer to Scholarius) this extract is taken. There is another small work of Pletho's upon the same subject, entitled, *Περὶ ὧν Ἀριστοτέλης πρὸς Πλάτωνα διαφέρεται*, printed at Paris, 1541; and Bessario (a learned Greek of that age, who went over to the Latin church, and became a cardinal) wrote a large tract to defend the Platonic doctrine, entitled, *Contra Calumniatorem Platonis*. The printed edition is in Latin, but the whole work is extant in Greek among the manuscripts of St. Marc's library at Venice, to which library Bessario bequeathed his own. There is, too, a fine letter remaining of the same Bessario, addressed to Michael Apostolius; who, though he took Bessario's side, and defended Plato, yet appears to have done it, according to Bessario's letter, with a zeal and bitterness not becoming him; a zeal and bitterness too frequent in controversy, and (unfortunately for the cause of letters) nowhere more than among learned men, and those in particular whom we call professors of humanity.

The epistle above mentioned may be found in Greek and Latin, published by the learned Boivinus, in the second tome of l'Histoire de l'Academie Royale des Inscriptions, &c. p. 455; and it is well worth perusal, for its temper and elegance.

See also Cicero de Senectute, c. 15. Vitis quidem, &c.

[o] *Πάντα δὲ φίλων μεστά.* Arrian. Epict. l. iii. c. 24. p. 486. edit. Upt.

[p] This was an axiom inculcated everywhere by Aristotle; and more especially when he is speaking of final causes, which, though now they make a small part of philosophy, were never omitted by the Stagirite, as often as they could be introduced. His own words deserve attention: *Ἡ φύσις οὐθὲν ποιεῖ μάτην, ἀλλ' ἀεὶ ἐκ τῶν ἐνδεχομένων τῇ οὐσίᾳ περὶ ἕκαστον γένος ζῴου τὸ ἄριστον:* "Nature makes nothing in vain; but with respect to each animal genus, out of the several ways practicable, she always makes that which is best." De Animal. Ingressu, p. 28. edit. Sylb. And again, in the same tract: *Ἡ φύσις οὐθὲν δημιουργεῖ μάτην, ὥσπερ εἴρηται πρότερον, ἀλλὰ πάντα πρὸς τὸ βέλτιον ἐκ τῶν ἐνδεχομένων:* "Nature creates nothing in vain, but (as has been said already) all things for the best, out of the several ways that are practicable." Ibid. p. 141. edit. Sylb.

the eagle's talons, the viper's venom, &c. are all founded on such wants as can never be satisfied amicably. The wants, therefore, of this character naturally rouse up similar instincts, and thus the world becomes filled as well with hostile relations, as friendly.

Torva leæna lupum sequitur, lupus ipse capellam. Virg. Ecl. ii.

It appears to have been these relations of hostility that first gave rise to the phenomena of natural and moral evil. Now whether real evil exist at all, or whether we should confine it, with the Stoics, to evil purely moral, are questions beyond the scope of this treatise to examine. It will be sufficient to say, that much evil is imaginary, and founded merely on false opinion: that of the evils more real, there are many which have their end, and so may be said to partake, ultimately, the nature of good. Many of the difficulties and distresses which befall the human species, conduce to save it from sloth, and to rouse it up to action; to action which is, in fact, the very life of the universe.

Pater ipse colendi
Haud facilem esse viam voluit, primusque per artem
Movit agros, curis acuens mortalia corda,
Nec torpere gravi passus sua regna veterno. Virg. Georg. i.

If there were no dangers, then could there be no fortitude; if no temptations, then no temperance; if no adverse accidents, nor loss of what we love, then no submissive resignation, no pious acquiescence.

Οὐκ ἂν γενοῖτο χωρὶς ἐσθλὰ καὶ κακά·
Ἀλλ' ἔστι τις σύγκρασις, ἥστ' ἔχειν καλῶς.

"Things good and ill can ne'er exist apart;
But such the mixture, that they well accord."[q]

Again, the jaws of the lion, the poison of the rattle-snake, the sword of the conqueror, and every instrument of destruction, may be said incidentally to prepare the way for generation; and that not only by making room for new comers, but by furnishing fresh materials towards their respective production. For though the theatre of the world so far resembles other theatres, that it is perpetually filled with successions of new spectators; yet has it this in peculiar, that the spectators which succeed here, are made out of those that went before.[r] Every particular birth, or

[q] The fine distich here translated is from Euripides, quoted by Plutarch, De Isid. et Osirid. p. 369. edit. Xyland.

As to the speculations here offered, and the solutions suggested, we may well apply to them that just reflection of the Stagirite, though used by him on a different occasion. Ἴσως δὲ χαλεπὸν καὶ περὶ τῶν τοιούτων σφοδρῶς ἀποφαίνεσθαι, μὴ πολλάκις ἐπεσκεμμένον· τὸ μέντοι διηπορηκέναι περὶ ἑκάστου αὐτῶν, οὐκ ἄχρηστόν ἐστι: "Perhaps it is difficult to prove any thing clearly upon subjects such as these, without having often considered and examined them. And yet to have thrown out doubts concerning them, is a thing not altogether without its use." Aristot. Præd. p. 40. edit. Sylb.

[r] The subject-matter is the same in many succeeding beings; as the river is the same, which, as it flows along, reflects many different objects. It is in this sense we are to

natural production, appears an act, if not of hostility, at least of separation; a secession from the general mass; a kind of revolt from the greater bulk in favour of a smaller; which smaller would detach itself, and, were it able, be independent.

In a word, as *friendship*, by cementing multitude, produces *union*; so *strife*, by dissolving union, produces *multitude*; and it is by *multitude* that the world becomes diversified and replenished.

And hence we may perceive the meaning of what Heraclitus says in Plutarch, where he calls "*war*, the father and king and lord of all things;" and asserts, "that when Homer prayed,

That strife be banished both from gods and men,

he was not aware that he was cursing the generation of all things; as, in fact, they deduce their rise out of contest and antipathy." The same philosopher adds immediately, "that *the sun* could not pass his appointed bounds: that otherwise, if he could,

Tongues he would find to patronise the cause:"

meaning, by this mythological way of talking, that the sun could not desert his course, because so much depended on it; or otherwise, if he could, that being himself one of the primary authors of generation upon this earth, and well knowing how much strife cooperated in the same work, he would surely look out for an advocate (were such any where existing) to defend the cause of *strife* against the calumnies of Homer.[3]

understand the following assertion, and not with the least view to equivocal production.

Οὐκοῦν διὰ τὸ τὴν τοῦδε φθορὰν ἄλλου εἶναι γένεσιν, καὶ τὴν τοῦδε γένεσιν ἄλλου εἶναι φθορὰν, ἄπαυστον ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τὴν μεταβολήν: "Wherefore, from the dissolution of one thing being the generation of another, and the generation of one thing being the dissolution of another, it necessarily follows that the change must be perpetual, and never cease." Arist. de Gen. et Corr. l. i. c. 3. p. 10. edit. Sylb.

The change here alluded to is the common course of nature in the production of beings, which, were it not for the process above mentioned, would either soon be at a stand, or would require a perpetual miracle for the supply of new materials.

[3] Ἡράκλειτος μὲν γὰρ ἄντικρυς πόλεμον ὀνομάζει πατέρα καὶ βασιλέα καὶ κύριον πάντων· καὶ τὸν μὲν Ὅμηρον, εὐχόμενον,

Ἔκ τε θεῶν ἔριν, ἔκ τ' ἀνθρώπων ἀπολέσθαι,

λανθάνειν φησὶ τῇ πάντων γενέσει καταρώμενον, ἐκ μάχης καὶ ἀντιπαθείας τὴν γένεσιν ἐχόντων· ἥλιον δὲ μὴ ὑπερβήσεσθαι τοὺς προσήκοντας ὅρους· εἰ δὲ μή,

Γλώττας μιν δίκης ἐπικούρους ἐξευρήσειν.

Plutarch. de Isid. et Osir. p. 370. edit. Xyland. fol.

Dr. Squire, the late bishop of St. David's, has given a fair edition of this tract in the original, to which he has subjoined an English translation; but (according to a practice too frequent with the best critics) he has, in the passage above quoted, attempted to mend, where no emendation was wanting.

Chalcidius plainly alludes to the same sentiment of Heraclitus in the following extract from his commentary on Plato's Timæus: Proptereaque Numenius laudat Heraclium (lege Heraclitum) reprehendentem Homerum, qui optaverit interitum et vastitatem malis vitæ, quod non intelligeret mundum sibi deleri placere: si quidem sylva, quæ malorum fons est, exterminaretur. Chal. p. 396. edit. Meurs. 1617.

In the Greek quotation Homer is supposed to wish inadvertently against the generation of all things; in the Latin, he wishes, in the same inadvertent manner, against the existence of *sylva*, that is, of "matter." The difference is easily reconciled, if we suppose matter to be the basis of generation, and to be essentially requisite to the existence of things generable and pe-

From all these speculations one thing at least appears, (whatever else may be doubtful,) that relations of hostility, as well as friendship, have their use in the universe. Both also equally arise from *want* on one side, and from *the power of removing it* on the other.[t] The difference is, that in friendly relations the help is communicated either with pleasure, as when the mother suckles her child; or at least without pain, as when we shew a traveller his way, In hostile relations, the help, without regard to the communicator, is either taken by force, as when the wolf devours the lamb; or obtained by stratagem, as when the spider ensnares the fly.

And thus by the reciprocal relations of *want* and *help*, (both of which under a variety of forms exist in every individual,) is there a kind of general concatenation extended throughout the universe; while each being communicates what help it can afford, and obtains, in its turn, that help which it requires.

To all these relations must be added that chief, though mentioned last, that of the whole universe, and every being in it, to the first, supreme, and intelligent Cause, through which relation they are called his offspring, and he their Father. Here, indeed, the relations are not blended as before; they are all purely referable to want on one side, and all purely arise from spontaneous help on the other; the correspondence existing, as far as perfect has respect to imperfect, independent to dependent, the object desired to the beings which desire,[u] the maker to his works, the parent to his children.[x]

And now to conclude with a remark, which regards relation in general. "As to every continuous being the genus of *quality* gives distinctions, which help to mitigate its sameness, and render it, as it were, discrete; so to beings discrete, however remote, the genus of relation gives a connection, which serves to mitigate their diversity, and to render them, as it were, continuous. Thus is the world maintained as well in its union, as in its variety, while both species of quantity run through the whole, and through every part."

And so much for the arrangement or genus of *relation*, its nature, its properties, its utility, and extent.[y]

rishable, out of which this lower and visible world is wholly composed.

[t] How far the *want of good* leads to arts and action, may be seen in p. 14, and in notes subjoined. We here perceive it to extend, not only to the whole animal world, but even to the vegetable. More will be found on this subject in the treatise upon Motion, a part of the present work.

[u] Πῶς δὲ καὶ ἐφετὸν πᾶσιν ὁ θεὸς λέγεται, εἰ μηδεμία σχέσις ἐστὶ πρὸς τὸ ἐφετὸν τῷ ἐφιεμένῳ; "How is God called an object desirable to all beings, if there be no relation between the object of desire, and the being which desires?" Simplic. in Prædic. p. 43. B. edit. Basil. 1551. See before, note *a*, p. 314.

[x] St. Paul has given his sanction to that verse of Aratus, Τοῦ γὰρ καὶ γένος ἐσμέν: "For we are his offspring." Arat. Phœn. v. 5. Acts xvii. 28.

[y] Before we quit this arrangement, we shall subjoin the following note.

The old logicians held, that things intelligible, and intellection, were relatives; so also things sensible, and sensation. But

CHAPTER XI.

CONCERNING ACTION AND PASSION. ACTION, ITS FIVE SPECIES—THOSE OF PASSION RECIPROCATE—MIND DIVINE, HUMAN—LATTER, HOW ACTED UPON—POLITICS, ECONOMICS, ETHICS. PASSIVITY IN BODIES ANIMATE AND INANIMATE. ACTION AND RE-ACTION, WHERE THEY EXIST, WHERE NOT. SELF-MOTION, WHAT, AND WHERE. POWER, WHENCE AND WHAT—REQUISITE BOTH IN ACTION AND IN PASSION. POWER, THOUGH LIKE NONENTITY, YET WIDELY DIFFERENT. DOUBLE IN THE REASONING FACULTY. POWER, NOT FIRST IN EXISTENCE, BUT ENERGY, WHICH NEVER HAS CEASED, OR WILL CEASE, OR CAN CEASE.

In treating of relatives, we have considered principally those which possess the relative character in a degree above every

them they started an objection—If relatives coexist, and always reciprocate in their existence, what would become of Euclid's theorems, supposing there were no geometricians? What would become of sensible objects, supposing there were no beings sensitive?

One solution of this objection is derived from the percipient: the first original and supreme percipient is everywhere, and always in the full energy of universal perception.

Another solution is from the objects perceived, be they sensible or intelligible. Every such object has a double nature; an absolute nature, and a relative one. The sound A is an octave to the sound B. B ceases, and A continues. A is no longer an octave, but still it is a sound: and even though we should call it no sound, if there were to be no hearers; it would still be an undulation of air, capable of producing sound, if there were an ear capable of perceiving it, that is, an organ adequate to the sensation.

The instance given on this occasion by the philosophers Porphyry and Simplicius, is curious, because it is taken from that difficult system of music, the enharmonic. The following are the words of Simplicius: *Κἂν γὰρ διὰ ῥαθυμίαν ἀποβάλωμεν ποτὲ τὴν τῶν ὄντων γνῶσιν, οὐδὲν ἧττον μένει τὰ ὄντα, ὅπερ ἐστὶ τὰ ἐπιστητά· καὶ γὰρ ἐν τῇ μουσικῇ πρότερον μὲν κατηκούομεν διέσεως, νῦν δὲ ἀνεπαίσθητοι τούτου τοῦ διαστήματος ἐσμέν:* "For if ever, through any sloth or indolence, we reject knowledge, those things, which are intelligible, remain nevertheless. It is thus that in music we used in former days to hear the quarter-tone, but now we are unable to distinguish this interval." Simplic. in Præd. p. 48. B. edit. Basil. 1551.

Porphyry having told us, that though there were no geometry, considered as a science, there would still be objects geometrical, subjoins—*ἐκεῖ καὶ ἐν τῇ μουσικῇ τὸ μὲν πάλαι τοῦ διεσιαίου διαστήματος ἤκουον οἱ μουσικοί, ὕστερον δὲ ἀμεληθείσης τῆς ἐναρμονίου μελῳδίας, καθ' ἣν τὸ διεσιαῖον διάστημα ἐμελῳδεῖτο, οὐκέτι τοῦ τοιούτου αἴσθησις ἔσται* (lege *ἐστὶ*) *διαστήματος· καὶ δῆλον ὅτι ἐν τῇ φύσει ἐστὶ τὸ αἰσθητὸν τοῦτο διάστημα, εἰ καὶ ἡ αἴσθησις ἐκλέλοιπεν:* "For thus, too, in music, musicians used formerly to hear (and distinguish) the interval of the quarter-tone; but in latter days, the enharmonic melody having been neglected, by which this interval used to be modulated, there is no longer now any sensation of such an interval: and yet it is evident that this sensible interval has an existence in nature, although for the present the sensation of it be lost." Porphyr. in Prædic. p. 40. ed. Paris. 1543.

Porphyry flourished in the third century; Simplicius in the sixth.

We may remark, by the way, from the above quotations, how fast the arts of elegance were sinking, even in the more early of those two periods.

As for the state of philosophy in the latter period, we may form a judgment of it by what we learn from Simplicius in the same treatise, with regard to the Stoics. Having, in his Commentary on the Predicaments of Action and Passion, given many quotations from the Stoic logic, he concludes the chapter with the following words: *Πολλὴ δὲ ἡ τῶν τοιούτων ἐξερ-*

other. But there are things which, as they possess it blended with characters more eminent, have been formed for that reason into separate arrangements. Such, for example, is the relation between a being and the place which it occupies; that between a being and the time while it exists; the first of which relations gives an answer to the question, *where;* the latter to the question, *when*.

There are also relations of position; relations of habit; and, besides these, there are relations of *action* and *passion;* all of which are distinguished by peculiar attributes of their own, and have therefore merited distinct examinations from the ancient writers upon logic.

Thus, if we consider the two last, I mean *action* and *passion*, we shall find them diffused through every part of the universe; and that, either united in one subject, or else separate, and in different subjects.

By Horace they are united:

> Qui studet optatam cursu contingere metam,
> Multa tulit, fecitque puer. Hor. Art. Poet. 412.

So are they by Livy, in that manly speech of Caius Mucius: Et facere et pati fortia, Romanum est.[z]

So are they by Shakspeare:

> Whether 'tis nobler in the mind to suffer
> The stings and arrows of outrageous fortune,
> Or—by opposing end them. Hamlet.

So are they by Milton:

> Fall'n cherub, to be weak is miserable,
> Doing, or suffering. Par. Lost, i. 157.

In Virgil we see them separated, and passion given to man, action to the Deity:

> O! passi graviora, dabit Deus his quoque finem. Æn. i. 203.

As, therefore, *action* and *passion* are of the most extensive influence; as they partake in some degree the nature of qualities or attributes, by being intimately and essentially connected with substance; while the relatives *when*, *where*, and *position* seem rather connected accidentally: we shall give action and passion their just precedence, and make them the subject of the present chapter.

The species of action are as many as are the different modes of acting in the different species of agents.

γασία παρὰ τοῖς Στωϊκοῖς· ὧν ἐφ' ἡμῶν καὶ ἡ διδασκαλία, καὶ τὰ πλεῖστα τῶν συγγραμμάτων ἐπιλέλοιπεν: "There is much elaborate discussion of these matters among the Stoics, of whom both the doctrine and most of the writings are in our times lost, and at an end." Simpl. in Præd. p. 84. B. edit. Basil. 1551.

Mahomet soon followed, whose successor Omar burnt the Alexandrine library; nor did the succeeding caliphs emerge from barbarity till the race of the Abbassidæ, near two centuries after.

The barbarity of Western Europe continued much longer, and did not begin to lessen till the fifteenth century, that preceding the age of Leo the Tenth.

[z] Liv. ii. 11.

The first sort of action is that of mere *body alone*, considered either as void of sensation wholly, like fire, when it burns; or, at least, as void of sensation, at the time when it operates. Such is that great and universal power, the power of attraction, which all body, animal, vegetable, and elementary, is found to possess in proportion to its quantity; that active power, (if it may for the present be so called,) the effects of which modern philosophy has scrutinized with so much penetration. Such, too, are those energies peculiar to different bodies, and arising out of them from their different natures; as when we say, the heavens emit light; the trees produce leaves; the fields give us corn, &c.

> Cælum nitescere, arbores frondescere,
> Segetes largiri fruges, &c. Cic. Tusc. Disp. i. 28.

Such, too, are those more secret operations of bodies, whether magnetic or electric; to which may be added the virtues and efficacies of bodies medicinal. All these energies in a comprehensive sense may be called the action of body, considered merely as body.[a]

A second sort of action is that which is the result of sensation, instinct, and natural appetite, and which therefore, being complicated, must necessarily be confined to bodies of a higher genus, to *bodies sensitive*, that is, to animals.

> Dente lupus, cornu taurus petit, &c. Hor. Sat. ii. 1.

Nowhere are these actions expressed with more elegance and conciseness, than by our own epic poet, in his Paradise Lost:

> Air, water, earth,
> By fowl, fish, beast, was flown, was swam, was walked.[b] Par. Lost, vii. 502.

There is a third species of action more complicated even than the preceding, being derived not only from sensation, instinct, and natural appetite, but from reason also, superadded to these. This is a mode of action peculiar to man, because of all the animals we see around us, man alone possesses *the reasoning faculty*.

[a] This is that genus of energies which, as Iamblichus describes it, "indicates no action belonging to soul, or to animal nature, or to reasonings, or to life, but which (on the contrary) exhibits the particular energy of bodies, considered as bodies purely inanimate; and that as well with respect to all the peculiarities which appear to surround body, as to all those various inherent powers of bodies, not only as they are solid and capable of resisting, but as they contain within them a multitude of powers that are efficacious and active." Γένος ἐνεργειῶν, ὅπερ ψυχῆς καὶ φύσεως καὶ λόγων καὶ ζωῆς οὐκέτι ἐπιδείκνυσι ποίησιν, τῶν δὲ σωμάτων, ᾗ σώματά ἐστιν ἄψυχα, φανερὰν καθίστησι τὴν σωματοειδῆ ἐνέργειαν κατὰ πάσας μὲν τὰς περὶ τὸ σῶμα τὰς φαινομένας ἰδιότητας, κατὰ πάσας δὲ αὐτῶν τὰς δυνάμεις, οὐχ ᾗ μόνον στερεά ἐστι καὶ ἀντίτυπα, ἀλλ' ᾗ καὶ περὶ αὐτῶν ἔχει πολλὰς δραστηρίους δυνάμεις. Simpl. in Prædic. p. 81. edit. Basil. 1551.

[b] Καὶ δῆλον ὅσα ποτέ ἐστι καὶ ὁποῖα εἴδη τῶν ἀλόγων ζώων, τοσαῦτα καὶ τοιαῦτα καὶ ἐν τῷ ποιεῖν διάφορά ἐστιν εἴδη κατὰ τὴν τοιαύτην ἐνέργειαν, περὶ ὧν ἐν ταῖς περὶ ζώων ἱστορίαις διαριθμεῖσθαι εἰώθαμεν: "It is evident, that as are the species of irrational animals in number and in quality, so many and such are the different species in acting agreeably to this [animal] mode of energy; which several species of acting have been usually enumerated in the histories of animals." Simpl. in Præd. p. 81, ut supra.

Widely diversified is the share assumed by the subordinate faculties of the human soul, in actions of this character. Sometimes they submit to reason, and are (as becomes them) obedient; at other times they reject her, and proceed of themselves. And hence it is, that actions, produced from causes so peculiarly complicated, derive to themselves the colours of good and evil, and are denominated, in distinction to every other deed of man, *actions moral.*

When Virtue and Pleasure addressed the young Hercules, Virtue supposed him to have a reason that could control his appetites; Pleasure supposed him to have appetites that would bear down his reason. Had he obeyed the last, he had been vicious; as he obeyed the first, he was virtuous. There was a conflict in either case between his better part and his worse; and in that conflict both species of faculties were presumed, his rational faculties, and his irrational.[c]

There is a fourth sort of action, where the intellect, operating without passions or affections, stays not within itself, but passes out (as it were) to some external operation. It is thus that nature, considered as an efficient cause, may be called the energy of God, seen in the various productions that replenish and adorn the world. It is thus that art, considered as an efficient cause, may be called the energy of man, which imitates in its operations the plastic power of nature.[d]

The last and most excellent sort of action is seen in contemplation; in the pure energy of simple intellect, keeping within itself, and making itself its own object. This is the highest action of which we are susceptible; and by it we imitate the Supreme Being, as far as is consistent with our subordinate nature. It is to this that our great poet alludes, when speaking of his employment, during a state of blindness, he says,

> Then feed on thoughts, which voluntary move
> Harmonious numbers.[e] Par. Lost, iii. 37.

[c] See Xenoph. Mem. l. ii. c. 1. s. 21.

The above species of action is thus described by Simplicius: Τρίτον δὲ τοῦ ποιεῖν γένος, τὸ ἐν τῷ πράσσειν ἀπηρίθμηται ὅπερ τοῦ λόγου τὰς περὶ τὰ αἰσθητὰ καὶ σύνθετα ποιήσεις ἐπιτροπεύει προαίρεσιν καὶ βούλην, δόξαν τε καὶ σκέψιν, καὶ τὰς τοιαύτας ποιήσεις παρεχόμενον. Simpl. ut supra. "The genus comprehended under the idea of acting morally, is the third of this order; that genus which presides over the energies of reason with respect to the concrete objects of sense, (that is, which presides in the affairs of common life,) and which furnishes upon occasion deliberate choice, volition, opinion, inquiry, and other energies of the same character." Simpl. in Præd. p. 80. B. edit. Bas. 1551.

We have in this place translated πράσσειν, "to act morally," the better to distinguish it from ποιεῖν, a word of meaning more extensive, signifying simply "to do," or "to make."

[d] Τούτου δὲ πολὺ μέν ἐστι τὸ θεῖον, πολὺ δὲ καὶ ἐν ταῖς τέχναις, μιμουμέναις τὴν φύσιν, καὶ τὸ παραλειπόμενον ὑπ' αὐταῖς (lege αὐτῆς) ἀναπληρούσαις. Simplic. ut supra. "Of this species of acting the Divinity has a large share; a large share also falls to arts, that imitate nature, and supply what she has omitted."

[e] This highest mode of action (if it may be so called) is thus described by Simplicius in the same comment, p. 80.

Τὸ περὶ τῶν νοητῶν καὶ ἀμερίστων οὐσιῶν ἐπισκοπούμενον ἁπλαῖς νοήσεσιν: "That which, with simple intellections, inquires concerning substances intelligible

The species of *passion* may be understood by their reciprocating for the most part with those of *action*.

Thus though the Divine Mind, by being pure and intellectual energy, can have nothing passive in its transcendent theory;[f] yet the mind of man, which has intensions and remissions, is for that reason necessarily passive in two important manners: either as truth, real or apparent, demands its assent; or as falsehood, real or apparent, demands its dissent.

It is in consequence of this passivity of the human mind, which I choose to call *passivity intellectual*, that it becomes susceptible of discipline and institution, and thus finds itself adorned (according as it is cultivated) with the various tribes both of arts and sciences.[g]

As the reason of man is acted upon by the appearances of truth and falsehood, so are the appetites of man (and not only of man, but of brutes also) acted upon by the approach of pleasure and pain.[h] This therefore may be called *sensual passivity*, in opposition to the rational above described. It is to this Davus alludes in Horace,

> Etenim fateor, me dixerit ille
> Duci ventre levem: nasum nidore supinor,
> Imbecillus, iners, &c. Hor. Sat. ii. 7. 37.

The moulding this passivity of the human mind into as much of the fair and honest as it is capable of receiving, when it is applied to nations, is called politics; when to families, economics; when to individuals, ethics;[i] and is in general the foundation of moral principles and conduct.

and indivisible; that is, substances, which, having no parts, cannot, like body, be infinitely divided.

Archytas has enumerated these species of energy or action, but in a different manner, beginning with the last of them first, and so proceeding inversely, till he come to the first that is mentioned here, and this he omits. His words are worthy of perusal: *Τὰς δὲ ἐνεργείας διαφοραὶ τρεῖς· τὸ μὲν γάρ τί ἐστιν αὐτᾶς ἐν τῷ θεωρεῖν, οἷον ἀστρονομέν· τὸ δὲ ἐν τῷ ποιεῖν, οἷον ὑγιάζειν, τεκταίνειν· τὸ δὲ ἐν τῷ πράσσειν, οἷον στρατηγεῖν καὶ πολιτεύεσθαι· γίγνεται δὲ ἃ μὲν ἐνέργεια καὶ ἄνευ διανοίας, οἷον ἐν τοῖς ἀλόγοις ζώοις. Γενικάτατα δὲ αὐτά.* Archyt. apud Simpl. in Præd. p. 80. "There are three distinctions of action or energy: one sort of it consists in contemplating, as when we study the stars; another in making, as when we heal a disease, or exercise the art of a carpenter; another [not in making, but] in acting, as when we lead an army, or administer a commonwealth. There is, too, a fourth energy, where there is no use of reasoning, as in animals irrational. These are the forms of action the most general and comprehensive."

Simplicius tells us, that Archytas has omitted the other species, (that which we have mentioned first, and which respects bodies inanimate,) because he did not consider it as a species purely active, nor as arising from any internal and sensitive principle of motion. And yet, perhaps, in an introductory treatise, it can hardly be considered as introduced improperly, though it must be allowed at the same time to want this requisite.

We observe, by the way, that this distinction of actions is called by logicians *actio transiens*, and *actio immanens*, which corresponds in grammar to verbs transitive on one side, and verbs neuter and middle on the other. See Hermes, l. i. c. 9.

[f] See chapter on Qualities, p. 296.

[g] Vid. Arrian. Epict. l. iii. c. 3.

[h] *Δεῖ δὲ τιθέναι καὶ τὸ φαινόμενον ἀγαθὸν ἀγαθοῦ χώραν ἔχειν, καὶ τὸ ἡδύ· φαινόμενον γάρ ἐστιν ἀγαθόν:* "We ought to suppose, that both good apparent and pleasure supply the place of good (real); for pleasure is good apparent." Arist. de Animal. Motu, p. 154. edit. Sylb.

[i] Nicephorus Blemmides adopts this division from the Peripatetic school: *Τὸ δὲ πρακτικὸν διαιρεῖται εἰς ἠθικὸν, οἰκονομικὸν,*

The passivity peculiar to brutes may be seen in the various purposes to which we direct their several powers: some to plough our lands; others to carry us; a third species to hunt for us, &c.[k]

The passivity of insensitive bodies, whether vegetable or not, is equally conspicuous in the various ends to which we apply them. The earth we plough; over the sea we sail; out of the forest we build our ships, &c. This insensitive passivity, though it submit to the action of other bodies upon it, yet always follows the peculiar nature of the being to which it belongs; so that the effects often differ, where the active power is the same.

> Limus ut hic durescit, et hæc ut cera liquescit,
> Uno eodemque igni. Virg. Ecl. viii. 80.

Lastly, all bodies that act by attraction, are themselves reciprocally acted upon, as modern philosophers have clearly demonstrated.

As to action and passion in general, it may be observed, that the great and diversified mixture of them which runs through the world, and is conspicuous in every part of it, has a necessary reference (as all other mixtures have) to principles more simple, out of which it is compounded. Pure activity we may suppose mind; and pure passivity, matter. As mind is capable of acting whatever is possible, so is matter of having, whatever is possible, acted upon it. The former is the source of all forms, distinctions, and beauty; the latter is the receptacle. In the Supreme Mind there is nothing passive; in the lowest matter there is nothing active;[l] while all between is a mixture of both, where in different parts the different principles are prevalent, and from this prevalence give the being its proper character.

If we call man a composite of soul and body, as a rational being, he has a motion of his own; as a sensitive being, he has a motion in common with brutes; as a being merely corporeal,

καὶ πολιτικόν· καὶ ἠθικὸς μέν ἐστι φιλόσοφος, ὁ τὰ ἑαυτοῦ ἤθη καὶ ἄλλου ῥυθμίζειν δυνάμενος· οἰκονομικὸς δὲ, ὁ καὶ οἶκον ὅλον ἐκπαιδεύειν καλῶς ἐπιστάμενος· ὁ δέ γε πόλιν ἢ καὶ πόλεις διεξάγων καὶ διακυβερνῶν ἀρίστως, πολιτικός: "The practical part of philosophy is divided into moral, economical, and political. It is the moral philosopher, who is able to adjust his own manners, and those of any other individual: the economical, who knows how to instruct well a whole family; and he who in the best manner conducts and governs a city, or cities, this philosopher is the political one." Blem. Epitom. Logic. p. 37.

As we have been speaking just before of passivity, it is proper to remark, that the same writer, from the same philosophy, takes notice of two species of it, a better species and a worse; passivity corruptive, and passivity completive: corruptive, as when any being is consumed by fire; completive, as when a being either learns, or is acted upon, either by its intellect or its senses. *Τοῦ πάσχειν δὲ τὸ μέν ἐστι φθαρτικὸν, ὡς τὸ καίεσθαι· τὸ δὲ τελεωτικὸν, ὡς τὸ μανθάνειν, καὶ γινώσκειν, καὶ αἰσθάνεσθαι.* Nic. Blem. Ep. Log. 158.

[k] See page 22. See also, as to the passivity of bodies inanimate, page 21.

[l] See pages 280, 281.

Thus Archytas in Simplicius: *Τὰ καθαρὰ γένη τοῦ ποιεῖν καὶ πάσχειν ἐν τοῖς ἀρχηγικωτάτοις—τοῦ μὲν ποιεῖν ἐν τῷ θεῷ, τοῦ δὲ πάσχειν ἐν τῇ ὕλῃ:* "The pure and simple genera of acting, and being acted upon, exist in the primary and most original of beings; acting, in God; the being acted upon, in matter." Simplic. in Præd. p. 84. B. edit. Basil. 1551.

a motion in common with all bodies whatever. A dog has only the second and third of these motions, and a stone only the last. Thus is the stone least active, the man most so, and the brute between both.

The modes are different under which beings act upon one another.

Some (as the whole tribe of corporeal masses) only act, because they are acted upon, and that too by something external, and perfectly distinct from themselves. It is thus the nail acts upon the timber, because the hammer acts upon the nail; and were not the hammer to drive, the nail would never penetrate.

Now such motion as this is but a species of passivity, because though the beings, which possess it, have an original power to receive motion, they by no means possess an original power to impart it. And hence it follows, that if something did not exist more intrinsically active than themselves, they would never act, and there would be no motion at all.

Action of this kind, (if it deserve the name,) is the action of beings, which, though moveable, are not intrinsically motive, that is, causes of motion.

Another mode of action may be found in the following instances. A lamb acts upon the senses of a wolf—that sensation acts upon his appetite—that appetite acts upon his corporeal organs. By the action of these organs he runs, he seizes, and he devours the lamb.

A child is seen by its mother likely to fall from a precipice. The sensation acts upon her parental affections—these affections act upon her corporeal organs. By the action of these organs she runs, she seizes, and she saves her child.

The instances we are going to allege, appear to be more blended with deliberation and thought. The splendour of the Roman empire acted upon the imagination of Cæsar—that imagination acted upon his desire of sovereign power—that desire acted upon the faculties of his mind and body. By the energy of these faculties he passed the Rubicon, conquered Pompey, enslaved Rome, and obtained the wished-for empire.

Again; the domination of Cæsar acted upon the imagination of Brutus—that imagination acted upon his love for the republic—that love for the republic acted upon his corporeal organs. His hand in consequence plunged a dagger into Cæsar, and, for a time, the republic, which he loved, was restored.

In all these instances the corporeal organs act, like the corporeal masses before mentioned, because they are first acted upon. But then they are not acted upon, as those are, by other external bodies, but by internal appetites, affections, and desires, all which, as well as the organs, are parts of one and the same being. Such being therefore is not, like beings of the first order, in a manner passive and only moveable; but, as it pos-

sesses within itself the power of imparting motion, as well as of receiving it, the action is that of a being, not only moveable, but intrinsically motive.

We may go further, if we please, and suggest a third mode of action, the action of the first mover; that being, which, though motive, is itself perfectly immoveable.

In a series of agents, where each of them imparts motion, which it has previously received, were such agents two, or were they ten, or were they a million, no motion could ever begin, were there not something at their head totally different from them all; something purely impassive; something, which can move, without being moved; in other words, which can impart motion to every thing else, and remain itself immoveable.

It is to this character that Boethius alludes, in his truly sublime address to the Author of the Universe:

> Qui tempus ab ævo
> Ire jubes, stabilisque manens das cuncta moveri.[m]

Considering action, therefore, and the being acted upon with a view to motion and the being moved, we may say that the Peripatetic system (for it is hence we derive these speculations) contemplated all beings in three views; either as moveable, but not motive; or as both moveable and motive; or, lastly, as motive alone, but not moveable.[n]

More is said upon this subject in the subsequent theory concerning motion.[o]

We shall only add, that, in the above modes of acting, when bodies act upon bodies, the action for the greater part is reciprocal. While the oar impels the wave, the wave resists the oar; while the axe hews the timber, the timber blunts the axe; while the earth attracts the moon, the moon attracts the earth. And hence the theory of action and re-action,[p] so accurately scrutinized in modern philosophy.

[m] Τὸ ὀρεκτὸν καὶ τὸ νοητὸν κινεῖ, οὐ κινούμενον: "The desirable and the intelligible move, without being moved." Arist. Metaph. p. 202. edit. Sylb. See below, chap. xvii.

The Latin quotation is from the Consolation of Boethius, and is a part of those hexameters, which, for harmony of numbers and sublimity of sentiment, are perhaps not inferior to any in the Latin language:

O! qui perpetua mundum, &c.

[n] This doctrine is expressed by the Stagirite, but in an inverted order. Τὸ μὲν πρῶτον, οὐ κινούμενον, κινεῖ· ἡ δ' ὄρεξις καὶ τὸ ὀρεκτικὸν κινούμενον, κινεῖ· τὸ δὲ τελευταῖον τῶν κινουμένων οὐκ ἀνάγκη κινεῖν οὐδέν. De Animal. Motu, p. 154. edit. Sylb.

[o] Concerning that motion, which does not arise from the collision of one body with another body, but where the power which moves, and the organs which are moved, appear to be both of them vitally united in one and the same subject, see below, chap. xvii. Concerning the necessity of something, different from body, to put body in motion, *Ibid.* Concerning causative motion, *Ibid.* Concerning immobility, *Ibid.* and Hermes, p. 220, note *c*.

[p] Of this doctrine we have the following account. Αἴτιον δὲ τοῦ μὲν λύεσθαι τὰς κινήσεις, ὅτι τὸ ποιοῦν καὶ πάσχει ὑπὸ τοῦ πάσχοντος· οἷον τὸ τέμνον ἀμβλύνεται ὑπὸ τοῦ τεμνομένου, καὶ τὸ θερμαῖνον ψύχεται ὑπὸ θερμαινομένου, καὶ ὅλως τὸ κινοῦν (ἔξω τοῦ πρώτου) ἀντικινεῖταί τινα κίνησιν· οἷον ὠθοῦν ἀντωθεῖταί πως, καὶ ἀντιβλίβεται τὸ θλίβον: "The cause why motions are stopped, is, that the acting power is also acted upon by that upon which it acts; for example, the cutting power is blunted by that which is cut; and the warming power

If we contemplate the world, as well the vegetable as the animal, we shall perceive action and passion diffused through every part.

And yet it must be observed both of action and of passion, (such at least as those we see around us,) that they are neither of them perpetual in any one particular instance. Corn only nourishes, and hemlock only poisons, when they meet a proper body on which to operate: the musician does not always perform, nor is the ear always affected by sounds: the painter does not always paint, nor is the eye always affected by colours.

And hence the rise of that notable thing called *power;* that dormant capacity, into which both action and passion, when they cease, retreat; and out of which, when they return, as from their source they flow.

There is nothing which appears so nearly to approach nonentity as this singular thing called *power;* yet is there nothing, in fact, so truly different from it.

Of nonentity there are no attributes, no affections; but every power possesses a specific and a limited character, which not only distinguishes it from nonenity, but from every other power.

Thus, among the active powers, the smith, when asleep, has still those powers which make him a smith; the shipwright, when asleep, has still those powers which make him a shipwright. The powers distinguish both from the rest of mankind, who, purely from not having them, are neither smiths nor shipwrights.

The same powers help to distinguish the same artists from one another; for the powers, though invisible, are incommutable; nor can those of the shipwright enable him to forge an anchor, or those of the smith enable him to construct a ship.

If we pass from active to passive powers, we shall find these, after the same manner, to be limited in every subject, and different in every species. Timber has the capacity of becoming a ship, but not an axe; iron, on the contrary, of becoming an axe, but not a ship.[q] And though different agents, by operating on the same patient, may produce different effects, (as the shipwright makes timber into a ship, while the carpenter forms it into a house;) yet still must each effect correspond with the passive capacities; or else, where these fail, there is nothing to be done.

Were the case otherwise, were not the passive powers essentially requisite as well as the active, there would be no reason why any thing might not be made out of any thing.

Far distant, therefore, from nonenity are passive powers,

is cooled by that which is warmed; and, in general, the moving principle (excepting the supreme and first) is reciprocally moved itself under some motion or other; the impelling power, for instance, is after a manner re-impelled; and the compressing power, after a manner re-compressed." Aristot. de Animal. Gener. l. iv. p. 280. edit. Sylb.

[q] See page 267; also p. 292, 293.

however latent: so far, indeed, that where they differ essentially from one another, they often lead to effects perfectly contrary, though the agent which operates be individually the same:

> Limus ut hic durescit, et hæc ut cera liquescit,
> Uno eodemque igni, &c. Virg. ut sup. p. 270.

It is from this theory we perceive the reason of that ancient axiom, *Quicquid recipitur, recipitur secundum modum recipientis;* than which nothing can be more true, when properly understood.

As to the active powers, there is an important distinction between those called rational, and the irrational. The subordinate are mostly confined to the producing one contrary out of two. Fire can only warm, but cannot cool; ice can only cool, but cannot warm. But the rational powers imply both contraries at once, and give to their possessor the alternative of producing either. The musician has the power both of melody and dissonance; the physician, the power both of healing and making sick; the magistrate, the power of deciding both justly and unjustly.

The reason of this is, that rational power alone is founded in science, and it is always one and the same science which recognises contraries; that which teaches us harmony, teaches us discord; that which informs us what is health, informs us what is disease; that which discerns truth, discerns also falsehood. Hence, therefore, it is, that as every science may be called double in its powers of knowledge,[r] so all action founded on science may be called double in its powers of acting.[s] A noble privilege this to man, if well employed; a truly unfortunate one, if abused; since by this he alone, of all sublunary beings, is properly entitled either to praise or dispraise.

With respect to powers in general, there is this to be observed: so important are they to the constitution of many beings, that often, though latent, they are more regarded than

[r] Ἱκανὸν γὰρ θάτερον μέρος τῆς ἐναντιώσεως, ἑαυτό τε κρίνειν, καὶ τὸ ἀντικείμενον· καὶ γὰρ τῷ εὐθεῖ καὶ αὐτὸ καὶ τὸ κάμπυλον γινώσκομεν, κριτὴς γὰρ ἀμφοῖν ὁ κανών· τὸ δὲ κάμπυλον, οὔθ' ἑαυτοῦ οὔτε τοῦ εὐθέος: "One of the two parts in the contrariety is sufficient to judge both itself and its opposite. It is thus that by the straight we come to know both the straight and the crooked, for the straight rule of the artist is a judge of both. But the crooked, on the other side, is no judge either of itself, or of the straight." Arist. de An. i. 5.

[s] Καὶ τῶν δυνάμεων αἱ μὲν ἔσονται ἄλογοι, αἱ δὲ μετὰ λόγου—καὶ αἱ μὲν μετὰ λόγου πᾶσαι τῶν ἐναντίων αἱ αὐταί, αἱ δὲ ἄλογοι, μία ἑνός· οἷον τὸ θερμὸν τοῦ θερμαίνειν μόνον, ἡ δέ ἰατρικὴ νόσου καὶ ὑγιείας αἴτιον. Αἴτιον δὲ, ὅτι λόγος ἐστὶν ἡ ἐπιστήμη, ὁ δὲ λόγος ὁ αὐτὸς δηλοῖ τὸ πρᾶγμα, καὶ τὴν στέρησιν: "Of powers, some will be found irrational, others are attended with reason: and as to those which are attended with reason, the same powers will extend to things contrary: but as to the irrational, one power will extend only to one contrary: what is hot, for example, will only conduce to heating; but the art of medicine will become the cause both of disease and of health. The cause is, that this medicinal science is reason, and the same reason discovers both the thing and its privation." Arist. Metaph. p. 143. edit. Sylb.

See also p. 68, and note *f*; and p. 294, especially in note *i*.

the strongest apparent attributes. Thus it is from their medicinal powers only that we value the several species of drugs; and from their generative powers only that we value the several species of seed, while little regard is paid to their sensible, that is, their apparent qualities, further than as they help to indicate those invisible powers.

The just opposite to power is *energy*, which, as its etymology shews,[t] implies the existing in deed or act, as opposed to that existence which only implies possibility.

And here it is worth observing, that every thing existing in power is necessarily roused into energy by something, which itself existed previously in energy.[u] Events and incidents never stand still; some agents or other are perpetually energizing, though all, perhaps, by turns have their respites and relaxations, as many of them, at least, as are of the subordinate tribe. It happens, indeed, in the world, as in a ship upon a voyage. Every hand at a proper season has his hours of rest, and yet the duty never ceases, the business of the ship is never at a stand; those that wake, rousing those that sleep, and being in their turn roused again themselves.

But another way to shew that energy is of necessity previous to power, consists in admitting the contrary hypothesis.

Let us suppose, for example, a man placed in a part of space, where there was, and ever had been, eternal silence; or otherwise in a part where there was, and ever had been, eternal darkness; could such a one ever actually either have heard or seen, however exquisite his powers both of hearing and seeing? And why not? Because to the evocation of one of these powers, there is a necessity of actual sound; to that of the other, of actual light; so that had not these energies existed previously, his powers must have remained dormant through the period of their existence. Suppose, therefore, all energies of all kinds to stop; how could they ever revive? Were they all once sunk into one universal sleep, where should we find a waking cause, to rouse them from their slumbers?[x]

[t] Ἐν ἔργῳ, "In act, in deed." See a sketch of the difference between *act* and *power*, p. 7.

[u] It was a doctrine of the Peripatetic school, ὅτι πρότερον ἐνέργεια δυνάμεώς ἐστι: "that energy is prior to power:" Arist. Metaph. p. 150. 152.—ἀεὶ γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ δυνάμει ὄντος γίγνεται τὸ ἐνεργείᾳ ὂν ὑπὸ ἐνεργείᾳ ὄντος· οἷον ἄνθρωπος ἐξ ἀνθρώπου, μουσικὸς ὑπὸ μουσικοῦ, ἀεὶ κινοῦντός τινος πρώτου· τὸ δὲ κινοῦν ἐνεργείᾳ ἤδη ἐστίν: "that which exists in energy is always formed out of that which exists in power, by something which exists (already) in energy; for example, man is formed by man, the musical artist by the musical artist, there being always some first (or prior) being, which gives the motion. Now that which gives this motion is itself already in energy." Aristot. Metaph. p. 151. edit. Sylb.

Ὅσα φύσει γίγνεται ἢ τέχνῃ, ὑπὸ ἐνεργείᾳ ὄντος γίγνεται ἐκ τοῦ δυνάμει τοιούτου: "Whatever things are made either by nature or by art, are made out of something, having a capacity to become the thing produced, and that through the operation of something, which already exists in energy." De Animal. Gener. p. 204. edit. Sylb.

[x] It is hence that Aristotle, speaking according to the principles of his philosophy,

And what then are the inferences from this speculation, that power necessarily arises from previous energy? One is, that all those doctrines about order springing from disorder, beauty from confusion; of night and chaos being the oldest of beings; in general, of the perfect and actual arising from the imperfect and potential; however they may be true as to the material cause of things, yet are they far from being true with respect to their real and essential origin. There is nothing, in fact, more certain, than that the actual and perfect are previous to their contraries; else there could never have been in the universe any thing actual or perfect.

Another inference is, that the most minute and contemptible energy, now actually existing, necessarily proves the existence of an eternal energy, to which, as to its cause, it is ultimately referable. And what can such eternal energy be, but something whose very essence is that energy;[7] something, which knows no remissions, like subordinate energies, no occasional retirings into power and dead capacity, but is ever the same immutable and perfect? Without such a principle the universe could never have begun; or when once begun, could never have been continued. And what shall we call this principle? Shall we call it body or mind? The best way to answer this, will be to search within ourselves, where we may discover, if we attend, a portion of either being, together with the several attributes appertaining to each.

And so much for the two arrangements or predicaments of *action* and *passion*.

says of things eternal, unalterable, and necessary, that is, things ever in energy—*εἰ ταῦτα μὴ ἦν, οὐδὲν ἂν ἦν*, "if these were not, there could be nothing." Metaph. 153, ut supra. It is a pertinent question, stated by the same author, in another part of the same tract—*Πῶς γὰρ κινηθήσεται, εἰ μηθὲν ἔσται ἐνεργείᾳ αἴτιον; οὐ γὰρ ἥγε ὕλη κινήσει αὐτὴ ἑαυτήν:* "How can things ever be set in motion, if there be no cause (previously) existing in energy? Mere matter itself cannot move itself." Ibid. 201. And soon before, in the same page, *Ἐνδέχεται γὰρ τὸ δυνάμει ὂν μὴ εἶναι· δεῖ ἄρα εἶναι ἀρχὴν τοιαύτην, ἧς ἡ οὐσία ἐνέργεια:* "It may happen, that the thing, which exists in power only, may not exist at all: there must, therefore, be (in the universe) such a sort of principle, as that the very essence of it should be energy."

[7] See the note preceding. The founder of the Peripatetic sect, speaking of the Deity, uses the following expressions: *ἡ γὰρ νοῦ ἐνέργεια, ζωή· Ἐκεῖνος δὲ, ἡ ἐνέργεια:* "The energy of mind or intellect, is life: and He (the Supreme Being) is that energy." Metaph. p. 203. See also Ammon. in Lib. de Interpretat. p. 198. B. &c. where the arrangement of beings is deeply and philosophically discussed and exhibited. *Ἑξῆς δὲ τούτοις ἐπιδείξαι βουλόμενος, κ. τ. λ.*

It is agreeably to this reasoning we are told, *Τοῦ χρόνου ἀεὶ προλαμβάνει ἐνέργεια ἑτέρα πρὸ ἑτέρας, ἕως τῆς τοῦ ἀεὶ κινοῦντος πρώτως:* "that one energy in point of time always precedes another, till we arrive at the energy of that Being, which eternally gives motion in the first instance." Metaph. Θ. η'. p. 152. edit. Sylb.

Which is as much as to affirm, (in other words,) that there is a gradual ascent of active efficient principles, one above another, up to that one active Principle which is original and supreme.

CHAPTER XII.

CONCERNING WHEN AND WHERE. CONCERNING TIME AND PLACE, AND THEIR DEFINITION. WHEN AND WHERE, HOW DISTINGUISHED FROM TIME AND PLACE, HOW CONNECTED WITH THEM. DESCRIPTIONS OF WHEN AND WHERE—THEIR UTILITY AND IMPORTANCE IN HUMAN LIFE—VARIOUS TERMS DENOTING THESE TWO PREDICAMENTS—OTHERS DENOTING THEM NOT, YET MADE TO DENOTE THEM. WHEN AND WHERE, THEIR EXTENSIVE INFLUENCE—PLAUSIBLE TOPICS—CONCURRING CAUSES. OPPORTUNITY, WHAT. CHANCE, WHAT IT IS NOT, WHAT IT IS. FATE, PROVIDENCE. COOPERATING CAUSES. SUPREME INTELLIGENCE.

We have said already, that time and place agree, as they both belong to quantity continuous.[a] So essential is this character, that could either of them be separated, as we separate a piece of timber, there would then be intervals without time, and distances without place. Thus far then they agree, while in this they differ, that a million of different things may exist in one instant of time, but never more than one thing at once can occupy one place.

And hence the nature of *place* may be called *distributive*, while that of *time* may be called *accumulative*. Hence, too, as they agree in some respects, and differ in others, they are necessarily not simple, but compound ideas, both belonging to one genus, and each distinguished by specific differences. Having a genus and a difference, they become capable of definition, since it is on these two requisites that all definition is founded.[a]

Time, therefore, is continuity, successive in itself, and accumulative of its proper subjects; *place* is continuity, co-existent in itself, and distributive of its proper subjects.

We have said thus much about these two beings, because *when* and *where*, though distinct from both,[b] are necessarily connected with them, and cannot well be understood without reference to this connection.

Men, human affairs, and universally all sensible and corporeal beings, as none of them are infinite either in duration or extent, must have something of course to limit and circumscribe them. Now *place* circumscribes their extent, and *time* their duration; and hence the necessary connection of things corporeal with these two; and not only of things themselves, but of all their

[a] See before, p. 303, 304.

[a] Omnis definitio constat genere et differentia. Fell, 218. Termini vero essentiales (definitionis scil.) genus et differentia. Sanderson, l. i. c. 17. See also Wallisii Logic. l. i. c. 23. Οἱ μὲν γὰρ ὁρισμοὶ ἐκ γένους καὶ τῶν συστατικῶν εἰσι διαφορῶν, τουτέστι τῶν εἰδοποιῶν. Amm. in quinque voces, p. 67.

[b] How they are distinct, see below, particularly in note *d*, also p. 337.

motions, of all their accidents; in short, of all they are able to do, and of all they are able to suffer.

For example, certain persons are to meet for a certain purpose. They must be informed of the time and place, or their meeting would not be practicable. First, then, for the time:

> When shall we three meet again,
> In thunder, light'ning, or in rain? Shaksp. Macbeth.

The answer to this question connects their meeting with a certain time; and in the relation between these two, we behold the rise of the predicament, *when:*

> When the battle's lost and won,
> When the hurly burly's done.[c]

Again:

> Where's the place?

The answer to this question connects their meeting with a certain place; and in the relation between these two, we see the rise of the predicament, *where:*

> Upon the heath,
> There we go to meet Macbeth.[d]

Let us take another example. Virgil, we are informed, wrote his Georgics at Naples. By Naples, in this instance, is the place of Virgil circumscribed, which might else have been at Rome, at Mantua, &c. The connection therefore of Virgil with this city gives us an answer to the question, *where?*

Again, he wrote them, we are told, while Cæsar Augustus was on his Oriental expedition. Here the time of this expedition circumscribes the time of writing, which might else have been (for aught we know) during the wars with Brutus, with Antony, &c. This relative connection gives an answer to the question, *when?*

> Dum Cæsar ad altum
> Fulminat Euphraten bello, victorque volentes
> Per populos dat jura, viamque affectat Olympo:
> Illo Virgilium me tempore dulcis alebat
> Parthenope, studiis florentem ignobilis oti. Georg. iv. sub. fin.

[c] Οὐ μέντοι οὔτε τῷ χρόνῳ ταυτὸν τὸ ποτὲ, ἀλλ' εἴπερ ἄρα, ἐν σχέσει τῇ πρὸς τὸν χρόνον: "Nor is *when* the same with *time;* but if any thing, it consists in the relation which it bears to time." Simpl. in Præd. p. 87. B. ed. Bas. 1551. And again: Ὅταν δέ τι πρᾶγμα, ἕτερον ὂν τοῦ χρόνου, καὶ οὐχ ὡς μέρος χρόνου λαμβανόμενον, σχέσιν ἔχει πρὸς χρόνον, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἐν χρόνῳ ἐστὶν, ὥσπερ ἡ ἐν Σαλαμῖνι ναυμαχία ἐν τῷδε χρόνῳ· τότε ἄλλη κατηγορία γίγνεται, ἢ τοῦ ποτὲ, ἄλλη οὖσα παρὰ τὸ ποσόν: "But when any particular thing, which is assumed from time, and which is not assumed as any part of time, has a relation to time, and for this reason is in time; as, for example, the sea-fight at Salamis, which happened at such a particular time: then there arises a different predicament, that of *when*, a predicament different from that of *quantity*." Simplic. in Præd. p. 88. ejusd. edit.

[d] Ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τοῦ χρόνου ἄλλο μὲν ἦν ὁ χρόνος, ἄλλο δὲ τὸ κατὰ χρόνον, ἢ χρόνου τί· οὕτως ἄλλο μὲν ὁ τόπος, ἄλλο δὲ τὸ κατὰ τόπον, ἢ τόπου τί: "For as in *time*, time itself is one thing, and that which is according to time, or something belonging to it, is another thing; so also is *place* one thing, and that which is according to place, or something belonging to it, another thing." Simpl. in Præd. ut sup.

Ubi non est locus, sed esse in loco. Quando non est tempus, sed esse in tempore. Fell, p. 104, 107.

These elegant lines, which we so justly admire, are in fact nothing more than the common date of an epistle; as if the author, having finished his work, had subjoined Naples, such a month, such a year: so great, even in trivial matters, is the force of numbers, and sublime ideas.

Hence, then, we perceive the nature both of *when* and of *where*. *When* is not mere *time*, nor is it *beings* and *events*; but it is beings and events, as they stand related to time. Again, *where* is not properly *place*, nor is it *beings* and *events*; but it is beings and events, as they stand related to place.[e] If therefore the *when* only be given, and not the *where*, then might the thing have happened either here, or at the antipodes: and, by parity of reasoning, if the *where* only be given, and not the *when*, then might the event have happened, either yesterday, or before the flood. It is then only comes precision, when we view the two united.[f]

And hence, by the way, the utility and praise of those two subordinate accomplishments (for sciences I cannot call them) geography and chronology. By acquainting us with the relations borne by illustrious persons and great events to the different portions both of time and of place, they afford us proper means to contemplate human affairs; to view the general order and concatenation of events, and our own connection with this order, as members of the same universe.

In general it may be observed, that whatever is an answer to the question *where*, belongs to the genus or predicament of *where*; and whatever is an answer to the question *when*, belongs in like manner to the predicament of *when*. *When* did such a thing happen?—*Now; this instant; to-day; yesterday; a century ago; in such a year of our Lord; such a year of the Hegira; such a year of Rome; such an Olympiad*, &c. To these may be added such terms in the past as *lately*, *formerly*, *long ago*, &c.; and such also in the future as *immediately*, *soon*, *hereafter*,[g] &c. Again: *where* did such a thing happen?—*Here; there; in England; in Europe; in China; in the moon; in the sun*, &c. To these may be added such terms as *near*, *far off*, *above*, *below*, &c.

All these terms, by thus answering these questions, serve to indicate the relation of some being or event, either to time or to

[e] The force of this arrangement or predicament *where*, is finely contrasted with the predicament of *quantity*, in that laconic apopthegm of Agis. "The Lacedæmonians (said he) do not ask how many the enemies are, but where they are:" Οὐκ ἔφη δὲ τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους ἐρωτᾷν πόσοι εἰσὶν οἱ πολέμιοι, ἀλλὰ ποῦ εἰσιν. Plut. Lacon. Apophth. p. 215. D. edit. Xyland.

[f] Οὕτως δὲ καὶ τὸ ποῦ καὶ τὸ ποτὲ ἀδελφά πως ἐστὶ πρὸς ἄλληλα, κοινὴν ἐπίσης παρέχοντα τὴν συντέλειαν πρὸς ὅλην τὴν γένεσιν, καὶ τοῖς κινουμένοις τὴν ἴσην χρείαν συμβαλλόμενα: "And thus it is that *when* and *where* are a sort of brothers one to another, affording equally a common perfection to all things that are generated, and contributing an utility of equal value to all things that are in motion. Simplic. in Præd. p. 87. ed. Basil. 1551.

[g] See many of these terms elegantly and accurately explained in Aristotle's Physics, l. iv. c. 13. The terms alluded to are νῦν, ποτὲ, ἤδη, ἄρτι, πάλαι, ἐξαίφνης, κ.τ.λ.

place; and though some of them do it with greater precision, and some with less, yet did they not all do it in some degree, they could not belong to these two predicaments.

We cannot assert the same of such terms as *an inch*, *a foot*, or *a cubit; a day*, *a month*, or *a year*. The reason is, they indicate no relation of time or place to particular things, but only measure out definite portions in these two infinite natures.

With regard to the human body, not only the whole fills its proper place, but so, too, does every limb. Hence, as its particular place is a measure to each limb, so is this limb in its turn made a measure to that place, in order to define a like portion of it, existing elsewhere.[h] And hence the origin of such measures as an inch, a foot, a cubit, and the like, which are all of them deduced from certain limbs in the human body.

But though the limbs of man were tolerably adequate to measure place, yet were his motions by no means adequate to the mensuration of time, derived (as they appear) from such a number of appetites; from such a variety of fancies and contradictory opinions. Here, therefore, were mankind obliged to quit themselves, and to recur to motions more orderly than their own; to the real motion of the moon, to the apparent motions of the sun, in order to obtain such orderly measures as those of days, and months, and years.

And thus, from the nature and origin of these terms, we may perceive how they are distinguished from the predicaments of *where* and *when*.

There is (if I may use the expression) an *enlarged when*, such as *to-day*, *during this month*, *this year*, *this century;* and a *precise when*, the indivisible instant in which the event happened. So also is there an *enlarged where*, as *in London*, *in England*, *in Europe*, &c.; and a *precise where*, that is to say, the exact place which each individual fills.[i]

Now as every man exists in such a *precise where*, and during such a *precise when*, so is it with reference to these two relations of his own, that he recognises the *when* and the *where* of all other beings. *When* lived Charles the Great?—Almost three hundred years before the first crusade. Though this answer tells us the distance between Charles and that expedition, yet are we still uninformed as to the time when he lived, unless we have something given us to connect him with ourselves. And *when*, we demand, happened the first crusade?—About seven hundred years ago. Here we have the temporal relation between ourselves and

[h] This is, indeed, a common property to all mensuration, that the measurer and the thing measured should reciprocate; so that while the gallon measures the wine, the wine should measure the gallon; while the ell measures the silk, the silk should measure the ell.

See before, the quotation given in note *p*, page 254. Χόϊνιξ is there rendered a "quart," not as if this last represented that Greek measure, but as it was a measure familiar to an English reader.

[i] See Hermes, p. 151, note.

that event; so that having previously learned the like relation between that event and Charles the Great, we of course recognise the time when that prince existed; that is to say, the temporal relation between our own existence and his. The same, too, happens in ascertaining the place *where*.

And hence it follows, that such measures of time and place as *a year*, *a century*, *a foot*, *a furlong*, though they belong not of themselves to the present predicaments or arrangements, may yet be made a part of them by being properly associated. Such they become, when we say *a furlong hence*, *a century since*, *a foot below*, *a year after*. The reason is, they are brought by such association to define relative existence, in doing which the very essence of these predicaments consists.

And now a word as to the force of these two predicaments, their influence in the world, and more particularly in human affairs.

Cæsar, when he was assassinated, fell at the feet of Pompey's statue. The celebrated Hampden received his death's wound upon that field where he had first executed the ordinance for levying troops to serve the parliament.[k] From a royal banqueting house, built by himself in prosperity, was an unfortunate prince led to an unjust execution. In each of these instances, the place *where* is a plausible topic; a topic equally suited either to raise compassion, or, if we would sophisticate more harshly,[l] to insinuate judgments, divine vengeance, &c. But to quit topical arguments, which, in fact, demonstrate nothing:

It was by an unfortunate fall so near the conclusion of the race, that the swift-footed Salius lost the prize to young Euryalus.[m] It was by being attacked *when* asleep, and overpowered with liquor, that the gigantic Polypheme fell a sacrifice to Ulysses.[n] It was by living in an age *when* a capricious audience ruled, that the elegant Menander so often yielded to Philemon, his inferior by the confession of all succeeding ages.[o] "The race is not to the swift, nor the battle to the strong, nor yet favour to men of skill; but time and chance happeneth to them all."[p]

The same concurring causes, which acted in these cases like adversaries, can become in others the most powerful allies. *Δός μοι ποῦ στῶ*, "Give me *where* to stand," was a well-known saying of the famous Archimedes. He wanted but a place where to fix his machine, and he thought himself able to move even the world.[q] Shakspeare tells us,

[k] Clarendon's History, book vii.

[l] Luke xiii. 4.

[m] Æneid. v. 286, &c.

[n] Odyss. ix. sub. fin.

[o] Vid. Quinctil. l. x. c. 1. A. Gell. l. xvii. c. 4. who says of him, Ambitu, gratiaque, et factionibus sæpenumero vincebatur.

[p] Ecclesiastes ix. 11.

[q] See the Life of Archimedes, in Rivaltus's edition of his works. Paris, 1615. folio.

There *is a tide* in the affairs of men,
Which, taken at the flood, leads on to fortune:
Omitted, all the voyage of their life
Is bound in shallows. Julius Cæsar, act iv. sc. 5.

When Horace sent a messenger with some of his works to Augustus, his charge was to deliver them if Augustus was in health; and not only so, but in good humour; and not only so, but in a humour to call for them:

Si validus, si lætus erit, si denique poscet.
Hor. Epist. l. ii. ep. 13.

Such a stress did this polite author lay on the propriety of the *when*. Virgil mentions finely the

Mollissima fandi
Tempora. Æneid. iv. 293.

He makes, too, his Fury suspend her powers of mischief, till she could catch a lucky moment to make her influence more extensive:

At sæva e speculis tempus dea nacta nocendi,
Tartaream intendit vocem, &c. Æneid. vii. 511.

And hence we may collect a just idea of the term *opportunity*. It is not merely time, concurring with events, for time attends them all, be they prosperous or adverse; but it is time, concurring favourably; it is time, cooperating as an auxiliary cause.[r]

Time (it is said) and chance happeneth to all. And what is this *chance?* Is it the *chance* mentioned by Milton as residing at the court of Chaos?[s] Or is it the same which some philosophers suppose to have framed the world, and to have maintained in it ever since no inconsiderable sway? If such *chance* be the strict opposite to a rational principle, it is hard to conceive how it should have supplied its place, and without the least ingenuity have produced a work so ingenious. It is hard, also, to conceive, how without a reason that should exist, which it requires so much reason (even in part only) to comprehend.[t] There is, however, another sort of *chance*, which, under the name of *fortune*, we find described as follows: "a cause not manifest to human reasoning;[u] not a cause devoid of reason, but a cause which human reason wants the means to investigate."

[r] According to the Stagirite, *good* passes through all the predicaments, and, as it stops at each, assumes a different denomination. In substance, it is *mind* and *deity;* in quality, it is that which is just; in quantity, that which is exact, and according to measure; and in the predicament *when*, it is *opportunity;* ἐν δὲ τῷ πότε, ὁ καιρός· that is to say, *good* or *favourable*, acceding to the time *when*, and characterizing it, gives it by such accession the name of *opportunity*. Aristot. Ethic. Eudem. p. 86. edit. Sylb. Locum autem actionis, opportunitatem temporis esse dicunt; *tempus* autem *actionis opportunum* Græce εὐκαιρία, Latine appellatur *occasio*. Cic. de Offic. i. 40.

[s] Paradise Lost, book ii. 965.

[t] Hanc igitur in Stellis constantiam, hanc tantam tam variis cursibus in omni æternitate convenientiam temporum, non possum intelligere sine mente, ratione, consilio. Cic. de Nat. Deor. ii. 21. Dubitant de mundo, ex quo et oriuntur et fiunt omnia, casune ipse sit effectus aut necessitate aliqua, an ratione ac mente divina: et Archimedem arbitrantur plus valuisse in imitandis sphæræ conversionibus, quam naturam in efficiendis. Cic. de Nat. Deor. ii. 34.

[u] Δοκεῖ μὲν αἰτία ἡ τυχὴ, ἄδηλος δὲ ἀνθρωπίνῃ διανοίᾳ. Arist. Phys. ii. 4. p. 33. edit. Sylb. Instead of διανοίᾳ, they used afterwards the term λογισμῷ.

We may learn from experience, that whatever opening there may be left for human freedom, (and enough is there left, both for merit and demerit,) it is not so uncontrolled as in the least to affect the universe. It is not in our power to interrupt the course of nature; nor can we, like the giants of old, heap mountain upon mountain. There is an irreversible order of things, to which we necessarily submit; an indissoluble concatenation of successive causes with their effects, by which both the being and the well-being of this whole are maintained.

This divine order or concatenation has different denominations: referred to the Supreme Being as to its author, we call it *fate;* referred to his foresight for the good of all, we call it *providence.*[x]

It is this which mingles itself with all our actions and designs; which cooperates with the pilot, the husbandman, and the merchant; nor with these alone, but with all of every degree, from the meanest peasant, up to the mightiest monarch. If it cooperate favourably, they succeed; if otherwise, they fail. And hence the supposed efficacy of time and place, so often of such importance in this cooperation. It is hence, "the race is not to the swift, nor the battle to the strong," &c.

A pilot sails, with intention to reach a certain port. All that the skill of a good navigator can suggest, is done; yet he sails at a time when hurricanes arise, and, instead of gaining the destined port, is dashed upon the rocks. A farmer with proper industry manures and sows his fields; yet the seasons destroy his harvest, and (according to his own phrase) "the times fight against him." A merchant travels, for the sake of gain, to a distant country, and there contracts a pestilential disease, which carries him off.

These incidents, thus connected with time and place, are referred in common language to chance, as to their cause; and so indeed they may, as far as *chance* implies a *cause*, which human reasoning was not able either to foresee or obviate. But if we go further, and suppose it a cause, where there is, in fact, no reason at all; in such case we do nothing less than deify *chance*, committing the affairs of the world to the blindest of guides, instead of that One, All-good, All-powerful, Divine Intelligence, which, in the same undivided instant, both sees and hears all things.[y]

And so much for the two genera or arrangements of *when* and *where*.

[x] Three terms are here employed, *chance*, *fate*, and *providence;* the two first of which have been often improperly asserted, the last has been often hardily denied, and all this to favour the Atheistic system.

The author of these notes has endeavoured to give such meanings to the terms *chance* and *fate*, as may render them subservient to the cause of Providence, and by making them wholly dependent on the supreme intelligent principle, to make them weaken the system of Atheism, rather than contribute to its support.

[y] See Epicharmus, quoted in note *a*, p. 282.

CHAPTER XIII.

CONCERNING POSITION OR SITUATION. WHAT IT IS, AND HOW DEDUCED—HOW IT EXISTS IN BEINGS INANIMATE—IN VEGETABLES—IN MAN—ANIMAL PROGRESSION. WORKS OF ART. ATTITUDES—ILLUSTRATIONS OF ATTITUDE—FROM POETS—FROM ACTORS—FROM ORATORS. ITS EFFICACY, WHENCE. POSITION, AMONG THE ELEMENTS OF DEMOCRITUS—ITS INFLUENCE AND IMPORTANCE IN THE NATURAL WORLD—IN THE INTELLECTUAL.

THE arrangement or predicament of *position* or *situation* has a near affinity with that of *place*. They are both of the relative order, and are both conversant, when taken strictly, about corporeal substances only. They differ, however, inasmuch as the simple possession of space constitutes *place*; the manner of possessing it, *position*, or *situation*.[a]

Now the manner, in which a body possesses space, has respect to certain relations, which exist, some within, and some without it; relations, which arise from its parts, its whole, its immediate place, and the place surrounding it.

We shall explain what we assert, (which perhaps may appear obscure,) by beginning from bodies the most simple, and passing from these to others, more complex and diversified.

The simplest and most perfectly similar of all bodies is the sphere.[a] If, therefore, we take a sphere, and place it upon the ground, the part furthest from the earth's centre we call its *top*; that the nearest, its *bottom*; and all lying between we call its

[a] Differt *situs* ab *ubi* in hoc, quod *ubi* est locatio totius, *situs* est ordinatio partium in loco. *Ubi* est simpliciter esse in loco; *situs* secundum partium ordinationem. Fell, p. 104.

Ad situm omnem requiritur triplex habitudo, quæ conjuncta constituit situm; habitudo partium alicujus totius inter se; partium alicujus totius ad ipsum totum; partium et totius ad locum. Sanderson, p. 49. l. i. c. 14.

Prædicamentum situs (κεῖσθαι) respicit positionem rei, tum respectu partium suarum inter se, tum respectu loci, aliarumque rerum. Wallis, l. i. c. 13.

Οὔτε οὖν τὸ κείμενον σῶμα, οὔτε τὸν τόπον, ἐν ᾧ κεῖται, τῇ διανοίᾳ περιλαμβάνοντα, δεῖ νοεῖν τὸ κεῖσθαι, μόνην δὲ τὴν ἔχουσάν πως θέσιν ἐν τῷ γένει τοῦ κεῖσθαι λογιζόμενον κατὰ πάντα τὰ ὄντα, ὅσα πέφυκεν ἕτερα ὑφ' ἑτέρων ἀνέχεσθαι, ἢ ἐνιδρύεσθαι τὰ ἕτερα ἐν τοῖς ἑτέροις· ἡ γὰρ τοιάδε συμπλοκὴ τῶν ἐνιδρυμένων καὶ τῶν τὴν ἕδραν παρεχόντων κυριωτάτη καὶ πρωτίστη ἐστὶ τοῦ κεῖσθαι ὑπογραφή: "We are not to understand the genus of *lying*, or *position*, by taking into our discussion either the body lying, or the place in which it lies, but singly and solely by taking into our account the peculiar mode of *site* in the genus of lying, as it runs through all those ranks of beings, which are formed by nature to be supported some of them by others, or to be seated some of them upon others; for it is this connection between things that are seated, and things that afford the seat, which makes the primary and the strictest description of *lying*, or *position*." Simpl. in Præd. p. 85. edit. Basil. 1551.

[a] The sphere, and other solid figures, soon after mentioned in this chapter, are, for the greatest part, well known. He, however, who wishes for ocular inspection, may find them all (the sphere alone excepted) among the diagrams of the eleventh and twelfth books of Euclid, to which books we refer him, as they are easy to be had, under various editions.

middle. These distinctions in the sphere regard external objects only, because the sphere, being everywhere similar, contributes nothing to them itself. If we roll it, therefore, along, the distinctions are not lost; only, while the motion continues, they perpetually vary, and that merely with reference to local distinctions, existing without.

And hence it follows, that the sphere, though it have *place*, yet according to these reasonings has in strictness no *position*, because it has no peculiar parts deducible from its own figure, which parts can be called *top* or *bottom*, as contradistinguished one to another.

What is true of the sphere, may be asserted almost as truly of the five Platonic bodies, the equilateral pyramid, the cube, the octoedron, &c., and that, because they are not only regular, but because their several faces are every way similar.

What is true of these bodies, is true also of their opposites, the bodies I mean, which are not only dissimilar, but universally irregular. Fragments of rock, and hillocks of sand, have neither top nor bottom, but what is merely casual; and therefore, though of necessity they exist in place by being bodies, yet, as they have no internal local distinctions under the meaning here adopted, it of course follows they cannot properly have position.

But if we pass to those bodies which are neither irregular, like the broken rock, because they have order and proportion; nor yet every way similar, like the sphere, because they have extensions that are unequal, (such, for example, as the cylinder, or the parallelipopedon;) here we shall find the very bodies, from their own attributes, to concur with the world around, both in acquiring to themselves position, as well as in diversifying it.

The cylinder, for example, extends further one way than another, and therefore possesses within itself three such parts, as two extremes, and one mean. If we so place it, therefore, that one of these extremes (no matter which) shall be most remote from the earth's centre, and the other most near; in such case, by this manner of blending external and internal relations, the cylinder is said *to stand.* If we remove in part the higher extreme from its perpendicular, and thus differently blend relations, the cylinder is said *to incline.* And if we pursue this inclination, till the two extremes of top and bottom become horizontal, then it is said *to lie.* The motion which leads from standing to lying, we call *falling;* that from lying to standing, we call *rising.* Every one of these affections may well happen to the cylinder, because its peculiar figure, taken with its peculiar place, cooperates to the production of the positions here described.

It is not so with those bodies already mentioned, where these internal characters are not distinguished. The sphere and the

cube neither fall nor rise, because they neither stand nor lie more at one time than another.

But suppose we go further: suppose to one extreme of this cylinder we add a new part, that is a capital; to the other extreme another part, that is a base: the two extremes of the cylinder would no longer in such case remain indiscriminate, but the characters of top and bottom would become distinguished and ascertained, even in the figure itself, without looking to things external.

The consequences of these new characters are new modes of position. A pillar (for such we must now suppose it) is not only capable, like the simple cylinder, of standing and of lying, but inasmuch as two of its parts, that is to say, its extremes, are essentially distinguished, if it rest on its base, it stands upright; if on its capital, it stands inverted.

Let us carry our suppositions further, and by a metamorphosis, like one of Ovid's, transform this pillar into a tree. Let the capital sprout into branches, the shaft become a trunk, and the base strike into roots. Here then in a vegetable subject we behold the same distinctions; a top, a bottom, and a middle of its own, leading as before to the same diversities of position.

If we still pursue the metamorphosis, and transform the tree into a man, making its branches into a head, its trunk into a body, and its roots into feet, we shall discover also in an animal subject the same distinctions as before; and the subject will in consequence be capable of lying, as well as of standing; of standing upright, as well as inverted.

But this is not all. Man is not only an extended substance, like the column, or the tree, but over and above, as an animal, he is by nature locomotive. Now the part of him in progression, which leads the way, we denominate his fore part, or front; the opposite, his hinder part, or rear; and the two parts upon each side, his right and his left.

And thus has man, in consequence of his animal frame, over and above the former distinctions of top and bottom, (both of them common to the other subjects already described,) four additional distinctions peculiar to him as an animal, the distinctions of *front* and *rear*, of *right* and *left*, which four are wholly unknown both to the column and to the tree.

While he is under the position of standing, these four distinctions have little force, but when he happens to lie, then is their efficacy seen, and each of them leads to a new and different position. If his front, while he is lying, be nearest to the earth, then is he said to *lie prone;* if his hinder part, or rear, then to *lie supine;* if neither of these, then it is either on his right, or on his left; which positions are unknown either to the pillar or the tree.

Thus, besides the standing positions of upright and inverted,

has man, in consequence of his frame, four other positions, which appertain to him, as he lies; so that his frame taken together, as one perfect whole, is susceptible of six different and specific positions, which have reference to the six different and specific extensions of his body.[b]

Fables tell us, that the triangular island Sicily was thrown upon the Giant Typhoeus. Under one promontory lay his right arm; under another, his left; under a third, his legs; under Mount Ætna, his head; under the whole island his body, having his breast upwards, his back downwards. These positions refer to the several extensions above described.

> Vasta giganteis ingesta est insula membris
> Trinacris, et magnis subjectum molibus urget
> Æthereas ausum sperare Typhoëa sedes.
> Nititur ille quidem, pugnatque resurgere sæpe;
> Dextra sed Ausonio manus est subjecta Peloro;
> Læva, Pachyne, tibi: Lilybæo crura premuntur;
> Degravat Ætna caput: sub qua resupinus arenas
> Ejectat, flammamque fero vomit ore Typhoeus. Ovid. Metam. v. 346.

But not to anticipate with regard to poets, of whom we shall say more hereafter. In a cube there are six faces, capable of denoting as many positions; and yet there is this important difference between the cube and the man: the faces of the cube being all of them similar, its positions, being only nominal, can only refer to things without, and every face can alike concur to the forming of the same position. But the parts analogous to these in man being all of them dissimilar, his positions, being real, are by no means thus commutable; but if the head be uppermost, then, and then only, is he, by position, upright; if his back be uppermost, then, and then only, is he, by position, prone; nor can he possibly be called either prone or upright, were any other part to exist in the same place, excepting the two here mentioned.

From what has been alleged, we see the true origin of position or situation. "It arises from the relation which the distinctions of *parts within* bear to the distinctions of *place without;* and it varies, of course, as this relation is found to vary." The fewer of these internal distinctions any being possesses, the less always the number of its possible positions. As it possesses more, its positions increase with them.

As to the progression of animals, peculiar to them as animals, that progression (I mean) by which they move, not as mere bodies, but as bodies possessed of instinct and sensation; it is to be observed, that this progression is formed by the help of joints and muscles; and that these, during their operation, form within

[b] See these different extensions, which Aristotle calls "distances," διαστάσεις, fully discussed in his treatise De Animalium ingressu, p. 129. edit. Sylb. In his History of Animals, we read, ἔχει δ' ὁ ἄνθρωπος καὶ τὸ ἄνω καὶ τὸ κάτω, καὶ τὰ ἔμπροσθεν καὶ τὰ ὀπίσθια, καὶ δεξιὰ καὶ ἀριστερά. Hist. Animal. p. 17. edit. Sylb.

the animal body a variety of angles and flexures. Now hence arises a fresh multitude of characteristic positions. There is one position, under which a bird flies; another, under which a horse gallops; a third, under which a man walks, &c.

These latter positions differ from those already described, because they depend not on a simple relation of the whole body to things without, but on a diversified relation of its different parts one to another. The painter well knows the force of these positions, since it is by these he superinduces motion upon immoveable canvas; so that from the position, which we see, we infer the progression, which we see not.[c]

And this naturally leads us to consider the power of position or situation in works of art. Among the common utensils of life, such as chairs, beds, tables, &c., there is a position which is proper, and another which is absurd; a position by which they attain their end, and another which renders them useless. Some derive their very essence (if I may use the phrase) from their situation: for example, the lintel, from being over the door; the threshold, from being under it.[d] We pass from these to productions more elegant.

It is the knowledge of these various positions peculiar to animal bodies, and to the human above the rest, (commonly known by the name of attitudes,) which constitutes so eminent a part in the character of a perfect painter. To the statuary, if possible, it is a more important science still, because he has no helps, like the painter, from colour, light, and shade.

Instances in support of this assertion (if it needs supporting by instances) may be alleged innumerable, both from pictures and from statues.

Painting gives us the the attitudes of St. Paul and the sorcerer Elymas, in the cartoon of Raphael; of Apollo and the dancing Hours, in the Aurora of Guido; of the Sleeping Christ, his mother, and St. John, in the Silence of Caracci; of many and diversified holy families, in the works of Carlo Maratti, &c.

From attitudes in painting, we pass to those in sculpture; to that of the Medicean Venus, the Farnesian Hercules, the Niobe, the Laocoon, the Wrestlers, the Dying Gladiator,[e] &c.

[c] See page 29, &c.

[d] Τὰ δὲ θέσει [λέγεται,] οἷον οὐδὸς καὶ ὑπέρθυρον· ταῦτα γὰρ τῷ κεῖσθαι πως διαφέρει: "Other substances are denominated from their position, as the threshold and the lintel; for these differ by the peculiar manner of their being situated." And soon after, Οὐδὸς γάρ ἐστιν, ὅτι οὕτως κεῖται· καὶ τὸ εἶναι, τὸ οὕτως αὐτὸ κεῖσθαι σημαίνει: "For it is a threshold, because it is so situated; and its existence indicates its being situated after this manner." Metaph. H. c. 6. p. 135. edit. Sylb.

[e] To these attitudes may be added that given by Lysippus to the statue of Alexander the Great. That prince had a certain extension of neck, which made him gently recline it upon his left shoulder. When his figure was cast in brass by Lysippus, the artist ingeniously contrived to convert this natural defect into an attitude of magnificence. His head, being reclined, was made, with a sort of insolent look, to contemplate the heavens, as if things below were already at his command. And hence the meaning of that celebrated epigram, in which this work of brass is supposed to address Jupiter in the following words:

It is easy, when we are describing these beauties, to be diffuse in our expressions, and to exclaim, as we describe, How charming! How exquisite! &c. But the observation is just, as well as obvious:

> Segnius inritant animos demissa per aurem,
> Quam quæ sunt oculis commissa fidelibus. Hor. Art. Poet. 180.

He, therefore, who would comprehend attitude in works such as these, must either visit the originals, or else contemplate them (as he may easily do) in models, drawings, and books of sculpture and painting.[f]

We shall find less difficulty in the works of poets, because these address us in words, and convey to us their ideas not through our language but their own. It is thus Virgil gives us an attitude of sitting in desperation:

> Sedet, æternumque sedebit
> Infelix Theseus. Æn. vi. 517.

Shakspeare, of sitting in despondence:

> She sat, like patience on a monument
> Smiling at grief. Twelfth Night, act ii. sc. 6.

Milton, of conjugal affection:

> He, on his side
> Leaning half raised, with looks of cordial love
> Hung over her, enamour'd. Par. Lost, v. 11.

Ovid makes Thescelus, as he elevated a javelin, to be miraculously petrified in the very attitude of aiming:

> Utque manu jaculum fatale parabat
> Mittere, in hoc hæsit signum de marmore gestu. Metam. v. 182.

More formidable is a similar attitude at Milton's Lazar-house:

> Over them triumphant Death his dart
> Shook, but delay'd to strike. Par. Lost, xi. 491.

There are *attitudes* less tremendous, that mark reverence and humiliation.

Thus Shakspeare:

> These crouchings, and these lowly courtesies
> Might fire the blood of ordinary men. Jul. Cæsar, act iii. sc. 1.

The lying, or being extended on some surface, is an attitude in most instances so connected with death, that death is often denoted by that attitude alone.

Thus Nestor, in Homer, speaking of the Greek commanders slain before Troy:

> Αἰδάσσοντι δ' ἔοικεν ὁ χάλκεος, εἰς Διὰ λεύσσων,
> Γᾶν ὅτ' ἐμοὶ τίθεμαι· Ζεῦ, σὺ δ' Ὄλυμπον ἔχε.
> *The brass looks up to Jove, and seems to cry,*
> *This earth is mine; do thou possess the sky.*

Plut. de Vita et For. Alex. p. 335. edit. Xyland. See also Brodæi Epigram. Gr. l. iv. p. 454. edit. Franc. 1600, where the lines here cited are introduced by two others.

[f] Those who dwell in the neighbourhood where these notes were written, may find excellent examples of attitude at Wilton house, (lord Pembroke's,) among the statues and basso-relievos there preserved; in particular, the Cupid bending his Bow; the Faun, who, as he stands, turns his body, and looks backwards; the figures in the Marriage-vase; the Amazon fighting, the basso-relievos of Meleager, of Niobe, of Ceres and Triptolemus, &c.

Ἔνθα δ' ἔπειτα κατέκτανεν ὅσσοι ἄριστοι,
Ἔνθα μὲν Αἴας κεῖται ἀρήϊος, ἔνθα δ' Ἀχιλλεὺς,
Ἔνθα δὲ Πάτροκλος, θεόφιν μήστωρ ἀτάλαντος,
Ἔνθα δ' ἐμὸς φίλος υἱός. Odys. Γ. 108.

"There fell the bravest of the Grecian chiefs;
There lies great Ajax; there Achilles lies;
There, too, Patroclus, knowing as a god;
There my own much-lov'd son."[g]

Thus Shakspeare:

O! mighty Cæsar, dost thou lie so low?
Are all thy triumphs, glories, conquests, spoils,
Shrunk to this little measure? Jul. Cæs. act iii. sc. 3.

Sleep, whom the poets deify, appears under a similar position:

Cubat ipse Deus, membris languore solutis. Ovid. Metam. xi. 612.

It was perhaps from this resemblance in *position*, joined to that other, the cessation of the sensitive powers, that Sleep and Death were by the poets called brothers,[h] and that the former upon many occasions served to represent the latter.[i]

If we pass from poets to actors,[j] (by actors, I mean those of dramatic compositions,) we shall find that attitudes and positions make at least a moiety of their merit; so that though they are to speak, it is certain, as well as to act, yet it is from acting, not from speaking, that they take their denomination.

Nor are just positions without their use to that real actor upon the stage of life, I mean the orator. Demosthenes, in whom rhetoric attained its last perfection, was at first so unsuccessful, that he was in a state of despair, till Satyrus, a celebrated tragedian, shewed him the amazing force of action, by the different manners of repeating certain passages out of Euripides and Sophocles.[k]

And whence is it that positions derive this wondrous efficacy? It is, in fact, because the body is an organ to the soul; an instrument, whose gestures correspond to every affection, and are

[g] See also Hom. Il. Σ. 20. and Mr. Clarke's note, where he quotes Quinctilian.

[h] See page 132.

[i] When sleep represents death, it is commonly marked with some strong epithet: by Homer it is called a brazen sleep; by Virgil, an iron sleep; by Horace, simply a long sleep; which idea the poet Moschus heightens by calling it not only a long sleep, but a sleep without an end; a sleep out of which we cannot be awaked.

Εὕδομες εὖ μάλα μακρὸν, ἀτέρμονα, νήγρετον ὕπνον.

See Hom. Iliad. Λ. 241. Virg. Æn. x. 745. Hor. Od. l. iii. 11. 36. Mosch. Idyl. iii. 105.

Even in prose-writers, when we read of persons being dead, we sometimes read that "they are fallen asleep," or that "they slept with their fathers." 1 Cor. xv. 6; 2 Chron. ix. 31.

It seems indeed to have been a custom with all nations, in instances of this sort, to mitigate the harshness of the thing signified, by the mildness of the terms that signify it: a well-known figure, called, in books of rhetoric, Euphemismus.

[j] See Cic. de Orat. iii. 56, 57, 58, 59. edit. Pearce; where it is worth remarking, (c. 59.) so much stress is laid on the management of the countenance, and of the eyes in particular, that we are informed the old men of that age did not greatly praise even Roscius himself, when he appeared in his mask—Quo melius nostri illi senes, qui personatum ne Roscium quidem magnopere laudabant; animi est enim omnis actio; et imago animi vultus est, indices oculi.

[k] Plutarch. Demosthen. p. 849. edit. Xyland.

diversified by nature herself, as those affections are found to vary. Words move only those who understand the language; and even, where the language is understood, acute sentiments often escape the comprehension of unacute hearers. But action, spontaneously indicating the motions of the soul, is a language which not only the vulgar, but even the stranger comprehends. Every one knows the external gestures and signs by which, without teaching, both himself and others indicate their several affections; so that seeing the same signs recur, he readily knows their meaning, inasmuch as nature herself supplies the place of an interpreter. But to pass from these speculations to others more general.

The primary elements of Democritus were *atoms* and *a void*. As for the variety and the specific differences, which he found to exist in things, he deduced them out of his atoms; first by *figure*, as A, for example, differs from N; next by *order*, as AN, for example, differs from NA; and lastly by *position*, as Z, for example, differs from N, these letters in figure being in a manner the same.[l]

Thus position, according to this philosopher, stands among the principles of the universe.

A high rank this, and yet perhaps not an undeserved one, if, by attending to particulars, we contemplate its extensive influence. For not to mention the force of position in the different parts of every animal; not to mention the admirable situation even of subordinate subjects; the grateful variety of lands and waters, of mountains and plains; what shall we say to the position of the heavens above, and of the earth beneath; of the sun himself in the centre, and the several planets moving round him? If we carry our hypothesis further, and suppose (as has been well conjectured) that the solar system itself has a proper position respecting the fixed stars; and that they, presiding in other systems, maintain a certain position respecting the system of the sun; we shall have reason so to esteem the importance of this genus, that perhaps upon its permanence depends the permanence of the world.

Nor need we be surprised, though it be properly an attribute of things corporeal, if we discover the traces of it even in beings incorporeal. If the sensible world be an effect, of which the cause is a sovereign mind, all that we discover in effects we may fairly look for in their causes, since here its prior existence is in a manner necessary.[m]

Thus our own minds are not only the place and region of our

[l] What others called σχῆμα, "figure," Democritus called ῥυσμός: τάξις, "order," he called διαθήγη: and θέσις, "situation," or "position," he called τροπή. See Aristot. Metaph. p. 11. 134. edit. Sylb. See also Lib. de Gen. et Corrupt. l. i. c. 2. where Philoponus, in his comment, informs us, that these strange words were λέξεις Ἀβδερικαί, "Abderic words;" words used in Abdera, the city to which Democritus belonged.

[m] See p. 228, &c.

ideas,[n] but with respect to these ideas, such is the influence of position, that upon this in a manner depends our whole perception of truth. Let us, for example, invert the terms of a simple proposition, and instead of saying, that "every man is an animal," say that "every animal is a man;" and what becomes of the truth which such proposition contained? Let us derange in any theorem the propositions themselves, confounding them in their order, blending them promiscuously, putting the first last, and the last first; and what becomes of the truth which such theorem was to demonstrate? It is lost, till the propositions recover their natural situation.

Tantum series, juncturaque pollet. Hor.

Democritus, whom we have just mentioned, in order to shew the importance of arrangement in natural subjects, and the amazing differences that arise, where the change is most minute, ingeniously remarks, that out of the same letters are formed tragedy and comedy.[o] We may affirm as confidently, that out of the same terms are formed truth and falsehood.[p]

The efficacy, indeed, of this intellectual position is so great, that through it not only the wise know, but the unwise become informed. It is by the strength of this alone that all teaching is performed; all learning acquired; that the simple and uninstructed are led from truths acknowledged to truths unknown,[q] and thus ascend by due degrees to the sublimest parts of science. What then shall we say to that stupendous position, to that marvellous arrangement, existing within the Divine Mind; where the whole of being is ever present in perfect order; and to which no single truth is ever latent or unrevealed?[r]

If we would comprehend the dignity of position in this its

[n] Καὶ εὖ δὴ οἱ λέγοντες τὴν ψυχὴν εἶναι τόπον εἰδῶν: "Well, therefore, do they conceive, who say that the soul is the region of forms, or ideas." Arist. de An. iii. 4. p. 57. edit. Sylb. See before, p. 277, note o, and p. 281.

[o] Ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν γὰρ τραγῳδία γίνεται, καὶ κωμῳδία γραμμάτων. De Gen. et Corrupt. l. i. c. 2. p. 4. edit. Sylb.

[p] Simple terms are to be found in the several predicaments or arrangements here treated, being the first part of logic.

From different arrangements of these terms arise propositions; and from different arrangements of propositions arise syllogisms.

Propositions are the object of the second part of logic; syllogisms, of the third.

There is no going further, for the most enlarged speculations are but syllogisms repeated. Such, then, in a logical and intellectual view, is the force and extent of the predicament of position or situation here treated.

[q] There is an order or arrangement peculiar to learners; and of course, with respect to them, the principle or beginning of knowledge is different from what it is according to the order of nature. Hence the following observation: Ἡ δὲ (ἀρχὴ) ὅθεν ἂν κάλλιστα ἕκαστον γένοιτο· οἷον καὶ μαθήσεως, οὐκ ἀπὸ τοῦ πρώτου καὶ τῆς τοῦ πράγματος ἀρχῆς ἐνίοτε ἀρκτέον, ἀλλ' ὅθεν ῥᾷστ' ἂν μάθοι: "There is another species of beginning, and that is the point from which any thing may be done after the best manner; for example, in the affair of learning any thing, we are sometimes not to begin from what is first, and which is the principle or beginning of the thing itself, but we are to begin from that point whence any one may learn the most easily." Metaph. l. iv. c. 1.

In the Meno of Plato there is a striking example of an arrangement of truths, which lead an uninstructed youth to the knowledge of a fine and important theorem in geometry. See the dialogue of that name in Plato, and Sydenham's elegant and accurate translation, enriched with diagrams.

[r] See before, p. 281, 296, &c.

archetypal form, let us view it at the same instant with something its perfect contrary: let us compare it, for example, to the sick man's dream, or to that chaos of ideas which fills the mind of one delirious. As we can find few situations more unfortunate than these latter; so we can conceive no one more respectable, or divine, than the former.

And so much for the genus or arrangement of *position*, which arises from the genus or arrangement of *where*, as this from the genus or arrangement of *relation*, both *position* and *where* being in their nature relatives.

CHAPTER XIV.

CONCERNING HABIT, OR RATHER THE BEING HABITED. ITS DESCRIPTION. ITS PRINCIPAL SPECIES DEDUCED AND ILLUSTRATED. ITS PRIVATION. CONCLUSION OF THE SECOND OR MIDDLE PART OF THE TREATISE.

THE genus of *habit*, or rather of being habited, is of so little importance, when compared to the other predicaments, that perhaps it might be omitted, were it not in deference to ancient authority.[s]

Though it have respect both to habits which are worn, and to persons who wear them, yet is it not recognised either in the one or the other, but is a relation, which arises from the two taken together.[t]

Now as every such habit, as well as every such wearer, are both of them substances, the relation must necessarily be a relation existing between substances. It cannot, therefore, be the relation existing between mind and its habits, (such as virtue or science,) nor that between body and its habits, (such as agility or health,)[u] for these habits are not substances, but inherent attributes.

Again; it cannot be the relation existing between a man and his possessions; for though these are both of them substances, and though a possessor may be said to have an estate, he cannot be said to have it upon him; he does not wear it.[x]

[s] The authority alluded to is that of the Pythagoreans and Peripatetics.

[t] Quod non ita intelligendum est, ac si res ipsæ, quæ sic habentur, sint hujus prædicamenti (puta vestitus ipsi, &c.) quæ ad alia prædicamenta spectant, sed habitio harum, seu ipsum habere, τὸ ἔχειν ταῦτα. Wallis. Logic. l. i. c. 14. Soon after he explains *habitio*, and informs us it means, Vestitum esse, tunicatum esse, togatum esse, corona cingi, calceo indui, &c.

Sanderson in his Logic explains the predicament as follows: Corpus habens est substantia; res habita fere est forma artificialis de quarta specie qualitatis; applicatio hujus ad illud est habitus hujus prædicamenti. Lib. i. c. 14.

[u] Simplicius, when he gives the reason, why habit and the body habited cannot coexist, as substance and its attributes coexist, says, συμφυῆ γὰρ ταῦτά ἐστι, καὶ αὐτὸ ἐκεῖνο: "for these attributes are connatural, [that is, grow with the being,] and are the being itself." Simplic. in Præd. p. 93.

[x] Διὸ οὐδὲ τὰ κτήματα, ἢ ἀνδράποδα, ἢ φίλους, ἢ πάτερας, ἢ υἱεῖς κατὰ τοῦτο τὸ

The being habited therefore is, in its strictest sense, something less than the first relation, that between a substance and its attributes; something more than the second relation, that (I mean) between a possessor and his possessions.[y]

It is to be hoped that these reasonings on a subject so trite will be pardoned for their brevity. They are to shew, not what the relation is, but what it is not.

If it be demanded, And what then is it? The answer must be, It is a relation existing after a peculiar manner; when an artificial substance is superinduced upon a natural one,[z] and becomes contiguous to it, though it be not united in vital continuity.

> Such was the very armour he had on,
> When he th' ambitious Norway combated.
>
> Hamlet, act i. sc. 1.

The primary end of being habited seems to have been protection; and that either by way of defence against the inclemencies of nature, as in the case of common apparel; or by way of defence against insults, as in the case of helmets, breastplates, coats of mail, &c.

Further than this: as habits were various, both in their materials and shapes; and, as among the number of those who wore them, some were superior to the rest by their dignity and office: hence it was found expedient, that many of these superior ranks should be marked by the distinctions of peculiar habits; so that this established another end of being habited, over and above protection, an end which gave robes to peers, uniforms to admirals, &c.

Further still: some regard, when either of the sexes habited themselves, was had to decency, some to beauty and adventitious ornament; of which last we may be more sensible, if we contemplate the elegant draperies of the Grecian statues, or those in the capital pictures of the great Italian masters, and compare these truly graceful and simple forms to the tasteless and ever mutable ones of ourselves and our neighbours.[a]

γένος ἔχειν λεγόμεθα, διότι οὐκ ἐν περιθέσει ταῦτά ἐστι, καίτοι κτήματα ὄντα: "For which reason we are not said, in the sense of this genus, to have possessions, or slaves, or friends, or fathers, or children; for these none of them are said to exist in their being thrown round us, or superinduced, although they are all [in some sense or other] our possessions." Simplic. ut supra.

[y] Καὶ ἐοίκε μέσον πῶς εἶναι τὸ ἔχειν, τοῦ κεκτῆσθαι, καὶ τοῦ καθ' ἕξιν διακεῖσθαι· ᾗ μὲν γὰρ ἔχεται, ὡς ἡ λευκότης. χωρίζεται ἀπὸ τῶν ἔξωθεν κτημάτων, ἃ οὐ περικείμεθα· ᾗ δὲ σωματικόν ἐστι καὶ ἔξωθεν, χωρίζεται ἀπὸ τῶν ἕξεων, αἱ συμβεβήκασιν ἡμῖν, συμφυεῖς οὖσαι, καὶ οὐκ ἐπίκτητοι: "The having any thing on, appears to be a sort of medium between possessing, and the being habitually disposed. As far as it is had, after the same manner as whiteness is had, [or any inherent attribute,] it is distinguished from possessions without, with which we are not said to be enveloped or clothed. As far as it is corporeal, and from without, it is distinguished from [inherent attributes or] habits which belong to us, as things connatural, and not as things adventitious." Simplic. ut supra.

[z] See the preceding notes in this chapter, particularly the second.

[a] The same simplicity which contributes

As there are many sorts of habit which have respect to this last end, I mean to beauty or adventitious ornament, so when a man is found to cultivate this end to an excess, it constitutes the character which we call a fop.[b] Nay, even the conveniencies of dress, when too minutely studied, degenerate into an effeminacy, which carries with it a reproach. It was hence that Turnus upbraided the Trojans for wearing a covering over their hands, and for tying their caps on with strings; that is to say, in modern language, for using gloves and chinstays.

Et tunicæ manicas, et habent redimicula mitræ. Æn. ix. 616.

We have already mentioned the use of habit as to *distinction*. In almost all countries something of this hath taken place, to distinguish the noble from the ignoble, the scholar from the mechanic; to mark the sacerdotal, the military, the juridical, &c. It is to the fallibility which sometimes attends this method of distinguishing, that we owe those proverbial sayings, "the cloak makes not the philosopher; the cowl makes not the monk."[c]

It is in a sense less strict and precise, that we take the word *habit*, when we say of the plains, they are *clothed* with grass; of the mountains, they are *clothed* with wood;[d] and more remotely still, when we apply the notion of *habit* to the *mind:* "having on the *breast-plate* of righteousness," "taking the *shield* of faith,"[e] &c.

In the language of poetry there is sometimes much elegance derived from this arrangement; as, for example, when the morn, at day-break, is said to be clad with "russet mantle;" or when the moon, in diffusing her pallid light, is said "to throw o'er the dusk her silver mantle;"[f] or when the psalmist says, on a greater

to the decoration of our persons, contributes also to the decoration of nature.

The following anecdote, communicated to me by the late lord Lyttleton, appears to be worth preserving. When sir John Vanbrugh had finished Blenheim-house, the then duchess of Marlborough asked him for the plan of a garden. Sir John told her, he could give no plan himself, and he feared she might apply to others as incapable as he was, naming certain gardeners of the time, that are now unknown. "But," continued he, "if your grace would have a garden truly elegant, you must apply for a plan to the best painters of landscape."

So happily did this ingenious man predict (as it were) a taste, which, taking its rise not many years after from Kent, has been since completed by Brown, and nowhere with greater beauty and magnificence than on the very spot of which we are now writing, I mean Blenheim.

[b] Horace, in the first satire of his first book, calls the wild and extravagant Nævius by the name of *Vappa;* which Baxter ingeniously explains, Quod insano sumptu stolidas sequeretur delicias. Non hujuscemodi homunciones *fopps* dicimus; an et hoc a *vappa*, quærant alii.

Vappa meant originally, the juice of the grape in a state of perfect insipidity, when it was neither wine nor vinegar. *Vappa* proprie dicitur, quod nec vinum, nec acetum est. Vet. Scholiast. in Horat. Satir. l. i. s. 2. v. 13.

[c] Pallium non facit philosophum—Cucullus non facit monachum.

[d] Thus Cicero: Spatia frugifera atque immensa camporum, vestitusque densissimos montium, pecudum pastus, &c. De Nat. Deor. ii. 64, p. 253. edit. Davis. And before, in the same treatise, he speaks of the earth as Vestita floribus, herbis, arboribus, frugibus, &c. ii. 39. p. 195. Yet all this, we must remember, is but metaphorical.

[e] Ephesians, vi. 14. 16.

[f] Hamlet, act i. sc. 1. Paradise Lost, iv. 608.

subject, "thou deckest thyself with light, as it were with a garment."[g]

Though from all these instances we may perceive the force of this genus, yet another still remains, I mean the force of its *privation*. Nakedness is found to heighten other circumstances of distress:

Nudus in ignota, Palinure, jacebis arena. Æn. v. 871.

Though the sense be metaphorical, yet Shakspeare avails himself of the same privation in the pathetic speech which he gives to Wolsey:

O! Cromwell, Cromwell!
Had I but serv'd my God with half the zeal
I serv'd my king, he would not in mine age
Have left me *naked* to my enemies. Henry VIII. act iii. sc. 6.

The same privation has its effect, also, in a way more comic and contemptuous. It is thus Aristophanes talks about philosophers:

Τοὺς ὠχριῶντας, τοὺς ἀνυποδήτους λέγεις. Νεφ. 103.

"You mean those pallid, those barefooted fellows."

It is thus the author of the Dunciad describes friars:

Linsey-woolsey brothers,
Grave mummers, sleeveless some, and shirtless others.
Dunciad. iii. 113.

In some instances, such partial privations of habit become an indication of reverence. Thus Moses, when on holy ground, was ordered to stand barefooted;[h] and among Europeans it is a mark of respect to appear bareheaded.

And so much for the *genus* or predicament of *habit*, which we divide into species from its different ends of *protection*, *distinction*, *decency*, and *ornament*, to all of which is alike opposed their contrary, *privation*. So much also for the ten universal arrangements, genera, or predicaments, with the discussion of which we conclude the second, or middle part of this treatise.

CHAPTER XV.

CONCERNING THE APPENDAGES TO THE UNIVERSAL GENERA OR ARRANGEMENTS; THAT IS TO SAY, CONCERNING OPPOSITES, PRIOR, SUBSEQUENT, TOGETHER OR AT ONCE, AND MOTION, USUALLY CALLED POST-PREDICAMENTS—THE MODES OR SPECIES OF ALL THESE (MOTION EXCEPTED) DEDUCED, AND ILLUSTRATED—PREPARATION FOR THE THEORY OF MOTION.

Having now gone through each of the predicaments or philosophical arrangements, and considered its character, and distin-

[g] Psalm civ. 2. [h] Exod. iii. 5.

guishing attributes, there remains nothing further to complete the theory, but an explication of certain terms, which have occasionally occurred; and which, from their subsequent place, and subsequent contemplation, have been called by the Latin logicians *post-predicaments*,[i] and form the third, or last part of this treatise.

Thus, for example, things have been sometimes mentioned in the former part of this work, as opposed to one another; and hence it becomes expedient to consider the doctrine of *opposites*.[k]

At other times, things have been treated as being some *prior*, some *subsequent*, and others existing *together* or *at once*;[l] and hence it becomes expedient to examine these several terms, and to investigate the different meanings, of which each of them is susceptible.

Lastly; *motion*, in its various species, is so widely diffused through some of the most important genera already treated, that it cannot be omitted in a speculation, where the professed end is to scrutinize universals.

It appears, therefore, that there still remain, as subjects of our inquiry, *opposites*, *prior* and *subsequent*, *co-existent* or *at once*, and last of all, *motion*.

Now in the first place, as to *opposites*, the reader must be reminded, that, having already spoken of them in a former treatise,[m] we omit them here, and refer to that.

The doctrine of *prior* and *subsequent* follows:[n] and these perhaps may appear to be sufficiently discussed, if we enumerate and explain the following modes.

The most obvious mode of priority is the *temporal*,[o] according

[i] See page 258, 259.

[k] See before, c. vii. and c. viii. p. 300. See also Arist. Præd. Περὶ τῶν Ἀντικειμένων, p. 47. edit. Sylb.

[l] See before, p. 382. 316. See Arist. Prædic. Περὶ τοῦ Ἅμα. p. 54. edit. Sylb.

[m] See p. 189, note *a*, in which note are enumerated "relatives," τὰ πρός τι; "contraries," τὰ ἐναντία; "contradictories," τὰ κατὰ ἀπόφασιν καὶ κατάφασιν. There is is one species omitted, τὰ καθ' ἕξιν καὶ στέρησιν, "things opposed in the way of habit and privation;" such as sight and blindness.

This privation differs from that mentioned already in the third chapter of this treatise, because the privation there is the road to natural productions; the privation here admits no progress, nor any return to the original habit, at least in a natural way. See Ammon. p. 146; and of this work, p. 265.

[n] See Arist. Præd. Περὶ τοῦ Πρότερον, p. 53. edit. Sylb.

[o] This mode Aristotle calls *prior* κατὰ τὸν χρόνον, "according to time;" the priority, depending on the quantity of time being larger with respect to the subject, which is called older, or more ancient, τῷ γὰρ τὸν χρόνον πλείω εἶναι καὶ παλαιότερον καὶ πρεσβύτερον λέγεται. Præd. p. 53. edit. Sylb.

Ammonius, in commenting this passage, observes an elegance in the Greek tongue, peculiar to itself: παλαιότερον, he tells us, is applied indiscriminately to beings animal and inanimate; πρεσβύτερον is applied only to the animal genus. Simplicius on the same occasion makes the same observation, in Præd. p. 106.

The last author has also the following remark concerning the different modes of temporal priority: τὰ δὲ κατὰ χρόνον πρότερα, ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν γενομένων τὰ πορρώτερον ὄντα τοῦ νῦν· ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἐσομένων, τὰ ἐγγύτερον: Simpl. in Præd. p. 106. B. "Things prior in time among the past are those the furthest from the present now; among the future, are those the nearest to it." Simpl. in Loc.

to which we say, that the Trojan wars were *prior* to the Punic, and the battle of Marathon to that of Blenheim.

A second mode of priority is, when a thing is prior to some other, because it does not reciprocate in the consequence of existence.[p]

A few examples will illustrate the apparent difficulty of this character. The number *one* according to this doctrine is *prior* to the number *two*, because if there exist *two*, it is a necessary consequence that there should be *one;* but if there exist *one*, it does not reciprocate, that there should be *two*. Thus every genus is prior to any one of its various species; because, if there be such a species as man, or lion, there is necessarily such a genus as animal; but if there be such a genus as animal, there is not necessarily such a species as man, or lion.

This mode of priority, which we call *priority essential*, will be found of great importance in all logical disquisitions, and may therefore perhaps merit some further attention.

According to this, that thing of any two or many things is prior, which, by being taken away, annihilates the rest; or which, if the rest *are*, must necessarily be.[q]

For example: if there were no theorems of science, to guide the operations of art, there could be no art; but if there were no operations of art, there might still be theorems of science. Therefore is science prior to art.[r] Again, if there were no such things as syllogized truths, there could be no such sciences as optics or astronomy. But, though neither of these, there might notwithstanding be such things as truths syllogized. Therefore is logic prior to these, and, by parity of reasoning, to every other particular science. Again, if there were no such principles as self-evident truths, there could be no such things as truths syllogized. But, though no truths syllogized, there might still be truths self-evident. Therefore the first philosophy, which treats of these primary and original truths, being prior to logic, is prior also to the tribe of sciences, as are these to the tribe of arts; so that of course the whole structure of logic, of sciences, and of arts, may be said to rest upon this first philosophy, as upon that only firm and solid base, against which the powers of ignorance and sophistry can never totally prevail.

[p] The words in Aristotle are, *τὸ μὴ ἀντιστρέφον κατὰ τὴν τοῦ εἶναι ἀκολούθησιν.* Prædic. p. 53. edit. Sylb.

He alleges the same instance from numbers, which is given here.

[q] What is here said, is explained in what immediately follows. Simplicius says, agreeably to the explanation here given, *καλεῖν δὲ ἐνθάσιν οἱ νεώτεροι τὸ τοιοῦτον πρότερον, συνεπιφερόμενον μὲν, μὴ συνεπιφέρον δὲ, καὶ συναναιροῦν μὲν, μὴ συναναιρούμενον δέ:* "The latter logicians are accustomed to call this mode of priority, that which is co-inferred, but does not co-infer; that which co-annihilates, but is not co-annihilated." Simpl. in Præd. p. 106.

[r] Nihil est enim, quod ad artem redigi possit, nisi ille prius, qui illa tenet, quorum artem instituere vult, habeat illam scientiam, ut ex iis rebus, quarum ars nondum sit, artem efficere possit. Cic. de Orat. i. 41. edit. Pearce, &c. p. 63. edit. Oxon.

This citation well proves a part of what is here asserted, viz. the necessary priority of some science to every art.

There is a third mode of priority, seen in *order* and *arrangement*. Thus in the demonstrative sciences, definitions and postulates are prior to theorems and problems; in grammar, syllables are prior to words, and letters to syllables. It is thus in a well-composed oration, the *proëme* is prior to the state and argument; and these last, to the peroration.[s]

A fourth mode of priority, is that of *honour* and *affection*, when we prefer objects, that we revere or love, to others that less merit, or at least that we esteem less to merit our regard and attention.[t]

> Ἀθανάτους μὲν πρῶτα θεοὺς, νόμῳ ὡς διάκειται,
> Τίμα—ἔπειθ' Ἥρωας ἀγανοὺς·
> Τούς τε καταχθονίους σέβε δαίμονας, ἔννομα ῥέζων·
> Τούς τε γονεῖς τίμα, τούς τ' ἀγχίστ' ἐκγεγαῶτας, κ. τ. λ.
>
> Pythag. aurea carmina.

> "The gods immortal, as by law divine
> They stand arrang'd, first honour: next revere
> Th' illustrious heroes, and terrestrial race
> Of genii, paying each the legal rites:
> Honour thy parents next, and those of kin
> The nearest," &c.

Hierocles, in his comment on these verses, commonly called for their excellence the golden verses of Pythagoras, has largely expatiated on this divine precedence and subordination.

Thus Horace, with respect to that priority of beings, founded on the religion of his country:

> Quid prius dicam solitis parentis
> Laudibus, &c.
> Proximos illi tamen occupavit
> Pallas honores. Od. l. i. 12.

He adopts priority, derived from the same principle, when he speaks of the favourite topics which his genius led him to cultivate:

> Quid prius illustrem satiris, musaque pedestri? Sat. l. ii. 6. v. 17.

The Stagirite, who records these various modes of priority, observes on this fourth mode (and apparently with reason) that it was in a manner the most alien and foreign of them all.[u]

He mentions also a fifth mode, but he introduces it with a sort of doubt. It should seem,[x] says he, besides the modes here mentioned, there was another mode of priority even in things reciprocating; although, so far as they reciprocate, they may be said to co-exist.

The fact is, if either of them in any sense can be called *cause*

[s] Τρίτον δὲ κατά τινα τάξιν τὸ πρότερον λέγεται, καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἐπιστημῶν καὶ τῶν λόγων· ἔν τε γὰρ ταῖς ἀποδεικτικαῖς ἐπιστήμαις, κ. τ. λ. Arist. Præd. p. 53. edit. Sylb. This is not translated, being expressed in the text.

[t] Ἔτι παρὰ τὰ εἰρημένα τὸ βέλτιον καὶ τιμιώτερον πρότερον τῇ φύσει δοκεῖ· εἰώθασι δὲ οἱ πολλοὶ τοὺς ἐντιμοτέρους καὶ μᾶλλον ἀγαπωμένους ὑπ' αὐτῶν, προτέρους παρ' αὐτοῖς φάσκειν εἶναι. Arist. Præd. ibid. not translated for the reason before given.

[u] His words are, ἔστι δὲ δὴ καὶ σχεδὸν ἀλλοτριώτατος τῶν τρόπων οὗτος. Arist. Præd. ibid. p. 54.

[x] Δόξειε δ' ἂν καὶ παρὰ τοὺς εἰρημένους ἕτερος εἶναι τοῦ προτέρου τρόπος· τῶν γὰρ ἀντιστρεφόντων τὸ αἴτιον, κ. τ. λ. Ibid. p. 54.

to the other, it may for that reason be called prior, if not in time, at least in efficacy and power.

For example: the actual existence of a man reciprocates with the proposition, which affirms him actually to exist. For if the man actually exist, then is the proposition true; and reciprocally, if the proposition be true, then does the man actually exist. And yet, though these things in this manner reciprocate, is not the proposition cause to the man's existence, but the man's existence to that of the proposition; since according as the man either is or is not, in like manner we call the proposition either true or false.[y]

This last mode of priority we call *causal priority*, or the *being prior by causality*.

We must not however quit this speculation, without observing, that cause and effect do not always thus reciprocate, but that, for the greater part, the cause is naturally prior. For example: hunger and thirst are the natural causes of eating and drinking; and thus, by being their causes, are naturally prior to them. Crimes, too, are the natural cause why punishments are inflicted; and therefore crimes, by parity of reason, are prior to punishments. The sentiment, though obvious, is well expressed by Pætus Thrasea. Nam culpa quam pæna tempore prior est; emendari, quam peccare, posterius est.[z]

Nor are crimes only prior to punishment, but so is judicial process; since to punish first, and then to hear, is what sir Edward Coke chooses to call, (in a language somewhat strong,) "the damnable and damned proceedings of the judge of hell:"[a]

Castigatque, auditque dolos. Æneid. vi. 567.

And thus it appears there are five principal modes of priority; that is to say, the *temporal*, the *essential*, that of *order*, that of *precedence*, and that of *causality*; which five being known, the modes of what is subsequent (its natural opposite) are easily known also.[b]

We are now to examine the modes of co-existence, or that of being at once and together;[c] and these modes have evidently great connection with the preceding.

The most simple mode among these, as well as among the modes of priority, is the *temporal*, perceived in things or events, which exist during the same time.[d]

Una eurusque notusque ruunt. Æn. i. 89.

Ὁμοῦ πόλεμός τε δαμᾷ καὶ λοῖμος Ἀχαιούς. Iliad. A. 61.

"War and the plague at once destroy the Greeks."

[y] The words of Aristotle are, τῷ γὰρ εἶναι τὸ πρᾶγμα ἢ μὴ, ἀληθὴς ὁ λόγος ἢ ψευδὴς λέγεται. Ibid. p. 54. edit. Sylb.

[z] Tacit. Annal. xv. 26.

[a] Coke's Institutes, vol. ii. p. 54, 55.

[b] Δῆλον δὲ ὅτι ὁσαχῶς τὸ πρῶτον, τοσαυταχῶς· ὧν καὶ τὸ ὕστερον λέγοιτο. Simplic. ut supra, p. 106. B.

[c] Aristot. Præd. p. 54. edit. Sylb.

[d] Ὧν ἡ γένεσις ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ χρόνῳ. Prædic. p. 54. edit. Sylb.

Persons, in this manner co-existing, are called *contemporaries*: such as Socrates and Alcibiades; Virgil and Horace; Shakspeare and Johnson.

A second mode of co-existence is founded in *nature* and *essence*, where two things necessarily reciprocate in consequence of their existing, while neither of them, at the same time, is the cause of existence to the other.[e]

It is in this sense that double and half are *together* or *at once*, for they reciprocate; if there be double, there must be half; and if half, there must be double. They are also neither of them the cause why the other exists. Double is no more the cause of half, than half is of double. This last condition is requisite, because if either of the two were essentially and truly a cause to the other, it would pass, by virtue of its causality, from co-existence to priority.[f]

There is a third mode of co-existence, seen in different species of the same genus, when, upon dividing the genus, we view them arranged together, contra-distinguished one to another.[g]

It is thus the genus triangle, being divided into equilateral, equicrural, and scalene, no one of these species appears to be by nature prior, but all of them *to exist at once* in a state of contradistinction. The same may be said of the three animal species, the aerial, aquatic, and terrestrial, when we divide, after the same manner, the genus animal.[h]

And thus are the modes of co-existence, or together, either the *temporal*, the *essential*, or the *specific*.

And here, should any one object to these distinctions, as either too trivial or too scholastic for the purposes of a polite writer; we answer, that we no more wish an author to mention them, when not professedly his subject, than we would have him dissert, without a cause, upon nouns, pronouns, and the principles of grammar. All we hope from these elementary doctrines, is to see them in their effects; to see them in the accuracy of the composition, both as to reasoning and language. It is thus a grazier, when he turns his oxen into some rich and fertile pasture, never wishes to inspect what food they have devoured, but to see a fair and ample bulk, the effect of food well digested. Besides, when sophists assail us, and either exhibit one thing for another, or two things for one and the same; to what surer weapon can we recur for defence, than to that of precise and well-established distinction?[i]

[e] Thus expressed by Aristotle: *Φύσει δὲ ἅμα, ὅσα ἀντιστρέφει μὲν κατὰ τὴν τοῦ εἶναι ἀκολούθησιν, μηδαμῶς δὲ αἴτιον θάτερον θατέρῳ τοῦ εἶναι.* Præd. p. 54. edit. Sylb.

By referring to the chapter on Relatives, it is easy to perceive, whence this speculation arises; for in that chapter the same example is alleged as here, by way of illustration of the same doctrine. See before, p. 316.

[f] See before, p. 357, 8.

[g] Thus expressed by Aristotle: *Καὶ τὰ ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ γένους ἀντιδιῃρημένα ἀλλήλοις ἅμα τῇ φύσει λέγεται.* Ibid. 55.

[h] *Ἀντιδιῃρῆσθαι δὲ λέγεται ἀλλήλοις τὰ κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν διαίρεσιν· οἷον τὸ πτηνὸν τῷ πεζῷ καὶ τῷ ἐνύδρῳ.* Ibid. 55.

[i] Learning and science, or rather learned and scientific terms, when introduced out of season, become what we call pedantry.

There remains to be treated the theory of motion; in which, without attempting to impeach or contradict any modern speculations, we shall inquire, what was the opinion of the ancients concerning it; in what manner they attempted to catch its fugitive nature; and how they divided it by its effects into its subordinate species.

But this is a theory demanding a separate chapter, where those, who question the doctrines, may perhaps amuse their curiosity, while they peruse an attempt to exhibit the sentiments of antiquity upon so singular a subject; a subject, in its existence so obvious, in its real character so abstruse.

CHAPTER XVI.

CONCERNING MOTION PHYSICAL. ITS VARIOUS SPECIES DEDUCED AND ILLUSTRATED—BLEND THEMSELVES WITH EACH OTHER, AND WHY—CONTRARIETY, OPPOSITION, REST. MOTION PHYSICAL—AN OBJECT OF ALL THE SENSES. COMMON OBJECTS OF SENSATION, HOW MANY. MOTION, A THING NOT SIMPLE, BUT COMPLICATED WITH MANY OTHER THINGS—ITS DEFINITION OR DESCRIPTION TAKEN FROM THE PERIPATETICS—THE ACCOUNTS GIVEN OF IT BY PYTHAGORAS AND PLATO ANALOGOUS TO THAT OF ARISTOTLE, AND WHY.

All motion is either physical, or not physical. As by *motion physical*, I mean that which is obvious to the senses; so by *motion not physical*, I mean that which, by being the object of no sense, (as, for example, the succession of our thoughts and volitions,) is the subject of after-contemplation, and knowable not to the sensitive, but to the rational faculty.

This, therefore, will be the plan of our following inquiry.

In the present chapter, we shall consider *motion merely physical*, both in its several distinct species, and in its general or common character.

In the next chapter, we shall inquire whether there be *other motion besides;* and if such may be found, we shall then examine how far it is distinguished from the physical, and how far it is connected.

First, therefore, for the first.[k]

As the most obvious of all motions is the motion of body, so

The subject may have merit, the terms be precise, and yet, notwithstanding, the speaker be a pedant, if he talk without regard either to place or time.

The following story may perhaps illustrate this assertion: "A learned doctor at Paris was once purchasing a pair of stockings, but unfortunately could find none that were either strong enough, or thick enough. 'Give me,' says he to the hosier, 'stockings of matter continuous, not of matter discrete.'" Menagiana, tom. ii. p. 64.

[k] In the order of nature, the genus precedes its several species; but in the order of human perception, the several species precede their genus, which last is the order adopted here. See Hermes, p. 119.

the most obvious motion of body is that by which it changes from place to place,[l] itself remaining, or at least supposed to remain, both in one place and the other, precisely the same. It is thus a bowl moves over a plane; a bird through the air; a planet round the sun. This motion is properly *motion local;* or, if we choose a single name, we may call it *passage* or *transition.* Its peculiar character, as opposed to any other motion, is to affect no attribute of body, but merely that of local site.

> Cœruleo per summa levis volat æquora curru,
> Subsidunt undæ tumidumque sub axe tonanti
> Sternitur æquor aquis; fugiunt vasto æthere nimbi. Æn. v. 819.

Here the chariot flies, the waves subside, the clouds disperse, all is in local motion.

There are other motions, which affect the more inherent attributes. Thus, when a lump of clay is moulded from a cube into a sphere, there is motion more than local; for there is the acquisition of a new figure. The same happens, when a man from hot becomes cold, from ruddy becomes pale. Motion of this species has respect to the genus of quality, and (if I may be permitted to coin a word) may be called *aliation.*[m]

> If thou be'st he! but O! how fall'n, how chang'd
> From him, who in the happy realms of light,
> Cloth'd with transcendent brightness, didst outshine
> Myriads, tho' bright.[n] Par. Lost, i. 84.

Here we behold qualities that are changed, a scene of aliation.

Another species of motion is seen in addition and detraction; as when we either add, or take away a gnomon from a square. Here is no aliation, or change of quality, (for the figure, as a square, remains the same in either case,) but the effect of such motion is a change only in the quantity, as the square becomes either smaller or larger. When quantity is enlarged, we call the motion *augmentation;* when it is lessened, we call it *diminution.*[o]

> Behold a wonder: they, but now who seem'd
> In bigness to surpass earth's giant sons,
> Now less than smallest dwarfs, in narrow room
> Throng numberless. Par. Lost, i. 777.

Here we behold *diminution.*

> Parva metu primo; mox sese attollit in auras,
> Ingrediturque solo, et caput inter nubila condit.[p] Æn. iv. 176.

Here we behold *augmentation.*

All these motions have this in common, that they are changes or roads from one attribute to another,[q] while the substance re-

[l] Called therefore in Greek, ἡ κατὰ τόπον μεταβολή, and sometimes by a single word, φορά. See Arist. Prædic. p. 55. edit. Sylb. and Ammon. in Loc. p. 171. B.

[m] Ἀλλοίωσις, in barbarous Latin, *alleratio.* Vid. Arist. ut supra.

[n] See p. 300.

[o] "Augmentation," αὔξησις: "diminution," μείωσις. Vid. Arist. ut sup.

[p] See chap. ix. where the species of quantity are enumerated.

[q] Οὐ κατηγορίαι εἰσὶν, ἀλλ' ὁδὸς εἰς τὰς κατηγορίας: "They (that is, these several species of motion) are not predicaments,

mains the same, both in essence and in name. Thus the planet Jupiter, which was a year ago in such a part of the heavens, and is at present in another, though his attributes of place are changed, is yet both in essence and in name still the same planet. By parity of reason, it is the same individual man, who, by change in quantity, from fleshy becomes emaciated.[r]

But there are other motions, which in their effects go further. Thus, when the substance of a man becomes not only pallid and emaciated, but its living principle is detached from that which it enlivens, putrefaction and dissolution of the body ensue, and it is no longer a change within the substance, but the very substance is lost both in essence and in name.[s] Such motion is called *corruption*, *dissolution*, or *dying*. On the contrary, when the seed of any species, whether animal or vegetable, by evolution, accretion, or other latent process of nature, produces a certain being, which had no existence before; it is a change, like the former, that goes not merely to attributes, but by a more efficacious operation to the very substance itself. Such motion is called *generation* or *birth*.

The following difference subsists between these two latter species and the former; the former are no more than roads to different modes of being; the latter lead to being itself, and to its opposite, non-being.[t]

However separate and distinct these species of motion may

but a road to the predicaments." Ammon. in Præd. 171.

[r] Speaking of these species of motion, Ammonius says, Κινεῖσθαι ἢ κατὰ ποσὸν, ἢ κατὰ ποιὸν, ἢ κατὰ τόπον, φυλάττοντα τὸ ἐξ ἀρχῆς οὐσιῶδες εἶδος: "That things are moved and changed either in quantity, or in quality, or in place, still preserving [during these motions] their original essential form." Ammon. in Præd. p. 172.

Here we find the phrase εἶδος οὐσιῶδες, commonly called *substantial form*, but which we choose (as thinking it more accurate) to translate "essential." To explain: Let us, for example, call *sphericality* (if we may employ such a word) the *essential form* to a bowl. Every one will admit that the bowl may undergo many changes; may become white from black, hot from cold; and (by a more easy change than these) it may roll from one place to another; and yet notwithstanding it may still continue to be a bowl. But when its sphericality, that is to say, its εἶδος οὐσιῶδες, its "essential form," departs, when (supposing its matter to be clay) it is moulded from a sphere into a cube, from that instant the bowl is no more, it has no longer an existence either in essence or in name. See before, p. 275.

[s] See the note immediately preceding.

[t] Hence *generation* is called, ὁδὸς ἀπὸ τοῦ πῇ μὴ ὄντος εἰς τὸ πῇ ὄν, τουτέστιν ἀπὸ τοῦ δυνάμει ὄντος εἰς τὸ ἐνεργείᾳ ὄν: "the road from non-being to being; that is, from being in power to being in act:" *corruption* or *dissolution*, on the contrary, is called, ὁδὸς ἀπὸ τοῦ ὄντος εἰς τὸ μὴ ὄν: "the road from being to non-being." Ammon. in Præd. p. 172.

The particle πῇ, prefixed in the quotations to μὴ ὄντος, and τὸ ὄν, is to distinguish the non-being and being here mentioned from being and non-being absolute. Πῇ means "in a manner," "as it were," "after a sort." See below, p 365.

These motions, under the name of changes, (μεταβολαὶ,) are well explained as follows.

Ὅταν μὲν οὖν κατὰ τὸ ποσὸν ᾖ ἡ μεταβολὴ τῆς ἐναντιώσεως, αὔξησις καὶ φθίσις· ὅταν δὲ κατὰ τόπον, φορά. ὅταν δὲ κατὰ πάθος, καὶ τὸ ποιὸν ἀλλοίωσις· ὅταν δὲ μηδὲν ὑπομένῃ, οὗ θάτερον πάθος ἢ συμβεβηκὸς ὅλως, γένεσις· τὸ δὲ, φθορά: "When therefore the change of the contrary attribute is according to the quantity, it is augmentation or diminution; when according to the place, it is local motion; when according to any affection or quality, it is aliation. When nothing remains, of which the new production can be at all considered as an affection, or an attribute, it is then generation; and the contrary, dissolution." Arist. de Gen. et Corr. l. i. c. 4. p. 14. edit. Sylb.

be found, yet being all of the same genus, they naturally blend themselves together.

Thus, though local motion may possibly exist without the rest, yet it is impossible for the rest to exist without local motion. Generation is the assemblage of parts; corruption, the separation; so that here local motion is evident in either case. It is the same in aliation; the same in augmentation and diminution. When fear renders a person pale, such change could not be, did not his blood retreat locally from the surface to within: and as for augmentation and its opposite, they are no more than the bringing to, and the carrying off; both which in their very idea imply local motion.

The other species of motion are incidentally blended also. He that increases in bulk, commonly increases with ruddiness; and he that lessens in bulk, commonly lessens with paleness. There are both in the qualities and the quantities of the particles to be assembled, many changes necessarily previous to generation or birth; and many others, as necessarily previous to corruption or death.[u]

And thus have we established six species of motion, which we denominate *physical*, because they respect physical subjects. They are to be found in four of the universal genera, or arrangements; one in the genus where, *transition;* one in quality, *aliation;* two in quantity, *augmentation* and *diminution;* two in substance, *generation* and *corruption.*

In all these motions there is opposition or contrariety.[x] Where two species are coupled in one genus, the two species themselves are, in such case, contraries; as generation and corruption, augmentation and diminution. Where the species stands single, as local motion, or aliation, the contrarieties are more numerous, and therefore perhaps not mentioned. In local motion we behold backward and forward, rectilinear and curvilinear, centripetal and centrifugal, &c. In aliation, or change of quality, we behold blackening and whitening; straightening and bending; strengthening and weakening; with many others, to which names are wanting. Lastly, all *motion* whatever is contrary to *rest.*[y]

And now perhaps it may not be amiss to inquire, what physical motion is. Some philosophers have found a short

[u] See Aristot. Phys. l. viii. c. 8: where he shews at large, that local motion is necessarily the primary motion, as running through the rest, and essential to them all; and where he likewise explains in what manner the other species of motion necessarily blend themselves with each other. The chapter is too long to be here transcribed. In his tract De Anima, l. i. c. 3. having spoken of the several species of motion, he adds, that motion infers place, πᾶσαι γὰρ αἱ λεχθεῖσαι κινήσεις ἐν τόπῳ: "for that all the motions here enumerated are in place."

[x] See the chapter preceding, p. 355.

[y] Ἔστι δὲ ἁπλῶς τῇ μὲν κινήσει ἠρεμία ἐνάντιον: "In strictness, the contrary to motion is rest." Arist. Prædic. c. xi. p. 56. edit. Sylb.

The other modes of contrariety are explained in the subsequent part of the chapter here quoted, which in some editions is the fourteenth.

method here, by telling us, it is a simple idea, and therefore cannot be defined. Others, with more reason, have called it hard to be defined;[a] a circumstance not unusual with other subjects equally obvious, there being nothing more different both in accuracy and truth, than that apprehension which is adequate to the purposes of the vulgar, and that which ought to satisfy the investigation of a philosopher.

In the first place, if we consider motion as an object of sensation, we shall discover it to be the object not of one sense, but of all. In a ring of bells we hear it; in a succession of savours we taste it; of odours, we smell it; and that we feel or see it, there needs no example. Thus is it distinguished from those objects, that are peculiar to one sense alone; as from colours, which we only see, or from sounds, which we only hear. Simple therefore as it is, it is not only an object of sensation, but stands distinguished, as a common object, from other objects that are peculiar.

And are there then (it may be demanded) no other objects of the same character? It is answered, there are; as bulk and figure, common objects to the sight and feeling; rest and number, common objects, like motion, to every sense.[a]

And how (it is asked again) is motion distinguished from these? We reply, from rest, by contrariety; from number, by continuity; from bulk and figure, as the parts of motion are never permanent, never co-exist. What speculations does this idea, simple as it is called, open, even while we consider it no further than as an object of sensation?

But we must not stop here, even while we consider it as physical. As such we shall find it connected with a body which moves; and as such, necessarily performed through space, and in time; so that these also, and their attributes of infinite and continuous, must be added to its theory, as so many necessary speculations.

We cannot therefore but observe, that if it be a simple idea, it is strangely complicated with a multitude of others;[b] such

[a] Χαλεπὸν λαβεῖν αὐτὴν (scil. κίνησιν) τί ἐστιν: "It is hard to comprehend what it is:" so says the Stagirite, and gives his reasons, which we postpone for the present, that we may not anticipate. Phys. l. iii. c. 2. p. 45. edit. Sylb.

[a] Κοινὰ δὲ, κίνησις, ἠρεμία, ἀριθμὸς, σχῆμα, μέγεθος· τὰ γὰρ τοιαῦτα οὐδεμιᾶς ἐστιν ἴδια (scil. αἰσθήσεως:) "The common objects of sensation are motion, rest, number, figure, bulk: for these are peculiar to no one sense." Arist. de Anima, l. ii. c. 6. p. 34. These common objects are well worthy of attention in explaining the doctrine of the senses and sensation.

[b] See the beginning of the third book of Aristotle's Physics, ch. i. where being about to treat of motion, he shews with what other subjects it is necessarily connected, such as continuous, infinite, place, time, &c., and where accordingly, after he has given us the opinions of his predecessors in philosophy concerning these subjects, he proceeds in due order to explain what he thinks himself. His words are, as they here follow: Δοκεῖ δ' ἡ κίνησις εἶναι τῶν συνεχῶν· τὸ δ' ἄπειρον ἐμφαίνεται εὐθὺς ἐν τῷ συνεχεῖ· διὸ καὶ τοῖς ὁριζομένοις τὸ συνεχὲς, συμβαίνει προσχρῆσθαι πολλάκις τῷ λόγῳ τῷ τοῦ ἀπείρου, ὡς εἰς ἄπειρον διαιρετὸν τὸ συνεχὲς ὄν. Πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἄνευ τόπου, καὶ κενοῦ, καὶ χρόνου ἀδύνατον κίνησιν εἶναι: "Motion appears to be in the number of things continuous: now infinite immediately shews itself in that which is continuous; for which reason, when they

as space, time, infinitude, continuity, together with body, and its visible attributes both of quantity and of quality. But to proceed in our speculation.

That there are things existing in act, in reality, in actuality, (call it as you please,) we have the evidence both of our senses and of our internal consciousness; so that this is a matter of fact, which we take for granted. That there also are things which actually and really are not, is equally evident as the former, and requires no proving. A Sphinx, for example, actually is not; a Centaur, actually is not; for these we may call phantoms, in the language of Lucretius:

Quæ neque sunt usquam, neque possunt esse profecto.

Lastly, every substance that actually is, by actually being that thing, actually is not any other.[c] A piece of brass, for example, actually is not an oak; an acorn, not a vine; a grape-stone, not a statue.

There is a difference however here; I mean, a difference in the last mode of actually not being; for though the brass is no more a statue than it is an oak, yet has it a capacity to become the one, and none to become the other. The same may be said of the acorn, with respect to the oak; of the grape-stone, with respect to the vine. Were it not for this definite nature of capacity, which as much distinguishes the invisible powers, as actuality distinguishes the visible attributes, there would be no reason why an acorn should not produce a statue, as well as it produces an oak; or why any thing (to speak more generally) should not be able to produce any thing.[d]

What, then, if there were no capacity existing in the universe? Could there be generations, corruptions, growths, diminutions, aliations, or change of place? Impossible. But if these are all the species of physical motion, it follows, that without capacity there can be no such motions.

And is motion, then, for this reason, pure *capacity*, and that only? Let us examine. A man, being in Salisbury, has a capacity of travelling to London. Is he, therefore, for merely possessing such capacity, upon the road thither? He is not. Motion, therefore, though capacity, is not capacity alone: there

define continuous, they have often occasion to employ withal the character of infinite, inasmuch as continuity is that which is divisible to infinite. Add to this, without place, and vacuum, and time, it is impossible that motion should have existence." Physic. l. iii. c. 1.

[c] This last species of nonentity should be carefully attended to, as the doctrine of motion wholly depends upon it, and as it is so essentially distinguished both from the fantastic nonentities (the Sphinx, the Centaur, &c.) immediately preceding, and from that strongest of all nonentities, the nonentity of impossibility, such as that the diameter of the square should be commensurable with its sides, or that the same number should be both even and odd. See before, p. 362.

[d] This distinction of τὸ ἐντελεχείᾳ and τὸ δυνάμει, "of that which is in actuality, and that which is in power," is the basis of all the Peripatetic reasoning upon this subject. See p. 333, &c. also p. 292, 3.

must be some degree of *actuality*, or else *motion* can never exist. Shall we, then, call it pure *actuality?* We cannot assert that, when we have made capacity one of its requisites. Besides, how should motion be seen in pure actuality; an actuality which never exists, till motion is at an end? A man surely can no more be called moving towards London, who is actually arrived there, than he who, possessing the capacity of going thither, forbears to exert any of his motive powers.

If motion, therefore, be neither capacity alone, nor actuality alone, and yet both (as it appears) are essential to it; it is in both we must look after it, as deriving its existence from both.

Such, in fact, it will appear; something more than dead capacity, something less than perfect actuality: capacity roused, and striving to quit its latent character: not the capable brass, nor yet the actual statue, but the capacity in energy; that is to say, the brass in fusion, while it is becoming the statue, and is not yet become. Thus, too, when a complexion is actually red, we say not that it reddens; much less do we assert so, while it remains perfectly pale; but as every pale complexion implies a capacity to become red, it is in the energy of this capacity exists the reddening, that is, the motion.

In the account of motion here given, we see the doctrine of the Peripatetics. The more ancient sects of Pythagoreans and Platonics, though they give different descriptions, seem to have deduced them all from the same principles. Thus, because whenever any thing is moved, it is some way or other diversified either in quantity or in quality, or at least in place; for this reason they called motion *diversity*. Again, because while opposite forces are equal, then is motion suspended, and revives not till inequality destroys the equilibrium; for this reason they called motion *inequality*. Again, because every thing which is moving is not, in some certain attributes, either what it was or what it will be; for this reason they called motion *nonentity*,[e] not nonentity absolute, but with a peculiar reference.

All these descriptions of motion naturally flow from one source, and that is, from its indefinite and unascertainable appearance.[f] Now the reason why it so appears, is, as we have said, because we cannot place it either in the simple capacity of things, or in the simple actuality. The bow, for example, moves not, because it may be bent; nor because it is bent; but the motion lies between; lies in an imperfect and obscure union of the two together; is the actuality (if I may so say) even of

[e] Ἔλεγον δὲ οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι τὴν κίνησιν εἶναι ἑτερότητα, καὶ ἀνισότητα, καὶ τὸ μὴ ὄν. Philop. in Physic. p. 144. For nonentity, see before, p. 365.

[f] Αἴτιον δὲ τοῦ εἰς ταῦτα τιθέναι αὐτοὺς ὅτι ἀόριστόν τι δοκεῖ εἶναι ἡ κίνησις. Phys. p. 45. edit. Sylb.: "The cause of their placing motion among these things, is, that it appears to be something indefinite."

capacity itself;[g] imperfect and obscure, because such is *capacity* to which it belongs.

And so much for *motion physical*, its different species, and its general character. We are now to inquire concerning motion of another kind.

CHAPTER XVII.

CONCERNING MOTION NOT-PHYSICAL. THIS MEANS METAPHYSICAL, AND WHY SO CALLED. SPONTANEITY—WANT—PERCEPTION, CONSCIOUSNESS, ANTICIPATION, PRECONCEPTION — APPETITE, RESENTMENT, REASON. MOTION PHYSICAL AND METAPHYSICAL, HOW UNITED. DISCORD AND HARMONY OF THE INTERNAL PRINCIPLES—POWERS VEGETATIVE, ANIMAL, RATIONAL—IMMORTALITY. REST, ITS SEVERAL SPECIES. MOTION, TO WHAT PERCEPTIVE BEINGS IT APPERTAINS; TO WHAT NOT—AND WHENCE THE DIFFERENCE.

Our contemplation hitherto may be called physical, because it is about physical motions that the whole has been employed, and it is from physical observations that the whole has been deduced. But he who stops here, has but half finished his work, if it be true that corporeal masses only move, because they are moved;[h] and therefore cannot be considered as the original source of motion.

[g] We have just before styled it, the energy of capacity; here, the actuality of capacity. These expressions are difficult, unless we attend to the manner in which they are used. The original Greek expresses the sentiment thus: Ἡ τοῦ δυνάμει ὄντος ἐντελέχεια, ᾗ τοιοῦτον, κίνησίς ἐστιν: "The energy of what exists in power, considered as so existing, is motion." Arist. Physic. 43. edit. Sylb. And soon after, p. 45, Τοῦ δὲ δοκεῖν ἀόριστον εἶναι τὴν κίνησιν αἴτιον ὅτι οὔτε εἰς δύναμιν τῶν ὄντων, οὔτε εἰς ἐνέργειάν ἐστι θεῖναι αὐτὴν ἁπλῶς· οὔτε γὰρ τὸ δυνατὸν εἶναι ποσὸν κινεῖται ἐξ ἀνάγκης, οὔτε τὸ ἐνεργείᾳ ποσόν· ἥτε κίνησις ἐνέργεια μέν τις εἶναι δοκεῖ, ἀτελὴς δέ· αἴτιον δ' ὅτι ἀτελὲς τὸ δυνατὸν οὗ ἐστιν ἐνέργεια κίνησις· καὶ διὰ τοῦτο δὴ χαλεπὸν αὐτὴν λαβεῖν τί ἐστιν· ἢ γὰρ εἰς στέρησιν ἀναγκαῖον θεῖναι, ἢ εἰς δύναμιν, ἢ εἰς ἐνέργειαν ἁπλῆν· τούτων δ' οὐθὲν φαίνεται ἐνδεχόμενον· λείπεται τοίνυν ὁ εἰρημένος τρόπος, ἐνέργειαν μέν τινα εἶναι, τοιαύτην δ' ἐνέργειαν, οἵαν εἴπομεν, χαλεπὴν μὲν ἰδεῖν, ἐνδεχομένην δ' εἶναι. Arist. Phys. l. iii. c. 2.: "The reason why motion appears to be indefinite, is, that there is no placing it simply, either in the capacity of things, or in their energy: for neither is that necessarily moved which is capable of becoming a certain quantity; nor that which is a certain quantity in energy and act. Indeed, the motion itself appears to be a certain sort of energy, but then it is an imperfect one; and the reason of this is, the capacity itself is imperfect, of which it is the energy. Hence, therefore, it becomes hard to comprehend its nature: for it is necessary to place it either in privation, or in capacity, or else in simple energy, and yet no one of these appears to be possible. The manner, therefore, which we have mentioned, is the only one remaining, which is, that it should be a peculiar sort of energy, and that such a one as we have described; hard to discern, and yet possible to exist." Page 45, ut supra. edit. Sylb.

[h] Τὸ κινοῦν φυσικῶς, κινητόν· πᾶν γὰρ τὸ τοιοῦτον κινεῖ, κινούμενον καὶ αὐτό: "That which gives motion physically, is itself moveable: for every thing which gives motion in this manner, is moved also itself." And soon after, Τοῦτο δὲ ποιεῖ θίξει· ὥστε ἅμα καὶ πάσχει: "This (namely, the giving motion) it does by contact; so that at the same time (while it acts) it is acting upon." Aristot. Physic. l. iii. c. 1. p. 44, 45. edit. Sylb.

When a boy carries about with him an insect in a box, we call not this motion the insect's motion as an animal, because a nut or a pebble would have moved in like manner.[i] When the same boy, piercing a wing of this insect, makes it describe a circular motion round a pin or needle, even this cannot well be called the insect's motion; for its motion, as an animal, is not, like a planet, round a centre. So far however the motion differs from that in the box, that by being a mixed motion, the centrifugal part is the animal's own, the centripetal is extraneous. But if ever the wing detach itself, and the fortunate insect fly off; at that instant the mixture of extraneous is no more, and the motion thenceforward becomes properly and purely animal.

And what is it which gives the motion this proper and pure character? It is *spontaneity*,[j] that pure and innate impulse arising from the animal itself, by which alone its flight is then produced and conducted.

And thus, while we pass from flying to innate and spontaneous impulse, that is to say, in other words, from flying to its cause, we pass also insensibly from motion physical to metaphysical; for metaphysics are properly conversant about primary and internal causes. We call not such impulse metaphysical, as if it were *μετὰ τὴν φυσικὴν κίνησιν*, "something subsequent to natural motion," that is, to flying, (for this would set effect before cause, a preposterous order indeed;) but we call it metaphysical,[k] because though truly prior in itself, it is subsequent in man's contemplation, whose road of science is naturally upward, that is, from effect to cause, from sensible to intelligible.[l]

Spontaneous impulse[m] is to the insect the cause of flying; so it is to the dolphin, of swimming; to the man, of walking. But what is the cause of this impulse itself? And why do animals possess it, more than stocks or stones?

[i] *Ἐοίκε δὴ τὸ βίαιον εἶναι, οὗ ἔξωθεν ἡ ἀρχὴ, μηδὲν συμβαλλομένου τοῦ βιασθέντος:* "That seems to be forced, or compelled, of which the principle or moving cause is from without, while the being compelled contributes nothing from itself." Ethic. Nic. l. iii. c. 1. p. 37. edit. Sylb.

[j] *Τὸ ἑκούσιον δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι, οὗ ἡ ἀρχὴ ἐν αὐτῷ:* "That should seem to be spontaneous, of which the principle or moving cause is in the being itself." Eth. Nic. l. iii. c. 1. p. 38. edit. Sylb.

[k] Philoponus, in a very few words, well explains the term metaphysical. Speaking of the first and supreme cause of all things, he adds, *Περὶ μὲν οὖν ἐκείνου εἰπεῖν, τῆς πρώτης ἔστι φιλοσοφίας· θεολογίᾳ γὰρ οἰκεῖον, καὶ τῇ μετὰ τὰ φυσικὰ πραγματείᾳ. μᾶλλον δὲ πρὸ τῶν φυσικῶν, πρὸς ἡμᾶς γὰρ ὕστερα τὰ τῇ φύσει πρότερα:* "To speak concerning this principle, is the business of the first philosophy, for it is a subject belonging to theology, and to that speculation which is metaphysical, that is to say, subsequent to matters physical, or rather indeed it is a subject prior to matters physical, inasmuch as those things with regard to us are subsequent, which are by nature prior." Philop. in Aristot. de Gen. et Corr. p. 12. edit. Ald. Venet, 1527.

[l] See Hermes, p. 119. See also p. 26, note; and of the present treatise, p. 350, note.

[m] *Ὁρμή.* Diog. Laert. vii. 85. Una pars in appetitu posita est. Cic. de Offic. i. 28. Appetitionesque, quas illi *ὁρμὰς* vocant, obedientes efficere rationi. De Offic. ii. 5. Animalia, quæ habent suos impetus et rerum appetitus. Ejusd. ii. 3. Naturalem enim appetitionem, quam vocant *ὁρμὴν*, itemque, &c. De Fin. iv. 14. Seneca uses the words, spontaneos motus. Epist. cxxi.

To solve this question, we must first remark, that every animal, however exquisite in its frame, is nevertheless far from being perfect, being still the part of a greater and more perfect whole,[n] to which it is connected by many necessary wants.

One of these, for example, is common to all animals, that of food or aliment. Suppose then this want were not to be gratified, what would be the consequence? The animal would perish. And how has Providence obviated this danger? It has given to every animal, however base, however young, not only a consciousness of this want, but an obscure sensation of some distinction in things without; and a preconception or anticipation in favour of that aliment which it is to prefer, from an inward feeling of its proper constitution.[o] It is thus without either teaching or experience, but merely from an innate feeling of what is conducive to their proper being, that infants are able to distinguish milk from vinegar; and silk-worms the leaf of a mulberry from that of a laurel or an ash.[p] Now the consequence

[n] Ipse autem homo—nullo modo perfectus, sed est quædam particula perfecti. Cic. de Nat. Deor. ii. 14. See chap. x. and the end of the present chapter.

What is applied by Cicero in the above passage to man, may with equal propriety be applied to all other animals, and needs no proving. It was a fundamental doctrine of the Stoics.

[o] Πρῶτον οἰκεῖον εἶναι παντὶ ζώῳ τὴν αὐτοῦ σύστασιν, καὶ τὴν ταύτης συνείδησιν: "The thing primarily intimate to every animal, is its own constitution, and a consciousness of it." Diog. Laert. vii. 85.

[p] Simul atque natum sit animal—ipsum sibi conciliari, et commendari ad se conservandum et suum statum, et ad ea, quæ conservantia sunt ejus status, diligenda; alienari autem ab interitu, iisque rebus, quæ interitum videantur adferre. Cic. de Fin. iii. 5.

Thus Seneca: Omnibus (sc. animalibus) constitutionis suæ sensus est, et inde membrorum tam expedita tractatio. Epist. cxxi. Soon after: Constitutionem suam [animal] crasse intelligit, summatim, et obscure. And again: Ante omnia est mei cura: hoc animalibus inest cunctis: nec inseritur, sed innascitur. And soon after, speaking of the terror which some animals feel in their earliest state, when they first behold a hawk, or a cat, he adds—Apparet illis inesse scientiam nocituri, non experimento collectam; nam, antequam possint experiri, cavent.

Even the ferocious tribes of animals, when their powers become mature, are shewn how to employ them, by an innate, internal instinct.

Dente lupus, cornu taurus petit, unde, nisi intus
Monstratum.

As to innate ideas, there is certainly nothing so true, (and it requires no great logic to prove,) that, if by innate ideas be meant innate propositions, there never were, nor ever can be, any such things existing. But this no ways tends to subvert that innate distinction of things into eligible and ineligible, according as they are suitable to every nature, or not suitable; a distinction which every being appears to recognise from its very birth.

Hence the author above quoted, in the same epistle: Tenera quoque animalia, a materno utero, vel quoquo modo effusa, quid sit infestum ipsis protinus norunt, et mortifera devitant.

And it is upon this reasoning we may venture to affirm, that every such being in its earliest moments perceives itself to be an animal, though it may not be philosophically informed what an animal really is: Quid sit animal, nescit; animal esse se sentit. *Ibid.*

Whatever others, in ancient, or even in modern days, may have thought concerning this subject, that philosopher surely can be hardly suspected of favouring innate ideas, who held the human soul, or rather its intellective part, "from its comprehending all things to be for that very reason something pure and unmixed,"—ἐπεὶ πάντα νοεῖ, ἀμιγῆ εἶναι—and this, because [in any compound] "that which is alien, by shewing itself along with other objects impedes and obstructs"—παρεμφαινόμενον γὰρ κωλύει τὸ ἀλλότριον, καὶ ἀντιφράττει. "That therefore the human intellect in its nature was

of this consciousness, of these preconceptions or anticipations, is a spontaneous impulse; for it is in these that such impulse finds an adequate efficient cause. But if we include all these under the common name of *perception*,[q] we shall then find that *per-*

nothing else than mere capacity, or the being capable"—ὥστε μηδ' αὐτοῦ εἶναι φύσιν τίνα μηδεμίαν, ἀλλ' ἢ ταύτην, ὅτι δύνατον—"that in consequence it was not any simple one of the whole tribe of beings, before it comprehended and understood it" —ὁ ἄρα καλούμενος τῆς ψυχῆς νοῦς—οὐδέν ἐστιν ἐνεργείᾳ τῶν ὄντων, πρὶν νοεῖν—"that it was not therefore probable it should be blended with the body, for that then it would become vested with some corporeal quality, and be either hot or cold, and have some corporeal organ, as the sensitive faculty has; whereas now it has none"—διὸ οὐδὲ μεμίχθαι εὔλογον αὐτὸν τῷ σώματι· ποῖος γὰρ ἄν τις γίγνοιτο, θερμὸς ἢ ψυχρὸς κἄν ὄργανόν τι εἴη, ὥσπερ τῷ αἰσθητικῷ· νῦν δὲ οὐδέν ἐστι. He concludes, at last, his reasonings with telling us, "that the intellect, as he had said before, was in capacity, after a certain manner, the several objects intelligible; but was in actuality no one of them, until it first comprehended it; and that it was the same with the mind, or human understanding, [in its original state,] as with a *rasa tabula*, or writing tablet, in which nothing as yet had been actually written"—διὸ εἴρηται πρότερον, ὅτι δυνάμει πως ἐστὶ τὰ νοητὰ ὁ νοῦς, ἀλλ' ἐντελεχείᾳ οὐδὲν, πρὶν ἂν μὴ νοῇ· δεῖ δ' οὕτως, ὥσπερ ἐν γραμματείῳ, ᾧ μηδὲν ὑπάρχει ἐντελεχείᾳ γεγραμμένον, ὅπερ συμβαίνει ἐπὶ τοῦ νοῦ. Aristot. de Anima, l. iii. iv.

As to the simile of *rasa tabula*, or (to speak in a language more modern and familiar) that of a sheet of fair writing paper, though it be sufficiently evident of itself, it may be illustrated in the following manner.

The human intellect is pure unmixed, untainted capacity, as a sheet of fair writing paper is pure unmixed, untainted whiteness. The pure unmixed character of this intellectual capacity renders it fit for every object of comprehension, as the pure unmixed character of the paper makes it adequate to every species of writing. The paper would not be adequate to this purpose, were it previously scrawled over with syllables or letters. As far only as it is clear, it is capable; and if we suppose it perfectly clear, then is it perfectly capable. The same sort of reasoning is applicable to the human understanding.

Such we take to be the sentiments of this ancient sage on this important subject.

The sentiments and subject, being both of them curious, will (it is hoped) be an apology for this digression.

By it we think it appears, that it was a received opinion among the ancients, that instincts both in man and beast were original, and founded in nature. That Aristotle held the same, appears not only from his History of Animals, but from the following remarkable passage in his Politics relative to man. There, speaking of the social state, or state of society, he says, φύσει μὲν οὖν ἡ ὁρμὴ ἐν πᾶσιν ἐπὶ τὴν τοιαύτην κοινωνίαν, "that the tendency to such a society was by nature in all men." Pol. p. 4. edit. Sylb.

We think also it further appears, that whatever Aristotle thought of instincts residing in the lower faculties of man, instincts respecting the purposes of common life and society, yet, as to the supreme and intellective part, this he held in its original state to be wholly pure and unmixed, and only fitted, by that purity, for general and universal comprehension. He seems (like the rest) to have justly distinguished between innate instincts, and innate propositions.

[q] This word, perception, is of the most extensive meaning, and not only includes intellection, but sensation also, and that of the lowest degree. What is here called perception, is by Aristotle called knowledge. Γνώσεώς τινος πάντα (scil. ζῶα) μετέχουσι, τὰ μὲν πλείονος, τὰ δ' ἐλάττονος, τὰ δὲ πάμπαν μικρᾶς, αἴσθησιν γὰρ ἔχουσιν· ἡ δ' αἴσθησις, γνῶσίς τις. Ταύτης δὲ τὸ τίμιον καὶ ἄτιμον πολὺ διαφέρει σκοποῦσι πρὸς φρόνησιν, καὶ πρὸς τὸ τῶν ἀψύχων γένος. Πρὸς μὲν γὰρ φρόνησιν ὥσπερ οὐδὲν εἶναι δοκεῖ τὸ κοινωνεῖν ἁφῆς καὶ γεύσεως μόνον· πρὸς δὲ ἀναισθησίαν, βέλτιστον. Ἀγαπητὸν γὰρ ἂν δόξῃ τὸ ταύτης τυχεῖν τῆς γνώσεως, ἀλλὰ μὴ κεῖσθαι τεθνεὼς καὶ μὴ ὄν: "All animals share a degree of knowledge; some of them, a greater; others of them, a less; and some of them, an exceedingly small degree; for they have all of them sensation, and sensation is a sort of knowledge. But the value and the no-value of sensation is widely different, when we compare it with rational comprehension on the one side, and with the race of beings inanimate on the other. With regard to rational comprehension, the mere partaking of taste and touch alone appears to be as nothing; but with regard to pure insensibility, it is something most excellent. For [when compared to beings insensible] it may surely appear a blessed event, to be

ception is the proper cause of *spontaneous impulse*; that it is so the animal impels itself, because it is so that it perceives; it does not so perceive, because it is so impelled.[r]

The impulse hitherto spoken of is of earliest date, commencing in a manner with the animal itself; and, as it merely respects the body and bodily pleasure, is distinguished from other impulses by the name of *appetite*.[s]

As animals advance, the scene of perception enlarges, and the number of spontaneous impulses increase, of course, with it. Yet while pleasure corporeal continues the sole object, and there appears no danger, either in acquiring or preserving it, the impulse is still an appetite, varying only in its name, as the pleasure, to which it is referred, varies in the species.

Yet, besides these preconceptions, the sources of simple appetite, there are also preconceptions of offering violence, and others of resisting danger, and these naturally call forth another power, I mean the power of anger.[t] Few animals, when young, feel any such preconceptions; but the more ferocious and savage are sure to find them at maturity; and the irascible impulses soon spontaneously attend, prompting the lion to employ his fangs, the vulture his talons, the boar his tusk, and every other animal of prey his proper and natural preparations.

All these spontaneous impulses, as well of anger as of appetite, are equally included under the common name of irrational,[u] being called by this name, because they have nothing to do with reason.

But when reason becomes strong enough to view its proper objects; that sight, to which no being here but man alone is equal; when the moral and the intelligible rise before his mental eye, and he beholds the fair forms of good and of truth; then, too, arise impulses of a far more noble kind, those to friendship, to society, to virtue, and to science.[x]

possessed of this knowledge, and not [resembling them] to lie as dead and a nonentity." Aristot. de Animal. Gener. lib. i. sub. fin. p. 197. edit. Sylb.

[r] Ὀρεγόμεθα ὅτι δοκεῖ, μᾶλλον ἢ δοκεῖ, διότι ὀρεγόμεθα. Arist. Metaph. Λ. ζ'. p. 203. edit. Sylb.

[s] Ἐπιθυμία.

[t] Θυμός.

[u] Ἄλογος, as well as λογικὸς and λόγος, are terms too well known to need more than to be mentioned.

[x] This progression from the lower to the superior faculties is well described by Cicero.

Prima est enim conciliatio hominis ad ea, quæ sunt secundum naturam: simul autem cepit intelligentiam, vel notionem potius (quam adpellant ἔννοιαν illi) viditque rerum agendarum ordinem, et, ut ita dicam, concordiam; multo eam pluris æstimavit, quam omnia illa, quæ primum dilexerat: atque ita cogitatione et ratione conlegit, ut statueret in eo conlocatum summum illud hominis per se laudandum et expetendum bonum. Cic. de Fin. iii. 6.

Unicuique ætati sua constitutio est: alia infanti, alia puero, alia seni: omnes enim constitutioni conciliantur, in qua sunt. Infans sine dentibus est: huic constitutioni suæ conciliatur. Enati sunt dentes: huic, &c. Sen. Epist. cxxi. The whole epistle is worth perusal, in particular what follows: Ergo infans ei constitutioni suæ conciliatur, quæ tunc infanti est, non quæ futura juveni est. Neque enim, si aliquid illi majus in quo transeat, restat; non hoc quoque, in quo nascitur, secundum naturam est.

And thus is man not only a microcosm in the structure of his body, but in the system, too, of his impulses, including all of them within him, from the basest to the most sublime.[y] **He includes them all, as being possessed of all perception; and per-**

See also his elegant application of this doctrine to the different stages of that well-known vegetable, corn, from its first appearance above the ground, to its state of maturity. Nam et illa herba, quæ in segetem, &c. Epist. p. 603. edit. Varior.

See also how elegantly Cicero applies the same doctrine to the vine, where to the vegetative powers he first supposes sense superadded; and then to sense, reason; each superaddition still increasing in value, though not robbing the former powers of their due regard and attention: Et nunc quidem, quod eam tuetur, ut de viti potissimum loquar, est id, &c. De Fin. v. 14.

See the Dialogue concerning Happiness, part ii. and the notes, p. 72, &c.

The number and subordination of the animating powers are well distinguished in the following extracts.

Τῶν δὲ δυνάμεων τῆς ψυχῆς αἱ λεχθεῖσαι τοῖς μὲν ἐνυπάρχουσι πᾶσαι (καθάπερ εἴπομεν) τοῖς δὲ τινὲς αὐτῶν, ἐνίοις δὲ μία μόνη· δυνάμεις δὲ εἴπομεν θρεπτικὸν, αἰσθητικὸν, ὀρεκτικὸν, κινητικὸν κατὰ τόπον, διανοητικόν· ὑπάρχει δὲ τοῖς μὲν φυτοῖς τὸ θρεπτικὸν μόνον, ἑτέροις δὲ τὸ αὐτό τε καὶ τὸ αἰσθητικόν· εἰ δὲ τὸ αἰσθητικὸν, καὶ τὸ ὀρεκτικόν· ὄρεξις μὲν γὰρ ἐπιθυμία, καὶ θυμὸς καὶ βούλησις· τὰ δὲ ζῶα πάντα μίαν ἔχει τῶν αἰσθήσεων, τὴν ἁφήν· ᾧ δὲ αἴσθησις ὑπάρχει, τούτῳ ἡδονή τε καὶ λύπη, καὶ ἡ ἐπιθυμία, τοῦ γὰρ ἡδέος ὄρεξις ἐστὶν αὕτη: "With regard to the powers of the soul that have been enumerated, to some beings they appertain all of them; to others, only some of them; and to others, only one of them. The powers we have mentioned are the nutritive, the sensitive, the power of desire, of local motion, of ratiocination. Now to plants there appertains only the nutritive power; to other beings both this and the sensitive: but if the sensitive, then the power of desire; for appetite, and resentment, and volition, (the three great leading powers,) are each of them a species of desire, and all animals have at least one of the senses, I mean the sense of touch. Now to the being which possesses sensation, to this appertain also pleasure and pain, and that which is pleasurable and painful. But if these, then appetite; for appetite is the desire of that which is pleasurable." Arist. de Anim. l. ii. c. 3.

And soon after: *Ἄνευ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ θρεπτικοῦ τὸ αἰσθητικὸν οὐκ ἔστι· τοῦ δὲ αἰσθητικοῦ χωρίζεται τὸ θρεπτικὸν ἐν τοῖς φυτοῖς. Πάλιν δὲ, ἄνευ μὲν τοῦ ἁπτικοῦ τῶν ἄλλων αἰσθήσεων οὐδεμία ὑπάρχει, ἁφὴ δὲ ἄνευ τῶν ἄλλων ὑπάρχει· πολλὰ γὰρ τῶν ζώων οὔτε ὄψιν οὔτε ἀκοὴν ἔχουσιν, οὔτε ὀσμῆς ὅλως αἴσθησιν· καὶ τῶν αἰσθητικῶν τὰ μὲν ἔχει τὸ κατὰ τόπον κινητικὸν, τὰ δ' οὐκ ἔχει· τελευταῖον δὲ καὶ τὸ ἐλάχιστον, λογισμὸν καὶ διάνοιαν· οἷς μὲν γὰρ ὑπάρχει λογισμὸς τῶν φθαρτῶν, τούτοις καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ πάντα· οἷς δὲ ἐκείνων ἕκαστον, οὐ πᾶσι λογισμὸς—ἀλλὰ τοῖς μὲν οὐδὲ φαντασία, τὰ δὲ ταύτῃ μόνον ζῶσι:* "Without the nutritive power there is no sensitive; but then the nutritive is separated from the sensitive in plants. Again: without touch there can be none of the other sensations, but there may be touch without any of the rest; for thus are there many animals which have neither sight, nor hearing, nor even a sensation of smells. Further still: of the sensitive beings some possess the locomotive power, and others possess it not: the last order of beings, and those the fewest in number, are those which possess the powers of reasoning and discussion; and among the mortal and perishable beings, those who possess these powers possess all the remaining species; but those who possess any one of these powers in particular, do not all of them therefore possess the reasoning power, but some of them want even the power of fancy or imagination; others of them conduct themselves, and live by that [inferior power] alone." Arist. de Anim. l. ii. c. 3. p. 28. edit. Sylb. See before, p. 280, note *t*.

It must be here observed, that plants are said to live, (*ζῆν*,) though not to be animals, (*ζῶα*): the character of animal being derived from the power of sensation, of which plants are supposed destitute; while that of life appertains to them, because they grow, and produce each of them seed after their kind.

These different powers, as they stand united in one subject, may be better comprehended by marking their clear and distinct character, when they exist apart, in different subjects.

[y] The preceding speculations have respect to the threefold division of the soul, adopted by the Pythagoreans and Platonics, by which they made it to be rational, irascible, and concupiscible; and called its three faculties *λόγος*, *θυμὸς*, and *ἐπιθυμία*, "reason, anger, and concupiscence," or appetite. See Diog. Laert. iii. 90. Plato's Republic is founded on this division.

ception we have now found to be the cause of all spontaneous impulse.

We must remember, however, that it is not perception simply which causes such impulse, but it is perception of want within, and of adequate good without; and that as this good is sometimes an object of sense, sometimes of intellect, sometimes a mistaken good, at other times a real one, (inasmuch as sensation is fallible, and reason may be deceived,) so the whole amounts to this: "the cause of spontaneous impulse is the perception of absent good, and that either sensible or intelligible, either real or apparent."[z]

After this manner we perceive one of the most important unions; the union of those two capital motions, the physical and the metaphysical. The soul perceives those goods which it is conscious that the animal wants. Hence an impulse to obtain them by employing the organs of the body; and this, as far as the soul only is concerned, we call motion metaphysical. Hence the bodily organs actually are employed, and this we call motion physical. Perception leads the way; spontaneous impulse follows; and the body supplies the place of an instrument or tool.[a]

As every animal motion has a view to good, so, if it miss that good, the motion ceases, and the animal is left discontented: if it obtain it, the animal is happy, but then, too, the motion ceases; for the end is obtained to which the motion tended. And thus is all animal motion in its nature finite, as it has a beginning and an end; as it begins from the want of good, and ends in its acquisition.[b] Hence, too, as it ends where it begins, it bears an analogy to motion circular, where we run a complete round, by returning to the point whence we began.

It is no unentertaining speculation to attend to these internal motions, as they arise from the different prevalence of their different internal causes. Within the soul of man there are passions, and a principle of reason: sometimes the internal mo-

[z] See Treatise on Happiness, and notes on the same, page 90, and 108.

[a] Οὕτως μὲν οὖν ἐπὶ τὸ κινεῖσθαι καὶ πράττειν τὰ ζῶα ὁρμῶσι, τῆς μὲν ἐσχάτης αἰτίας τοῦ κινεῖσθαι ὀρέξεως οὔσης, ταύτης δὲ γινομένης ἢ δι' αἰσθήσεως, ἢ διὰ φαντασίας καὶ νοήσεως: "And thus it is that animals proceed to move themselves and act, a desire being the last and immediate cause of their moving, and this desire being occasioned either by sensation, or else by imagination and intellection." Arist. de Animal. Motu, c. vii. p. 155. edit. Sylb.

Τὰ μὲν γὰρ ὀργανικὰ μέρη παρασκευάζει ἐπιτηδείως τὰ πάθη, ἡ δὲ ὄρεξις τὰ πάθη, τὴν δὲ ὄρεξιν ἡ φαντασία· αὕτη δὲ γίγνεται ἢ διὰ νοήσεως, ἢ δι' αἰσθήσεως: "The corporeal feelings prepare in a proper manner the organic parts of the body; desire prepares those feelings; that desire is prepared by some fancy or appearance; and this last arises either through intellection or sensation." Ejusd. c. viii. p. 157. edit. Sylb.

If it be asked, why nothing has been said concerning aversion and evil, as well as concerning volition and good; the answer is, that to fly evil is to seek good; and to escape evil is to obtain good; so that in the present inquiry they are both included.

[b] Πάντα γὰρ τὰ ζῶα καὶ κινεῖ καὶ κινεῖται ἕνεκά τινος· ὥστε τοῦτ' ἔστιν αὐτοῖς πάσης κινήσεως πέρας, τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα: "All animals both move, and are moved for the sake of something; so that this something, that is to say, the final cause, is the bound or limit of all their motion." Arist. de Animal. Mot. c. 6. p. 153. edit. Sylb.

tion arises from many passions at once, and the soul is like a sea when agitated by contrary winds.

> Æstuat ingens
> Imo in corde pudor, mixtoque insania luctu. Æn. x. 870.

Here the motion is tempestuous, and reason, during the storm, appears to be overwhelmed. At other times she interposes, but without success; and in such case the motion is equally turbid and irregular. Thus Medea, when she is about to murder her children:

> Καὶ μανθάνω μὲν, οἷα δρῶν μέλλω κακά·
> Θυμὸς δὲ κρείττων τῶν ἐμῶν βουλευμάτων.[c] Euripid. Med. 1078.

> "I know the mischiefs, that I soon shall act,
> But passion overrules my better thoughts."

There are times, too, when reason acts with greater success, and when the motion becomes of course more placid and serene. But whenever she is so far able to establish her authority, as to have the passions obey her uniformly without murmuring or opposition, then follows that orderly, that fair and equal motion, by which the Stoics represented even happiness itself, and elegantly called it "the well-flowing of life."[d]

Besides, the well-flowing here mentioned, which is of a kind purely moral, there is another highly valuable, which is of a kind purely intellectual. It is under this motion, that the man of speculation passes, through the road of syllogism, from the simplest truths to the most complicated theorems.

And here it may be remarked, that as pure and original truth is the object of our most excellent *volition*, (it being all that we seek, considered as beings intelligent,) so is it as strictly and properly the object of our most excellent *perception;* there being no perceptive power, but our intellect alone, that can reach it. It is here, then, we behold the meaning of an ancient and important doctrine, that "the primary objects of perception and of volition are the same."[e] It is hence, also, we may learn, that not only all good is truth, (as there can be none such without a reason, from which it is so denominated,) but also that all truth is good, as it is the sole pursuit of the contemplative, the natural object of their wants, equally as honours are to the ambitious, or as banquets to the luxurious.[f]

[c] Arrian. Epict. l. i. c. 28. p. 144. edit. Upton.

[d] Εὔροια βίου. See Diog. Laert. vii. 88. Hinc intellecta est illa beata vita, secundo defluens cursu. Senec. Epist. 120. See also p. 325.

[e] Τὸ ὀρεκτὸν καὶ τὸ νοητὸν κινεῖ, οὐ κινούμενον· τούτων δὲ τὰ πρῶτα, τὰ αὐτά: "The desirable and the intelligible move, without being moved; and of these two genera those objects, that are highest and first, are the same." Arist. Metaph. Λ. ζ'. p. 202. edit. Sylb.

When a theorem of Archimedes moves within us a desire to understand it; or when, being understood, it raises within us our necessary assent: we do not conceive the theorem itself to be moved, either by the desire or by the assent, as the horses are moved that give motion to the waggon, or the waggon moved that gives motion to its load.

[f] Though we seldom hear of goods in our common intercourse with mankind, but what have reference to the body, or at best to the lower affections; yet has the highest

Having said thus much concerning perception, and that highest species of animal impulse, I mean volition, it must not be forgot, that there are other internal motions of a very different character, where both perception and spontaneous impulse are in a manner unconcerned.

Within every animal there is an innate and active power, which ceases not its work, when sense and appetite are asleep; which, without any conscious cooperation of the animal itself, carries it from an embryo or seed to the maturity of its proper form. Now so far this power may be called a principle of motion. At maturity it stops, (for were the progress infinite, there could be no maturity at all,) and so far it may be called a principle of cessation or rest.[g] From this point of rest it deserts the being gradually, and in consequence of such desertion the being gradually decays.

> Subeunt morbi, tristisque senectus;
> Et labor, et duræ rapit inclementia mortis. Georg. iii. 67.

As the local motion of animals is derived from sense, and spontaneous impulse; so from the principle, just described, are derived their other motions: from its activity, their generation, their augmentation, and changes to better; from its cessation, their change to worse, their diminution, and, lastly, death.[h] It is this is that internal principle which descends from animals even to vegetables; and which, as these last possess no other, is commonly called *vegetative life*, though sometimes it is denoted by the more obvious name of *nature*.[i]

faculty of the soul a peculiar good, as much as the other faculties have from the intellectual possession of which good it seeks felicity and peace.

"I loved her," (says the wise man, speaking of wisdom; and what is wisdom, but the most exalted truth?) "I loved her above health and beauty, and chose to have her instead of light: for the light that cometh from her never goeth out." Wisd. vii. 10.

[g] Speaking of the difference between the operation of the elements and mere matter, and that of nature, and an internal principle, the Stagirite observes—*Τῶν δὲ φύσει συνεστώτων πέρας ἐστὶ καὶ λόγος μεγέθους καὶ αὐξήσεως· ταῦτα δὲ ψυχῆς, ἀλλ' οὐ πυρὸς, καὶ λόγου μᾶλλον ἢ ὕλης:* "As to things which derive their constitution from nature, there is a bound and proportion in their magnitude and growth; and these proceed from their soul, not from the element of fire; and are caused rather by reason, than by matter." De An. ii. 4. p. 30. edit. Sylb. And, not long before, describing a physical or natural substance, he makes it to be something—*ἔχοντος ἀρχὴν κινήσεως καὶ στάσεως ἐν αὑτῷ*—"which possesses within itself a principle of motion and of rest." De An. ii. 1. p. 23. edit. Sylb.

It is by this principle that the magnitude of the thistle, the oak, the bee, the elephant, and every other natural production, whether animal or vegetable, is to a certain degree circumscribed and limited; and when that limit either fails or exceeds in a conspicuous manner, the being becomes a monster. See page 65, note *a*.

[h] See before, p. 361, 2.

[i] See the definition of nature, among the notes, p. 6.

The vegetative life here mentioned is sometimes called *ψυχὴ φυτικὴ*, sometimes *θρεπτικὴ*, and at other times *θρεπτικὸν*, "the nutritive principle;" that principle which, passing through plants as well as animals, never ceases to nourish and support them, through the period of their existence: *Ἀεὶ γὰρ ἐνεργεῖ ἡ φυτικὴ ψυχὴ—καὶ μᾶλλον ἐν τοῖς ὕπνοις, ἔνθα αἱ λοιπαὶ τῆς ψυχῆς δυνάμεις ἠρεμοῦσι· τότε γοῦν μάλιστα αἱ πέψεις:* "The vegetative soul energizes at all times, and more during sleep, when the other powers are at rest; and therefore it is then mostly are per-

We must remember, however, that while we speak of motion here, we mean the invisible cause, not the visible effects; for these are purely physical, and belong to another speculation. After the same manner are we to speak of those other motive powers, the powers of magnetism and electricity; the visible motions, which they produce, being of a species merely physical, but the cause of these motions lying itself totally concealed. Whether, then, we suppose it a species of inferior life, and say with Thales, that the magnet and the amber are animated;[k] or whether we content ourselves with calling it an internal active quality, (occult we must not call it, for that is now forbidden,) we may safely pronounce it a quality, which, though we are sure of its existence, is not otherwise comprehensible, than by reference to its effects; as we know Homer, who is out of sight, by his Iliad, which lies before us.

There is yet another motive principle, far greater in local extent than all yet mentioned; I mean that, by which not only every atom of this our earth has its proper tendency, but by which even planets, satellites, and comets describe their orbits.

Astronomers will inform us as to the force of motion here, and how much on its due order depends this immense universe.

The best of ancient philosophers, when they saw so many inferior motions not to be performed without counsel or design, could not think of imputing such superior ones to the efficacy of blind chance; and, therefore, whatever they might conceive of the immediate cause, (call it gravitation, or attraction, or by any other name,) they justly supposed the primary cause to be a principle of intellection:

> Totam infusa per artus
> Mens agitat molem. Æn. vi. 727.

They indeed so far considered mind to be the source of all motion, that it was through its motive powers that they distinguished it from body; which last was no more than a passive subject, possessing nothing motive within itself, but deriving all its motions from something else.

formed the digestions." Philop. in Arist. de An. l. ii. *Τὸ ἔργον τὸ αὐτοῦ ποιεῖ τὸ θρεπτικὸν μόριον ἐν τῷ καθεύδειν μᾶλλον ἢ ἐν τῷ ἐγρηγορέναι· τρέφεται γὰρ καὶ αὐξάνεται τότε μᾶλλον ὡς οὐδὲν προσδεόμενα πρὸς ταῦτα τῆς αἰσθήσεως:* "The nutritive part of the soul performs its work in sleeping more than in waking; for then, more than at any other time, are animals nourished and enlarged in bulk, as they have no need of sensation for these purposes." Aristot. de Somno, cap. l. sub. fin. See before, p. 279.

[k] This opinion of Thales concerning the magnet's having a soul, because it moved iron, (*ψυχὴν ἔχει, ὅτι τὸν σίδηρον κινεῖ,*) may be found in Arist. de An. l. i. c. 2. p. 7.

Philoponus, in his comment on this passage, gives us from Thales the following sentiment, which, though not immediately to our purpose, we have transcribed for its importance: *ἔλεγεν, ὡς ἡ πρόνοια μέχρι τῶν ἐσχάτων διήκει, καὶ οὐδὲν αὐτὴν λανθάνει, οὐδὲ τὸ ἐλάχιστον:* "He used to say, that Providence extends to the lowest of all beings, and that nothing is hid from it, no not even that which is most minute." See before, p. 287.

It was hence, too, that they inferred the immortality of the soul. They reasoned thus: "Vital motion may forsake the body, because to the body it is not an essential; and in such case the body is said to die. But vital motion cannot forsake the soul, because to the soul it is an essential, and it is not possible that any thing should be forsaken by itself."[1] But this by way of digression.

As to the rise and duration of motion, the founder of the Peripatetic sect thus states the question. "Was motion (says he) ever generated without existing before; and is it ever again so destroyed, that there is nothing moved; or was it neither generated, nor is destroyed, but ever was, and will be; something appertaining to beings, which is immortal and unceasing; a kind of life, as it were, to all things that exist by the power of nature?"[m]

Those who meditate an answer to these queries, will remember that motion is coeval with the universe, since we learn that, in its first and earliest era, "the Spirit of God moved upon the face of the waters."[n] They will remember, too, that motion is as old as time, and their co-existence so necessary, it is not possible to suppose the one, without supposing the other.

And thus, having before considered *physical motion*, have we now considered what may be called *metaphysical*, or (if I may use the expression) *causative motion*; including under this name every animating power, whether rational or irrational, which, though different from body acts upon body, causing it to live, to grow, and move itself and other bodies. These animating powers are only known from their effects, as the painter's art is known from his pictures. And hence, as it is the effect which leads us to recognise the cause, hence these animating powers, though prior in existence to physical effects, are necessarily subsequent in human contemplation, and are thence, and thence only, called metaphysical.[o]

[1] Quod autem motum adfert alicui, quodque ipsum agitatur alicunde, quando finem habet motus, vivendi finem habeat necesse est. Solum igitur, quod seipsum movet, quia nunquam deseritur a se, nunquam ne moveri quidem desinit. Quinetiam, &c. Cic. Tuscul. Disp. i. 23.

The whole passage, which is rather too long to transcribe, is the translation of an argument taken from Plato's Phædrus: Τὸ δὲ ἄλλο κινοῦν, καὶ ὑπ' ἄλλου κινούμενον, κ. τ. λ. Plat. edit. Ficini. p. 1221. B.

See Macrobius in Somn. Scipionis, c. 13.

Cicero has used the same argument, in his tract de Senectute: Cumque semper agitetur animus, nec principium motus habeat, quia se ipse moveat, ne finem quidem habiturum esse motus, quia nunquam se ipse sit relicturus. Cap. 21.

Quinctilian has brought the argument into the form of a syllogism: Quicquid ex seipso movetur, immortale est: anima autem ex seipsa movetur: immortalis igitur est anima. Inst. Orat. v. 14.

[m] Πότερον δὲ γέγονέ ποτε κίνησις, οὐκ οὖσα πρότερον, καὶ φθείρεται πάλιν οὕτως, ὥστε κινεῖσθαι μηδέν· ἢ οὔτε ἐγένετο, οὔτε φθείρεται, ἀλλ' ἀεὶ ἦν, καὶ ἔσται, καὶ τοῦτ' ἀθάνατον καὶ ἄπαυστον ὑπάρχει τοῖς οὖσιν, οἷον ζωή τις οὖσα τοῖς φύσει συνεστῶσι πᾶσιν; Arist. Phys. l. viii. c. 1. p. 144. edit. Sylb.

[n] Genesis, chap. i.

[o] See p. 368. As to the character and subordination of the several animating powers, see before, p. 372, and so on to p. 377, as well in the text as in the notes. See also chap. vi.

And now, having done with *motion*, we must take some notice of *rest*.

The most obvious species of *rest* is that opposed to the most obvious species of *motion*; such, for example, as the cessation of gales, after they have been fresh and blowing:

> Ingrato celeres obruit otio
> Ventos. Horat. Od. l. i. 16.

The cessation of billows, after they had been loud and tempestuous:

> Silence, ye troubled waves, and thou deep, peace.[p] Par. Lost, vii. 216.

But it is expedient to be more particular. The two instances of rest, that we have alleged, are of motion purely local. So is it, when the flight of an arrow is spent; when a bowl, that has been running, stops. But rest is also connected with the other species of motion. The cessation of growth is maturity; of the vital energies, is death.

So, too, with respect to the higher faculties of the soul, sense and reason. The rest of the sensitive powers, after the labours of the day, is sleep:

> Dulcis et alta quies, placidæque simillima morti.[q] Æn. vi. 522.

The rest of the passions, after having been agitated, is *composure* and *equanimity*; the rest of the deliberative and reasoning powers, after sedulous investigation, is the discovery of the thing sought, or rather the *acquiescence in truth* discovered, either real or apparent, either practical or speculative.

And hence, in the last mode of rest, or acquiescence, the rise of our English phrase, *I am fixed*; and of the Latin phrase, *Stat*:

> Stat conferre manum.[r] Æn. xii. 678.

Hence *science* in Greek is called ἐπιστήμη, every theorem being, as it were, a resting place, at which the man of science stops.[s]

[p] Both these species of rest are denoted in English by the common name of *calm*. The Greeks, with their usual precision, have given a different name to each: the first, that is, the "wind-calm," they call νηνεμία, and define it ἠμεμία ἐν πλήθει ἀέρος, "tranquillity in a quantity of air;" the second, that is, the "sea-calm," they call γαλήνη, and define it ὁμαλότης θαλάττης, "evenness in the sea's surface." These definitions are of Archytas, and may be found in Aristotle's Metaph. p. 136. edit. Sylb.

Plato has brought the two terms together, in those harmonious lines, delivered by Agatho in the Banquet.

> Εἰρήνη μὲν ἐν ἀνθρώποις, πελάγει δὲ γαλήνην,
> Νηνεμίαν ἀνέμων, κοίτην ὕπνον τ' ἐνὶ κήδει.

See Platon. Symp. p. 1190. edit. Fic. See also the learned and ingenious translation of Mr. Sydenham, p. 118.

[q] See before, Hermes, p. 132, and of this treatise, p. 348.

[r] The incomparable Sanctius, in his Minerva, gives the following excellent explanation of this passage: Quamdiu enim deliberatur, consilium vacillat, et sententia fluctuat; ubi certum ac statutum est, quod quis facere vult, consistit consilium, et stat sententia. Sanct. Minerv. l. iv. c. 4. p. 637. edit. Amst. 1733.

In Perizonius's note upon this part of Sanctius, it appears that *sedet* is used in the same signification, and for the same reasons. See the note following.

[s] Ἔτι δὲ καὶ ἡ νόησις ἔοικεν ἠρεμήσει τινὶ, καὶ ἐπιστάσει μᾶλλον ἢ κινήσει: "Intellection appears to resemble a certain

Lastly, there is a rest of all the most interesting to mankind, I mean peace, that happy rest, which follows the trepidations and ravages of war.

And now, having done with *rest*, let us bring the whole to a conclusion.

We have said already, that the cause of all animal motion is good, either real or apparent. It is a further requisite, that it should be good, which is wanting; good at a distance: for were it present, the motion would then be superfluous. Thus we see the meaning of the philosophical critic, Scaliger: *motionis enim appetentia causa est; appetentiæ, privatio:*[t] "the cause of motion is appetition; of appetition, is privation." It is to this privation, or want, that the wisdom of all ages has imputed industry, perseverance, and the invention of arts and sciences.

This, in Virgil, is the

> Duris urgens in rebus egestas.[u] Georg. i. 146.

To this alludes Epicharmus, the poet and philosopher:

> Τῶν πόνων
> Πωλοῦσιν ἡμῖν πάντα γὰρ τ' ἀγαθ' οἱ θεοί. Xenoph. Mem. l. ii. c. 1.
>
> "The gods
> Sell us all goods at labour's painful price."

To this alludes the scripture, at man's earliest period, "In the sweat of thy face shalt thou eat bread.[x]

But though want be thus essential to set man, and not only man, but all animal nature, in motion, yet is want itself an imperfection; and to be in want is to be imperfect. And hence it follows, that true greatness, or superiority of nature, consists not in having many wants, even though we can find means to get them gratified; but in having as few as possible, and those within the compass of our own abilities.

It is to this doctrine that Virgil nobly alludes, when he makes Evander with an heroic dignity receive Æneas, not at the gates of a proud palace, but at the door of an humble cottage:

> Ut ventum ad sedes, hæc, inquit, limina victor
> Alcides subiit; hæc illum regia cepit:
> Aude, hospes, contemnere opes, et te quoque dignum
> Finge deo; rebusque veni non asper egenis. Æn. viii. 362.

Conformable to the same way of thinking is what Socrates says to Antipho in Xenophon: "You seem, (says he,) O Antipho, to be one of those who imagine happiness to be luxury and expense. But I, for my part, esteem the wanting of nothing to be divine; and the wanting of as little as possible, to come nearest to the divinity; and, as the divinity is most excellent, so the

resting and standing still, rather than a motion." De An. l. i. c. 3. See Hermes, p. 223, where this etymology is treated of more at large.

[t] Scalig. de Causis Ling. Lat. c. 114.

[u] See p. 6, and p. 16, note.

[x] Gen. iii. 19.

being nearest to the divinity is the being nearest to the most excellent."[y]

Aristotle seems to have followed his old master (for such was Socrates) with respect to this sentiment: "To that being (says he) which is in the most excellent state, happiness appears to appertain without action at all; to the being nearest to the most perfect, through a small and single action; to those the most remote, through actions many and various."[z] He soon after subjoins the reason, why the most excellent being has no need of action: "It has (says he) within itself the final cause;" that is to say, perfect happiness; but action always exists in two, when there is both a final cause and a power to obtain it, each of them separate and detached from one another.[a]

And hence, perhaps, we may be able to discern, why immobility should be a peculiar attribute to the Supreme and Divine Nature, in contradistinction to all other beings endued with powers of perception. To him there are no wants, nothing absent which is good, being himself the very essence of pure perfection and goodness.[b]

And so much for that motion which, though subsequent in contemplation to the physical,[c] and thence called *metaphysical*, is yet truly prior to it in the real order of beings, because it appertains to the first philosophy. So much also for the theory of motion.

[y] Ἔοικας, ὦ Ἀντιφῶν, τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν οἰομένῳ τρυφὴν καὶ πολυτέλειαν εἶναι· ἐγὼ δὲ νομίζω τὸ μὲν μηδενὸς δεῖσθαι, θεῖον εἶναι, τὸ δὲ ὡς ἐλαχίστων, ἐγγυτάτω τοῦ Θείου· καὶ τὸ μὲν Θεῖον, κράτιστον, τὸ δὲ ἐγγυτάτω τοῦ Θείου, ἐγγυτάτω τοῦ κρατίστου. Xenoph. Memorabil. l. i. c. 6. sect. 10.

[z] Ἔοικε γὰρ τῷ μὲν ἄριστα ἔχοντι ὑπάρχειν τὸ εὖ ἄνευ πράξεως· τῷ δὲ ἐγγύτατα, διὰ ὀλίγης καὶ μιᾶς· τοῖς δὲ πορρωτάτω, διὰ πλειόνων. Arist. de Cœlo. l. ii. c. 12. p. 54. edit. Sylb.

[a] Τῷ δ' ὡς ἄριστα ἔχοντι οὐδὲν δεῖ πράξεως, ἔστι γὰρ ἐν αὐτῷ τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα· ἡ δὲ πρᾶξίς ἐστιν ἀεὶ ἐν δυσίν, ὅταν καὶ οὗ ἕνεκα ᾖ, καὶ τὸ τούτου ἕνεκα. Ibid.

The following remark may perhaps explain this sentiment, if it should appear obscure.

When a being finds its good fully and wholly within itself, then, itself and its good being one, it finds no cause of motion to seek that which it possesses already. Such being, therefore, from its very nature, is immoveable.

But when a being and its good are separate, here, as they necessarily are two, the distant good, by being perceived, becomes a final cause of motion, and thus awakens within the being a certain desire, of which desire motion is the natural consequence. Such being, therefore, by its nature is moveable.

Ammonius, in the following quotation, appears to have had this doctrine and these passages of Aristotle in his view.

Ὅσα γοῦν πλειόνων τινῶν δέεται, πλείονας κινήσεις κινεῖται· τὰ δὲ ὀλιγοδεᾶ, ὀλιγοκίνητα· ἀμέλει τὸ Θεῖον, ἀνενδεὲς ὂν, καὶ πάντῃ ἐστὶν ἀκίνητον: "All such beings as are in want of many things, are moved in many motions; those who have few wants, have few motions; but the Divinity being without wants, is therefore perfectly immoveable." Am. in Præd. 144. B. 145.

[b] See before, p. 296.

[c] See before, p. 368.

CHAPTER XVIII.

CONCLUSION—UTILITIES DEDUCIBLE FROM THE THEORY OF THESE ARRANGEMENTS—RECAPITULATION.

And thus having finished the doctrine of these Philosophical Arrangements, or, in other words, of categories, predicaments, comprehensive or universal genera, (for we have called them indifferently by every one of these names,) together with such speculations both previous and subsequent,[d] as were either requisite to explain the subject, or else naturally arose out of it; we imagine the utilities of this knowledge will be obvious to every one who has studied it with impartiality, and has aimed to know what it really is.

In the first place, as we have usually begun the consideration of each arrangement from speculations respecting body, and have thence made a transition to others respecting mind; we may hence mark the connection between these two great principles which stand related to each other, as the subject and its efficient cause, and in virtue of that relation may be said to run through all things.[e]

Again: our mind, by this orderly and comprehensive theory, becoming furnished, like a good library, with proper cells or apartments, we know where to place our ideas both of being and its attributes, and where to look for them again, when we have occasion to call them forth. Without some arrangement of this sort, the mind is so far from increasing in knowledge by the acquisition of new ideas, that, while it increases the number of these, it does but increase its own perplexity. It is no longer a library well regulated, but a library crowded and confused:

> Ubi multa supersunt,
> Et dominum fallunt. Horat. Epist. l. i. 6.

Again: as these Arrangements have a necessary connection with the whole of existence, with all being or substance on one hand, with every possible accident or attribute on the other; it follows, of course, that so general a speculation must have naturally introduced many others; speculations not merely logical, but extending to physics, to ethics, and even to the first philosophy.[f] The reader, from these incidental theorems, (if the author has succeeded in his endeavours to represent them,) will have a taste how the ancients wrote, when they reasoned upon these subjects, and may gratify his curiosity (if he please) by comparing them with the moderns.

It was not from an ostentatious wish to fill his page with

[d] See before, p. 258, 9, 360; and below, p. 384.

[e] See before, p. 258.

[f] See before, p. 253.

quotations, that the author has made such frequent and copious extracts from other authors. He flatters himself, that by this he has not only given authority to the sentiments, but relieved also a subject, in itself rather severe. From the writers alleged, both ancient and modern, the reader will perceive how important and respectable these authorities are. He will perceive, too, that, in the wide regions of being, some sages having cultivated one part, and some another, the labours of ancients and moderns have been often different, when not hostile; often various, when not contradictory; and that among the valuable discoveries of later periods, there are many so far from clashing with the ancient doctrines here advanced, that they coincide as amicably as a Chillingworth and an Addison in the same library, a Raphael and a Claude in the same gallery.

It is not without precedents that he has adopted this manner of citation. It was adopted by Aristotle long ago, in his Rhetoric and his Poetics. Aristotle was followed by those able critics, Demetrius, Quinctilian, and Longinus. Chrysippus, the philosopher, so much approved the method, that in a single tract he inserted nearly the whole of that celebrated tragedy, the Medea of Euripides; so that a person who was perusing the tract, being asked what he was reading, replied pleasantly, "It was the Medea of Chrysippus.[g] Cicero has enriched his philosophic treatises with many choice morsels, both from Greek and Roman writers; and this he does, not only approving the practice himself, but justifying it by the practice of the philosophers then at Athens, among whom he names Dionysius the Stoic, and Philo the Academic.[h] Seneca and Plutarch both pursued the same plan, the latter more particularly in his moral compositions. To these may be added, though of a baser age, my own learned countryman, John of Salisbury,[i] who, having perused and studied most of the Latin classics, appears to have decorated every part of his works with splendid fragments, extracted out of them. Two later writers of genius have done the same in the narrative of their travels; Sandys at the beginning of the last century, and Addison at the beginning of the present.

And so much by way of apology for the author himself. But he has a further wish in this exhibition of capital writers; a wish to persuade his readers, of what he has been long persuaded himself, that every thing really elegant, or sublime in composition, is ultimately referable to the principles of a sound logic; that those

[g] Diog. Laert. l. vii. s. 180.

[h] Tusc. Disput. l. ii. s. 10.

[i] This extraordinary man flourished in the reign of Henry the Second, and was therefore of Old Salisbury, not of New Salisbury, which was not founded till the reign of Henry the Third. John (of whom we write) having had the best education of the time, and being not only a genius, but intimate with the most eminent men, in particular with pope Adrian, (who was himself an Englishman,) became at length a bishop, and died in the year 1182. See Fabricius, in his Biblioth. Lat. vol. ii. p. 368; and in his Biblioth. Med. et Infim. ætat. See also Cave's Histor. Literar. vol. ii. p. 243.

principles, when readers little think of them, have still a latent force, and may be traced, if sought after, even in the politest of writers.[k]

By reasoning of this kind he would establish an important union; the union, he means, between taste and truth. It is this is that splendid union which produced the classics of pure antiquity; which produced, in times less remote, the classics of modern days; and which those who now write ought to cultivate with attention, if they have a wish to survive in the estimation of posterity.

Taste is, in fact, but a species of inferior truth. It is the truth of elegance, of decoration, and of grace; which, as all truth is similar and congenial, coincides, as it were, spontaneously with the more severe and logical; but which, whenever destitute of that more solid support, resembles some fair but languid body; a body, specious in feature, but deficient as to nerve; a body, where we seek in vain for that natural and just perfection, which arises from the pleasing harmony of strength and beauty associated.

Recommending an earnest attention to this union, we resume our subject by observing, that it is in contemplating these orderly, these comprehensive arrangements,[l] we may see whence the subordinate sciences and arts all arise; history, natural and civil, out of *substance;* mathematics, out of *quantity;* optics, out of *quality* and *quantity;* medicine, out of the same; astronomy, out of *quantity* and *motion;* music and mechanics, out of the same; painting, out of *quality* and *site;* ethics, out of *relation;* chronology, out of *when;* geography, out of *where;* electricity, magnetism, and attraction, out of *action* and *passion;* and so in other instances.

Every art and every science being thus referred to its proper principle, we shall be enabled with sufficient accuracy to adjust their comparative value,[m] by comparing the several principles from which they severally flow. Thus shall we be saved from

[k] See the numerous quotations through every part of this treatise.

[l] There are few theories so great, so comprehensive, and so various, as the theory of these predicaments, or philosophical arrangements.

The ancients had many methods of representing works of such a diversified and miscellaneous character.

Fruits of various kinds, promiscuously blended, used to be presented in a dish, as an offering to Ceres. This dish, so filled, they called *lanx satura;* and hence *lanx satura*, or rather *satura*, or *satira* alone, (*lanx* being understood,) came to signify, by metaphor, a "miscellaneous writing;" such as were the compositions of Lucilius, Horace, Persius, Juvenal, and others.

A satire, in this sense, did not mean sarcasm, calumny, or personal abuse; it meant no more than a writing, where the subject was various and diversified, such as Juvenal well describes it, when he speaks of his own works:

Quicquid agunt homines, nostri est farrago libelli.

Again, we all know that groves and forests are diversified with trees; with trees of various figures, magnitudes, and species; and hence it was that Statius called his miscellany collections of poems by the name of *Silvæ.*

[m] See before, p. 258.

absurdly overprizing a single art, or a single science, and from treating all the rest with a sort of insolent contempt; advantages so little to be expected from any knowledge less extensive, that, on the contrary, the more deeply knowing men may be in a single subject alone, the more likely are they to fall into such narrow and illiberal sentiments.

It is indeed no wonder in such case, that mistakes should arise, since those who reason thus, be they as accurate as may be in their own particular science, will be found to reason about one thing which they know, and about many of which they are ignorant; and how from reasoners such as these, so inadequately prepared, can we expect either an exact or an impartial estimate?

And thus much at present for the speculation concerning predicaments, or Philosophical Arrangements;[n] in the treating of which, we have considered, in the beginning,[o] such matters as were necessarily previous; in the middle,[p] we have considered the arrangements themselves; and, in the end,[q] various matters, naturally arising out of them, or which have incidentally occurred during the time of their being discussed.

And thus this part of logical speculation appears to be finished.

[n] Many learned and ingenious observations on this subject, as well as on several other parts of ancient philosophy, (the Peripatetic in particular,) have been given to the world in a tract lately published, styled, On the Origin and Progress of Language, in two volumes, 8vo.

There may be found, too, in the second volume, many judicious and curious remarks on style, composition, language, particularly the English; observations of the last consequence to those who wish either to write or to judge with accuracy and elegance.

The author of these Arrangements might have availed himself of many citations from this work, highly tending to illustrate and to confirm his opinions, but unfortunately for him, the greater part of his own treatise was printed off, before the second volume of this work appeared.

[o] See chap. i. and ii.

[p] See from chap. iii. to xiv. inclusive.

[q] See from chap. xv. to the conclusion.

PHILOLOGICAL INQUIRIES.

PHILOLOGICAL INQUIRIES,

ADDRESSED TO MY MUCH ESTEEMED RELATION AND FRIEND, EDWARD HOOPER, ESQ. OF HURN-COURT, IN THE COUNTY OF HANTS.

Dear Sir,—Being yourself advanced in years, you will the more easily forgive me, if I claim a privilege of age, and pass from Philosophy to Philology.

You may compare me, if you please, to some weary traveller, who, having long wandered over craggy heights, descends at length to the plains below, and hopes, at his journey's end, to find a smooth and easy road.

For my writings, (such as they are,) they have answered a purpose I always wished, if they have led men to inspect authors far superior to myself, many of whose works (like hidden treasures) have lain for years out of sight.

Be that, however, as it may, I shall at least enjoy the pleasure of thus recording our mutual friendship; a friendship which has lasted for more than fifty years, and which I think so much for my honour to have merited so long.

But I proceed to my subject.

As the great events of nature[a] led mankind to admiration; so curiosity to learn the cause whence such events should arise, was that which by due degrees formed Natural Philosophy.

What happened in the natural world, happened also in the literary. Exquisite productions, both in prose and verse, induced men here likewise to seek the cause; and such inquiries, often repeated, gave birth to Philology.

Philology should hence appear to be of a most comprehensive character, and to include, not only all accounts both of criticism and critics, but of every thing connected with letters, be it speculative or historical.

The treatise which follows is of this philological kind, and will consist of three parts, properly distinct from each other.

The first will be an investigation of the rise and different species of criticism and critics.

[a] Some of these great events are enumerated by Virgil—the course of the heavens—eclipses of the sun and moon—earthquakes—the flux and reflux of the sea—the quick return of night in winter, and the slow return of it in summer. Virg. Georg. ii. 475, &c.

The second will be an illustration of critical doctrines and principles, as they appear in distinguished authors, as well ancient as modern.

The third and last part will be rather historical than critical, being an essay on the taste and literature of the middle age.

These subjects of speculation being despatched, we shall here conclude these Philological Inquiries.

First therefore for the first, the rise and different species of criticism and critics.

PART I.

CHAPTER I.

CONCERNING THE RISE OF CRITICISM IN ITS FIRST SPECIES, THE PHILOSOPHICAL. EMINENT PERSONS, GREEKS AND ROMANS, BY WHOM THIS SPECIES WAS CULTIVATED.

Those who can imagine that the rules of writing were first established, and that men then wrote in conformity to them, as they make conserves and comfits by referring to receipt-books, know nothing of criticism, either as to its origin or progress. The truth is, they were authors who made the first good critics, and not critics who made the first good authors, however writers of later date may have profited by critical precepts.

If this appear strange, we may refer to other subjects. Can we doubt that men had music, such, indeed, as it was, before the principles of harmony were established into a science? that diseases were healed, and buildings erected, before medicine and architecture were systematized into arts? that men reasoned and harangued upon matters of speculation and practice, long before there were professed teachers either of logic or of rhetoric? To return therefore to our subject, the rise and progress of criticism.

Ancient Greece in its happy days was the seat of liberty, of sciences, and of arts. In this fair region, fertile of wit, the epic writers came first; then the lyric; then the tragic; and lastly the historians, the comic writers, and the orators; each in their turns delighting whole multitudes, and commanding the attention and admiration of all. Now when wise and thinking men, the subtle investigators of principles and causes, observed the wonderful effect of these works upon the human mind, they were prompted to inquire whence this should proceed; for that it should happen merely from chance, they could not well believe.

Here therefore we have the rise and origin of criticism, which in its beginning was "a deep and philosophical search into the primary laws and elements of good writing, as far as they could be collected from the most approved performances."

In this contemplation of authors, the first critics not only attended to the powers and different species of words; the force of numerous composition, whether in prose or verse; the aptitude of its various kinds to different subjects; but they further considered that which is the basis of all, that is to say, in other words, the meaning or the sense. This led them at once into the most curious of subjects; the nature of man in general; the different characters of men, as they differ in rank or age; their reason and their passions; how the one was to be persuaded, the others to be raised or calmed; the places or repositories to which we may recur when we want proper matter for any of these purposes. Besides all this, they studied sentiments and manners; what constitutes a work, one; what a whole and parts; what the essence of probable, and even of natural fiction, as contributing to constitute a just dramatic fable.

Much of this kind may be found in different parts of Plato. But Aristotle, his disciple, who may be called the systematizer of his master's doctrines, has in his two treatises of Poetry and Rhetoric,[b] with such wonderful penetration, developed every part of the subject, that he may be justly called the father of criticism, both from the age when he lived, and from his truly transcendent genius. The criticism which this capital writer taught, has so intimate a correspondence and alliance with philosophy, that we can call it by no other name than that of philosophical criticism.

To Aristotle succeeded his disciple Theophrastus, who followed his master's example in the study of criticism, as may be seen in the catalogue of his writings, preserved by Diogenes Laertius.[c] But all the critical works of Theophrastus, as well as of many others, are now lost. The principal authors of the kind now remaining in Greek, are Demetrius of Phalera, Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Dionysius Longinus, together with Hermogenes, Aphthonius, and a few others.

Of these the most masterly seems to be Demetrius, who was the earliest, and who appears to follow the precepts, and even the text of Aristotle, with far greater attention than any of the rest. His examples, it must be confessed, are sometimes obscure; but this we rather impute to the destructive hand of time, which has prevented us from seeing many of the original authors.

Dionysius of Halicarnassus, the next in order, may be said to

[b] To such as read not this author in the original, we recommend the French translation of his Rhetoric by Cassandre, and that of his Art of Poetry by Dacier; both of them elaborate and laudable performances.

[c] Vid. Diog. Laert. lib. v. s. 46, 47, &c.

have written with judgment upon the force of numerous composition, not to mention other tracts on the subject of oratory, and those also critical as well as historical. Longinus, who was in time far later than these, seems principally to have had in view the passions and the imagination; in the treating of which he has acquired a just applause, and expressed himself with a dignity suitable to the subject. The rest of the Greek critics, though they have said many useful things, have yet so minutely multiplied the rules of art, and so much confined themselves to the oratory of the tribunal, that they appear of no great service as to good writing in general.

Among the Romans, the first critic of note was Cicero, who, though far below Aristotle in depth of philosophy, may be said, like him, to have exceeded all his countrymen. As his celebrated treatise concerning the Orator[d] is written in dialogue, where the speakers introduced are the greatest men of his nation, we have incidentally an elegant sample of those manners, and that politeness, which were peculiar to the leading characters during the Roman commonwealth. There we may see the behaviour of free and accomplished men, before a baser address had set that standard, which has been too often taken for good-breeding ever since.

Next to Cicero came Horace, who often in other parts of his writings acts the critic and scholar, but whose Art of Poetry is a standard of its kind, and too well known to need any encomium. After Horace arose Quinctilian, Cicero's admirer and follower; who appears by his works not only learned and ingenious, but (what is still more) an honest and a worthy man. He likewise dwells too much upon the oratory of the tribunal, a fact no way surprising, when we consider the age in which he lived; an age, when tyrannic government being the fashion of the times, that nobler species of eloquence, I mean the popular and deliberative, was, with all things truly liberal, degenerated and sunk. The latter Latin rhetoricians there is no need to mention, as they little help to illustrate the subject in hand. I would only repeat that the species of criticism here mentioned, as far at least as handled by the more able masters, is that which we have denominated criticism philosophical. We are now to proceed to another species.

[d] This treatise, being the work of a capital orator on the subject of his own art, may fairly be pronounced a capital performance. The proem to the third book, both for language and sentiment, is perhaps as pathetic, and in that view as sublime, as any thing remaining among the writings of the ancients.

CHAPTER II.

CONCERNING THE PROGRESS OF CRITICISM IN ITS SECOND SPECIES, THE HISTORICAL. GREEK AND ROMAN CRITICS, BY WHOM THIS SPECIES OF CRITICISM WAS CULTIVATED.

As to the criticism already treated, we find it not confined to any one particular author, but containing general rules of art, either for judging or writing, confirmed by the example not of one author, but of many. But we know from experience, that, in process of time, languages, customs, manners, laws, governments, and religions insensibly change. The Macedonian tyranny, after the fatal battle of Chæronea, wrought much of this kind in Greece; and the Roman tyranny, after the fatal battles of Pharsalia and Philippi, carried it throughout the known world.[e] Hence, therefore, of things obsolete, the names became obsolete also; and authors, who in their own age were intelligible and easy, in after-days grew difficult and obscure. Here, then, we behold the rise of a second race of critics, the tribe of scholiasts, commentators, and explainers.

These naturally attached themselves to particular authors. Aristarchus, Didymus, Eustathius, and many others, bestowed their labours upon Homer; Proclus and Tzetzes upon Hesiod; the same Proclus and Olympiodorus upon Plato; Simplicius, Ammonius, and Philoponus upon Aristotle; Ulpian upon Demosthenes; Macrobius and Asconius upon Cicero; Calliergus upon Theocritus; Donatus upon Terence; Servius upon Virgil; Acro and Porphyrio upon Horace; and so with respect to others, as well philosophers as poets and orators. To these scholiasts may be added the several composers of lexicons, such as Hesychius, Philoxenus, Suidas, &c.; also the writers upon grammar, such as Apollonius, Priscian, Sosipater, Charisius, &c. Now all these pains-taking men, considered together, may be said to have completed another species of criticism, a species which, in distinction to the former, we call criticism historical.

And thus things continued, though in a declining way, till, after many a severe and unsuccessful plunge, the Roman empire sunk through the West of Europe. Latin then soon lost its purity; Greek they hardly knew; classics and their scholiasts were no longer studied; and an age succeeded of legends and crusades.

[e] See Hermes, p. 239, 240.

CHAPTER III.

MODERNS EMINENT IN THE TWO SPECIES OF CRITICISM BEFORE MENTIONED, THE PHILOSOPHICAL AND THE HISTORICAL—THE LAST SORT OF CRITICS MORE NUMEROUS—THOSE MENTIONED IN THIS CHAPTER CONFINED TO THE GREEK AND LATIN LANGUAGES.

At length, after a long and barbarous period, when the shades of monkery began to retire, and the light of humanity once again to dawn, the arts also of criticism insensibly revived. It is true, indeed, the authors of the philosophical sort (I mean that which respects the causes and principles of good writing in general) were not many in number. However, of this rank among the Italians were Vida and the elder Scaliger; among the French were Rapin, Bouhours, Boileau, together with Bossu, the most methodic and accurate of them all. In our own country, our nobility may be said to have distinguished themselves: lord Roscommon, in his Essay upon translated Verse; the duke of Buckingham, in his Essay on Poetry; and lord Shaftesbury, in his treatise called Advice to an Author: to whom may be added our late admired genius, Pope, in his truly elegant poem, the Essay upon Criticism.

The discourses of sir Joshua Reynolds upon Painting have, after a philosophical manner, investigated the principles of an art, which no one in practice better verified than himself.

We have mentioned these discourses, not only from their merit, but as they incidentally teach us, that to write well upon a liberal art, we must write philosophically; that all the liberal arts in their principles are congenial; and that these principles, when traced to their common source, are found all to terminate in the first philosophy.[f]

But to pursue our subject. However small among moderns may be the number of these philosophical critics, the writers of historical or explanatory criticism have been in a manner innumerable. To name, out of many, only a few: of Italy were Beroaldus, Ficinus, Victorius, and Robertellus; of the Higher and Lower Germany were Erasmus, Sylburgius, Le Clerc, and Fabricius; of France were Lambin, Du Vall, Harduin, Capperonerius; of England were Stanley, (editor of Æschylus,) Gataker, Davis, Clarke, (editor of Homer;) together with multitudes more from every region and quarter,

> Thick as autumnal leaves, that strow the brooks
> In Vallombrosa.

[f] See Hermes, p. 154, and Philosophical Arrangements, p. 356; also the words *first philosophy*, in the index to those Arrangements.

But I fear I have given a strange catalogue, where we seek in vain for such illustrious personages as Sesostris, Cyrus, Alexander, Cæsar, Attila, Tottila, Tamerlane, &c. The heroes of my work (if I may be pardoned for calling them so) have only aimed in retirement to present us with knowledge. Knowledge only was their object, not havoc, nor devastation.

After commentators and editors, we must not forget the compilers of lexicons and dictionaries, such as Charles and Henry Stevens, Favorinus, Constantine, Budæus, Cooper, Faber, Vossius, and others. To these also we may add the authors upon grammar: in which subject the learned Greeks, when they quitted the East, led the way, Moschopulus, Chrysoloras, Lascaris, Theodore Gaza; then in Italy, Laurentius Valla; in England, Grocin and Linacer; in Spain, Sanctius;[g] in the Low Countries, Vossius; in France, Cæsar Scaliger, by his residence, though by birth an Italian, together with those able writers Mess. de Port Royal. Nor ought we to omit the writers of philological epistles, such as Emanuel Martin;[h] nor the writers of literary catalogues, (in French called *catalogues raisonnées*,) such as the account of the manuscripts in the imperial library at Vienna, by Lambecius; or of the Arabic manuscripts in the Escurial library, by Michael Casiri.[i]

[g] Sanctius, towards the end of the sixteenth century, was professor of rhetoric, and of the Greek tongue, in the university of Salamanca. He wrote many works, but his most celebrated is that which bears the name of *Sanctii Minerva, seu de Causis Linguæ Latinæ*. This invaluable book (to which the author of these treatises readily owns himself indebted for his first rational ideas of grammar and language) was published by Sanctius at Salamanca in the year 1587. Its superior merit soon made it known through Europe, and caused it to pass through many editions in different places. The most common edition is a large octavo, printed at Amsterdam in the year 1733, and illustrated with notes by the learned Perizonius.

[h] Emanuel Martin was dean of Alicant in the beginning of the present century. He appears from his writings, as well as from his history, to have been a person of pleasing and amiable manners; to have been an able antiquarian, and, as such, a friend to the celebrated Montfaucon; to have cultivated with eagerness the various studies of humanity, and to have written Latin with facility and elegance. His works, containing twelve books of epistles, and a few other pieces, were printed in Spain about the year 1735, at the private expense of that respectable statesman and scholar, sir Benjamin Keene, the British ambassador, to whom they were inscribed in a classical dedication by the learned dean himself, then living at Alicant. As copies of this edition soon became scarce, the book was reprinted by Wesselingius, in a fair quarto, (the two tomes being usually bound together,) at Amsterdam, in the year 1738.

[i] Michael Casiri, the learned librarian of the Escurial, has been enabled, by the munificence of the last and present kings of Spain, to publish an accurate and erudite catalogue of the Arabic manuscripts in that curious library, a work well becoming its royal patrons, as it gives an ample exhibition of Arabic literature in all its various branches of poetry, philosophy, divinity, history, &c. But of these manuscripts we shall say more in the Appendix, subjoined to the end of these Inquiries.

CHAPTER IV.

MODERN CRITICS OF THE EXPLANATORY KIND, COMMENTING MODERN WRITERS—LEXICOGRAPHERS—GRAMMARIANS—TRANSLATORS.

Though much historical explanation has been bestowed on the ancient classics, yet have the authors of our own country by no means been forgotten, having exercised many critics of learning and ingenuity.

Mr. Thomas Warton (besides his fine edition of Theocritus) has given a curious history of English poetry during the middle centuries; Mr. Tyrwhitt, much accurate and diversified erudition upon Chaucer; Mr. Upton, a learned comment on the Fairy Queen of Spencer; Mr. Addison, many polite and elegant Spectators on the conduct and beauties of the Paradise Lost; Dr. Warton, an Essay on the Genius and Writings of Pope, a work filled with speculations, in a taste perfectly pure. The lovers of literature would not forgive me, were I to omit that ornament of her sex and country, the critic and patroness of our illustrious Shakspeare, Mrs. Montagu. For the honour of criticism, not only the divines already mentioned, but others also, of rank *still* superior, have bestowed their labours upon our capital poets,[k] suspending for a while their severer studies, to relax in these regions of genius and imagination.

The dictionaries of Minshew, Skinner, Spelman, Sumner, Junius, and Johnson, are all well known, and justly esteemed. Such is the merit of the last, that our language does not possess a more copious, learned, and valuable work. For grammatical knowledge, we ought to mention with distinction the learned prelate, Dr. Lowth, bishop of London; whose admirable tract on the Grammar of the English Language, every lover of that language ought to study and understand, if he would write, or even speak it, with purity and precision.

Let my countrymen, too, reflect, that in studying a work upon this subject, they are not only studying a language in which it becomes them to be knowing, but a language which can boast of as many good books as any among the living or modern languages of Europe. The writers, born and educated in a free country, have been left for years to their native freedom. Their pages have been never defiled with an *index expurgatorius*, nor their genius ever shackled with the terrors of an inquisition.

May this invaluable privilege never be impaired either by the hand of power, or by licentious abuse.

Perhaps with the critics just described I ought to arrange translators, if it be true that translation is a species of explana-

[k] Shakspeare, Milton, Cowley, Pope.

tion, which differs no otherwise from explanatory comments, than that these attend to parts, while translation goes to the whole.

Now as translators are infinite, and many of them (to borrow a phrase from sportsmen) unqualified persons, I shall enumerate only a few, and those such as for their merits have been deservedly esteemed.

Of this number I may very truly reckon Meric Casaubon, the translator of Marcus Antoninus; Mrs. Carter, the translator of Epictetus; and Mr. Sydenham, the translator of many of Plato's Dialogues. All these seem to have accurately understood the original language from which they translated. But that is not all. The authors translated being philosophers, the translators appear to have studied the style of their philosophy, well knowing that in ancient Greece every sect of philosophy, like every science and art, had a language of its own.[1]

To these may be added the respectable name of Melmoth and of Hampton, of Franklyn and of Potter; nor should I omit a few others, whose labours have been similar, did I not recollect the trite, though elegant admonition,

> Fugit irreparabile tempus,
> Singula dum capti circumvectamur amore. Virg.

Yet one translation I can by no means forget, I mean that of Xenophon's Cyropædia, or the Institution of Cyrus, by the Hon. Maurice Ashley Cowper, son to the second earl of Shaftesbury, and brother to the third, who was author of the Characteristics. This translation is made in all the purity and simplicity of the original, and to it the translator has prefixed a truly philosophical dedication, addressed to my mother, who was one of his sisters.

I esteem it an honour to call this author my uncle, and that not only from his rank, but much more from his learning, and unblemished virtue; qualities which the love of retirement (where he thought they could be best cultivated) induced him to conceal, rather than to produce in public.

The first edition of this translation, consisting of two octavo volumes, was published soon after his decease, in the year 1728. Between this time and the year 1770, the book has passed through a second and a third edition, not with the eclat of popular applause, but with the silent approbation of the studious few.

[1] See Hermes, p. 195.

CHAPTER V.

RISE OF THE THIRD SPECIES OF CRITICISM, THE CORRECTIVE—PRACTISED BY THE ANCIENTS, BUT MUCH MORE BY THE MODERNS, AND WHY.

But we are now to inquire after another species of criticism. All ancient books, having been preserved by transcription, were liable through ignorance, negligence, or fraud, to be corrupted in three different ways; that is to say, by retrenchings, by additions, and by alterations.

To remedy these evils, a third sort of criticism arose, and that was criticism corrective. The business of this at first was painfully to collate all the various copies of authority; and then, from amidst the variety of readings thus collected, to establish by good reasons either the true, or the most probable. In this sense we may call such criticism, not only corrective, but authoritative.

As the number of these corruptions must needs have increased by length of time, hence it has happened that corrective criticism has become much more necessary in these latter ages, than it was in others more ancient. Not but that even in ancient days various readings have been noted. Of this kind there are a multitude in the text of Homer; a fact not singular, when we consider his great antiquity. In the comments of Ammonius and Philoponus upon Aristotle, there is mention made of several in the text of that philosopher, which these his commentators compare and examine.

We find the same in Aulus Gellius, as to the Roman authors; where it is withal remarkable, that, even in that early period, much stress is laid upon the authority of ancient manuscripts,[m] a reading in Cicero being justified from a copy made by his learned freedman, Tiro; and a reading in Virgil's Georgics, from a book which had once belonged to Virgil's family.

But since the revival of literature, to correct has been a business of much more latitude, having continually employed, for two centuries and a half, both the pains of the most laborious, and the wits of the most acute. Many of the learned men before enumerated were not only famous as historical critics, but as corrective also. Such were the two Scaligers, (of whom one has been already mentioned,[n]) the two Casaubons, Salmasius, the Heinsii, Grævius, the Gronovii, Burman, Kuster, Wasse, Bentley, Pearce, and Markland. In the same class, and in a rank highly eminent, I place Mr. Toupe of Cornwall, who, in his Emendations upon Suidas, and his edition of Longinus, has shewn a critical acumen, and a compass of learning, that may justly

[m] See Aulus Gellius, lib. i. c. 7. and 21. Macrob. Saturn. lib. i. c. 5.
[n] Page 392.

arrange him with the most distinguished scholars. Nor must I forget Dr. Taylor, residentiary of St. Paul's; nor Mr. Upton, prebendary of Rochester. The former, by his edition of Demosthenes, (as far as he lived to carry it,) by his Lysias, by his comment on the Marmor Sandvicense, and other critical pieces; the latter, by his correct and elegant edition, in Greek and Latin, of Arrian's Epictetus, (the first of the kind that had any pretensions to be called complete;) have rendered themselves, as scholars, lasting ornaments of their country. These two valuable men were the friends of my youth; the companions of my social as well as my literary hours. I admired them for their erudition; I loved them for their virtue: they are now no more.

His saltem accumulem donis, et fungar inani
Munere. Virg.

CHAPTER VI.

CRITICISM MAY HAVE BEEN ABUSED—YET DEFENDED, AS OF THE LAST IMPORTANCE TO THE CAUSE OF LITERATURE.

But here was the misfortune of this last species of criticism. The best of things may pass into abuse. There were numerous corruptions in many of the finest authors, which neither ancient editions nor manuscripts could heal. What, then, was to be done? Were forms so fair to remain disfigured, and be seen for ever under such apparent blemishes? "No, (says a critic,) conjecture can cure all: conjecture, whose performances are, for the most part, more certain than any thing that we can exhibit from the authority of manuscripts."* We will not ask, upon this wonderful assertion, how, if so certain, can it be called conjecture? It is enough to observe, (be it called as it may,) that this spirit of conjecture has too often passed into an intemperate excess; and then, whatever it may have boasted, has done more mischief by far than good. Authors have been taken in hand, like anatomical subjects, only to display the skill and abilities of the artist; so that the end of many an edition seems often to have been no more than to exhibit the great sagacity and erudition of an editor. The joy of the task was the honour of mending; while corruptions were sought with a more than common attention, as each of them afforded a testimony to the editor and his art.

And here I beg leave, by way of digression, to relate a short story concerning a noted empiric. "Being once in a ball-room crowded with company, he was asked by a gentleman, What he

* Plura igitur in Horatianis his curis ex conjectura exhibemus, quam ex codicum subsidio; et, nisi me omnia fallunt, plerumque certiora.—Bentleii Præfat. ad Horat.

thought of such a lady? was it not pity that she squinted! Squint! sir! replied the doctor, I wish every lady in the room squinted; there is not a man in Europe can cure squinting but myself."

But to return to our subject. Well, indeed, would it be for the cause of letters, were this bold conjectural spirit confined to works of second rate, where, let it change, expunge, or add, as happens, it may be tolerably sure to leave matters as they were; or if not much better, at least not much worse. But when the divine geniuses of higher rank, whom we not only applaud, but in a manner revere, when these come to be attempted by petulant correctors, and to be made the subject of their wanton caprice, how can we but exclaim, with a kind of religious abhorrence,

Procul! O! procul este profani!

These sentiments may be applied even to the celebrated Bentley. It would have become that able writer, though in literature and natural abilities among the first of his age, had he been more temperate in his criticism upon the Paradise Lost; had he not so repeatedly and injuriously offered violence to its author, from an affected superiority, to which he had no pretence. But the rage of conjecture seems to have seized him, as that of jealousy did Medea;[P] a rage which she confessed herself unable to resist, although she knew the mischiefs it would prompt her to perpetrate.

And now, to obviate an unmerited censure, (as if I were an enemy to the thing, from being an enemy to its abuse,) I would have it remembered, it is not either with criticism or critics that I presume to find fault. The art, and its professors, while they practise it with temper, I truly honour; and think that, were it not for their acute and learned labours, we should be in danger of degenerating into an age of dunces.

Indeed, critics (if I may be allowed the metaphor) are a sort of masters of the ceremony in the court of letters, through whose assistance we are introduced into some of the first and best company. Should we ever, therefore, by idle prejudices against pedantry, verbal accuracies, and we know not what, come to slight their art, and reject them from our favour, it is well we do not slight also those classics with whom criticism converses, becoming content to read them in translations, or (what is still worse) in translations of translations, or (what is worse even than that) not to read them at all. And I will be bold to assert, if that should ever happen, we shall speedily return into those days of darkness, out of which we happily emerged upon the revival of ancient literature.

[P] See the Medea of Euripides, v. 1078. See also Philosoph. Arrangements, p. 374.

CHAPTER VII.

CONCLUSION. RECAPITULATION. PREPARATION FOR THE SECOND PART.

And so much at present for critics and learned editors. So much also for the origin and progress of criticism; which has been divided into three species, the philosophical, the historical, and the corrective: the philosophical, treating of the principles and primary causes of good writing in general; the historical, being conversant in particular facts, customs, phrases, &c.; and the corrective, being divided into the authoritative and the conjectural; the authoritative, depending on the collation of manuscripts and the best editions; the conjectural, on the sagacity and erudition of editors.[q]

As the first part of these inquiries ends here, we are now to proceed to the second part, a specimen of the doctrines and principles of criticism, as they are illustrated in the writings of the most distinguished authors.

PART II.

INTRODUCTION.

We are, in the following part of this work, to give a specimen of those doctrines, which having been slightly touched in the first part, we are now to illustrate more amply, by referring to examples, as well ancient as modern.

It has been already hinted, that among writers the epic came first;[a] it has been hinted likewise, that nothing excellent in a literary way happens merely by chance.[b]

Mention also has been made of numerous composition,[c] and the force of it suggested, though little said further.

To this we may add the theory of whole and parts,[d] so essential to the very being of a legitimate composition; and the theory also of sentiment and manners,[e] both of which naturally belong to every whole, called dramatic.

Nor can we on this occasion omit a few speculations on the

[q] For the first species of criticism, see p. 388. For the second species, see p. 390. For the third species, see p. 396, to the end of the chapter following, p. 398.

There are a few other notes besides the preceding; but as some of them were long, and it was apprehended for that reason that they might too much interrupt the continuity of the text, they have been joined with other pieces, in the forming of an Appendix.

[a] Page 388.
[b] Page 389.
[c] Ibid.
[d] Ibid.
[e] Ibid.

fable or action; speculations necessarily connected with every drama, and which we shall illustrate from tragedy, its most striking species.

And here, if it should be objected that we refer to English authors, the connection should be remembered between good authors of every country, as far as they all draw from the same sources, the sources I mean of nature and of truth. A like apology may be made for inquiries concerning the English tongue, and how far it may be made susceptible of classic decoration. All languages are in some degree congenial, and, both in their matter and their form, are founded upon the same principles.[f]

What is here said, will, we hope, sufficiently justify the following detail; a detail naturally arising from the former part of the plan, by being founded upon expressions, not sufficiently there developed.

First, therefore, for the first: that the epic poets led the way; and that nothing excellent, in a literary view, happens merely by chance.

CHAPTER I.

THAT THE EPIC WRITERS CAME FIRST, AND THAT NOTHING EXCELLENT IN LITERARY PERFORMANCES HAPPENS MERELY FROM CHANCE—THE CAUSES, OR REASONS OF SUCH EXCELLENCE, ILLUSTRATED BY EXAMPLES.

It appears, that not only in Greece, but in other countries, more barbarous, the first writings were in metre,[g] and of an epic cast, recording wars, battles, heroes, ghosts; the marvellous always, and often the incredible. Men seemed to have thought, that the higher they soared, the more important they should appear; and that the common life which they then lived, was a thing too contemptible to merit imitation.

Hence it followed, that it was not till this common life was rendered respectable by more refined and polished manners, that men thought it might be copied, so as to gain them applause.

Even in Greece itself, tragedy had attained its maturity many years before comedy,[h] as may be seen by comparing the age of Sophocles and Euripides with that of Philemon and Menander.

For ourselves, we shall find most of our first poets prone to a turgid bombast, and most of our first prosaic writers to a pedantic stiffness, which rude styles gradually improved, but

[f] Hermes, p. 217.
[g] Temple's Works, vol. i. p. 239. fol. edit. Also Characteristics, vol. i. p. 244.
[h] Aristot. Poet. c. 4. p. 227. edit. Sylb.

reached not a classical purity sooner than Tillotson, Dryden, Addison, Shaftesbury, Prior, Pope, Atterbury, &c. &c.

As to what is asserted soon after upon the efficacy of causes in works of ingenuity and art, we think in general, that the effect must always be proportioned to its cause. It is hard for him, who reasons attentively, to refer to chance any superlative production.[i]

Effects indeed strike us, when we are not thinking about the cause; yet may we be assured, if we reflect, that a cause there is, and that too a cause intelligent and rational. Nothing would perhaps more contribute to give us a taste truly critical, than on every occasion to investigate this cause; and to ask ourselves, upon feeling any uncommon effect, why we are thus delighted; why thus affected; why melted into pity; why made to shudder with horror?

Till this *why* is well answered, all is darkness, and our admiration, like that of the vulgar, founded upon ignorance.

To explain by a few examples, that are known to all, and for that reason here alleged, because they are known.

I am struck with the night-scene in Virgil's fourth Æneid: The universal silence throughout the globe; the sweet rest of its various inhabitants, soothing their cares and forgetting their labours; the unhappy Dido alone restless—restless, and agitated with impetuous passions.[k]

I am affected with the story of Regulus, as painted by West: The crowd of anxious friends, persuading him not to return; his wife, fainting through sensibility and fear; persons, the least connected, appearing to feel for him; yet himself unmoved, inexorable and stern.[l]

Without referring to these deeply tragic scenes, what charms has music, when a masterly band pass unexpectedly from loud to soft, or from soft to loud? When the system changes from the greater third to the less; or reciprocally, when it changes from this last to the former?

All these effects have a similar and well-known cause: the amazing force which contraries acquire, either by juxta-position, or by quick succession.[m]

But we ask still further, why have contraries this force? We answer, because, of all things which differ, none differ so widely. Sound differs from darkness, but not so much as from silence; darkness differs from sound, but not so much as from light. In

[i] Philosoph. Arrang. p. 340, and 376.

[k] Æn. iv. 522, &c.

[l] Horat. Carm. l. iii. od. 5.

[m] This truth is not only obvious, but ancient. Aristotle says, Παράλληλα τὰ ἐναντία μάλιστα φαίνεσθαι: "that contraries, when set beside each other, make the strongest appearance." Παράλληλα γὰρ μᾶλλον τὰ ἐναντία γνωρίζεται: "that contraries are better known, when set beside each other." Arist. Rhetor. lib. iii. p. 120, and p. 152. edit. Sylb. The same author often makes use of this truth in other places; which truth, simple as it seems, is the source of many capital beauties in all the fine arts.

the same intense manner differ repose and restlessness; felicity and misery; dubious solicitude and firm resolution; the epic and the comic; the sublime and the ludicrous.[n]

And, why differ contraries thus widely? Because while attributes, simply different, may coexist in the same subject, contraries cannot coexist, but always destroy one another.[o] Thus the same marble may be both white and hard; but the same marble cannot be both white and black. And hence it follows, that as their difference is more intense, so is our recognition of them more vivid, and our impressions more permanent.

This effect of contraries is evident even in objects of sense, where imagination and intellect are not in the least concerned. When we pass (for example) from a hot-house, we feel the common air more intensely cool; when we pass from a dark cavern, we feel the common light of the day more intensely glaring.

But to proceed to instances of another and a very different kind.

Few scenes are more affecting than the taking of Troy, as described in the second Æneid: The apparition of Hector to Æneas, when asleep, announcing to him the commencement of that direful event—the distant lamentations, heard by Æneas, as he awakes—his ascending the house-top, and viewing the city in flames—his friend Pentheus, escaped from destruction, and relating to him their wretched and deplorable condition—Æneas, with a few friends, rushing into the thickest danger—their various success, till they all perish, but himself and two more—the affecting scenes of horror and pity at Priam's palace—a son, slain at his father's feet; and the immediate massacre of the old monarch himself—Æneas, on seeing this, inspired with the memory of his own father—his resolving to return home, having now lost all his companions—his seeing Helen in the way, and his design to despatch so wicked a woman—Venus interposing,

[n] From these instances we perceive the meaning of those descriptions of contraries, that they are *τὰ πλεῖστον διαφέροντα τῶν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ γένει—ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ δεκτικῷ—τῶν ὑπὸ τὴν αὐτὴν δύναμιν*: "things which differ most widely, among things existing in the same genus, in the same recipient, comprehended under the same power or faculty." Arist. Metaph. Δ. i. p. 82. edit. Sylb. Cicero, in his Topica, translates the first description, Quæ in eodem genere plurimum differunt. Sect. 70.

Aristotle reasons as follows: *Ἐπεὶ δὲ διαφέρειν ἐνδέχεται ἀλλήλων τὰ διαφέροντα πλεῖον καὶ ἔλαττον, ἐστί τις καὶ μεγίστη διαφορὰ, καὶ ταύτην λέγω ἐναντίωσιν*: "It being admitted that things differing from one another, differ more and less, there must be also a certain difference, which is most, and this I call contrariety." Metaph. p. 162. edit. Sylb.

[o] Ammonius, commenting the doctrine of contraries, (as set forth in Aristotle's Categories,) informs us, that "they not only do not imply one another, (as a son necessarily implies a father,) but that they even destroy one another, so that, where one is present, the other cannot remain:" *οὐ μόνον οὐ συνεισφέρει ἄλληλα, ἀλλὰ καὶ φθείρει· τοῦ γὰρ ἑνὸς παρόντος, οὐχ ὑπομένει τὸ ἕτερον.* Ammon. in Categ. p. 147. edit. Venet. The Stagirite himself describes them in the same manner: *τὰ μὴ δυνατὰ ἅμα τῷ αὐτῷ παρεῖναι*: "things that cannot be present at once in the same subject." Metaph. Δ. p. 82. edit. Sylb.

and shewing him (by removing the film from his eyes) the most sublime, though most direful, of all sights, the gods themselves busied in Troy's destruction; Neptune at one employ, Juno at another, Pallas at a third—It is not Helen (says Venus) but the gods, that are the authors of your country's ruin—it is their inclemency, &c.

Not less solemn and awful, though less leading to pity, is the commencement of the sixth Æneid: The Sibyl's cavern—her frantic gestures, and prophecy—the request of Æneas to descend to the shades—her answer, and information about the loss of one of his friends—the fate of poor Misenus—his funeral—the golden bough discovered, a preparatory circumstance for the descent—the sacrifice—the ground bellowing under their feet—the woods in motion—the dogs of Hecate howling—the actual descent in all its particulars of the marvellous and the terrible.

If we pass from an ancient author to a modern, what scene more striking than the first scene in Hamlet? The solemnity of the time, a severe and pinching night—the solemnity of the place, a platform for a guard—the guards themselves; and their apposite discourse—yonder star in such a position; the bell then beating one—when description is exhausted, the thing itself appears, the ghost enters.

From Shakspeare, the transition to Milton is natural. What pieces have ever met a more just, as well as universal applause, than his L'Allegro and Il Penseroso? The first, a combination of every incident that is lively and cheerful; the second, of every incident that is melancholy and serious: the materials of each collected, according to their character, from rural life, from city life, from music, from poetry; in a word, from every part of nature, and every part of art.

To pass from poetry to painting, the Crucifixion of Polycrates, by Salvator Rosa,[p] is a most affecting representation of various human figures, seen under different modes of horror and pity, as they contemplate a dreadful spectacle, the crucifixion above mentioned. The Aurora of Guido, on the other side, is one of those joyous exhibitions, where nothing is seen but youth and beauty, in every attitude of elegance and grace. The former picture in poetry would have been a deep Penseroso; the latter, a most pleasing and animated Allegro.

And to what cause are we to refer these last enumerations of striking effects?

To a very different one from the former: not to an opposition of contrary incidents, but to a concatenation or accumulation of many that are similar and congenial.

And why have concatenation and accumulation such a force? From these most simple and obvious truths, that many things similar, when added together, will be more in quantity than any

[p] See page 30.

one of them taken singly; consequently, that the more things are thus added, the greater will be their effect.[q]

We have mentioned at the same time both accumulation and concatenation, because in painting, the objects, by existing at once, are accumulated; in poetry, as they exist by succession, they are not accumulated, but concatenated. Yet, through memory and imagination,[r] even these also derive an accumulative force, being preserved from passing away by those admirable faculties, till, like many pieces of metal melted together, they collectively form one common magnitude.

It must be further remembered, there is an accumulation of things analogous, even when those things are the objects of different faculties. For example: as are passionate gestures to the eye, so are passionate tones to the ear; so are passionate ideas to the imagination. To feel the amazing force of an accumulation like this, we must see some capital actor acting the drama of some capital poet, where all the powers of both are assembled at the same instant.

And thus have we endeavoured, by a few obvious and easy examples, to explain what we mean by the words, "seeking the cause, or reason, as often as we feel works of art and ingenuity to affect us."[s]

If I might advise a beginner in this elegant pursuit, it should be, as far as possible, to recur for principles to the most plain and simple truths, and to extend every theorem, as he advances, to its utmost latitude, so as to make it suit and include the greatest number of possible cases.

I would advise him further, to avoid subtle and far-fetched refinement, which, as it is for the most part adverse to perspicuity and truth, may serve to make an able sophist, but never an able critic.

[q] Quinctilian observes, that the man who tells us, "a city was stormed," includes, in what he says, "all things which such a disaster implies;" and yet for all that, such a brief information less affects us than a detail, because it is less striking, to deliver the whole at once, than it is to enumerate the several particulars. His words are, Minus est *totum* dicere, quam *omnia*. Quinct. Institut. viii. 3.

The whole is well worth reading, particularly his detail of the various and horrid events which befall the storming of a city. Sine dubio enim, qui dicit expugnatam esse civitatem, &c.

Aristotle reasons much after the same manner: Καὶ διαιρούμενα δέ εἰς τὰ μέρη, τὰ αὐτὰ μείζω φαίνεται· πλειόνων γὰρ ὑπεροχὴ φαίνεται: "The same things, divided into parts, appear greater, for then there appears an excess or an abundance of many things."

By way of proof he quotes Homer on the same subject, I mean the taking of a city by storm:

Ὅσσα κακ' ἀνθρώποισι πέλει, τῶν ἔστυ ἁλώη·
Ἄνδρας μὲν κτείνουσι, πόλιν δέ τε πῦρ ἀμαθύνει,
Τέκνα δέ τ' ἄλλοι ἄγουσι, βαθυζώνους τε γυναῖκας. Iliad. ix. 588.

The dire disasters of a city stormed;
The men they massacre; the town they fire;
And others lead the children and the wives
Into captivity.

See Arist. Rhetor. lib. i. p. 29. edit. Sylb. where the above lines of Homer are quoted; and though with some variation from the common reading, yet with none which affects the sense.

[r] See Hermes, p. 219, &c.

[s] See pages 388, 389, 401.

A word more; I would advise a young critic, in his contemplations, to turn his eye rather to the praiseworthy than the blameable; that is, to investigate the causes of praise rather than the causes of blame. For though an uninformed beginner may in a single instance happen to blame properly, it is more than probable that in the next he may fail, and incur the censure passed upon the criticising cobler, *Ne sutor ultra crepidam.*[t]

We are now to inquire concerning numerous composition.

CHAPTER II.

NUMEROUS COMPOSITION, DERIVED FROM QUANTITY SYLLABIC, ANCIENTLY ESSENTIAL BOTH TO VERSE AND PROSE. RHYTHM. PÆANS AND CRETICS, THE FEET FOR PROSE. QUANTITY ACCENTUAL—A DEGENERACY FROM THE SYLLABIC. INSTANCES OF IT, FIRST IN LATIN, THEN IN GREEK. VERSUS POLITICI—TRACES OF ACCENTUAL QUANTITY IN TERENCE—ESSENTIAL TO MODERN LANGUAGES, AND AMONG OTHERS TO ENGLISH, FROM WHICH LAST EXAMPLES ARE TAKEN.

As numerous composition arises from a just arrangement of words, so is that arrangement just, when formed upon their verbal quantity.

Now if we seek for this verbal quantity in Greek and Latin, we shall find, that while those two languages were in purity, their verbal quantity was in purity also. Every syllable had a measure of time, either long or short, defined with precision either by its constituent vowel, or by the relation of that vowel to other letters adjoining. Syllables thus characterized, when combined, made a foot; and feet thus characterized, when combined, made a verse; so that, while a particular harmony existed in every part, a general harmony was diffused through the whole.

Pronunciation at this period being, like other things, perfect, accent and quantity were accurately distinguished; of which distinction, familiar then, though now obscure, we venture to suggest the following explanation. We compare quantity to musical tones differing in long and short, as, upon whatever line they stand, a semibreve differs from a minim. We compare accent to musical tones differing in high and low, as D upon the third line differs from G upon the first, be its length the same, or be it longer or shorter.

And thus things continued for a succession of centuries, from Homer and Hesiod to Virgil and Horace; during which interval,

[t] Those who wish to see the origin of this ingenious proverb, may find it in Pliny, l. xxv. s. 12, and in Valerius Maximus, l. viii. c. 12.

if we add a trifle to its end, all the truly classical poets, both Greek and Latin, flourished.

Nor was prose at the same time neglected. Penetrating wits discovered this also to be capable of numerous composition, and founded their ideas upon the following reasonings.

Though they allowed that prose should not be strictly metrical, (for then it would be no longer prose, but poetry,) yet at the same time they asserted, if it had no rhythm at all, such a vague effusion would of course fatigue, and the reader would seek in vain for those returning pauses, so helpful to his reading, and so grateful to his ear.[u]

Now as feet were found an essential to that rhythm, they were obliged, as well as poets, to consider feet under their several characters.

In this contemplation, they found the heroic foot (which includes the spondee, the dactyl, and the anapæst) to be majestic and grave, but yet improper for prose, because, if employed too frequently, the composition would appear epic.

On the contrary, in the iambic they found levity; it often made, though undesignedly, a part of common discourse, and could not, for that reason, but want a suitable dignity.[x]

What expedient then remained? They recommended a foot where the former two were blended; where the pomp of the heroic and the levity of the iambic were mutually to correct and temper one another.

But as this appears to require explanation, we shall endeavour, if we can, to render it intelligible, saying something previously upon the nature of rhythm.

Rhythm differs from metre, inasmuch as rhythm is proportion applied to any motion whatever; metre is proportion applied to the motion of words spoken. Thus in the drumming of a march, or the dancing of a hornpipe, there is rhythm though no metre; in Dryden's celebrated Ode, there is metre as well as rhythm, because the poet with the rhythm has associated certain words. And hence it follows, that though all metre is rhythm, yet all rhythm is not metre.[y]

[u] See Aristot. Rhetor. l. iii. p. 129. edit. Sylb. Τὸ δὲ σχῆμα τῆς λέξεως δεῖ μήτε ἔμμετρον εἶναι, μήτε ἄρρυθμον, κ. τ. λ. So Cicero: Numeris astrictam orationem esse debere, carere versibus. Ad Brut. Orator. s. 187.

[x] See in the same treatise of Aristotle what is said about these feet, just after the passage above cited. Τῶν δὲ ῥυθμῶν, ὁ μὲν ἡρῷος σεμνὸς, κ. τ. λ. All that follows is well worth reading.

[y] Διαφέρει δὲ μέτρον ῥυθμοῦ, ὕλη μὲν γὰρ τοῖς μέτροις ἡ συλλαβὴ, καὶ χωρὶς συλλαβῆς οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο μέτρον· ὁ δὲ ῥυθμὸς γίνεται μὲν καὶ ἐν συλλαβαῖς, γίνεται δὲ καὶ χωρὶς συλλαβῆς, καὶ γὰρ ἐν τῷ κρότῳ. Ὅταν μὲν γὰρ τοὺς χαλκέας ἴδωμεν τὰς σφύρας καταφερόντας, ἅμα τινὰ καὶ ῥυθμὸν ἀκούομεν—μέτρον δὲ οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο χωρὶς λέξεως ποιᾶς καὶ ποσῆς: "Metre differs from rhythm, because, with regard to metres, the subject matter is a syllable, and without a syllable (that is, a sound articulate) no metre can exist. But rhythm exists both in and without syllables; for it may be perceived in mere pulsation or striking. It is thus, when we see smiths hammering with their sledges, we hear, at the same time, (in their strokes,) a certain rhythm; but as to metre, there can

This being admitted, we proceed and say, that the rhythm of the heroic foot is one to one, which constitutes in music what we call common time; and in musical vibration what we call the unison. The rhythm of the iambic is one to two, which constitutes in music what we call triple time; and in musical vibration what we call the octave. The rhythm next to these is that of two to three, or else its equivalent, three to two; a rhythm compounded of the two former times united, and which constitutes in musical vibration what we call the fifth.

It was here, then, they discovered the foot they wanted; that foot, which being neither the heroic nor the iambic, was yet so far connected with them as to contain virtually within itself the rhythms of them both.

That this is fact is evident from the following reasoning. The proportion of two to three contains in two the rhythm of the heroic foot; in three, that of the iambic; therefore, in two and three united, a foot compounded out of the two.

Now the foot thus described is no other than the pæan; a foot constituted either by one long syllable and three short, and called the *pæan a majori;* or else by three short syllables and one long, and called the *pæan a minori.* In either case, if we resolve the long syllable into two short, we shall find the sum of the syllables to be five; that is, two to three for the first pæan, three to two for the second, each being in what we call the sesquialter proportion.[z]

Those who ask for examples, may find the first pæan in the

be none, unless there be an articulate sound, or word, having a peculiar quality and quantity," (to distinguish it.) Longini Fragm. iii. s. 5. p. 162. edit. Pearce, 4to.

Metrum in verbis modo; rhythmus etiam in corporis motu est. Quinctil. Inst. ix. 4. p. 598. edit. Capper.

What these authors call *rhythmus,* Virgil calls *numerus,* or its plural *numeri.*

Numeros memini, si verba tenerem.
Bucol. ix. 45.

And, before that, speaking of the fauns and wild beasts dancing, he informs us,

Tum vero in numerum faunosque ferasque videres
Ludere. Bucol. vi. 27.

So, too, speaking of the Cyclopes at their forge, he tells us,

Illi inter sese magna vi brachia tollunt
In numerum. Geor. iv. 174.

Which same verses are repeated in the eighth Æneid. So Cicero, *Numerus* Latine; Græce *ῥυθμός.* Ad Brut. Orat. s. 170.

No English term seems to express *rhythmus* better than the word *time;* by which we denote every species of measured motion. Thus we say, there is *time* in beating a drum, though but a single sound; *time* in dancing, and in rowing, though no sound at all but what is quite incidental.

[z] The sum of this speculation is thus shortly expressed by Cicero. Pes enim, qui adhibetur ad numeros, partitur in tria: ut necesse sit partem pedis aut æqualem esse alteri parti; aut altero tanto, aut sesqui esse majorem. Ita fit æqualis, dactylus; duplex, iambus; sesqui, pæon. Ad Brut. Orat. s. 188.

Aristotle reasons upon the same principles. Ἔστι δὲ τρίτος ὁ παιὰν, καὶ ἐχόμενος τῶν εἰρημένων· τρία γὰρ πρὸς δύο ἐστίν· ἐκείνων δὲ, ὁ μὲν ἓν πρὸς ἕν· ὁ δὲ, δύο· ἔχεται δὲ τῶν λόγων τούτων ὁ ἡμιόλιος, οὗτος δ' ἐστιν ὁ παιὰν, κ. τ. λ. Arist. Rhet. l. iii. c. 8. p. 129, 130. edit. Sylb.

Again; Cicero, after having held much the same doctrine, adds—Probatur autem ab eodem illo (scil. Aristotele) maxime pæan, qui est duplex; nam aut a longa oritur, quam tres breves consequuntur, ut hæc verba, *dĕănĭtĕ, īncĭpĭtĕ, cōmprĭmĭtĕ;* aut a brevibus deinceps tribus, extrema producta atque longa, sicut illa sunt, *dŏmŭĕrānt, sŏnĭpĕdēs.* De Orator. iii. 57, (183.) and in his Orator. ad M. Brutum, s. 205. and before, s. 191—197.

words *ἡφᾰνῖσᾰ*, *dēsĭnĭtĕ*; the second, in the words *μĕτᾰ δᾰ γῆν*, *dŏmŭĕrānt*.

To the pæan may be added the cretic, a foot of one short syllable between two long, as in the words *ἐψŏμαī*, *quōvĕ nūnc*; a foot in power evidently equal to the pæan, because resolvable, like that, into five equal times.

We dwell no longer here; perhaps we have already dwelt too long. It is enough to observe, that by a discreet use of these pæans, the ancients obtained what they desired, that is, they enriched their prose without making it into verse; and, while vague and vulgar prose flowed indefinitely, like a stream, theirs, like descending drops, became capable of being numbered.[a]

It may give credit to these speculations, trivial as they may appear, when it is known they have merited the attention of the ablest critics, of Aristotle and Demetrius Phalereus, of Cicero and Quinctilian.[b]

The productions still remaining of this golden period seem (if I may so say) to have been providentially preserved to humiliate modern vanity, and check the growth of bad taste.

But this classical era, though it lasted long, at length terminated. Many causes, and chiefly the irruption and mixture of Barbarians, contributed to the debasing both of Latin and Greek. As diction was corrupted, so also was pronunciation. Accent and quantity, which had been once accurately distinguished, began now to be blended. Nay, more, accent so far usurped quantity's place, as by a sort of tyranny to make short syllables long, and long syllables short. Thus, in poetry, as the accent fell upon *de* in *dēus*, and upon *i* in *ĭbi*, the first syllables of these two words were considered as long. Again, where the accent did not fall, as in the ultimas of *regnŏ* or *Saturnŏ*, and even in such ablatives as *insulâ* or *Cretâ*, there the poet assumed a licence, if he pleased, to make them short. In a word, the whole doctrine of prosody came to this—that, as anciently the quantity of the syllables established the rhythm of the verse, so now the rhythm of the verse established the quantity of the syllables.

There was an ancient poet, his name Commodianus, who dealt much in this illicit quantity, and is said to have written

[a] *Numerus* autem in continuatione nullus est: distinctio, et æqualium et sæpe variorum intervallorum percussio, *numerum* conficit: quem in cadentibus guttis, quod intervallis distinguuntur, notare possumus; in omni præcipitante non possumus. Cic. de Oratore, lib. iii. s. 186.

[b] See Aristotle and Cicero, as quoted before, particularly the last in his Orator, s. 189 to the end; Quinctilian, l. ix. c. 4. Demetrius Phalereus, at the beginning of his tract De Elocut.

Cicero, in his De Oratore, introduces Crassus using the same arguments; those, I mean, which are grounded upon authority.

Atque hæc quidem ab iis philosophis, quos tu maxime diligis, Catule, dicta sunt: quod eo sæpius testificor, ut auctoribus laudandis ineptiarum crimen effugiam. De Oratore, lib. iii. s. 187.

(if that be possible) in the fifth, nay, some assert, in the third century. Take a sample of his versification:

Saturnusque senex, si dĕus, quando senescit?

And again:

Nec divinus erat, sed dĕum sesĕ dĭcebat.

And again:

Jupiter hic natŭs ĭn insulā Cretā Sāturno,
Ut fuit ādultus, patrem de regnŏ privavit.

And again:

Ille autem in Cretā regnavit, et ĭbi dĕfecit.

I shall crown the whole with an admirable distich, where (as I observed not long ago) the rhythm of the verse gives alone the quantity, while the quantity of the syllables is wholly disregarded.

Tŏt rĕŭm crīmĭnĭbŭs, pārrĭcĭdām quōqŭe fŭtūrūm,
Ex aŭctŏrĭtātĕ vēstrā cŏntŭlĭstĭs ĭn ālttūm.

Dr. Davies, at the end of his Minutius Felix, has thought it worth giving us an edition of this wretched author, who, if he lived so early as supposed, must have been from among the dregs of the people, since Ausonius, Claudian, Sulpicius Severus, and Boethius, who were all authors of the same or a later period, wrote both in prose and verse with classical elegance.

We have mentioned the debasement of Latin previously to that of Greek, because it was an event which happened much sooner. As early as the sixth century, or the seventh at farthest, Latin ceased to be the common language of Rome, whereas Greek was spoken with competent purity in Constantinople even to the fifteenth century, when that city was taken by the Turks.

Not but that corruption found its way also into Greek poetry, when Greek began to degenerate, and accent, as in Latin, to usurp dominion over quantity.

It was then began the use of the *Versus Politici*,[c] a species of verses so called, because adapted to the vulgar, and only fit for vulgar ears. It was then the sublime hexameters of Homer were debased into miserable trochaics, not even legible as verses but by a suppression of real quantity.

Take a sample of these productions, which, such as it is, will be easily understood, as it contains the beginning of the first Iliad:

Τὴν ὀργὴν ἄδε, καὶ λέγε,
Ὦ θεά μου Καλλιόπη,
Τοῦ Πηλείδου Ἀχιλλέως,
Πῶς ἐγένετ' ὀλεθρία,
Καὶ πολλὰς λύπας ἐποίσε
Εἰς τοὺς Ἀχαΐους δὴ πάντας,
Καὶ πολλὰς ψυχὰς ἀνδρείας
Πῶς ἀπέστειλεν εἰς Ἅδην.

In reading the above verses we must carefully regard accent,

[c] See Fabricii Biblioth. Græc. vol. x. p. 253. 318, 319.

to which, and to which alone, we must strictly adhere, and follow the same trochaic rhythm as in those well-known verses of Dryden:

> Wár he súng is tóil and tróuble,
> Hónour bút an émpty búbble, &c.

The accentual quantity in the Greek, as well as in the English, totally destroys the syllabic: *δε* in *ἄδε* is made long; so also is *λε* in *λέγε*; *α*, in *θεὰ*; *ο*, in *Καλλιόπη*. Again, *μου* is short; so also is *Πη* in *Πηλείδου*. In *Ἀχιλλέως* every syllable is corrupted; the first and third, being short, are made long; the second and fourth, being long, are made short. We quote no farther, as all that follows is similar, and the whole exactly applicable to our present versification.

This disgraceful form of Homer was printed by Pinelli, at Venice, in the year 1540, but the work itself was probably some centuries older.[d]

Besides this anonymous perverter of the Iliad and Odyssey, (for he has gone through both,) there are political verses of the same barbarous character by Constantinus Manasses, John Tzetzes, and others of that period.

And so much for the verse of these times. Of their prose (though next in order) we say nothing, it being loss of time to dwell upon authors, who being unable to imitate the eloquence of their predecessors, could discover no new roads to fame but through obscurity and affectation. In this class we range the Historiæ Augustæ Scriptores, Marcianus Capella, Apuleius, together with many others, whom we may call authors of African Latinity. Perhaps, too, we may add some of the Byzantine historians.

Before we quit accentual quantity, there is one thing we must not omit. Strange as it appears, there are traces of it extant even in classical writers.

As dactyls and anapæsts were frequently intermixed with iambics, we find no less a writer than the accurate Terence, make syllables short, which by position were long, in order to form the feet above mentioned. Take the following instances, among many others:

˘Et ĭd grātŭm fuisse advorsum te habeo gratiam.	Andr. act. i. s. 1. 15.
Prŏptĕr hŏspitaĭ hujusce consuetudinem.	Andr. act. ii. s. 6. 8.
˘Ego ĕxclūdor: ille recipitur, quâ gratiâ?	Eunuch. act. i. s. 2. 79.

Among these verses, all beginning with anapæsts, the second syllable *id* in the first verse is made short, though followed by three consonants: the first syllable *prŏpter* in the second verse

[d] A sort of glossary is subjoined, whence, for curiosity, we select some very singular explanations: Πύλη, "a gate," is explained by *πορτα*; *θυρωροὶ*, those "who keep gates," are called *πόρτάροι*, that is, "porters;" *κλίσιαι*, "tents," are called by the name of *τένται*; *πύργος*, "a tower," by that of *τούρη*; and of *κῆρυξ* we are informed, *σημαίνει ὅλον τρουμπετάριον*, "that it signifies, in general, a trumpeter."

is made short, though followed by two consonants: and the third syllable, *ĕx* in *excludor*, in the third verse is made short, though followed by a double consonant, and two others after it.

We are to observe, however, that, while licences were assumed by the dramatic writers of the comic iambic, and by Terence more than the rest, it was a practice unknown to the writers of hexameter. It is to be observed, likewise, that these licences were taken at the beginning of verses, and never at the end, where a pure iambic was held as indispensable. They were also licences usually taken with monosyllables, dissyllables, or prepositions; in general with words in common and daily use, which in all countries are pronounced with rapidity, and made short in the very speaking. It has been suggested, therefore, with great probability, that Terence adopted such a mode of versifying, because it more resembled the common dialogue of the middle life, which no one ever imitated more happily than himself.*

We are now to proceed to the modern languages, and to our own in particular, which, like the rest, has little of harmony but what it derives from accentual quantity. And yet as this accentual quantity is wholly governed by ancient rhythm, to which, as far as possible, we accommodate modern words, the speculations are by no means detached from ancient criticism, being wholly derived from principles which that criticism had first established.

CHAPTER III.

QUANTITY VERBAL IN ENGLISH—A FEW FEET PURE, AND AGREEABLE TO SYLLABIC QUANTITY—INSTANCES—YET ACCENTUAL QUANTITY PREVALENT—INSTANCES—TRANSITION TO PROSE—ENGLISH PÆANS, INSTANCES OF—RHYTHM GOVERNS QUANTITY, WHERE THIS LAST IS ACCENTUAL.

In the scrutiny which follows we shall confine ourselves to English, as no language, to us at least, is equally familiar. And here, if we begin with quoting poets, it must be remembered, it is not purely for the sake of poetry, but with a view to that harmony of which our prose is susceptible.

A few pure iambics of the syllabic sort we have, though commonly blended with the spurious and accentual. Thus Milton:

> Foūntaĭns, and ye, that warble, as *yĕ flōw*. Par. Lost, v. 195.

And again, more completely, in that fine line of his,

> Fŏr ĕloquēnce, thĕ soūl; sōng chārms *thĕ sēnse*. Par. Lost. ii. 556.

In the first of these verses the last foot is (as it always should

* See the valuable tract of the celebrated Bentley, prefixed to his Terence, under the title of De Metris Terentianis Ἐχεθίαμα.

be[g]) a pure syllabic iambic; in the second verse every foot is such, but in the fourth.

Besides iambics, our language knows also the heroic foot. In the verse just quoted,

Foŭntaĭns, and ye, that warble as ye flow;

the first foot is a spondee: so is the fourth foot in that other verse,

For eloquence, the soul; *sōng chārms* the sense.

This foot seems to have been admitted among the English iambics precisely for the same reason as among the Greek and Latin; to infuse a certain stability, which iambics wanted, when alone:

Tardior ut paullo, *graviorque* veniret ad aures,
Spondeos stabiles in jura paterna recepit. Hor. Art. Poet.

Nor do we want that other heroic foot, the dactyl, and that, too, accompanied (as usual) with the spondee. Thus in the second Psalm we read,

Whȳ dŏ thĕ pēoplĕ ĭmāgĭne ă vāin thĭng?

And soon after,

Against the Lōrd ănd ăgaĭnst hĭs ānoĭntĕd.

Where in both instances we have the hexameter cadence, though perhaps it was casual, and what the translators never intended.

It must, indeed, be confessed, this metre appears not natural to our language, nor have its feet a proper effect, but when mixed with iambics, to infuse that stability which we have lately mentioned.[h]

It is proper also to observe, that, though metrical feet, in English, have a few long and short syllables, even in their genuine character, (that, I mean, which they derive from true syllabic quantity,) yet is their quantity more often determined by accent alone,[i] it being enough to make a syllable long, if it be accented; and short, if it be unaccented; whatever may be the position of any subsequent consonants.

Thus in Milton, we read,

On the sĕcrĕt top
Of ˜Orĕb dĭdst ĭnspīre. Par. Lost. i. 6, 7.

And again,

Hŭrl'd hĕadlŏng, flămĭng, frŏm th' ĕthĕrĭăl skȳ. Par. Lost, i. 45.

In these examples, the first syllable of *ĭnspire* is short by accentual quantity, though the position of its vowel is before three consonants; the last syllable of *headlŏng* and the last syllable of

[g] Sup. p. 82.

[h] The use of the heroic and the iambic is well explained by Cicero from Aristotle.

Quod longe Aristoteli videtur secus, qui judicat heroum numerum grandiorem quam desideret soluta oratio; iambum autem nimis e vulgari sermone. Ita neque humilem, nec abjectam orationem, nec nimis altam et exaggeratam probat; plenam tamen eam vult esse gravitatis, ut eos, qui audiunt, ad majorem admirationem possit traducere. Ad Brut. Orat. s. 192.

[i] Sup. p. 408, 411.

flaming, are short, even though the consecutive consonants are in both cases four.

Such then, in English, being the force of accentual quantity, we are now to consider those feet, through which not our verse, but our prose may be harmonized.

Now these feet are no other than the two pæans already described,[k] and their equivalent, the cretic, which three may more particularly be called the feet for prose.[l]

In prose-composition they may be called those ingredients which, like salt in a banquet, serve to give it a relish. Like salt, too, we should so employ them, that we may not seem to have mistaken the seasoning for the food. But more of this hereafter.[m]

As to the place of these pæans, though they have their effect in every part of a sentence, yet have they a peculiar energy at its beginning and its end. The difference is, we are advised to begin with the first pæan and to conclude with the second, that the sentence in each extreme may be audibly marked.[n] If the sentence be emphatical, and call for such attention, nothing can answer the purpose more effectually than that characteristic long syllable, which in the first pæan is always inceptive, in the second is always conclusive.

For want of better examples we venture to illustrate by the following, where we have marked the two pæans, together with their equivalent, the cretic; and where we have not only marked the time over each syllable, but separated each foot by a disjunctive stroke.

Beāutȳ măy bĕ—lōst, măy bĕ fŏr—yēars oŭtlīv'd: but virtue remains the same, till līfe ĭtsĕlf—īs ăt ăn ēnd.

Again:

Stēep ĭs thĕ ă-scēnt bȳ whĭch wĕ—moūnt tŏ fāme;—nŏr ĭs thĕ sŭm-mĭt tŏ bĕ gaīn'd—bŭt bȳ săgā-cĭtȳ ănd toīl. Fōols ăre sūre tŏ lōse thĕir wāy, ănd cōwărds sīnk bĕnēath the difficulty: thĕ wīse ănd brāve ălōne sŭccēed; pĕrsīst—ĭn thĕir ăttēmpt—ănd nĕvĕr yiēld—tŏ thĕ fătigūe.

The reader in these examples will regard two things; one, that the strokes of separation mark only the feet, and are not to be regarded in the reading; another, that though he may meet, perhaps, a few instances agreeable to ancient prosody, yet in modern rhythm like this, be it prosaïc or poetic, he must expect to find it governed, for the greater part, by accent.[o]

And so much for prosaïc feet, and numerous prose, which,

[k] Sup. p. 407, 408.

[l] Sit egitur [oratio] (ut supra dixi) permista et temperata numeris, nec dissoluta, nec tota numerosa, pæone maxime, &c. Ad Brut. Orat. s. 196; and soon before, s. 194, Pæon autem minime est aptus ad versum; quo libentius enim recepit oratio.

[m] Infr. p. 418.

[n] Vid. Aristot. Rhetor. l. iii. c. 8. p. 30. edit. Sylb. Ἔστι δὲ παιᾶνος δύο εἴδη, ἀντικείμενα ἀλλήλοις· ὧν τὸ μὲν, κ. τ. λ.

[o] Sup. p. 409, 411, 412.

upon the principles established by ancient critics, we have aimed to accommodate to our own language.

But we stop not here, having a few more speculations to suggest, which, appearing to arise from the principles of the old critics, are amply verified in our best English authors. But more of this in the following chapter.

CHAPTER IV.

OTHER DECORATIONS OF PROSE BESIDES PROSAÏC FEET—ALLITERATION—SENTENCES—PERIODS. CAUTION TO AVOID EXCESS IN CONSECUTIVE MONOSYLLABLES. OBJECTIONS, MADE AND ANSWERED. AUTHORITIES ALLEGED. ADVICE ABOUT READING.

Besides the decoration of prosaïc feet, there are other decorations admissible into English composition, such as alliteration and sentences, especially the period.

First, therefore, for the first; I mean alliteration.

Among the classics of old there is no finer illustration of this figure, than Lucretius's description of those blessed abodes, where his gods, detached from providential cares, ever lived in the fruition of divine serenity.

> Apparet Divum numen, sedesque *quietæ*,
> *Quas* neque concutiunt venti, neque *nubila nimbis*
> Aspergunt, *neque nix* acri concreta pruinâ
> *Cana cadens* violat, semperque *innubilus æther*
> *Integit*, et *large* diffuso *lumine* ridet. Lucret. iii. 18.

The sublime and accurate Virgil did not contemn this decoration, though he used it with such pure, unaffected simplicity, that we often feel its force, without contemplating the cause. Take one instance out of infinite with which his works abound:

> *Aurora* interea *miseris mortalibus almam*
> Extulerat *lucem*, referens opera atque *labores*.[p] Æn. xi. 183.

[p] The following account of this figure is taken from Pontanus, one of these ingenious Italians, who flourished upon the revival of a purer literature in Europe.

Ea igitur sive figura, sive ornatus, condimentum quasi quoddam numeris affert, placet autem nominare *alliterationem*, quod e literarum allusione constet. Fit itaque in versu, quoties dictiones continuatæ, vel binæ, vel ternæ ab iisdem primis consonantibus, mutatis aliquando vocalibus, aut ab iisdem incipiunt syllabis, aut ab iisdem primis vocalibus. Delectat autem alliteratio hæc mirifice in primis et ultimis locis facta, in mediis quoque, licet ibidem aures minus sint intentæ. Ut

"*Sæva sedens super arma.* Virg.
Tales casus Cassandra canebat. Ejusd.
Insontem infando indicio. Ejusd.
Longe sale Saxa sonabant. Ejusd.
Magno misceri murmure pontum. Ejusd.
Quæque lacus late liquidos." Ejusd.

Fit interdum per continuationem insequentis versus, ut in his Lucretianis:

"*Adverso flabra ferunntur*
Flumine."

Atqui alliteratio hæc ne Ciceroni quidem displicuit in oratione soluta, ut cum dixit in Bruto, "Nulla res magis penetrat in animos, eosque *fingit*, *format*, *flectit*." Et in secundo de Oratore: "Quodque me *sollicitare summe* solet." Quid quod ne in jocis quidem illis tam lepidis neglecta est a Plauto; ut cum garrientem apud herum induxit Pœnulum; "Ne tu oratorem hunc *pugnis plectas postea*." Atque hæc quidem

To Virgil we may add the superior authority of Homer:

Ἤτοι ὁ καπνεδίον τὸ Ἀλήϊον οἶος Ἀλᾶτο,
Ὁ θυμὸν κατέδων, πάτον Ἀνθρώπων Ἀλεείνων. Ιλ. ζ'. 201.

Hermogenes, the rhetorician, when he quotes these lines, quotes them as an example of the figure here mentioned, but calls it by a Greek name, *παρήχησις*.[q]

Cicero has translated the above verses elegantly, and given us, too, alliteration, though not under the same letters:

Qui miser in campis errabat solus allæis,
Ipse suum cor edens, hominum vestigia vitans.

Aristotle knew this figure, and called it *παρομοίωσις:* a name, perhaps, not so precise as the other, because it rather expresses resemblance in general, than that which arises from sound in particular. His example is, *Ἀγρὸν γὰρ ἔλαβεν, ἀργὸν παρ' αὐτοῦ.*[r]

The Latin rhetoricians styled it *annominatio*, and give us examples of similar character.[s]

But the most singular fact is, that so early, in our own history, as the reign of Henry the Second, this decoration was esteemed and cultivated both by the English and the Welch. So we are informed by Giraldus Cambrensis, a contemporary writer, who, having first given the Welch instance, subjoins the English in the following verse,

God is together *Gammen* and Wisedóme;

that is, "God is at once both Joy and Wisdom."

He calls the figure by the Latin name *annominatio;* and adds, "that the two nations were so attached to this verbal ornament in every high finished composition, that nothing was by them esteemed elegantly delivered, no diction considered but as rude and rustic, if it were not first amply refined with the polishing art of this figure."[t]

It is perhaps from this national taste of ours that we derive many proverbial similes, which, if we except the sound, seem to have no other merit: "Fine as fivepence," "Round as a robin," &c.

Even Spenser and Shakspeare adopted the practice, but then it was in a manner suitable to such geniuses.

alliteratio quemadmodum tribus in iis fit vocibus, fit alibi etiam in duabus simili modo. Ut,

"*Taciti ventura videbant.* Virg.
Tamo tempus erit." Ejusd.

Johannis Joviani Pontani Actius, Dialogus. vol. ii. p. 104. edit. Venetis, ap. Ald. 1519.

[q] The explanation of it, given by Hermogenes, exactly suits his instance. Παρήχησις δέ ἐστι κάλλος ὁμοίων ὀνομάτων, ἐν διαφόρῳ γνώσει ταὐτὸν ἠχούντων: "Parechesis is beauty in similar words, which, under a different signification, sound the same." Ἑρμογ. περὶ Εὑρεσ. Τομ. δ. p. 193. edit. Porti, 1570.

[r] Aristot. Rhet. iii. 9. p. 132. edit. Sylb.

[s] Scrip. ad Herenn. l. iv. s. 29.

[t] Præ cunctis autem rhetoricis exornationibus annominatione magis utuntur, eaque præcipue specie, quæ primas dictionum litteras vel syllabas convenientia jungit. Adeo igitur hoc verborum ornatu duæ nationes (Angli scil. et Cambri) in omni sermone exquisito utuntur, ut nihil ab his eleganter dictum, nullum nisi rude et agreste censeatur eloquium, si non schematis hujus lima plene fuerit expolitum. Girald. Cambrensis Cambriæ Descriptio, p. 889. edit. fol. Camdeni, 1603.

Spenser says:

> For not to have been dipt in Lethe lake
> Could save the son of Thetis from to die;
> But that blind bard did him immortal make
> With verses, dipt in dew of Castalie.

Shakspeare says:

> Had my sweet Harry had but half their numbers,
> This day might I, hanging on Hotspur's neck,
> Have talked, &c. Hen. IV. part ii. act 2.

Milton followed them:

> For eloquence the soul; song charms the sense. Par. Lost. ii. 556.

And again:

> Behemoth, biggest born of earth, upheav'd
> His vastness. Par. Lost, vii. 471.

From Dryden we select one example out of many, for no one appears to have employed this figure more frequently, or (like Virgil) with greater simplicity and strength.

> Better to hunt in fields for health unbought,
> Than fee the doctor for a nauseous draught.
> The wise for cure on exercise depend;
> God never made his work for man to mend. Fables.

Pope sings in his Dunciad:

> 'Twas chatt'ring, grinning, mouthing, jabb'ring all;
> And noise, and Norton; brangling, and Breval;
> Dennis, and dissonance.

Which lines, though truly poetical and humorous, may be suspected by some to shew their art too conspicuously, and too nearly to resemble that verse of old Ennius,

> O! Tite, Tute, Tati, Tibi Tanta, Tyranne, Tulisti.
> Script. ad Herenn. l. iv. s. 18.

Gray begins a sublime ode,

> Ruin seize thee, ruthless king, &c.

We might quote also alliterations from prose writers, but those we have alleged we think sufficient.

Nor is elegance only to be found in single words, or in single feet; it may be found, when we put them together, in our peculiar mode of putting them. It is out of words and feet thus compounded that we form sentences, and among sentences none so striking, none so pleasing, as the period. The reason is, that, while other sentences are indefinite, and (like a geometrical right-line) may be produced indefinitely, the period (like a circular line) is always circumscribed, returns, and terminates at a given point. In other words, while other sentences, by the help of common copulatives, have a sort of boundless effusion; the constituent parts of a period have a sort of reflex union,[n] in

[n] Vid Arist. Rhet. iii. c. 9. Demetr. Phal. de Elocut. s. 10, &c.
The compact combining character of the period is well illustrated by Demetrius in the following simile: "Ἔοικε γοῦν τὰ μὲν περιοδικὰ κῶλα τοῖς λίθοις, τοῖς ἀντερεί-

which union the sentence is so far complete, as neither to require, nor even to admit a further extension. Readers find a pleasure in this grateful circuit, which leads them so agreeably to an acquisition of knowledge.

The author, if he may be permitted, would refer, by way of illustration, to the beginnings of his Hermes and his Philosophical Arrangements, where some attempts have been made in this periodical style. He would refer, also, for much more illustrious examples, to the opening of Cicero's Offices; to that of the capital oration of Demosthenes concerning the Crown; and to that of the celebrated Panegyric, made (if he may be so called) by the father of periods, Isocrates.

Again; every compound sentence is compounded of other sentences more simple, which, compared to one another, have a certain proportion of length. Now it is in general a good rule, that among these constituent sentences the last (if possible) should be equal to the first; or if not equal, then rather longer than shorter.[x] The reason is, that without a special cause, abrupt conclusions are offensive, and the reader, like a traveller quietly pursuing his journey, finds an unexpected precipice, where he is disagreeably stopped.

To these speculations concerning sentences, we subjoin a few others.

It has been called a fault in our language, that it abounds in monosyllables. As these, in too lengthened a suite, disgrace a composition, lord Shaftesbury (who studied purity of style with great attention) limited their number to nine, and was careful, in his Characteristics, to conform to his own law. Even in Latin, too, many of them were condemned by Quinctilian.[y]

Above all, care should be had, that a sentence end not with a crowd of them, those especially of the vulgar, untunable sort, such as, *to set it up*, to *get by and by at it*, &c., for these disgrace a sentence that may be otherwise laudable, and are like the rabble at the close of some pompous cavalcade.

It was by these, and other arts of similar sort, that authors in distant ages have cultivated their style. Looking upon knowledge (if I may be allowed the allusion) to pass into the mansions of the mind through language, they were careful (if I may pursue the metaphor) not to offend in the vestibule. They did not esteem it pardonable to despise the public ear, when they saw the love of numbers so universally diffused.[z]

δουσιν τᾶς περιφερεῖς στέγας, καὶ συνέχουσιν: "the constitutive members of the period resemble those stones, which mutually support, and keep vaulted roofs together." Sect. 13.

[x] Aut paria esse debent posteriora superioribus, extrema primis; aut, quod est etiam melius et jucundius, longiora. Cic. de Orat. iii. s. 136.

[y] Etiam monosyllaba, si plura sunt, male continuabuntur: quia necesse est, compositio, multis clausulis concisa, subsultet. Inst. Orat. ix. 4.

[z] Nihil est autem tam cognatum mentibus nostris, quam numeri atque voces; quibus et excitamur, et incendimur, et lenimur, et

Nor were they discouraged, as if they thought their labour would be lost. In these more refined, but yet popular arts, they knew the amazing difference between the power to execute, and the power to judge: that to execute was the joint effort of genius and of habit; a painful acquisition, only attainable by the few: to judge, the simple effort of that plain but common sense, imparted by Providence in some degree to every one.[a]

But here methinks an objector demands, "And are authors then to compose, and form their treatises by rule? Are they to balance periods? To scan pæans and cretics? To affect alliterations? To enumerate monosyllables," &c.

If, in answer to this objector, it should be said, They ought; the permission should at least be tempered with much caution. These arts are to be so blended with a pure but common style, that the reader, as he proceeds, may only feel their latent force. If ever they become glaring, they degenerate into affectation; an extreme more disgusting, because less natural, than even the vulgar language of an unpolished clown. It is in writing, as in acting, the best writers are like our late admired Garrick. And how did that able genius employ his art? Not by a vain ostentation of any one of its powers, but by a latent use of them all in such an exhibition of nature, that, while we were present in a theatre, and only beholding an actor, we could not help thinking ourselves in Denmark with Hamlet, or in Bosworth field with Richard.[b]

There is another objection still: these speculations may be called minutiæ; things partaking at best more of the elegant than of the solid; and attended with difficulties, beyond the value of the labour.

To answer this, it may be observed, that, when habit is once gained, nothing so easy as practice. When the ear is once habituated to these verbal rhythms, it forms them spontaneously, without attention or labour. If we call for instances, what more easy to every smith, to every carpenter, to every common mechanic, than the several energies of their proper arts?[c] How little do even the rigid laws of verse obstruct a genius truly poetic? How little did they cramp a Milton, a Dryden, or a Pope? Cicero writes, that Antipater the Sidonian could pour forth hexameters extempore;[d] and that, whenever he chose to

languescimus, et ad hilaritatem et ad tristitiam sæpe deducimur; quorum illa summa vis, &c. Cic. de Orat. iii. s. 197.

[a] Mirabile est, cum plurimum in faciendo intersit inter doctum et rudem, quam non multum differat in judicando. Ibid. iii. s. 197.

[b] Ubicunque ars ostentatur, veritas abesse videtur. Quinctil. Instit. x. 3. p. 587. edit. Capp. Quæ sunt artes altiores, plurumque occultantur, ut artes sint. Ejusd. viii. c. 3. p. 478. edit. Capper. Desinit ars esse, si appareat. Ejusd. iv. 2. p. 249.

[c] See Dionys. Halicarn. de Struct. Orat. s. 25. where this argument is well enforced by the common well-known habit of reading, so difficult at first, yet gradually growing so familiar, that we perform it at last without deliberation, just as we see, or hear.

[d] Cic. de Oratore, l. iii. 194. The same great writer, in another place, speaking of

versify, words followed him of course. We may add to Antipater the ancient rhapsodists of the Greeks, and the modern improvisatori of the Italians. If this then be practicable in verse, how much more so in prose? In prose, the laws of which so far differ from those of poetry, that we can at any time relax them as we find expedient? Nay, more, where to relax them is not only expedient, but even necessary, because though numerous composition may be a requisite, yet regularly returning rhythm is a thing we should avoid.[e]

In every whole, whether natural or artificial, the constituent parts well merit our regard, and in nothing more than in the facility of their coincidence. If we view a landscape, how pleasing the harmony between hills and woods, between rivers and lawns? If we select from this landscape a tree, how well does the trunk correspond with its branches, and the whole of its form with its beautiful verdure? If we take an animal, for example, a fine horse, what a union in his colour, his figure, and his motions? If one of human race, what more pleasingly congenial, than when virtue and genius appear to animate a graceful figure?

Pulchro veniens e corpore virtus?

The charm increases, if to a graceful figure we add a graceful elocution. Elocution, too, is heightened still, if it convey elegant sentiments; and these again are heightened, if clothed with graceful diction, that is, with words which are pure, precise, and well arranged.

But this brings us home to the very spot whence we departed. We are insensibly returned to numerous composition, and view in speech, however referred, whether to the body or the mind, whether to the organs of pronunciation or the purity of diction, whether to the purity of diction or the truth of sentiment, how perfectly natural the coincidence of every part?

We must not then call these verbal decorations, *minutiæ*. They are essential to the beauty, nay, to the completion of the whole. Without them the composition, though its sentiments may be just, is like a picture, with good drawing, but with bad and defective colouring.

These we are assured were the sentiments of Cicero, whom we must allow to have been a master in his art, and who has amply and accurately treated verbal decoration and numerous composition in no less than two capital treatises,[f] strengthening withal his own authority with that of Aristotle and Theo-

the power of habit, subjoins, Id autem bona disciplina exercitatis, qui et multa scripserint, et quæcunque etiam sine scripto dicerent similia scriptorum effecerint, non erit difficilimum. Ante enim circumscribitur mente sententia, confestimque verba concurrunt, &c. Orator. ad Brut. s. 200.

[e] Multum interest, utrum numerosa sit (id est, similis numerorum) an plane e numeris, constet oratio. Alterum si sit, intolerabile vitium est: alterum nisi sit, dissipata, et inculta, et fluens est oratio. Ejusd. ad Brut. s. 220.

[f] His Orator, and his De Oratore.

phrastus; to whom, if more were wanting, we might add the names of Demetrius Phalereus, Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Dionysius Longinus, and Quinctilian.

Having presumed thus far to advise authors, I hope I may be pardoned for saying a word to readers, and the more so, as the subject has not often been touched.

Whoever reads a perfect or finished composition, whatever be the language, whatever the subject, should read it, even if alone, both audibly and distinctly.

In a composition of this character, not only precise words are admitted, but words metaphorical and ornamental. And further, as every sentence contains a latent harmony, so is that harmony derived from the rhythm of its constituents parts.[g]

A composition, then, like this, should (as I said before) be read both distinctly and audibly; with due regard to stops and pauses; with occasional elevations and depressions of the voice, and whatever else constitutes just and accurate pronunciation.[h] He who, despising, or neglecting, or knowing nothing of all this, reads a work of such character, as he would read a sessions-paper, will not only miss many beauties of the style, but will probably miss (which is worse) a large proportion of the sense.

Something still remains concerning the doctrine of whole and parts, and those essentials of dramatic imitation, manners, sentiment, and the fable. But these inquiries properly form other chapters.

CHAPTER V.

CONCERNING WHOLE AND PARTS, AS ESSENTIAL TO THE CONSTITUTING OF A LEGITIMATE WORK—THE THEORY ILLUSTRATED FROM THE GEORGICS OF VIRGIL, AND THE MENEXENUS OF PLATO—SAME THEORY APPLIED TO SMALLER PIECES—TOTALITY, ESSENTIAL TO SMALL WORKS, AS WELL AS GREAT—EXAMPLES TO ILLUSTRATE—ACCURACY, ANOTHER ESSENTIAL—MORE SO TO SMALLER PIECES, AND WHY—TRANSITION TO DRAMATIC SPECULATIONS.

Every legitimate work should be one, as much as a vegetable, or an animal; and, to be one like them, it should be a whole, consisting of parts, and be in nothing redundant, in nothing deficient. The difference is, the whole of an animal, or a vegetable, consists of parts, which exist at once: the whole of an oration, or a poem, as it must be either heard or perused, consists of parts not taken at once, but in a due and orderly succession.

The description of such a whole is perfectly simple, but not, for that simplicity, the less to be approved.

[g] See before, from p. 410 to p. 416. l. iii. a. 19, 20, 21, 22, 23. p. 4. 73, 74, 75.
[h] Vid. Scriptor. ad Herenn. l. i. a. 3. edit. Oxon. 1718.

A whole, we are informed, should have a beginning, middle, and end.[i] If we doubt this, let us suppose a composition to want them: would not the very vulgar say, it had neither head nor tail?

Nor are the constitutive parts, though equally simple in their description, for that reason less founded in truth. "A beginning is that, which nothing necessarily precedes, but which something naturally follows. An end is that, which nothing naturally follows, but which something necessarily precedes. A middle is that, which something precedes, to distinguish it from a beginning; and which something follows, to distinguish it from an end."[k]

I might illustrate this from a proposition in Euclid. The stating of the thing to be proved, makes the beginning; the proving of it, makes the middle; and the asserting of it to have been proved, makes the conclusion, or end: and thus is every such proposition a complete and perfect whole.

The same holds in writings of a character totally different. Let us take for an example the most highly-finished performance among the Romans, and that in their most polished period, I mean the Georgics of Virgil.

> Quid faciat lætas segetes, quo fidere terram
> Vertere, Mæcenas, (2) ulmisque adjungere vites
> Conveniat; (3) quæ cura boum, qui cultus habendo
> Sit pecori; (4) apibus quanta experientia parcis,
> Hinc canere incipiam, &c. Virg. Georg. i.

In these lines, and so on (if we consult the original) for forty-two lines inclusive, we have the beginning; which beginning includes two things, the plan, and the invocation.

In the four first verses we have the plan, which plan gradually opens and becomes the whole work, as an acorn, when developed, becomes a perfect oak. After this comes the invocation, which extends to the last of the forty-two verses above mentioned. The two together give us the true character of a beginning, which, as above described, nothing can precede, and which it is necessary that something should follow.

The remaining part of the first book, together with the three books following, to verse the 458th of book the fourth, make the middle; which also has its true character, that of succeeding the beginning, where we expect something further; and that of preceding the end, where we expect nothing more.

The eight last verses of the poem make the end, which, like the beginning, is short, and which preserves its real character by

[i] Ὅλον δέ ἐστι τὸ ἔχον ἀρχὴν καὶ μέσον καὶ τελευτήν. Arist. Poet. cap. 7. p. 231. edit. Sylb.

[k] Ἀρχὴ δὲ ἔστιν, ὁ αὐτὸ μὲν ἐξ ἀνάγκης μὴ μετ' ἄλλο ἐστί· μετ' ἐκεῖνο δ' ἕτερον πεφυκὲν εἶναι ἢ γινέσθαι. Τελευτὴ δὲ τοὐναντίον, ὃ αὐτὸ μετ' ἄλλο πέφυκεν εἶναι, ἢ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἢ ὡς ἐπιτοπολὺ, μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο ἄλλο οὐδέν· Μέσον δὲ καὶ αὐτὸ μετ' ἄλλο, καὶ μετ' ἐκεῖνο ἕτερον. Arist. Poet. cap. 7. p. 231, 232. edit. Sylb.

satisfying the reader, that all is complete, and that nothing is to follow. The performance is even dated. It finishes like an epistle, giving us the place and time of writing; but then giving them in such a manner as they ought to come from Virgil.[l]

But to open our thoughts into a further detail.

As the poem from its very name respects various matters relative to land, (Georgica,) and which are either immediately or mediately connected with it; among the variety of these matters the poem begins from the lowest, and thence advances gradually from higher to higher, till having reached the highest, it there properly stops.

The first book begins from the simple culture of the earth, and from its humblest progeny, corn, legumes, flowers, &c.[m]

It is a nobler species of vegetables which employs the second book, where we are taught the culture of trees, and, among others, of that important pair, the olive and the vine.[n] Yet it must be remembered, that all this is nothing more than the culture of mere vegetable and inanimate nature.

It is in the third book that the poet rises to nature sensitive and animated, when he gives us precepts about cattle, horses, sheep, &c.[o]

At length, in the fourth book, when matters draw to a conclusion, then it is he treats his subject in a moral and political way. He no longer pursues the culture of the mere brute nature; he then describes, as he tells us,

Mores, et studia, et populos, et prælia, &c.

For such is the character of his bees, those truly social and political animals. It is here he first mentions arts, and memory, and laws, and families. It is here (their great sagacity considered) he supposes a portion imparted of a sublimer principle. It is here that every thing vegetable or merely brutal seems forgotten, while all appears at least human, and sometimes even divine.

His quidam signis, atque hæc exempla secuti,
Esse apibus partem divinæ mentis, et haustus
Ætherios dixere: deum namque ire per omnes
Terrasque tractusque maris, &c. Georg. iv. 219.

When the subject will not permit him to proceed further, he suddenly conveys his reader, by the fable of Aristæus, among nymphs, heroes, demi-gods, and gods, and thus leaves him in company, supposed more than mortal.

This is not only a sublime conclusion to the fourth book,

[l] See Philosophical Arrangements, page 336.

[m] These are implied by Virgil in the first line of his first book, and in every other part of it, the Episodes and Epilogue excepted.

[n] This too is asserted at the beginning of his first book, Ulmisque adjungere vites, and is the entire subject of the second, the same exceptions made as before.

[o] This is the third subject mentioned in the Proeme, and fills (according to just order) the entire third book, making the same exceptions as before.

but naturally leads to the conclusion of the whole work; for he does no more after this than shortly recapitulate, and elegantly blend his recapitulating with a compliment to Augustus.

But even this is not all.

The dry didactic character of the Georgics made it necessary they should be enlivened by episodes and digressions. It has been the art of the poet, that these episodes and digressions should be homogeneous; that is, should so connect with the subject, as to become (as it were) parts of it. On these principles every book has for its end, what I call an epilogue; for its beginning, an invocation; and for its middle, the several precepts relative to its subject, I mean husbandry. Having a beginning, a middle, and an end, every part itself becomes a smaller whole, though with respect to the general plan it is nothing more than a part. Thus the human arm, with a view to its elbow, its hand, its fingers, &c. is as clearly a whole, as it is simply but a part with a view to the entire body.

The smaller wholes of this divine poem may merit some attention; by these I mean each particular book.

Each book has an invocation. The first invokes the sun, the moon, the various rural deities, and, lastly, Augustus; the second invokes Bacchus; the third, Pales and Apollo; the fourth, his patron Mæcenas. I do not dwell on these invocations, much less on the parts which follow, for this, in fact, would be writing a comment upon the poem. But the epilogues, besides their own intrinsic beauty, are too much to our purpose to be passed in silence.

In the arrangement of them, the poet seems to have pursued such an order, as that alternate affections should be alternately excited; and this he has done, well knowing the importance of that generally acknowledged truth, "the force derived to contraries by their juxta-position or succession."[p] The first book ends with those portents and prodigies, both upon earth and in the heavens, which preceded the death of the dictator Cæsar. To these direful scenes the epilogue of the second book opposes the tranquillity and felicity of the rural life, which (as he informs us) faction and civil discord do not usually impair:

Non res Romanæ, perituraque regna.

In the ending of the third book we read of a pestilence, and of nature in devastation; in the fourth, of nature restored, and, by help of the gods, replenished.

As this concluding epilogue (I mean the fable of Aristæus) occupies the most important place, so is it decorated accordingly with language, events, places, and personages.

No language was ever more polished and harmonious. The descent of Aristæus to his mother, and of Orpheus to the shades,

[p] See before, p. 401, 402.

are events; the watery palace of the Nereids, the cavern of Proteus, and the scene of the infernal regions, are places; Aristæus, old Proteus, Orpheus, Eurydice, Cyllene and her nymphs, are personages; all great, all striking, all sublime.

Let us view these epilogues in the poet's order: 1. Civil horrors; 2. Rural tranquillity; 3. Nature laid waste; 4. Nature restored. Here, as we have said already, different passions are, by the subjects being alternate,[q] alternately excited; and yet withal excited so judiciously, that, when the poem concludes, and all is at an end, the reader leaves off with tranquillity and joy.

From the Georgics of Virgil we proceed to the Menexenus of Plato; the first being the most finished form of a didactic poem, the latter, the most consummate model of a panegyrical oration.

The Menexenus is a funeral oration in praise of those brave Athenians who had fallen in battle by generously asserting the cause of their country. Like the Georgics, and every other just composition, this oration has a beginning, a middle, and an end.

The beginning is a solemn account of the deceased having received all the legitimate rights of burial, and of the propriety of doing them honour not only by deeds, but by words; that is, not only by funeral ceremonies, but by a speech, to perpetuate the memory of their magnanimity, and to recommend it to their posterity as an object of imitation.

As the deceased were brave and gallant men, we are shewn by what means they came to possess their character, and what noble exploits they performed in consequence.

Hence the middle of the oration contains, first, their origin; next, their education and form of government; and last of all, the consequence of such an origin and education; their heroic achievements from the earliest days to the time then present.[r]

The middle part being thus complete, we come to the conclusion; which is, perhaps, the most sublime piece of oratory, both for the plan and execution, which is extant of any age, or in any language.

By an awful prosopopœia, the deceased are called up to address the living; the fathers, slain in battle, to exhort their living children; the children, slain in battle, to console their living fathers; and this with every idea of manly consolation, and with every generous incentive to a contempt of death, and a love of their country, that the powers of nature or of art could suggest.[s]

It is here this oration concludes, being (as we have shewn) a

[q] See before, p. 423.

[r] See Dr. Bentham's elegant edition of this oration, in his Λόγοι Ἐπιταφίοι, printed at Oxford, 1746, from p. 21 to p. 40.

[s] See the same edition, from the words Ὦ παῖδες, ὅτι μέν ἐστε πατέρων ἀγαθῶν, p. 41, to the conclusion of the oration, p. 48.

perfect whole, executed with all the strength of a sublime language, under the management of a great and sublime genius.

If these speculations appear too dry, they may be rendered more pleasing, if the reader would peruse the two pieces criticised. His labour, he might be assured, would not be lost, as he would peruse two of the finest pieces, which the two finest ages of antiquity produced.

We cannot however quit this theory concerning *whole* and *parts*, without observing, that it regards alike both small works and great; and that it descends even to an essay, to a sonnet, to an ode. These minuter efforts of genius, unless, they possess (if I may be pardoned the expression) a certain character of totality, lose a capital pleasure derived from their union; from a union which, collected in a few pertinent ideas, combines them all happily, under one amicable form. Without this union, the production is no better than a sort of vague effusion, where sentences follow sentences, and stanzas follow stanzas, with no apparent reason why they should be two rather than twenty, or twenty rather than two.

If we want another argument for this minuter totality, we may refer to nature, which art is said to imitate. Not only this universe is one stupendous whole, but such also is a tree, a shrub, a flower; such those beings which, without the aid of glasses, even escape our perception. And so much for totality, (I venture to familiarize the term,) that common and essential character to every legitimate composition.

There is another character left, which, though foreign to the present purpose, I venture to mention, and that is the character of accuracy. Every work ought to be as accurate as possible. And yet, though this apply to works of every kind, there is a difference whether the work be great or small. In greater works, (such as histories, epic poems, and the like,) their very magnitude excuses incidental defects, and their authors, according to Horace, may be allowed to slumber. It is otherwise in smaller works, for the very reason that they are smaller. Such, through every part, both in sentiment and diction, should be perspicuous, pure, simple, and precise.

As examples often illustrate better than theory, the following short piece is subjoined for perusal. The reader may be assured, it comes not from the author; and yet, though not his own, he cannot help feeling a paternal solicitude for it; a wish for indulgence to a juvenile genius, that never meant a private essay for public inspection.

"PERDITA TO FLORIZEL.

"*Argument.*

"Several ladies in the country having acted a dramatic pastoral, in which one of them, under the name of Florizel, a shep-

herd, makes love to another, under the name of Perdita, a shepherdess; their acting being finished, and they returned to their proper characters, one of them addresses the other in the following lines:

"No more shall we with trembling hear that bell,[t]
Which shew'd me, Perdita; thee, Florizel.
No more thy brilliant eyes, with looks of love,
Shall in my bosom gentle pity move.
The curtain drops, and now we both remain,
You free from mimic love, and I from pain.
Yet grant one favour—tho' our drama ends,
Let the feign'd lovers still be real friends."

The author, in his own works, as far as his genius would assist, has endeavoured to give them a just totality. He has endeavoured that each of them should exhibit a real beginning, middle, and end, and these properly adapted to the places which they possess, and incapable of transposition, without detriment or confusion. He does not, however, venture upon a detail, because he does not think it worthy to follow the detail of productions, like the Georgics or the Menexenus.

So much, therefore, for the speculation concerning *whole* and *parts*, and such matters relative to it, as have incidentally arisen.

We are now to say something upon the theory of sentiment; and as sentiment and manners are intimately connected, and in a drama both of them naturally rise out of the fable, it seems also proper to say something upon dramatic speculation in general, beginning, according to order, first from the first.

CHAPTER VI.

DRAMATIC SPECULATIONS—THE CONSTITUTIVE PARTS OF EVERY DRAMA—SIX IN NUMBER—WHICH OF THESE BELONG TO OTHER ARTISTS—WHICH TO THE POET—TRANSITION TO THOSE WHICH APPERTAIN TO THE POET.

The laws and principles of dramatic poetry among the Greeks, whether it was from the excellence of their pieces, or of their language, or of both, were treated with attention even by their ablest philosophers.

We shall endeavour to give a sketch of their ideas; and, if it shall appear that we illustrate by instances chiefly modern, we have so done, because we believe that it demonstrates the universality of the precepts.

[t] The play-bell.

A dramatic piece, or (in more common language) a play, is the detail or exhibition of a certain action: not, however, an action, like one in history, which is supposed actually to have happened, but, though taken from history, a fiction or imitation, in various particulars derived from invention. It is by this that Sophocles and Shakspeare differ from Thucydides and Clarendon. It is invention makes them poets, and not metre; for had Coke or Newton written in verse, they could not, for that reason, have been called poets.[u]

Again, a dramatic piece, or play, is the exhibition of an action; not simply related, as the Æneid or Paradise Lost, but where the parties concerned are made to appear in person, and personally to converse and act their own story. It is by this that the Samson Agonistes differs from the Paradise Lost, though both of them poems from the same sublime author.

Now such dramatic piece, or play, in order to make it pleasing, (and, surely, to please is an essential to the drama,) must have a beginning, middle, and end; that is, as far as possible, be a perfect whole, having parts. If it be defective here, it will be hardly comprehensible; and if hardly comprehensible, it is not possible that it should please.

But upon whole and parts, as we have spoken already,[x] we speak not now. At present we remark, that such an action, as here described, makes in every play what we call the story, or (to use a term more technical) the fable; and that this story or fable is, and has been justly called, the very soul of the drama,[y] since from this it derives its very existence.

We proceed: this drama, then, being an action, and that not rehearsed like an epopee or history, but actually transacted by certain present living agents, it becomes necessary that these agents should mutually converse, and that they should have too a certain place where to hold their conversation. Hence we perceive that in every dramatic piece, not only the fable is a requisite, but the scenery, and the stage, and, more than these, a proper diction. Indeed, the scenery and stage are not in the poet's department: they belong at best to the painter, and after him to inferior artists. The diction is the poet's, and this indeed is important, since the whole of his performance is conveyed through the dialogue.

But diction being admitted, we are still to observe, that there are other things wanting, of no less importance. In the various

[u] Δῆλον οὖν ἐκ τούτων ὅτι τὸν ποιητὴν μᾶλλον τῶν μύθων εἶναι δεῖ ποιητὴν, ἢ τῶν μέτρων, ὅσῳ ποιητὴς κατὰ τὴν μίμησίν ἐστι· μιμεῖται δὲ τὰς πράξεις. "It is therefore evident hence, that a poet, or maker, ought rather to be a maker of fables than of verses, inasmuch as he is a poet, or maker, in virtue of his imitation, and as the objects he imitates are human actions." Arist. de Poet. cap. 9. p. 234. edit. Sylb.

[x] Sup. chap. v.

[y] Ἀρχὴ μὲν οὖν καὶ οἷον ψυχὴ ὁ μῦθος τῆς τραγῳδίας. Arist. Poet. c. 6. p. 231. edit. Sylb.

transactions of real life, every person does not simply speak, but some way or other speaks his mind, and discovers by his behaviour certain traces of character. Now it is in these almost inseparable accidents to human conduct, that we perceive the rise of sentiment and manners. And hence it follows, that as dramatic fiction copies real life, not only diction is a necessary part of it, but manners also, and sentiment.

We may subjoin one part more, and that is music. The ancient choruses between the acts were probably sung, and perhaps the rest was delivered in a species of recitative. Our modern theatres have a band of music; and have music often introduced where there is no opera. In this last, (I mean the opera,) music seems to claim precedence.

From these speculations it appears, that the constitutive parts of the drama are six; that is to say, the fable, the manners, the sentiment, the diction, the scenery, and the music.[a]

But then, as out of these six the scenery and the music appear to appertain to other artists, and the play (as far as respects the poet) is complete without them; it remains that its four primary and capital parts are the fable, the manners, the sentiment, and the diction.

These, by way of sketch, we shall successively consider, commencing from the fable, as the first in dignity and rank.

CHAPTER VII.

IN THE CONSTITUTIVE PARTS OF A DRAMA, THE FABLE CONSIDERED FIRST—ITS DIFFERENT SPECIES—WHICH FIT FOR COMEDY, WHICH FOR TRAGEDY—ILLUSTRATIONS BY EXAMPLES—REVOLUTIONS—DISCOVERIES—TRAGIC PASSIONS—LILLO'S FATAL CURIOSITY—COMPARED WITH THE ŒDIPUS TYRANNUS OF SOPHOCLES—IMPORTANCE OF FABLES, BOTH TRAGIC AND COMIC—HOW THEY DIFFER—BAD FABLES, WHENCE—OTHER DRAMATIC REQUISITES, WITHOUT THE FABLE, MAY BE EXCELLENT—FIFTH ACTS, HOW CHARACTERIZED BY SOME DRAMATIC WRITERS.

If we treat of dramatic fables or stories, we must first inquire how many are their species; and these we endeavour to arrange, as follows.

One species is, when the several events flow in a similar succession, and calmly maintain that equal course, till the succession stops, and the fable is at an end. Such is the story of a simple

[a] They are thus enumerated by Aristotle: Μῦθος, καὶ ἤθη, καὶ λέξις, καὶ διάνοια, καὶ ὄψις, καὶ μελοποιΐα. De Poet. c. 6. p. 230. edit. Sylb.

The doctrines of Aristotle, in this and the following chapters, may be said to contain in a manner the whole dramatic art.

peasant, who quietly dies in the cottage where he was born, the same throughout his life, both in manners and in rank.

There is a second species of story or fable, not simple, but complicated;[a] a species where the succeeding events differ widely from the preceding; as, for example, the story of the well-known Massinello, who, in a few days, from a poor fisherman rose to sovereign authority. Here the succession is not equal or similar, because we have a sudden revolution from low to high, from mean to magnificent.

There is another complicated species, the reverse of this last, where the revolution, though in extremes, is from high to low, from magnificent to mean. This may be illustrated by the same Massinello, who, after a short taste of sovereignty, was ignominiously slain.

And thus are all fables or stories either simple or complicated: and the complicated also of two subordinate sorts; of which the one, beginning from bad, ends in good; the other, beginning from good, ends in bad.

If we contemplate these various species, we shall find the simple story least adapted either to comedy or tragedy. It wants those striking revolutions, those unexpected discoveries,[b] so essential to engage and to detain a spectator.

It is not so with complicated stories. Here every sudden revolution, every discovery, has a charm, and the unexpected events never fail to interest.

It must be remarked, however, of these complicated stories, that, where the revolution is from bad to good, as in the first subordinate sort, they are more natural to comedy than to tragedy,[c] because comedies, however perplexed and turbid may

[a] *Εἰσὶ δὲ τῶν μύθων οἱ μὲν ἁπλοῖ, οἱ δὲ πεπλεγμένοι· καὶ γὰρ αἱ πράξεις, ὧν μιμήσεις οἱ μυθοί εἰσιν, ὑπάρχουσιν εὐθὺς οὖσαι τοιαῦται· λέγω δὲ, κ. τ. λ.* "Of fables, some are simple, and some are complicated; for such are human actions, of which fables are imitations. By simple, I mean," &c. Aristot. Poet. cap. 10. p. 235. edit. Sylb.

[b] These revolutions and discoveries are called in Greek *περιπέτειαι* and *ἀναγνώρισεις*. They are thus defined: *Ἔστι δὲ περιπέτεια μὲν ἡ εἰς τὸ ἐναντίον τῶν πραττομένων μεταβόλη, καθάπερ εἴρηται, καὶ τοῦτο δὲ—κατὰ τὸ εἰκὸς, ἢ ἀναγκαῖον:* "A revolution is, as has been already said, a change into the reverse of what is doing, and that either according to probability, or from necessity." Aristot. Poet. c. 11. p. 235. edit. Sylb. Again: *Ἀναγνώρισις δ' ἐστὶν, ὥσπερ καὶ τοὔνομα σημαίνει, ἐξ ἀγνοίας εἰς γνῶσιν μεταβολὴ, ἢ εἰς φιλίαν ἢ ἔχθραν τῶν πρὸς εὐτυχίαν ἢ δυστυχίαν ὡρισμένων:* "A discovery is, as the name implies, a change from ignorance to knowledge; knowledge leading either to friendship or enmity between those who [in the course of the drama] are destined to felicity or infelicity." Aristot. Poet. ut supra.

[c] The Stagirite having approved the practice, that tragedy should end with infelicity, and told us that the introduction of felicity was a sort of compliment paid by the poet to the wishes of the spectators, adds, upon the subject of a happy ending—*Ἔστι δὲ οὐχ αὕτη ἀπὸ τραγῳδίας ἡδονὴ, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τῆς κωμῳδίας οἰκεία· ἐκεῖ γὰρ ἂν οἱ ἔχθιστοι ὦσιν ἐν τῷ μύθῳ· οἷον Ὀρέστης καὶ Αἴγισθος· φίλοι γενόμενοι ἐπὶ τελευτῆς ἐξέρχονται, καὶ ἀποθνῄσκει οὐδεὶς ὑπ' οὐδενός:* "This is not a pleasure arising from tragedy, but is rather peculiar to comedy. For there, if the characters are most hostile, (as much so, as Orestes and Ægisthus were,) they become friends at last, when they quit the stage, nor does any one die by the means of any other." Aristot. Poet. c. 13. p. 238. edit. Sylb.

be their beginning, generally produce at last (as well the ancient as the modern) a reconciliation of parties, and a wedding in consequence. Not only Terence, but every modern may furnish us with examples.

On the contrary, when the revolution, as in the second sort, is from good to bad, (that is, from happy to unhappy, from prosperous to adverse,) here we discover the true fable, or story, proper for tragedy. Common sense leads us to call, even in real life, such events, tragical. When Henry the Fourth of France, the triumphant sovereign of a great people, was unexpectedly murdered by a wretched fanatic, we cannot help saying, it was a tragical story.

But to come to the tragic drama itself.

We see this kind of revolution sublimely illustrated in the Œdipus of Sophocles; where Œdipus, after having flattered himself in vain, that his suspicions would be relieved by his inquiries, is at last by those very inquiries plunged into the deepest woe,[d] from finding it confirmed and put beyond doubt, that he had murdered his own father, and was then married to his own mother.

We see the force also of such a revolution in Milton's Samson Agonistes. When his father had specious hopes to redeem him from captivity, these hopes are at once blasted by his unexpected destruction.[e]

Othello commences with a prospect of conjugal felicity; Lear with that of repose, by retiring from royalty.[f] Different revolutions (arising from jealousy, ingratitude, and other culpable affections) change both of these pleasing prospects into the deepest distress, and with this distress each of the tragedies concludes.

Nor is it a small heightening to these revolutions, if they are attended, as in the Œdipus, with a discovery; that is, if the parties who suffer, and those who cause their sufferings, are discovered to be connected: for example, to be husband and wife, brother and sister, parents and a child, &c.

If a man in real life happen to kill another, it certainly heightens the misfortune, even though an event of mere chance, if he discover that person to be his father or his son.

It is easy to perceive, if these events are tragic, (and can we for a moment doubt them to be such?) that pity and terror are the true tragic passions;[g] that they truly bear that name, and are necessarily diffused through every fable truly tragic.

[d] See the same Poetics of Aristotle, in the beginning of chap. 11. Ὥσπερ ἐν τῷ Οἰδίποδι, κ. τ. λ. p. 235. edit. Sylb.

[e] See Samson Agonistes, v. 1452, &c.

[f] This example refers to the real Lear of Shakspeare, not the spurious one, commonly acted under his name, where the imaginary mender seems to have paid the same compliment to his audience, as was paid to other audiences two thousand years ago, and then justly censured. See note *c*, p. 429.

[g] It has been observed, that if persons of consummate virtue and probity are made

Now whether our ingenious countryman, Lillo, in that capital play of his, the Fatal Curiosity, learned this doctrine from others, or was guided by pure genius, void of critical literature; it is certain that in this tragedy (whatever was the cause) we find the model of a perfect fable, under all the characters here described.

"A long-lost son, returning home unexpectedly, finds his parents alive, but perishing with indigence.

"The young man, whom from his long absence his parents never expected, discovers himself first to an amiable friend, his long-loved Charlotte, and with her concerts the manner how to discover himself to his parents.

"It is agreed he should go to their house, and there remain unknown, till Charlotte should arrive, and make the happy discovery.

"He goes thither accordingly; and having, by a letter of Charlotte's, been admitted, converses, though unknown, both with father and mother, and beholds their misery with filial affection; complains at length he was fatigued, (which in fact he really was,) and begs he may be admitted for a while to repose. Retiring, he delivers a casket to his mother, and tells her it is a deposit she must guard till he awakes.

"Curiosity tempts her to open the casket, where she is dazzled with the splendour of innumerable jewels. Objects so alluring suggest bad ideas, and poverty soon gives to those ideas a sanction. Black as they are, she communicates them to her husband, who, at first reluctant, is at length persuaded, and for the sake of the jewels stabs the stranger while he sleeps.

"The fatal murder is perpetrating, or at least but barely perpetrated, when Charlotte arrives, full of joy, to inform them that the stranger within their walls was their long-lost son."

What a discovery? What a revolution? How irresistibly are the tragic passions of terror and pity excited.[h]

It is no small praise to this affecting fable, that it so much resembles that of the play just mentioned, the Œdipus Tyrannus. In both tragedies, that which apparently leads to joy, leads in its completion to misery; both tragedies concur in the horror of their discoveries; and both in those great outlines of a truly tragic revolution, where (according to the nervous sentiment of Lillo himself) we see

unfortunate, it does not move our pity, for we are shocked; if persons notoriously infamous are unfortunate, it may move our humanity, but hardly then our pity. It remains that pity, and we may add fear, are naturally excited by middle characters, those who are no way distinguished by their extraordinary virtue, nor who bring their misfortunes upon them so much by improbity as by error.

As we think the sufferings of such persons rather hard, they move our pity; as we think them like ourselves, they move our fear.

This will explain the following expressions: Ἔλεος μὲν, περὶ τὸν ἀνάξιον· φόβος δὲ περὶ τὸν ὅμοιον. Aristot. Poet. c. 13. p. 237. edit. Sylb.

[h] See page 430.

> The two extremes of life,
> The highest happiness, and deepest woe,
> With all the sharp and bitter aggravations
> Of such a vast transition.

A further concurrence may be added, which is, that each piece begins and proceeds in a train of events, which with perfect probability lead to its conclusion, without the help of machines, deities, prodigies, spectres, or any thing else incomprehensible or incredible.[k]

We may say, too, in both pieces there exists totality; that is to say, they have a beginning, a middle, and an end.[l]

We mention this again, though we have mentioned it already, because we think we cannot enough enforce so absolutely essential a requisite; a requisite descending in poetry from the mighty epopee down to the minute epigram; and never to be dispensed with, but in sessions-papers, controversial pamphlets, and those passing productions, which, like certain insects of which we read, live and die within the day.[m]

And now having given, in the above instances, this description of the tragic fable, we may be enabled to perceive its amazing efficacy. It does not, like a fine sentiment, or a beautiful simile, give an occasional or local grace; it is never out of sight; it adorns every part, and passes through the whole.

It was from these reasonings that the great father of criticism, speaking of the tragic fable, calls it the very soul of tragedy.[n]

Nor is this assertion less true of the comic fable, which has, too, like the tragic, its revolutions and its discoveries; its praise from natural order, and from a just totality.

The difference between them only lies in the persons and the catastrophe, inasmuch as (contrary to the usual practice of tragedy) the comic persons are mostly either of middle or lower life, and the catastrophe for the greater part from bad to good, or (to talk less in extremes) from turbid to tranquil.[o]

On fables, comic as well as tragic, we may alike remark, that, when good, like many other fine things, they are difficult. And hence perhaps the cause, why in this respect so many dramas are defective; and why their story or fable is commonly no more than either a jumble of events hard to comprehend, or a tale taken from some wretched novel, which has little foundation either in nature or probability.

Even in the plays we most admire, we shall seldom find our admiration to arise from the fable: it is either from the sentiment, as in Measure for Measure; or from the purity of the

[k] It is true, that in one play mention is made of an oracle; in the other, of a dream; but neither of them affects the catastrophe; which in both plays arises from incidents perfectly natural.

[l] See chap. v.

[m] Vid. Aristot. Animal. Histor. l. v. p. 143. edit. Sylb.

[n] See before, p. 427.

[o] See p. 429, 430.

diction, as in Cato; or from the characters and manners, as in Lear, Othello, Falstaff, Benedict and Beatrice, Ben the Sailor, sir Peter and lady Teazle, with the other persons of that pleasing drama, the School for Scandal.

To these merits, which are great, we may add others far inferior, such as the scenery; such as, in tragedy, the spectacle of pomps and processions; in comedy, the amusing bustle of surprises and squabbles; all of which have their effect, and keep our attention alive.

But here, alas! commences the grievance. After sentiment, diction, characters, and manners; after the elegance of scenes; after pomps and processions, squabbles and surprises; when, these being over, the whole draws to a conclusion, it is then unfortunately comes the failure. At that critical moment, of all the most interesting, (by that critical moment, I mean the catastrophe,) it is then the poor spectator is led into a labyrinth, where both himself and the poet are often lost together.

In tragedy, this knot, like the Gordian knot, is frequently solved by the sword. The principal parties are slain; and, these being despatched, the play ends of course.

In comedy, the expedient is little better. The old gentleman of the drama, after having fretted and stormed through the first four acts, towards the conclusion of the fifth is unaccountably appeased. At the same time, the dissipated coquette and the dissolute fine gentleman, whose vices cannot be occasional, but must clearly be habitual, are in the space of half a scene miraculously reformed, and grow at once as completely good as if they had never been otherwise.

It was from a sense of this concluding jumble, this unnatural huddling of events, that a witty friend of mine, who was himself a dramatic writer, used pleasantly, though perhaps rather freely, to damn the man who invented fifth acts.[p]

And so much for the nature or character of the dramatic fable.

We are now to inquire concerning manners and sentiment; and first for the theory of manners.

[p] So said the celebrated Henry Fielding, who was a respectable person both by education and birth, having been bred at Eton school and Leyden, and being lineally descended from an earl of Denbigh.

His Joseph Andrews and Tom Jones may be called master-pieces in the comic epopee, which none since have equalled, though multitudes have imitated; and which he was peculiarly qualified to write in the manner he did, both from his life, his learning, and his genius.

Had his life been less irregular, (for irregular it was, and spent in a promiscuous intercourse with persons of all ranks,) his pictures of human kind had neither been so various nor so natural.

Had he possessed less of literature, he could not have infused such a spirit of classical elegance.

Had his genius been less fertile in wit and humour, he could not have maintained that uninterrupted pleasantry, which never suffers his reader to feel fatigue.

CHAPTER VIII.

CONCERNING DRAMATIC MANNERS—WHAT CONSTITUTES THEM—MANNERS OF OTHELLO, MACBETH, HAMLET—THOSE OF THE LAST QUESTIONED, AND WHY—CONSISTENCY REQUIRED—YET SOMETIMES BLAMEABLE, AND WHY—GENUINE MANNERS IN SHAKSPEARE—IN LILLO—MANNERS, MORALLY BAD, POETICALLY GOOD.

"WHEN the principal persons of any drama preserve such a consistency of conduct, (it matters not whether that conduct be virtuous or vicious,) that, after they have appeared for a scene or two, we conjecture what they will do hereafter from what they have done already, such persons in poetry may be said to have manners, for by this, and this only, are poetic manners constituted."[q]

To explain this assertion by recurring to instances: As soon as we have seen the violent love and weak credulity of Othello, the fatal jealousy, in which they terminate, is no more than what we may conjecture. When we have marked the attention paid by Macbeth to the witches, to the persuasions of his wife, and to the flattering dictates of his own ambition, we suspect something atrocious; nor are we surprised that, in the event, he murders Duncan, and then Banquo. Had he changed his conduct, and been only wicked by halves, his manners would not have been as they now are, poetically good.

If the leading person in a drama, for example Hamlet, appear to have been treated most injuriously, we naturally infer that he will meditate revenge; and should that revenge prove fatal to those who had injured him, it is no more than was probable, when we consider the provocation.

But should the same Hamlet by chance kill an innocent old man—an old man from whom he had never received offence, and with whose daughter he was actually in love—what should we expect then? Should we not look for compassion, I might add, even for compunction? Should we not be shocked, if, in-

[q] Ἔστι δὲ ἦθος μὲν τὸ τοιοῦτον, ὃ δηλοῖ τὴν προαίρεσιν ὁποῖά τις ἐστὶν, ἐν οἷς οὐκ ἐστι δῆλον, εἰ προαιρεῖται, ἢ φεύγει ὁ λέγων: "Manners or character is that which discovers what the determination [of a speaker] will be, in matters where it is not yet manifest, whether he chooses to do a thing, or to avoid it." Aristot. Poet. c. 6. p. 231. edit. Sylb.

It was from our being unable, in the persons of some dramas, to conjecture what they will determine, that the above author immediately adds, διόπερ οὐκ ἔχουσιν ἦθος ἔνιοι τῶν λόγων: "for which reason some of the dramatic dialogues have no manners at all."

And this well explains another account of manners given in the same book: τὰ δὲ ἤθη, καθ' ἃ ποιούς τινας εἶναι φάμεν τοὺς πράττοντας: "manners are those qualities through which we say, the actors are men of such or such a character." Ibid.

Bossu, in his Traité du Poeme Epique, has given a fine and copious commentary on this part of Aristotle's Poetics. See his work, l. iv. c. 4, 5, &c.

stead of this, he were to prove quite insensible, or (what is even worse) were he to be brutally jocose?

Here the manners are blameable, because they are inconsistent; we should never conjecture from Hamlet any thing so unfeelingly cruel.

Nor are manners only to be blamed for being thus inconsistent. Consistency itself is blameable, if it exhibit human beings completely abandoned; completely void of virtue; prepared, like king Richard, at their very birth, for mischief. It was of such models that a jocose critic once said, they might make good devils, but they could never make good men: not (says he) that they want consistency, but it is of a supernatural sort, which human nature never knew.

Quodcumque ostendis mihi sic, incredulus odi. Hor.

Those who wish to see manners in a more genuine form, may go to the characters already alleged in the preceding chapter;[r] where, from our previous acquaintance with the several parties, we can hardly fail, as incidents arise, to conjecture their future behaviour.[s]

We may find also manners of this sort in the Fatal Curiosity. Old Wilmot and his wife discover affection for one another; nor is it confined here—they discover it for their absent son; for his beloved Charlotte; and for their faithful servant Randal. Yet, at the same time, from the memory of past affluence, the pressure of present indigence, the fatal want of resources, and the cold ingratitude of friends, they shew to all others (the few above excepted) a gloomy, proud, unfeeling misanthropy.

In this state of mind, and with these manners, an opportunity offers, by murdering an unknown stranger, to gain them immense treasure, and place them above want. As the measure was at once both tempting and easy, was it not natural that such a wife should persuade, and that such a husband should be persuaded? We may conjecture from their past behaviour what part they would prefer, and that part, though morally wicked, is yet poetically good; because here, all we require is a suitable consistence.[t]

We are far from justifying assassins. Yet assassins, if truly drawn, are not monsters, but human beings; and as such, being chequered with good and with evil, may by their good move our pity, though their evil cause abhorrence.

But this in the present case is not all. The innocent parties, made miserable, exhibit a distress which comes home; a distress which, as mortals, it is impossible we should not feel.

Sunt lacrymæ rerum, et mentem mortalia tangunt.[u] Virg. Æn.

[r] See p. 433.
[s] See p. 434.
[t] See above.
[u] It was intended to illustrate, by large quotations from different parts of this affecting tragedy, what is asserted in various parts of these Inquiries. But the intention was laid aside, (at least in greater part,) by

CHAPTER IX.

CONCERNING DRAMATIC SENTIMENT—WHAT CONSTITUTES IT—CONNECTED WITH MANNERS, AND HOW—CONCERNING SENTIMENT, GNOMOLOGIC, OR PRECEPTIVE—ITS DESCRIPTION—SOMETIMES HAS A REASON ANNEXED TO IT—SOMETIMES LAUDABLE, SOMETIMES BLAMEABLE—WHOM IT MOST BECOMES TO UTTER IT, AND WHY—BOSSU—TRANSITION TO DICTION.

FROM *manners* we pass to *sentiment;* a word which, though sometimes confined to mere gnomology, or moral precept, was often used by the Greeks in a more comprehensive meaning, including every thing for which men employ language; for proving and solving; for raising and calming the passions; for exaggerating and depreciating; for commands, monitions, prayers, narratives, interrogations, answers, &c. &c. In short, sentiment, in this sense, means little less than the universal subjects of our discourse.[x]

It was under this meaning the word was originally applied to the drama, and this appears not only from authority, but from fact: for what can conduce more effectually than discourse to establish with precision dramatic manners and characters?

To refer to a play already mentioned, the Fatal Curiosity:

reflecting that the tragedy was easily to be procured, being modern, and having passed through several editions, one particularly so late as in the year 1775, when it was printed with Lillo's other dramatic pieces.

If any one read this tragedy, the author of these Inquiries has a request or two to make, for which he hopes a candid reader will forgive him: one is, not to cavil at minute inaccuracies, but look to the superior merit of the whole taken together; another is, totally to expunge those wretched rhymes which conclude many of the scenes; and which it is probable are not from Lillo, but from some other hand, willing to conform to an absurd fashion, then practised, but now laid aside, the fashion (I mean) of a rhyming conclusion.

[x] There are two species of sentiment successively here described, both called in English either a sentiment or a sentence, and in Latin *sententia*. The Greeks were more exact, and to the different species assigned different names, calling the one *διάνοια*, the other *γνώμη*.

Of *γνώμη* we shall speak hereafter: of *διάνοια* their descriptions are as follows: *Ἔστι δὲ κατὰ τὴν διάνοιαν ταῦτα, ὅσα ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου δεῖ παρασκευασθῆναι· μέρη δὲ τούτων, τό, τε ἀποδεικνῦναι, καὶ τὸ λύειν, καὶ τὸ πάθη παρασκευάζειν, οἷον ἔλεον, ἢ φόβον, ἢ ὀργὴν, καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα, καὶ ἔτι μέγεθος καὶ σμικρότητα:* "All those things belong to sentiment (or *διάνοια*) that are to be performed through the help of discourse: now the various branches of these things are to prove, and to solve, to excite passions, (such as pity, fear, anger, and the like,) and, besides this, to magnify, and to diminish." Arist. Poet. c. 19. p. 245. edit. Sylb.

We have here chosen the fullest description of *διάνοια;* but in the same work there are others more concise, which yet express the same meaning. In the sixth chapter we are told it is, *τὸ λέγειν δύνασθαι τὰ ἐνόντα καὶ τὰ ἁρμόττοντα,* "to be able to say (that is, to express justly) such things as necessarily belong to a subject, or properly suit it." And again, soon after: *Διάνοια δὲ, ἐν οἷς ἀποδεικνύουσί τι, ὡς ἔστιν, ἢ ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν, ἢ καθόλου τι ἀποφαίνονται:* "Διάνοια, or sentiment, exists, where men demonstrate any thing either to be, or not to be; or through which they assert any thing general, or universal." Ibid. p. 231.

When old Wilmot discharges his faithful servant from pure affection, that he might not starve him, how strongly are his manners delineated by his sentiments? The following are among his monitions:

> Shun my example; treasure up my precepts;
> The world's before thee; be a knave and prosper.

The young man, shocked at such advice from a master whose virtues he had been accustomed so long to venerate, ventures modestly to ask him,

> Where are your former principles?

The old man's reply is a fine picture of human frailty; a striking, and yet a natural blending of friendship and misanthropy; of particular friendship, of general misanthropy:

> No matter (says he) for principles;
> Suppose I have renounc'd 'em: I have passions,
> And love thee still; therefore would have thee think
> The world is all a scene of deep deceit,
> And he who deals with mankind on the square
> Is his own bubble, and undoes himself.

He departs with these expressions, but leaves the young man far from being convinced.

The suspicious gloom of age, and the open simplicity of youth, give the strongest contrast to the manners of each, and all this from the sentiments alone; sentiments which, though opposite, are still perfectly just, as being perfectly suited to their different characters.

It is to this comprehensive meaning of *sentiment* that we may in a manner refer the substance of these inquiries; for such sentiment is every thing, either written or spoken.

Something, however, must be said upon that other, and more limited species of it, which I call *the gnomologic*, or *preceptive*; a species, not indeed peculiar to the drama, but, when properly used, one of its capital ornaments.

The following description of it is taken from antiquity. A gnomologic sentiment, or precept, is an assertion or proposition—not however all assertions, as that, "Pericles was an able statesman," "Homer a great poet;" for these assertions are particular, and such a sentiment must be general—nor yet is it every assertion, though general; as that, "The angles of every triangle are equal to two right angles"—but it is an assertion which, though general, is only relative to human conduct, and to such objects, as in moral action we either seek or avoid.[y]

[y] We now come to the second species of sentiment, called in Greek γνώμη, and which Aristotle describes much in the same manner as we have done in the text: Ἔστι δὲ γνώμη ἀπόφανσις, οὐ μέντοι περὶ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστον, οἷον, ποῖός τις Ἰφικράτης· οὔτε περὶ πάντων καθόλου, οἷον, ὅτι τὸ ἐνθὼ τῷ καμπύλῳ ἐναντίον· ἀλλὰ περὶ ὅσων αἱ πράξεις εἰσὶ, καὶ αἱρετὰ ἢ φευκτά ἐστι πρὸς τὸ πράσσειν. Arist. Rhetor. l. ii. c. 21. p. 96. edit. Sylb. So too the Scriptor. ad Herennium, l. iv. s. 24. Sententia est

Among the assertions of this sort we produce the following; the precept which forbids unseasonable curiosity:

> Seek not to know, what must not be reveal'd.

Or that which forbids unrelenting anger:

> Within thee cherish not immortal ire.

We remark, too, that these sentiments acquire additional strength, if we subjoin the reason.

For example:

> Seek not to know what must not be reveal'd;
> Joys only flow where fate is most conceal'd.

Or again:

> Within thee cherish not immortal ire,
> When thou thyself art mortal.[z]

In some instances, the reason and sentiment are so blended as to be in a manner inseparable. Thus Shakspeare:

> He who filches from me my good name,
> Robs me of that which not enriches him,
> But makes me poor indeed.

There are, too, sentiments of bad moral and evil tendency:

> If sacred right should ever be infring'd,
> It should be done for empire and dominion:
> In other things pure conscience be thy guide.[a]

And again:

> The man's a fool,
> Who, having slain the father, spares the sons.[b]

These ideas are only fit for tyrants, usurpers, and other profligate men; nor ought they to appear in a drama, but to shew such characters.

On gnomologic sentiments in general it has been observed, that though they decorate, they should not be frequent, for then the drama becomes affected and declamatory.[c]

It has been said, too, they come most naturally from aged persons, because age may be supposed to have taught them ex-

oratio sumpta de vita, quæ aut quid fit, aut quid esse oporteat in vita, breviter ostendit, hoc modo—Liber is est existimandus, qui nulli turpitudini servit.

[z] The first of these sentiments is taken from Dryden, the second is quoted by Aristotle, in his Rhetoric, l. ii. c. 22. p. 97. edit. Sylb.

Ἀθάνατον ὀργὴν μὴ φύλαττε, θνητὸς ὤν.

On this the philosopher well observes, that if the monition had been no more, than that we should not cherish our anger for ever, it had been a sentence or moral precept; but when the words θνητὸς ὤν, "being mortal," are added, the poet then gives us the reason, τὸ διὰ τί λέγει. Rhet. ut sup. The Latin rhetorician says the same: Sed illud quodque probandum est genus sententiæ, quod confirmatur subjectione rationis, hoc modo: omnes bene vivendi rationes in virtute sunt collocandæ, propterea quod sola virtus in sua potestate est. Scriptor. ad Heren. l. iv. s. 24.

[a] Vid. Cic. de Officiis, l. iii. c. 21; who thus translates Euripides:

Nam si violandum est jus, regnandi gratia
Violandum est: aliis rebus pietatem colas.

[b] Νήπιος, ὃς, πατέρα κτείνας, παῖδας καταλείπει. Arist. Rhet. l. i. c. 16. l. iii. c. 22. p. 98. edit. Sylb.

[c] So the same Latin rhetorician, above quoted: Sententias interponi raro convenit, ut rei actores, non vivendi præceptores esse videamur. Scriptor. ad Herenn. lib. iv. s. 25.

perience. It must, however, be an experience suitable to their characters: an old general should not talk upon law, nor an old lawyer upon war.[d]

We are now to proceed to diction.

CHAPTER X.

CONCERNING DICTION—THE VULGAR—THE AFFECTED—THE ELEGANT—THIS LAST MUCH INDEBTED TO THE METAPHOR—PRAISE OF THE METAPHOR—ITS DESCRIPTION; AND, WHEN GOOD, ITS CHARACTER—THE BEST AND MOST EXCELLENT, WHAT—NOT TURGID—NOR ENIGMATIC—NOR BASE—NOR RIDICULOUS—INSTANCES—METAPHORS BY CONSTANT USE SOMETIMES BECOME COMMON WORDS—PUNS—RUPILIUS REX—OTTIE—ENIGMAS—CUPPING—THE GOD TERMINUS—OVID'S FASTI.

As every sentiment must be expressed by words, the theory of *sentiment* naturally leads to that of *diction*. Indeed, the connection between them is so intimate, that the same sentiment, where the diction differs, is as different in appearance, as the same person, dressed like a peasant, or dressed like a gentleman. And hence we see, how much diction merits a serious attention.

But this perhaps will be better understood by an example. Take, then, the following: "Do not let a lucky hit slip; if you do, belike you may not any more get at it." The sentiment (we must confess) is expressed clearly, but the diction surely is rather vulgar and low. Take it another way: "Opportune moments are few and fleeting; seize them with avidity, or your progression will be impeded." Here the diction, though not low, is rather obscure. The words are unusual, pedantic, and affected. But what says Shakspeare?

> There is a tide in the affairs of men,
> Which, taken at the flood, leads on to fortune;
> Omitted, all the voyage of their life
> Is bound in shallows.

Here the diction is elegant, without being vulgar or affected; the words, though common, being taken under a metaphor, are so far estranged by this metaphorical use, that they acquire through the change a competent dignity, and yet, without becoming vulgar, remain intelligible and clear.

Knowing, therefore, the stress laid by the ancient critics on the metaphor, and viewing its admirable effects in the decorating of diction, we think it may merit a further regard.

[d] Ἁρμόττει δὲ γνωμολογεῖν ἡλικίᾳ μὲν πρεσβύτερον, περὶ δὲ τούτων ὧν ἐμπειρός τις ἐστίν: "It becomes him to be sententious who is advanced in years, and that upon subjects in which he has experience." Arist. Rhet. ut supra, p. 97. edit. Sylb. See also the ingenious Bossu, in his Traité du Poeme Epique, l. vi. c. 4, 5; who is, as usual, copious and clear.

There is not, perhaps, any figure of speech so pleasing as the metaphor. It is at times the language of every individual, but, above all, is peculiar to the man of genius.[e] His sagacity discerns not only common analogies, but those others more remote, which escape the vulgar, and which, though they seldom invent, they seldom fail to recognise when they hear them from persons more ingenious than themselves.

It has been ingeniously observed, that the metaphor took its rise from the poverty of language. Men, not finding upon every occasion words ready made for their ideas, were compelled to have recourse to words analogous, and transfer them from their original meaning to the meaning then required. But though the metaphor began in poverty, it did not end there. When the analogy was just, (and this often happened,) there was something peculiarly pleasing in what was both new and yet familiar; so that the metaphor was then cultivated, not out of necessity, but for ornament. It is thus that clothes were first assumed to defend us against the cold, but came afterwards to be worn for distinction and decoration.

It must be observed, there is a force in the united words, *new* and *familiar*. What is new, but not familiar, is often unintelligible; what is familiar, but not new, is no better than common place. It is in the union of the two, that the obscure and the vulgar are happily removed; and it is in this union that we view the character of a just metaphor.

But after we have so praised the metaphor, it is fit at length we should explain what it is; and this we shall attempt as well by a description as by examples.

"A metaphor is the transferring of a word from its usual meaning to an analogous meaning, and then the employing it agreeably to such transfer."[f] For example: the usual meaning of evening, is the conclusion of the day. But age too is a conclusion; the conclusion of human life. Now there being an analogy in all conclusions, we arrange in order the two we have alleged, and say, that, "as evening is to the day, so is age to human life." Hence, by an easy permutation, (which furnishes

[e] *Τὸ δὲ μέγιστον μεταφορικὸν εἶναι· μόνον γὰρ τοῦτο οὔτε παρ' ἄλλου ἐστὶ λαβεῖν, εὐφυΐας τε σημεῖόν ἐστι· τὸ γὰρ εὖ μεταφέρειν, τὸ ὅμοιον θεωρεῖν ἐστι:* "The greatest thing of all is to be powerful in metaphor; for this alone cannot be acquired from another, but is a mark of original genius: for to metaphorize well, is to discern in different objects that which is similar." Arist. Poet. c. 22. p. 250. edit. Sylb.

Δεῖ δὲ μεταφέρειν—ἀπὸ οἰκείων καὶ μὴ φανερῶν, οἷον καὶ ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ τὸ ὅμοιον καὶ ἐν πολὺ διέχουσι θεωρεῖν, εὐστόχου: "We ought to metaphorize, that is, to derive metaphors, from terms which are proper, and yet not obvious; since even in philosophy, to discern the similar in things widely distant, is the part of one who conjectures happily." Arist. Rhetor. l. iii. c. 11. p. 137. edit. Sylb.

That metaphor is an effort of genius, and cannot be taught, is here again asserted in the words of the first quotation: *Καὶ λαβεῖν οὐκ ἔστιν αὐτὴν* (scil. *μεταφοράν*) *παρ' ἄλλου.* Rhetor. l. iii. c. 2. p. 120. edit. Sylb.

[f] *Μεταφορὰ δ' ἐστὶν ὀνόματος ἀλλοτρίου ἐπιφορά, κ. τ. λ.* Arist. Poet. cap. 21. p. 247. edit. Sylb.

at once two metaphors,) we say alternately, that "evening is the age of the day;" and that "age is the evening of life."[g]

There are other metaphors equally pleasing, but which we only mention, as their analogy cannot be mistaken. It is thus that old men have been called stubble; and the stage or theatre, the mirror of human life.[h]

In language of this sort there is a double satisfaction: it is strikingly clear; and yet raised, though clear, above the low and vulgar idiom. It is a praise too of such metaphors, to be quickly comprehended. The similitude and the thing illustrated are commonly despatched in a single word, and comprehended by an immediate and instantaneous intuition.

Thus a person of wit, being dangerously ill, was told by his friends, two more physicians were called in. "So many!" says he, "do they fire then in platoons?"

These instances may assist us to discover, what metaphors may be called the best.

They ought not, in an elegant and polite style, (the style of which we are speaking,) to be derived from meanings too sublime; for then the diction would be turgid and bombast. Such was the language of that poet, who, describing the footmen's flambeaux at the end of an opera, sung or said,

> Now blaz'd a thousand flaming suns, and bade
> Grim night retire.

Nor ought a metaphor to be farfetched, for then it becomes

[g] Ὁμοίως ἔχει ἑσπέρα πρὸς ἡμέραν, καὶ γῆρας πρὸς βίον: ἐρεῖ τοίνυν τὴν ἑσπέραν γῆρας ἡμέρας, καὶ τὸ γῆρας ἑσπέραν βίου. Aristot. Poet. c. 21. p. 248. edit. Sylb.

[h] The Stagirite having told us what a natural pleasure we derive from information, and having told us that in the subject of words, exotic words want that pleasure, from being obscure, and common words from being too well known, adds immediately—ἡ δὲ μεταφορὰ ποιεῖ τοῦτο μάλιστα· ὅταν γὰρ εἴπῃ τὸ γῆρας καλαμὴν, ἐποίησε μάθησιν καὶ γνῶσιν διὰ τοῦ γένους, ἄμφω γὰρ ἀπηνθηκότα—"but the metaphor does this most effectually, for when Homer (in metaphor) said that age was stubble, he conveyed to us information and knowledge through a common genus, (through the genus of time,) as both old men and stubble have passed the flower of their existence.

The words in Homer are,

Ἀλλ' ἔμπης καλάμην γε σ' ὄτομαι εἰσορόωντα
Γινώσκειν. Οδυσσ. Ξ. 214.

Sed tamen stipulam saltem te arbitror intuentem
Cognoscere.

In which verse we cannot help remarking an elegance of the poet.

Ulysses, for his protection, had been metamorphosed by Minerva into the figure of an old man. Yet even then the hero did not choose to lose his dignity. By his discourse he informs Eumæus, (who did not know him,) that although he was old, he was still respectable: I imagine (says he) that even now you may know the stubble by the look. As much as to suggest, that, though he had compared himself to stubble, it was nevertheless to that better sort, left after the reaping of the best corn.

See the note upon this verse by my learned friend, the late Mr. Samuel Clarke, in his Greek edition of the Odyssey, and Klotzius upon Tyrtæus, p. 26.

As to the next metaphor, it is an idea not unknown to Shakspeare, who, speaking of acting or playing, says, with energy,

That its end, both at first, and now, was, and is,
To hold as it were the mirror up to nature.
Hamlet.

According to Aristotle, the Odyssey of Homer was elegantly called by Alcidamas, καλὸν ἀνθρωπίνου βίου κατόπτρον, "a beautiful mirror of human life." Rhet. l. iii. c. 3. p. 124. edit. Sylb.

an enigma. It was thus a gentleman once puzzled his country friend, in telling him, by way of compliment, that "he was become a perfect centaur." His honest friend knew nothing of centaurs, but being fond of riding, was hardly ever off his horse.

Another extreme remains, the reverse of the too sublime, and that is, the transferring from subjects too contemptible. Such was the case of that poet quoted by Horace, who, to describe winter, wrote—

> Jupiter hybernas cana nive conspuit Alpes. Hor. l. ii. Sat. 5.
> "O'er the cold Alps Jove spits his hoary snow."

Nor was that modern poet more fortunate whom Dryden quotes, and who, trying his genius upon the same subject, supposed winter

> To perriwig with snow the baldpate woods.

With the same class of wits we may arrange that pleasant fellow, who, speaking of an old lady whom he had affronted, gave us in one short sentence no less than three choice metaphors. "I perceive," said he, "her back is up; I must curry favour, or the fat will be in the fire."

Nor can we omit that the same word, when transferred to different subjects, produces metaphors very different, as to propriety or impropriety.

It is with propriety that we transfer the word, to embrace, from human beings to things purely ideal. The metaphor appears just, when we say, "to embrace a proposition; to embrace an offer; to embrace an opportunity." Its application perhaps was not quite so elegant when the old steward wrote to his lord, upon the subject of his farm, that "if he met any oxen, he would not fail to embrace them."[i]

If then we are to avoid the turgid, the enigmatic, and the base or ridiculous, no other metaphors are left, but such as may be described by negatives; such as are neither turgid, nor enigmatic, nor base and ridiculous.

Such is the character of many metaphors already alleged, among others that of Shakspeare's, where tides are transferred to speedy and determined conduct.[k] Nor does his Wolsey with less propriety moralize upon his fall in the following beautiful metaphor, taken from vegetable nature.

> This is the state of man; to day he puts forth
> The tender leaves of hope; to-morrow blossoms,
> And bears his blushing honours thick upon him:
> The third day comes a frost, a killing frost,
> And—nips his root.

[i] The species of metaphors here condemned, are thus enumerated: *Εἰσὶ γὰρ καὶ μεταφοραὶ ἀπρεπεῖς, αἱ μὲν διὰ τὸ γελοῖον —αἱ δὲ διὰ τὸ σεμνὸν ἄγαν καὶ τραγικόν· ἀσαφεῖς δὲ, ἂν πόῤῥωθεν, κ. τ. λ.* "For metaphors are unbecoming, some from being ridiculous, and others from being too solemn and tragical: there are likewise the obscure, if they are fetched from too great a distance." Arist. Rhet. l. iii. c. 3. p. 124. edit. Sylb. See Cic. de Oratore, l. iii. p. 155, &c.

[k] Sup. p. 439. Philos. Arrangements, p. 340.

In such metaphors (besides their intrinsic elegance) we may say the reader is flattered; I mean flattered, by being left to discover something for himself.

There is one observation, which will at the same time shew both the extent of this figure, and how natural it is to all men.

There are metaphors so obvious, and of course so naturalized, that ceasing to be metaphors, they are become (as it were) the proper words. It is after this manner we say,—a sharp fellow; a great orator; the foot of a mountain; the eye of a needle; the bed of a river; to ruminate, to ponder, to edify, &c.

These we by no means reject, and yet the metaphors we require we wish to be something more; that is, to be formed under the respectable conditions here established.

We observe, too, that a singular use may be made of metaphors, either to exalt, or to depreciate, according to the sources from which we derive them. In ancient story, Orestes was by some called "the murderer of his mother;" by others, "the avenger of his father." The reasons will appear by referring to the fact. The poet Simonides was offered money to celebrate certain mules that had won a race. The sum being pitiful, he said, with disdain, he should not write upon demi-asses. A more competent sum was offered, he then began,

> Hail! Daughters of the generous horse,
> That skims, like wind, along the course.[1]

There are times, when, in order to exalt, we may call beggars, petitioners; and pick-pockets, collectors; other times, when, in order to depreciate, we may call petitioners, beggars; and collectors, pick-pockets. But enough of this.

We say no more of metaphors, but that it is a general caution with regard to every species, not to mix them, and that more particularly, if taken from subjects which are contrary.

Such was the case of that orator, who once asserted in his oration, that, "if cold water were thrown upon a certain measure, it would kindle a flame that would obscure the lustre," &c.

A word remains upon enigmas and puns. It shall indeed be short, because, though they resemble the metaphor, it is as brass and copper resemble gold.

A pun seldom regards meaning, being chiefly confined to sound.

Horace gives a sad sample of this spurious wit, where (as Dryden humorously translates it) he makes Persius the buffoon exhort the patriot Brutus to kill Mr. King, that is *Rupilius Rex*, because Brutus, when he slew Cæsar, had been accustomed to king-killing.

> Hunc regem occide; operum hoc mihi crede tuorum est. Sat. lib. i. vii.

[1] For these two facts, concerning Orestes and Simonides, see Arist. Rhet. l. iii. c. 2. p. 122. edit. Sylb. The different appellations of Orestes were, ὁ Μητροφόντης, and ὁ Πατρὸς ἀμύντωρ. Simonides called the mules ἡμιόνοι at first; and then began,

> Χαίρετ' ἀελλοπόδων θύγατρες ἵππων.

We have a worse attempt in Homer, where Ulysses makes Polypheme believe his name was *ΟΥΤΙΣ*; and where the dull Cyclops, after he had lost his eye, upon being asked by his brethren who had done him so much mischief, replies, it was done by *ΟΥΤΙΣ*; that is, by nobody.[m]

Enigmas are of a more complicated nature, being involved either in pun or metaphor, or sometimes in both.

> Ἄνδρ' εἶδον πυρὶ χαλκὸν ἐπ' ἀνέρι κολλήσαντα.
> "I saw a man, who, unprovok'd with ire,
> Stuck brass upon another's back by fire."[n]

This enigma is ingenious, and means the operation of cupping, performed in ancient days by a machine of brass.

In such fancies, contrary to the principles of good metaphor and good writing, a perplexity is caused, not by accident, but by design, and the pleasure lies in the being able to resolve it.

Aulus Gellius has preserved a Latin enigma, which he also calls a *sirpus* or *sirpos*, a strange thing, far below the Greek, and debased with all the quibble of a more barbarous age.

> Semel minusne, an bis minus, (non sat scio)
> An utrumque eorum (ut quondam audivi dicier)
> Jovi ipsi regi noluit concedere? Aul. Gell. xii. 6.

This, being sifted, leaves in English the following small quantity of meaning.

"Was it once minus, or twice minus, (I am not enough informed,) or was it not rather the two taken together, (as I have heard it said formerly,) that would not give way to Jove himself, the sovereign?"

The two taken together, (that is, "once minus and twice minus,") make, when so taken, thrice minus; and thrice minus in Latin is *ter minus*, which, taken as a single word, is *Terminus*, the god of boundaries.

Here the riddle, or conceit, appears. The Pagan legend says, that, when in honour of Jove the capitol was founded, the other gods consented to retire, but the god Terminus refused.

The story is elegantly related in the Fasti of Ovid, iii. 667.

> Quid nova cum fierent capitolia? nempe deorum
> Cuncta Jovi cessit turba, locumque dedit.
> Terminus (ut veteres memorant) conventus in æde
> Restitit, et magno cum Jove templa tenet.

The moral of the fable is just and ingenious; that boundaries are sacred, and never should be moved.

The poet himself subjoins the reason, with his usual address.

> Termine, post illud levitas tibi libera non est;
> Qua positus fueris in statione, mane.
> Nec tu vicino quicquam concede roganti,
> Ne videare hominem præposuisse Jovi.

And so much for the subject of puns and enigmas; to which,

[m] Homer, Odyss. i. 366—408, &c. [n] Arist. Rhetor. l. iii. c. 2. p. 121. edit. Sylb.

like other things of bad taste, no age or country can give a sanction.

Much still remains upon the subject of diction, but, as much has been said already,[o] we here conclude.

CHAPTER XI.

RANK OR PRECEDENCE OF THE CONSTITUTIVE PARTS OF THE DRAMA—REMARKS AND CAUTIONS BOTH FOR JUDGING AND COMPOSING.

THE four constitutive parts of dramatic poetry, which properly belong to the poet,[p] have appeared to be the fable, the manners, the sentiment, and the diction; and something has been suggested to explain the nature of each.

Should we be asked, to which we attribute the first place, we think it due to the fable.[q]

If the fable be an action, having a necessary reference to some end, it is evident that the manners and the sentiment are for the sake of that end; the end does not exist for the sake of the manners and the sentiment.[r]

Again, the finest unconnected samples either of manners or of sentiment, cannot of themselves make a drama without a fable. But, without either of these, any fable will make a drama, and have pretensions (such as they are) to be called a play.[s]

A third superiority is, that the most affecting and capital parts of every drama arise out of its fable; by these, I mean

[o] See chapters ii. iii. iv.

[p] Sup. p. 428.

[q] Ἀρχὴ μὲν οὖν, καὶ οἷον ψυχὴ ὁ μῦθος τῆς τραγῳδίας: "The fable therefore is the principle, and (as it were) the soul of tragedy." And not long before, after the constituent parts of the drama have been enumerated, we read, μέγιστον δὲ τούτων ἐστὶν ἡ τῶν πραγμάτων σύστασις: "but the greatest and the most important of all these is the combining of the incidents, that is to say, the fable." Arist. Poet. cap. 6. p. 231. edit. Sylb.

[r] Οὐκ οὖν ὅπως τὰ ἤθη μιμήσωνται, πράττουσιν, ἀλλὰ τὰ ἤθη συμπεριλαμβάνουσιν διὰ τὰς πράξεις: "The persons of the drama do not act, that they may exhibit manners, but they include manners, on account of the incidents in the fable." Arist. Poet. c. 6. p. 230. edit. Sylb.

[s] The Stagirite often illustrates his poetic ideas from painting, an art at that time cultivated by the ablest artists, Zeuxis, Polygnotus, and others. In the present case, he compares the dramatic manners to colouring; the dramatic fable to drawing; and ingeniously remarks, εἰ γάρ τις ἐναλείψειε τοῖς καλλίστοις φαρμάκοις χύδην, οὐκ ἂν ὁμοίως εὐφράνειεν, καὶ λευκογραφήσας εἰκόνα: "if any one were to make a confused daubing with the most beautiful colours, he would not give so much delight, as if he were to sketch a figure in chalk alone." Arist. Poet. c. 6. p. 231. edit. Sylb.

Ἔτι ἐάν τις ἐφεξῆς θῇ ῥήσεις ἠθικὰς, καὶ λέξεις, καὶ διανοίας, εὖ πεποιημένας, οὐ ποιήσει ὃ ἦν τῆς τραγῳδίας ἔργον, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μάλλον ἡ καταδεεστέροις τούτοις κεχρημένη τραγῳδία, ἔχουσα δὲ μῦθον καὶ σύστασιν πραγμάτων: "Were any one to arrange in order the best formed expressions relative to character, as well as the best diction and sentiments, he would not attain what is the business of a tragedy; but much more would that tragedy attain it, which, having these requisites in a very inferior degree, had at the same time a just fable, and combination of incidents." Arist. Poet. c. 6. p. 230. edit. Sylb.

every unexpected discovery of unknown personages, and every unexpected revolution[t] from one condition to another. The revolutions and discoveries in the Œdipus and the Fatal Curiosity have been mentioned already. We add to these, the striking revolution in the Samson Agonistes; where, while every thing appears tending to Samson's release, a horrible crash announces his destruction.[u]

These dramatic incidents are properly tragic; but there are others of similar character, not wanting even to comedy. To refer to a modern drama: what discovery more pleasing than that, where, in the Drummer of Addison, the worthy lost master is discovered in the supposed conjuror? or, to refer still to the same drama, what revolution more pleasing, than where, in consequence of this discovery, the house of disorder and mourning changes into a house of order and joy? Now these interesting incidents, as well comic as tragic, arise neither from manners, nor from sentiment, but purely from the fable.

It is also a plausible argument for the fable's superiority, that, from its superior difficulty, more poets have excelled in drawing manners and sentiment, than there have in the forming of perfect fables.[x]

But although we give a superiority to the fable, yet the other constitutive parts, even supposing the fable bad, have still an important value; so important, indeed, that through them, and them alone, many dramas have merited admiration.

And here, next to the fable, we arrange the manners. The manners, if well formed, give us samples of human nature, and seem in poetry as much to excel sentiment, as the drawing in painting to excel the colouring.

The third place, after the manners, belongs to the sentiment, and that before the diction, however they may be united: it being evident that men speak, because they think; they seldom think, because they speak.

After this, the fourth and last place falls to the diction.

Having settled the rank of these several constitutive parts, a few cursory remarks remain to be suggested.

One is this: that if all these parts are really essential, no drama can be absolutely complete which in any one of them is deficient.

Another remark is, that though a drama be not absolutely complete in every part, yet from the excellence of one or two

[t] "A revolution," *περιπέτεια;* "a discovery," *αναγνώρισις.* See before, what is said about these two, p. 429, 430.

[u] Sama. Agon. 481, and 1452 to 1507.

[x] *Οἱ ἐγχειροῦντες ποιεῖν, πρότερον δύνανται τῇ λέξει καὶ τοῖς ἤθεσιν ἀκριβοῦν, ἢ τὰ πράγματα συνίστασθαι, οἷον καὶ οἱ πρώτοι ποιῆται σχεδὸν ἅπαντες:* "Those who attempt to write dramatically, are first able to be accurate in the diction and the manners, before they are able to combine incidents, [and form a fable,] which was indeed the case of almost all the first poets." Arist. Poet. c. 6. p. 230. edit. Sylb.

parts it may still merit praise.[y] It is thus in painting, there are pictures admired for colouring, which fail in the drawing; and others for drawing, which fail in the colouring.

The next remark is, in fact, a caution; a caution not to mistake one constitutive part for another, and still, much more, not to mistake it for the whole. We are never to forget the essential differences between fable, manners, sentiment, and diction.

If, without attending to these, we presume to admire, we act, as if in painting we admired a Rembrandt for grace, because we had been told that he was capital in colouring.

This caution, indeed, applies not only to arts, but to philosophy. For here if men fancy, that a genius for science, by having excelled in a single part of it, is superlative in all parts; they insensibly make such a genius their idol, and their admiration soon degenerates into a species of idolatry.

Decipit exemplar, vitiis imitabile. Hor.

It is to be hoped that our studies are at present more liberal, and that we are rather adding to that structure which our forefathers have begun, than tamely leaving it to remain, as if nothing further were wanting.

Our drama, among other things, is surely capable of improvement. Events from our own history (and none can be more interesting) are at hand to furnish fables, having all the dramatic requisites. Indeed, should any of them be wanting, invention may provide a remedy, for here we know poets have unbounded privilege.[z]

In the mean time, the subjects, by being domestic, would be as interesting to us, as those of Ajax or Orestes were of old to the Greeks. Nor is it a doubt, that our drama, were it thus rationally cultivated, might be made the school of virtue even in a dissipated age.

And now, having shewn such a regard for dramatic poetry, and recommended so many different rules, as essential to its perfection; it may not, perhaps, be improper to say something in their defence, and, when that is finished, to conclude this part of our inquiries.

[y] This is a case expressly decided by that able critic, Horace, as to the manners and the sentiment.

Speciosa locis, morataque recte,
Fabula nullius veneris, sine pondere et arte,
Valdius oblectat populum, meliusque moratur,
Quam versus inopes rerum, nugæque canoræ. Art. Poet. 320.

Which may be thus paraphrased:

"A fable (or dramatic story) of no beauty, without dignity or contrivance, if it excel in sentiment, and have its characters well drawn, will please an audience much more than a trifling piece barren of incidents, and only to be admired for the harmony of its numbers." See p. 449.

[z] Infra, 449.

CHAPTER XII.

RULES DEFENDED—DO NOT CRAMP GENIUS, BUT GUIDE IT—FLATTERING DOCTRINE THAT GENIUS WILL SUFFICE—FALLACIOUS, AND WHY—FURTHER DEFENCE OF RULES—NO GENIUS EVER ACTED WITHOUT THEM; NOR EVER A TIME WHEN RULES DID NOT EXIST—CONNECTION BETWEEN RULES AND GENIUS—THEIR RECIPROCAL AID—END OF THE SECOND PART—PREPARATION FOR THE THIRD.

Having mentioned rules, and indeed our whole theory having been little more than rules developed, we cannot but remark upon a common opinion, which seems to have arisen either from prejudice or mistake.

Do not rules, say they, cramp genius? Do they not abridge it of certain privileges?

It is answered, if the obeying of rules were to induce a tyranny like this, to defend them would be absurd, and against the liberty of genius. But the truth is, rules, supposing them good, like good government, take away no privileges. They do no more than save genius from error, by shewing it, that a right to err is no privilege at all.

It is surely no privilege to violate, in grammar, the rules of syntax; in poetry, those of metre; in music, those of harmony; in logic, those of syllogism; in painting, those of perspective; in dramatic poetry, those of probable imitation.

If we enlarge on one of these instances, we shall illustrate the rest.

The probable imitation just now mentioned, like that of every other kind, is, when the imitation resembles the thing imitated in as many circumstances as possible; so that the more of those circumstances are combined, the more probable the resemblance.

It is thus in imitation by painting the resemblance is more complete, when to the outline we add light and shade; and more complete still, when to light and shade we add the colours.

The real place of every drama is a stage; that is, a space of a few fathoms deep, and a few fathoms broad. Its real time is the time it takes in acting, a limited duration, seldom exceeding a few hours.

Now imagination, by the help of scenes, can enlarge this stage into a dwelling, a palace, a city, &c.; and it is a decent regard to this which constitutes probable place.

Again, the usual intervals between the acts, and even the attention paid by the mind to an interesting story, can enlarge without violence a few hours into a day or two; and it is in a

decent regard to this, we may perceive the rise of probable time.[a]

Now it is evident that the above probabilities, if they belong to the fable, cannot but affect us, because they are both of them requisites which heighten the resemblance, and because resemblance is so universally an essential to imitation.

If this doctrine want confirming, we may prove it by the contrary; I mean, by a supposition of such time and such place as are both of them improbable.

For example, as to time, we may suppose a play, where lady Desmond, in the first act, shall dance at the court of Richard the Third, and be alive, in the last act, during the reign of James the First.[b]

As to place, we may suppose a tragedy, where Motesuma shall appear at Mexico, in the first act; shall be carried to Madrid, in the third; and be brought back again, in the fifth, to die at Mexico.

It is true, indeed, did such plays exist, and were their other dramatic requisites good, these improbabilities might be endured, and the plays be still admired. Fine manners and sentiment, we have already said,[c] may support a wretched fable, as a beautiful face may make us forget a bad figure. But no authority for that reason can justify absurdities, or make them not to be so, by being fortunately associated.

Nor is it enough to say, that by this apparent austerity many a good play would have been spoilt.[d] The answer is obvious: choose another and a fitter subject. Subjects are infinite. Consult the inexhaustible treasures of history; or, if these fail, the more inexhaustible fund of invention.[e] Nay, more; if you are distressed, bring history and invention together, and let the richness of the last embellish the poverty of the former. Poets, though bound by the laws of common sense, are not bound to the rigours of historical fact.

It must be confessed, it is a flattering doctrine to tell a young beginner, that he has nothing more to do, than to trust his own genius, and to contemn all rules as the tyranny of pedants.

[a] What this implies, we are told in the following passage: *Ὅτι μάλιστα πειρᾶται. ὅπο μίαν περιόδον ἡλίου εἶναι, ἢ μικρὸν ἐξαλλάττειν:* "Tragedy aims, as far as possible, to come within a single revolution of the sun, (that is, a natural day,) or but a little to exceed." Arist. Poet. c. 5. p. 229. edit. Sylb.

[b] Aristotle, speaking upon the indefinite duration of the epopee, which is sometimes extended to years, adds, *Καίτοι τὸ πρῶτον ὁμοίως ἐν ταῖς τραγῳδίαις τοῦτο ἐποίουν:* "at first they did the same in tragedies;" that is, their duration, like that of the epopee, was alike undefined, till a better taste made them more correct. Aristot. Poet. c. 5. p. 229. edit. Sylb.

[c] See p. 447, in the note.

[d] Aristotle, speaking about introducing any thing irrational into the drama, adds, *Ὥστε τὸ λέγειν, ὅτι ἀνῃρητο ἂν ὁ Μῦθος, γελοῖον· ἐξ ἀρχῆς γὰρ οὐ δεῖ συνίστασθαι τοιούτους:* "That to say (by this restriction) the fable would have been destroyed, is ridiculous; for they ought not, from the very beginning, to form fables upon such a plan." Arist. Poet. c. 24. p. 253. edit. Sylb.

[e] Sup. p. 447.

The painful toils of accuracy by this expedient are eluded, for geniuses (like Milton's harps[f]) are supposed to be ever tuned.

But the misfortune is, that genius is something rare, nor can he, who possesses it, even then, by neglecting rules, produce what is accurate. Those, on the contrary, who, though they want genius, think rules worthy their attention, if they cannot become good authors, may still make tolerable critics; may be able to shew the difference between the creeping and the simple; the pert and the pleasing; the turgid and the sublime; in short, to sharpen, like the whetstone, that genius in others, which nature in her frugality has not given to themselves.

Indeed, I have never known, during a life of many years, and some small attention paid to letters and literary men, that genius in any art had been ever cramped by rules. On the contrary, I have seen great geniuses miserably err by transgressing them, and, like vigorous travellers who lose their way, only wander the wider on account of their own strength.

And yet it is somewhat singular in literary compositions, and perhaps more so in poetry than elsewhere, that many things have been done in the best and purest taste, long before rules were established, and systematized in form. This we are certain was true with respect to Homer, Sophocles, Euripides, and other Greeks. In modern times it appears as true of our admired Shakspeare; for who can believe that Shakspeare studied rules, or was ever versed in critical systems?

A specious objection then occurs. "If these great writers were so excellent before rules were established, or, at least, were known to them, what had they to direct their genius, when rules (to them at least) did not exist?"

To this question it is hoped the answer will not be deemed too hardy, should we assert, that there never was a time when rules did not exist; that they always made a part of that immutable truth, the natural object of every penetrating genius; and that, if at that early Greek period, systems of rules were not established, those great and sublime authors were a rule to themselves. They may be said indeed to have excelled, not by art, but by nature; yet by a nature which gave birth to the perfection of art.

The case is nearly the same with respect to our Shakspeare. There is hardly any thing we applaud, among his innumerable beauties, which will not be found strictly conformable to the rules of sound and ancient criticism.

That this is true with respect to his characters and his sentiment, is evident hence, that, in explaining these rules, we have so often recurred to him for illustrations.[g]

[f] Par. Lost, iii. 365, 366.

[g] See before, of these Inquiries, p. 403. 415. 418. 430. 433, 434. 439. 442.

Besides quotations already alleged, we subjoin the following as to character.

When Falstaff and his suite are so ignominiously routed, and the scuffle is by Falstaff so humourously exaggerated; what can be more natural than such a narrative to such a character, distinguished for his humour, and withal for his want of veracity and courage?[h]

The sagacity of common poets might not perhaps have suggested so good a narrative, but it certainly would have suggested something of the kind, and it is in this view the essence of dramatic character, which is, when we conjecture what any one will do or say, from what he has done or said already.[i]

If we pass from characters (that is to say, manners) to sentiment, we have already given instances,[k] and yet we shall still give another.

When Rosencrantz and Guilderstern wait upon Hamlet, he offers them a recorder, or pipe, and desires them to play; they reply, they cannot:—he repeats his request; they answer, they have never learned:—he assures them nothing was so easy; they still decline. It is then he tells them, with disdain, "There is much music in this little organ, and yet you cannot make it speak; Do you think I am easier to be played on than a pipe?[l]

This I call an elegant sample of sentiment, taken under its comprehensive sense.[m] But we stop not here; we consider it as a complete instance of Socratic reasoning, though it is probable the author knew nothing, how Socrates used to argue.

To explain: Xenophon makes Socrates reason as follows with an ambitious youth, by name Euthydemus.

"It is strange, (says he,) that those who desire to play upon the harp, or upon the flute, or to ride the managed horse, should not think themselves worth notice, without having practised under the best masters: while there are those who aspire to the governing of a state, and can think themselves completely qualified, though it be without preparation or labour."[n]

Aristotle's illustration is similar in his reasoning against men chosen by lot for magistrates. "It is (says he) as if wrestlers were to be appointed by lot, and not those that are able to wrestle: or, as if from among sailors we were to choose a pilot by lot, and that the man so elected were to navigate, and not the man who knew the business."[o]

Nothing can be more ingenious than this mode of reasoning. The premises are obvious and undeniable; the conclusion cogent, and yet unexpected. It is a species of that argumentation, called in dialectic ἐπαγωγή, or "induction."

[h] See Hen. IV. part ii.
[i] See before, p. 434.
[k] See before, p. 436.
[l] Hamlet, act iii.
[m] See before, p. 436, 437.
[n] Xenoph. Mem. iv. c. 2. s. 6.
[o] Arist. Rhetor. l. ii. c. 20. p. 94. edit. Sylb.

Aristotle, in his Rhetoric, (as above quoted,) calls such reasonings τὰ Σωκρατικά, "the Socratics;" in the beginning of his Poetics he calls them the Σωκρατικοὶ λόγοι, the "Socratic discourses;" and Horace, in his Art of Poetry, calls them the "Socraticæ chartæ."[p]

If truth be always the same, no wonder geniuses should coincide, and that, too, in philosophy as well as in criticism.

We venture to add, returning to rules, that if there be any things in Shakspeare objectionable, (and who is hardy enough to deny it?) the very objections, as well as the beauties, are to be tried by the same rules; as the same plummet alike shews, both what is out of the perpendicular, and in it; the same ruler alike proves, both what is crooked and what is straight.

We cannot admit that geniuses, though prior to systems, were prior also to rules, because rules from the beginning existed in their own minds, and were a part of that immutable truth, which is eternal and every where.[q] Aristotle, we know, did not form Homer, Sophocles, and Euripides; it was Homer, Sophocles, and Euripides, that formed Aristotle.

And this, surely, should teach us to pay attention to rules, inasmuch as they and genius are so reciprocally connected, that it is genius which discovers rules, and then rules which govern genius.

It is by this amicable concurrence, and by this alone, that every work of art justly merits admiration, and is rendered as highly perfect, as by human power it can be made.[r]

But we have now (if such language may be allowed) travelled over a vast and mighty plain; or, (as Virgil better expresses it,)

Immensum spatio confecimus æquor.

It is not however improbable, that some intrepid spirit may demand again,[s] What avail these subtleties? Without so much trouble, I can be full enough pleased. I know what I like. We answer, And so does the carrion-crow, that feeds upon a carcase. The difficulty lies not in knowing what we like; but in knowing how to like, and what is worth liking. Until these

[p] See a most admirable instance of this induction, quoted by Cicero from the Socratic Æschines. Cic. de Invent. lib. i. a. 51.

[q] The author thinks it superfluous to panegyrize truth; yet in favour of sound and rational rules, (which must be founded in truth, or they are good for nothing,) he ventures to quote the Stagirite himself: Ἀληθῆ ἀληθεῖ οὐκ ἐνδέχεται ἐναντίαν εἶναι οὔτε δόξαν, οὔτ' ἀντίφασιν: "It is not possible for a true opinion, or a true contradictory proposition, to be contrary to another true one." Aristot. de Interpret. c. 19. p. 78. edit. Sylb.

This may be thus illustrated: If it be true, that the time and place of every drama should be circumscribed, the contrary cannot be true, that its time and place need not to be circumscribed. See p. 423.

[r] This is fairly stated and decided by Horace:

Natura fieret laudabile carmen, an arte,
Quæsitum est. Ego nec studium sine divite vena,
Nec rude quid prosit video ingenium; alterius sic
Altera poscit opem res, et conjurat amice.
Art. Poet. v. 408, &c.

[s] See p. 418.

ends are obtained, we may admire Durfey before Milton; a smoking boor of Hemskirk, before an apostle of Raphael.

Now as to the knowing how to like, and then what is worth liking; the first of these, being the object of critical disquisition, has been attempted to be shewn through the course of these inquiries.

As to the second, what is worth our liking, this is best known by studying the best authors, beginning from the Greeks, then passing to the Latins; nor on any account excluding those who have excelled among the moderns.

And here, if, while we peruse some author of high rank, we perceive we do not instantly relish him, let us not be disheartened; let us even feign a relish, till we find a relish come. A morsel perhaps pleases us; let us cherish it: another morsel strikes us; let us cherish this also. Let us thus proceed, and steadily persevere, till we find we can relish, not morsels, but wholes; and feel, that what began in fiction, terminates in reality. The film being in this manner removed, we shall discover beauties which we never imagined; and contemn for puerilities, what we once foolishly admired.

One thing, however, in this process is indispensably required: we are on no account to expect that fine things should descend to us; our taste, if possible, must be made ascend to them.

This is the labour, this the work; there is pleasure in the success, and praise even in the attempt.

This speculation applies not to literature only: it applies to music, to painting, and, as they are all congenial, to all the liberal arts. We should in each of them endeavour to investigate what is best, and there, (if I may so express myself,) *there* to fix our abode.

By only seeking and perusing what is truly excellent, and by contemplating always this, and this alone, the mind insensibly becomes accustomed to it, and finds that in this alone it can acquiesce with content. It happens, indeed, here, as in a subject far more important, I mean in a moral and a virtuous conduct. If we choose the best life, use will make it pleasant.[t]

And thus having gone through the sketch we promised, (for our concise manner cannot be called any thing more,) we here finish the second part of these Inquiries, and, according to our original plan, proceed to the third part, the taste and literature of the middle age.

[t] Ἕλοῦ βίον ἄριστον, ἡδὺν δὲ αὐτὸν ἡ συνήθεια ποιήσει. Plut. Mor. p. 602. ed. Wolfii.

PART III.

CHAPTER I.

DESIGN OF THE WHOLE—LIMITS AND EXTENT OF THE MIDDLE AGE—THREE CLASSES OF MEN, DURING THAT INTERVAL, CONSPICUOUS: THE BYZANTINE GREEKS; THE SARACENS, OR ARABIANS; AND THE LATINS, OR FRANKS, INHABITANTS OF WESTERN EUROPE—EACH CLASS IN THE FOLLOWING CHAPTERS CONSIDERED APART.

When the magnitude of the Roman empire grew enormous, and there were two imperial cities, Rome and Constantinople, then that happened which was natural; out of one empire it became two, distinguished by the different names of the Western and the Eastern.

The Western empire soon sunk. So early as in the fifth century,[a] Rome, once the mistress of nations, beheld herself at the feet of a Gothic sovereign. The Eastern empire lasted many centuries longer; and though often impaired by external enemies, and weakened as often by internal factions, yet still it retained traces of its ancient splendour, resembling, in the language of Virgil, some fair, but faded flower:

Cui neque fulgor adhuc, necdum sua forma recessit.

At length, after various plunges and various escapes, it was totally annihilated in the fifteenth century, by the victorious arms of Mahomet the Great.[b]

The interval between the fall of these two empires, (the Western or Latin in the fifth century, the Eastern or Grecian in the fifteenth,) making a space of near a thousand years, constitutes what we call the middle age.

Dominion passed, during this interval, into the hands of rude,

[a] About the year of Christ 475, Augustulus was compelled to abdicate the Western empire by Odoacer, king of the Heruli. As Augustulus was the last Roman who possessed the imperial dignity at Rome, and as the dominion both of Rome and Italy soon after passed into the hands of Theodoric the Goth, it has been justly said, that then terminated the Roman empire in the West.

During these wretched times, Rome had been sacked not long before by Alaric, as it was a second time (about the middle of the sixth century) by Totila; after which events the Roman name and authority were so far sunk, that early in the seventh century they ceased to speak Latin, even in Rome itself. See Blair's Chronology.

[b] See the various histories of the Turkish empire. The unfortunate Greeks, at this period, when, to resist such an enemy as the Turks, they should have been firmly combined, were never so miserably distracted. An union with the church of Rome was at the time projected. The Greeks who favoured it imputed their calamities to their not-uniting; those who opposed it, to their uniting. Between the two factions all was lost, and Constantinople taken in the year 1453.

illiterate men; men who conquered more by multitude than by military skill; and who, having little or no taste either for sciences or arts, naturally despised those things from which they reaped no advantage.

This was the age of monkery and legends; of Leonine verses,[c] (that is, of bad Latin put into rhyme;) of projects to decide truth by ploughshares and batoons;[d] of crusades to conquer infidels and extirpate heretics; of princes deposed, not as Crœsus was by Cyrus, but by one who had no armies, and who did not even wear a sword.[e]

[c] See below, chap. xi.

[d] This alludes to the two methods of trial, much practised in those dark times, the trial by ordeal, and that by duel.

Heated ploughshares were often employed in trials by ordeal; and it is remarkable, that express mention is made of this absurd method of purgation by fire, even in the Antigone of Sophocles. The messenger there says, in order to justify himself and his companions,

Ἡμεν δ' ἕτοιμοι καὶ μύδρους αἴρειν χεροῖν,
Καὶ πῦρ διέρπειν, καὶ θεοὺς ὁρκωμοτεῖν,
Τὸ μήτε δρᾶσαι, μήτε, κ.τ.λ.

Antig. v. 270.

Ready we were with both our hands to lift
The glowing mass; or slowly cross the fire,
And by the gods to swear, we neither did
The deed, nor knew, &c.

This carries up the practice to the time of Eteocles and Polynices, before the Trojan war.

Perhaps the poet, by the incidental mention of so strange a custom, intended to characterize the manners of a ruder age; an age widely different from his own, which was an age of science and philosophical disquisition.

As to trials by battle, they were either before the earl marshal, or the judges of Westminster-hall. If before the earl marshal, they were upon accusations of treason, or other capital crimes, and the parties were usually of high and noble rank. If before the judges of Westminster-hall, the cause was often of inferior sort, as well as the parties litigating.

Hence the combats differed in their ends. That before the earl marshal was victory, often attended with slaughter; that before the judges was victory alone, with no such consequence.

The weapons, too, differed, as well as the ends. The weapons before the earl marshal were a long sword, a short sword, and a dagger; that before the judges was a batoon, above mentioned, called in barbarous Latin *drumcus*, but in words more intelligible *fustis teres*.

So late as the reign of queen Elizabeth, an instance occurs of this trial being insisted upon. But that wise princess, though she permitted the previous forms, I mean that of the lists being enclosed, of the judges taking their seats there, of the champions making their appearance, &c. (forms which perhaps could not legally be prevented,) had too much sense to permit so foolish a decision. She compelled the parties to a compromise, by the plaintiff's taking an equivalent in money for his claim, and making in consequence a voluntary default.

Wyvil, bishop of Salisbury, in the reign of Edward the Third, recurred to trial by battle in a dispute with the earl of Salisbury, and ordered public prayers through his diocese for the success of his champion, till the matter, by the king's authority, was compromised.

But notwithstanding this bishop's conduct, it was a practice which the church disapproved, and wisely, as well as humanely, endeavoured to prevent. Truculentum morem in omni ævo acriter insectarunt theologi, præ aliis Agobardus, et plurimo canone ipsa ecclessia. See Spelman, under the words *Campus*, *Campsius*, and *Campio*.

I must not omit that there is a complete history of such a duel, recorded by Walsingham, in the reign of Richard the Second, between Aneslee a knight, and Karryngton an esquire. Karryngton was accused by the other of treason, for selling a castle to the French, and, being defeated in the combat, died the next day raving mad. Walsingham's narrative is curious and exact, but their weapons differed from those above mentioned, for they first fought with lances, then with swords, and lastly with daggers. Walsing. Histor. p. 237.

[e] Such was pope Innocent the Third, who, besides his crusades to extirpate heretics by armies not his own, excommunicated Philip king of France, Alphonso king of Leon, Raimond earl of Toulouse, and John king of England.

Nor is this wonderful, when we view in his own language the opinion he had of his own station and authority.

Different portions of this age have been distinguished by different descriptions; such as *Sæculum Monotheleticum*, *Sæculum Eiconoclasticum*, *Sæculum Obscurum*, *Sæculum Ferreum*, *Sæculum Hildibrandinum*, &c.; strange names, it must be confessed, some more obvious, others less so, yet none tending to furnish us with any high or promising ideas.[f]

And yet we must acknowledge, for the honour of humanity, and of its great and divine Author, who never forsakes it, that some sparks of intellect were at all times visible, through the whole of this dark and dreary period. It is here we must look for the taste and literature of the times.

The few who were enlightened, when arts and sciences were thus obscured, may be said to have happily maintained the continuity of knowledge; to have been (if I may use the expression) like the twilight of a summer's night; that auspicious gleam between the setting and the rising sun, which, though it cannot retain the lustre of the day, helps at least to save us from the totality of darkness.

A cursory disquisition, illustrated by a few select instances, will constitute the subject of the present essay; and these instances we shall bring from among three classes of men, who had each a large share in the transactions of those times: from the Byzantine Greeks, from the Arabians or Saracens, and from the inhabitants of Western Europe, at that time called the Latins. We shall give precedence, as we think they merit it, to the Greeks of Constantinople, although it is not always easy to preserve an exact chronology, because in each of these three classes many eminent men were contemporary.

CHAPTER II.

CONCERNING THE FIRST CLASS, THE BYZANTINE GREEKS—SIMPLICIUS—AMMONIUS—PHILOPONUS—FATE OF THE FINE LIBRARY AT ALEXANDRIA.

Simplicius and Ammonius were Greek authors, who flourished at Athens, during the sixth century; for Athens, long after her trophies at Marathon, long after her political sovereignty was no more, still maintained her empire in philosophy and the fine arts.[g]

"I am placed (says he) in the middle, between God and man; on this side God, but beyond man; nay, I am greater than man, as I can judge of all men, but can be judged by no one. Sum enim inter Deum et hominem medius constitutus, citra Deum sed ultra hominem; imo major homine, qui de omnibus judicem, a nemine vero judicari possim." Innocen. III. serm. 2. in Historia Transubstantionis Joannis Cosin. Episcop. Dunelm. Lond. 1675. See also the church histories of this period.

[f] Those who would be further informed concerning these Sæcula, may, among other authors, consult two very learned ones, Cave, in his Historia Literaria, and Mosheim, in his Ecclesiastical History.

[g] See below, chap. iii.

Philosophy, indeed, when these authors wrote, was sinking apace. The Stoic system, and even the Stoic writings were the greater part of them lost.[h] Other sects had shared the same fate. None subsisted but the Platonic and the Peripatetic; which, being both derived from a common source, (that is to say, the Pythagorean,) were at this period blended, and commonly cultivated by the same persons.

Simplicius and Ammonius, being bred in this school, and well initiated in its principles, found no reason, from their education, to make systems for themselves; a practice referable sometimes to real genius, but more often to not knowing what others have invented before.

Conscious therefore they could not excel their great predecessors, they thought, like many others, that the commenting of their works was doing mankind the most essential service.

It was this which gave rise, long before their time, to that tribe of commentators, who, in the person of Andronicus the Rhodian, began under Augustus, and who continued, for ages after, in an orderly succession.

Simplicius wrote a variety of comments upon different parts of Aristotle, but his comment upon the Physics is peculiarly valuable, as it is filled with quotations from Anaxagoras, Democritus, Parmenides, and other philosophers, who flourished so early as before the time of Aristotle, and whose fragments many of them are not to be found elsewhere.

As this compilation must have been the result of extensive reading, we may justly distinguish him by the title of a learned commentator.[i]

Ammonius wrote comments on the first and second tracts of Aristotle's Logic, as likewise upon the Introductory Discourse of the philosopher Porphyry. His manner of writing is orderly; his style clear and copious; copious in its better sense, by leaving nothing unexplained, not copious by perplexing us with tiresome tautology.

To those who wish for a taste of this literature, I know no author who better merits perusal. The preface to his Comment on Porphyry is a curious account of philosophy under its many and different definitions, every one of which he explains with perspicuity and precision. The preface to his Comment on the Predicaments gives us an ingenious plan of critical scrutiny; in other words, furnishes us with a suite of leading queries, by which, before we read a book, we may learn what it is, and judge, when analyzed, if it be a legitimate composition.[k]

When things change by uninterrupted continuity, as (to use an idea already suggested) the splendour of the day to the dark-

[h] See Philosoph. Arrangements, p. 323.

[i] For a fuller and more accurate account of Simplicius, see Fabricii Biblioth. Græc. vol. viii. p. 620, &c.

[k] See Fabr. Biblioth. Græc. vol. iv. p. 161.

ness of the night, it is hard to decide, precisely, where the one concludes and the other commences. By parity of reasoning it is difficult to determine, to what age we shall adjudge the two philosophers just mentioned; whether to the commencement of a baser age, or rather (if we regard their merit) to the conclusion of a purer. If we arrange them with the conclusion, it is, as Brutus and Cassius were called the last of the Romans.[l]

We can have less doubt about the disciple of Ammonius, John the Grammarian, called Philoponus from his love of labour. It was his misfortune to live during the time of Mahomet, and to see Alexandria taken by the arms of one of his immediate successors. What passed there on this occasion with regard to the library, though recorded in modern books, is too curious to be omitted here. I translate it from the accurate version of Abulpharagius's History, made by that able orientalist, Pococke.

"When Alexandria was taken by the Mahometans, Amrus, their commander, found there Philoponus, whose conversation highly pleased him, as Amrus was a lover of letters, and Philoponus a learned man. On a certain day, Philoponus said to him, 'You have visited all the repositories or public warehouses in Alexandria, and you have sealed up things of every sort, that are found there. As to those things that may be useful to you, I presume to say nothing; but as to things of no service to you, some of them perhaps may be more suitable to me.' Amrus said to him, 'And what is it you want?' 'The philosophical books (replied he) preserved in the royal libraries.' 'This,' says Amrus, 'is a request upon which I cannot decide. You desire a thing where I can issue no orders, till I have leave from Omar, the commander of the faithful.' Letters were accordingly written to Omar, informing him of what Philoponus had said, and an answer was returned by Omar to the following purport. 'As to the books of which you have made mention, if there be contained in them what accords with the book of God, (meaning the Alcoran,) there is without them, in the book of God, all that is sufficient. But if there be any thing in them repugnant to that book, we in no respect want them. Order them, therefore, to be all destroyed.' Amrus, upon this, ordered them to be dispersed through the baths of Alexandria, and to be there burned in making the baths warm. After this manner, in the space of six months, they were all consumed."

The historian, having related the story, adds, from his own feelings, "Hear what was done, and wonder."[m]

[l] See Tacit. Annal. iv. 34.

[m] Vid. Abulpharagii Dynastiar. p. 114. Oxon. 1663.

The reader will here observe, that in the many quotations which we shall hereafter make from Abulpharagius, we shall always quote from the same edition; that is, from the Latin version of the learned Pococke, subjoined to the original Arabic.

Thus ended this noble library; and thus began, if it did not begin sooner, the age of barbarity and ignorance.

CHAPTER III.

DIGRESSION TO A SHORT HISTORICAL ACCOUNT OF ATHENS, FROM THE TIME OF HER PERSIAN TRIUMPHS, TO THAT OF HER BECOMING SUBJECT TO THE TURKS. SKETCH, DURING THIS LONG INTERVAL, OF HER POLITICAL AND LITERARY STATE; OF HER PHILOSOPHERS; OF HER GYMNASIA; OF HER GOOD AND BAD FORTUNE, &c. &c. MANNERS OF THE PRESENT INHABITANTS. OLIVES AND HONEY.

HAVING mentioned Athens, I hope that celebrated city will justify a digression, and the more so, as that digression will terminate in events which belong to the very age of which we are now writing. But it is expedient to deduce matters from a much earlier period.

When the Athenians had delivered themselves from the tyranny of Pisistratus, and after this had defeated the vast efforts of the Persians, and that against two successive invaders, Darius and Xerxes, they may be considered as at the summit of their national glory. For more than half a century afterwards they maintained, without control, the sovereignty of Greece.[n]

As their taste was naturally good, arts of every kind soon rose among them, and flourished. Valour had given them reputation; reputation gave them an ascendant; and that ascendant produced a security, which left their minds at ease, and gave them leisure to cultivate every thing liberal or elegant.[o]

It was then that Pericles adorned the city with temples, theatres, and other beautiful and public buildings. Phidias, the great sculptor, was employed as his architect, who, when he had erected edifices, adorned them himself, and added statues and basso-relievos, the admiration of every beholder.[p] It was then that Polygnotus and Myro painted; that Sophocles and Euripides wrote; and, not long after, that they saw the divine Socrates.

[n] For these historical facts, consult the ancient and modern authors of Grecian history.

[o] It was in a similar period of triumph, after a formidable adversary had been crushed, that the Romans began to cultivate a more refined and polished literature.

..... *Post Punica bella quietus, quærere cœpit,*
Quid Sophocles, et Thespis, et Æschylus utile ferrent. Hor. Ep. ii. l. ii. 162.

See the note from a Greek manuscript in the Treatise on Music, Painting, &c. p. 25, where the progress of arts and sciences, from their dawn to their meridian, is elegantly and philosophically exhibited.

[p] See Plutarch's Life of Pericles, p. 350, 351, 352, 353, 354, in the quarto Greek edition of Bryan, vol. i. and Stuart's Antiquities of Athens.

Human affairs are by nature prone to change; and states, as well as individuals, are born to decay. Jealousy and ambition insensibly fomented wars, and success in these wars, as in others, was often various. The military strength of the Athenians was first impaired by the Lacedæmonians; after that, it was again humiliated, under Epaminondas, by the Thebans; and last of all it was wholly crushed by the Macedonian, Philip.[q]

But though their political sovereignty was lost, yet, happily for mankind, their love of literature and arts did not sink along with it.

Just at the close of their golden days of empire flourished Xenophon and Plato, the disciples of Socrates; and from Plato descended that race of philosophers called the Old Academy.[r]

Aristotle, who was Plato's disciple, may be said, not to have invented a new philosophy, but rather to have tempered the sublime and rapturous mysteries of his master with method, order, and a stricter mode of reasoning.[s]

Zeno, who was himself also educated in the principles of Platonism, only differed from Plato in the comparative estimate of things, allowing nothing to be intrinsically good but virtue, nothing intrinsically bad but vice, and considering all other things to be in themselves indifferent.[t]

He, too, and Aristotle, accurately cultivated logic, but in different ways; for Aristotle chiefly dwelt upon the simple syllogism; Zeno upon that which is derived out of it, the compound or hypothetic. Both, too, as well as other philosophers, cultivated rhetoric along with logic; holding a knowledge in both to be requisite for those who think of addressing mankind with all the efficacy of persuasion. Zeno elegantly illustrated the force of these two powers by a simile taken from the hand: the close power of logic he compared to the fist, or hand compressed; the diffuse power of rhetoric to the palm, or hand open.[u]

I shall mention but two sects more, the New Academy, and the Epicurean.

[q] See, as before, the several histories of Greece.

[r] See Cic. de Fin. l. v. and Academ. l. i. s. 5. p. 21. edit. Davisii.

[s] See Hermes, p. 240.

[t] See Cicer. de Fin. l. iii. s. 7, 8. 16. The beginning of the Enchiridion of Epictetus, Τῶν ὄντων τὰ μὲν ἐφ' ἡμῖν, κ. τ. λ. Diogen. Laert. in vita Zenon. l. vii. s. 102.

[u] Zeno quidem ille, a quo disciplina Stoicorum est, manu demonstrare solebat, quid inter has artes [dialecticam scil. et eloquentiam] interesset. Nam, cum compresserat digitos, pugnumque fecerat, dialecticam aiebat ejusmodi esse: cum autem diduxerat, et manum dilataverat, palmæ illius similem eloquentiam esse dicebat. Cicer. Orator. s. 113.

Both Peripatetics and Stoics wrote tracts of rhetoric as well as logic. The Rhetoric of Aristotle is perhaps one of the most valuable remains of antiquity, and deservedly worth studying, be it for speculation or practice.

As for the rhetoric of the Stoics, there is extant, among the Latin rhetoricians, published in a thin quarto, by Plantin, at Paris, an. 1599, a tract by Sulpitius Victor, called Institutiones Oratoriæ, wherein he has this expression at the beginning: Zenonis præcepta maxime persecutus. See p. 187; also p. 288, 193, of the said treatise.

The New Academy, so called from the Old Academy, (the name given to the school of Plato,) was founded by Arcesilas, and ably maintained by Carneades. From a mistaken imitation of the great parent of philosophy, Socrates, (particularly as he appears in the Dialogues of Plato,) because Socrates doubted some things, therefore Arcesilas and Carneades doubted all.[x]

Epicurus drew from another source; Democritus had taught him atoms and a void: by the fortuitous concourse of atoms, he fancied he could form a world; while by a feigned veneration he complimented away his gods, and totally denied their providential care, lest the trouble of it should impair their uninterrupted state of bliss. Virtue he recommended, though not for the sake of virtue, but pleasure; pleasure, according to him, being our chief and sovereign good. It must be confessed, however, that, though his principles were erroneous, and even bad, never was a man more temperate and humane; never was a man more beloved by his friends, or more cordially attached to them in affectionate esteem.[y]

We have already mentioned the alliance between philosophy and rhetoric. This cannot be thought wonderful, if rhetoric be the art by which men are persuaded, and if men cannot be persuaded without a knowledge of human nature: for what, but philosophy, can procure us this knowledge?

It was for this reason the ablest Greek philosophers not only taught, (as we hinted before,) but wrote also treatises upon rhetoric. They had a further inducement, and that was the intrinsic beauty of their language, as it was then spoken among the learned and polite. They would have been ashamed to have delivered philosophy, as it has been too often delivered since, in compositions as clumsy as the common dialect of the mere vulgar.

The same love of elegance which made them attend to their style, made them attend even to the places where their philosophy was taught.

Plato delivered his lectures in a place shaded with groves, on the banks of the river Ilissus; and which, as it once belonged to a person called Academus, was called, after his name, the Academy.[z] Aristotle chose another spot of a similar character, where there were trees and shade; a spot called the Lycæum.[a] Zeno taught in a portico or colonnade, distinguished from other buildings of that sort (of which the Athenians had many) by the name of the Variegated Portico, the walls being decorated with various paintings of Polygnotus and Myro, two capital

[x] Vid. Cic. Academ. l. i. s. 13. p. 48. edit. Dav. Itaque Arcesilas negabat esse quicquam, &c.

[y] See Diogen. Laert. l. x. s. 9, &c. where an ample detail is given of Epicurus, his friends, his last will, and his death; all tending to establish his amiable character, however erroneous and blameable his doctrines.

[z] Vid. Diog. Laert. lib. iii. s. 7. Potter's Arch. Græc. vol. i. p. 40.

[a] See Potter's Arch. Græc. vol. i. p. 40.

They made their peace however with Augustus, and having met afterwards with different treatment under different emperors, sometimes favourable, sometimes harsh, and never more severe than under Vespasian, their oppressions were at length relieved by the virtuous Nerva and Trajan.[k]

Mankind during the interval, which began from Nerva, and which extended to the death of that best of emperors Marcus Antoninus, felt a respite from those evils which they had so severely felt before, and which they felt so severely revived under Commodus, and his wretched successors.

Athens, during the above golden period, enjoyed more than all others the general felicity, for she found in Adrian so generous a benefactor, that her citizens could hardly help esteeming him a second founder. He restored their old privileges; gave them new; repaired their ancient buildings, and added others of his own. Marcus Antoninus, although he did not do so much, still continued to shew them his benevolent attention.[l]

If from this period we turn our eyes back, we shall find, for centuries before, that Athens was the place of education, not only for Greeks, but for Romans. It was hither that Horace was sent by his father; it was here that Cicero put his son Marcus under Cratippus, one of the ablest philosophers then belonging to that city.[m]

The sects of philosophers, which we have already described, were still existing, when St. Paul came thither. We cannot enough admire the superior eloquence of that apostle, in his manner of addressing so intelligent an audience. We cannot enough admire the sublimity of his exordium; the propriety of his mentioning an altar, which he had found there; and his quotation from Aratus, one of their well-known poets.[n]

Nor was Athens only celebrated for the residence of philosophers, and the institution of youth: men of rank and fortune found pleasure in a retreat which contributed so much to their liberal enjoyment.

The friend and correspondent of Cicero, T. Pomponius, from his long attachment to this city and country had attained such a perfection in its arts and language, that he acquired to himself the additional name of Atticus. This great man may be said to have lived during times of the worst and cruelest factions. His youth was spent under Sylla and Marius; the middle of his life during all the sanguinary scenes that followed; and, when he was old, he saw the proscriptions of Antony and Octavius. Yet though Cicero and a multitude more of the best men perished,

[k] See the same tract, in the same volume of Gronovius's collection, p. 1746, 1747.

[l] See the same author, in the same volume, p. 1748, 1749.

[m] See Horat. Epist. ii. l. ii. 43, and the beginning of Cicero's Offices, addressed to his son—Quamquam, Marce Fili, &c.

[n] Acts xvii. 22, &c.

he had the good fortune to survive every danger. Nor did he seek a safety for himself alone; his virtue so recommended him to the leaders of every side, that he was able to save not himself alone, but the lives and fortunes of many of his friends.[o]

When we look to this amiable character, we may well suppose, that it was not merely for amusement that he chose to live at Athens; but rather that, by residing there, he might so far realize philosophy, as to employ it for the conduct of life, and not merely for ostentation.

Another person, during a better period, (that I mean between Nerva and Marcus Antoninus,) was equally celebrated for his affection to this city. By this person I mean Herodes Atticus, who acquired the last name from the same reasons for which it had formerly been given to Pomponius.[p]

We have remarked already, that vicissitudes befall both men and cities, and changes too often happen from prosperous to adverse. Such was the state of Athens under the successors of Alexander, and so on from Sylla down to the time of Augustus. It shared the same hard fate with the Roman empire in general upon the accession of Commodus.

At length, after a certain period, the Barbarians of the north began to pour into the south. Rome was taken by Alaric, and Athens was besieged by the same. Yet here we are informed (at least we learn so from history) that it was miraculously saved by Minerva and Achilles. The goddess, it seems, and the hero both of them appeared, compelling the invader to raise the siege.[q]

It was thus, we are told, that, many years before, Castor and Pollux had fought for the Romans;[r] and that, many centuries afterwards, St. George, at Iconium, discomfited the Saracens;[s] nay, so late as in the sixteenth century, a gallant Spaniard, Peter de Paz, was seen to assist his countrymen, some months after his decease, when they made an assault at the siege of Antwerp.[t]

[o] The life of this extraordinary man is finely and fully written by Cornelius Nepos, a life well worthy of perusal. See also the large and valuable collection of confidential letters, addressed to him by Cicero.

[p] See Fabric. Bibl. Græc. vol. iv. p. 371. and Suidas, under the word *Herodes*.

[q] See Zosimi Histor. l. v. c. 5, 6. p. 511, &c. edit. Gr. Lat. 8vo. 1679. where the whole story is related at length.

[r] See Florus, l. i. 2; l. ii. 12. Justin. l. xx. 3.

[s] Fuller's Holy War, p. 27. Matt. Paris, p. 43. According to this last author, there were three that fought, St. George, St. Demetrius, and St. Mercury.

[t] The following extract is taken from the Disquisitiones Magicæ of Martin Del-Rio, printed at Mentz, an. 1617. cum gratia et privilegio Cæsar. Majest. together with the approbation of Oliverius Manarcus, vice-provincial of the Belgic Jesuits, and Gulielmus Fabricius, styled Apostolicus et regius librorum censor; and attested also by the evidence Multorum gravium militum, qui vidisse se sancte jurabant.

The besieged, it seems, and their allies, the Dutch and English, were upon the point of forcing a post (aggerem) possessed by the Spaniards, who besieged the city. Del-Rio's words after this are, Tum a regiis militibus (Hispanis scil.) primo paucioribus conspectus prope aggerem Petrus de Paz, Hispanus tribunus, vir et militarib. et pietatis ornamentis laudatissimus, qui, jam mensibus aliquot ante defunctus, visus his

Instead of giving my own sentiments upon these events, I choose to give those of an abler man upon a similar subject. After having related some singular stories of equal probability, lord Bacon concludes with the following observation.

"My judgment (says he) is, that they (he means the stories) ought all to be despised, and ought to serve but for winter-talk by the fireside. Though when I say despised, I mean it as for belief; for otherwise the spreading or publishing of them is in no sort to be despised, for they have done much mischief."[u]

Synesius, who lived in the fifth century, visited Athens, and gives in his Epistles an account of his visit. Its lustre appears at that time to have been greatly diminished. Among other things he informs us, that the celebrated portico or colonnade, the Greek name of which gave name to the sect of Stoics, had by an oppressive proconsul been despoiled of its fine pictures; and that, on this devastation, it had been forsaken by those philosophers.[x]

In the thirteenth century, when the Grecian empire was cruelly oppressed by the crusaders, and all things in confusion, Athens was besieged by one Segurus Leo, who was unable to take it; and, after that, by a marquis of Montserrat, to whom it surrendered.[y]

Its fortune after this was various; and it was sometimes under the Venetians, sometimes under the Catalonians, till Mahomet the Great made himself master of Constantinople. This fatal catastrophe (which happened near two thousand years after the time of Pisistratus) brought Athens, and with it all Greece, into the hands of the Turks, under whose despotic yoke it has continued ever since.

The city from this time has been occasionally visited, and descriptions of it published by different travellers. Wheeler was there along with Spon, in the time of our Charles the Second, and both of them have published curious and valuable narratives. Others, as well natives of this island as foreigners, have been there since, and some have given (as Monsr. Le Roy) specious publications of what we are to suppose they saw. None however have equalled the truth, the accuracy, and elegance of Mr. Stuart, who, after having resided there between three and four years, has given us such plans and elevations of the capital buildings now standing, together with learned comments to elucidate every part, that he seems, as far as was possible for

armatus, ut solebat, legionem præcedere, et suis quondam militibus, manu advocatis, sequerentur ut se imperare. Indicant primi secundis; sic tertiis; sic sequentibus; vident omnes idem, mirantur, animisque resumptis notum sequuntur ducem, &c. Disquisit. Mag. p. 262.

[u] Essays and Counsels by Lord Verulam, num. xxxv.

[x] See Synesii Epist. 135. in Gronovius's Collection, vol. v. (as before,) p. 1751, and of this work, p. 461.

[y] See Gronovius's Collection, (as before,) p. 1751—1754.

the power of description, to have restored the city to its ancient splendour.

He has not only given us the greater outlines and their measures, but separate measures and drawings of the minuter decorations; so that a British artist may (if he please) follow Phidias, and build in Britain as Phidias did at Athens.[z]

Spon, speaking of Attica, says that the road near Athens was pleasing, and the very peasants polished. Speaking of the Athenians in general, he says of them, "Ils ont une politesse d'esprit naturelle, et beaucoup d'addresse dans toutes les affaires, qu'ils enterprenent."[a]

Wheeler, who was Spon's fellow-traveller, says as follows, when he and his company approached Athens: "We began now to think ourselves in a more civilized country than we had yet passed: for not a shepherd that we met but bid us welcome, and wished us a good journey." p. 335. Speaking of the Athenians, he adds, "This must with great truth be said of them, their bad fortune hath not been able to take from them what they have by nature, that is, much subtlety or wit." p. 347. And again, "The Athenians, notwithstanding the long possession that barbarism hath had of this place, seem to be much more polished in point of manners and conversation, than any other in these parts; being civil, and of respectful behaviour to all, and highly complimental in their discourse."[b]

Stuart says of the present Athenians, what Spon and Wheeler said of their forefathers: he found in them the same address, the same natural acuteness, though severely curbed by their despotic masters.

One custom I cannot omit. He tells me, that frequently at their convivial meetings, one of the company takes what they now call a lyre, though it is rather a species of guitar, and after a short prelude on the instrument, as if he were waiting for inspiration, accompanies his instrumental music with his voice, suddenly chanting some extempore verses, which seldom exceed two or three distichs; that he then delivers the lyre to his neighbour, who, after he has done the same, delivers it to another; and that so the lyre circulates, till it has passed round the table.

Nor can I forget his informing me, that, notwithstanding the various fortune of Athens, as a city, Attica was still famous for olives, and mount Hymettus for honey. Human institutions perish, but nature is permanent.

[z] This most curious and valuable book was published at London, in the year 1762.

[a] Spon, vol. ii. p. 76, 92. edit. 8vo.

[b] Wheeler, p. 356. edit. fol.

CHAPTER IV.

ACCOUNT OF BYZANTINE SCHOLARS CONTINUED—SUIDAS—JOHN STOBÆUS, OR OF STOBA—PHOTIUS—MICHAEL PSELLUS—THIS LAST SAID TO HAVE COMMENTED TWENTY-FOUR PLAYS OF MENANDER—REASONS TO MAKE THIS PROBABLE—EUSTATHIUS, A BISHOP, THE COMMENTATOR OF HOMER—EUSTRATIUS, A BISHOP, THE COMMENTATOR OF ARISTOTLE—PLANUDES, A MONK, THE ADMIRER AND TRANSLATOR OF LATIN CLASSICS, AS WELL AS THE COMPILER OF ONE OF THE PRESENT GREEK ANTHOLOGIES—CONJECTURES CONCERNING THE DURATION OF THE LATIN TONGUE AT CONSTANTINOPLE.

THAT I may not be prolix, I hasten from the writers already mentioned to Suidas, who is supposed to have lived during the ninth or tenth centuries. In his Lexicon, which is partly historical, partly explanatory, he has preserved many quotations from authors who lived in the earlier and politer ages, and from poets in particular, whose works at present are for the greater part lost. Kuster, an able critic in the beginning of the present century, gave a fine edition of this author, at Cambridge, in three volumes folio; and Mr. Toupe of Cornwall (whom I have mentioned already, and cannot mention with too much applause) has lately favoured the learned world with many valuable emendations.[c]

John Stobæus, or of Stoba, (whose name John makes it probable he was a Christian,) is of an uncertain age, as well as Suidas; though some imagine him to have lived during an earlier period, by two or three centuries.[d] His work is not a lexicon, like that of the other, but an immense common-place, filled with extracts upon various subjects, both ethical and physical, which extracts he had collected from the most approved writers. As this book is highly valuable, from containing such incredible variety of sentiments upon interesting topics, and those taken from authors many of whom are lost; as it is at the same time so incorrectly printed, that in too many places it is hardly intelligible; it would be a labour well worthy an able critic, by the help of manuscripts and plausible conjecture, to restore it, as far as possible, to its original purity. The speculations he chiefly gives us are neither trivial nor licentious, but, in the language of Horace,

> Quod magis ad nos
> Pertinet, et nescire malum est.

But to return from Stobæus to Suidas. If we consider the

[c] Concerning this little-known author, see the preface of his learned editor, Kuster.

[d] See Fabric. Biblioth. Græc. vol. viii. 665.

late age when Suidas lived; if we consider, too, the authors which he must needs have studied, in order to form his work; authors who, many of them, wrote in the most refined and polished ages; it will be evident, that even in those late centuries the taste for a purer literature was by no means extinct, and that even then there were readers who knew its value.

In the ninth century lived Photius, patriarch of Constantinople. His most celebrated work may be called a journal of his studies; a journal where we learn the various authors he perused, the subjects they treated, the plans of their works, and where sometimes, also, we have extracts. From him we are informed, not only of many authors now lost, but what was in his time the state of many that are now remaining.

Among the authors now lost, he perused Theopompus the historian, and Hyperides the orator; among those now mutilated and imperfect, he perused entire Diodorus Siculus. Many others, if necessary, might be added of either sort.

It is singular, with regard to Photius, that from a layman he was raised at once to be patriarch of Constantinople. Yet his studies evidently seem to have had such a rank in view, being principally applied to theology, to history, and to oratory; with enough philosophy and medicine not to appear deficient, if such subjects should occur. As to poetry, one might imagine, either that he had no relish for it, or that, in the train of his inquiries, he did not esteem it a requisite.[e]

Michael Psellus, of the eleventh century, was knowing in the Greek philosophy and poetry of the purer ages, and for his various and extensive learning was ranked among the first and ablest scholars of his time.

Besides his treatise of Mathematics, his comments upon Aristotle, and a number of other works, (many of which are printed,) he is said to have commented and explained no less than twenty-four comedies of Menander, a treatise now lost, though extant as well as the comedies in so late a period. He must have had a relish for that polite writer, or otherwise it is not probable he would have undertaken such a labour.[f]

Nor need we wonder this should happen. Why should not the polite Menander have had his admirers in these ages, as well as the licentious Aristophanes? Or rather, why not as well as Sophocles and Euripides? The scholia upon these (though some,

[e] See Fabric. Bibl. Græc. vol. ix. 369.

[f] See Fabric. Bibl. Græc. vol. i. 769.

In the passage quoted by Fabricius upon this subject, its author says, that the latter Greek monks persuaded the latter Greek emperors, to destroy Menander and many other of the old Greek poets, from the looseness of their morals, and their great indecencies. That the monks may have persuaded this, is not improbable; perhaps from bigotry, perhaps from a consciousness of their own wretched inferiority in every species of elegant composition, but certainly from no indignation against indecency and immorality. For if so, why preserve Lucian? why preserve Aristophanes? why preserve collections of epigrams, more indecent and flagitious than the grossest productions of the most licentious modern ages?

perhaps may be more ancient) were compiled by critics, who lived long after Psellus.[g]

We may add, with regard to all these scholiasts, (whatever may have been their age,) they would never have undergone the labours of compilation and annotation, had they not been encouraged by the taste of their contemporary countrymen. For who ever published, without hopes of having readers?

The same may be asserted of the learned bishop of Thessalonica, Eustathius, who lived in the twelfth century. His admiration of Homer must have been almost enthusiastic, to carry him through so complete, so minute, and so vast a commentary both upon the Iliad and the Odyssey, collected from such an immense number both of critics and historians.[h]

Eustratius, the metropolitan of Nice, who lived a little earlier in the same century, convinces us that he studied Aristotle with no less zeal; and that, not only in his logical pieces, but in his ethical also, as may be seen by those minute and accurate comments on the Nicomachean Ethics, which go under his name, and in which, though others had their share, he still is found to have taken so large a portion to himself.[i]

Planudes, a monk of the fourteenth century, appears (which is somewhat uncommon) to have understood and admired the Latin classics, Cicero, Cæsar, Ovid, Boethius, and others; parts of which authors he translated, such as the Commentaries of Cæsar relative to the Gallic wars, the Dream of Scipio by Cicero, the Metamorphosis of Ovid, the fine tract of Boethius de Consolatione, and (according to Spon) St. Augustine de Civitate Dei. Besides this, he formed a Greek Anthology, (that well-known collection printed by Wechelius in 1600,) and composed several original pieces of his own.[k]

It appears from these examples, and will hereafter appear from others, how much the cause of letters and humanity is indebted to the church.

Having mentioned Latin classics, I beg leave to submit a conjecture concerning the state and duration of the Latin tongue at Constantinople.

When Constantine founded this imperial city, he not only adorned it with curiosities from every part of the Roman empire, but he induced, by every sort of encouragement, many of the first families in Italy, and a multitude more of inferior rank, to leave their country, and there settle themselves. We may therefore suppose, that Latin was for a long time the prevailing language of the place, till in a course of years it was supplanted by

[g] Demetrius Triclinius, the scholiast on Sophocles, lived after Planudes, for he mentions him. See Fabric. Bibl. Græc. p. 634.

[h] See Fabric. Biblioth. Græc. vol. i. p. 289, &c.

[i] See Fabric. Biblioth. Græc. vol. ii. p. 151.

[k] See Fabric. Biblioth. Græc. vol. x. p. 533.

Greek, the common language of the neighbourhood, and the fashionable acquired language of every polite Roman.

We are told, that soon after the end of the sixth century, Latin ceased to be spoken at Rome.[1] Yet was it in the beginning of that century that Justinian published his Laws in Latin at Constantinople; and that the celebrated Priscian in the same city taught the principles of the Latin grammar.

If we descend to a period still later, (so late, indeed, as to the tenth and eleventh centuries,) we shall find, in the ceremonial of the Byzantine court, certain formularies preserved, evidently connected with this subject.

As often as the emperor gave an imperial banquet, it was the custom for some of his attendants, at peculiar times during the feast, to repeat and chant the following words: *Κωνσέρβετ Δέους ἡμπέριουμ βέστρουμ—βήβητε, Δόμηνι ἡμπεράτωρες ἐν μουλτὸς ἄννος· Δέους ὀμνήποτενς πρέστεθ—Ἤν γαυδίῳ πραν-δεῖτε, Δόμηνι.*

It may possibly for a moment surprise a learned reader, when he hears that the meaning of this strange jargon is, "May God preserve your empire: live, imperial lords, for many years; God Almighty so grant: dine, my lords, in joy."

But his doubts will soon vanish, when he finds this jargon to be Latin, and comes to read it exhibited according to a Latin alphabet:

"Conservet Deus imperium vestrum—vivite, domini imperatores, in multos annos; Deus Omnipotens præstet—in gaudio prandete, domini."[m]

It is evident, from these instances, that traces of Latin were still remaining at Constantinople during those centuries. It will be then, perhaps, less wonderful, if Planudes upon the same spot should, in the fourteenth century, appear to have understood it. We may suppose, that by degrees it changed from a common language to a learned one, and that, being thus confined to the learned few, its valuable works were by their labours again made known, and diffused among their countrymen in Greek translations.

This, too, will make it probable, that even to the lowest age of the Greek empire their great libraries contained many valuable Latin manuscripts; perhaps had entire copies of Cicero, of Livy, of Tacitus, and many others. Where else did Planudes, when he translated, find his originals?

[1] See before, p. 454, note *a*.

[m] These formularies are selected from a ceremonial of the Byzantine court, drawn up by the emperor Constantine Porphyrogenitus, who reigned in the beginning of the eleventh century. The book, being a large folio, was published in the original Greek, with a Latin translation and notes, by Leichius and Reiskius, at Leipzic, in the year 1751. See of this book, p. 215, 216. Many more traces of this Hellenistic Latin occurs in other parts of it. In the Latin types I have followed the commentator, and not the translator; and as the Greeks have no letter but B to denote the Latin V, have preferred *vivite* to *bibite*.

CHAPTER V.

NICETAS, THE CHONIATE—HIS CURIOUS NARRATIVE OF THE MISCHIEFS DONE BY BALDWYN'S CRUSADE, WHEN THEY SACKED CONSTANTINOPLE IN THE YEAR 1205—MANY OF THE STATUES DESCRIBED, WHICH THEY THEN DESTROYED—A FINE TASTE FOR ARTS AMONG THE GREEKS, EVEN IN THOSE DAYS, PROVED FROM THIS NARRATIVE—NOT SO AMONG THE CRUSADERS—AUTHENTICITY OF NICETAS'S NARRATIVE—STATE OF CONSTANTINOPLE AT THE LAST PERIOD OF THE GRECIAN EMPIRE, AS GIVEN BY CONTEMPORARY WRITERS, PHILELPHUS AND ÆNEAS SYLVIUS—NATIONAL PRIDE AMONG THE GREEKS NOT TOTALLY EXTINCT EVEN AT THIS DAY.

Besides Planudes, a large number of the same nation might be mentioned, but I omit them all for the sake of Nicetas, the Choniate, in order to prove through him, that the more refined part of that ingenious people had not even in the thirteenth century lost their taste; a taste not confined to literary works only, but extended to works of other kinds and character.

This historian (I mean Nicetas[n]) was present at the sacking of Constantinople by the Barbarians of Baldwyn's crusade, in the year 1205. Take, by the way of sample, a part only of his enumeration of the noble statues, which were probably brought thither by Constantine to decorate his new city, and which these adventurers then destroyed.[o]

Among others, he mentions the colossian statue of Juno, erected in the forum of Constantine; the statue of Paris standing by Venus, and delivering to her the golden apple; a square and lofty obelisk, with a figure on it to indicate the wind; the figure of Bellerophon, riding upon Pegasus; the pensive Hercules, made by no less an artist than Lysippus; the two celebrated figures of the man and the ass, erected by Augustus after his victory at Actium; the wolf, suckling Romulus and Remus; an eagle destroying a serpent, set up by Apollonius Tyaneus; and an exquisite Helen, in all the charms of beauty and of elegance.

Speaking of the wind-obelisk, he relates with the greatest feeling the curious work on its sides: the rural scene; birds singing; rustics labouring, or playing on their pipes; sheep bleating; lambs skipping; the sea, and a scene of fish and

[n] He was called the Choniate from Chonæ, a city of Phrygia, and possessed, when in the court of Constantinople, some of the highest dignities. Fabric. Biblioth. Græc. vol. xi. p. 401, 402.

[o] A large part of this chapter is extracted from the History of Nicetas, as printed by Fabricius in the tome above quoted, beginning from p. 405, and proceeding to p. 418.

The author has endeavoured to make his translated extracts faithful, but he thought the whole original Greek too much to be inserted, especially as it may be found in Fabricius's Bibliotheca, a book by no means rare. A few particular passages he has given in the original.

fishing; little naked Cupids, laughing, playing, and pelting each other with apples; a figure on the summit, turning with the slightest blast, and thence denominated the wind's attendant.

Of the two statues brought from Actium, he relates, that they were set up there by Augustus on the following incident. As he went out by night to reconnoitre the camp of Antony, he met a man driving an ass. The man was asked, who he was, and whither he was going? My name, replied he, is Nico, my ass's name Nicander; and I am going to Cæsar's army. The story derives its force from the good omen of lucky names, and may be found (though with some variation) both in Suetonius and Plutarch. The real curiosity was, that statues so celebrated should be then existing.

If the figures of the wolf and the founders of Rome were of the same age, they might probably have been the very work to which Virgil is supposed to have alluded, in describing the shield of Æneas:

> Illam tereti cervice reflexam
> Mulcere alternos, et corpora fingere lingua. Æn. viii. 633.

But nowhere does the taste of Nicetas appear so strongly, as when he speaks of the Hercules and the Helen.

"The Hercules is exhibited to us, as if he were actually present—immense in bulk, and, with an air of grandeur, reposing himself—his lion's-skin (that looked formidable even in brass) thrown over him—himself sitting without a quiver, a bow, or a club, but having the right leg bent at the knee; his head gently reclining on the hand of his left arm; and a countenance full of dejection, as if he were reflecting with indignation on the many successive labours imposed on him by Eurystheus."[p]

For his person, we are informed he was ample in the chest; broad in the shoulders; had hair that curled; arms that were strong and muscular; and a magnitude, such as might be supposed to belong to the original Hercules, were he to revive; a leg being equal in length to the stature of a common man.[q] And yet adds Nicetas, filled with indignation, "this Hercules, being such as here represented, this very Hercules did not these men spare."

I can only subjoin, by way of digression, that there is a fine Greek epigram describing the statue of a dejected Hercules, sitting without his weapons, which exactly resembles this of Nicetas, and which is said likewise to be the work of Lysippus, only there the poet imputes his hero's dejection, not to the tyranny of Eurystheus, but to the love of Omphale.[r]

If Nicetas speak with admiration of this statue, it is with

[p] Ἐκάθητο δὲ, μὴ γωρυτὸν ἐξημμένος, μὴ τόξον ταῖν χεροῖν φέρων, μὴ, κ. τ. λ. Fabr. as above, p. 408, 409.

[q] Ἦν δὲ τὸ στέρνον εὐρὺς, τοῦς ὤμους πλατὺς, τὴν τρίχα οὖλος, κ. τ. λ. Ibid. p. 409.

[r] Vid. Antholog. l. iv. tit. 1.

rapture he mentions the other. "What (says he) shall I say of the beauteous Helen; of her who brought together all Greece against Troy? Did she mitigate these immitigable, these iron-hearted men? No, (says he,) nothing like it could even she affect, who had before enslaved so many spectators with her beauty."[s]

After this he describes her dress, and then proceeds to her person; which description, as it is something singular, I have endeavoured to translate more strictly.

"Her lips, (says he,) like opening flowers, were gently parted, as if she was going to speak: and as for that graceful smile, which instantly met the beholder, and filled him with delight; those elegant curvatures of her eye-brows, and the remaining harmony of her figure; they were what no words can describe, and deliver down to posterity."[t]

He then breaks into an exclamation: "But, O! Helen, thou pure and genuine beauty; offspring of the loves; decorated by the care of Venus; most exquisite of nature's gifts; prize of contest between Trojans and Grecians; where was thy Nepenthes, that soothing draught which thou learnedst in Egypt? Where thy irresistible love-charms? Why didst thou not employ them now, as thou didst in days of yore? Alas! I fear it was destined by fate, that thou shouldst perish by flames; thou, who didst not cease even in thy statue to inflame beholders into love. I could almost say that these sons of Æneas had demolished thee by fire, as a species of retaliation for the burning of their Troy, as those flames were kindled by thy unfortunate amours."[u]

I have been thus particular in these relations, and have translated for the greater part the very words of the historian, not only because the facts are little known, but because they tend to prove, that even in those dark ages (as we have too many reasons to call them) there were Greeks still extant, who had a taste for the finer arts, and an enthusiastic feeling of their exquisite beauty. At the same time, we cannot without indignation reflect on these brutal crusaders, who, after many instances of sacrilegious avarice, related by Nicetas in consequence of their success, could destroy all these, and many other precious remains of antiquity, melting them down (for they were of brass) into money to pay their soldiers, and exchanging things of inestimable value for a poor pittance of contemptible coin.[x]

[s] Ἆρ' ἐμείλιξε τοῦς δυσμειλίκτους; ἆρ', ἐμάλθαξε τοῦς σιδηρόφρονας; οὐ μὴν οὐν οὐδὲ ὅλως τοιοῦτον τι δεδύνηται ἡ πάντα θεατὴν τῷ κάλλει δουλαγωγήσασα, καίπερ, κ. τ. λ. Fabric. ut supra, p. 412, 413.

[t] Ἦν δὲ καὶ τὰ χείλη, καλύκων δίκην, ἠρέμα παρανοιγόμενα, ὡς καὶ δοκεῖν, κ. τ. λ. Ibid. p. 413.

[u] Ἀλλ' Ὦ Τυνδαρὶς Ἑλένη, κάλλος αὐτόθεν καλὸν, Ἐρώτων μόσχευμα, Ἀφροδίτης τημελούχημα, πανάριστον φύσεως δώρημα, Τρώων καὶ Ἑλλήνων βράβευμα, ποῦ σοι τὸ Νηπενθὲς, κ. τ. λ. Ibid. p. 413.

[x] Κεκόφασιν [ἀγάλματα] εἰς νομίσμα, ἀνταλασσόμενοι μικρῶν τὰ μεγάλα, καὶ τὰ δαπάναις πονηθέντα μεγίσταις οὐτιδανῶν ἀντιδιδόντες κερμάτων. Ibid. p. 406.

They surely were what Nicetas well calls them, *τοῦ καλοῦ ἀνέρασποι βάρβαροι*, "barbarians devoid of taste for the beautiful and fair."[y]

And yet it is remarkable, that these sad and savage events happened more than a century after these adventurers had first passed into the East, above four-score years of which time they had possessed the sovereignty of Palestine. But

Cœlum, non animum mutant, &c.[z] Hor.

Though I have done with these events, I cannot quit the Greeks without adding a word upon Constantinople, as to literature and language, just before the fatal period when it was taken by the Turks. There is more stress to be laid upon my quotations, as they are transcribed from authors who lived at the time, or immediately after.

Hear what Philelphus says, who was himself at Constantinople in that part of the fifteenth century, while the Greek empire still subsisted. "Those Greeks (says he) whose language has not been depraved, and whom we ourselves both follow and imitate, speak even at this time, in their ordinary talk, as the comic Aristophanes did, or the tragic Euripides; as the orators would talk; as the historians; as the philosophers themselves, even Plato and Aristotle."[a]

Speaking afterwards of the corruption of the tongue in that city by the concourse of traders and strangers, he informs us, that the people belonging to the court still retained "the ancient dignity and elegance of speech; and, above all, the women of quality, who, as they were wholly precluded from strangers, still preserved that genuine and pure speech of the ancient Greeks, uncorrupted."[b]

[y] I have given the words of Nicetas himself, which precede the passage just quoted. In another part of his narrative he styles them illiterate barbarians, who absolutely did not know their A B C.—*παρ' ἀγραμμάτοις βαρβάροις, καὶ τέλεον ἀναλφαβήτοις*, p. 414.

[z] It ought to be observed, that though the narrative of Nicetas, whence these extracts are taken, appear not in the printed editions, (being probably either through fraud, or shame, or both, designedly omitted,) yet has it been published by that honest and learned critic Fabricius, in the sixth volume of his Bibliotheca Græca here quoted, and is still extant in a fair and ancient manuscript of the two last books of Nicetas, preserved in the Bodleian library.

[a] Græci, quibus lingua depravata non sit, et quos ipsi tum sequimur, tum imitamur, ita loquuntur vulgo hac etiam in tempestate, ut Aristophanes comicus, ut Euripides tragicus, ut oratores omnes, ut philosophi etiam ipsi et Plato et Aristoteles. Philelph. Epist. in Hodii de Græcis illustribus, lib. i. p. 188.

[b] The same Philelphus, in the same epistle, adds, Nam viri aulici veterem sermonis dignitatem atque elegantiam retinebant; in primisque ipsæ nobiles mulieres, quibus cum nullum esset omnino cum viris peregrinis commercium, merus ille ac purus Græcorum sermo servabatur intactus. Hod. ut supra.

It is somewhat singular, that what Philelphus relates concerning the women of rank at the court of Constantinople, should be related by Cicero concerning the women of rank in the polished days of the Roman commonwealth; concerning Cornelia, mother of the Gracchi; concerning Lælia, daughter of the great Lælius; concerning the Muciæ, the Liciniæ; in short, the mothers, wives, and daughters of the most illustrious Romans of that illustrious age.

Cicero accounts for the purity of their language, and for its being untainted with vitious novelty, precisely as Philelphus

Æneas Sylvius, afterwards pope by the name of Pius the Second, was the scholar of this Philelphus. A long letter of his is extant upon the taking of Constantinople by Mahomet; a letter addressed to a cardinal, just after that fatal event. Speaking of the fortune of the city, he observes, that New Rome (for so they often called Constantinople) had subsisted, from its foundation to its capture, nearly the same number of years with Old Rome; that between Romulus, the founder of Old Rome, and the Goth, Alaric, who took it, was an interval of about eleven hundred years; and that there was nearly the same interval between Constantine and Mahomet the Great.

He observes, that though this last city had been taken before, it had never before suffered so total and so fatal a change. "Till this period (says he) the remembrance of ancient wisdom remained at Constantinople; and, as if it were the mansion, the seat of letters, no one of the Latins could be deemed sufficiently learned, if he had not studied for some time at Constantinople. The same reputation for sciences, which Athens had in the times of ancient Rome, did Constantinople appear to possess in our times. It was thence that Plato was restored to us; it was thence that the works of Aristotle, Demosthenes, Xenophon, Thucydides, Basil, Dionysius, Origen, and others, were in our days made known; and many more in futurity we hoped would become so. But now, as the Turks have conquered," &c.[c]

A little further in the same epistle, when he expresses his fears lest the Turks should destroy all books but their own, he subjoins, "Now therefore both Homer, and Pindar, and Menander, and all the more illustrious poets, will undergo a second death. Now will a final destruction find its way to the Greek philosophers. A little light will remain perhaps among the Latins, but that I apprehend will not be long, unless God from heaven will look upon us with a more favourable eye, and grant a better fortune either to the Roman empire, or to the apostolic see," &c.[d]

does. Facilius enim mulieres incorruptam antiquitatem conservant, quod, multorum sermonis expertes, ea tenent semper, quæ prima didicerunt.

This passage is no small strengthening of Philelphus's authority. See Cicer. de Oratore iii. 45. et de Claris Orator. s. 211.

[c] Itaque mansit in hunc diem vetustæ sapientiæ apud Constantinopolim monumentum: ac, velut ibi domicilium literarum esset, et arx summæ philosophiæ, nemo Latinorum satis doctus videri poterat, nisi Constantinopoli aliquandem studuisset; quodque florente Roma doctrinarum nomen habuerunt Athenæ, id tempestate nostra videbatur Constantinopolis obtinere. Inde nobis Plato redditus: inde Aristotelis, Demosthenis, Xenophontis, Thucydidis, Basilii, Dionysii, Origenis et aliorum multa Latinis opera diebus nostris manifestata sunt; multa quoque in futurum manifestanda sperabamus. Nunc vero, vincentibus Turcis, &c. Æneæ Sylv. Epist. p. 704, 705. edit. Basil. 1551.

[d] Nunc ergo et Homero, et Pindaro, Menandro, et omnibus illustrioribus poetis secunda mors erit; nunc Græcorum philosophorum ultima patebit interitus. Restabit aliquid lucis apud Latinos; at, fateor, neque id erit diuturnum, nisi mitiori nos oculo Deus ex alto respexerit, fortunamque vel imperio Romano, vel apostolicæ sedi præbuerit meliorem, &c. Ibid. p. 705, 706.

Those who have not the old edition of

It must be remarked, that, in this epistle, by Latins[e] he means the Western Europeans, as opposed to the Greeks, or Eastern; and that by the Roman empire, (just before mentioned,) he means the Germanic body.

The author's apprehensions for the fate of letters in the West was premature; for, upon the destruction of this imperial city, the number of learned Greeks, which this event drove into those Western parts of Europe; the favour of the popes and the Medici family, shewn at this period to literature; together with the then recent invention of printing, which, by multiplying copies of books, made them so easy to be purchased; all this (I say) tended to promote the cause of knowledge and of taste, and to put things into that train in which we hope they may long continue.

Besides Philelphus, Æneas Sylvius, and many others, who were Italians, I might mention two Greeks of the same age, George Gemistus and cardinal Bessario, both of them deeply knowing in Grecian literature and philosophy.

But as some account of these last and of their writings has been already given,[f] I shall quit the Greeks, after I have related a short narrative; a narrative so far curious, as it helps to prove, that even among the present Greeks, in the day of servitude, the remembrance of their ancient glory is not yet totally extinct.

When the late Mr. Anson (lord Anson's brother) was upon his travels in the East, he hired a vessel to visit the isle of Tenedos. His pilot, an old Greek, as they were sailing along, said, with some satisfaction, "There it was our fleet lay." Mr. Anson demanded, "What fleet?" "What fleet?" replied the old man, (a little piqued at the question,) "Why, our Grecian fleet, at the siege of Troy."[g]

But we must now quit the Greeks, and, in consequence of our plan, pass to the Arabians, followers of Mahomet.

Æneas Sylvius, may find the above quotations in Hody de Græcis Illustribus, Lond. 1751. 8vo.

[e] Nicetas had before called them, sons of Æneas. See p. 474.

[f] See Philosoph. Arrangements, p. 319, note.

[g] This story was told the author by Mr. Anson himself.

CHAPTER VI.

CONCERNING THE SECOND CLASS OF GENIUSES DURING THE MIDDLE AGE, THE ARABIANS, OR SARACENS—AT FIRST, BARBAROUS—THEIR CHARACTER BEFORE THE TIME OF MAHOMET—THEIR GREATEST CALIPHS WERE FROM AMONG THE ABASSIDÆ—ALMANZUR ONE OF THE FIRST OF THAT RACE—ALMAMUN OF THE SAME RACE, A GREAT PATRON OF LEARNING AND LEARNED MEN—ARABIANS CULTIVATED LETTERS, AS THEIR EMPIRE GREW SETTLED AND ESTABLISHED—TRANSLATED THE BEST GREEK AUTHORS INTO THEIR OWN LANGUAGE—HISTORIANS, ABULPHARAGIUS, ABULFEDA, BOHADIN—EXTRACTS FROM THE LAST CONCERNING SALADIN.

THE Arabians began ill.[h] The sentiment of their caliph Omar, when he commanded the Alexandrian library to be burnt, (a fact we have already related,[i]) was natural to any bigot, when in the plenitude of despotism. But they grew more rational, as they grew less bigoted, and by degrees began to think that science was worth cultivating. They may be said, indeed, to have recurred to their ancient character; that character which they did not rest upon brutal force alone, but which they boasted to imply three capital things—hospitality, valour, and eloquence.[k]

When success in arms has defeated rivals, and empire becomes not only extended but established, then is it that nations begin to think of letters, and to cultivate philosophy and liberal speculation. This happened to the Athenians, after they had triumphed over the Persians; to the Romans, after they triumphed over Carthage; and to the Arabians, after the caliphate was established at Bagdad.[l]

And here, perhaps, it may not be improper to observe, that after the four first caliphs, came the race of the Ommiadæ. These, about thirty years after Mahomet, upon the destruction of Ali, usurped the sovereignty, and held it ninety years. They were considered by the Arabic historians as a race of tyrants, and were in number fourteen.[m] Having made themselves, by their oppressions, to be much detested, the last of them, Merwin, was deposed by Al-Suffah, from whom began another race, the

[h] As many quotations are made in the following chapters from Arabian writers, and more particularly from Abulpharagius, Abulfeda, and Bohadin, a short account of those three authors will be given in the notes of this chapter, where their names come in course to be mentioned.

[i] See before, p. 458.

[k] Schultens, in his Monumenta vetustiora Arabiæ, (Lugdun. Batavor. 1740,) gives us in his preface the following passage from Saphadius, an Arabic author. Arabes antiquitus non habebant, quo gloriarentur, quam gladio, hospite, et eloquentia.

[l] See before, p. 459.

[m] See Herbelot's Bibliothêque Orientale, under the word *Ommiades;* also Abulpharagius, p. 138, 160; and in particular Abulfeda, p. 138, &c.

race of Abassidæ,[n] who claimed to be related in blood to Mahomet, by descending from his uncle, Abbas.

As many of these were far superior in character to their predecessors, so their dominion was of much longer duration, lasting for more than five centuries.

The former part of this period may be called the era of the grandeur and magnificence of the caliphate.

Almanzur, who was among the first of them, removed the imperial seat from Damascus to Bagdad, a city which he himself founded upon the banks of the Tigris, and which soon after became one of the most splendid cities throughout the East.

Almanzur was not only a great conqueror, but a lover of letters and learned men. It was under him that Arabian literature, which had been at first chiefly confined to medicine and a few other branches, was extended to sciences of every denomination.[o]

His grandson, Almamun, (who reigned about fifty years after,) giving a full scope to his love of learning, sent to the Greek emperors for copies of their best books; employed the ablest scholars that could be found to translate them; and, when translated, encouraged men of genius in their perusal, taking a pleasure in being present at literary conversations. Then was it that learned men, in the lofty language of Eastern eloquence, were called "luminaries that dispel darkness; lords of human kind; of whom, when the world becomes destitute, it becomes barbarous and savage."[p]

The rapid victories of these Eastern conquerors soon carried their empire from Asia even into the remote regions of Spain. Letters followed them, as they went. Plato, Aristotle, and their best Greek commentators, were soon translated into Arabic; so were Euclid, Archimedes, Apollonius, Diophantus, and the other Greek mathematicians; so Hippocrates, Galen, and the best professors of medicine; so Ptolemy, and the noted writers on the subject of astronomy. The study of these Greeks produced others like them; produced others, who not only explained them in Arabic comments, but composed themselves original pieces upon the same principles.

Averroes was celebrated for his philosophy in Spain; Alpharabi and Avicenna were equally admired through Asia.[q] Science (to speak a little in their own style) may be said to have extended

A Gadibus usque
Auroram et Gangem.

[n] Abulphar. p. 138—150, &c. Abulfeda, p. 143. Herbelot's Bib. Orient. under the word *Abassides*.

[o] See Abulfeda, p. 144. Abulpharag. p. 139. 141. 160.

[p] See Abulfeda, p. 181. Abulpharag. p. 160, 161. The lofty language alluded to stands thus in the Latin version of the page last quoted: Docti tenebrarum lumina sunt, et generis humani domini, quibus destitutus ferus evadit mundus.

[q] See Herbelot, under the several names here quoted.

Nor, in this immense multitude, did they want historians, some of which (such as Abulfeda, Abulpharagius, Bohadin,[r] and others) have been translated, and are perused, even in their translations, both with pleasure and profit, as they give not only the outlines of amazing enterprises, but a sample of manners and character widely differing from our own.

No history, perhaps, can be more curious than the Life of Saladin by Bohadin. This author was a constant attendant upon the person of this great prince through all his active and important life, down to his last sickness, and the very hour of his death. The many curious anecdotes which he relates, give us the striking picture of an Eastern hero.

Take the following instance of Saladin's justice and affability.

"He was in company once with his intimate friends, enjoying their conversation apart, the crowd being dismissed, when a slave of some rank brought him a petition in behalf of a person oppressed. The Sultan said, that he was then fatigued, and wished the matter, whatever it was, might for a time be deferred. The other did not attend to what was desired, but on the contrary almost thrust the petition into the sultan's face. The sultan, on this, opening and reading it over, declared he

[r] Abulfeda was an Oriental prince, descended from the same family with the great Saladin. He died in the year 1345, and published a general history, in which, however, he is most particular and diffuse in the narrative of Mahomet and his successors.

Learned men have published different parts of this curious author. Gagnier gave us, in Arabic and Latin, as much of him as related to Mahomet. This was printed in a thin folio at Oxford, in the year 1723.

The largest portion, and from which most of the facts here related are taken, was published by Reiske, or Reiskius, (a very able scholar,) in Latin only, and includes the history of the Arabians and their caliphs, from the first year of the Mahometan era, An. Dom. 622, to their 406th year, An. Dom. 1015. This book, a moderate or thin quarto, was printed at Leipzic, in the year 1754.

We have another portion of a period later still than this, published by Schultens in Arabic and Latin; a portion relative to the life of Saladin, and subjoined by Schultens to the Life of that great prince by Bohadin, which he (Schultens) published. But more of this hereafter.

Abulpharagius gave likewise a general history, divided into nine dynasties, but is far more minute and diffuse (as well as Abulfeda) in his history of Mahomet and the caliphs.

He was a Christian, and the son of a Christian physician; was an Asiatic by birth, and wrote in Arabic, as did Abulfeda. He brought down his history a little below the time of the celebrated Jingez Chan; that is, to the middle of the thirteenth century, the time when he lived. A fine edition of this author was given in Arabic and Latin, by the learned Pococke, in two small quartos, at Oxford, 1663.

Bohadin wrote the Life of the celebrated Saladin, but more particularly that part of it which respects the crusades, and Saladin's taking of Jerusalem. Bohadin has many things to render his history highly valuable: he was a contemporary writer; was an eyewitness of almost every transaction; and what is more, instead of being an obscure man, was high in office, a favourite of Saladin's, and constantly about his person. This author flourished in the twelfth century; that is, in the time of Saladin and king Richard, Saladin's antagonist.

Bohadin's history, in Arabic and Latin, with much excellent erudition, was published in an elegant folio, by that accurate scholar, Schultens, at Leyden, in the year 1755.

It must be observed, that though Abulpharagius was a Christian, yet Abulfeda and Bohadin were both Mahometans. All three historians bear a great resemblance to Plutarch, as they have enriched their histories with so many striking anecdotes. From Abulpharagius, too, and Abulfeda, we have much curious information as to the progress and state of literature in those ages and countries.

thought the petitioner's cause a good one. 'Let, then, our sovereign lord,' says the other, 'sign it.' 'There is no inkstand,' says the sultan, (who, being at that time seated at the door of his tent, rendered it impossible for any one to enter.) 'You have one,' replies the petitioner, 'in the inner part of your tent,' (which meant, as the writer well observes, little less than bidding the prince go and bring it himself.) The sultan, looking back and seeing the inkstand behind him, cries out, 'God help me, the man says true,' and immediately reached back for it, and signed the instrument."

Here the historian, who was present, spoke the language of a good courtier. "God Almighty," said he, "bore this testimony to our prophet, that his disposition was a sublime one: our sovereign lord, I perceive, has a temper like him." The sultan, not regarding the compliment, replied coolly, "The man did no harm; we have despatched his business, and the reward is at hand."[s]

After this fact we shall the more readily believe Bohadin, when, speaking of the same illustrious person, he informs us, that his conversation was remarkably elegant and pleasing; that he was a perfect master of the Arabian families, of their history, their rites, and customs; that he knew also the genealogies of their horses, (for which we know that to this hour Arabia is celebrated;) nor was he ignorant of what was rare and curious in the world at large; that he was particularly affable in his inquiries about the health of his friends, their illness, their medicines, &c.; that his discourse was free from all obscenity and scandal; and that he was remarkably tender and compassionate both to orphans and to persons in years.[t]

I may add from the same authority an instance of his justice.

"As Bohadin, the historian, was one day exercising at Jerusalem his office of a judge, a decent old merchant tendered him a bill or libel of complaint, which he insisted upon having opened. 'Who,' says Bohadin 'is your adversary?' 'My adversary,' replies the merchant, 'is the sultan himself: but this is the seat of justice, and we have heard that you (applying to Bohadin) are not governed by regard to persons.' Bohadin told him the cause could not be decided without his adversary's being first apprized. The sultan accordingly was informed of the affair, submitted to appear, produced his witnesses, and, having justly defended himself, gained the cause. Yet so little did he resent this treatment, that he dismissed his antagonist with a rich garment and a donation."[u]

His severity upon occasions was no less conspicuous than his clemency.

[s] See Bohadin, p. 22.

[t] Ibid. p. 28. and at the end of Bohadin, the Excerpta from Abulfeda, p. 62, 63.

[u] See Bohadin, p. 10.

We learn from the same writer, that Arnold, lord of Cracha, (called Reginald by M. Paris, and Rainold by Fuller,) had thought proper, during the truce between the Christians and the Saracens, to fall upon the caravan of travellers going to Mecca from Egypt, whom he cruelly pillaged and thrust into dungeons, and when they appealed to the truce for better usage, replied with scorn, "Let your Mahomet deliver you."

Saladin, fired with indignation at this perfidy, vowed a vow to despatch him with his own hand, if he could ever make him prisoner. The event happened at the fatal battle of Hittyn, where Guy king of Jerusalem, Arnold, and all the principal commanders of the Christian army were taken. Saladin, as soon as his tent could be erected, in the height of his festivity, orders king Guy, his brother Geoffry, and prince Arnold into his presence.

As Guy, the king, was nearly dying for thirst, Saladin presented him a delicious cup, cooled with snow, out of which the king drank, and then transmitted it to Arnold. "Tell the king," says the sultan, turning to his interpreter, "tell him, Thou, king, art he, who hast given the cup to this man, and not I."

Now it is a most admirable custom (observes Bohadin) among the Arabians, a custom breathing their liberal and noble disposition, that a captive, the moment he has obtained meat or drink from his captor, is by that very treatment rendered secure of life, the Arabians being a people by whom hospitality and the generous point of honour is most sacredly observed.

The prisoners, being dismissed, were soon remanded, when only the sultan and a few of his ministers were left. Arnold was the first brought in, whom the sultan reminding of his irreverent speech, subjoined, "See me now act the part of Mahomet's avenger." He then offers Arnold to embrace the Mahometan faith; which he refusing, the sultan with his drawn scimitar gave him a stroke that broke the hilt, while the rest of his attendants joined and despatched him. King Guy thought the same destiny was prepared for him. The sultan, however, bid him be of good cheer, observing, that "it was not customary for kings to kill kings; but that this man had brought destruction upon himself, by passing the bounds of all faith and honour."[x]

When princes are victorious, their rigour is often apt to extend too far, especially where religion, as in these wars called holy, blends itself with the transaction.

More than fourscore years before Saladin's time, the crusaders, when they took Jerusalem, had murdered every Mahometan they found there.[y]

[x] See Bohadin, p. 27, 28. 70, 71.

[y] See Abulpharagius, p. 243. Matt. Par. in anno 1099. p. 48. Fuller's Holy War, b. i. c. 24. p. 141.

When Saladin took Jerusalem, he had at first meditated putting all the Franks to the sword, as a sort of retaliation for what had been done there by these first crusaders. However, he was persuaded to change his intention, and spare them: nay, more, after he had turned the rest of their churches into mosques, he still left them one, in which they had toleration to perform their worship.[a]

After the fatal battle of Hittyn, where Guy and Arnold (as above mentioned) were taken, Saladin divided his prisoners; some were sold, others put to death; and among the last, all the commanders of the hospitallers and templars.

On the taking of Ptolemais by the crusaders, some difference arising between them and Saladin about the terms of the capitulation, the crusaders led the captive Mussulmans out of the city into a plain, and there, in cold blood, murdered three thousand.[a]

Customs, in all times and in all countries, have a singular effect. When the French ambassadors were introduced to Saladin, he was playing with a favourite son, by name Elemir. The child no sooner beheld the ambassadors with their faces shaved, their hair cut, and their garments of an unusual form, than he was terrified, and began to cry. A beard, perhaps, would have terrified a child in France; and yet, if beards are the gift of nature, it seems easier to defend the little Arabian.[b]

Bohadin, our historian, appears to have thought so; who, mentioning a young Frank, of high quality, describes him to be a fine youth, except that his face was shaved; a mark, as he calls it, by which the Franks are distinguished.[c]

We cannot quit Saladin, without a word on his liberality.

He used to say, it was possible there might exist a man (and by such man it was supposed he meant himself) who with the same eye of contempt could look on riches and on dirt.[d]

These seem to have been his sentiments, when some of his revenue-officers were convicted of putting into his treasury purses of brass for purses of gold. By the rigour of Eastern justice they might have immediately been executed; but Saladin did no more than dismiss them from their office.[e]

When his treasury was so empty that he could not supply his largesses, in order to have it in his power, he sold his very furniture.[f]

When his army was encamped in the plains of Ptolemais, it was computed he gave away no less than twelve thousand horses;

[a] See Abulpharagius, p. 273. Bohadin, p. 73. Abulfedæ Excerpta, p. 42. Matth. Paris, p. 145. Fuller's Holy War, b. ii. c. 46. p. 106.

[a] See Bohadin, p. 70, for the Templars, and p. 183, for the Mussulmans; also Fuller's Holy War, b. ii. c. 45. p. 105.

[b] See Bohadin, p. 270.

[c] Ibid. p. 193.

[d] Ibid. p. 13.

[e] Ibid. p. 27.

[f] Ibid. p. 12, 13.

nay, it was said he never mounted a horse, which was not either given away, or promised.[g]

Bohadin, whom he employed in most of his acts of munificence, relates, that all who approached him were sensible of its effects; nay, that he exceeded in his donations even the unreasonable wishes of the petitioners, although he was never heard to boast of any favour that he had conferred.[h]

The effect of such immense liberality was, that, when he died, out of all the vast revenues of Egypt, Syria, the Oriental Provinces, and Arabia Felix, there was no more left in his treasury than forty-seven pieces of silver, and one of gold; so that they were forced to borrow money, to defray the expenses of his funeral.[i]

As to the facts respecting the Western crusaders at this period, and particularly Saladin's great antagonist, Richard Cœur de Leon, these are subjects reserved, till we come to the Latins, or Franks.

We shall now say something concerning Arabian poetry and works of invention, adding, withal, a few more anecdotes relative to their manners and character.

CHAPTER VII.

ARABIAN POETRY, AND WORKS OF INVENTION—FACTS RELATIVE TO THEIR MANNERS AND CHARACTERS.

Arabian poetry is so immense a field, that he who enters it is in danger of being lost. It was their favourite study long before the time of Mahomet, and many poems are still extant of an earlier era.[k] So much did they value themselves upon the elegance of their compositions, that they called their neighbours, and more particularly the Persians, Barbarians.[l] It seems unfortunate for these last, that the old Greeks should have distinguished them by the same appellation.[m]

If we reckon among pieces of poetry, not the metrical only, but those also the mere efforts of invention and imagination, (such as the incomparable Telemachus, of the truly eloquent Fenelon,) we may justly range in this class the Arabian Nights, and the Turkish Tales. They are valuable, not only for ex-

[g] See Bohadin, p. 13; the same book, in the extract from Abulfeda, p. 62.

[h] See Bohad. p. 13.

[i] See Bohadin, p. 5. 13. and, in the same book, the extracts from Abulfeda, p. 62. Abulpharagius, p. 277. See Fuller's character of Saladin, Holy War, b. iii. c. 14. as also the above extracts, and Abulpharagius, both under the same pages.

[k] See Schultens, in his Monumenta vetustiora Arabiæ, Lugd. Bat. 1740, where there will be found fragments of poetry many centuries before Mahomet, and some said to be as ancient as the days of Solomon.

[l] Vid. Pocockii Not. in Camum Tograi, p. 5; and Abulfed. p. 194.

[m] See Isocrates, Plato, Demosthenes, &c.

hibiting a picture of Oriental manners during the splendour of the caliphate, but for inculcating, in many instances, a useful and instructive moral. Nothing can be better written than the Tale of Alnaschar, to illustrate that important part of the Stoic moral, the fatal consequence of not resisting our fancies.[n]

They were fond of the fabulous and allegorical, and loved to represent under that form the doctrines they most favoured. They favoured no doctrine more than that of each individual's inevitable destiny. Let us see after what manner they conveyed this doctrine.

"They tell us, that as Solomon (whom they supposed a magician from his superior wisdom) was one day walking with a person in Palestine, his companion said to him with some horror, 'What ugly being is that which approaches us? I do not like his visage; send me, I pray thee, to the remotest mountain of India.' Solomon complied, and the very moment he was sent off, the ugly being arrived. 'Solomon, (said the being,) how came that fellow here? I was to have fetched him from the remotest mountain of India.' Solomon answered, 'Angel of Death, thou wilt find him there.'"[o]

I may add to this that elegant fiction concerning the self-taught philosopher Hai Ebn Yokdan, who, being supposed to have been cast an infant on a desert island, is made by various incidents (some possible, but all ingenious) to ascend gradually, as he grew up in solitude, to the sublime of all philosophy, natural, moral, and divine.[p]

But this last was the production of a more refined period, when they had adopted the philosophy of other nations. In their earlier days of empire they valued no literature but their own, as we have learned from the celebrated story, already related, concerning Omar, Amrus, and the library at Alexandria.[q]

The same Omar, after the same Amrus had conquered the vast province of Egypt, and given (according to the custom of those early times) many proofs of personal strength and valour, the same Omar (I say) was desirous to see the sword by which Amrus had performed so many wonders. Having taken it into his hand, and found it no better than any other sword, he returned it with contempt, and averred, "it was good for nothing." "You say true, sir," replied Amrus; "for you demanded to see the sword, not the arm that wielded it: while that was wanting, the sword was no better than the sword of Pharezdacus."

Now Pharezdacus was, it seems, a poet, famous for his fine

[n] A curious and accurate version of this admirable tale is printed at Oxford, in a Grammar of the Arabic language; a version which gives us too much reason to lament our imperfect view of those other ingenious fictions, so obscurely transmitted to us through a French medium.

[o] This tale was told me by Dr. Gregory Sharpe, late master of the Temple, well known for his knowledge in Oriental literature.

[p] See Pococke's edition of this work, Oxon. 1671.

[q] See before, p. 458. 478.

description of a sword, but not equally famous for his personal prowess.[r]

It is a singular instance of their attention to hospitality, that they used to kindle fires by night, upon hills near their camps, to conduct wandering travellers to a place of refuge.[s]

Such an attention to this duty naturally brings to our mind what Eumæus in the Odyssey says to Ulysses:

> Ξεῖν' οὔ μοι θέμις ἐστ', οὐδ' εἰ κακίων σέθεν ἔλθοι,
> Ξεῖνον ἀτιμῆσαι, πρὸς γὰρ Διός εἰσιν ἅπαντες
> Ξεῖνοι. Ὀδυσ. Ξ. 56.
>
> "Stranger, I dare not with dishonour treat
> A stranger, tho' a worse than thou should come;
> For strangers all belong to Jove."

Nor are there wanting other instances of resemblance to the age of Homer. When Ibrahim, a dangerous competitor of the caliph Almanzur, had in a decisive battle been mortally wounded, and his friends were endeavouring to carry him off, a desperate conflict ensued, in which the enemy prevailed, overpowered his friends, and gained what they contended for, the body of Ibrahim. The resemblance between this story, and that respecting the body of Patroclus, is a fact too obvious to be more than hinted.[t]

In an earlier period, when Moawigea (the competitor of the great Ali) was pressed in a battle, and had just begun to fly, he is reported to have rallied upon the strength of certain verses, which at that critical instant occurred to his memory. The verses were these, as we attempt to translate them:

> When direful scenes of death appear,
> And fill thy flutt'ring heart with fear:
> Say—Heart! be firm; the storm endure;
> For evils ever find a cure.
> Their mem'ry, should we 'scape, will please;
> Or, should we fall, we sleep at ease.[u]

This naturally suggests to every lover of Homer, what is said by Ulysses:

> Τέτλαθι δὴ, κραδίη· καὶ κύντερον ἄλλο ποτ' ἔτλης
> Ἤματι τῷ, ὅτε, κ.τ.λ. Ὀδυσ. Υ. 18.
>
> "Endure it, heart; for worse thou hast endured
> In days of yore, when," &c.

Such resemblances as these prove a probable connection between the manners of the Arabians, and those of the ancient Greeks. There are other resemblances, which, as they respect not only Greek authors, but Roman, are perhaps no more than casual.

Thus an Arabian poet:

[r] Pocock. Notæ in Carm. Togr. p. 184.
[s] Ejusd. Carm. Tograi, p. 111.
[t] See Abulfeda, p. 148.
[u] Ibid. p. 91.

Horses and wealth we know you've none;
Let then your eloquence atone
For fortune's failure.[x]

What the Arabian says of his friend, Horace says of himself:

Donarem pateras, grataque commodus,
Censorine, meis, &c. Od. 8. l. iv.

Another of their poets has the following sentiment:

Who fondly can himself deceive,
And venture reason's rules to leave;
Who dares, thro' ignorance, aspire
To that, which no one can acquire;
To spotless fame, to solid health,
To firm unalienable wealth;
Each wish he forms, will surely find
A wish denied to human kind.[y]

Here we read the Stoic description of things not in our power, and the consequence of pursuing them, as if they were things in our power; concerning which fatal mistake, see Epictetus, either in the original, or in Mrs. Carter's valuable translation. The Enchiridion, we know, begins with this very doctrine.

There is a fine precept among the Arabians: "Let him to whom the gate of good fortune is opened, seize his opportunity; for he knoweth not how soon it may be shut."

Compare this with those admired lines in Shakspeare,

There is a tide in the affairs of men,
Which taken at the flood, &c. Jul. Cæs. act iv. sc. 5.

Though the metaphors differ, the sentiment is the same.[z]

In the comment on the verses of Tograi we meet an Arabic sentiment, which says, that "a friend is another self." The same elegant thought occurs in Aristotle's Ethics, and that in the same words: *Ἔστι γὰρ ὁ φίλος ἄλλος αὐτός.*[a]

After the preceding instances of Arabian genius, the following perhaps may give a sample of their manners and character.

On a rainy day, the caliph Al-Mostasem happened, as he was riding, to wander from his attendants. While he was thus alone, he found an old man, whose ass, laden with fagots, had just cast his burden, and was mired in a slough. As the old man was standing in a state of perplexity, the caliph quitted his horse, and went to helping up the ass. "In the name of my father and my mother, I beseech thee," said the old man, "do not spoil thy clothes." "That is nothing to thee," replied the caliph; who, after having helped up the ass, replaced the fagots, and washed his hands, got again upon his horse; the old man in the mean time crying out, "Oh youth, may God reward thee!" Soon after

[x] Abulfeda, p. 279.
[y] Ibid.
[z] Bohadin Vit. Salad. p. 73. Of this work, p. 439.
[a] Arist. Ethic. Nicom. x. 4. and Not. in Carm. Tograi, p. 25.

this, the caliph's company overtook him, whom he generously commanded to present the old man with a noble largess of gold.[b]

To this instance of generosity we subjoin another of resentment.

The Grecian emperors used to pay the caliphs a tribute. This the emperor Nicephorus would pay no longer; and not only that, but requiring the caliph in a haughty manner to refund all he had received, added that, if he refused, the sword should decide the controversy. The caliph had no sooner read the letter, than, inflamed with rage, he inscribes upon the back of it the following answer.

"In the name of the most merciful God: from Harun, prince of the faithful, to Nicephorus, dog of the Romans. I have read thy epistle, thou son of an unbelieving mother: to which, what thou shalt behold, and not what thou shalt hear, shall serve for an answer."

He immediately upon the very day decamped, marched as far as Heraclia, and, filling all things with rapine and slaughter, extorted from Nicephorus the performance of his contract.[c]

The following is an instance of a calmer magnanimity. In the middle of the third century after Mahomet, one Jacub, from being originally a brazier, had made himself master of some fine provinces, which he governed at will, though professing (like the Eastern governors of later times) a seeming deference to his proper sovereign.

The caliph, not satisfied with this apparent submission, sent a legate to persuade him into a more perfect obedience. Jacub, who was then ill, sent for the legate into his presence, and there shewed him three things, which he had prepared for his inspection—a sword, some black barley bread, and a bundle of onions. He then informed the legate, that, should he die of his present disorder, the caliph in such case would find no further trouble. But if the contrary should happen, there could be then no arbitrator to decide between them, excepting that, pointing to the sword. He added, that if fortune should prove adverse, should he be conquered by the caliph, and stripped of his possessions, he was then resolved to return to his ancient frugality, pointing to the black bread and the bundle of onions.[d]

To former instances of munificence we add the following, concerning the celebrated Almamun.[e]

Being once at Damascus, and in great want of money, he complained of it to his brother Mostasem. His brother assured him he should have money in a few days, and sent immediately for thirty thousand pieces of gold from the revenues of those provinces which he governed in the name of his brother. When the money arrived, brought by the royal beasts of burden, Al-

[b] Abulpharagius, p. 166.
[c] Abulfeda, p. 166, 167.
[d] Abulfeda, p. 214.
[e] Ibid. p. 326.

mamun invited Jahia the son of Actam, one of his favourites, to attend him on horseback, and view what was brought. They went, accordingly, and beheld the treasure arranged in the finest order, and the camels, too, which had brought it, richly decorated. The prince admired both the quantity of the money and the elegance of the show; and as his courtiers looked on with no less admiration, he bid them be of good cheer. Then turning about to Jahia, "O! Abu Mahommed," says he, "we should be sordid, indeed, were we to depart hence with all this money, as if it were scraped up for ourselves alone, whilst our longing friends look on to no purpose." Calling, therefore, immediately for a notary, he commands him to write down for such a family so many thousands, for such a family so many, and so on, never stopping till, out of the thirty thousand pieces, he had given away twenty-four thousand, without so much as taking his foot out of the stirrup.[f]

From munificence we pass to another quality, which, though less amiable, is not less striking and popular, I mean magnificence.

The splendour of the caliph Moctader, when he received the ambassador of the Greek emperor at Bagdad, seems hardly credible. We relate it from one of their historians, precisely as we find it.

The caliph's whole army, both horse and foot, were under arms, which together made a body of one hundred and sixty thousand men. His state-officers stood near him in the most splendid apparel, their belts shining with gold and gems. Near them were seven thousand eunuchs; four thousand white, the remainder of them black. The porters, or door-keepers, were in number seven hundred. Barges and boats with the most superb decoration were swimming on the Tigris. Nor was the palace itself less splendid, in which were hung up thirty-eight thousand pieces of tapestry; twelve thousand five hundred of which were of silk, embroidered with gold. The carpets on the floor were twenty-two thousand. An hundred lions were brought out, with a keeper to each lion.

Among the other spectacles of rare and stupendous luxury, was a tree of gold and silver, which opened itself into eighteen larger branches, upon which, and the other less branches, sat birds of every sort, made also of gold and silver. The tree glittered with leaves of the same metals, and while its branches, through machinery, appeared to move of themselves, the several birds upon them warbled their proper and natural notes.

When the Greek ambassador was introduced to the caliph, he was led by the vizier through all this magnificence.[g]

But besides magnificence of this kind, which was at best but

[f] Abulfeda, p. 189.

[g] Abulfeda, p. 237. This, according to the Christian era, happened in the year 917.

temporary, the caliphs gave instances of grandeur more permanent. Some of them provided public buildings for the reception of travellers, supplied the roads with wells and watering-places, measured out the distances by columns of stone, and established posts and couriers. Others repaired old temples, or built magnificent new ones. The provision of snow (which in hot countries is almost a necessary) was not forgotten. Add to this, forums, or public places for merchants to assemble; infirmaries; observatories, with proper instruments for the use of astronomers; libraries, schools, and colleges for students; together with societies, instituted for philosophical inquiry.[h]

In the account of the Escurial Arabic manuscripts, lately given by the learned Casiri, it appears that the public libraries in Spain, when under the Arabian princes, were no fewer than seventy: a noble help this to literature, when copies of books were so rare and expensive.[i]

A transaction between one of the caliph of Bagdad's ambassadors and the court of Constantinople is here subjoined, in order to illustrate the then manners, both of the ambassador and the court.

As this court was a remnant of the ancient imperial one under the Cæsars, it still retained, (as was natural,) after its dominions were so much lessened, an attachment to that pomp and those minute ceremonials, which in the zenith of its power it had been able to enforce. It was an affection for this shadow of grandeur, when the substance was in a manner gone, that induced the emperor Constantine Porphyrogenitus to write no less than a large folio book upon its ceremonials.[k]

It was in consequence of the same principles, that the above ambassador, though coming from the caliph, was told to make a humble obeisance, as he approached the Grecian emperor. This the ambassador (who had his national pride also) absolutely refusing, it was ingeniously contrived that he should be introduced to the emperor through a door so very low, as might oblige him, however unwillingly, to make the obeisance required. The ambassador, when he arrived, no sooner saw the door, than he com-

[h] Many things are enumerated in this paragraph, to confirm which we subjoin the following references among many omitted.

For buildings to accommodate travellers. Abulfed. p. 154. Abulphar. p. 315, 316.

For wells upon the road, watering-places, and mile-stones, Abulfed. p. 154; for posts and couriers, the same, p. 157. 263.

For temples, Abulfed. p. 125. Abulphar. p. 210. 315, 316.

For snow, Abulfed. p. 154. Abulphar. p. 261. Bohadin, p. 70.

For infirmaries, Abulphar. p. 210. 343.

For observatories, public schools, &c. Abulphar. p. 216.

For learned societies, Abulphar. p. 217. Abulfed. p. 181, 182, 183. 210. 274. Bohadin Vit. Salad. p. 25.

Among their philosophical transactions was a mensuration of the earth's circumference, made by order of the caliph Almamun, which they brought to about twenty-four thousand miles.

[i] Vid. Biblioth. Arabico-Hispan. vol. ii. p. 71. Matriti, 1770.

[k] See before, p. 471, note *m*.

prehended the contrivance, and with great readiness turned about, and entered the room backward.[1]

We have said little concerning eminent Arabians during this period in Spain. Yet that we may not be wholly silent, we shall mention one fact concerning Averroes, the famous philosopher and lawyer, who was born at Corduba in the eleventh century.

As he was lecturing one day in the college of lawyers, a slave, belonging to one who was his enemy, came and whispered him. Averroes turning round, and saying, "Well, well," the company believed the slave had brought him a message from his master. The next day the slave returned, implored his pardon, and publicly confessed that, when he had whispered him, he had spoken a slander. "God forgive thee," replied Averroes; "thou hast publicly shewn me to be a patient man; and as for thy injury, it is not worthy of notice." Averroes after this gave him money, adding withal this monition, "What thou hast done to me, do not do to another."[m]

And here, before we conclude this chapter, we cannot help confessing, that the facts we have related are not always arranged in the strict order of chronology.

The modes, indeed, of history (if these chapters merit that name) appear to be different. There is a mode which we may call historical declamation; a mode where the author, dwelling little upon facts, indulges himself in various and copious reflections.

Whatever good (if any) may be derived from this method, it is not likely to give us much knowledge of facts.

Another mode is that which I call general, or rather public history; a mode abundant in facts, where treaties and alliances, battles and sieges, marches and retreats, are accurately retailed; together with dates, descriptions, tables, plans, and all the collateral helps, both of chronology and geography.

In this, no doubt, there is utility. Yet the sameness of the events resembles not a little the sameness of human bodies. One head, two shoulders, two legs, &c. seem equally to characterize an European and an African; a native of Old Rome, and a native of Modern.

A third species of history still behind, is that which gives a sample of sentiments and manners.

If the account of these last be faithful, it cannot fail being instructive, since we view through these the interior of human nature. It is by these we perceive what sort of animal man is; so that while not only Europeans are distinguished from Asiatics, but English from French, French from Italians, and (what is still more) every individual from his neighbour, we view at the same time one nature, which is common to them all.

[1] Abulphar.

[m] Fabric. Bibl. Græc. vol. xiii. p. 283, 284.

Horace informs us that a drama, where the sentiments and manners are well preserved, will please the audience more than a pompous fable where they are wanting.[n] Perhaps what is true in dramatic composition, is not less true in historical.

Plutarch, among the Greek historians, appears in a peculiar manner to have merited this praise. So likewise Bohadin among the Arabians, and to him we add Abulpharagius and Abulfeda, from whom so many facts in these chapters are taken.

Nor ought I to omit (as I shall soon refer to them) some of our best monkish historians, though prone upon occasion to degenerate into the incredible. As they often lived during the times which they described, it was natural they should paint the life and the manners which they saw.

A single chapter more will finish all we have to say concerning the Arabians.

CHAPTER VIII.

ARABIANS FAVOURED MEDICINE AND ASTROLOGY—FACTS RELATIVE TO THESE TWO SUBJECTS—THEY VALUED KNOWLEDGE, BUT HAD NO IDEAS OF CIVIL LIBERTY—THE MEAN EXIT OF THEIR LAST CALIPH, MOSTASEM—END OF THEIR EMPIRE IN ASIA AND IN SPAIN—THEIR PRESENT WRETCHED DEGENERACY IN AFRICA—AN ANECDOTE.

The Arabians favoured medicine and astrology, and many of their princes had professors of each sort usually near their persons. Self-love, a natural passion, led them to respect the art of healing; fear, another natural passion, made them anxious to know the future; and superstition believed there were men, who, by knowing the stars, could discover it.

We shall first say something concerning medicine,[o] which we are sorry to couple with so futile an imposture.

It is commonly supposed that the prescriber of medicines and the provider, that is to say, in common words, the physician and the apothecary, were characters anciently united in the same person. The following fact proves the contrary, at least among the Orientals.

In an army commanded by Aphshin, an officer of the caliph Al-Mostasem, it happened that Aphshin and the army physician, Zacharias, were discoursing together. "I assert," says Zacharias, "you can send for nothing from an apothecary, but, whether he has it or has it not, he will affirm that he has." Aphshin, willing to make the trial, bids them bring him a catalogue of unknown people, and transcribing out of it about twenty of their names, sends messengers to the apothecaries to provide him those medi-

[n] Sup. p. 445, in the note.

[o] Abulphar. p. 160.

cines. A few confessed they knew no such medicines; others affirmed they knew them well, and taking the money from the messengers, gave them something out of their shops. Aphshin, upon this, called them together, permitted those who said they knew nothing of the medicines to remain in the camp, and commanded the rest that instant to depart.[p]

The following story is more interesting.

The caliph Mottawakkel had a physician belonging to him, who was a Christian, named Honaïn. One day, after some other incidental conversation, "I would have thee," says the caliph, "teach me a prescription, by which I may take off any enemy I please, and yet at the same time it should never be discovered." Honaïn, declining to give an answer, and pleading ignorance, was imprisoned.

Being brought again, after a year's interval, into the caliph's presence, and still persisting in his ignorance, though threatened with death, the caliph smiled upon him, and said, "Be of good cheer; we were only willing to try thee, that we might have the greater confidence in thee."

As Honaïn upon this bowed down and kissed the earth, "What hindered thee," says the caliph, "from granting our request, when thou sawest us appear so ready to perform what we had threatened?" "Two things," replied Honaïn; "my religion, and my profession: my religion, which commands me to do good to my enemies; my profession, which was purely instituted for the benefit of mankind." "Two noble laws," said the caliph; and immediately presented him (according to the Eastern usage) with rich garments and a sum of money.[q]

The same caliph was once sitting upon a bench with another of his physicians, named Bactish, who was dressed in a tunic of rich silk, but which happened on the edge to have a small rent. The caliph, entering into discourse with him, continued playing with this rent, till he had made it reach up to his girdle. In the course of their conversation, the caliph asked him, "How he could determine when a person was so mad as to require being bound?" "We bind him," replies Bactish, "when things proceed to that extremity, that he tears the tunic of his physician up to the girdle." The caliph fell backward in a fit of laughing, and ordered Bactish (as he had ordered Honaïn) a present of rich garments, and a donation in money.[r]

That such freedom of conversation was not always checked, may appear from the following, as well as the preceding narrative.

The caliph Al-wathick was once fishing with a rod and line, upon a raft in the river Tigris. As he happened to catch nothing, he turned about to his physician John, the son of Misna, then sitting near him, and said a little sharply, "Thou

[p] Abulphar. p. 167. [q] Ibid. p. 172, 173. [r] Ibid. p. 171.

unlucky fellow, get thee gone." "Commander of the faithful," replies his physician, "say not what is absurd. That John, the son of Misna, whose father was an obscure man, and whose mother was purchased for a few pieces of silver; whom fortune has so far favoured, that he has been admitted to the society and familiarity of caliphs; who is so overpowered with the good things of life, as to have obtained from them that to which even his hopes did not aspire; that he (I say) should be an unlucky fellow, is surely something most absurd.

"However, if the commander of the faithful would have me tell him, who is unlucky, I will inform him." "And who is he?" says the caliph. "The man," replied John, "who being sprung from four caliphs, and being then raised through God to the caliphate himself, can leave his caliphate and his palaces, and in the middle of the Tigris sit upon a paltry raft, twenty cubits broad and as many long, without the least assurance that a stormy blast may not sink him; resembling, too, by his employ, the poorest, the worst fellows in the world; I mean fishermen."

The prince on this singular discourse only remarked, "My companion I find is moved, if my presence did not restrain him."[s]

Another instance of lenity I must not omit, though in a later period, and in another country. When Al-azis was sultan of Egypt, a poet there wrote a scandalous invective upon him and his vizier. The vizier complained, and repeated the verses to Al-azis, to whom the Sultan thus replied: "I perceive," says he, "that in this invective I have my share along with yóu: in pardoning it, yóu shall have your share along with mé."[t]

We are now, as we promised, to mention astrology, which seems to have been connected in its origin with astronomy. Philosophers, men of veracity, studied the heavenly bodies; and it was upon their labours that impostors built astrology.

The following facts, however, notwithstanding its temporary credit, seem not much in its favour.

When Al-wathick (the caliph whom we have just mentioned) was dangerously ill, he sent for his astrologers, one of whom, pretending to inquire into his destiny, pronounced that from that day he would live fifty years. He did not however live beyond ten days.[u]

A few years after, the same pretenders to prediction said, that a vast number of countries would be destroyed by floods; that the rains would be immense, and the rivers far exceed their usual boundaries.

Men began upon this to prepare; to expect inundations with terror; and to betake themselves into places which might protect them by their altitude.

The event was far from corresponding either to the threats of

[s] Abulpharag. p. 168. [t] Ibid. p. 219. [u] Ibid. p. 168.

the prophets or to the fears of the vulgar. The rain that season was so remarkably small, and so many springs and rivers were absorbed by the drought, that public supplications for rain were many times made in the city of Bagdad.[x]

We must however confess that, notwithstanding these and many other such failures, astrologers still maintained their ground, gained admittance for many years into the courts of these princes, and were consulted by many, who appear not to have wanted abilities.

As the West of Europe learned astronomy from these Arabians, so astrology appears to have attended it, and to have been much esteemed during centuries not remote, through Germany, Italy, France, &c.

Even so late as the days of cardinal Mazarine, when that minister lay on his death-bed, and a comet happened to appear, there were not wanting flatterers to insinuate, that it had reference to him, and his destiny. The cardinal answered them, with a manly pleasantry, "Messieurs, la comete me fait trop d'honneur."[y]

We cannot quit these Orientals without observing, that, though they eagerly coveted the fair fruit of knowledge, they appear to have had little relish for the fairer fruit of liberty. This valuable plant seems to have rarely flourished beyond the bounds of Europe, and seldom even there, but in particular regions.

It has appeared, indeed, from the facts already alleged, that these Eastern princes often shewed many eminent virtues; the virtues, I mean, of candour, magnanimity, affability, compassion, liberality, justice, and the like. But it does not appear, that either they or their subjects ever quitted those ideas of despotism and servitude, which during all ages appear to have been the characteristic of Oriental dominion.

As all things human naturally decay, so, after a period of more than five centuries, did the illustrious race of the Abasidæ. The last reigning caliph of that family, Al-Mostasem, wasting his time in idleness and luxury, and that without the least judgment, or consistency in the conduct of his empire; when he was told of the formidable approach of the Tartars, and how necessary it was, either to soothe them by submission, or to oppose them by force, made, in answer to this advice, the following mean reply: "For me, Bagdad suffices; which they will not surely think too much, if I yield them the other provinces. They will not invade me while I remain there; for this is my mansion, and the place of my abode."

Little did these poor sentiments avail. Bagdad soon after was taken, and he himself, having basely asked permission to approach the Tartar prince, appeared, and offered him dishes, filled with pearls and precious stones. These the Tartar dis-

[x] Abulpharag. p. 181. Abulfeda, p. 222.

[y] Bayle, sur la Cométe.

tributed among his attendants, and a few days after put the unhappy caliph to death.[a]

Bagdad being lost by this fatal event, the dignity and sovereignty of the caliphs were no more.

The name indeed remained in Egypt under the Mamlucs, but it was a name merely of honour, as those other princes were absolute.

It even continued in the same family to the time of Selim, emperor of the Turks. When that emperor in 1520 conquered Egypt, and destroyed the Mamlucs, he carried the caliph, whom he found there, a prisoner to Constantinople. It was partly in this last city and partly in Egypt that this caliph, when degraded, lived upon a pension. When he died, the family of the Abassidæ, once so illustrious, and which had borne the title of Caliph for almost eight hundred years, sunk with him from obscurity into oblivion.[a]

When the Tartars and the Turks had extinguished the sovereignty of these Arabians in the East, and the descendants of the ancient Spaniards had driven them out of Spain, the remainder in Africa soon degenerated; till at length, under the celebrated Muly Ismael, in the beginning of this century, they sunk into a state of ignorance, barbarity, and abject servitude, hardly to be equalled either in ancient or in modern history.

But I say nothing concerning them during this unhappy period. That which I have been treating, though in chronology a middle period, was to them, in many respects, a truly golden one.

I conclude this chapter with the following anecdote, so far curious, as it proves that, even in our own century, the taste among the Orientals for philosophy was not totally extinguished.

In the year 1721, a Turkish envoy came to the court of France. As he was a man of learning, he searched through Paris (though in vain) for the Commentary of Averroes upon Aristotle, a large work in Latin, containing five folio volumes, printed at Venice by the Juntæ, in the years 1552, 1553. It happened that, visiting the king's library, he saw the book he wanted; and seeing it, he could not help expressing his ardent wish to possess it. The king of France, hearing what had happened, ordered the volumes to be magnificently bound, and presented him by his librarian, the abbé Bignon.[b]

[a] Abulpharag. p. 318. 337, 338, 339. These events happened in the middle of the thirteenth century.

[a] See the supplement of that excellent scholar, Pococke, to his edition of Abulpharagius. In this supplement we have a short but accurate account of the caliphs who succeeded Mostasem, even to the time of their extinction.

See also Herbelot's Biblioth. Orientale, under the word *Abassides*, with the several references to other articles in the same work.

[b] Vid. Reimanni Histor. Atheismi et Atheorum, 8vo. p. 537.

CHAPTER IX.

CONCERNING THE LATINS OR FRANKS—BEDE, ALCUIN, JOANNES ERIGENA, ETC. GERBERTUS, OR GIBERTUS, TRAVELLED TO THE ARABIANS IN SPAIN FOR IMPROVEMENT—SUSPECTED OF MAGIC—THIS THE MISFORTUNE OF MANY SUPERIOR GENIUSES IN DARK AGES; OF BACON, PETRARCH, FAUST, AND OTHERS—ERUDITION OF THE CHURCH; IGNORANCE OF THE LAITY—INGULPHUS, AN ENGLISHMAN, EDUCATED IN THE COURT OF EDWARD THE CONFESSOR—ATTACHED HIMSELF TO THE DUKE OF NORMANDY—ACCOMPLISHED CHARACTER OF QUEEN EGITHA, WIFE OF THE CONFESSOR—PLAN OF EDUCATION IN THOSE DAYS—THE PLACES OF STUDY, THE AUTHORS STUDIED—CANON LAW, CIVIL LAW, HOLY WAR, INQUISITION—TROUBADOURS—WILLIAM OF POICTOU—DEBAUCHERY, CORRUPTION, AND AVARICE OF THE TIMES—WILLIAM THE CONQUEROR, HIS CHARACTER AND TASTE—HIS SONS, RUFUS AND HENRY—LITTLE INCIDENTS CONCERNING THEM—HILDEBERT, A POET OF THE TIMES—FINE VERSES OF HIS QUOTED.

I PASS now to another race, the Latins, or inhabitants of Western Europe, who in this middle age were often by the Arabians, their contemporaries, called Franks.

Ignorance was their general character, yet individuals we except in the enumeration which follows.

Bede, called *the venerable* from his respectable character, was an Englishman; was born in the seventh century, but flourished in the eighth; and left many works, critical, historical, and theological, behind him.

Alcuin (sometimes called Alcuinus, sometimes Flaccus Albinus) was Bede's disciple, and like him an Englishman. He was famous for having been preceptor to Charlemagne, and much in his favour for many years.[c]

Joannes Erigena, a native of Scotland, and who, about the same period or a little later, lived sometimes in France and sometimes in England, appears to have understood Greek; a rare accomplishment for those countries in those days.

It is related of him, that when he was once sitting at table over-against the emperor, Charles the Bald, the emperor asked him, How far distant a Scot was from a sot? As far, sir, replied he, as the table's length.[d]

[c] The grammatical works of these two, together with those of other grammarians, were published in quarto by Putschius, at Hanover, in the year 1605. Those who would learn more concerning them, may consult Fabricius and Cave.

[d] In the original, taken from Roger de Hoveden, Annal. pars prior, it is, Quid distat inter Sotum et Scotum? The answer was, Tabula tantum.

We have translated *sotum*, sot, in order to preserve the emperor's dull pun, though perhaps not quite agreeably to its proper meaning.

The word Scotum plainly decides the country of this learned man, which some seem, without reason, to have doubted.

A treatise of his, which appears to be metaphysical, entitled De Divisione Naturæ, was printed in a thin folio at Oxford, in the year 1681.

Adelard, a monk of Bath, for the sake of mathematical knowledge travelled into Spain, Egypt, and Arabia, and translated Euclid out of Arabic into Latin, about the year 1130. Robert of Reading, a monk, travelled into Spain on the same account, and wrote about the year 1143.[e]

They found, by fatal experience, that little information was to be had at home, and therefore ventured upon these perilous journeys abroad.

Gerbertus, or Gibertus, a native of France, flourished a little before them in the tenth century, called (though not on his account) *sæculum obscurum*, "the dark age." His ardent love for mathematical knowledge carried him too from his own country into Spain, that he might there learn science from the learned Arabians.

After an uncommon proficiency in the mathematics, and after having recommended himself for his learning and abilities both to Robert, king of France, and to the emperor Otho, he became first archbishop of Rheims, then of Ravenna, and at length pope, by the name of Sylvester the Second.

His three capital preferments being at Rheims, Ravenna, and Rome, each beginning with an R, gave occasion to the following barbarous verse,

Transit ab R Gerbertus ad R, post papa viget R.[f]

It is singular that not his sacerdotal, nor even his pontifical character could screen him from the imputation of magic, incurred merely, as it should seem, from his superior ingenuity.

A bishop Otho, who lived in the next century, gravely relates of him, that he obtained the pontificate by wicked arts; for in his youth, when he was nothing more than a simple monk, having left his monastery, he gave himself up wholly to the devil, on condition he might obtain that which he desired.

Soon after this, the same historian, having given an account of his gradual rise, subjoins, that at length, by the devil's help, he was made Roman pontiff; but then it was upon compact, that after his decease, he should wholly in body and soul belong to him, through whose frauds he had acquired so great a dignity.[g]

A cardinal Benno, of nearly the same age with this bishop

[e] See Wallis's preface to his Algebra, fol. Lond. 1685. p. 5.

[f] See Brown's Fasciculus rerum expetendar. et fugiendar. vol. ii. p. 83.

[g] Hic (scilicet Gerbertus) malis artibus pontificatum obtinuit, eo quod ab adolescentia, cum monachus esset, relicto monasterio, se totum diabolo obtulit, modo quod optabat obtineret. And soon after, a short narrative of his rise being given, the historian subjoins — Postremo Romanus pontifex diabolo adjuvante fuit constitutus; hac tamen lege, ut post ejus obitum totus illius in anima et corpore esset, cujus fraudibus tantam adeptus esset dignitatem. See Bishop Otho, in Brown's Fasciculus, just quoted, vol. ii. p. 88.

Otho, speaking of the same great man, (Gerbertus, I mean,) informs us, his demon had assured him, that he should not die till he had celebrated mass at Jerusalem: that Gerbertus, mistaking this for the city so called, unwarily celebrated mass at Rome, in a church called Jerusalem, and, being deceived by the equivocation of the name, met a sudden and wretched end.[h]

As to these stories, they are of that vagabond sort, which wander from age to age, and from person to person; which find their way into the histories of distant periods, and are sometimes transferred from histories to the theatre.

The Jerusalem tale may be found in Shakspeare's Henry the Fourth; and for the compact, we have all seen it in the pantomime of Dr. Faustus.

One thing we cannot but remark: the dull contemporaries of these superior geniuses, not satisfied with referring their superiority to pre-eminence merely natural, recurred absurdly to power supernatural, deeming nothing less could so far exceed themselves.

Such was the case of the able scholar just mentioned. Such, some centuries afterward, was the case of Roger Bacon, of Francis Petrarch, of John Faust, and many others.

Bacon's knowledge of glasses, and of the telescope in particular, made them apply to him literally, what Virgil had said poetically:

Carmina vel cælo possunt deducere lunam.

Virgil himself had been foolishly thought a magician; and therefore, because Petrarch was delighted with the study of so capital an author, even Petrarch also was suspected of magic.

For John Faust, as he was either the inventor, or among the first practisers of the art of printing, it is no wonder the ignorant vulgar should refer to diabolical assistance, a power which multiplied books in a manner to them so incomprehensible.

This digression has led us to examples rather against chronological order; though all of them included within that age of which we are writing.[i] For the honour, too, of the church, these falsely-accused geniuses were all of them ecclesiastics. Indeed, the rest of Western Europe was in a manner wholly barbarous, composed of ignorant barons, and their more ignorant vassals; men, like Homer's Cimmerians,

Ἠέρι καὶ νεφέλῃ κεκαλυμμένοι.

"With fog and cloud enveloped."

From these we pass, or rather go back, to Ingulphus, an ec-

[h] See the same Fascicul. p. 88.

[i] Bacon lived in the thirteenth century; Petrarch, in the fourteenth; Faust, in the fifteenth. See a curious book of Gabriel Naude, a learned Frenchman of the last century, entitled Apologie pour les grand Hommes, accusées de Magie.

clesiastic, and an historian, valuable for having lived during an interesting time, and in interesting places.

He was by birth an Englishman, and had been educated in the court of Edward the Confessor; went thence to the court of the Duke of Normandy, to whose favour he was admitted, and there preferred. Some time after this, when the successful expedition of that duke had put him in possession of the crown of England, the duke (then William the Conqueror) recalled him from Normandy; took him into favour here, and made him at length abbot of Croyland, where he died advanced in years.[k]

Ingulphus tells us, that king Edward's queen, Egitha, was admirable for her beauty, her literary accomplishments, and her virtue.

He relates, that being a boy he frequently saw queen Egitha, when he visited his father in king Edward's court; that many times when he met her, as he was coming from school, she used to dispute with him about his learning and his verses; that she had a peculiar pleasure to pass from grammar to logic, in which she had been instructed; and that, when she had entangled him there with some subtle conclusion, she used to bid one of her attendants give him two or three pieces of money, and carry him to the royal pantry, where he was treated with a repast.[l]

As to the manners of the times, he tells us, that the whole nation began to lay aside the English customs, and in many things to imitate the manners of the French; all the men of quality to speak the Gallic idiom in their houses, as a high strain of gentility; to draw their charters and public instruments after the manner of the French; and in these and many other things to be ashamed of their own customs.[m]

Some years before the conquest, the duke of Normandy (whom Ingulphus calls most illustrious and glorious) made a visit to England, attended with a grand retinue. King Edward received him honourably, kept him a long while, carried him round to see his cities and castles, and at length sent him home with many rich presents.[n]

Ingulphus says, that at this time duke William had no hopes of his succession, nor was any mention made of it; yet considering the settlement of the crown made upon him soon afterward, and the reception he then found, this should hardly seem probable.

King Edward, according to Ingulphus, had great merit in remitting the Dane-gelt, that heavy tax imposed upon the people by the Danish usurpers, his immediate predecessors.[o]

As to literary matters, it has appeared that the queen, besides

[k] See Ingulphus's History, in the preface to the Oxford edition of the year 1684. See also p. 75 of the work itself.

[l] See the same Ingulphus, p. 62.

[m] Ibid. p. 62.

[n] Ibid. p. 65. 68.

[o] Ibid. p. 65.

the usual accomplishments of the times, (which she undoubtedly possessed,) had been instructed also in superior sorts of knowledge. She may be supposed, therefore, to have surpassed not only her own court, but perhaps other courts since, as they have seldom more to boast than the fashionable polish.

For the literary qualifications of our historian himself, we perceive something of his education in what we have already quoted from him. He is more particular afterwards, when he tells that he was first bred at Westminster, and then sent to Oxford; that in the first he learned grammar, in the last he studied Aristotle and the rhetoric of Cicero: that finding himself superior to many of his contemporaries, and disdaining the littleness of his own family, he left home, sought the palaces of kings and princes, &c. &c. It was thus that, after a variety of events, he became secretary to the duke of Normandy, afterwards William the Conqueror, and so pursued his fortune till he became abbot of Croyland.[p]

We shall only remark on this narrative, that Westminster and Oxford seem to have been destined to the same purposes then as now; that the scholar at Westminster was to begin, and at Oxford was to finish: a plan of education which still exists; which is not easy to be mended; and which can plead so ancient and so uninterrupted a prescription.

Nearly the same time, a monk, by name Gratian, collecting the numerous decrees of popes and synods, was the first who published a body of canon law.[q] It was then, also, or a little earlier, that Amalfi, a city of Calabria, being taken by the Pisans, they discovered there, by chance, an original MS. of Justinian's Code, which had been in a manner unknown from the time of that emperor.[r] This curious book was brought to Pisa; and, when Pisa was taken by the Florentines, was transferred to Florence, and there has continued even to this day.

And thus it was, that by singular fortune the civil and canon law, having been about the same time promulged, gradually found their way into most of the Western governments, changing more or less their municipal laws, and changing with those laws the very forms of their constitutions.

It was soon after happened that wild enthusiasm which carried so many thousands from the West into the East, to prosecute what was thought, or at least called, a holy war.[s]

After the numerous histories, ancient and modern, of these crusades, it would be superfluous to say more than to observe that, by repeating them, men appear to have grown worse; to

[p] See Ingulphus's History, p. 73. 75.

[q] This happened in the year 1157. See Duck De Auctoritate Juris Civilis Romanor. p. 66. 88. edit. Lond. 1679.

[r] Ibid. p. 66. Amalfi was taken by the Pisans in the year 1127.

[s] It began in the year 1095. See Fuller's Holy War, book i. ch. 8. William of Malmesbury, lib. iv. c. 2. among the Scriptores post Bedam.

have become more savage, and greater barbarians. It was so late as during one of the last of them, that these crusaders sacked the Christian city of Constantinople;[t] and that while these were committing unheard-of cruelties in that capital of Christendom, another party of them, nearer home, were employed in massacring the innocent Albigeois.[u]

So great was the zeal of extirpation, that when one of these home crusades was going to storm the city of Bezieres, a city filled with catholics as well as heretics, a scruple arose, that, by such a measure, the good might perish as well as the bad. "Kill them all," said an able sophist, "kill them all, and God will know his own."[v]

To discover these Albigeois, the home crusades were attended by a band of monks, whose business was to inquire after offenders called heretics. When the crusade was finished, the monks, like the dregs of an empty vessel, still remained, and deriving from the crusade their authority, from the canon law their judicial forms, became, by these two, (I mean the crusade and canon law,) that formidable court, the court of inquisition.

But in these latter events we rather anticipate, for they did not happen till the beginning of the thirteenth century, whereas the first crusade was towards the end of the eleventh.[x]

About the beginning of the eleventh century, and for a century or two after, flourished the tribe of troubadours, or Provençal poets,[y] who chiefly lived in the courts of those princes that had sovereignties in or near Provence, where the Provençal language was spoken. It was in this language they wrote: a language which, though obsolete now, was then esteemed the best in Europe, being prior to the Italian of Dante and Petrarch.

They were called troubadours from *trouver*, "to find" or "to invent,"[z] like the Greek appellation, *poet*, which means (we know) "a maker."

Their subjects were mostly gallantry and love, in which their licentious ideas, we are told, were excessive. Princes did not

[t] In the year 1204. See the same Fuller, b. iii. c. 17; and Nicetas the Choniate, already quoted at large, from p. 472 to 475.

[u] The crusades against them began in the year 1206; the massacres were during the whole course of the war; see Fuller's Holy War, b. iii. from c. 18 to 22. especially c. 21; and Mosheim's Church History, under the article *Albigenses*.

[v] Tuez les tous: Dieu connoit ceux, qui sont a lui. Histoire de Troubadours, vol. i. p. 193.

[x] In the year 1095 or 1096. Fuller's Holy War, p, 21; and William of Malmesbury, before quoted.

It is to be remarked, that these two events, I mean the sacking of Constantinople, and the massacres of the Albigeois, happened more than a hundred years after this Holy War had been begun, and after its more splendid parts were past; that is to say, the taking of Jerusalem, the establishment of a kingdom there, (which lasted eighty years,) and the gallant efforts of Cœur de Leon against Saladin. All against the Saracens, that followed, was languid, and, for the greater part of it, adverse.

[y] See a work, 3 vols. 12mo. entitled, Histoire Litteraire de Troubadours, printed at Paris 1774, where there is an ample detail both of them and their poems.

[z] See Hist. de Troub. vol. i. Discours prelim. p. 25.

disdain to be of their number;[a] such, among others, as our Richard Cœur de Leon, and the celebrated William count of Poictou, who was a contemporary with William the Conqueror and his sons.

A sonnet or two, made by Richard, are preserved; but they are obscure, and, as far as intelligible, of little value.[b]

The sonnets of William of Poictou, now remaining, are (as we are informed) of the most licentious kind, for a more licentious man never existed.[c]

Historians tell us, that near one of his castles he founded a sort of abbey for women of pleasure, and appointed the most celebrated among his ladies to the offices of abbess, prioress, &c.; that he dismissed his wife, and taking the wife of a certain viscount, lived with her publicly; that being excommunicated for this by Girard, bishop of Angouleme, and commanded to put away his unlawful companion, he replied, "Thou shalt sooner curl hair upon that bald pate of thine, than will I submit to a divorce from the viscountess;" that having received a like rebuke, attended with an excommunication from his own bishop, the bishop of Poictou, he seized him by the hair, and was about to despatch him, but suddenly stopped by saying, "I have that aversion to thee, thou shalt never enter heaven through the assistance of my hand.[d]

If I might be permitted to digress, I would observe that Hamlet has adopted precisely the same sentiment. When he declines the opportunity offered him of killing the king at his prayers, he has the following expressions, among many others:

> A villain kills my father, and for that
> I, his sole son, do this same villain send
> To heav'n—O! this is hire and salary,
> Not revenge. Act iii. sc. 10.

It is hard to defend so strange a sentiment either in Hamlet or the count. We shall only remark, that Hamlet, when he delivered it, was perfectly cool; the count, agitated by impetuous rage.

This count, as he grew older, became, as many others have done, from a profligate a devotee; engaged in one of the first crusades; led a large body of troops into the East; from which, however, after his troops had been routed, and most of them destroyed, he himself returned with ignominy home.[e]

[a] Hist. de Troub. vol. i. p. 25.

[b] Ibid. p. 54.

[c] Ibid. p. 7.

As to his famous abbey or nunnery, soon after mentioned, see the same work, p. 3, 4; but more particularly and authentically, see William of Malmesbury, a writer nearly contemporary, and from whom the narrative here given is taken. The passage in Malmesbury begins with the words, Erat tum Willielmus, comes Pictavorum, &c. p. 96. edit. Londin. fol. 1596.

[d] The words in Malmesbury are, Nec cœlum unquam intrabis meæ manus ministerio, p. 96.

[e] See the same William of Malmesbury, p. 75. 84.

The loose gallantry of these troubadours may remind us of the poetry during the reign of our second Charles; nor were the manners of one court unlike those of the other, unless that those of the court of Poictou were more abandoned of the two.

Be that as it may, we may fairly, I think, conclude, if we compare the two periods, there were men as wicked during the early period, as during the latter; and not only so, but wicked in vices of exactly the same character.

If we seek for vices of another character, we read, at the same era, concerning a neighbouring kingdom to Poictou, that "all the people of rank were so blinded with avarice, that it might be truly said of them, (according to Juvenal,)

> Not one regards the method, how he gains,
> But, fix'd his resolution, gain he must.

"The more they discoursed about right, the greater their injuries. Those who were called the justiciaries, were the head of all injustice. The sheriffs and magistrates, whose duty was justice and judgment, were more atrocious than the very thieves and robbers, and were more cruel than others, even the most cruel. The king himself, when he had leased his domains as dear as was possible, transferred them immediately to another that offered him more, and then again to another, neglecting always his former agreement, and labouring still for bargains that were greater and more profitable."[f]

Such were the good old times of good old England (for it is of England we have been reading) during the reign of our conqueror, William.

And yet if we measure greatness (as is too often the case with heroes) by any other measure than that of moral rectitude, we cannot but admit that he must have been great, who could conquer a country so much larger than his own, and transmit the permanent possession of it to his family. The numerous Norman families with which he filled this island, and the very few Saxon ones which he suffered to remain, sufficiently shew us the extent of this revolution.

As to his taste, (for it is taste we investigate, as often as we are able,) there is a curious fact related of him by John of Salisbury, a learned writer, who lived as early as the times of Stephen and Henry the Second.

This author informs us, that William, after he was once settled in the peaceable possession of his kingdom, sent ambassadors to foreign nations, that they should collect for him, out of all the celebrated mansions, whatever should appear to them magnificent or admirable.

[f] See Henrici Huntindoniensis Histor. l. vii. p. 212, inter Scriptores post Bedam, edit. London. 1594, beginning from the words, *Principes omnes*, &c. The verse from Juvenal is,

Unde habeat, quærit nemo, sed oportet habere.

Our author cannot help allowing that this was the laudable project of a great man, desirous of pouring into his own dominions all that was excellent in others.[g]

It does not appear what these rarities were, but it sufficiently shews the Conqueror to have had a genius superior to the barbarity of his age.

One may imagine he was not ignorant of Ovid, and the ancient mythology, by his answer to Philip king of France.

William, as he became old, grew to an unwieldy bulk. The king of France, in a manner not very polite, asked of him, (with reference to this bulk,) "When, as he had been so long in breeding, he expected to be brought to bed?" "Whenever that happens," replied William, "it will be, as Semele was, in flames and thunder." France soon after that felt his devastations.[h]

His son Rufus seems more nearly to have approached the character of the times.

We have a sample of his manners in the following narrative. Being immensely fond of expense in dress, when one of his attendants brought him new shoes, and was putting them on, he demanded, "How much they cost?" "Three shillings, sir," replied his attendant. "Son of a whore," says Rufus, "at so pitiful a price to provide shoes for a king! Go and purchase me some for a mark of silver."[i]

Matthew Paris writes, that he was once told of a formidable dream, relative to his death, which had been dreamed by a certain monk. Rufus, on hearing it, burst into laughter, and said, "The man is a monk, and monk-like has dreamed, to get a little money; give him a hundred shillings, that he may not think he has been dreaming for nothing."[k]

His historian, Malmesbury, after having related other facts of him, adds, "that he had neither application enough, nor leisure, ever to attend to letters."[l]

It was not so with his brother, Henry the First. He (as this historian informs us[m]) spent his youth in the schools of liberal

[g] Simile aliquid fecisse visus est rex Anglorum Vilhelmus Primus, cujus virtuti Normannia et tandem major Britannia cessit. Assumpto namque regni diademate, et pace composita, legatos misit ad exteras nationes, ut a præclaris omnium domibus, quicquid eis magnificum aut mirificum videretur, afferrent. Defluxit ergo in insulam opulentam, et quæ fere sola bonis suis est in orbe contenta, quicquid magnificentiæ, imo luxuriæ potuit inveniri. Laudabile quidem fuit magni viri propositum, qui virtutes omnium orbi suo volebat infundere. Joan. Sarisb. de Nugis Curialium, p. 480. edit. Lugd. 8vo. 1595.

[h] Quærente, sc. Philippo, numquidnam tandem pareret Guilielmus, qui tam diu gessisset uterum: se pariturum, sed instar Semeles, respondit, cum flammis et fulmine. Panciroll. Nova Reperta, tit. x. p. 219. edit. Francofurt. 1631. See this fact somewhat differently told by Matthew Paris. p. 13. edit. fol. London, 1640. The devastations here mentioned are related in the same page.

[i] William of Malmesbury, p. 69. The words of Rufus were, Fili meretricis, ex quo habet rex caligas tam exilis pretii! Vade et affer mihi emptas marca argenti.

[k] Matthew Paris, p. 53. Rufus's words were, Monachus est, et lucri causa monachiliter somniavit: da ei centum solidos, ne videatur inaniter somniasse.

[l] William of Malmesbury, p. 70.

[m] Ibid. p. 87.

science, and so greedily imbibed the sweets of literature, that in after-times, (as the same writer rather floridly relates,) no tumults of war, no agitation of cares, could ever expel them from his illustrious mind.

Soon after we meet the well-known saying of Plato, that it was then states would be happy, if philosophers were to reign, or kings were to philosophize. Our historian, having given this sentiment, tells us, (to use his own expressions,) that Henry fortified his youth with literature in a view to the kingdom; and ventured even in his father's hearing, to throw out the proverb, *Rex illiteratus, asinus coronatus*, "that an illiterate king was but an ass crowned."[n]

That the king his father, from perceiving his son's abilities, had something like a presentiment of his future dignity, may appear from the following story.

When Henry was young, one of his brothers having injured him, he complained of his ill-treatment to his father with tears. "Do not cry, child," says his father, "for thou, too, shalt be king."[o]

As Henry was a learned prince, we may suppose he was educated by learned men; and perhaps, if we attend to the account given by Ingulphus of his own education in the time of Edward the Confessor,[p] it is probable there may have been among the clergy a succession of learned men from the time of Venerable Bede.

It is certain that, in England at least, during these middle ages, learning never flourished more, than from the time of Henry the First to the reign of his grandson Henry the Second, and some years after.

The learned historian of the life of Henry the Second, (I mean the first lord Lyttleton,) has put this beyond dispute.

Perhaps, too, the times which followed were adverse to the cause of literature. The crusades had made the laity greater barbarians, if possible, than they were before. Their cruelty had been stimulated by acting against Greeks, whom they hated for schismatics, and against Saracens, whom they hated for infidels; although it was from these alone they were likely to learn, had they understood (which few of them did) a syllable of Greek or Arabic.

Add to this, the inquisition being then established in all its terrors,[q] the clergy (from whom only the cause of letters could hope any thing) found their genius insensibly checked by its gloomy terrors.

This depraved period (which lasted for a century or two) did not mend till the invention of printing, and the taking of Con-

[n] William of Malmesbury, p. 87. B.

[o] The words of William were, Ne fleas, fili; quoniam et tu rex eris. See the same author in the same page, that is, p. 87. B.

[p] Page 500, 501.

[q] See before, p. 502.

stantinople. Then it was that these, and other hidden causes, roused the genius of Italy, and restored to mankind those arts and that literature which to Western Europe had been so long unknown.

Before I conclude this chapter, I cannot but remark, that, during these inauspicious times, so generally tasteless, there were even Latins as well as Greeks[r] whom the very ruins of antique arts carried to enthusiastic admiration.

Hildebert, archbishop of Tours, who died in the year 1139, in a fine poem, which he wrote upon the city of Rome, among others has the following verses, in praise of the then remaining statues and antiquities:

Non tamen annorum series, nec flamma, nec ensis,
  Ad plenum potuit tale abolere decus.
Hic superum formas superi mirantur et ipsi,
  Et cupiunt fictis vultibus esse pares.
Nec potuit natura deos hoc ore creare,
  Quo miranda deum signa creavit homo.
Vultus[s] adest his numinibus, potiusque coluntur
  Artificum studio, quam deitate sua.[t]

It is worth observing, that the Latinity of these verses is in general pure, and that they are wholly free from the Leonine jingle.

They are thus attempted in English, for the sake of those who do not read the original.

But neither passing years, nor fire, nor sword
Have yet avail'd such beauty to annul.
Ev'n gods themselves their mimic forms admire,
And wish their own were equal to the feign'd.
Nor e'er could nature deities create
With such a countenance, as man has giv'n
To these fair statues, creatures of his own.
Worship they claim, tho' more from human art,
Than from their own divinity, ador'd.

CHAPTER X.

SCHOOLMEN—THEIR RISE, AND CHARACTER—THEIR TITLES OF HONOUR—REMARKS ON SUCH TITLES—ABELARD AND HELOISA—JOHN OF SALISBURY—ADMIRABLE QUOTATIONS FROM HIS TWO CELEBRATED WORKS—GIRALDUS CAMBRENSIS—WALTER MAPPS—RICHARD CŒUR DE LEON—HIS TRANSACTIONS WITH SALADIN—HIS DEATH, AND THE SINGULAR INTERVIEW WHICH IMMEDIATELY PRECEDED IT.

We are now to consider the state of literature with respect to other geniuses, both before the conquest and after it, so low as to the times of our first Richard.

[r] See before, what has been quoted from Nicetas the Choniate, p. 301, &c.

[s] Forsan Cultus.

[t] William of Malmesbury, p. 76. Fabricii Bibliotheca med. et infim. ætat. in voce *Hildebert.*

It was during this period began the race of schoolmen; a race much admired and followed in their day. Their subtlety was great; and though that subtlety might sometimes have led them into refinements rather frivolous, yet have they given eminent samples of penetrating ingenuity.

They began in the eleventh century, and lasted to the fourteenth, when new causes leading to new events, they gradually decreased, and were no more.

That they had some merit must be allowed, when we are told that the learned bishop Sanderson used constantly to read the Secunda Secundæ of Thomas Aquinas;[u] and that this treatise, together with Aristotle's Rhetoric, and Cicero's Offices, were three books which he always had with him, and never ceased to peruse. The scholastic tract must have been no bad one, which was so well associated.

Various epithets at the time were bestowed upon these schoolmen. There was *the irrefragable* doctor, *the subtle*, *the seraphic*, *the angelic*, &c.

There is certainly something exaggerated in the pomp of these appellations. And yet, if we reflect on our modern titles of honour, on our common superscriptions of epistles, on our common modes of concluding them, and mark how gravely we admit all this; may we not suppose those other epithets appear ridiculous, not so much from their being absurd, as from their being unusual?[x]

Before we quit these schoolmen, we cannot omit the famous Peter Abelard, who, when he taught at Paris, was followed by thousands, and was considered almost as an oracle in discussing the abstrusest of subjects. At present he is better known for his unfortunate amour with the celebrated Heloisa, his disciple, his mistress, and at length his wife.

Her ingenuity and learning were celebrated also, and their epistolary correspondence, remarkably curious, is still extant.[y] The religion of the times drove them at length to finish their days in two separate convents. When Abelard died, (which happened about the year 1134,) his body was carried to Heloisa, who buried it in the convent of the Paraclete, where she presided.

My countryman, John of Salisbury, comes next, who lived in the reign of Stephen and Henry the Second. He appears to have been conversant in all the Latin classics, whom he not only quotes, but appears to understand, to relish, and to admire.[z]

[u] This able and acute man died, aged forty-eight years, in the year 1274.

[x] For a fuller account of these schoolmen, see Scholasticæ Theologiæ Syntagma, by Prideaux bishop of Worcester, Mosheim's History, and Cave's Hist. Lit. vol. ii. p. 275.

[y] An octavo edition of their letters in Latin was published at London, in the year 1718.

[z] See Philosophical Arrangements, p. 382.

How far they sunk into his mind, and inspired him with sentiments similar to their own, the following passages may suffice to shew.

Take his ideas of liberty and servitude.

"For as the true and only liberty is to serve virtue, and discharge its various duties; so the only true and essential slavery is to be in subjection to the vices. He, therefore, is evidently mistaken, who imagines that either of these conditions can proceed from any other cause: for, indeed, (if we except the difference of virtue and vice,) all men throughout the world proceed from a similar beginning; consist of, and are nourished by the same elements; draw from the same principle the same vital breath; enjoy the same cope of heaven; all alike live; all alike die."[a]

Take his idea concerning the extensive influence of philosophy.

"It is philosophy that prescribes a just measure to all things; and while she arranges moral duties, condescends to mix with such as are plebeian and vulgar. No otherwise, indeed, can any thing be said to proceed rightly, unless she herself confirm by deeds, what she teaches us in words."[b]

Speaking of virtue and felicity, he thus explains himself.

"But these (two possessions) are more excellent than any other, because virtue includes all things that are to be done; felicity, all things that are to be wished. Yet does felicity excel virtue, because in all things the end is more excellent than the means. Now no one is happy, that he may act rightly; but he acts rightly, that he may live happily."[c]

The following distich is of his own age, but being difficult to translate, is only given in its original, as a sample of elegant and meritorious poetry.

It expresses a refined thought; that as the soul of man animates the body, so is the soul itself animated by God.

Vita animæ Deus est; hæc, corporis; hac fugiente,
Solvitur hoc; perit hæc, destituente Deo.[d]

The preceding quotations are taken from his tract De Nugis Curialium; those which follow are from another tract, called

[a] Sicut enim vera et unica libertas est, servire virtuti, et ipsius exercere officia; ita unica et singularis servitus est vitiis subjugari. Errat plane quisquis aliunde conditionem alterutram opinatur accidere. Si quidem omne hominum genus in terris simili ab ortu surgit, eisdem constat et alitur elementis, eundemque spiritum ab eodem principio carpit, eodemque fruitur cælo, æque moritur, æque vivit. De Nugis Curialium, p. 510. edit. Lugdun. 1595.

[b] Ipsa (philosophia) est, quæ universis præscribit modum, et dum disponit officia, etiam plebeis et vulgaribus interesse dignatur. Alioquin nihil aliud recte procedit, nisi et ipsa rebus asserat, quod verbis docet. De Nugis Curial. p. 483.

[c] Sunt autem hæc omnibus aliis præstantiora, quia virtus omnia agenda, felicitas omnia optanda complectitur. Felicitas tamen virtuti præstat, quia in omnibus præstantius est propter quod aliquid, quam quod propter aliquid. Non enim felix est quis, ut recte agat; sed recte agit, ut feliciter vivat. De Nugis Curial. p. 367, 368.

[d] Ibid. p. 127.

Metalogicus, so named from being subsequent to logic, as metaphysics are to physics.

He makes three things requisite to the existence of every art, and these are genius, memory, and the reasoning faculty; and these three he thus defines:

"Genius is a certain power, naturally implanted in the mind, and which is of itself originally capable."[e]

"Memory is (as it were) the mind's ark or chest; the firm and faithful preserver of things perceived."[f]

"The reasoning faculty is a power of the mind, which examines things that have occurred either to the senses or to the intellect, and fairly decides in favour of the better; which, well weighing the similitudes and dissimilitudes of things, at length (after due discussion) establishes art, and shews it to be (as it were) a finite science of things infinite."[g]

Our author concludes with telling us, that "as nature is the mother of all arts, so the contempt of them surely redounds to the injury of their parent."[h]

I must not omit some of his grammatical ideas, because they are of a superior sort; that is to say, they are logical and philosophical.

He tells us, "For as [in nature] accidents clothe substances, and give them a form; so [in language] through a similar correspondence are substantives vested with a form by adjectives. And that this [grammatical] institution of reason may the more easily coincide with nature, in the same manner as the substance of every natural being knows nothing of intension and remission; so likewise in language substantives admit no degree of comparison."[i]

After this, he proceeds to shew that this imitation of nature not only exists in nouns, but in the other parts of speech. He

[e] Est autem ingenium vis quædam, animæ naturaliter insita, per se valens. Metalog. p. 756.

[f] Memoria vero quasi mentis arca, firma et fidelis custodia perceptorum. Metalog. p. 757.

[g] Ratio eorum, quæ sensibus aut animo occurrunt, examinatrix animi vis est, et fidelis arbitra potiorum; quæ, rerum similitudines dissimilitudinesque perpendens, tandem artem statuit quasi quandam infinitorum finitam esse scientiam. Metalog. 757.

This may be illustrated from the arts of arithmetic and grammar.

Numbers, which are infinite, being reduced to the finite genera of even and odd; and these again being divided into the few subordinate species; in this limited reduction we behold the rise of arithmetic, and of all the various theorems contained in that art.

Sounds articulate, which are infinite, being reduced to the finite genera of vowels and consonants; and vowels again being enlarged into the species of long, short, and middle; consonants into the species of mutes and liquids; in these limited reductions we behold the rise of grammar, through which, by about twenty simple sounds, called letters, we form articulate sounds by millions.

[h] Quia artium natura mater est, merito in injuriam parentis redundat contemptus earum. Metalog. 757.

[i] Sicut enim accidentia substantiam vestiunt, et informant: sic quadam proportione rationis ab adjectivis substantiva informantur. Et, ut familiarius rationis institutio naturæ cohæreat, sicut substantia cujusque rei intentionis et remissionis ignara est: sic substantiva ad comparationis gradum non veniunt. Metalog. 561.

tells us, that verbs, as they denote time, are necessarily provided with tenses; and, as they always express something else in their original meaning, he calls the additional denoting of time by a truly philosophic word, a *consignification*.[j]

The writer of these remarks cannot say he has transferred any of them into his Hermes, because Hermes was written long before he knew John of Salisbury. But that both writers drew from the same source, he thinks sufficiently clear from the similitude of their sentiments.[k]

I fear, I have dwelt too long on my countryman, perhaps, because a countryman; but more, in truth, because his works are little known, and yet are certainly curious and valuable.

I shall only mention, that there were other respectable geniuses of the same century, such as the epic poet, Joseph of Exeter; the pleasant archdeacon of Oxford, Walter Mapps; Giraldus Cambrensis, &c.

But the eloquent author of the Life of Henry the Second has, in his third volume, handled the state of our literature during this period in so masterly a way, that the writer of these observations would not have said so much, had not the arrangement of his remarks made it in some degree necessary.[l]

We must not conclude this chapter without relating a few facts, relative to the gallant Richard, called, from his magnanimity, Cœur de Leon. Other heroes, long before him, had been likened to lions; and the celebrated Ali, in the lofty language of Arabia, was called the Lion of God.

What Bohadin says of Richard is remarkable. "He was, as that historian relates, uncommonly active; of great spirit and firm resolution; one who had been signalized by his battles, and who was of intrepid courage in war. By those whom he led, he was esteemed less than the king of France on account of his kingdom and dignity, but more abundant in riches, and far more illustrious for military valour."[m]

This testimony receives no small weight, as it comes from a contemporary writer, who was present; and who, being likewise a fast friend to Saladin, Richard's great antagonist, can hardly be suspected of flattering an adversary.

In the following extracts from the same author, which extracts contain different conferences between Richard and Saladin, we have a sample of their sentiments, and of the manner in which they expressed them.

When Richard in Palestine was ill, he longed for fruit and ice, and the fruits he desired were pears and peaches. He sent for them to Saladin, and they were immediately given him.

[j] Motus non est sine tempore, nec verbum esse potuit sine temporis consignificatione. Metalog. 561. Aristot. de Interpret. c. 3.

[k] See Hermes, p. 144.

[l] See lord Lyttleton's Life of Henry the Second.

[m] Bohadin, vit. Salad. p. 160.

Richard, in return, was equally bountiful, and entertained the sultan's people magnificently. War between great men seldom extinguishes humanity.[n]

After a long and various war, Richard sent to Saladin the following message.

"When you have greeted the prince, you will lay what follows before him: the Mussulmans and Franks are both perishing; their countries laid waste, and completely passing to ruin; the wealth and lives of their people consumed on either side. To this contest and religious war its proper rights have been now paid. Nothing remains to be settled, but the affair of the holy city of the cross, and of the several regions or countries. As to the holy city, it being the seat of our worship, from that indeed we can by no means recede, although not a single man of us were to survive the attempt. As to the countries, those on this side Jordan, shall be restored to us. As to the cross, it being with you only a pitiful piece of wood, although to us of value inestimable, this the sultan will give us; and thus peace being established, we shall all of us rest from this our uninterrupted fatigue."[o]

Saladin's answer to Richard.

"The holy city is as much holy to us as to you; nay, is rather of greater worth and dignity to us than to you; as it was thence that our prophet took his journey by night to heaven; it is there the angels are wont solemnly to assemble themselves. Imagine not therefore that we shall ever depart thence. We dare not among the Mussulmans appear so abandoned, so neglectful of our affairs, as to think of this. As to the regions or countries, these also you know were originally ours, which you indeed have annexed to your dominions by the imbecility of the Mussulmans at the period when you attacked them. God has not suffered you to lay a single stone there, ever since the war began; while we, it is evident, enjoy all the produce of our countries to the full. Lastly, as to the cross, that in truth is your scandal, and a great dishonour to the Deity; which, however, it does not become us, by giving up, to neglect, unless it be for some more important advantage accruing thence to the faith of Mahomet."[p]

It must be observed, that the cross here mentioned was supposed to have been that on which Christ was crucified; and which being in Jerusalem, when it was taken, had been from that time in the hands of Saladin.

Though no peace was now made, it was made soon after, yet without restoration either of Jerusalem or of the cross.

It was usual in those days to swear to treaties, and so did the inferior parties; but the two monarchs excused themselves, saying, "it was not usual for kings to swear."[q]

[n] Bohadin, p. 176. [o] Ibid. p. 207. [p] Ibid. p. 208. [q] Ibid. p. 261.

When Richard was returning home, he was basely seized by a duke of Austria, and kept prisoner for more than a year, till by a large sum raised upon his people he was redeemed.[r]

This gallant prince, after having escaped for years the most formidable perils, fell at length unfortunately by the arrow of an obscure hand, in besieging an obscure castle, within his own French domains.

He did not immediately die; but as the wound began to mortify, and his end to approach, he ordered the person who had shot him (his name was Bertramn de Gurdun) to be brought into his presence.

When he arrived, the king thus addressed him. "What harm have I ever done thee? for what reason hast thou slain me?" Bertramn replied, "Thou hast slain my father and two brothers with thy own hand; and now it was thy desire to slay me. Take then any vengeance upon me thou wilt; I shall freely suffer the greatest tortures thou canst invent, so that thou art but despatched, who hast done the world so much mischief."

The king, on this intrepid answer, commanded his chains to be taken off, forgave what he had done, and dismissed him with a present.

But the king's servants were not so generous as their master; for when the king was dead, (which soon happened,) they put the prisoner to a cruel death.

A poet of the time compares, not improperly, the death of Richard to that of a lion killed by an ant. The sentiment is better than the metre.

Istius in morte perimit Formica Leonem.[s]

It is somewhat singular, that in these periods, considered as dark and barbarous, the same nations should still retain their superiority of taste, though not perhaps in its original purity. During the reign of Henry the Third, (which soon followed,) when bishop Poore erected the cathedral of Salisbury, (which, considering its lightness, its uniformity, and the height of its spire, is one of the completest gothic buildings now extant,) we are informed he sent into Italy for the best architects.[t]

Long before this, in the eighth century, when one of the caliphs erected a most magnificent temple, or mosque, at Damascus, he procured for the building of it the most skilful architects, and

[r] See the histories of Richard's life, Rapin, Hume, &c.

[s] Rogeri de Hoveden Annalium pars posterior. p. 791. edit. Francof. 1601. We have transcribed from the original the discourse which passed between Richard and Bertramn, as it appears to be curious, and the Latinity not to be despised.

Quid mali tibi feci? Quare me interemisti? Cui ille respondit—Tu interemisti patrem meum, et duos fratres manu tua, et me nunc interimere voluisti. Sume ergo de me vindictam, quamcunque volueris: libenter enim patiar, quaecunque excogitaveris majora tormenta, dummodo Tu interficiaris, qui tot et tanta mala contulisti mundo.

[t] Matthew Paris.

those not only from his own dominions, but (as the historian informs us) from Greece.[u]

From these accounts it is evident, that some knowledge of the fine arts, even during this middle age, existed both in Italy and Greece.

Should it be demanded, to which nation, in this respect, we give the preference; it is a question to be decided by recurring to facts.

Italy at the beginning of her history was barbarous; nor did she emerge from her barbarity, till Greece, which she had conquered, gave her poets, orators, philosophers, &c.

Græcia captu ferum Victorem cepit. Her.

After a succession of centuries, the Roman empire fell. By this fatal event the finer arts fell also, and lay for years in a kind of torpid state, till they revived through the genial warmth of Greece.

A few Greek painters, in the thirteenth century, came from Greece into Italy, and taught their art to Cimabue, a Florentine.[x] Cimabue was the father of Italian painters; and from him came a succession, which at length gave the Raphaels, the Michael Angelos, &c.

The statues and ruined edifices with which Italy abounded, and which were all of them by Greek artists, or after Grecian models, taught the Italians the fine arts of sculpture and architecture.[y]

The Greek fugitives from Constantinople, after its unhappy catastrophe, brought that superior literature into Italy, which enabled the Italians to read in the original the capital authors of Attic eloquence.[z]

When literature, sculpture, architecture, and painting had thus attained a perfection in Italy, we learn from history, they were transplanted into the north, where they lived, though it was rather like exotics than natives.

As therefore Northern Europe derived them from Italy, and this last from Greece, the conclusion is evident, that not Italy, but Greece was their common parent. And thus is the question concerning preference to be decided.

[u] Abulfed. p. 125.

[x] Cimabue died in 1300.

[y] How early these fine remains began to excite their admiration, we learn from those warm verses of Hildebert quoted before, p. 507.

[z] Sup. p. 477.

CHAPTER XI.

CONCERNING THE POETRY OF THE LATTER LATINS, OR WESTERN EUROPEANS—ACCENTUAL QUANTITY—RHYME—SAMPLES OF RHYME IN LATIN—IN CLASSICAL POETS, ACCIDENTAL; IN THOSE OF A LATER AGE, DESIGNED—RHYME AMONG THE ARABIANS—ODILO, HUCBALDUS, HILDIGRIM, HALABALDUS, POETS OR HEROES OF WESTERN EUROPE—RHYMES IN MODERN LANGUAGES—OF DANTE, PETRARCH, BOCCACCIO, CHAUCER, ETC.—SANNAZARIUS, A PURE WRITER IN CLASSIC LATIN WITHOUT RHYME—ANAGRAMS, CHRONOGRAMS, ETC., FINELY AND ACCURATELY DESCRIBED BY THE INGENIOUS AUTHOR OF THE SCRIBLERIAD.

And here, as we are about to speak upon the poetry of these times, we wish our readers previously to review what we have already said upon the two species of verbal quantity, the syllabic and the accentual.[a]

It will there appear, that till Greek and Latin degenerated, accentual quantity was hardly known. But though degeneracy spread it through these two languages, yet, with regard to modern languages, it was the best that could be attained. Their harsh and rugged dialects were in few instances suited to the harmonious simplicity of the syllabic measure.

And yet, though this more perfect and elegant prosody was rarely attainable, so strong was the love of mankind for rhythm, so connate (if I may so say) with their very being, that metre of some sort was everywhere cultivated, and even these northern tribes had their bards, their minstrels, their troubadours, and the like.

Now, though in the latter Latinity syllabic quantity was little regarded, and the accentual more frequently supplied its place, they did not esteem even this last always sufficient to mark the measure. An expedient was therefore found, (flattering to the ear, because it had something of harmony,) and this was, to mark the last syllables of different verses with sounds that were similar, so that the ear might not doubt a moment where every verse ended.

And hence in modern verse these last syllables, which poets of a purer age in a manner neglected, came to claim a peculiar and superior regard, as helping to mark the rhythm through the medium of the rhyme.

> Si sol spendescat Maria purificante,
> Major erit glacies post festum, quam fuit ante.[b]

[a] See from p. 408 to p. 413.

[b] Rhyme is the similitude of sound at the ends of two verses. Rhythm is measured motion, and exists in verses of every sort, whether classical or not classical, whether blank verse, or rhyme. In short, without rhythm no verse can exist of any species; without rhyme they may, and often do.

Nor was this practised in heroics only, but in trochaics also.

> Suscitavit igitur || deus Hebræ*orum*
> Christianos principes, || et robur *eorum*
> Vindicare scilicet || sanguinem san*ctorum*,
> Subvenire filiis || mortifica*torum*.[c]

Nay, so fond were those poets of their jingle, that they not only infused it into different verses, but into one and the same verse; making the middle of each verse to rhyme with its end, as well as one verse to rhyme with another.

Thus, in St. Edmund's epitaph, we read,

> Hic erat *Edmundus*, anima cum corpore *mundus*,
> Quem non *immundus* potuit pervertere *mundus*.[d]

And again, in those verses transcribed from an old monument,

> Hic sunt con*fossa* Bernoldi præsulis *ossa*;
> Laudet cum *glossa*, dedit hic quia munera *grossa*.

To these may be added the inscription upon the three wise men of the East, buried (as they tell us) at Cologn in the West.

> Corpora san*ctorum* recubant hic terna ma*gorum*,
> Ex his sub*latum* nihil est, alibive loc*atum*.

Verses of this sort, of which there are innumerable still extant, have been called Leonine verses, from Leo, a writer of the twelfth century, who is supposed to have been their inventor. But this should seem a mistake, if the inscription upon the image of a king Dagobert, who lived in the seventh century, be of the same period with that monarch.

> Fingitur hac specie, bonitatis odore *refertus*,
> Istius ecclesiæ fundator, rex *Dagobertus*.

It is true, there are verses of this sort to be found even among poets, the first in classical rank.

Thus Virgil:

> Trajicit: i, *verbis* virtutem illude su*perbis*.

Thus Horace:

> Fratrem mæ*rentis*, rapto de fratre *dolentis*.

Thus even Homer himself:

> Ἐκ γὰρ κρηΤΑΩΝ γένος εὔχομαι εὐρειΑΩΝ.

The difference seems to have been, the rhymes, falling from these superior geniuses, fell (it was probable) accidentally: with the latter race of poets they were the work of labour and design. They may well, indeed, be called works of labour and design, when we reflect on the immense pains which their makers must have taken, where their plan of rhyming was so complicated, as they sometimes made it.

[c] Roger Hoveden. Annal. p. 379. B.

[d] Waverly, p. 202.

Take a singular example of no fewer than three rhymes to each verse.

> Crimina *crescere* flete; *tepescere* jus, decus, *æquum*;
> Flete, *gemiscite*; denique *dicite*, dicite *mecum*,
> Qui regis *omnia*, pelle tot *impia*, surge, *perimus*,
> Nos, Deus, *aspice*, ne sine *simplice* lamine *simus*.

Fabricius, who gives these verses, remarks, that they were written in the dactylic Leonine; that is, they had every foot a dactyl, excepting the last, and contained three rhymes in each verse, two within the verse itself, and one referring to the verse that followed. He adds, that their author, Bernardus Morlanensis, a monk of the eleventh century, composed no less than three books of this wonderful versification. What leisure must he have had, and how was it employed?[e]

Before we quit the subject of rhyme we may add, that rhyme was used not only by the Latin, but by the Arabian poets, as we may see by a tract upon the Arabic prosody, subjoined by Dr. Pococke to his Carmen Tograï.

Rhyme, however, was not so strictly followed, but that sometimes they quitted it. In the following heroics, the monk Odilo, addressing himself to his friend Hucbaldus, appears so warm in his wishes, as not only to forget rhyme, but even classical quantity.

> Hucbaldo Sōpho Sōphĭă sĭt semper amica;
> Hucbaldus Sōphus Sōphĭæ semper amicus:
> Exposco hoc Odĭlo, peccator cernuus ēgo.

This genius (over whose verses I have occasionally marked the accentual quantity in contradistinction to the syllabic) is supposed to have written in the tenth century.

Others, rejecting rhyme, wrote elegiacs; as that monk who celebrated Hildīgrim and Halabuldus; the one for building a church, the other for consecrating it.

> Hildīgrim struxĭt; Hălăbaldus episcopus archi
> Sanctificavit: honor certus utrumque manet.

In the first of these two verses the word *archi-episcopus* is, by a pleasant transposition, made into a dactyl and spondee, so as to complete the hexameter.[f]

It was upon these principles of versification, that the early poets of this era wrote much bad verse in much bad Latin. At length they tried their skill in their vernacular tongues, introducing here also their rhyme and their accentual quantity, as they had done before in Latin.

Through the southern parts of France, the troubadours (already mentioned[g]) composed sonnets in the Provençal tongue.

[e] See Fabric. Biblioth. med. et infim. ætatis, under the word, *Bernardus Morlanensis*.

[f] See Recueil de divers Ecrits pour servir de l'Eclaircissements a l'Histoire de France par l'Abbé de Beuf, p. 115.—p. 106.

[g] See before, p. 502.

Soon after them, Dante, Petrarch, and Boccaccio wrote poems in Italian; and soon after these, Chaucer flourished in England. From Chaucer, through Rowley, we pass to lords Surry and Dorset; from them to Spencer, Shakspeare, and Johnson; after whom came Milton, Waller, Dryden, Pope, and a succession of geniuses down to the present time.

The three Italian poets we have mentioned, were capital in their kind, being not only strong and powerful in sentiment, but, what is more surprising, elegant in their diction, at a time when the languages of England and France were barbarous and unpolished. This, in English, is evident from our countryman, Chaucer, who, even to an English reader, appears so uncouth, and who yet wrote later than the latest of these three.

It must, however, be acknowledged, that, if we except his language, for learning and wit he appears equal to the best of his contemporaries, and, I may add, even of his successors.

I cannot omit the following sample of his literature in the Frankelein's Tale. In that poem, the fair Dorigen is made to lament the absence of her much-loved Arveragus; and, as she sits upon a cliff, beholding the sea and the formidable rocks, she breaks forth with terror into the following exclamation.

> Eternal God! that thro' thy purveyaúnce
> Leadest the world by certain governaúnce;
> In idle, as men sayn, ye nothing make.
> But, Lord, those griealy, fendly, rockis, blake,
> That seem rathír a foul confúsión
> Of work, than any fair creátión
> Of such a perfect God, wise, and full stable:
> Why have ye wrought this work unréasonáble?

Dorigen, after more expostulation of the same sort, adds,

> I wote well clerkis woll sayn, as 'hem leste,
> By argumenta, that "All is for the beste,"
> Tho' I ne cannot well the causes know—
> But thilké God, that make the winds to blow,
> Ay keep my Lord, &c.

There is an elegant pathos in her thus quitting those deeper speculations, to address a prayer for the safety of her Arveragus.

The verse, before quoted,

> To lead the world by certain governaunce,

is not only a philosophical idea, but philosophically expressed.

The next verse,

> In idle, as men sayn, ye nothing make,

is a sentiment translated literally from Aristotle, and which that philosopher so much approved as often to repeat it.

Take one example:

Ὁ δὲ Θεὸς καὶ ἡ φύσις οὐδὲν μάτην ποιοῦσιν: "God and nature make nothing in vain."[g]

[g] Arist. de Cælo, l. i. c. 4.

As to what follows, I mean that speculation of learned men, that "All is for the best," this, too, we meet in the same philosopher, annexed (as it were) to the sentiment just alleged.

Ἡ φύσις οὔθεν δημιουργεῖ μάτην, ὥσπερ εἴρηται πρότερον, ἀλλὰ πάντα πρὸς τὸ βέλτιον ἐκ τῶν ἐνδεχομένων: "Nature (as has been said before) creates nothing in vain, but all things for the best, out of the contingent materials."[h]

It may be fairly doubted, whether Chaucer took this from the original Greek; it is more probable he took it from the Latin version of the Spanish Arabic version, which Latin was then current, and admitted through Western Europe for the Aristotelic text.

The same thought occurs in one of our most elegant modern ballads; though whence the poet took it, I pretend not to decide.

How can they say, that nature
  Has nothing made in vain?
Why then beneath the water
  Do hideous rocks remain?
Those rocks no eyes discover,
  Which lurk beneath the deep,
To wreck, &c.

But to return to Chaucer.

If in the tale we have just quoted, if in the tale of the Nun's Priest, and in many other of his works, there are these sprinklings of philosophy; if to these we add the extensive knowledge of history, mythology, and various other subjects, which he everywhere shews: we may fairly, I think, arrange him among our learned poets, and take from him an estimate of the literature of the times, as far at least as possessed by men of superior education.

After having mentioned (as we have lately done) Petrarch and some of the Italians, I can by no means omit their countryman Sannazarius, who flourished in the century following, and whose eclogues in particular, formed on the plan of *fishing* life instead of *pastoral*, cannot be enough admired both for their Latinity and their sentiment. His fourth eclogue, called Proteus, written in imitation of Virgil's eclogue called Silenus, may be justly valued as a master-piece in its kind. The following slight sketch of it is submitted to the reader.

"Two fishermen sailing during a dark night from Caprea into the bay of Naples, as they silently approach the promontory of Minerva, hear Proteus from the shore, singing a marvellous narrative of the strange events of which those regions had been the well-known scene. He concludes with the unhappy fate of the poet's friend and patron, Frederic, king of Naples, who, having been expelled his kingdom, died an exile in France."

[h] De Animal. incessu, c. 12.

If I might be pardoned a digression, it should be on the elegance of the numbers by which this unfortunate part of the tale is introduced.

> Addit tristia fata, et te, quem luget ademptum
> Italia, &c.

The omission of the usual cæsura, in the first of these verses, naturally throws it into that anapæstic rhythm, so finely suited to solemn subjects.

> Addit—tristia—fata et—te quem, &c.[1]

It may be observed, also, in how pathetic, and yet, withal, in how manly a way Sannazarius concludes. Frederic died in a remote region, and was buried where he died. "It is pleasing," says Proteus, "for a man's remains to rest in his own country, and yet for a tomb every land suffices."

> Grata quies patriæ, sed et omnis terra sepulcrum.

Those who know how much sooner Italy emerged from barbarity than the rest of Europe, may choose to place Sannazarius rather at the beginning of a good age, than at the conclusion of a bad one. Their opinion, perhaps, is not without foundation, and may be extended to Fracastorius, Politian, Poggius, and many other eloquent authors, which that century then produced, when eloquence was little known elsewhere.

Before we quit poetry, we shall say something upon its lowest species, upon acrostics, chronograms, wings, altars, eggs, axes, &c.

These were the poor inventions of men devoid of taste, and yet absurdly aiming at fame by these despicable whims. Quitting the paths of simplicity and truth, (of which it is probable they were wholly ignorant,) they aspired, like rope-dancers, to merit, which only lay in the difficulty. The wings, the axes, the altars, &c. were wretched forms into which they tortured poor words, just as poor trees in our gardens were formerly mangled into giants, flower-pots, peacocks, obelisks, &c.

Whoever remembers that acrostics, in versification, are formed from the initial letter of every verse, will see the force and ingenuity of the following description.

> Firm and compact, in three fair columns wove,
> O'er the smooth plain the bold acrostics move:
> High o'er the rest the tow'ring leaders rise,
> With limbs gigantic and superior size.

Chronograms, by a different conceit, were not confined to initial letters, but, as they were to describe dates, the numeral letters, in whatever part of the word they stood, were distinguished from other letters by being written in capitals.

[1] Πότνια—θέα μὴ—μοὶ τόδε—χόεο. Hom. Odyss. E. 215.

For example: I would mark by a chronogram the date 1506. I take for the purpose the following words,

Feriam sidera vertice;

and by a strange elevation of capitals, I compel even Horace to give me the date required.

FeriaM siDera VertIce—MDVI.

The ingenious author, whom I have quoted before, thus admirably describes this second species of folly.

Not thus the looser chronograms prepare;
Careless their troops, undisciplined to war;
With rank irregular, confused they stand,
The chieftains mingling with the vulgar band.

If I have dwelt too long on these trifles, it is not so much for their merit, (of which they have none,) as for those elegant lines in which they are so well described.

On the same motive I conclude this chapter with selecting a few more lines from the same ingenious poem.

To join these squadrons, o'er the champain came
A numerous race, of no ignoble name;
Riddle, and rebus, riddle's dearest son,
And false conundrum, and insidious pun;
Fustian, who scarcely deigns to tread the ground,
And Rondeau, wheeling in repeated round.
On their fair standards, by the winds display'd,
Eggs, altars, wings, pipes, axes were pourtrayed.[j]

CHAPTER XII.

PAUL THE VENETIAN, AND SIR JOHN MANDEVILLE, GREAT TRAVELLERS —SIR JOHN FORTESCUE, A GREAT LAWYER—HIS VALUABLE BOOK ADDRESSED TO HIS PUPIL THE PRINCE OF WALES—KING'S COLLEGE IN CAMBRIDGE FOUNDED BY HENRY THE SIXTH.

It was during this middle period lived those celebrated travellers, Paul the Venetian, and our countryman, sir John Mandeville.

We have mentioned Chaucer before them, though he flourished after both; for Chaucer lived till past the year 1400, Paul began his travels in the year 1272, and Mandeville began his in the year 1322. The reason is, Chaucer has been arranged with the poets already spoken of.

Marc Paul, who is the first writer of any note concerning the Eastern countries, travelled into those remote regions as far as

[j] See the Scribleriad (book ii. 151, &c.) of my valuable friend, Mr. Cambridge of Twickenham.

the capital and court of Cublai Chan, the sixth from that tremendous conqueror, Jingiz Chan.[k] Paul is a curious and minute relator of what he saw there.

He describes the capital, Cambalu, to be a square, walled in, of six miles on every side, having to each side three gates, and the several streets rectilinear, and crossing at right angles.

The imperial palace, he tells us, was inclosed within a square wall of a mile on every side, and was magnificently adorned with gilding and pictures. It was a piece of state, that through the grand or principal gate no one could enter but the emperor himself.

Within the walls of this square there were extensive lawns, adorned with trees, and stocked with wild animals, stags, goats, fallow deer, &c. not to mention a river, which formed a lake, filled with the finest fish.

Besides this, at a league's distance from the palace, he describes a small mountain, or hill, planted with evergreens, in circumference about a mile. "Here (he tells us) the emperor had all the finest trees that could be procured brought to him, employing his elephants for that purpose, as the trees were extracted with their roots.

"The mountain, from its verdure, was called the Green Mountain. On its summit stood a fine palace, distinguished also by its green colour, where he (the great Chan) often retired to enjoy himself."[l]

Speaking of the person of Cublai, the then monarch, he thus describes him.

"He is remarkably handsome; of a moderate stature; neither too corpulent, nor too lean; having a countenance ruddy and fair; large eyes; a beautiful nose; and all the lineaments of his body formed in due proportion."[m]

We here quit our traveller, only observing, as we conclude, that learned men have imagined this Cambalu to be Pekin in China, founded there by Jingiz Chan, soon after he had conquered it.

When we consider the immense power of this mighty conqueror, who in a manner subdued the vast tract of Asia, we are the less difficult in believing such marvellous relations. The city, the palace, and the territory around, teach us what was

[k] See Abulpharagius, from p. 281 to 306.

[l] The preceding extracts are taken from a Latin edition of Paulus Venetus, published, in a small quarto, Coloniæ Brandenburgicæ, ex officina Georgii Schulzii, anno 1679.

As the book is not rare, nor the style curious, we have only given the several pages by way of reference.

For the capital, Cambalu, see p. 68. l. ii. c. 10.

For the imperial palace, lawns adjoining, and the Green Mountain, see p. 66, 67. l. ii. c. 9.

[m] Rex Cublai est homo admodum pulcher, statura mediocri, non nimis pinguis, nec nimis macilentus, faciem habens rubicundam atque candidam, oculos magnos, nasum pulchrum, et omnia corporis lineamenta debita proportione consistentia. Mar. Pauli, l. ii. c. 8. p. 65.

the taste of him and his family, whose boundless empire could admit of nothing minute.

It is, too, an additional argument for credibility, that though the whole is vast, yet nothing appears either foolish, or impossible.

One thing is worthy of notice, that though Paul resided in China so long, he makes no mention of the celebrated wall. Was this forgetfulness? or was it not then erected?

As to our countryman, sir John Mandeville, though he did not travel so far as Marc Paul, he travelled into many parts of Asia and Africa; and, after having lived in those countries for thirty-three years, died at Liege, in the year 1371.

He wrote his travels in three languages, Latin, French, and English; from the last of which languages we quote, taking the liberty, in a few instances, to modernise the words, though not in the minutest degree to change the meaning.

We confine ourselves, for brevity, to a single fact.

Travelling through Macedonia, he tells us as follows: "In this country was Aristotle born; in a city that men call Strageris,[n] a little from the city of Tragie, or Trakys; and at Strageris is Aristotle buried; and there is an altar at his tomb, where they make a great feast every year, as though he was a saint. Upon this altar the lords (or rulers) hold their great councils and assemblies, for they hope, that, through the inspiration of God and of him, they shall have the better counsel."[o]

Such was the veneration (for it was more than honour) paid by the Stagirites to their countryman, more than eighteen hundred years after his death.[p]

From these times we pass over the triumphant reign of Henry the Fifth (a reign rather of action than of letters) to that of his unfortunate son. This was a period disgraced by unsuccessful wars abroad, and by sanguinary disorders at home. The king himself met an untimely end, and so did his hopeful and high-spirited son, the prince of Wales. Yet did not even these times keep one genius from emerging, though plunged by his rank into their most tempestuous part. By this I mean sir John Fortescue, chancellor of England, and tutor to the young prince, just mentioned. As this last office was a trust of the greatest importance, so he discharged it not only with consummate wisdom, but (what was more) with consummate virtue.

His tract in praise of the laws of England,[q] is written with

[n] Its ancient name in Greek was Στάγειρα, whence Aristotle was often called, by way of eminence, the Stagirite, as being a citizen there.

[o] See Mandeville's Voyages, chap. 2.

[p] Those who desire a taste of this great man's philosophy in English, may find their curiosity amply gratified in the last work of that learned and acute Grecian, lord Monboddo, which work he styles Ancient Metaphysics, published in quarto at Edinburg, 1779.

[q] This book, which he styles De Laudibus Legum Angliæ, is written in dialogue, between himself and the young prince his pupil, and was originally in Latin. The great Selden thought it worthy of a commentary; and since that it has been pub-

the noblest view that man ever wrote; written to inspire his pupil with a love of the country he was to govern, by shewing him, that to govern by those admirable laws, would make him a far greater prince than the most unlimited despotism.[r]

This he does not only prove by a detail of particular laws, but by an accurate comparison between the state of England and France, one of which he makes a land of liberty, the other of servitude. His thirty-fifth and thirty-sixth chapters upon this subject are invaluable, and should be read by every Englishman, who honours that name.

Through these and the other chapters, we perceive an interesting truth, which is, that the capital parts of our constitution, the trial by juries, the abhorrence of tortures, the sovereignty of parliament as well in the granting of money as in the making and repealing of laws; I say, that all these, and many other inestimable privileges, existed then, as they do now; were not new projects of the day, but sacred forms, to which ages had given a venerable sanction.[s]

As for the literature of this great man, (which is more immediately to our purpose,) he appears to have been a reader of Aristotle, Diodorus Siculus, Cicero, Quinctilian, Seneca, Vegetius, Boethius, and many other ancients; to have been not uninformed in the authors and history of later ages; to have been deeply knowing, not only in the laws of his own country, (where he attained the highest dignity they could bestow,) but in the Roman, or civil law, which he holds to be far inferior;[t] we must add to this, a masterly insight into the state and policy of the neighbouring nations.

Perhaps a person of rank, even at present, need not wish to be better instituted, if he had an ambition to soar above the fashionable polish.

We must not conclude without observing, that the taste for gothic architecture seems never to have been so elegant as during this period: witness that exquisite structure, built by Henry the Sixth; I mean, the chapel of King's college in Cambridge.

lished and enriched with additional notes by Mr. Gregor. A new edition was given ann. 1775, and the Latin text subjoined.

[r] See of Fortescue's work, chap. ix. and xiii. and, above all, chap. xiv. where he tells us, the possibility of doing amiss (which is the only privilege an absolute prince enjoys above a limited one) can be called an addition of power, no other, than we so call a possibility to decay, or to die. See p. 41 of the English version.

It is worth observing that Fortescue, in his dialogue, gives these fine sentiments to the young prince, after he has heard much and due reasoning upon the excellence of our constitution. See chap. xxxiv. p. 119.

[s] For trial by juries, see of this author chap. xx. xxi. xxii. For his abhorrence of torture, see chap. xxiii. For the sovereignty of parliament, see chap. ix. xiii. xviiii. xxxvi. particularly p. 118 of the English version. For the high antiquity of our laws and constitution, see chap. xvii.

[t] The inferiority of the Roman law to our own, is a doctrine he strongly inculcates. See, above all, chap. ix. xix, &c., also chap. xxxiv. where he nobly reprobates, as he had done before in chap. ix, that infamous maxim, Quod principi placuit, legis habet vigorem; a maxim well becoming an Oriental caliph, but hardly decent even in a degenerate Roman lawgiver.

CHAPTER XIII.

CONCERNING NATURAL BEAUTY—ITS IDEA THE SAME IN ALL TIMES—THESSALIAN TEMPLE—TASTE OF VIRGIL AND HORACE—OF MILTON, IN DESCRIBING PARADISE—EXHIBITED OF LATE YEARS FIRST IN PICTURES—THENCE TRANSFERRED TO ENGLISH GARDENS—NOT WANTING TO THE ENLIGHTENED FEW OF THE MIDDLE AGE—PROVED IN LELAND, PETRARCH, AND SANNAZARIUS—COMPARISON BETWEEN THE YOUNGER CYRUS AND PHILIP LE BEL OF FRANCE.

But let us pass for a moment from the elegant works of art to the more elegant works of nature. The two subjects are so nearly allied, that the same taste usually relishes them both.

Now there is nothing more certain, than that the face of inanimate nature has been at all times captivating. The vulgar, indeed, look no further than to the scenes of culture, because all their views merely terminate in utility. They only remark, that it is fine barley; that it is rich clover; as an ox or an ass, if they could speak, would inform us. But the liberal have nobler views; and though they give to culture its due praise, they can be delighted with natural beauties, where culture was never known.

Ages ago they have celebrated, with enthusiastic rapture, "a deep retired vale, with a river rushing through it; a vale having its sides formed by two immense and opposite mountains, and those sides diversified by woods, precipices, rocks, and romantic caverns." Such was the scene produced by the river Penēus, as it ran between the mountains Olympus and Ossa, in that well-known vale, the Thessalian Tempe.[u]

Virgil and Horace, the first for taste among the Romans, appear to have been enamoured with beauties of this character. Horace prayed for a villa where there was a garden, a rivulet, and above these a little grove.

> Hortus ubi, et tecto vicinus jugis aquæ fons,
> Et paulum silvæ super his foret. Sat. vi. 2.

Virgil wished to enjoy rivers, and woods, and to be hid under immense shade in the cool valleys of Mount Hæmus:

> O! qui me gelidis in vallibus Hæmi
> Sistat, et ingenti ramorum protegat umbra? Georg. ii. 486.

The great elements of this species of beauty, according to

[u] *Est nemus Hæmoniæ, prærupta quod undique claudit*
Silva: vocant Tempe. Per quæ Penëus ab imo
Effusus Pindo spumosis volvitur undis,
Dejectuque gravi, &c.—Ovid. Met. i. 568.
A fuller and more ample account of this beautiful spot may be found in the first chapter of the third book of Ælian's Various History.

these principles, were water, wood, and uneven ground; to which may be added a fourth, that is to say, lawn. It is the happy mixture of these four that produces every scene of natural beauty, as it is a more mysterious mixture of other elements (perhaps as simple, and not more in number) that produces a world or universe.

Virgil and Horace having been quoted, we may quote, with equal truth, our great countryman, Milton. Speaking of the flowers of Paradise, he calls them flowers

> Which not nice art
> In beds and curious knots, but nature boon
> Pours forth profuse on hill, and dale, and plain. Par. Lost, iv. 245.

Soon after this he subjoins,

> This was the place
> A happy rural seat, of various view.

He explains this variety, by recounting the lawns, the flocks, the hillocks, the valleys, the grots, the waterfalls, the lakes, &c.; and in another book, describing the approach of Raphael, he informs us, that this divine messenger passed

> Through groves of myrrh,
> And flow'ring odours, cassia, nard, and balm;
> A wilderness of sweets; for nature here
> Wanton'd as in her prime, and play'd at will
> Her virgin-fancies, pouring forth more sweet,
> Wild above rule or art, enormous bliss. Par. Lost, v. 292.

The painters in the preceding century seem to have felt the power of these elements, and to have transferred them into their landscapes with such amazing force, that they appear not so much to have followed, as to have emulated nature. Claude de Lorraine, the Poussins, Salvator Rosa, and a few more, may be called superior artists in this exquisite taste.

Our gardens in the mean time were tasteless and insipid. Those who made them, thought the further they wandered from nature, the nearer they approached the sublime. Unfortunately, where they travelled, no sublime was to be found; and the further they went, the further they left it behind.

But perfection, alas! was not the work of a day. Many prejudices were to be removed; many gradual ascents to be made; ascents from bad to good, and from good to better, before the delicious amenities of a Claude or a Poussin could be rivalled in a Stour-head, a Hagley, or a Stow; or the tremendous charms of a Salvator Rosa be equalled in the scenes of a Piercefield or a Mount Edgecumb.

Not however to forget the subject of our inquiry. Though it was not before the present century that we established a chaster taste; though our neighbours at this instant are but learning it from us; and though to the vulgar everywhere it is totally incomprehensible, (be they vulgar in rank, or vulgar in capacity;)

yet even in the darkest periods we have been treating, periods when taste is often thought to have been lost, we shall still discover an enlightened few, who were by no means insensible to the power of these beauties.

How warmly does Leland describe Guy's Cliff; Sannazarius, his villa of Mergilline; and Petrarch, his favourite Vaucluse?

Take Guy's Cliff from Leland in his own old English, mixed with Latin: "It is a place meet for the Muses; there is sylence; a praty wood; antra in vivo saxo, (grottos in the living rock;) the river roling over the stones with a praty noyse." His Latin is more elegant: Nemusculum ibidem opacum, fontes liquidi et gemmei, prata florida, antra muscosa, rivi levis et per saxa decursus, nec non solitudo et quies Musis amicissima.[x]

Mergilline, the villa of Sannazarius near Naples, is thus sketched in different parts of his poems.

Exciso in scopulo, fluctus unde aurea canos
Despiciens, celso se culmine Mergilline
Attollit, nautisque procul venientibus offert.
Sannaz. De partu Virgin. i. 25.

Rupis O! sacræ, pelagique custos,
Villa, Nympharum custos et propinquæ
Doridos . . . . . .
Tu mihi solos nemorum recessus
Des, et hærentes per opaca lauros
Saxa: Tu, fontes, Aganippedumque
Antra recludis. Ejusd. Epigr. i. 2.

Quæque in primis mihi grata ministrat
Otia, Musarumque cavas per saxa latebras,
Mergillina; novos fundunt ubi citria flores,
Citria, Medorum sacros referentia lucos.
Ejusd. De partu Virgin. iii. sub fin.

De Fonte Mergillino.

Est mihi rivo vitreus perenni
Fons, arenosum prope littus, unde
Sæpe descendens sibi nauta rores
Haurit amicos, &c. Ejusd. Epigr. ii. 36.

It would be difficult to translate these elegant morsels; it is sufficient to express what they mean, collectively: "that the villa of Mergillina had solitary woods; had groves of laurel and citron; had grottos in the rock, with rivulets and springs; and that, from its lofty situation, it looked down upon the sea, and commanded an extensive prospect."

It is no wonder that such a villa should enamour such an owner. So strong was his affection for it, that when, during the subsequent wars in Italy, it was demolished by the imperial troops, this unfortunate event was supposed to have hastened his end.[y]

[x] See Leland's Itinerary, vol. iv. p. 66.

[y] So we learn from Paulus Jovius, the writer of his life, published with his poems by Grævius, in a small edition of some of the Italian poets, at Amsterdam, in the year 1695.

Vaucluse (Vallis Clausa) the favourite retreat of Petrarch, was a romantic scene, not far from Avignon.

"It is a valley, having on each hand, as you enter, immense cliffs, but closed up at one of its ends by a semi-circular ridge of them; from which incident it derives its name. One of the most stupendous of these cliffs stands in the front of the semicircle, and has at its foot an opening into an immense cavern. Within the most retired and gloomy part of this cavern is a large oval bason, the production of nature, filled with pellucid and unfathomable water; and from this reservoir issues a river of respectable magnitude, dividing, as it runs, the meadows beneath, and winding through the precipices that impend from above."[a]

This is an imperfect sketch of that spot where Petrarch spent his time with so much delight, as to say, that this alone was life to him, the rest but a state of punishment.

In the two preceding narratives I seem to see an anticipation of that taste for natural beauty which now appears to flourish through Great Britain in such perfection. It is not to be doubted that the owner of Mergillina would have been charmed with Mount Edgecumb; and the owner of Vaucluse have been delighted with Piercefield.

When we read in Xenophon,[a] that the younger Cyrus had with his own hand planted trees for beauty, we are not surprised, though pleased with the story, as the age was polished, and Cyrus an accomplished prince. But when we read that in the beginning of the fourteenth century a king of France (Philip le Bell) should make it penal to cut down a tree, *qui a esté gardè pour sa beaultè*, "which had been preserved for its beauty;" though we praise the law, we cannot help being surprised that the prince should at such a period have been so far enlightened.[b]

[a] See Memoires pour la Vie de François Petrarque, quarto, vol. i. p. 231. 341, 342. See also Plin. Nat. Hist. l. xxviii. c. 22.

[a] See the Œconomics of Xenophon, where this fact is related.

[b] See a valuable work, entitled Observations on the Statutes, chiefly on the ancient, &c. p. 7, by the Hon. Mr. Barrington; a work concerning which it is difficult to decide, whether it be more entertaining, or more instructive.

CHAPTER XIV.

SUPERIOR LITERATURE AND KNOWLEDGE BOTH OF THE GREEK AND LATIN CLERGY, WHENCE—BARBARITY AND IGNORANCE OF THE LAITY, WHENCE—SAMPLES OF LAY-MANNERS, IN A STORY FROM ANNA COMNENA'S HISTORY — CHURCH AUTHORITY INGENIOUSLY EMPLOYED TO CHECK BARBARITY—THE SAME AUTHORITY EMPLOYED FOR OTHER GOOD PURPOSES—TO SAVE THE POOR JEWS—TO STOP TRIALS BY BATTLE—MORE SUGGESTED CONCERNING LAY-MANNERS—FEROCITY OF THE NORTHERN LAYMEN, WHENCE—DIFFERENT CAUSES ASSIGNED—INVENTIONS DURING THE DARK AGES—GREAT, THOUGH THE INVENTORS OFTEN UNKNOWN—INFERENCE ARISING FROM THESE INVENTIONS.

Before I quit the Latins, I shall subjoin two or three observations on the Europeans in general.

The superior characters for literature here enumerated, whether in the western or eastern Christendom, (for it is of Christendom only we are now speaking,) were by far the greater part of them ecclesiastics.

In this number we have selected from among the Greeks the patriarch of Constantinople, Photius; Michael Psellus; Eustathius and Eustratius, both of episcopal dignity; Planudes; cardinal Bessario. From among the Latins, Venerable Bede; Gerbertus, afterwards pope Sylvester the Second; Ingulphus, abbot of Croyland; Hildebert, archbishop of Tours; Peter Abelard; John of Salisbury, bishop of Chartres; Roger Bacon; Francis Petrarch; many monkish historians; Æneas Sylvius, afterwards pope Pius the Second, &c.

Something has been already said concerning each of these, and other ecclesiastics.[c] At present we shall only remark, that it was necessary, from their very profession, that they should read and write; accomplishments at that time usually confined to themselves.

Those of the western church were obliged to acquire some knowledge of Latin; and for Greek, to those of the eastern church it was still (with a few corruptions) their native language.

If we add to these preparations their mode of life, which, being attended mostly with a decent competence, gave them immense leisure; it was not wonderful that, among such a multitude, the more meritorious should emerge, and soar, by dint of genius, above the common herd. Similar effects proceed from similar causes.

[c] Those who wish to see more particulars concerning these learned men, may recur to their names in the Index; or, if he please, may consult the third part of these Inquiries, in chapters iv. ix. x. xi. xiv.

The learning of Egypt was possessed by their priests; who were likewise left from their institution to a life of leisure.[d]

For the laity, on the other side, who, from their mean education, wanted all these requisites, they were in fact no better than what Dryden calls them, "a tribe of Issachar;" a race from their cradle bred in barbarity and ignorance.

A sample of these illustrious laymen may be found in Anna Comnena's History of her father Alexius, who was Grecian emperor in the eleventh century, when the first crusade arrived at Constantinople. So promiscuous a rout of rude adventurers could not fail of giving umbrage to the Byzantine court, which was stately and ceremonious, and conscious withal of its internal debility.

After some altercation, the court permitted them to pass into Asia through the imperial territories, upon their leaders taking an oath of fealty to the emperor.

What happened at the performance of this ceremonial, is thus related by the fair historian above mentioned.

"All the commanders being assembled, and Godfrey of Bulloign himself among the rest, as soon as the oath was finished, one of the counts had the audaciousness to seat himself beside the emperor upon his throne. Earl Baldwin, one of their own people, approaching, took the count by the hand, made him rise from the throne, and rebuked him for his insolence.

"The count rose, but made no reply, except it was in his own unknown jargon to mutter abuse upon the emperor.

"When all things were despatched, the emperor sent for this man, and demanded, 'who he was, whence he came, and of what lineage?' His answer was as follows: 'I am a genuine Frank, and in the number of their nobility. One thing I know, which is, that in a certain part of the country I came from, and in a place where three ways meet, there stands an ancient church, where every one who has a desire to engage in single combat, having put himself into fighting order, comes, and there implores the assistance of the Deity, and then waits in expectation of some one that will dare attack him. On this spot I myself waited a long time, expecting and seeking some one that would arrive and fight me. But the man that would dare this was no where to be found.'[e]

[d] Aristotle, speaking of Egypt, informs us, Ἐκεῖ γὰρ ἠφείθη σχολάζειν τὸ τῶν ἱερέων ἔθνος, "For there (meaning in Egypt) the tribe of priests were left to lead a life of leisure." Arist. Metaph. l. i. c. 1.

[e] Those who attend to this story, and who have perused any of the histories of chivalry, in particular an ingenious French treatise upon the subject, in two small volumes, 8vo. published at Paris in the year 1759, entitled, Mémoires sur l'ancienne Chevalerie, will perceive that the much-admired Don Quixote is not an imaginary character, but a character drawn after the real manners of the times. It is true, indeed, the character is somewhat heightened; but even here the witty author has contrived to make it probable, by ingeniously adding a certain mixture of insanity.

These romantic heroes were not wholly extinct even in periods far later than the crusades. The Chevalier Bayard flourished

"The emperor, having heard this strange narrative, replied pleasantly, 'If at the time when you sought war, you could not find it, a season is now coming in which you will find wars enough. I therefore give you this advice: not to place yourself either in the rear of the army, or in the front, but to keep among those who support the centre; for I have long had knowledge of the Turkish method in their wars.'"[f]

This was one of those counts, or barons, the petty tyrants of western Europe; men, who, when they were not engaged in general wars, (such as the ravaging of a neighbouring kingdom, the massacring of infidels, heretics, &c.) had no other method of filling up their leisure, than, through help of their vassals, by waging war upon one another.

And here the humanity and wisdom of the church cannot enough be admired, when by her authority (which was then mighty) she endeavoured to shorten that scene of bloodshed, which she could not totally prohibit. The truce of God (a name given it purposely to render the measure more solemn) enjoined these ferocious beings, under the terrors of excommunication, not to fight from Wednesday evening to Monday morning, out of reverence to the mysteries accomplished on the other four days; the ascension on Thursday, the crucifixion on Friday, the descent to hell on Saturday, and the resurrection on Sunday.[g]

I hope a further observation will be pardoned, when I add, that the same humanity prevailed during the fourteenth century, and that the terrors of church power were then held forth with an intent equally laudable. A dreadful plague at that period desolated all Europe. The Germans, with no better reason than their own senseless superstition, imputed this calamity to the Jews, who then lived among them in great opulence and splendour. Many thousands of these unhappy people were inhumanly massacred, till the pope benevolently interfered, and prohibited by the severest bulls so mad and sanguinary a proceeding.[h]

I could not omit two such salutary exertions of church power, as they both occur within the period of this inquiry. I might add a third, I mean the opposing and endeavouring to check that absurdest of all practices, the trial by battle, which Spelman expressly tells us that the church in all ages condemned.[i]

It must be confessed, that the fact just related concerning the unmannered count, at the court of Constantinople, is rather

under Francis the First of France, and lord Herbert of Cherbury under James and Charles the First of England.

[f] See Anna Comnena's History of her Father, fol. Gr. Lat. p. 300.

[g] See any of the church histories of the time, in particular an ingenious French book, entitled Histoire Ecclesiastique, in two volumes, 12mo. digested into annals, and having the several years marked in the course of the narrative. Go to the years 1027, 1031, 1041, 1068, 1080.

[h] See the church histories about the middle of the fourteenth century, and Petrarch's Life.

[i] Truculentum morem in omni ævo acriter insectarunt theologi, &c. See before, p. 455.

against the order of chronology, for it happened during the first crusades. It serves however to shew the manners of the Latin, or Western laity, in the beginning of that holy war. They did not, in a succession of years, grow better, but worse.

It was a century after, that another crusade, in their march against infidels, sacked this very city, deposed the then emperor, and committed devastations which no one would have committed, but the most ignorant as well as cruel barbarians. If we descend not at present to particulars, it is because we have already quoted so largely from Nicetas in a former chapter.[k]

But a question here occurs, easier to propose than to answer. "To what are we to attribute this character of ferocity, which seems to have then prevailed through the laity of Europe?"

Shall we say, it was climate, and the nature of the country? These, we must confess, have in some instances great influence.

The Indians, seen a few years since by Mr. Byron in the southern parts of South America, were brutal and savage to an enormous excess. One of them, for a trivial offence, murdered his own child, (an infant,) by dashing it against the rocks. The Cyclopes, as described by Homer, were much of the same sort; each of them gave law to his own family, without regard for one another; and besides this, they were atheists and man-eaters.

May we not suppose, that a stormy sea, together with a frozen, barren, and inhospitable shore, might work on the imagination of these Indians, so as, by banishing all pleasing and benign ideas, to fill them with habitual gloom, and a propensity to be cruel? or might not the tremendous scenes of Etna have had a like effect upon the Cyclopes, who lived amid smoke, thunderings, eruptions of fire, and earthquakes? If we may believe Fazelius, who wrote upon Sicily about two hundred years ago, the inhabitants near Etna were in his time a similar race.[l]

If therefore these limited regions had such an effect upon their natives, may not a similar effect be presumed from the vast regions of the north? May not its cold, barren, uncomfortable climate have made its numerous tribes equally rude and savage?

If this be not enough, we may add another cause, I mean their profound ignorance. Nothing mends the mind more than culture, to which these emigrants had no desire, either from example or education, to lend a patient ear.

We may add a further cause still, which is, that, when they had acquired countries better than their own, they settled under the same military form through which they had conquered; and were, in fact, when settled, a sort of army after a campaign, quartered upon the wretched remains of the ancient inhabitants,

[k] See part iii. chap. 5, and Abulpharagius, p. 282, who describes their indiscriminate cruelty in a manner much resembling that of their brother crusaders at Bezieres, and that nearly about the same time. See before, p. 502.

[l] See Fazelius de Rebus seculis, l. ii. c. 4.

by whom they were attended under the different names of serfs, vassals, villains, &c.

It was not likely the ferocity of these conquerors should abate with regard to their vassals, whom, as strangers, they were more likely to suspect than to love.

It was not likely it should abate with regard to one another, when the neighbourhood of their castles, and the contiguity of their territories, must have given occasions (as we learn from history) for endless altercation. But this we leave to the learned in feudal tenures.

We shall add to the preceding remarks one more, somewhat singular, and yet perfectly different; which is, that though the darkness in Western Europe, during the period here mentioned, was (in scripture language) a darkness that might be felt, yet is it surprising that, during a period so obscure, many admirable inventions found their way into the world; I mean such as clocks, telescopes, paper, gunpowder, the mariner's needle, printing, and a number here omitted.[m]

It is surprising, too, if we consider the importance of these arts, and their extensive utility, that it should be either unknown, or at least doubtful, by whom they were invented.

A lively fancy might almost imagine, that every art, as it was wanted, had suddenly started forth, addressing those that sought it, as Æneas did his companions:

Coram, quem quæritis, adsum. Virg.

And yet, fancy apart, of this we may be assured, that though the particular inventors may unfortunately be forgotten, the inventions themselves are clearly referable to man; to that subtle and active principle, human wit, or ingenuity.

Let me then submit the following query:

If the human mind be as truly of divine origin as every other part of the universe, and if every other part of the universe bear testimony to its Author; do not the inventions above mentioned give us reason to assert, that God, in the operations of man, never leaves himself without a witness?

CHAPTER XV.

OPINIONS ON PAST AGES AND THE PRESENT—CONCLUSION ARISING FROM THE DISCUSSION OF THESE OPINIONS—CONCLUSION OF THE WHOLE.

And now having done with the middle age, we venture to say a word upon the present.

[m] See two ingenious writers on this subject, Polydore Virgil, De Rerum Inventoribus; and Pancirollus, De Rebus perditis et inventis.

Every past age has in its turn been a present age. This, indeed, is obvious, but this is not all; for every past age, when present, has been the object of abuse. Men have been represented by their contemporaries not only as bad, but degenerate; as inferior to their predecessors both in morals and bodily powers.

This is an opinion so generally received, that Virgil, (in conformity to it,) when he would express *former* times, calls them simply *better*, as if the term *better* implied *former* of course.

> Hic genus *antiquum* Teucri, pulcherrima proles,
> Magnanimi heroes, nati *melioribus* annis. Æn. vi. 648.

The same opinion is ascribed by Homer to old Nestor, when that venerable chief speaks of those heroes whom he had known in his youth. He relates some of their names—Perithous, Dryas, Cæneus, Theseus; and some also of their exploits—as how they had extirpated the savage Centaurs. He then subjoins,

> Κείνοισι δ' ἂν οὔτις,
> Τῶν οἱ νῦν βροτοί εἰσιν ἐπιχθόνιοι, μαχέοιτο. Ἰλ. Α. 271.
>
> "With these no one
> Of earthly race, as men are now, could fight."

As these heroes were supposed to exceed in strength those of the Trojan war, so were the heroes of that period to exceed those that came after. Hence, from the time of the Trojan war to that of Homer, we learn that human strength was decreased by a complete half.

Thus the same Homer:

> Ὁ δὲ χερμάδιον λάβε χειρὶ
> Τυδείδης, μέγα ἔργον, ὃ οὐ δύο γ' ἄνδρε φέροιεν,
> Οἷοι νῦν βροτοί εἰσ'· ὁ δέ μιν ῥέα πάλλε καὶ οἶος. Ἰλ. Ε. 302.
>
> "Then grasp'd Tydides in his hand a stone,
> A bulk immense, which not two men could bear,
> As men are now, but he alone with ease
> Hurl'd it."

Virgil goes further, and tells us, that not twelve men of his time (and those, too, chosen ones) could even carry the stone which Turnus flung.

> Vix illud lecti bis sex cervice subirent,
> Qualia nunc hominum producit corpora tellus:
> Ille manu raptum trepida torquebat in hostem. Æn. xii. 899.

Thus human strength, which in Homer's time was lessened to half, in Virgil's time was lessened to a twelfth. If strength and bulk (as commonly happens) be proportioned, what pigmies in stature must the men of Virgil's time have been, when their strength, as he informs us, was so far diminished? A man only eight times as strong, (and not, according to the poet, twelve times,) must, at least, have been between five and six feet higher than they were.

But we all know the privilege claimed by poets and painters.

It is in virtue of this privilege that Horace, when he mentions the moral degeneracies of his contemporaries, asserts, that "their fathers were worse than their grandfathers; that they were worse than their fathers; and that their children would be worse than they were;" describing no fewer, after the grandfather, than three successions of degeneracy.

> Ætas parentum, pejor avis, tulit
> Nos nequiores, mox daturos
> Progeniem vitiosiorem. Od. l. iii. 6.

We need only ask, were this a fact, what would the Romans have been, had they degenerated in this proportion for five or six generations more?

Yet Juvenal, subsequent to all this, supposes a similar progression; a progression in vice and infamy, which was not complete till his own times.

Then truly, we learn, it could go no further.

> Nil erit ulterius, nostris quod moribus addat
> Posteritas, &c.
> Omne in præcipiti vitium stetit, &c. Sat. i. 147, &c.

But even Juvenal, it seems, was mistaken, bad as we must allow his times to have been. Several centuries after, without regard to Juvenal, the same doctrine was inculcated with greater zeal than ever.

When the western empire began to decline, and Europe and Africa were ravaged by barbarians, the calamities then happening (and formidable they were) naturally led men, who felt them, to esteem their own age the worst.

The enemies of Christianity (for Paganism was not then extinct) absurdly turned these calamities to the discredit of the Christian religion, and said the times were so unhappy, because the gods were dishonoured, and the ancient worship neglected. Orosius, a Christian, did not deny the melancholy facts, but, to obviate an objection so dishonourable to the true religion, he endeavours to prove from historians, both sacred and profane, that calamities of every sort had existed in every age, as many and as great as those that existed then.

If Orosius has reasoned right, (and his work is an elaborate one,) it follows that the lamentations made then, and made ever since, are no more than natural declamations incidental to man; declamations naturally arising, let him live at any period, from the superior efficacy of present events upon present sensations.

There is a praise belonging to the past congenial with this censure; a praise formed from negatives, and best illustrated by examples.

Thus a declaimer might assert, (supposing he had a wish, by exalting the eleventh century, to debase the present,) that

"in the time of the Norman conqueror we had no routs, no ridottos, no Newmarkets, no candidates to bribe, no voters to be bribed," &c. and string on negatives as long as he thought proper.

What, then, are we to do, when we hear such panegyric? Are we to deny the facts?—That cannot be. Are we to admit the conclusion?—That appears not quite agreeable. No method is left but to compare evils with evils, the evils of 1066 with those of 1780, and see whether the former age had not evils of its own, such as the present never experienced, because they do not now exist.

We may allow the evils of the present day to be real; we may even allow, that a much larger number might have been added; but then we may allege evils, by way of return, felt in those days severely, but now not felt at all.

"We may assert, we have not now, as happened then, seen our country conquered by foreign invaders; nor our property taken from us, and distributed among the conquerors; nor ourselves, from freemen, debased into slaves; nor our rights submitted to unknown laws, imported, without our consent, from foreign countries."

Should the same reasonings be urged in favour of times nearly as remote, and other imputations of evil be brought, which, though well known now, did not then exist; we may still retort, that "we are no longer now, as they were then, subject to feudal oppression; nor dragged to war, as they were then, by the petty tyrant of a neighbouring castle; nor involved in scenes of blood, as they were then, and that for many years, during the uninteresting disputes between a Stephen and a Maud."

Should the same declaimer pass to a later period, and praise after the same manner the reign of Henry the Second, we have then to retort, "that we have now no Beckets." Should he proceed to Richard the First, "that we have now no holy wars;" to John Lackland and his son Henry, "that we have now no barons' wars;" and with regard to both of them, "that, though we enjoy at this instant all the benefits of Magna Charta, we have not been compelled to purchase them at the price of our blood."

A series of convulsions brings us, in a few years more, to the wars between the houses of York and Lancaster; thence, from the fall of the Lancaster family, to the calamities of the York family, and its final destruction in Richard the Third; thence to the oppressive period of his avaricious successor; and from him to the formidable reign of his relentless son, when neither the coronet, nor the mitre, nor even the crown, could protect their wearers; and when (to the amazement of posterity) those by whom church authority was denied, and those by whom it was

maintained, were dragged together to Smithfield, and burnt at one and the same stake.[n]

The reign of his successor was short and turbid, and soon followed by the gloomy one of a bigoted woman.

We stop here, thinking we have instances enough. Those who hear any portion of these past times praised for the invidious purpose above mentioned, may answer by thus retorting the calamities and crimes which existed at the time praised, but which now exist no more. A true estimate can never be formed, but in consequence of such a comparison; for if we drop the laudable, and allege only the bad, or drop the bad, and allege only the laudable, there is no age, whatever its real character, but may be made to pass at pleasure, either for a good one, or a bad one.

If I may be permitted in this place to add an observation, it shall be an observation founded upon many years experience. I have often heard declamations against the present race of men; declamations against them, as if they were the worst of animals; treacherous, false, selfish, envious, oppressive, tyrannical, &c. This (I say) I have often heard from grave declaimers, and have heard the sentiment delivered with a kind of oracular pomp. Yet I never heard any such declaimer say, (what would have been sincere, at least, if it had been nothing more,) "I prove my assertion by an example where I cannot err; I assert myself to be the wretch I have been just describing."

So far from this, it would be perhaps dangerous to ask him, even in a gentle whisper, "You have been talking, with much confidence, about certain profligate beings. Are you certain, that you yourself are not one of the number?"

I hope I may be pardoned for the following anecdote, although compelled in relating it to make myself a party.

"Sitting once in my library with a friend, a worthy but melancholy man, I read him out of a book the following passage.

"'In our time it may be spoken more truly than of old, that virtue is gone; the church is under foot; the clergy is in error; the devil reigneth,' &c. My friend interrupted me with a sigh, and said, 'Alas! how true! How just a picture of the times!' I asked him, 'Of what times?' 'Of what times?' replied he, with emotion; 'Can you suppose any other but the present? Were any before ever so bad, so corrupt, so,' &c.? 'Forgive me,' said I, 'for stopping you: the times I am reading of are older than you imagine; the sentiment was delivered above four hundred years ago; its author sir John Mandeville, who died in 1371.'"[o]

[n] Some of these unfortunate men denied the king's supremacy, and others, the real presence. See the histories of that reign.

[o] See this writer's own preface, p. 10, in the large octavo English edition of his Travels, published at London, in 1727. See also of these Philological Inquiries, p. 523.

As man is by nature a social animal, good humour seems an ingredient highly necessary to his character. It is the salt which gives a seasoning to the feast of life; and which, if it be wanting, surely renders the feast incomplete. Many causes contribute to impair this amiable quality, and nothing perhaps more than bad opinions of mankind. Bad opinions of mankind naturally lead us to misanthropy. If these bad opinions go further, and are applied to the universe, then they lead to something worse, for they lead to atheism. The melancholy and morose character being thus insensibly formed, morals and piety sink of course; for what equals have we to love, or what superior have we to revere, when we have no other objects left than those of hatred or of terror?[p]

It should seem then expedient, if we value our better principles, nay, if we value our own happiness, to withstand such dreary sentiments. It was the advice of a wise man, "Say not thou, What is the cause that the former days were better than these? for thou dost not inquire wisely concerning this."[q]

Things present make impressions amazingly superior to things remote; so that, in objects of every kind, we are easily mistaken as to their comparative magnitude. Upon the canvas of the same picture, a near sparrow occupies the space of a distant eagle; a near mole hill, that of a distant mountain. In the perpetration of crimes, there are few persons, I believe, who would not be more shocked at actually seeing a single man assassinated (even taking away the idea of personal danger) than they would be shocked in reading the massacre of Paris.

The wise man, just quoted, wishes to save us from these errors. He has already informed us, "The thing that hath been, is that which shall be; and there is no new thing under the sun. Is there any thing whereof it may be said, See, this is new? it hath been already of old time, which was before us." He then subjoins the cause of this apparent novelty: things past, when they return, appear new, if they are forgotten; and things present will appear so, should they too be forgotten, when they return.[r]

This forgetfulness of what is similar in events which return,

[p] Misanthropy is so dangerous a thing, and goes so far in sapping the very foundations of morality and religion, that I esteem the last part of Swift's Gulliver (that I mean relative to his Houyhnhnms and Yahoos) to be a worse book to peruse, than those which we forbid as the most flagitious and obscene.

One absurdity in this author (a wretched philosopher, though a great wit) is well worth remarking: in order to render the nature of man odious, and the nature of beasts amiable, he is compelled to give human characters to his beasts, and beastly characters to his men; so that we are to admire the beasts, not for being beasts, but amiable men; and to detest the men, not for being men, but detestable beasts.

Whoever has been reading this unnatural filth, let him turn for a moment to a Spectator of Addison, and observe the philanthropy of that classical writer; I may add the superior purity of his diction and his wit.

[q] Ecclesiastes vii. 10.

[r] See of the same Ecclesiastes, chap. i. 9. and ii. 16.

(for in every returning event such similarity exists,) is the forgetfulness of a mind uninstructed and weak; a mind ignorant of that great, that providential circulation, which never ceases for a moment through every part of the universe.

It is not like that forgetfulness which I once remember in a man of letters, who, when at the conclusion of a long life, he found his memory began to fail, said cheerfully, "Now I shall have a pleasure I could not have before; that of reading my old books, and finding them all new."

There was in this consolation something philosophical and pleasing. And yet perhaps it is a higher philosophy (could we attain it) not to forget the past; but in contemplation of the past to view the future, so that we may say on the worst prospects, with a becoming resignation, what Æneas said of old to the Cumean prophetess,

> Virgin, no scenes of ill
> To me or new, or unexpected rise;
> I've seen 'em all; have seen, and long before
> Within myself revolv'd 'em in my mind.*

In such a conduct, if well founded, there is not only fortitude, but piety: fortitude, which never sinks, from a conscious integrity; and piety, which never resists, by referring all to the Divine will.

But lest such speculation, by carrying me above my subject, should expose a writer upon criticism to be himself criticised, I shall here conclude these Philological Inquiries.

* Æn. vi. 103—105.

APPENDIX.

PART I.

AN ACCOUNT OF THE ARABIC MANUSCRIPTS BELONGING TO THE ESCURIAL LIBRARY IN SPAIN.

This account is extracted from two fair folio volumes, to the first of which volumes the title is conceived in the following words.

"Bibliothecæ Arabico-Hispanæ Escuraliensis, sive Librorum omnium MSS. quos Arabice ab auctoribus magnam partem Arabo-Hispanis compositos Bibliotheca Cænobii Escuraliensis complectitur, Recensio et Explanatio: Opera et Studio Michaelis Casiri, Syro-Maronitæ, Presbyteri, S. Theologiæ Doctoris, Regis a Bibliotheca, Linguarumque Orientalium Interpretatione; Caroli III. Regis Opt. Max. auctoritate atque auspiciis edita. Tomus Prior. Matriti. Antonius Perez de Soto imprimebat Anno MDCCLX."

This catalogue is particularly valuable, because not only each manuscript is enumerated, but its age also and author (when known) are given, together with large extracts upon occasion, both in the original Arabic and in Latin.

From the first volume it appears that the Arabians cultivated every species of philosophy and philology, as also (according to their systems) jurisprudence and theology.

They were peculiarly fond of poetry, and paid great honours to those whom they esteemed good poets. Their earliest writers were of this sort, some of whom (and those much admired) flourished many centuries before the time of Mahomet.

The study of their poets led them to the art of criticism, whence we find in the above catalogue, not only a multitude of poems, but many works upon composition, metre, &c.

We find in the same catalogue, translations of Aristotle and Plato, together with their lives; as also translations of their best Greek commentators, such as Alexander Aphrodisiensis, Philoponus, and others. We find also comments of their own, and original pieces, formed on the principles of the above philosophers.

There too may be found translations of Euclid, Archimedes, Apollonius Pergæus, and the other ancient mathematicians, together with their Greek commentators, and many original pieces of their own upon the same mathematical subjects. In the

arithmetical part they are said to follow Diophantus, from whom they learned that algebra of which they are erroneously thought to have been the inventors.

There we may find also the works of Ptolemy translated, and many original treatises of their own upon the subject of astronomy.

It appears, too, that they studied with care the important subject of agriculture. One large work in particular is mentioned, composed by a Spanish Arabian, where every mode of culture, and every species of vegetable is treated; pasture, arable, trees, shrubs, flowers, &c. By this work may be perceived (as the editor well observes) how much better Spain was cultivated in those times, and that some species of vegetables were then found there which are now lost.

Here are many tracts on the various parts of jurisprudence; some ancient copies of the Alcoran; innumerable commentaries on it; together with books of prayer, books of devotion, sermons, &c.

Among their theological works, there are some upon the principles of the mystic divinity; and among their philosophical, some upon the subject of talismans, divination, and judicial astrology.

The first volume, of which we have been speaking, is elegantly printed, and has a learned preface prefixed by the editor, wherein he relates what he has done, together with the assistance he has received, as well from the crown of Spain and its ministers, as from learned men.

He mentions a fatal fire, which happened at the Escurial, in the year 1670; when above three thousand of these valuable manuscripts were destroyed. He has in this volume given an account of about fourteen hundred.

The second volume of this valuable work, which bears the same title with the first, was published at Madrid, ten years after it, in the year 1770.

It contains chiefly the Arabian chronologers, travellers, and historians; and, though national partiality may be sometimes suspected, yet, as these are accounts given us by the Spanish Arabians themselves, there are many incidents preserved, which other writers could not know; incidents respecting not only the successions and the characters of the Arabic-Spanish princes, but the country and its productions, together with the manners and the literature of its then inhabitants.

Nor are the incidents in these volumes confined to Spain only, many of them relate to other countries; such as the growth of sugar in Egypt; the invention of paper there, (of which material there are manuscripts in the Escurial library of the year 1180;) the use of gunpowder, carried not only to the beginning of the fourteenth century, but even so far back (if we can believe it)

as to the seventh century; the description of Mecca; the antiquity of the Arabic language, and the practice of their most ancient authors to write in verse; their year, months, weeks, and methods of computation; their love for poetry and rhetoric, &c.

Great heroes are recorded to have flourished among them, such as Abdelrahmanus, and Abi Amer Almoapheri.

Abdelrahmanus lived in the beginning of the tenth century, and Abi Amer Almoapheri at its latter end. The first, having subdued innumerable factions and seditions, reigned at Corduba with reputation for fifty years, famed for his love of letters, and his upright administration of justice. The second, undertaking the tuition of a young prince, (who was a minor, named Hescham,) and having restored peace to a turbid kingdom, turned his arms so successfully against its numerous invaders, that he acquired the honourable name of Almanzor, that is, the Defender. (See vol. ii. of this Catalogue, pages 37, 49, 50.)

Arabian Spain had too its men of letters, and those in great numbers; some whose fame was so extensive, that even Christians came to hear them from remote regions of Europe. But this has been already mentioned, p. 488 of these Inquiries.

Public libraries (not less than seventy) were established through the country; and noble benefactions they were to the cause of letters, at a time when books, by being manuscripts, were so costly an article, that few scholars were equal to the expense of a collection.

To the subjects already treated, were added the lives of their famous women; that is, of women who had been famous for their literature and genius.

It is somewhat strange, when we read these accounts, to hear it asserted, that the religion of these people was hostile to literature; and this assertion founded on no better reason, than that the Turks, their successors, by being barbarous and ignorant, had little value for accomplishments of which they knew nothing.

These Spanish Arabians, also, like their ancestors in the East, were great horsemen, and particularly fond of horses. Accounts are preserved both of horses and camels; also of their coin; of the two races of caliphs, the Ommiadæ and the Abbassadæ; of the first Arabic conqueror of Spain, and the conditions of toleration granted to the Christians whom he had conquered.

It further appears from these Arabic works, that not only sugar, but silk was known and cultivated in Spain. We read a beautiful description of Grenada and its environs; as also epitaphs of different kinds; some of them approaching to Attic elegance.

When that pleasing liquor coffee was first introduced among them, a scruple arose among the devout (perhaps from feeling

its exhilarating quality) whether it was not forbidden by the Alcoran, under the article of *wine*. A council of Mahometan divines was held upon the occasion, and the council luckily decreed for the legality of its use. (See vol. ii. of this Catalogue, p, 172, 173.)

The concessions made by the Arabian conquerors of Spain to the Gothic prince whom he subdued, is a striking picture of his lenity and toleration. He neither deposed the Gothic prince, nor plundered his people, but, on payment of a moderate tribute, stipulated not to deprive them either of their lives or property; and gave them also their churches, and a toleration for their religion. See this curious treaty, which was made about the year 712 of the Christian era, in the second volume of this Catalogue, p. 106.

When the posterity of these conquerors came in their turn to be conquered, (an event which happened many centuries afterward,) they did not experience that indulgence which had been granted by their forefathers.

The conquered Moors (as they were then called) were expelled by thousands; or, if they ventured to stay, were exposed to the carnage of a merciless inquisition:

> Pueri, innuptæque puellæ,
> Impositique rogis juvenes ante ora parentum.

It appears that many of these Arabic-Spanish princes were men of amiable manners, and great encouragers both of arts and letters, while others, on the contrary, were tyrannic, cruel, and sanguinary.

There were usually many kingdoms existing at the same time, and these on every occasion embroiled one with another; not to mention much internal sedition in each particular state.

Like their Eastern ancestors, they appear not to have shared the smallest sentiment of civil liberty; the difference as to good and bad government seeming to have been wholly derived, according to them, from the worth or pravity of the prince who governed. See p. 495 of these Inquiries.

The reader will observe, that the pages referring to facts, in the two historical volumes of these manuscripts, are but seldom given, because whoever possesses those volumes (and without them any reference would be useless) may easily find every fact, by referring to the copious and useful index subjoined to the second volume, which index goes to the whole work.

PART II.

CONCERNING THE MANUSCRIPTS OF LIVY, IN THE ESCURIAL LIBRARY.

It having been often asserted, that an entire and complete copy of Livy was extant in the Escurial library, I requested my son, in the year 1771, (he being at that time minister plenipotentiary to the court of Madrid,) to inquire for me, what manuscripts of that author were there to be found.

He procured me the following accurate detail from a learned ecclesiastic, Don Juan de Pellegeros, canon of Lerma, employed by Monsr. De Santander, his catholic majesty's librarian, to inspect for this purpose the manuscripts of that valuable library.

The detail was in Spanish, of which the following is a translation.

Among the MSS. of the Escurial library are the following works of T. Livy.

1. Three large volumes, which contain so many decads, the first, third, and fourth, (one decad in each volume,) curiously written on parchment, or fine vellum, by Pedro de Middleburgh, or of Zeeland, (as he styles himself.)

The books are truly magnificent, and in the title and initials curiously illuminated. They bear the arms of the house of Borgia, with a cardinal's cap, whence it appears that they belonged either to pope Callixtus the Third, or to Alexander the Sixth, when cardinals.

2. Two other volumes, written by the same hand, one of the first decad, the other of the third; of the same size and beauty as the former. Both have the same arms; and in the last is a note, which recites, "This book belongs to D. Juan de Fonseca, bishop of Burgos."

3. Another volume of the same size, and something more ancient than the former, (being of the beginning of the fifteenth century,) containing the third decad entire. This is also well written on parchment, though not so valuable as the former.

4. Another of the first decad, finely written on vellum. At the end is written as follows: "Ex centum voluminibus, quæ ego indies vitæ meæ magnis laboribus hactenus scripsisse memini, hos duos Titi Livii libros Anno Dni. 1441, ego Joannes Andreas de Colonia feliciter, gratia Dei, absolvi;" and at the end of each book, "Emendavi Nicomachus Fabianus."

In the last leaf of this book is a fragment either of Livy himself, or of some pen capable of imitating him. It fills the whole leaf; and the writer says, it was in the copy from which he

transcribed. It appears to be a fragment of the latter times of the second Punic war.

5. Another large volume, in parchment, well written, of the same century, viz. the fifteenth, containing three decads. 1. De Urbis initu. 2. De Bello Punico. 3. De Bello Macedonico. In this last decad is wanting a part of the book. This volume is much esteemed, being full of notes and various readings, in the hand of Hieronimo Zunita, its former possessor.

6. Another very valuable volume, containing the first decad, equal to the former in the elegance of its writing and ornaments. This also belonged to Hieronimo Zunita; the age the same.

7. Lastly, there is another of the first decad also, written on paper, at the beginning of the fifteenth century. This contains nothing remarkable.

In all, there are ten volumes, and all nearly of the same age.

Here ends the account of the Escurial manuscripts, given us by this learned Spaniard; in which manuscripts we see there appears no part of Livy but what was printed in the early editions.

The other parts of this author, which parts none of the manuscripts here recited give us, were discovered and printed afterwards.

As to the fragment mentioned in the fourth article, (all of which fragment is there transcribed,) it has, though genuine, no peculiar rarity, as it is to be found in all the latter printed editions. See particularly in Crevier's edition of Livy, Paris, 1736, tome ii. pages 716, 717, 718, beginning with the words *Raro simul hominibus*, and ending with the words *increpatis risum esse*, which is the whole extent of the fragment here exhibited.

From this detail it is evident that no entire copy of Livy is extant in the Escurial library.

PART III.

GREEK MANUSCRIPTS OF CEBES, IN THE LIBRARY OF THE KING OF FRANCE.

The picture of Cebes, one of the most elegant moral allegories of Grecian antiquity, is so far connected with the middle age, that the ingenious Arabians of that time thought it worth translating into Arabic.

It was also translated from Greek into Latin by Ludovicus Odaxius, a learned Italian, soon after Greek literature revived there, and was published in the year 1497.

After this it was often printed, sometimes in Greek alone, sometimes accompanied with more modern Latin versions. But

the misfortune was, that the Greek manuscripts, from which the editors printed, (that of Odaxius alone excepted,) were all of them defective in their end or conclusion. And hence it followed that this work for many years was published, edition after edition, in this defective manner.

Had its end been lost, we might have lamented it, as we lament other losses of the same kind. But in the present case, to the shame of editors, we have the end preserved, and that not only in the Arabic paraphrase, and the old Latin translation of Odaxius, but, what is more, even in the original text, as it stands in two excellent manuscripts of the king of France's library.

From these MSS. it was published in a neat 12mo. edition of Cebes, by James Gronovius, in the year 1689; and after him by the diligent and accurate Fabricius, in his Bibliotheca Græca, vol. i. p. 834, 835; and, after Fabricius, in a small octavo edition, by Thomas Johnson, A. M. printed at London, in the year 1720.

Whoever reads the conclusion of this treatise will find sufficient internal evidence to convince him of its authenticity, both from the purity of the language, and the truth, as well as connection of the sentiment.

However, the manuscript authority resting on nothing better than the perplexed account of that most obscure and affected writer, James Gronovius, I procured a search to be made in the royal library at Paris, if such manuscripts were there to be found.

Upon inspection of no less than four manuscripts of Cebes, preserved in that valuable library, numbers 858, 2992, 1001, 1774, it appeared, that in the second and in the third, the end of Cebes was perfect and entire, after the manner in which it stands in the printed editions above mentioned.

The end of this short essay is to prove, that the genuineness of the conclusion thus restored does not rest merely on such authority as that of James Gronovius, (for Fabricius and Johnson only follow him,) but on the authority of the best manuscripts, actually inspected for the purpose.

PART IV.

SOME ACCOUNT OF LITERATURE IN RUSSIA, AND OF ITS PROGRESS TOWARDS BEING CIVILIZED.

The vast empire of Russia extending far into the north, both in Europe and Asia, it is no wonder that, in such a country, its in-

habitants should have remained so long uncivilized. For culture of the finer arts it is necessary there should be comfortable leisure. But how could such leisure be found in a country where every one had enough to do to support his family, and to resist the rigour of an uncomfortable climate? Besides this, to make the finer arts flourish, there must be imagination; and imagination must be enlivened by the contemplation of pleasing objects; and that contemplation must be performed in a manner easy to the contemplator. Now, who can contemplate with ease, where the thermometer is often many degrees below the freezing point? Or what object can he find worth contemplating for those many long months, when all the water is ice, and all the land covered with snow?

If then the difficulties were so great, how great must have been the praise of those princes and legislators, who dared attempt to polish mankind in so unpromising a region, and who have been able, by their perseverance, in some degree to accomplish it?

Those who on this occasion bestow the highest praises upon Peter the Great, praise him, without doubt, as he justly deserves. But if they would refer the beginning of this work to him, and much more its completion, they are certainly under a mistake.

As long ago as the time of our Edward the Sixth, Ivan Basilowitz adopted principles of commerce, and granted peculiar privileges to the English, on their discovery of a navigation to Archangel.

A sad scene of sanguinary confusion followed from this period to the year 1612, when a deliverer arose, prince Pajanky. He, by unparalleled fortitude, having routed all the tyrants and impostors of the time, was by the bojars, or magnates, unanimously elected czar. But this honour he, with a most disinterested magnanimity, declined for himself, and pointed out to them Michael Fædorowitz, of the house of Romanoff, and by his mother's side descended from the ancient czars.

From this period we may date the first appearances of a real civilizing, and a development of the wealth and power of the the Russian empire. Michael reigned thirty-three years. By his wisdom, and the mildness of his character, he restored ease and tranquillity to subjects who had been long deprived of those inestimable blessings; he encouraged them to industry, and gave them an example of the most laudable behaviour.

His son Alexius Michaelowitz was superior to his father in the art of governing and sound politics. He promoted agriculture; introduced into his empire arts and sciences, of which he was himself a lover; published a code of laws, still used in the administration of justice; and greatly improved his army, by mending its discipline. This he effected chiefly by the help of

strangers, most of whom were Scotch. Lesley, Gordon, and Ker, are the names of families still existing in this country.

Theodore, or Fædor, succeeded his father in 1677. He was of a gentle disposition, and weak constitution; fond of pomp and magnificence, and in satisfying this passion contributed to polish his subjects by the introduction of foreign manufactures and articles of elegance, which they soon began to adopt and imitate. His delight was in horses, and he did his country a real service in the beginning and establishing of those fine breeds of them in the Ukraine and elsewhere. He reigned seven years; and having on his death-bed called his bojars round him, in the presence of his brother and sister, Ivan and Sophia, and of his half-brother Peter, said to them, "Hear my last sentiments; they are dictated by my love for the state, and by my affection for my people: the bodily infirmities of Ivan necessarily must affect his mental faculties; he is incapable of ruling a dominion like that of Russia; he cannot take it amiss, if I recommend to you to set him aside, and to let your approbation fall on Peter, who to a robust constitution joins great strength of mind, and marks of a superior understanding."

Theodore dying in 1682, Peter became emperor, and his brother Ivan remained contented. But Sophia, Ivan's sister, a woman of great ambition, could not bring herself to submit.

The troubles which ensued; the imminent dangers which Peter escaped; his abolition of that turbulent and seditious soldiery, called the Strelitz; the confinement of his half-sister Sophia to a monastery; all these were important events, which left Peter in the year 1689 with no other competitor than the mild and easy Ivan; who dying not many years after, left him sole monarch of all the Russias.

The acts at home and abroad, in peace and in war, of this stupendous and elevated genius, are too well known to be repeated by me. Peter adorned his country with arts, and raised its glory by arms: he created a respectable marine; founded St. Petersburgh, a new capital, and that from the very ground; rendering it withal one of the first cities in Europe for beauty and elegance.

To encourage letters, he formed academies, and invited foreign professors not only to Petersburgh (his new city) but to his ancient capital Moscow; at both which places these professors were maintained with liberal pensions.

As a few specimens of literature from both these cities have recently come to my hand, I shall endeavour to enumerate them, as I think it relative to my subject.

1. Plutarchus *περὶ Δυσωπίας, καὶ περὶ Τύχης*—Gr. Lat. cum animadversionibus Reiskii et alior: suas adjecit Christianus Fridericus Matthæi. Typis Universitatis Mosquensis, an. 1777. 8vo.

2. Plutarchi libellus de Superstitione, et Demosthenis Oratio funebris, Gr. Lat. cum notis integris Reiskii et alior.—suas adjecit Christ. Frider. Matthæi. Typis Cæsareæ Mosquensis Universitatis, an. 1778. 8vo.

3. Lectiones Mosquenses, in two volumes, 8vo. bound together, and printed at Leipsic, an. 1779: they contain various readings in different authors, and some entire pieces, all in Greek, collected from the libraries of Moscow, and published by the same learned editor.

4. Isocratis, Demetrii Cyd. et Michael Glycæ aliquot Epistolæ, nec non Dion. Chrysostomi Oratio—Græc. Typis Universitatis Cæsareæ Mosquensis. 8vo. By the same learned editor.

5. Glossaria Græca minora, et alia Anecdota Græca: a work consisting of two parts, contained under one volume, in a thin quarto, by the same able professor, printed at Moscow by the university types, in the years 1774, 1775. A catalogue of the several pieces in both parts is subjoined to the end of the second part. Among the pieces in the first part are, Excerpta ex Grammaticâ Niceph. Gregoræ; ex Glossario Cyrilli Alexandrini; Glossarium in Epistolas Pauli; Nomina Mensium: those of the second part are chiefly theological.

6. Notitia Codicum Manuscriptorum Græcorum Bibliothecarum Mosquensium, cum variis Anecdotis, Tabulis Æneis, Indicibus locupletissimis: edidit Christ. Fridericus Matthæi. Mosquæ, Typis Universitatis, an. 1776.

This publication, on a large folio paper, is as yet incomplete, only sixty pages being printed off. It ends, Partis primæ Sectionis primæ Finis.

7. An Ode to the present empress, Catharine, in ancient Greek and Russian.

8. An Ode on the birth-day of Constantine, second son to the grand duke, in ancient Greek and Russian: printed at Petersburgh; and, as we learn from the title, ἐν τῇ Αὐτοκρατορικῇ Ἀκαδημίᾳ τῶν Ἐπιστημῶν, "in the Imperial Academy of Sciences."

9. An Ode to prince Potemkin, ancient Greek and Russian, and printed (as before) an. 1780.

10. An Ode, consisting of Strophe, Antistrophe, and Epode, ancient Greek and Russian, made in 1779, in honour of the empress, the great duke and duchess, and Alexander and Constantine, their two sons, grandsons to the empress.

This Ode was sung in the original Greek by a large number of voices, before a numerous and splendid court in one of the imperial palaces.

As I have a copy of this music, I cannot omit observing, that it is a genuine exemplar of the ancient Antiphona, so well known to the church in very remote ages. On this plan, two complete choirs (each consisting of trebles, counters, tenors, and bases)

sing against each other, and reciprocally answer; then unite all of them; then separate again, returning to the alternate response, till the whole at length concludes in one general chorus. The music of this ode may be called purely vocal, having no other accompaniment but that of an organ.

The composer was no less a man than the celebrated Paesiello, so well known at present, and so much admired, both in Italy and elsewhere, for music of a very different character, I mean his truly natural and pleasing burlettas.

Those who are curious to know more of this species of music, may consult the valuable Glossary of Spelman, under the word *Antiphona*, and the ingenious Musical Dictionary of Rousseau, under the word *Antienne*.

11. A short copy of Greek elegiac verses, printed at Petersburg, in the year 1780, and addressed to prince Potemkin, with this singular title, *Ἐπίγραμμα ἐπὶ τῆς παμφαοῦς καὶ χαρμοσύνου γοργειοφορίας, τῆς κοινοτέρως μασκάραδος καλουμένης, ἣν, κ. τ. λ.* Thus Englished: "A poem on the splendid and delightful festivity, where they wear Gorgonian visors; more commonly called a masquerade; which prince Potemkin celebrated," &c.

A better word to denote a masquerade could hardly have been invented than the word here employed, *γοργειοφόρια*. In attempting to translate it, that I might express one word, I have been compelled to use many.

12. A translation of Virgil's Georgics from the Latin Hexameters into Greek Hexameters, by the celebrated Eugenius, famous for his treatise of Logic, published a few years since in ancient Greek at Leipsic. He was made an archbishop, but chose to resign his dignity. He is now carrying on this translation under the protection of prince Potemkin, but has as yet gone no further than to the end of the first Georgic.

The work is printed on a large folio paper, having the original on one side, and the translation on the other. Copious notes in Greek are at the bottom of the several pages.

Take a short specimen of the performance.

> Continuo, ventis surgentibus, aut freta ponti
> Incipiunt agitata tumescere, et aridus altis
> Montibus audiri fragor; aut resonantia longe
> Littora misceri, et nemorum increbrescere murmur.
>
> Geor. i. 356.

> *Αὐτίκα, ἐγρομένων ἀνέμων, πορθμοῖς ἐπὶ πόντου*
> *Ἅλς τε σαλευομένη οἰδαίνει, καὶ κορυφαὶ δὲ*
> *Οὔρεος ἄκραι τραχὺ βοᾶσιν· ἀτὰρ μακρόθεν γε*
> *Ἀκταὶ τ' εἰνάλιοι βὰ βρέμονται, κ' αἰγιαλοί τε·*
> *Ἐμερδαλέον πνοιῆσι δὲ μυκάετ' αἶα καὶ ὕλη.*

Of these various printed works, the first six were sent me by the learned scholar above mentioned, Christianus Fridericus

Matthæi, from Moscow; the last six I had the honour to receive from prince Potemkin at Petersburgh.

Besides the printed books, the learned professor at Moscow sent me a curious Latin narrative in manuscript.

In it he gives an account of a fine manuscript of Strabo, belonging to the Ecclesiastical library at Moscow. He informs me, this MS. is in folio; contains four hundred and twenty-seven leaves; is beautifully written by one, whom he calls a learned and diligent scribe, at the end of the fifteenth or beginning of the sixteenth century; and came, as appears by a memorandum in the manuscript, from the celebrated Greek monastery at Mount Athos.

He adds, (which is worth attention,) that almost all the Greek manuscripts which are now preserved at Moscow were originally brought thither from this monastery; and that, in the last century, by order of the emperor Alexius Michaelowitz and the patriarch Nico, by means of the monk Arsenius. So early in this country did a gleam of literature shew itself.

He strongly denies the fact, that there is any other MS. of Strabo besides this, either at Moscow or at Petersburgh.

Of the present MS. he has been so kind as to send me collations, taken from the first and second book.

After this he mentions the unpublished hymn of Homer upon Ceres, and the fragment of another by the same poet upon Bacchus; both of which, since I heard from him, have been published by Ruhnkenius at Leyden, to whom my correspondent had sent them from the Moscowan library.

He has been generous enough to send me copies of all the books he has published, for which valuable donation I take this public opportunity of making my grateful acknowledgments.

With regard to all the publications here mentioned, it is to be observed, that those from Petersburgh are said to be printed in the imperial academy of sciences; those from Moscow, by the types of the imperial university; each place by its style indicating its establishment.

In justice to my son, his majesty's minister to the court of Russia, it is incumbent upon me to say, that all this information, and all these literary treasures, have been procured for me by his help, and through his interest.

I must not conclude without observing, (though perhaps it may be a repetition,) that the efforts to civilize this country did not begin from Peter the Great, but were much older. A small glimmering, like the first day-break, was seen under czar Ivan, in the middle of the sixteenth century.

This dawn of civilizing became more conspicuous a century afterwards, under czar Alexius Michaelowitz; of whom, as well as of his son Theodore, or Fædor, we have spoken already.

But under the Great Peter it burst forth, with all the

splendour of a rising sun, and (if I may be permitted to continue my metaphor) has continued ever since to ascend towards its meridian.

More than fifty years have passed since the death of Peter; during which period, with very little exception, this vast empire has been governed by female sovereigns only. All of them have pursued more or less the plan of their great predecessor, and none of them more than the illustrious princess who now reigns.

And so much for literature in Russia, and for its progress towards being civilized.

ADVERTISEMENT.

It was proposed, as mentioned in p. 399 of this work, to have joined a few notes to the pieces contained in the preceding Appendix; but the work growing larger than was expected, the notes, as not being essentially parts of it, have been omitted.

One omission however we beg to supply, because it has happened through inadvertence. Besides the Arabic translations from the Greek, mentioned in the Appendix, part the first, there are also translations of Hippocrates, Galen, and the old Greek physicians, whom the Arabians, as they translated, illustrated with comments, and upon whose doctrines they formed many compositions of their own, having been remarkably famous for their study and knowledge of medicine.

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